TCRLA_Public/150619.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, June 19, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 120


                            Headlines



A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A

* ANTIGUA & BARBUDA: Hoteliers Blamed for Drop in Tourism


A R G E N T I N A

BUENOS AIRES CITY: Moody's Rates USD28.9MM Class 15 Notes 'Caa1'
ROMBO COMPANIA: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Series 29 Bonds


B E L I Z E

BELIZE: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Issuer Ratings


B O L I V I A

BANCO SOLIDARIO: Moody's Cuts Global Scale LC Dep. Ratings to Ba3
BOLIVIA: To Get $142.5MM IDB Loan for Disaster Risk Management


B R A Z I L

ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Moody's Assigns Ba2 GS Corp. Family Rating
CAIXA ECONOMICA: Moody's Affirms Ba3(hyb) FC Sub. Debt Rating
CEMIG GERACAO: Moody's Gives Ba1 Rating to BRL1-Bil. Debentures


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

COMBINE RE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 9
DAISY CONSULTING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 8
DALRYMPLE GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ENTERPRISE DATA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
FRONTIER MINING: Ct. Enters Order to Liquidate Firm

HELPSAUDE HOLDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 29
LEVEN LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MONTREUX PARTNERS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ROCK SHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SJK ABSOLUTE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 8


M E X I C O

GRUPO POSADAS: Fitch Affirms 'B' IDR & Revises Outlook to Stable


N I C A R A G U A

NICARAGUA: To Get $55MM IDB Loan to Improve Trade Competitiveness


P A N A M A

* PANAMA: Foreign Investment Surges 32.2%


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

SAN JUAN/LAVENTVILLE: Chair Pleas With Govt. for Workers' Backpay


S T.  L U C I A

* ST. LUCIA: We Can Fix Our Broken Economies, PM Says


                            - - - - -


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A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A
===============================


* ANTIGUA & BARBUDA: Hoteliers Blamed for Drop in Tourism
---------------------------------------------------------
The Daily Observer reports that Antigua & Barbuda Minister of
Tourism Asot Michael is blaming the 8 percent drop in air arrivals
for the first quarter of the year on local hoteliers.

Mr. Michael, who spoke on the Voice of the People said the decline
can be attributed to a failure by hoteliers to liaise with main
tour operators and the fact the some of the country's room stock
is simply unsellable, according to The Daily Observer.

"The drop in arrivals is directly attributed to about 35 percent
of our room stock that is just not sellable, or should I say
underperforming," Mr. Michael said, the report notes.

"Look at properties like the Royal Antigua Hotel.  They have
absolutely none, or very little relationship with any of the main
tour operators to sell their inventory," Mr. Michael said, the
report relates.

Antigua & Barbuda recorded the third highest decline in the
region, behind Bermuda and Montserrat, the report notes.  During
the same period, 16 of the 22 states within the Caribbean Tourism
Organization saw increased arrivals, the report relays.

The opposition has argued the drop came as a result of Mr.
Michael's decision, upon taking office little over a year ago, to
scrap a web marketing plan and other initiatives put in place by
former Tourism Minister John Maginley, the report discloses.

The tourism minister cast blame on the operators of the Jolly
Beach Hotel, Rex Halcyon and Hawksbill for failing to re-invest in
their properties, the report relays.

"We gotta make sure we re-invest into our hotels, so that they're
sellable.  These hotels are not five star hotels, they're not
four-star, but they're very important to our overall tourism
product, because these are the hotels that fill the back of the
planes.  These are the hotels that bring the three-star visitors
to your country and you need these hotels," Mr. Maginley added.


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


BUENOS AIRES CITY: Moody's Rates USD28.9MM Class 15 Notes 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned Caa1 -- Global Scale local currency debt rating -- and
Baa1.ar rating -- on Argentina National Scale in local currency --
to Class 15 Notes for up to USD28.9 million, to be issued by the
City of Buenos Aires under its Local Financing Program.  The
ratings are in line with the City's long term local currency
ratings, which carry negative outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The creation of the Local Financing Program was authorized by Laws
4315,4431 and 4472 of 2012, Laws 4810 and 4885 of 2013 and by Law
4949 of 2014.  Class 15 to be issued under the program, will
constitute direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated
obligation of the city, ranking at all times pari passu without
any preference among other debts.  The bond will be issued and
payable in Argentine Pesos for an equivalent amount of USD28.9
million and sold in the local capital market.  It will pay
interest on a quarterly basis and amortize in five semiannual and
equal installments starting one year after the issuance date with
final maturity of 3 years.  The assigned ratings are in line with
the city's Caa1 (global scale) and Baa1.ar (Argentina's national
scale) local currency debt ratings.

According to the term sheet reviewed by Moody's, the expected
amount under Class 15 will represent approximately 0.3% of the
City's total revenues budgeted for 2015.  Given the relatively
small amount under this Class 15 and the expected increase in the
City of Buenos Aires' total revenues for the current fiscal year,
Moody's does not anticipate a relevant increase in the ratio of
total debt divided by total revenues for the end of 2015 --
currently at 28%--.

The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date.  Moody's
does not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this
period or anticipates changes in the main conditions that the
notes will carry.  Should issuance conditions and/or final
documentation of any of the series under this program deviate from
the original ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency,
Moody's will assess the impact that these differences may have on
the ratings and act accordingly.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook on the City, Moody's does not expect
upward pressures in the ratings assigned in the near to medium
term.  A downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings and/or further
systemic deterioration or idiosyncratic risks arising in this City
   -- especially a sharp increase in the debt to revenues ratio--
could continue to exert downward pressure on the ratings assigned
and could translate in to a downgrade in the near to medium term.


ROMBO COMPANIA: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Series 29 Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A.
assigned a B2 global local currency senior debt rating to Rombo
Compania Financiera S.A.'s Series 29 expected bond issuance for an
amount up to ARS150 million, which will be due in 24 months.  At
the same time, on the National Scale, Moody's assigned Aa2.ar
local currency debt rating to the expected issuance.

The outlook on all ratings is negative.

These ratings were assigned to Rombo Compan¡a Financiera S.A.:

ARS150 million senior unsecured debt issuance:
B2 Global Local Currency Debt Rating
Aa2.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Debt Rating

RATINGS RATIONALE

The local currency senior unsecured debt ratings are based on a
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) of caa1, which
receives two notches of uplift reflecting the assessment of a
moderate probability of support from the company's main parent,
RCI Banque International (Baa3, under review for upgrade), in case
of stress.  Rombo is 60% owned by RCI Banque International and 40%
by BBVA Banco Frances (unrated), and together with RCI Banque
International forms the principal financial arm of its ultimate
owner, Renault S.A. (Ba1, Positive) in Argentina.

The caa1 BCA assigned to Rombo is based on the company's monoline
business model, its predominantly wholesale funding structure, and
the increasing level of competition within the car-financing
industry in Argentina.  These risks are balanced in part by
satisfactory risk management practices that are aligned with those
of its parent companies, as well as its adequate capitalization.

The negative outlook on the company's ratings is in line with the
negative outlook for Argentina's Caa1 government bond rating.  The
outlook reflects Argentina's deteriorating operating environment,
including economic deceleration and high inflation, which is
negatively affecting the business and earnings prospects of
financial companies and banks in Argentina.  The company's ratings
could face downward pressure if the government's sovereign bond
rating is downgraded and/or asset quality and profitability weaken
as a result of the challenging operating environment.

Rombo Compania Financiera S.A. is headquartered in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, with assets of ARS2.13 billion and equity of ARS699.93
million as of March 2015.


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B E L I Z E
===========


BELIZE: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Issuer Ratings
-------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Belize's Caa2 issuer
ratings. The outlook remains stable.

The key drivers of the rating actions are the following:

(1) The expectation of ongoing economic recovery mitigates the
    negative trends in public finances, although downside risks to
    the fiscal outlook remain.

(2) The risk of losses to bondholders through 2017-18 remains
    considerable given fiscal challenges and a confluence of
    risks.

Belize's long-term local-currency country risk ceilings and the
foreign currency bond ceiling remain unchanged at B2. The foreign-
currency bank deposit ceilings is also unchanged at Caa3. The
short-term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings remain at NP
(Not Prime). These ceilings reflect a range of undiversifiable
risks to which issuers in any jurisdiction are exposed, including
economic, legal and political risks. These ceilings act as a cap
on ratings that can be assigned to the foreign and local-currency
obligations of entities domiciled in the country.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The principal driver of Moody's decision to affirm Belize's
sovereign rating is our expectation that the ongoing economic
recovery is likely to mitigate the negative trends in public
finances, although risks to the fiscal outlook remain mainly on
the downside. Real GDP growth accelerated to 3% in 2014 from 1.5%
in 2013. Moody's forecasts that economic activity will expand by
2.5% in 2015-16, underpinned by continuing strength in the tourism
sector and further recovery in agricultural output. Declining oil
output will continue to drag on economic performance.

Despite improving prospects for economic growth, public finances
weakened markedly in fiscal year 2014. Moody's estimates that the
fiscal deficit widened to just under 4% of GDP in fiscal year
2014, compared to the 1.7% deficit the budget targeted.

The worse-than-anticipated fiscal outcome mainly reflects higher
expenditures due to: (1) a wage agreement that increased the wage
bill and pension outlays, and (2) a strong rise in capital
spending to rehabilitate the infrastructure damaged by the rainy
season. Moody's forecasts that the fiscal imbalance will narrow to
approximately 2.7% of GDP in fiscal year 2015, partly based on the
proposed budget assumptions. Nevertheless, Moody's also expects
that the March 2017 election will prompt fiscal easing in fiscal
2016, with the deficit likely to widen to 3.5%.

The second driver of the affirmation is that the risk of losses to
bondholders remains significant given concerns about debt
sustainability. The weaker fiscal stance is likely to have shifted
the primary balance into deficit. Even if substantial fiscal
consolidation is achieved, the primary balance is unlikely to
reach the sustained surplus of about 1% of GDP that had been the
authorities' target over the medium term. The International
Monetary Fund believes that a sustained primary surplus of well
over 2% of GDP (potentially closer to 5% of GDP) is necessary to
absorb the potential recognition of debt related to the
nationalization of the electric (BEL) and telecom (BTL) companies.
The payouts from these nationalization cases are likely to come
sometime around 2017, barring an out-of-court settlement with some
of the claimants, which could potentially happen in 2015-16.

Although the current fiscal stance would not in itself lead to a
significant increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, the
recognition of liabilities from the nationalizations could push
public debt to above 90% of GDP, rendering debt unsustainable. In
addition to the risk of fiscal slippage from electoral spending,
the sovereign faces increased debt servicing costs from the first
step-up in the coupon rate on its restructured bonds, as well as
the partial amortization of the bonds in 2019. Other systemic
risks include the potential crystallization of contingent
liabilities from a vulnerable, albeit strengthening, financial
system, and increased pressure on external finances. The
confluence of these factors is highly likely to lead to a greatly
decreased ability to service debt and an unsustainable public debt
burden, suggesting that despite the authorities' commitment to
ensuring sustained primary surpluses, bondholders could likely
face losses consistent with a Caa2 rating level.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Belize's Caa2 ratings reflects Moody's
ongoing concerns about public debt sustainability despite the
short-term relief to fiscal liquidity pressures following the 2013
debt restructuring. Moody's says credit risks could potentially
escalate by 2017-18 given that: (1) as the general election
approaches, the government will find it more difficult to maintain
fiscal discipline as demand for public sector wage hikes and
increased social transfers increase; (2) debt service on market
debt will escalate due to an increase in the step-up coupon rate -
amortization payments will start in 2019; and (3) the compensation
amount from litigation claims due to the nationalization of BEL
and BTL could push public debt into unsustainable levels. Faced
with pressures that could translate into financial stress, the
possibility of a pre-emptive debt restructuring remains high
through 2017-18.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Positive rating pressure could develop if the government builds a
track record of servicing external debt and is able to maintain
fiscal discipline through the 2017 general election; the discovery
of new commercially viable oil/gas reserves that arrest the
decline of the oil industry could also improve credit prospects.

Conversely, material and sustained fiscal slippage would
jeopardize public debt sustainability and put downward pressure on
the rating. The size of compensation claims related to
nationalizations will be a key factor in determining potential
losses to investors in the event of a default.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,248 (2014 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 3% (2014 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): -0.4% (2014 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.8% (2014 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -7.7% (2014 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 76.2% (2014 Actual)

Level of economic development: Very Low level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On June 15, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Belize, Government of. The main points raised during the
discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including its
economic strength, have not materially changed. The issuer's
fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has
materially decreased. The issuer has become marginally less
susceptible to event risks. Other views raised included: The
issuer's institutional strength/framework has increased.


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B O L I V I A
=============


BANCO SOLIDARIO: Moody's Cuts Global Scale LC Dep. Ratings to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. has
concluded its rating reviews on Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A.,
Banco Nacional de Bolivia S.A., Banco Bisa S.A., Banco Union S.A.,
Banco Solidario S.A., Banco Fassil S.A., Banco Fortaleza S.A. and
Bisa Leasing S.A. These reviews were initiated on March 17, 2015,
following the publication of Moody's new bank rating methodology.

As a result, Moody's lowered the global scale local currency
deposit ratings of Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A., Banco Nacional
de Bolivia S.A., Banco Bisa S.A., Banco Solidario S.A. and Banco
Union S.A. to Ba3 from Ba2, but affirmed those banks' global scale
foreign currency deposit ratings. All the banks' national scale
ratings were affirmed except for Banco Solidario S.A., whose
national scale local currency deposit and senior unsecured debt
and subordinated debt ratings were downgraded. Moody's also
downgraded Banco Solidario's global local currency senior
unsecured and subordinated debt ratings.

In addition, Moody's downgraded Bisa Leasing S.A.'s global scale
senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba3 from Ba2 and affirmed its
Aaa.bo national scale ratings.

At the same time, Moody's upgraded Banco Fassil S.A.'s global and
national scale local and foreign currency deposit ratings to B1
and Aa2.bo from B2 and Aa3.bo respectively, as well as its
subordinated debt ratings to B2 and Aa3.bo from B3 and A1.bo.
Banco Fortaleza's long-term debt and deposit ratings were
confirmed. All the banks carry stable outlooks.

Moody's also affirmed Banco Ganadero S.A., Banco Economico S.A.,
Banco Pyme Ecofuturo S.A.'s ratings, with stable outlook and also
affirmed Banco Fie S.A.'s ratings, and changed its outlook to
stable from negative.

In general, the rating changes neither reflect an improvement nor
a deterioration in the affected issuers' credit fundamentals.
Rather, the changes are due to the implementation of Moody's new
bank methodology, which highlighted these issuers as being either
positive or negative outliers at their previous rating levels.
Moody's considers these issuers to be more appropriately
positioned at their current revised rating levels.

Moody's has also assigned Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessments in
line with its new bank rating methodology to 15 banks and one
cooperative.

Moody's has withdrawn the outlook on the subordinated debt ratings
of Banco Solidario S.A., Banco Fassil S.A., Banco Fortaleza S.A.,
Banco Ganadero S.A., Banco Economico S.A., Banco Fie S.A. and
Banco Pyme Ecofuturo S.A. for its own business reasons.

Outlooks, which provide an opinion on the likely rating direction
over the medium term, are now assigned only to long-term deposit
and senior debt ratings.

A list of the affected issuers is available at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_182416

RATINGS RATIONALE

The new banking methodology includes a number of elements that
Moody's has developed to help accurately predict bank failures and
determine how each creditor class is likely to be treated when a
bank fails and enters resolution. These new elements capture
insights gained from the financial crisis and the fundamental
shift in the banking industry and its regulation.

In light of the new methodology, Moody's rating actions generally
reflect the following considerations: (1) the "Weak" macro profile
of Bolivia; (2) the banks' core financial ratios; and (3) the
likelihood of government support for these institutions.

1) Bolivia's "Weak" macro profile

Bolivia has maintained strong economic growth over the past
decade, though its overall economy remains small, per capita
income is still low and the country's weak institutional framework
is a drag on banks' credit metrics. Notwithstanding a robust
external position, the country is moderately susceptible to event
risks, including but not limited to the risk of political
instability, as well as a sharp, prolonged decline in commodity
prices given the reliance of the economy on hydrocarbon exports.
Bolivia has a Ba3 sovereign rating with a stable outlook.

2) Healthy asset quality, capitalization and profitability are
threatened by regulatory requirements

Bolivian banks' BCAs (median ba3) take into account their low
problem loan ratios, good capitalization metrics and healthy
profitability ratios. However, onerous government regulations,
including mandated lending requirements and interest rate caps,
will reduce lenders' earnings power and lead to asset quality
problems. In the coming years, government lending mandates will
increasingly drive credit allocation, as regulations require
lenders to direct 60% of total loan books to productive industries
and social housing within four years. The regulations also include
below-market lending rate caps that will inhibit banks' ability to
price risk and will lower profitability, reducing internal capital
generation, though this will be partially offset by strict
limitations on banks' ability to pay out dividends. As a result of
this deterioration in lending conditions, banks have already
started to slow the overall pace of loan growth, which will likely
reveal asset quality problems that have accumulated during several
years of rapid growth. These challenges are partially offset by
Bolivian banks' stable base of core deposit funding. In addition,
dollarization of both loans and deposits has decreased
significantly in recent years, reducing banks' exposure to foreign
currency risk.

3) Likelihood of government support

Moody's has changed the way it assesses the Bolivian government's
ability to support banks. Moody's believes that the Bolivian
government's bond rating of Ba3 is the appropriate measure of its
ability to support banks because it captures the government's
fiscal limitations and therefore its ultimate capacity to provide
support. Based on insights gained from historic experience in the
global markets, Moody's considers that in the case of a prolonged
crisis, forbearance and liquidity measures, which were considered
in the rating agency's prior assessment of government support,
would be insufficient to restore confidence in a banking system,
leading to the need for an outright recapitalization of financial
entities. Nevertheless, many Bolivian banks' ratings still benefit
from a one notch of uplift, owing to Moody's assumption of the
government's continued willingness to support banking system
stability.

SPECIFIC ANALYTICAL FACTORS FOR THE BANKS

DEPOSIT RATINGS OF BANCO MERCANTIL SANTA CRUZ S.A., BANCO NACIONAL
DE BOLIVIA S.A., BANCO BISA S.A. AND BANCO UNION S.A. DOWNGRADED,
WITH A STABLE OUTLOOK.

Moody's downgraded the local currency deposit ratings of Banco
Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A., Banco Nacional de Bolivia S.A., Banco
Bisa S.A. and Banco Uni¢n S.A. to Ba3 from Ba2. The downgrade
reflects the change in the anchor rating for government support
for Bolivia to Ba3 from Ba2 as a result of Moody's revised
assessment of the capacity of governments to provide support to
banks. This revised assessment affected these banks as their
global local currency deposit ratings were above that of the
sovereign. The three private-sector banks continue to benefit from
a very high probability of government support, while Banco Uni¢n
is deemed to be government-backed. At the same time, Moody's
affirmed Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A's, Banco Nacional de
Bolivia S.A.'s and Banco Bisa S.A.'s BCAs at ba3 as well as Banco
Uni¢n S.A.'s BCA at b1. Moody's also affirmed the banks' foreign
currency deposit ratings.

In affirming Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A.'s BCA at ba3, Moody's
noted the banks' well established retail and corporate banking
franchise, its nationwide branch network, market share and revenue
diversification. The banks' earnings generation capacity and its
stable and inexpensive funding structure were also considered,
though intensifying competition from both large and small players
will pressure margins. In addition, Moody's took into account the
bank's good capitalization metrics and modest non-performing loan
ratio as compared to the banking system.

Banco Nacional de Bolivia S.A.'s BCA of ba3 reflects the bank's
strong franchise, which supports good financial fundamentals.
Banco Nacional de Bolivia S.A. is a universal bank that has
traditionally focused in lending to large companies and high-
middle-income customers. However in the recent years, it has been
growing also in small and medium companies and plans to expand its
microfinance portfolio, which will improve sector diversification
and portfolio granularity. The bank exhibits good asset quality
and capitalization metrics as well as a solid funding and above
average liquidity.

Banco Bisa S.A.'s BCA of ba3 considers the banks' good
capitalization, well positioned corporate franchise, and sustained
growth. While increasing competition and changes in regulations
pose a threat to profit margins, Banco Bisa's market shares and
loan diversification position it well to meet this challenge. The
banks' asset quality metrics have recently showed a slight
deterioration, but have remained healthy, as a result of
conservative risk management practices. The bank also shows ample
earning diversification, stable funding and above average
liquidity metrics.

In affirming Banco Uni¢n S.A.'s b1 BCA, Moody's noted the bank's
role as the financial agent for the Bolivian Government and
government-owned enterprises, which ensures its access to a
captive customer base and stable, low-cost deposits. Banco Uni¢n
has the largest payroll client base in the system, as the paying
agent for civil servants, pensioners, and social programs
beneficiaries, which benefits the bank's funding cost and
availability and grants it access to a significant base of fees
and commissions. However, the government-owned bank's public
policy mandate to support social and economic development in
Bolivia has led to significant balance sheet expansion in recent
years, resulting in higher risks to asset quality and
profitability. Also incorporated in the rating is Banco Uni¢n
S.A.'s strong capitalization ratio.

BISA LEASING S.A.'S GLOBAL CORPORATE FAMILY RATING AND ISSUER
RATING DOWNGRADED, WITH A STABLE OUTLOOK

Moody's downgraded Bisa Leasing S.A.'s global corporate family
ratings and issuer ratings to Ba3 from Ba2 due to the downgrade of
the global local currency deposit rating of its parent, Banco Bisa
S.A. Bisa Leasing S.A.'s ratings derive from its b1 baseline
credit assessment and incorporate Moody's assessment of a very
high probability of support from Banco Bisa S.A..

BANCO SOLIDARIO S.A.'S BCA, GLOBAL AND NATIONAL SCALE LOCAL
CURRENCY DEPOSIT AND DEBT RATINGS DOWNGRADED, WITH A STABLE
OUTLOOK

Moody's downgraded Banco Solidario's global local currency deposit
and senior unsecured ratings to Ba3 from Ba2, as well as its
subordinated debt ratings to B2 from B1. The downgrade was driven
by a downgrade of the bank's BCA to b1 from ba3. Also, Moody's
downgraded the bank's national scale local currency deposit and
senior unsecured ratings to Aa1.bo from Aaa.bo and changed the
outlook to stable from negative.

In lowering the banks' BCA, Moody's considered Solidario's sizable
exposures to the microfinance sector, which leaves it particularly
vulnerable to the interest rate caps that have been imposed by the
government. These rate caps will have a larger impact on
microfinance lending, because of its historical high interest
rates, than on other sectors. In addition, given the sector
concentration of its portfolio, Banco Solidario S.A. will be
forced to significantly expand lending to the productive sector to
comply with the new lending mandates, a move that could well hurt
asset quality given the bank's limited experience lending to this
segment. The downgrade also considered Solidario's relatively weak
capitalization. Solidario's deposit and debt ratings incorporate
one notch of uplift, reflecting our assessment of the high
probability of government support.

BANCO FASSIL UPGRADED

Moody's upgraded Banco Fassil's BCA to b1 from b2, reflecting the
bank's increased product diversification as a result of its
reorganization from a microlender into a universal bank in 2014.
While Banco Fassil's very rapid loan growth increases asset
quality risks, delinquencies remain negligible and loan loss
reserves are a very high 7% of gross loans. Banco Fassil's
shareholders have shown a strong commitment to the business, as
reflected in their repeated capital contributions to maintain the
bank's robust capital ratios and foster loan portfolio growth.
Since becoming a universal bank, Fassil has shown improved
profitability metrics as a result of lower provisioning cost and
higher non-interest income. Operating expenses have also stayed
mostly steady, resulting in improved efficiency ratios. Fassil's
ratings do not benefit from government support given the bank's
still relatively small deposit market share.

BANCO FORTALEZA S.A.'S RATINGS CONFIRMED

Moody's confirmed Banco Fortaleza S.A.'s long-term ratings and
changed its outlook to stable. While Fortaleza benefits from
relatively strong capitalization, a stable funding profile and
adequate liquidity, it still lags behind the banking system's
average asset quality and profitability indicators. The bank has
been working to shift its portfolio mix towards small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in order to comply with new regulations.
While greater diversification would ultimately be credit positive,
during the transition period, this shift in strategy exposes the
bank to the risk of a deterioration in asset quality, which is
already threatened by the bank's rapid loan growth in recent
years. Fortaleza.'s earning generation capacity has improved
lately but will be affected by lending rate caps set by
regulations. Also, poor operating efficiency continues to
challenge bottom line earnings. Fortaleza's ratings benefit from a
low government support, which generates no uplift in its deposit
ratings.

RATINGS OF BANCO FIE, BANCO GANADERO, BANCO ECONOMICO AND BANCO
PYME ECOFUTURO AFFIRMED

The affirmation of Banco Fie's ratings considers the bank's
adequate asset quality and liquidity and stable funding profile.
Banco Fie has traditionally been a microfinance lender, but it has
sought to diversify its loan portfolio mix by also focusing on
lending to SMEs, therefore continuing to bank its customers as
they move up the income ladder. The portfolio growth has been
accompanied by Banco Fie's expansion of its branch network and
workforce to boost its presence in rural areas of the country.

In affirming Banco Ganadero's ratings, Moody's noted the bank's
well-established corporate and commercial-oriented franchise based
in Santa Cruz de la Sierra and its growing housing finance
operation. This business mix has provided income diversification,
good asset quality, and access to core deposit funding. The
ratings, however, are constrained by Banco Ganadero's geographical
concentrations, which expose its asset quality and earnings to
potential swings in the regional economy and a core capitalization
ratio that is lower than the banking system average. In addition,
profitability and asset quality face pressures stemming from new
banking regulations.

The affirmation of Banco Economico's ratings reflects the bank's
established position as a lender to SMEs and its growing
diversification into microfinance over past three years, which
reduces the borrower concentration of the bank's loan book.
However, the ratings also incorporate the generally riskier nature
of SME and microfinance customers, which are highly sensitive to
economic cycles. They also reflect the bank's continued
geographical concentration in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, despite
efforts to expand to other provinces of the country, and tight
capitalization metrics.

In affirming Banco Pyme Ecofuturo's ratings, Moody's considered
the bank's limited geographic diversification and monoline
microfinance nature. However, its portfolio has diversified, as
some of its original microlending clients have evolved into SMEs.
Given its microfinance nature, the entity has a manageable loan
book concentration, with a small average loan ticket size. Moody's
also took into account the institution's adequate asset quality,
conservative loan loss reserve policy and good capitalization
levels. However, Moody's notes that Banco Pyme Ecofuturo's
profitability will be under pressure as a result of regulatory
changes and that its asset quality could weaken in light of its
fast loan growth strategy.

Fie, Ganadero, and Economico's deposit ratings incorporate one
notch of uplift from their baseline credit assessments of b1,
reflecting our assessment of the high probability of government
support for these banks given the banks' deposit market share.
Ecofuturo's ratings do not benefit from government support
assumption as a result of its relatively low deposit market share.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given the challenges presented by the current regulatory
environment, upward rating pressure is unlikely at this time for
Bolivian banks. The ratings could suffer downward pressure if the
banks suffer a substantial deterioration in their asset quality
and/or profitability due to the new lending mandates and interest
rate caps.

ASSIGNMENT OF COUNTERPARTY RISK ASSESSMENTS

Moody's has also assigned CR Assessments to 15 banks and one
cooperative in Bolivia. CR Assessments are opinions of how
counterparty obligations are likely to be treated if a bank fails,
and are distinct from debt and deposit ratings in that they (1)
consider only the risk of default rather than expected loss and
(2) apply to counterparty obligations and contractual commitments
rather than debt or deposit instruments. The CR Assessment is an
opinion of the counterparty risk related to a bank's covered
bonds, contractual performance obligations (servicing),
derivatives (e.g., swaps), letters of credit, guarantees and
liquidity facilities.

For Bolivian institutions, the CR Assessment is positioned, prior
to government support, one notch above the Adjusted BCA and
therefore above senior unsecured and deposit ratings, reflecting
Moody's view that its probability of default is lower than that of
senior unsecured debt and deposits. Moody's believe that senior
obligations represented by the CR Assessment will be more likely
preserved in order to limit contagion, minimize losses and avoid
disruption of critical functions.

The CR Assessment does not benefit from any government support
with the exception of Banco Uni¢n's, which is considered
government-backed. This reflects our view that operating
activities and obligations reflected by the CR Assessment are
unlikely to benefit from any support provisions from resolution
authorities to senior unsecured debt or deposits.

In the case of Banco de Cr‚dito de Bolivia S.A. and Banco do
Brasil S.A. (Bolivia), given their very high deposit ratings,
Moody's has assigned CR Assessments of Ba1(cr), equal to the
banks' deposit ratings. Both the banks' CRAs and their deposit
ratings are constrained by Bolivia's Ba1 local currency deposit
ceiling.

The principal methodology used in rating Banco BISA S.A., Banco
Economico S.A. (Bolivia), Banco FIE S.A., Banco Fortaleza S.A.,
Banco Ganadero S.A., Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A., Banco
Nacional de Bolivia S.A., Banco Solidario S.A. (Bolivia), Banco
Union S.A. (Bolivia), Banco Pyme Ecofuturo S.A., and Banco Fassil
S.A. was Banks published in March 2015. The principal methodology
used in rating BISA Leasing S.A. was Finance Company Global Rating
Methodology published in March 2012.


BOLIVIA: To Get $142.5MM IDB Loan for Disaster Risk Management
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bolivia will improve its administrative and financial capacity to
manage the risks of disasters with a loan of $142.5 million
approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Bolivia is one of the countries most vulnerable to natural
disasters in the Andean region.  In 2013 and 2014, floods affected
more than 400,000 people and caused damages estimated at 1.3
percent of Gross Domestic Product.  During the period 1970-2012
the country suffered more than 4,000 disasters that left 2,357
dead and affected more than 2 million people.

The economic losses for the more vulnerable people was not the
only impact, however.  The government was forced to redirect
public funds to deal with the emergencies.  This increases the gap
in access to infrastructure between people with low and high
resources, limits access to basic services, creates bottlenecks in
the markets and increases the costs of transactions.

The intense changes in the use of land, especially the increases
linked to accelerated urban growth, the development of
infrastructure in risk areas and the environmental degradation of
catchment basins are contributing to a growing exposure and
vulnerability of the poorest people, who often live in informal
settlements located in areas exposed to natural events such as
landslides and floods.

This project will enable the creation of a national system for
managing the risks of natural disasters in which prevention, based
on an adequate analysis of the risks, becomes the central element
of public policy.  The goal is to create an institutional
structure with clearly defined responsibilities for the different
levels of government and ministries, with established financial
resources, for the prevention and management of emergencies,
through the approval of the regulations for Law 602 for Risk
Management, and other norms and planning procedures.

This is the first operation of a program for pragmatic credits
based on policies.  These loans provide resources to governments
to finance priority programs, and the funds are disbursed after
goals agreed by the IDB and the borrowing countries are met.

The loan is made up of $114 million from Common Capital, with a
grace period of six years, and $28.5 million from the Special
Operations Fund with a grace period of 40 years.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Moody's Assigns Ba2 GS Corp. Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina assigned a Ba2 global scale Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) and a Aa2.br CFR on the Brazilian national
scale (NSR) to Andrade Gutierrez Participacoes S.A ("AG Par" or
"the company"). At the same time, Moody's assigned a Ba2 global
scale rating and a Aa2.br NSR to the unsecured debentures issued
in 2012. The outlook is stable. This is the first time that
Moody's has rated the company.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2/Aa2.br CFR rating for AG Par reflects : (i) the relatively
stable nature of AG Par's main investments within the mature
infrastructure industry ; (ii) the well defined and transparent
financial policy illustrated among other things by a publicly
stated commitment to maintain leverage (net debt/dividends
received) below a 3.5x threshold ; (iii) a good liquidity position
characterized by large cash position, limited near term debt
maturities and some liquidity options kept available ; and (iv) a
good visibility over the invested assets due to their shares being
publicly traded on the Brazilian stock exchange.

However, the CFR also considers (i) a high degree of asset
concentration partially mitigated by the variety of segments
represented within each entity; (ii) the deep structural
subordination of AG Par and its reliance on dividend payments from
other debt funded entities to service its own debt obligations,
(iii) the added level of complexity of AG Par's capital structure
resulting from cross default exposure to the sister company
Constructora Andrade Gutierrez S.A ("CAG" -- Ba2, negative) which
is currently under investigation into allegations of anti-
competitive practices as part of the "Lava Jato" corruption
scandal in Brazil; (iv) expectation that the non-strategic assets
BRIO and MESA will continue to be a drag on cash flows for the
next two fiscal years and; (v) the lack of significant influence
over the dividends of the invested assets.

AG Par is an investment holding company with minority equity
participations in infrastructure and regulated utility assets
operating in Brazil. AG Par's main participations are CCR (through
a 17% equity ownership --rated Ba1, stable), CEMIG (14.4% - Ba1,
negative) and to a smaller extent Sanepar (8.3% - Ba1, stable). In
addition to those assets which AG Par holds via the intermediate
holding company Andrade Gutierrez Concessoes S.A (AGC -- not
rated), the company also has a direct minority participation in
the hydro-electric generation project MESA/Santo Antonio (2.1%)
and a 50% stake in the arena management company BRIO. AG Par is
wholly owned by Andrade Gutierrez S.A ("AG SA"), a top holding
ultimately owned by the local Brazilian family holdings Santo
EstevAo S.A., SAo Miguel S.A., and Sant'Ana LTDA.

Currently, AG Par has a good liquidity profile, with no material
debt maturity coming due after 2015 at least until 2018, and a
cash position of BRL 264 million as of the end of Q1 2015. As
there is no cash pooling mechanism in place within the group, and
intercompany loans are restricted as per the company's governance
framework, AG Par relies entirely on dividend upstreams to service
its debt obligations. However, Moody's understands that the
company could use alternatives to improve its liquidity position.
AG Par could for example (i) upstream more dividend payments from
AGC which could use its own debt capacity to re-leverage; (ii)
reduce AG Par's dividend paid to AG SA; (iii) sell non-strategic
assets (MESA/BRIO); and/or (iv) receive shareholder funding from
AG SA. Some of these options remain subject to reasonably open
access to either the bank or capital markets and favourable market
conditions.

In its structural consideration analysis, Moody's looked at the
debt of AG Par and AGC on a combined basis, considering that AGC
is fully controlled by AG Par and that both entities are pure
holding companies sharing essentially the same board members.
Currently, the combined debt is much more weighted towards AG Par
which at the end of March 2015 held three times as much debt as
AGC (BRL 1.2 billion compared to BRL 0.4 billion respectively).
Moody's consequently assigned the 2012 debentures with a
Ba2/Aa2.br rating in line with the CFR at AG Par.

The stable rating outlook is based on Moody's expectation that the
company will continue to receive sizable dividend flows in a
timely and predictable manner, and will be able to maintain a good
liquidity profile at all times. Improvements in operating
performance of invested assets and sustainable growth in the flow
of dividend streams leading to an interest coverage ratio visibly
above 3.0x and a Market Value Leverage below 15% on a sustainable
basis could lead to a rating upgrade. A simplification of the
capital structure such that the number of debt-funded levels
and/or exposure to the sister company CAG would also be a positive
for the rating.

A portfolio Market Value Leverage metric sustainably above 25%,
interest cash coverage below 2.0x and/or a failure to maintain a
strong liquidity position would lead to negative rating pressure.
A downgrade of CCR, CEMIG and/or of Brazil's sovereign rating
could also have negative implications on AG Par's rating.

AG Par is an investment holding company with minority equity
participations in infrastructure and utilities assets operating in
Brazil. During fiscal year 2014, the company reported a net income
of BRL 444.5 million, compared to BRL 436 million in the prior
year.


CAIXA ECONOMICA: Moody's Affirms Ba3(hyb) FC Sub. Debt Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed all debt and deposit
ratings in the global and national scales as well as the baseline
credit assessments (BCAs) of two Brazilian federal government-
owned banks, Caixa Economica Federal (Caixa) and Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES). The outlook on all
ratings is negative.

At the same time, Moody's assigned a Counterparty Risk (CR)
Assessment to Caixa and to Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A. (BNB),
prompted by the publication of its new bank rating methodology,
published by Moody's on March 16, 2015.

The three Brazilian government-owned banks covered in this press
release are:

Caixa Economica Federal (Caixa)

Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social -- BNDES

Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A. (BNB)

Moody's has withdrawn the outlook on Caixa's subordinated
instrument rating for its own business reasons. Outlooks are now
only assigned to long-term senior debt and deposit ratings,
indicating the direction of any rating pressures.

Moody's new Banks methodology is available at:

   http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PR_320662

RATING RATIONALE

CAIXA ECONOMICA FEDERAL

The affirmation of Caixa's ba2 BCA reflects Moody's ongoing
concerns about the bank's asset quality and profitability over the
next quarters. Following five years of aggressive growth and
expansion stimulated by the Brazilian government's countercyclical
policies, Caixa's loan book is exposed to growth in riskier
lending segments, Caixa has reduced the pace of loan origination
since the end of 2014. Moody's also expects weak economic activity
to affect the performance of the bank's asset quality indicators.

However, Moody's acknowledges the federal savings bank's
significant market share and dominant position in the Brazilian
mortgage financing segment, which benefit its funding and
delinquency metrics. Moody's also expects less tension around
capital needs as Caixa pulls back on the expansion of its lending,
although future earnings recurrence will suffer as the bank
reinforces provision buffers in the coming quarters to protect
capital.

Caixa's Baa2 supported local currency deposit rating is aligned
with Brazil's debt rating of Baa2 and therefore carries the
negative outlook of Brazil's Baa2 government bond rating. This
alignment reflects Moody's assessment of full systemic support for
the repayment of the bank's local currency deposits in a
distressed situation. The Baa2 also indicates Moody's view that
Caixa's operations are entangled with Brazil's central
government's policies, as evidenced by the significant non-cash
capital injections from the central government between 2009 and
2013, and the large dividends distribution to the bank's sole
shareholder, the Brazilian government.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS

Moody's does not expect upward pressure on Caixa's standalone BCA
at this point, given the challenges to asset quality following
years of strong growth. On the other hand, negative pressures on
the BCA could develop in the event of material deterioration in
the bank's asset quality that could lead to a decline in
profitability and a weakening of its capital base. In addition,
any indication of control and risk management failures would lead
to downward pressure on the ba2 BCA.

The following ratings assigned to Caixa Economica Federal were
affirmed:

  Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Baa2, negative
  outlook

  Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Prime-2

  Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of Baa2, negative
  outlook

  Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Prime-2

  Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating of Baa2,
  negative outlook

  Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating,
  assigned to GMTN Program, of (P)Baa2

  Foreign currency subordinated debt rating of Ba3(hyb)

  Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aaa.br

  Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1

BANCO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO E SOCIAL - BNDES

The affirmation of BNDES's BCA at ba1 reflects the bank's position
as the primary source of long-term debt and equity financing in
Brazil, along with its active role in the country's
infrastructure, export, and privatization programs. Since 2009,
the bank's risk profile has become significantly intertwined with
the government's, as BNDES experienced sizable loan growth to
foster economic development under the countercyclical policy
implemented by the government.

In future quarters, BNDES will likely experience a reduction in
loan disbursement as the government ceases the transfer of
subsidized resources to the bank in light of ongoing fiscal
adjustments. Moody's notes that roughly 48% of the bank's loan
operations are held out via financial intermediaries, which
explains the resilience of BNDES's asset quality indicators
through economic downturns. Nonetheless, Moody's expects some
increase in asset risk, owing to the bank's credit exposure to
companies in sectors debilitated by weak economic activity. The
bank's profitability will likely improve as BNDES begins to
originate higher-yielding assets that will gradually replace the
large volume of subsidized and low-cost loans produced by the
bank, particularly under the government-sponsored program PSI
(Programa de Sustentacao do Investimento).

At this moment, BNDES also shows adequate level of capitalization,
with a total capital ratio of 15.89% as of December 2014. To
accommodate loan growth, the government increased BNDES's
regulatory capital of BRL15.00 billion in June 2013, in the form
of public debt eligible for common equity Tier I capital and by
allocating hybrid instruments of BRL15.54 billion formerly
classified as additional Tier 1 capital in common equity in June
2014.

BNDES's global local currency issuer rating, foreign currency
deposit rating, and senior unsecured debt rating are positioned at
the same level as Brazil's government sovereign rating of Baa2.
BNDES's Baa2 issuer rating incorporates two notches of uplift from
the ba1 BCA, reflecting the assumption of very high government
support, which derives from the development bank's strategic
importance to its controlling shareholder, the federal government.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS

At this moment, an upgrade of BNDES's supported ratings is
unlikely, considering the negative outlook on Brazil's government
bond rating. A positive movement of the bank's BCA could derive
from (1) a reduction in direct resources from the National
Treasury in the bank's funding structure; (2) increased autonomy
to use bottom-line results to strengthen its capital base instead
of being upstreamed as dividends to the government; and (3) a more
robust capital position, with higher Tier 1 ratios.

Negative rating pressure on BNDES's global scale supported ratings
derives from the negative outlook on the sovereign rating, as the
bank's ratings are highly correlated to that of the sovereign. A
decline in the quality of the bank's capital position may weaken
its financial flexibility over time, with negative effects on its
BCA. Deterioration in the quality of the bank's loan portfolio
triggered by either a persistent slowdown of macroeconomic
conditions or poor asset allocation could result in a lower BCA.

The following ratings assigned to BNDES were affirmed:

  Long-term global local currency issuer rating of Baa2, negative
  outlook

  Short-term global local currency issuer rating of Prime-2

  Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of Baa2, negative
  outlook

  Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Prime-2

  Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating of Baa2,
  negative outlook

  Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aaa.br

  Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1

ASSIGNING COUNTERPARTY RISK ASSESSMENTS

As part of the actions, Moody's has assigned a CR Assessment to
Caixa and BNB. CR Assessments are opinions of how counterparty
obligations are likely to be treated if a bank fails, and are
distinct from debt and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider
only the risk of default rather than expected loss and (2) apply
to counterparty obligations contractual commitments rather than
debt or deposit instruments. The CR Assessment is an opinion of
counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual
performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps),
letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities.

The CR Assessments consider government support in line with
Moody's assumption on deposits and senior unsecured debt ratings.
Thus, the assessments reflect Moody's view that any support
provided by governmental authorities to a bank that benefits
senior unsecured debt or deposits is very likely to benefit
obligations reflected by the CR Assessment. The CR Assessments are
also consistent with Moody's belief that governments are likely to
maintain as going-concern obligations in order to reduce contagion
and preserve a bank's critical functions.

In the case of both Caixa and BNB, the assigned CR Assessments are
three notches above their respective ba2 adjusted BCAs. Moody's
assigned a long and short-term Counterparty Risk Assessments both
to Caixa and BNB at Baa2(cr) and Prime-2(cr), respectively. In the
case of Caixa, the CR Assessment of Baa2(cr) is in line with the
bank's deposit and senior unsecured debt, and for BNB, the
Baa2(cr) is one-notch above the global deposit and senior
unsecured ratings, and in line with the sovereign rating.

METHODOLOGY USED & LAST RATING ACTIONS

The principal methodology used in rating Caixa Economica Federal
was Banks published in March 2015. The principal methodology used
in rating Banco Nac. Desenv. Economico e Social - BNDES was
Government-Related Issuers published in October 2014.

LAST RATING ACTIONS

Moody's took its last rating action on Caixa Economica Federal
(Caixa) on September 9, 2014, when the rating agency changed the
outlook on all of Caixa's deposit and debt ratings to negative
following the change in outlook on Brazil's sovereign bond ratings
to negative. All ratings were affirmed.

Moody's took its last rating action on Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social -- BNDES on September 9, 2014,
when it changed the outlook on BNDES's deposit and debt ratings to
negative following the change in outlook on Brazil's sovereign
bond ratings to negative. All ratings were affirmed.

Moody's took its last rating action on Banco do Nordeste do Brasil
S.A. (BNB) on October 3, 2013, when the rating agency downgraded
BNB's global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to Baa3
from Baa2, and its senior unsecured debt rating to Baa3, from
Baa2. At the same date, Moody's changed to stable from positive
the outlook on BNB's deposit and debt ratings. This rating action
followed the change in outlook to stable from positive on Brazil's
government bond ratings. All ratings other remained unchanged.


CEMIG GERACAO: Moody's Gives Ba1 Rating to BRL1-Bil. Debentures
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina assigned the Ba1 rating on the global
scale, and the Aa2.br Brazilian National Scale Rating ("NSR") to
CEMIG GERACAO E TRANSMISSAO S.A.'s ("CEMIG GT")BRL 1 billion,
senior unsecured backed debentures. At the same time, Moody's
affirmed the Ba1 and Aa2.br corporate family rating on the global
and national scales, respectively. The outlook remains negative on
all ratings. The debentures will be issued in up to two series (3
and 5 years), and will be guaranteed by COMPANHIA ENERGETICA DE
MINAS GERAIS ("CEMIG"), the holding company of the economic group.
The proceeds of CEMIG GT's debentures will be used to restore its
cash position in light of maturing existing debt.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba1 ratings of CEMIG GT reflect the combined generation and
transmission profile of the company given that it has a strong
presence in the Brazilian electricity sector, a solid and
competitive management team, good historical access to the capital
markets, and above average corporate governance practices.

On a consolidated basis, CEMIG's rather ambitious equity
investment plans, the evolving Brazilian regulatory framework, and
a historically high dividend pay-out ratio constrain the ratings,
as do the risks associated with the potential political
interference of the Government of the State of Minas Gerais (Baa3
negative) in CEMIG's business strategy, and the ongoing lack of
definition from the federal regulatory agency (ANEEL) with respect
to the process of renewal and indemnification of CEMIG-GT's
generation concessions. The negative outlook of the State of Minas
Gerais also constrains CEMIG's ratings.

In accordance with Moody's methodology for government related
issuers, or GRIs, the Ba1 corporate family rating of CEMIG
(consolidated) reflects the combination of the following inputs:

-- Baseline credit assessment (BCA) of 11 (mapping to a ba1)

-- High-level dependence (70%)

-- Strong level of government support (51-70%)

-- The Baa3 rating of the State of Minas Gerais, which has a
    negative outlook

Rating Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that CEMIG-GT
will continue to be pressured due to the ongoing challenging
hydrology conditions as well as the possible negative outcome of
the judicial dispute with the Federal Government related to the
renewal of the Jaguara, Sao Simao and Miranda concessions, which
will potentially weaken the company's overall liquidity position.
The negative outlook also reflects the current negative outlook
for the State of Minas Gerais, which controls CEMIG, and Moody's
expectation that the electricity sector overall in Brazil will
continue to suffer a decline in operating margins for the
remainder of 2015 given the persistent challenging hydrology
conditions. A stabilization of the outlook could be considered in
the case of a positive outcome for CEMIG-GT by being allowed to
keep the aforementioned concessions.

What Could Change the Rating -- Up/Down

With the return of the Jaguara, Sao Simaro and Miranda's
concessions to the Federal Government Moody's expects that the
credit metrics will be under pressure for the remainder of 2015,
and potentially into 2016. Therefore, an upgrade rating action is
very unlikely in the short to medium term. The ratings could be
downgraded if CEMIG-GT continues to increase leverage to make
large equity investments or acquisitions, in addition to
maintaining a high level of dividend distributions to its parent,
CEMIG, or fails to secure long-term financing at reasonable terms
that will allow the company to preserve an adequate liquidity
level and robust capital structure. Quantitatively, Moody's would
consider downgrading the ratings if there was a material
deterioration in the companies' respective credit metrics as
follows:

CEMIG: (i) Cash Flow Interest Coverage ratio falls below 3.5x,
        and (ii) Retained Cash Flow / Debt stays below 10% for an
        extended period;

CEMIG-GT: (i) Cash Flow Interest Coverage ratios falls below
            3.5x, and (ii) Retained Cash Flow /Debt stays below
            12% for an extended period.

A downgrade of the State of Minas Gerais could also precipitate a
downgrade rating action for CEMIG's corporate family rating.

CEMIG is an integrated power utility group, with equity stakes in
more than 200 companies, operating in the electricity generation,
transmission and distribution sectors. CEMIG is publicly traded on
the local (BM&FBOVESPA), New York (NYSE) and Madrid (LATIBEX)
stock exchanges. The government of the State of Minas Gerais holds
50.97% of CEMIG's voting capital and 23.31% of its total capital.
CEMIG is currently the largest integrated electricity utility in
Brazil. CEMIG-D, the distribution company of CEMIG Group, is one
of the largest distribution companies in Brazil, with a total
concession area of 567,478 square kilometers (Km2), serving 774
cities, and approximately 8 million consumers. As of 2014, CEMIG-D
accounted for 57.5% of CEMIG's consolidated net revenues, 26.3% of
consolidated EBITDA, and 44.8% of consolidated indebtedness.
CEMIG-D is CEMIG's second largest company in terms of EBITDA,
following CEMIG-GT, which accounted for approximately 61.8% of
CEMIG's consolidated EBITDA. CEMIG is currently one of the largest
Brazilian electricity generation groups, with total installed
capacity of 7,717 MW. CEMIG controls both CEMIG-D and CEMIG-GT
owning 100% of their voting capital.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


COMBINE RE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 9
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Combine Re Ltd. are required to file their proofs
of debt by July 9, 2015, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 27, 2015.

The company's liquidators are:

          Shaun Geils
          Kevin Poole
          P.O. Box 10233 Grand Cayman
          171 Elgin Avenue, Willow House
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 914-2259
          Facsimile: 949-6021


DAISY CONSULTING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 8
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Daisy Consulting Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 8, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on May 26, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


DALRYMPLE GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
On May 27, 2015, the shareholder of The Dalrymple Global Resources
Offshore Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jerry Vane Swank
          3300 Oak Lawn Avenue
          Suite 560, Dallas
          TX 75219
          USA


ENTERPRISE DATA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On May 26, 2015, the sole shareholder of Enterprise Data Services
Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Cathlin Rossiter
          c/o Neil Montgomery
          Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          Midtown Plaza
          Elgin Avenue, George Town
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


FRONTIER MINING: Ct. Enters Order to Liquidate Firm
---------------------------------------------------
On May 27, 2015, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands entered an
order to liquidate the business of Frontier Mining Limited.

The company's liquidator is:

          A. Lawson
          c/o G. Lowry
          Telephone: (345) 914-4398
          Facsimile: (345) 949-7164
          KPMG
          P.O. Box 493 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Century Yard, Cricket Square
          Cayman Islands


HELPSAUDE HOLDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 29
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Helpsaude Holding Co. are required to file their
proofs of debt by June 29, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on May 27, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Hernan Kazah
          Aguada Park, Paraguay 2141, Floor 17, Office 18
          Montevideo, CP 11800
          Uruguay
          Telephone: +598 2927 2418


LEVEN LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On May 27, 2015, the shareholder of Leven Limited resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidators are:

          Cathlin Rossiter
          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Midtown Plaza
          Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


MONTREUX PARTNERS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
On May 28, 2015, the shareholder of Montreux Partners SPC resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidators are:

          Cathlin Rossiter
          Neil Montgomery
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Midtown Plaza
          Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


ROCK SHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------
On May 20, 2015, the sole shareholder of Rock Shore Casualty
Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kevin Poole
          c/o Kane (Cayman) Limited
          171 Elgin Avenue
          Willow House, 3rd Floor, Cricket Square
          P.O. Box 10233 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 2255
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 6021


SJK ABSOLUTE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 8
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of SJK Absolute Return Fund, Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by July 8, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 21, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor,
          P.O. Box 1344, Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


===========
M E X I C O
===========


GRUPO POSADAS: Fitch Affirms 'B' IDR & Revises Outlook to Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the 'B' foreign currency and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings of Grupo Posadas, S.A.B. de C.V.,
as well as the national scale rating at 'BB+(mex)'.  The Rating
Outlook has been revised to Stable from Negative.

The Outlook revision to Stable reflects lower leverage levels due
to improved operational performance, reflected both in Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs), as well as in higher sales in the
vacation club segment.  As a result, adjusted debt to EBITDAR has
fallen to 5.1x as of March 31, 2015 on a last 12 months basis, and
Fitch expects it to be generally below 5.0x going forward.

Posadas' ratings are supported by the company's solid business
position as a leading hotel chain in Mexico, strong brand equity
and operating performance, as well as its multiple hotel formats.
Conversely, the ratings are tempered by high leverage, as well as
industry cyclicality.  Posadas' presence in all major urban and
coastal locations in Mexico, consistent product offering and brand
image have resulted in occupancy levels that are above the
industry average in Mexico.  The use of multiple hotel formats
allows the company to target domestic and international business
travelers of different income levels as well as tourists,
diversifying its revenue base.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IMPROVEMENTS IN OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE

Posadas has improved its operations over the last few quarters.
RevPAR has improved, particularly in owned and leased hotels; this
has mostly been driven by improved Average Daily Rate (ADR).
Occupancy has remained stable, above 60%, although coastal
locations have outperformed urban ones, both for managed, as well
as owned and leased properties.  Furthermore, vacation club sales
have improved, as increased occupancy in coastal locations has
improved cross-selling opportunities.

As of LTM March 31, 2015, EBITDA was MXN1,161 million.  Cash from
operations (CFO) generation for the period was MXN443 million and
Fitch expects continued improvement due to continued strong
operating performance in the vacation club segment, as well as the
main hospitality business.

MODERATE CAPEX GROWTH STRATEGY

Going forward, Fitch believes Posadas' strategy will be centered
mostly on managing hotels, as opposed to owning the properties.
New openings should continue for all brands, mainly Fiesta Inn and
One, mostly under managed and leased formats.  This capex strategy
for new openings, with only about 16% being spent by Grupo Posadas
itself could support FCF generation, which is expected to be
mildly positive over the short to medium term.  From 2015 to 2017,
Posadas plans to open 40 hotels with a total of 6,548 rooms.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDAR around 4.5x in the medium term;
   -- Consolidated EBITDA above MXN1 billion;
   -- Broadly stable KPIs in the short-to-medium term.
   -- Low capex growth strategy.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative factors for credit quality could include any weakening of
operating trends or decreases in RevPAR that could lead to lower
EBITDA and cash flow levels, as well as cash outflows or incurring
debt that results in adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR consistently higher
than 5.0x.

Positive factors of the company's creditworthiness include stable
EBITDA generation, consolidating gains in operating indicators,
and a proven track record of stronger and stable credit metrics,
such as adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR consistently below 4.5x


LIQUIDITY

The company's liquidity position is manageable.  Currently, the
company is working on different refinancing initiatives to extend
the maturity of existing indebtedness, including USD 50 million of
commercial paper in November 2015.  Cash balances as of March 31,
2014 are MXN1,043 million, Furthermore, the company's strategy
considers signing committed secured credit lines of MXN550 million
(MXN 200 million currently approved), to bring additional
liquidity support.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Grupo Posadas, S.A.B. de C.V.
Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

   -- Local currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Foreign currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
   -- National scale rating at 'BB+(mex)'; Outlook Stable;
   -- USD310 million senior notes due 2017 at 'B+/RR3'.


=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================


NICARAGUA: To Get $55MM IDB Loan to Improve Trade Competitiveness
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Nicaragua will carry out a program to improve the operations of
its border posts and strengthen the competitiveness of its foreign
trade, with US$55 million in financing from the InterAmerican
Development Bank (IDB).

The program aims to upgrade the country's border posts --
initially focusing on Pena Blanca y San Pancho on the border with
Costa Rica, and El Guasaule on the border with Honduras -- through
the addition of infrastructure and an effective system for
controlling the process of handling passage of cargo and
travelers.

The low quality of the border posts' management and deficiencies
in the road infrastructure are increasing the costs of
transportation by 4 percent to 9 percent and are affecting the
country's competitiveness.  These factors also affect the
remainder of the logistics chain, generating high prices for the
end user, lengthy transit times and unsatisfactory service.

Because Nicaragua lacks its own port on the Caribbean sea, 38
percent of the country's exports are transported by land to
seaports in Honduras and Costa Rica for shipment to international
markets. Under the new program, the time it takes for goods to be
imported or exported through the Pena Blanca crossing should drop
by up to 69 percent.  The time for imports at El Guasaule is
expected to drop by 37 percent, and exports by 70 percent.  The
crossing times for travelers also is expected to drop
significantly at both border posts, by about 78 percent.

The IDB also approved a border integration program for Costa Rica,
which will allow the two countries to unify efforts toward a
coordinated management of the San Pancho and Pena Blanca border
posts.  The governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica signed a
memorandum of understanding in March that defines the process of
coordination on the design and operations of both border posts.

The IDB has conducted several studies of the region's key
logistics corridors and transit capacity. It also has led in the
design and execution of border post operations in Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru as part of its efforts to support
regional integration.


===========
P A N A M A
===========


* PANAMA: Foreign Investment Surges 32.2%
------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that foreign direct investment (FDI) totaled $1.7
billion in Panama in the first quarter, up 32.2 percent from the
same period in 2014, the National Institute of Statistics and
Census, or INEC, reported.

Foreign capital flowed mainly into hotels, banks, real estate,
electricity generation, commerce and manufacturing, the INEC said,
according to EFE News.

The report notes that some 65 percent of FDI in Panama comes from
reinvested profits, while 22 percent comes from purchases of
Panamanian companies' shares by investors based overseas, the INEC
said.

Companies operating out of the Colon Free Trade Zone contributed
$123.7 million to FDI growth in the first quarter, a 17 percent
increase over the January-March 2014 period, the report relates.

The increase in FDI is due to "investors' confidence in Panama and
its favorable outlook, thanks to the country's strategic location,
steady growth and high rates of return on public and private
projects being developed domestically," the Economy and Finance
Ministry said in a statement, the report says.

"Panama offers favorable conditions for the reinvestment of
foreign investors' profits, and the volume of additional
investments is a solid vote of confidence on the business climate
and Panamanian institutions," the ministry's director for social
and economic analysis, Rogelio Alvarado, said, the report
discloses.

Foreigners have pumped $11.21 billion into the Panamanian economy
over the past three years, Mr. Alvarado said, the report adds.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


SAN JUAN/LAVENTVILLE: Chair Pleas With Govt. for Workers' Backpay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Miranda La Rose at Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that
Chairman of San Juan/Laventille Regional Corporation (SJLRC)
Anthony Roberts is pleading with government to make funding
available to the corporation to pay the outstanding nine percent
retroactive pay on the salaries of daily-rated workers for 2011 to
2013.

"I am calling on Government whether it be through the Ministry of
Finance or the Ministry of Local Government to make funding
available for us to pay the workers so we can get on with the
business of the people," the report quoted Mr. Roberts as saying.

The report notes that Mr. Roberts made the plea at a press
conference held at the Council Chamber, MTS Plaza, Aranjuez noting
that some 1,000 employees of the corporation and council members
of the SJLRC were frustrated at the non-payment of the backpay
which was agreed to during the early part of 2014.  The agreement
to pay the nine percent retroactive pay was agreed to during the
first quarter of 2014 between Government and the National Union of
Government and Federated Workers (NUGFW), the report relays.

The corporation then prepared all its documents, Mr. Roberts said,
to ensure that its books were audited so that swift payment of the
outstanding sums could be paid to the workers, the report notes.
Workers have received the nine per cent increase in their salaries
from April last year to the present, but the retroactive payments
from 2011 to April 2014 have not been paid, the report discloses.

Since April last year, the SJLRC, Mr. Roberts said, has been
checking with the Ministry of Local Government to find out when
the workers will be paid, the report says.

The SJLRC has been given no guarantee, Mr. Roberts said, as to
when funds will be made available to pay the workers, the report
notes.

The non-payment of the retroactive pay, Mr. Roberts said, has been
affecting workers performance and because of this the council
cannot sit idly by without expressing concerns for the workers,
the report discloses.

The workers, Mr. Roberts said, have also been threatening to take
industrial action, something the corporation cannot afford, the
report adds.


===============
S T.  L U C I A
===============


* ST. LUCIA: We Can Fix Our Broken Economies, PM Says
-----------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that St. Lucia Prime Minister Dr. Kenny
Anthony says Caribbean governments are not managing "failed
economies" even though he admits these economies are struggling
against high unemployment, weak economic performance and natural
disasters.

Dr. Anthony, who is also minister of finance, was speaking at the
opening of the 3rd Caribbean Growth Forum at the Sandals Resort, a
15-minute drive from the capital city Castries, according to
Trinidad Express.

The report notes that the two-day Forum has been organized by the
World Bank and other global financial institutions and aims to
chart a way forward for Caribbean countries to divest and depend
less on commodities, tourism and agriculture.

More than 200 economists, bankers and regional government
officials are gathered for the Forum which will address topics
like harnessing growth in the region, private/public sector
partnerships and competitiveness and jobs, the report relays.

Dr. Anthony described the economic development of the Caribbean as
"anemic", pointing to average growth of just 1.1 per cent from
2008 to 2013, the report relays.

But Dr. Anthony remained optimistic, saying: "We need to dispel
the widespread view that we are all managing failed economies. I
do not subscribe to that perspective.  These economies may be
broken but I believe we can pick up the pieces.  I believe that
our task is to conceptualise, shape and define and economic model
that answers to the times and to our needs," the report relays.

Dr. Anthony recalled that the launch of the Forum three years ago
initiated dialogue for development amongst business groups and
governments, the report notes.

Trinidad and Tobago, St Lucia, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic
are some of the 12 countries that have committed to construct
reforms in areas of investment climate, skills and productivity
and connectivity, Dr. Anthony recalled, the report notes.

But problems remain.

Dr. Anthony said that foreign direct investment flows into the
region declined by 4.7 per cent in the region, the report
discloses.

Declines in tourism, commodities prices and workers' remittances
have "exacerbated the negative impact that the financial crisis
had on economies," Dr. Anthony added.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                   * * * End of Transmission * * *