TCRLA_Public/150703.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, July 3, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 130


                            Headlines



B A H A M A S

BAHA MAR: Asks Court to Enforce Automatic Stay
BAHA MAR: Court Approves Interim DIP Financing From Developer


B R A Z I L

BRASA HOLDINGS: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+' & Removes from Watch Pos.
BRAZIL: Expects to Account for 10% of U.S. Fresh Beef Imports
CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating, Outlook Now Neg.
ODEBRECHT OLEO: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR; Outlook Remains Stable

PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Braskem SA Sued in US for Ties to Scandal
USINAS SIDERURGICAS: S&P Lowers Rating to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
USJ ACUCAR: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B' & Puts on CreditWatch Negative


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

HEBER HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
INGLEBY URUGUAY 1: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 22
INGLEBY URUGUAY 2: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 22
JS & KING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 15
KIRKSWOOD LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 9

LSV LOW: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
NEW EMERGING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 14
OC 520 OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
TIPTOE COMMODITY: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
VISOR FUNDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 14


C H I L E

ENERSIS: Head Steps Down Amid Probe of Political Contributions


M E X I C O

MEXICO: Central Bank Changes Rate Decision Dates Based on Fed
* MEXICO: Remittances to Country Climb 3.6%


P E R U

CORPORACION AZUCARERA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB-'; Outlook Negative


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Moody's Cuts General Obligation Rating to 'Caa3'


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD CEMENT: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC' & Puts on Watch Positive


                            - - - - -


=============
B A H A M A S
=============


BAHA MAR: Asks Court to Enforce Automatic Stay
--------------------------------------------------
Northshore Mainland Services Inc. and its affiliated debtors are
asking the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware to
enter an order (i) enforcing and restating the automatic stay and
ipso facto provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and (ii) authorizing
Northshore to act as the foreign representative on behalf of the
Debtors' estates in any judicial or other proceedings in a foreign
country, including any proceedings in The Bahamas.

Laura Davis Jones, Esq., at Pachulski Stang Ziehl Jones LLP,
explains that given the nature and organizational structure of the
Debtors' businesses, the Debtors regularly and extensively
transact with vendors and suppliers of goods and services located
outside the United States, particularly in The Bahamas.  These
foreign creditors and counterparties are not likely to be familiar
with the Bankruptcy Code, particularly with respect to the various
protections it affords to chapter 11 debtors, including the
automatic stay.  Accordingly, the Debtors ask the Court to enter
an order enforcing and restating the automatic stay and ipso facto
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

In addition, the Debtors intend to seek assistance from the
Supreme Court of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas in order to
further protect the Debtors' assets and operations in The Bahamas.
In order to seek such relief, the Debtors must be authorized to
act as a "foreign representative" on behalf of the Debtors'
estates to seek such relief from the Supreme Court of The
Commonwealth of The Bahamas.  Accordingly, the Debtors seek
authorization from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to act as a "foreign
representative" for purposes of protecting the assets and
interests of the Debtors' estates.

                          About Baha Mar

Baha Mar -- http://www.bahamar.com-- is a 3.3 million square foot
resort complex located in Cable Beach, Nassau, The Bahamas.  A
prominent resident in The Bahamas, Sarkis Izmirlian,
conceptualized the project and has invested almost $900 million
from the project.  With the support of The Bahamian Government,
the project commenced in 2005.  When completed, Baha Mar will
feature elite hotels with gaming, entertainment, private
residences, shopping and natural attractions that reflect an
authentic Bahamian experience.  Amenities will include a Jack
Nicklaus Signature golf course; 200,000 square feet of flexible
convention facilities, including a 2,000-seat entertainment venue;
art galleries featuring Bahamian art; more than 40 restaurants,
bars and clubs; global luxury designer and local artisan
boutiques; and 20 acres of exquisitely landscaped beach and pool
experiences, including a beachfront sanctuary with native Bahamian
flora and fauna.

With the Baha Mar project only 97% complete as a result of
construction delays, Northshore Mainland Services Inc., Baha Mar
Ltd., and 13 other affiliated entities sought bankruptcy
protection in Delaware on June 29, 2015, with the goal of
completing the project while under the umbrella of the bankruptcy
court.  The cases are jointly administered, with joint pleadings
under lead debtor Northshore Mainland Services Inc. (Bankr. D.
Del. Case No. 15-11402).

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCoy, LLP and Kobre & Kim, LLP are
acting as legal advisors, and Moelis & Company is acting as
financial advisor to the filing entities.


BAHA MAR: Court Approves Interim DIP Financing From Developer
-------------------------------------------------------------
Baha Mar Ltd. on July 1 moved forward with its Chapter 11 process,
receiving Court approval for, among other key initiatives, the
continued payment of salaries and benefits, payment of ordinary
course suppliers and vendors for any post-petition claims, and the
operation of certain customer loyalty and other programs.

To enable Baha Mar to undertake these initiatives, the Court
approved the interim Debtor in Possession (DIP) financing arranged
by Sarkis Izmirlian, Baha Mar's developer.  Specifically, the
total DIP facility is up to $80 million of which up to $30 million
will be utilized by Baha Mar over the next 30 days.

Mr. Izmirlian stated, "Our goal is to complete construction and
successfully open Baha Mar as a world-class destination resort
that will attract guests from across the globe and serve as a key
economic sparkplug in The Bahamas.  The Chapter 11 process
provides us the best path to position us to achieve this goal."

More information about Baha Mar's voluntary undertaking of the
Chapter 11 process is available at www.bmpathforward.com
Information for suppliers and vendors is available at 855-410-7357
FREE (U.S.) or +1-646-795-6963 (International).  The court case
number is 15-11402.

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP and Kobre & Kim, LLP are
acting as legal advisors, and Moelis & Company is acting as
financial advisor to the filing entities.

                          About Baha Mar

Baha Mar -- http://www.bahamar.com-- is a 3.3 million square foot
resort complex located in Cable Beach, Nassau, The Bahamas.  A
prominent resident in The Bahamas, Sarkis Izmirlian,
conceptualized the project and has invested almost $900 million
from the project.

With the support of The Bahamian Government, the project commenced
in 2005.  When completed, Baha Mar will feature elite hotels with
gaming, entertainment, private residences, shopping and natural
attractions that reflect an authentic Bahamian experience.
Amenities will include a Jack Nicklaus Signature golf course;
200,000 square feet of flexible convention facilities, including a
2,000-seat entertainment venue; art galleries featuring Bahamian
art; more than 40 restaurants, bars and clubs; global luxury
designer and local artisan boutiques; and 20 acres of exquisitely
landscaped beach and pool experiences, including a beachfront
sanctuary with native Bahamian flora and fauna.

With the Baha Mar project only 97% complete as a result of
construction delays, Northshore Mainland Services Inc., Baha Mar
Ltd., and 13 other affiliated entities sought bankruptcy
protection in Delaware on June 29, 2015, with the goal of
completing the project while under the umbrella of the bankruptcy
court.  The cases are jointly administered, with joint pleadings
under lead debtor Northshore Mainland Services Inc. (Bankr. D.
Del. Case No. 15-11402).

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCoy, LLP and Kobre & Kim, LLP are
acting as legal advisors, and Moelis & Company is acting as
financial advisor to the filing entities.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRASA HOLDINGS: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+' & Removes from Watch Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its corporate credit
rating on Brazilian steak-house operator Brasa Holdings Inc. to
'B+' from 'B'.  At the same time, S&P removed the rating from
CreditWatch with positive implications, where it placed it on
April 21, 2015.

Subsequently, S&P withdraw the rating on Brasa at the issuer's
request.

"The upgrade reflects lower debt leverage following repayment of a
portion of Brasa's outstanding debt following the successful
completion of its IPO.  The company used the majority of the
proceeds from the IPO, together with about $165 million of
borrowings under a new $250 million revolving credit facility, to
repay approximately $243 million of outstanding debt," said credit
analyst Mariola Borysiak.  "Pro forma for the reduced debt, we
estimate total debt to EBITDA improved to below 4x at March 29,
2015 compared with the pre-IPO 4.7x."

Outlook
At the time of the rating withdrawal the outlook was stable.


BRAZIL: Expects to Account for 10% of U.S. Fresh Beef Imports
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Brazilian fresh beef exporters welcomed the
reopening of the U.S. market and said they soon expect to account
for 10 percent of U.S. imports of that food product, sector
sources said.

With the lifting of the ban, Brazil will begin with an annual
export quota of 64,000 tons of fresh beef, which will begin to be
shipped to the United States in September, according to EFE News.

But in the "coming years," Brazil expects that annual quota to
rise to 100,000 tons, or more than 10 percent of total U.S. fresh
beef imports, according to the Brazilian Beef Export Industries
Association, or ABIEC, which comprises 27 companies accounting for
92 percent of foreign sales, the report relates.

The United States imported 957,000 tons of fresh beef in 2014,
mostly from Australia, Canada and New Zealand, ABIEC said, the
report relays.

EFE News notes that U.S. President Barack Obama and Brazilian
counterpart Dilma Rousseff committed to increasing the amount of
energy produced from non-hydro renewable sources and signed
agreements aimed at expanding bilateral trade, including allowing
U.S. imports of fresh beef from Brazil, where foot and mouth
disease is still active.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture said in a proposal earlier this
year that "Brazil has infrastructure and emergency-response
capabilities adequate to effectively contain and eradicate foot
and mouth disease in the event of an outbreak and to comply with
U.S. import restrictions on products from affected areas," EFE
News relays.

In its final rulemaking, the USDA's Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service amended its regulations to allow the
importation of fresh beef from Brazil under specific conditions
that mitigate the risk of foot and mouth disease," the White House
said in a statement, the report notes.

EFE News relays that the agreement comes after 15 years of
negotiations aimed at lifting a U.S. ban on imports of Brazilian
fresh beef.

ABIEC President Antonio Jorge Camardelli said the market reopening
will pave the way for Brazil to negotiate with other countries of
North and Central America, the report notes.

"Several countries use the U.S. system as a reference for
international negotiations and could change their view of our
product.  This will also be an important factor in our
negotiations with Japan, which still maintains a ban on Brazilian
beef," Mr. Camardelli said, the report adds.


CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Caixa Economica Federal's Issuer
Default Ratings, National Ratings, Support Rating and Support
Rating Floor.  The Rating Outlook is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT
Caixa's IDRs, National and senior debt ratings are driven by
sovereign support and equal to Brazil's sovereign ratings.  The
Negative Outlook mirrors that on the sovereign ratings.  The
ratings reflect full ownership by the federal government, the
bank's domestic systemic importance and the policy role it plays
in the implementation of the government's economic programs and
anticyclical measures.  Fitch considers Caixa a public-mission
bank and does not assign a Viability Rating (VR).

The Central Bank of Brazil identified Caixa as a domestic
systemically important bank in 2015.  Caixa is the third and
second-largest bank in Brazil in terms of assets and deposits,
respectively.  It is Brazil's largest lender in the housing
sector, and the largest holder of savings deposits (68% and 36% of
market share, respectively, in March 2015).  The bank's strategy
is driven by government economic policies aimed at extending
credit to the low-income groups.  Caixa finances and manages
government programs such as Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida and
Bolsa Familia.  It also manages various public funds.

Caixa's loan book has grown significantly above the market average
in recent years (36% on average between 2011 and 2014 versus about
15% of sector average in the same period).  Growth was broadly
even across loan books.  In 2014 and the first quarter of 2015
(1Q15), annual growth was lower at 22% and 21%, respectively.  It
revised down its loan growth target for 2015 to 14.5%-18.5%, as a
result of lower funding availability, particularly for mortgages,
and weak macroeconomic environment.  In Fitch's opinion, rapid
loan growth of the past years, coupled with the challenging
macroeconomic environment, may result in asset quality
deterioration, as loans season and the borrowers' payment capacity
deteriorates.

Caixa's asset quality indicators have started showing signs of
weakness as of the second half of 2014.  Fitch expects asset
quality weakening to continue, as a result of the aforementioned
reasons.  At March 2015, impaired loans (loans classified in the
D-H scale of the central bank) and non-performing loans (NPLs)
over 90 days reached 8.67% and 2.86% of total loans, respectively,
up from 7.20% and 2.30%, at end-2013.  Likewise, loan loss reserve
coverage fell to 52% and 158%, of impaired loans and NPLs,
respectively.  Unlike the large private retail banks, Caixa does
not have additional loan loss reserve buffers.  Current NPLs for
mortgage loans are still low compared to similar but more mature
portfolios in Latin America.  Fitch believes Caixa's NPLs are
likely to converge to regional medians in the medium term, even
under a scenario of stable unemployment and household disposable
income.  Recent vintages with a higher loan to value ratios are
likely to be more exposed to a potential decline in real estate
prices.

Caixa's profitability has been lower than the sector average
historically, reflecting the lower net interest margin and larger
cost base, which stems partly from its public policy role.
Furthermore, loan loss charges are likely to rise in the short
term.  At March 2015, these stood at 88% of pre-impairment
operating income, reflecting that there is little room for
absorbing large increases going forward.  In the same period,
Caixa's profitability ratios were slightly weaker than in 2014 and
2013, whereby its ROAA fell to 0.59% from 0.74% at end-2014 and
0.85% at end-2013.

In 1Q15, there was a system-wide net outflow from savings
deposits.  As Caixa is Brasil's largest takes of savings deposits,
it also experienced an outflow, even though it maintained its
market share.  The decline was more than compensated by the
increase of financial bills (letras de credito imobiliario, LCIs).
As savings deposits and financial bills fund about 65% of mortgage
loans, continued pressure on savings deposits would hinder
mortgage loan growth and could lead the bank to revise its loan
growth target downwards.  Caixa has a structural maturity
mismatch, given the long term nature of the mortgage portfolio and
the short term saving deposits.  This makes the bank reliant on
the stability of saving deposits.

Caixa's capital base is sustained by the National Treasury and
Tier 2 securities held by the Workers' Severity and Indemnity Fund
(Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Servico, FGTS).  Historically, its
capital ratios have been below the average of other retail banks,
due to low internal capital generation, very rapid asset growth
and high dividend pay-outs.  The bank's capital adequacy ratios
improved significantly following the central bank's approval to
convert its legacy hybrid securities held by the National Treasury
to Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital in the second half of 2014.
This led to a meaningful improvement in Caixa's FCC ratio, which
stood at 10.31% at March 2015, up from 11.05% at Dec. 2014, and
6.01% at Dec. 2013.  Fitch views Caixa's capitalization levels as
adequate in the short term, considering expectations of slower
growth.  However, capitalization could become a constraint, should
the bank decide to resume fast growth.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The bank's SR of '2' reflects the high probability of support,
should it be needed.  Its SRF of 'BBB' is equivalent to Brazil's
sovereign IDRs.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Caixa's subordinated debt is rated two notches below its long-term
foreign currency IDR.  The notching is driven by the expected high
loss severity of the notes.  No notching for non-performance is
applied because coupons are not deferrable and the write-down
trigger is close to the point of non-viability.  As a result of
this, Fitch believes the non-performance risk is not material from
the rating perspective.  Also, because Caixa is a fully
government-owned domestic systemically important bank, it likely
would receive owner (i.e. government) support before the loss
absorption features of the notes are triggered.  This also
explains why the anchor rating for the notes' rating is Caixa's
support-driven IDR, rather than Fitch's standard anchor rating VR
for hybrid securities.  Fitch does not assign any equity credit to
these securities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT
The bank's IDRs, National and senior debt ratings are sensitive to
a change in Brazil's sovereign ratings and/or to any changes in
its willingness to support Caixa.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The SR and SRF are potentially sensitive to any change in
assumptions around the propensity or ability of the Brazilian
sovereign to provide timely support to the bank.  Fitch does not
expect a change in these assumptions over the rating horizon.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Caixa's subordinated debt ratings are sensitive to the same
considerations that might affect its IDRs, as they are notched
down from the IDR

Fitch has affirmed Caixa's ratings as:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs at 'BBB', Outlook
      Negative;
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDR 'F2';
   -- Long-term national rating at 'AAA(bra)', Outlook Stable;
   -- Short-term national rating at 'F1+(bra)';
   -- Support Rating at '2';
   -- Support Rating Floor at 'BBB';
   -- Senior unsecured USD notes due 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2022,
      long-term foreign currency rating at 'BBB';
   -- Subordinated notes due 2024 at 'BB+'.


COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating, Outlook Now Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its global scale rating
outlook on Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (CSN) to negative from
stable.  In addition, S&P affirmed its 'BB' global scale ratings.
At the same time, S&P lowered its national scale rating to 'brA+'
from 'brAA-'.  The outlook on this rating is negative.

The outlook revision reflects the weak market conditions for
Brazilian steelmakers as shrinking domestic demand pressures CSN's
financial metrics.  In addition, the Brazilian real's depreciation
increases the company's already high debt and interest expenses,
limiting its ability to reduce leverage through its own cash
generation.  As a result, a downgrade is possible within the next
6 months if Brazil's economy remains weak, unless the company
takes extraordinary measures to improve its cash inflows, such as
asset sales.

The ratings on CSN continue to reflect primarily its high debt.
Historically CSN has grown rapidly, mainly through acquisitions
and debt-funded expansions.  This has led to a high and burdensome
debt profile that limits its free cash flow generation.  CSN is
also looking to bring part of its cash allocated outside of Brazil
into the country, where interest rates are higher and would
generate greater interest income.  As a result, S&P expects this
to partially compensate for the high interest expenses from the
company's sizeable debt.  Furthermore, CSN has several non-core
assets that it can sell.  In S&P's base-case scenario, it expects
CSN to have limited free cash generation and successfully
generating cash through nonrecurring measures and use it to reduce
its debt.


ODEBRECHT OLEO: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR; Outlook Remains Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' corporate
credit and issue-level ratings on Odebrecht Oleo e Gas S.A. (OOG).
The outlook remains stable.  The recovery rating on the issue-
level rating remains unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's
expectation that lenders could expect meaningful (50% to 70%)
recovery if a payment default occurs.  S&P's recovery expectations
are in the higher half of the 50% to 70% range.  In addition, the
company's SACP remains unchanged at 'b+'.

S&P views OOG as a project developer and base S&P's ratings on its
ability to meet financial obligations at the holding level from
dividends from its operating subsidiaries.  The credit rating
reflects the aggregate quality of the residual distributions from
the company's projects.  S&P has made this analytical judgment
because OOG segregates its assets into special purpose entities
(SPEs) through which it makes extensive use of nonrecourse project
financing.  S&P views the quality of cash flow (QCF) of each
dividend stream.


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Braskem SA Sued in US for Ties to Scandal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia Hurtado and Dawn McCarty at Bloomberg News report that a
Braskem SA shareholder sued the petrochemical company for
securities fraud in a case tied to Petroleo Brasileiro SA, as
litigation in the U.S. over the Brazilian energy company's bribery
scandal expands to customers.

Petrobras sells naphtha to Braskem, Latin America's largest
petrochemical maker.  The material, the main ingredient for making
petrochemicals, is sold under long-term agreements between the two
firms, according to investor Douglas Peters.

Petrobras has been accused of involvement in a bribery scheme that
has rocked Brazil's economy and triggered lawsuits in the U.S.,
according to Bloomberg News.

The report relays that Mr. Peters alleged in his complaint that
Braskem didn't disclose it paid at least $5 million a year to
Petrobras from 2006 to 2012 to acquire crude derivative contracts
at lower prices.

"Braskem paid bribes to buy cheaper raw material from Petrobras
between 2006 and 2012," Mr. Peters said in court papers, the
report notes.  "Braskem's internal controls were grossly
ineffective," Mr. Peters added.

The report discloses that Braskem officials made false and
misleading statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission about its internal controls, according to Peters'
proposed class-action lawsuit filed in Manhattan federal court.

Braskem declined to comment, saying it hasn't been notified of the
lawsuit.  Braskem Chief Executive Officer Carlos Fadigas and three
other current or former executives are also named as defendants in
the case, the report notes.

                     Braskem's Investigation

Former Petrobras executive Paulo Roberto Costa and admitted money
launderer Alberto Youssef claimed in testimony published on the
Brazil Supreme Court's website in March that Braskem had paid
bribes, the report relays.  In April, Braskem said in a SEC filing
that it had hired law firms to investigate the bribery
allegations, the report notes.

Mr. Peters said he sued on behalf of investors who bought Braskem
American Depositary Receipts from June 1, 2010, to March 11, 2015.
Braskem ADRs fell more than 20 percent or $1.80 after the
disclosures were made, according to the complaint, the report
discloses.

Braskem fell 4.7 percent in Brazil trading July 1.

The case is Peters v. Braskem SA, 15-cv-05132, U.S. District
Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

                  About Petroleo Brasileiro

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. --
Petrobras (Brazilian Petroleum Corporation) -- explores for oil
and gas and it produces, refines, purchases, and transports oil
and gas products.  The Company has proved reserves of about 14.1
billion barrels of oil equivalent and operates 16 refineries, an
extensive pipeline network, and more than 8,000 gas stations.

                       *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 12, 2015, Moody's Investors Service said the corruption
investigation into Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) will
negatively affect parts of the public and private sectors, but
government support for the company is likely to help contain the
credit-negative impact.

On March 6, 2015, the TCLRA reported that the deepening
investigation into the alleged kickback scheme at Petrobras has
triggered concerns for the Brazilian banks with exposures not only
to the state-controlled oil company, but also to its large base of
suppliers, as well as the broader oil and gas (O&G) and
construction industries, says Moody's Investors Service.

Moody's Investors Service downgraded all ratings for Petrobras,
including a downgrade of the company's senior unsecured debt to
Ba2 from Baa3, and assigned a Ba2 Corporate Family Rating to the
company, the TCRLA reported on Feb. 27, 2015.  Its failure to
estimate its losses from the alleged corruption scheme and produce
audited third-quarter results prompted Moody's to cut its rating
to junk, the report said.

Rival agency Standard & Poor's delivered a further blow on March
23 when it revised its outlook on the company from stable to
negative, the TCRLA reported on March 26, 2015.

On Feb. 10, 2015, TCRLA said Fitch Ratings has downgraded the
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and
outstanding debt ratings of Petrobras to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'.
Concurrently, Fitch has placed all of Petrobras' international and
national scale ratings on Rating Watch Negative.


USINAS SIDERURGICAS: S&P Lowers Rating to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services downgraded its global scale
ratings on Brazil-based steel producer Usinas Siderurgicas de
Minas Gerais S.A. (Usiminas) to 'BB-' from 'BB'.  At the same time
S&P downgraded the national scale ratings to 'brA' from 'brA+'.
S&P is also lowering the issue-level ratings on Usiminas
Comercial's notes to 'BB-'.  The outlook on the corporate credit
ratings is stable.

The rating' action reflects the company's weakened operational
performance and credit metrics, which has continued to deteriorate
amid sluggish conditions in the Brazilian steel market.  Even
though the company's total indebtedness is somewhat low compared
to its peers, Usiminas' operating efficiency compares unfavorably
with its competitors, and the company has less flexibility to
improve product and market mix.  This has yielded lower margins
and volumes.  As a result of weakened performance, the company's
ability to generate free cash flow and to reduce indebtedness will
remain limited.  Also, S&P believes Usiminas will breach its
covenant requirements by mid-year 2015.

The soft market conditions in Brazil have highlighted the
weaknesses in Usiminas' business, mainly its lack of product
diversification, expensive logistic configuration, stemming from
delays in port operations and high production costs in its iron
ore operations.  During the past few quarters, the company was
forced to idle 15% of its steel capacity to reduce costs, and
could further scale back its operations.  Steel production is
expected to decrease to 4.8 million in 2015 -- from 5.5 million
tons in 2014 -- which is below S&P's previous expectation for 5.2
million tons in 2015.  The reduction in total output should allow
the company to maintain EBITDA margins at about 10% in 2015.
Usiminas is the second-largest flat steel producer in Brazil, with
vertical integration in iron ore operations, and S&P's assessment
reflects both its size and standing in the Brazilian market.
However, the company is exposed to a relatively cyclical industry
and its product and geographic concentration are vulnerabilities
amid depleting demand.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that--despite potentially
weaker operating performance over the next several quarters, if
market conditions continue to worsen--Usiminas will maintain its
metrics because it has adjusted its production capacity and
focused on its more profitable operations.  Also, the company is
reducing investments significantly in order to limit cash flow
pressure, while its robust cash position should provide a cushion
for additional liquidity pressures.  Even amid a weak market
environment, S&P estimates Usiminas will sustain debt to EBITDA of
4.0x and FFO to debt of 9% in 2015.


USJ ACUCAR: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B' & Puts on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its global scale
corporate credit and issue-level ratings on USJ Acucar e Alcool
S.A. to 'B' from 'B+'.  At the same time, S&P lowered its Brazil
national scale corporate credit and issue-level ratings on the
company to 'brBB-' from 'brBBB-'.  S&P has placed all ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P's recovery rating of
'4', reflecting its expectation of a 30-40% recovery of principal
in the event of a payment default, remains unchanged.

The rating actions reflect USJ's increasing liquidity pressures
because it has a hard time generating operating cash flows amid
significant short-term debt and interest maturities and tightening
lending conditions for the sector.  S&P will further downgrade the
company if it can't sell some of its land holdings in the next few
months.  S&P expects the company to use the proceeds from such
sales to repay more expensive debt and reduce interest burden,
which would bolster operating and free cash flow generation and
extend debt amortizations.

Although USJ has recently managed to rollover part of its short-
term debt, credit for the sector is tightening and costlier while
the real's depreciation pushes up principal and interest payments
in dollars.  Moreover, sugar prices remain low reducing prospects
for improving cash flows.

The drought diminished USJ's cane availability and raised its idle
capacity to 20% in the 2014-2015 harvest season.  These factors,
along with its still sizable capex, capital injection in its joint
venture, SJC Bioenergia, and high interest payments, have resulted
in a FOCF loss and "highly leveraged" financial metrics.

The positive factors are the company's likely higher crushing
volumes of about 3.3 million tons of sugarcane in fiscal 2016, the
cost-cutting measures, improved industrial efficiency and somewhat
better ethanol profits, somewhat stable exported sugar prices in
Brazilian reals, and the expected excess cogenerated energy to be
sold.  These factors, along with the higher productivity and more
valuable land than those of its industry peers, support S&P's
"fair" business risk profile.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================

HEBER HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On June 3, 2015, the sole shareholder of Heber Holdings Inc.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Luiz Alves Paes De Barros
          Telephone: 949-8344
          Harbour Place, 4th Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 10240 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands


INGLEBY URUGUAY 1: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 22
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ingleby Uruguay Holding 1 Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by July 22, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 1, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Christopher Kennedy
          c/o Omar Grant
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295
          P.O. Box 897
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands


INGLEBY URUGUAY 2: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 22
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ingleby Uruguay Holding 2 Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by July 22, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 1, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Christopher Kennedy
          c/o Omar Grant
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295
          P.O. Box 897
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands


JS & KING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 15
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of JS & King Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 15, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Jan. 30, 2015.

Elba Bethancourt is the company's liquidator.


KIRKSWOOD LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 9
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Kirkswood Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 9, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart C E Mackellar
          Zolfo Cooper (BVI) Limited
          c/o Ami Sweeney
          Telephone: (+1) 284 393 9600
          Facsimile: (+1) 284 393 9601
          e-mail: ami.sweeney@zolfocooper.vg


LSV LOW: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------
On June 5, 2015, the sole shareholder of LSV Low Volatility Fund,
Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          LSV Advisors, LLC
          540 Madison Avenue, 33rd Floor
          New York
          New York 10022
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 378 3700
          Email: notices@lsvfinancial.com


NEW EMERGING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 14
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of New Emerging Medical Opportunities Fund, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by July 14, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on May 22, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Gene Dacosta
          Telephone: (345) 814 7765
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


OC 520 OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On June 3, 2015, the sole shareholder of OC 520 Offshore Fund Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Westport Services Ltd.
          c/o Richard Lewis
          Telephone: (345) 949 5122
          Facsimile: (345) 949 7920
          P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


TIPTOE COMMODITY: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------------
On May 22, 2015, the sole shareholder of Tiptoe Commodity Offshore
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alexander Gansch
          c/o Ridhiima Kapoor
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands


VISOR FUNDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 14
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Visor Funding Cayman 2 are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 14, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 1, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuarts Walker Hersant Humphries
          Telephone: (345) 949 3344
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2888
          P.O. Box 2510 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


=========
C H I L E
=========


ENERSIS: Head Steps Down Amid Probe of Political Contributions
--------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Chief Executive Officer of Chilean energy
company Enersis, a subsidiary of Italy's Enel, has resigned,
members of the company said.

The decision taken by Jorge Rosenblut, one of the major fund-
raisers for President Michelle Bachelet's electoral compaign, was
announced at a meeting of the board that he attended by
videoconference, according to EFE News.

The report notes that Mr. Rosenblut was with Enersis for 15 years,
first as a director and then as president of the Chilectra
distributor for nine years, followed by another five as president
of the Endesa power company, until he was tabbed eight months ago
for the top job.

Mr. Rosenblut's resignation came amid criticism of his fund-
raising activities for political campaigns, the report relates.

The report says Mr. Rosenblut had already revealed his role in
raising funds for the electoral campaigns of 2012 that involved
the mining company SQM.

But statements made by the political strategist of Bachelet's New
Majority coalition, Giorgio Martelli, were what really troubled
the Enersis directors, the report notes.

The report discloses that Mr. Martelli, owner of a consulting
firm, testified as a defendant before prosecutors probing
irregularities committed by companies funding politicians, and
pointed to Rosenblut's prominent role in obtaining such financing
while he was president of Endesa Chile.

Mr. Rosenblut is also expected to be summoned for a deposition as
a potential defendant, though no date has been set for his court
appearance, the report adds.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


MEXICO: Central Bank Changes Rate Decision Dates Based on Fed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Martin at Bloomberg News reports that Mexico's central bank
changed the dates of its interest-rate decisions for the rest of
the year to improve its ability to react to an expected increase
in U.S. borrowing costs.

Interest-rate swaps rose as traders saw the move as a signal
Mexico will raise borrowing costs right after the Federal Reserve,
according to Bloomberg News.

Banco de Mexico moved its decisions to one day after the Fed for
July, October and December, and to within a week of the Fed in
September, according to a statement, Bloomberg News notes.  The
new dates will allow policy makers to have the most current
information about Fed decisions when they decide Mexico policy,
the bank said in its statement, Bloomberg News discloses.

Mexico's central bank will probably keep borrowing costs unchanged
until the fourth quarter, when they'll raise them for the first
time since 2008 after the Fed increases rates, according to the
median forecast of economists surveyed by Bloomberg.

                        'Clear Signaling'

"The signaling is very clear to me: the central bank of Mexico
will really react to what the Fed does," Benito Berber, an analyst
at Nomura Holdings Inc., told Bloomberg News in a telephone
interview from New York.  "This decision solidifies that view. If
the Fed goes, Banxico goes," Mr. Berber said.

One-year rate swaps extended their increase after the
announcement, rising 0.07 percentage point to 3.76 percent at 2:29
p.m. on July 2, in Mexico City, signaling higher odds of a rate
increase, Bloomberg News relays.  Six-month swaps also climbed.
The peso maintained its loss, falling 0.3 percent to 15.7878 per
dollar, Bloomberg News notes.

Mexico's policy makers have said they're concerned a smaller rate
advantage versus the U.S. could prompt investors to pull money out
of Latin America's second-largest economy, Bloomberg News notes.

The difference between the two nations' target rates is 2.75
percentage points, the least since Mexico adopted a new benchmark
in 2008, Bloomberg News relays.

Mexico's rate decisions will be announced on July 30, Sept. 21,
Oct. 29 and Dec. 17, compared with the previous plan for decisions
on July 23, Sept. 3, Oct. 15 and Dec. 3, Bloomberg News adds.


* MEXICO: Remittances to Country Climb 3.6%
-------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Mexico received $9.93 billion in remittances
during the first five months of the year, an increase of 3.6
percent over the same period in 2014, the central bank said.

Expatriates sent home an average of $294 per remittance during
January-May, unchanged from last year, according to the report
from the Banco de Mexico, the report relates.


=======
P E R U
=======


CORPORACION AZUCARERA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB-'; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Corporacion Azucarera del Peru, S.A.
(Coazucar) to 'BB-' from 'BB'.  The outlook is negative.  S&P also
lowered its long-term issue-level rating on the company's $325
million senior unsecured notes due 2022 to 'BB-' from 'BB'.

"The rating action reflects Coazucar's weaker than expected
operating performance and below average EBITDA margins, which
stemmed primarily from prolonged weakness in global sugar prices,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Alexandre Michel.  The
devaluation of the Peruvian Nuevo sol (PEN) against the U.S.
dollar further eroded the company's key financial credit metrics.
As of 2014, it had debt to EBITDA of 7.3x, funds from operations
(FFO) to debt of 5.4%, and an EBITDA interest coverage ratio of
1.6x.  The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that Coazucar's
operating performance and credit metrics could further weaken if
sugar prices are lower than forecasted, and if the company does
not achieve its goals for cost reduction in the next 12 months.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Moody's Cuts General Obligation Rating to 'Caa3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico's general obligation (GO) and guaranteed bonds as well
as its senior lien Sales Tax Financing Corporation (Sr COFINA)
bonds to Caa3 from Caa2.  "We also lowered ratings assigned to
other securities, including bonds of the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority, which also were downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2.
Bonds already in the Ca category were affirmed at that level. In
all, about $55.5 billion was affected by these actions. With the
GO rating action, the seventh downgrade in the past five years,
the commonwealth's rating has declined 12 notches since 2011. The
outlook for all affected securities remains negative."

SUMMARY RATING RATIONALE

Governor Alejandro GarcĀ”a Padilla's declaration that the
commonwealth cannot pay its debt, the suspension of a law
requiring monthly general obligation debt service deposits and the
decision to devise broad restructuring plans are clear signs that
holders of even those Puerto Rico securities with strong legal
protections face significant loss. While our ratings still
indicate higher recovery rates for the GO and senior COFINA bonds
than for other Puerto Rico government and public corporation
securities, it appears unlikely that a limited restructuring
excluding those better-protected bonds will be sufficient for
Puerto Rico to gain the relief desired. This is consistent with
the fact that the GO and COFINA bonds account for a very large
share of Puerto Rico's debt.

OUTLOOK

The outlook for Puerto Rico and its related debt remains negative,
because of trends such as weakening liquidity and economic
deterioration, which we believe point to recovery prospects at the
low end of estimates. Efforts to right-size a debt burden that has
become overwhelming, following years of deficit financing and
economic stagnation, probably will trigger a long and litigious
process, perhaps heightening bondholder loss prospects. We will
adjust ratings as needed to the extent that recovery rates appear
to diverge from those implied by our ratings.

OBLIGOR PROFILE

Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States, with a population
of 3.5 million (and an estimated population decline of 1.4% in
2014). The island has a high unemployment rate of 11.8%, high debt
and pension metrics, and a declining economy.

LEGAL SECURITY

This action affects many of the commonwealth's securities,
including the GO debt, which is a full faith and credit obligation
of the commonwealth.

USE OF PROCEEDS

Not applicable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Municipal Finance Agency, Puerto Rico
Highway & Transportation Authority, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer
Authority, Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority,
Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico, Convention Center
District Authority, and Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation
debt was US States Rating Methodology published in April 2013.

The additional methodology used in rating the Puerto Rico Highway
& Transportation Authority debt, the Puerto Rico Infrastructure
Financing Authority debt, and the Puerto Rico Convention Center
District Authority debt was US Public Finance Special Tax
Methodology published in January 2014.

The additional methodology used in rating the Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority was US Municipal Utility Revenue Debt
published in December 2014.

The additional methodology used in rating the Puerto Rico Public
Finance Corporation debt was The Fundamentals of Credit Analysis
for Lease-Backed Municipal Obligations published in December 2011.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


TRINIDAD CEMENT: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC' & Puts on Watch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its corporate credit
rating on Trinidad Cement Limited Group (TCL) to 'CCC' from 'D'.
S&P also placed this rating on CreditWatch positive to reflect the
likelihood that TCL's liquidity could improve if the company
successfully refinances its current bridge loan due February 2016.
At the same time, S&P assigned a preliminary 'B-' issue-level
rating to the company's proposed $245 million senior secured term
loan.

The rating action reflects TCL's completion of its debt
restructuring in May 2015, after the company missed its debt
service payments in September 2014.  Debt restructuring included
an 11% debt prepayment discount and $15 million cash prepayment,
which reduced the company's outstanding debt to $245 million in
May 2015 from about $292 million at the end of 2014.  TLC
refinanced this amount through a bridge loan it took out in May
2015, which is due February 2016.

The CreditWatch positive listing reflects the likelihood that TCL
could improve its debt maturity profile and liquidity within the
next three months.  This will be possible if the company
successfully refinance its $245 million bridge loan due February
2016.  Such scenario will likely result in an upgrade to 'B-',
assuming that the credit metrics will remain in line with the
rating, such as adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 3.0x, FFO to debt
of about 20%, and EBITDA interest coverage of about 3.2x by the
end of 2015.  The company's expected improvements in operating
efficiencies and cost reductions should allow it to post EBITDA
margin close to 23% in the next two years.  S&P also expects the
company to continue to generate FOCF in this same period.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *