TCRLA_Public/150720.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, July 20, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 140


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Debt Holdouts May Sue to Ban Bonar 2024 Bond Payments


B O L I V I A

BOLIVIA: Fitch Raises IDRs to 'BB' & Revises Outlook to Stable


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Moody's Says Economy Will Continue to Challenge Companies
OI SA: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB'; Outlook Revised to Negative
TONON BIOENERGIA: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'RD'


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CALLISTO MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
CALLISTO PRIME: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
CALLISTO PRIME (GP): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
CENTURY ASSETS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
COLUMBIA REINSURANCE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

CREDIT SUISSE INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 28
EDMOND INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 6
FLETCHER INCOME: Creditors to Hold Meeting on Aug. 27
LAXEY LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 10
NIMUE LEASING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


C H I L E

CHILE: Moody's Says Economy Will Weather Slowdown in Investment


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Poll Says Retailers Upbeat on Business Climate
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Migrant 'Crisis' Must be Dealt With, OAS Says


E L  S A L V A D O R

BANCO AGRICOLA: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB'


J A M A I C A

CIBONEY GROUP: Incurs J$5 Million Loss During 12-Months to May 15


P E R U

PERU: Moody's Says Credit Quality Will Remain Stable Through 2016


P U E R T O    R I C O

AES PUERTO RICO: Fitch Retains 'CC' Sr. Bond Rating on Watch Neg.
DORAL FINANCIAL: FDIC Can Repudiate Servicing Agreement with Bank
PUERTO RICO: Failed to Send Money for Bond Payments


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD CEMENT: Profits as Cement Sales Increase


U R U G U A Y

ACI AIRPORT: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to $200MM Sr. Sec. Notes


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 13 to July 17, 2015


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Debt Holdouts May Sue to Ban Bonar 2024 Bond Payments
----------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that holdout U.S. hedge funds seeking full
payment on bonds they bought at large discounts following Buenos
Aires' massive 2001 default may sue to block Argentina from
servicing Bonar notes that mature in 2024, a judge ruled.

U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa in Manhattan ruled that the
holdouts, led by Elliott Management Corp. founder and CEO Paul
Singer's NML Capital Ltd., can try to make those bonds subject to
his 2012 ruling in favor of the litigating hedge funds, according
to EFE News.

That decision ordered Argentina to pay the hedge funds $1.35
billion plus interest on defaulted bonds, the report notes.

EFE News relates that based on a "pari passu" (equal treatment)
clause in those bonds, he also ruled that the South American
country cannot make payments to so-called "exchange" bondholders
who accepted substantial haircuts in 2005 and 2010 debt
restructurings without simultaneously paying the holdouts.

Judge Griesa has ruled that the "vast majority" of the exchange
bonds, even those issued under Argentine law, qualify as "foreign"
indebtedness and are subject to the pari passu clause, EFE News
notes.

Seeking to get around Judge Griesa's rulings and gain access to
international financing, Argentina issued more of its dollar-
denominated Bonar 2024 bonds, which are not part of the debt
restructurings, in April, EFE News relays.

Since then, the holdouts have tried to block payment on the Bonar
notes on the basis that they were offered to foreign investors, an
attempt Argentina's Economy Ministry has called "another attempt
at extortion," EFE News discloses.

Argentina defaulted on roughly $100 billion in debt in December
2001 -- at the time the largest sovereign default in history --
amid a financial meltdown and economic depression, EFE News says.

The origins of the debt problem go back to Argentina's 1976-1983
military regime, which presided over a 465 percent expansion in
public indebtedness, the report adds.

                         *     *     *


The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 9, 2015,
reported that EFE News said U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa has
handed down a new decision against Argentina in a long-running
debt case, ruling that the country must pay $5.4 billion to a
group of "me-too" creditors based on an equal-treatment provision
in their bond contracts.  The more than 500 plaintiffs hold debt
that Argentina defaulted on in 2001 and refused to join the vast
majority of creditors in accepting steep haircuts in 2005 and 2010
restructurings.

Judge Griesa ruled in 2012 in favor of another group of holdout
bondholders led by two hedge funds -- NML Capital Ltd., a unit of
Paul Singer's Elliott Management Corp., and Aurelius Capital
Management -- ordering Argentina to pay them $1.3 billion plus
interest.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 1, 2014, reported that Argentina defaulted on
some of its debt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court- appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed.

The country hasn't been able to access international credit
markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA said Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.

On April 22, 2015, Moody's Investors Service expanded the portion
of Argentina's debt that is rated (P)Caa2. The (P)Caa2 rating
reflects the higher risk of default for both Argentina's
restructured foreign legislation debt (as before) and,
additionally now, its restructured local legislation foreign
currency obligations, as compared with the risk of default on
other debt instruments issued by Argentina.  Argentina's local
currency debt and its non-restructured foreign currency debt are
rated Caa1. The debt that remains in default since Argentina's
2001 default is rated Ca.


=============
B O L I V I A
=============


BOLIVIA: Fitch Raises IDRs to 'BB' & Revises Outlook to Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Bolivia's long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  Fitch
also upgraded the issue ratings on Bolivia's senior unsecured
foreign and local currency bonds to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  The Rating
Outlooks on the long-term IDRs have been revised to Stable from
Positive.  In addition, Fitch has upgraded the Country Ceiling to
'BB' from 'BB-' and affirmed the short-term foreign currency IDR
at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Bolivia has improved the sustainability of its hydrocarbons
production, the largest source of exports, fiscal revenue and
domestic investment.  In the absence of new discoveries, official
forecasts indicate that deep drilling and developments around
existing fields could provide the marginal output increase to
sustain gas production and meet local demand and export contracts
with Argentina and Brazil at least until 2019.  Smoothing the
declining curve of production beyond this date would depend on the
capacity to overcome political, technical and financing challenges
to the execution of a USD7 billion (20% of GDP) five-year upstream
investment plan, primarily focused on exploration.

Regulatory uncertainty and nationalization risks have eased.
Government and businesses agreed on reforms to the investment
regime that facilitate private participation in sectors that are
not subject to state control and recognize independent
conciliation and arbitration for contractual disputes.  The
authorities ceased nationalizations in 2013 and have paid USD690
million (2% of GDP) in compensation to multinational companies.
Sustained improvements in rule of law and the business environment
are key to lift the country's domestic investment rate, which at
an estimated 20% of GDP in 2015, continues to lag behind the 'BB'
median of 22%.

Bolivia's robust external buffers and ample fiscal policy space
render its economy better-placed to absorb adverse shocks and
adopt counter-cyclical policies than other commodity exporters in
the 'BB' category.  Fitch expects that the correction in oil
prices and a public investment impulse could swing the budget and
current account to deficits of up to 4% of GDP in 2015-2017.  A
low public debt starting point (30% of GDP), ample public sector
deposits (23% of GDP), large foreign reserves (46% of GDP),
resilient foreign direct investment and access to multilaterals
and global bond markets reduce sustainability and financing risks.

Five-year average economic growth rose to 5.4% in 2014, exceeding
the 'BB' median of 4.1%.  Faster growth has supported the
reduction of Bolivia's large per capita income gap, which remains
23% below the median of rating peers.  Fitch forecasts that
economic activity could keep pace at an average 4.4% in 2015-2017,
driven by robust public investment in diversification and
industrialization projects and eased domestic liquidity
conditions.  Further weakening in oil prices, execution
bottlenecks and delays represent downside risks to the growth
outlook.

Higher inflation rates than trading partners have led the
Boliviano to strengthen a cumulative 25% in real terms since 2009,
the largest appreciation in the 'BB' category.  Recent currency
depreciations in neighbouring Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are
affecting the competitiveness of the local industry and increasing
incentives for imports.  Exchange rate adjustments are unlikely
unless the ongoing oil price correction is sharper and more
prolonged.  Monetary authorities use the nominal exchange rate as
a nominal anchor to preserve purchasing power, control inflation
expectations and deepen financial de-dollarisation.  Fitch
forecasts that inflation could moderate to 5% in 2015-2017 from
5.8% in 2014.

Fitch revised its Macro Prudential Indicator for Bolivia to '3'
from '2' in June 2014, signaling that the potential for financial
systemic risks is high due to the combination of rapid credit
growth and real exchange appreciation since 2012.  The agency
recognizes that available real estate and equity market data is
less conclusive about the existence of potential bubbles.

The implementation of the new banking law is having mixed results
on the financial system.  Larger banks are better placed to
increase lending volumes to mitigate the negative impact of
interest rate controls on profitability and capitalization.
Microfinance entities have greater difficulties to meet mandatory
credit quotas for housing and productive loans due to their large
exposure to commercial lending and high dependence on interest
margins.  The strength of the new deposit insurance and resolution
schemes will be important to guarantee financial stability in
event that increased competition results in greater consolidation
in the system.

Bolivia's 'BB' ratings and Stable Outlook balance its stronger
sovereign fiscal and external balance sheet than peers, sustained
economic growth and record of macroeconomic stability against
structural constraints such as low GDP per capita, weak
institutional quality and a poor business environment relative to
'BB'-rated sovereigns.  High export commodity dependence, at over
70% of current external receipts, is higher than the 'BB' median
of 17% and exposes the country's credit metrics to terms of trade
shocks and gas supply shortages.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's assessment that upside and
downside risks to the rating are currently balanced.  The main
risk factors that, individually or collectively, could trigger a
rating action are:

Positive:

   -- Improvements in the business environment and governance
      indicators that enhance investment rates and boost natural
      gas production prospects;
   -- Higher economic growth allowing for faster per capita income
      convergence without increasing macroeconomic imbalances.

Negative:

   -- Hydrocarbons production shocks or further fall in export
      prices that impair the sovereign's fiscal and external
      solvency ratios;
   -- Fiscal slippage and materialization of contingent
      liabilities leading to faster-than-expected worsening of
      debt dynamics and erosion of public sector deposits;
   -- Policy mismanagement or regulatory changes that affect
      macroeconomic stability or the health of the financial
      system.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The ratings and Outlooks are sensitive to a number of assumptions:

   -- Fitch's growth, fiscal and external forecasts assume that
      Bolivia maintains natural gas production at present levels
      (0.7 trillion cubic feet per year) and is able to meet the
      gas requirements from the local market and export contracts
      with Argentina and Brazil in 2015-2017.  International Brent
      oil prices, a benchmark for Bolivia's energy contracts, are
      expected to average at USD65 per barrel in 2015 and recover
      to USD80 by 2017.

   -- Fitch assumes continuation of the government policies that
      have ceased nationalizations in 2013 and accelerated the
      settlement of international arbitration disputes since then.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: Moody's Says Economy Will Continue to Challenge Companies
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Brazil's weak economy will continue to weigh on Brazilian
companies through at least mid-2016 as it faces political
uncertainties, inflation and deteriorating investor confidence,
says Moody's Investors Service. The rating agency expects that
Brazil's GDP will decrease by 1.8% in 2015 but increase by 1.0% in
2016.

"Brazil's economy contracted by 1.6% in the first quarter of 2015
compared with a year earlier -- worse than the 0.2% decline in the
fourth quarter of 2014," says Marcos Schmidt, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Analyst. "Corruption investigations have
significantly strained the Brazilian economy, dragging on the
engineering and construction and energy sectors, with spillover
effects into the steel and building materials industries."

The report, "Corporate Credit Quality in Brazil: Slower Growth,
Inflation, Ebbing Confidence Pose Risks for Companies," notes that
the Brazilian government's investigation of Operation Lava Jato
has made investors wary of Brazil's non-financial companies,
limiting their access to global debt markets.

Furthermore, both consumer confidence and purchasing power have
deteriorated on the back of increasing household debt, high
interest rates, rising inflation and unemployment. Brazilian
consumers have ultimately tightened spending on durable goods and
even non-discretionary items such as pharmaceuticals.

"Weak economic conditions and reduced passenger demand will limit
revenue growth and margins for Brazil's airlines through at least
mid-2016," says Schmidt. "Similarly, growth will slow for
Brazilian telecom companies as customer bases and revenues
decline, while mining companies will struggle with soft worldwide
demand and weak prices for iron ore and base metals."

Meanwhile, pulp exporters will benefit from the weak Brazilian
real and favorable exchange rate. Nevertheless, inflation,
unemployment and falling consumer confidence will restrain
companies from raising prices.


OI SA: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB'; Outlook Revised to Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Oi S.A.'s long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'BB' from 'BB+'.  Fitch
has also downgraded Oi's National long-term rating and National
long-term debentures to 'AA-(bra)' from 'AA(bra)'.  The Rating
Outlook on these ratings has been revised to Negative from Stable.
Fitch has also downgraded Oi's senior unsecured and secured debt,
and the senior unsecured notes issued by Oi Brasil Holdings
Cooperatief U.A (Oi Netherlands) to 'BB' from 'BB+'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades mainly reflect a negative operating environment in
Brazil and Oi's weak market position, and its persistent negative
free cash flow (FCF) generation, which Fitch does not expect to be
curbed in the short- to medium-term.  Oi's financial profile has
continued to deteriorate and is no longer considered strong within
the 'BB' rating category. Also, low visibility on the potential
industry consolidation in Brazil is a negative.  Without this,
Fitch does not foresee any material improvement in Oi's operating
fundamentals over the medium term.

Oi's ratings reflect its fully integrated fixed and mobile service
lineup, which enables convergent service offerings, its extensive
network coverage and its incumbent fixed-telephony service
provider position in Brazil.  The company's liquidity is sound
following its recent sale of PT Portugal, SGPS, S.A. (PT
Portugal).  The ratings are tempered by Oi's weak market positon
and high leverage.  The operating environment is unfavorable as
the competitive pressures in Brazil are among the highest in the
region.
Tough Operating Environment:

Brazil remains one of the most competitive markets in Latin
America, while its mobile market has increasingly become
saturated.  Oi has the lowest mobile market share among the four
major players, with about 18% subscriber shares.  Mobile data and
fixed services, including broadband and pay-TV, have become the
key growth drivers for the industry, but Oi's rivals have made
more aggressive investments in those services than the company so
far.  Under this environment, Oi's Brazilian revenue and routine
EBITDA contracted by 3% and 8%, respectively, in 2014.

Positively, Oi managed to successfully execute various cost saving
measures which led to EBITDA turnaround during the first quarter
of 2015 (1Q15).  Despite high inflationary pressures, the
company's operating expenses from the main Brazil operation
declined by 5% compared to a year ago, resulting in EBITDA
improving by 13% to BRL1.9 billion from BRL1.7 billion during the
same period.  Backed by these measures, Fitch believes that Oi's
2015 Brazil EBITDA target of BRL7.0 billion-BRL7.4 billion is
achievable.
Weak Cash Flow Generation; High Leverage

Oi's negative FCF generation is unlikely to be curbed in the
short- to medium-term given unfavorable operating environment.
Despite projected modest EBITDA improvement, the company's high
interest expenses, capex, and judicial deposits will continue to
weigh on its cash flow generation and negatively affect leverage.
Oi's leverage is considered high for the rating category.  The
company intends to sell its 75% equity stake in Africatel Holdings
BV, the net book value of which was BRL5.8 billion including the
dividends receivable of BRL1.5 billion as of March 2015, but the
likelihood remains uncertain due to the legal dispute with another
shareholder.  Excluding this, any deleveraging in the short term
would remain difficult.

Sale of PT Portugal:

Oi's recent sale of PT Portugal to Altice Portugal S.A. (Altice)
is positive as it provided ample liquidity and financial
flexibility for the company to pursue any strategic investment
options, if needed.  Following the transaction, the company's net
debt was significantly reduced to BRL33 billion from BRL52 billion
at March 31, 2015, including its guarantees for PT Portugal debt.
Leverage has also improved moderately as Fitch estimates that the
financial leverage of PT Portugal assets sold to Altice which
excludes African assets was estimated to be above 5.0x in 2014.
Based on Oi's pro forma routine EBITDA during the last 12 months
(LTM) ended March 2015, Fitch estimates the company's adjusted net
leverage following the asset sale including the hedge derivatives
and tax instalments to be about 4.3x.

On June 2, 2015, Oi completed the sale of PT Portugal and received
the net cash proceeds of EUR4.9 billion, after the prepayment of
EUR869million of PT Portugal debt.  As part of the transaction,
Portugal Telecom International Finance B.V. (PTIF) became Oi's
wholly owned subsidiary, and PTIF's outstanding debt, which
amounts to about EUR4.9 billion, is now included in Oi's
consolidated debt.  Oi plans to use the proceeds only for its debt
repayment unless there is an industry consolidation opportunity in
Brazil.

Industry Consolidation:

The delay in industry consolidation is negative for Oi.  Despite
Oi's intent to pursue options for industry consolidation, the
details on the structure, or timing of the deal remains largely
uncertain at the moment.  Without the industry restructuring,
Fitch does not foresee any meaningful recovery in Oi's credit
profile.

In Fitch's view, the transformation to a three-player market led
by Oi in a crowded Brazil telecom industry should benefit the
company, as it would ease the competitive intensity, mainly price-
based competition, and help protect industrywide profitability.
Cash flow generation could also improve, given more efficient use
of capital investments, as well as network infrastructures and
distribution channels.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Oi include:

   -- Muted- to low-single-digits revenue growth over the medium
      term;
   -- Brazil EBITDA margin to recover to about 26% in 2015 from
      24% in 2014 backed by ongoing cost saving measures;
   -- Continued negative FCF generation at least for the short
      term despite tempered capex budget of around BRL4.5 billion;
   -- Net leverage recovering to below 4.0x unlikely in the
      absence of material improvement in the key operating
      metrics.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Oi's ratings are under negative pressure, given its high leverage
and weak cash flow generation amid unfavorable operating trends.
The company's credit profile could substantially change depending
on how its additional asset disposal and consolidation plans pan
out in the short term.  A negative rating action could be
considered if its net leverage ratio is forecast to remain well
above 4.0x over the medium- to long-term without any meaningful
improvement in its key operating metrics.

Conversely, any positive rating action is unlikely at this time.
Fitch would revise the Outlook to Stable should the company's net
leverage improve to below 4.0x along with material improvements in
its operational fundamentals on a sustained basis.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Oi's liquidity profile is sound, backed by its large cash position
of about BRL22.3 billion following the completed sale of PT
Portugal.  This compares to BRL15.5 billion of debt maturities in
between 2Q15 and the end of 2016.  The company also held BRL10.8
billion of credit facilities as of March 2015.  During the same
period, the company's total debt was BRL38.9 billion, mainly
comprised of senior notes, public debentures, and bank loans.
Positively, the company held the net value of BRL4.3 billion for
its hedge derivatives.  In addition, PTIF's outstanding debt of
EUR4.9 billion, which Oi used to provide a full guarantee, became
Oi's consolidated debt as PTIF became Oi's wholly owned
subsidiary.


TONON BIOENERGIA: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'RD'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Tonon Bioenergia S.A's foreign and
local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'RD' from 'C'.  At
the same time, Fitch has affirmed at 'C/RR4' the ratings on the
USD300 million senior unsecured notes due 2020 and the USD230
million senior secured notes due 2024 issued by Tonon's fully-
owned subsidiary Tonon Luxembourg S.A.  The senior unsecured notes
due 2020 were transferred to Tonon Luxembourg from Tonon.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade follows the conclusion of the debt exchange offer
for the USD300 million senior unsecured notes due 2020, with
approximately 95% adhesion.  New notes have a step-up coupon
starting at 7.25% for the first two years, moving to 9.25% from
Jan. 24, 2017 until Jan. 24, 2020.  Tonon Luxembourg will accrue
interests from Jan. 24, 2015 and the issuer has the option to
defer cash payments of interest due on any interest payment under
the New Notes.  Fitch understands the conditions for bondholders
deteriorated compared to the previous Notes and the company chose
this option to avoid entering in bankruptcy proceedings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Increased systemic risk and scarce availability of medium
      and long-term finance;
   -- Average sugar prices at USD14 cents/pound in 2015/2016,
      USD16 cents/pound in 2016/2017 and flat at USD17 cents/pound
      from 2017/2018 on;
   -- Domestic ethanol prices keeping the historical correlation
      with international sugar prices.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An upgrade to the C to CCC category is plausible over the short-
term, following the conclusion of the Debt Exchange Offer and the
consequent improvements in company's liquidity.  Upgrades to
higher categories are not expected given the maintenance of above-
average leverage indicators and the operational and financial
challenges surrounding the sugar and ethanol sector.

The company's ratings could be downgraded to 'D' if the company
defaults on its scheduled amortization/interest payments and/or
formally files for bankruptcy protection.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Tonon Bioenergia S.A.
   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'RD' from 'C';
   -- Local currency IDR downgraded to 'RD' from 'C'.

Tonon Luxembourg S.A.
   -- Rating of the USD230 million senior secured notes, due 2024,
      affirmed at 'C/RR4';
   -- Rating of the USD300 million senior unsecured notes, due
      2020, affirmed at 'C/RR4'.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


CALLISTO MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Callisto Prime Master Fund Ltd are required to
file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 8, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Penner
          c/o Michael Green
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue, George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 2223
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


CALLISTO PRIME: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Callisto Prime Fund Ltd are required to file
their proofs of debt by July 31, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 19, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Penner
          c/o Michael Green
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue, George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 2223
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


CALLISTO PRIME (GP): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Callisto Prime (GP) Ltd are required to file
their proofs of debt by July 31, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 19, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Penner
          c/o Michael Green
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue, George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 2223
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


CENTURY ASSETS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
On June 22, 2015, the shareholders of Century Assets Limited
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Trident Liquidators (Cayman) Ltd.
          c/o Lisa Thoppil
          Telephone: (345) 949 0880
          Facsimile: (345) 949 0881
          One Capital Place, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 847, George Town
          Grand Cayman, KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands


COLUMBIA REINSURANCE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------
On June 17, 2015, the shareholders of Columbia Reinsurance
Company, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Timm G. Johnson
          c/o Global Captive Management Ltd.
          Building 3, 2nd Floor, Governors Square
          23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
          P.O. Box 1363 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 7966
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8068


CREDIT SUISSE INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 28
---------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Credit Suisse Investment Services (Cayman)
Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by July 28,
2015, to be included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 19, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Hugh Dickson
          c/o Felicia Connor
          Telephone: +1 (345) 769 7216
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 7120
          10 Market Street, P.O. Box #765 Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1- 9006
          Cayman Islands


EDMOND INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 6
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Edmond International Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Aug. 6, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 24, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Peter Hart
          Telephone: +44 (0) 207 495 1100
          1 Westferry Circus
          Canary Wharf
          London


FLETCHER INCOME: Creditors to Hold Meeting on Aug. 27
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Fletcher Income Arbitrage Fund Ltd will hold
their annual general meeting on Aug. 27, 2015, at 5:00 p.m.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mr. Roy Bailey
          Tom Bussanich
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane
          Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1 -1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 8977


LAXEY LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 10
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Laxey Limited are required to file their proofs
of debt by Aug. 10, 2015, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on June 22, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Eagle Holdings Ltd.
          c/o Barclays Trust Company (Cayman) Limited
          FirstCaribbean House, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 487 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7128


NIMUE LEASING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On June 24, 2015, the sole shareholder of Nimue Leasing Limited
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Phang Thim Fatt
          8 Shenton Way #18-01
         Singapore 068811


=========
C H I L E
=========


CHILE: Moody's Says Economy Will Weather Slowdown in Investment
---------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the country's strong credit profile, slowing growth will
strain profitability and demand for companies that rely on
consumption, while weak commodities prices and rising production
costs will weigh on Chile's mining sector, says Moody's Investors
Service.

"A series of fiscal reforms in 2014 strengthened Chile's fiscal
policy and commitment to debt reduction, but in the process also
led to a temporary reduction in investment and consumer spending,"
says Moody's Vice President and Senior Credit Officer, Barbara
Mattos.

"Weaker investment has had a particularly negative effect on
Chile's economic growth. Commodities producers, especially copper,
which represents over half of Chile's exports and about 12% of its
GDP, have delayed some investments in a time of narrow profits,"
says Mattos in the report "Corporate Credit Quality in Chile:
Investment, Consumption Will Slow Briefly in Otherwise Resilient
Economy."

The weakness of Chile's peso against the US dollar further strains
companies that derive most of their revenue from domestic
consumption and have significant dollar-denominated debt on their
balance sheets coming due in 2015.

However, the weak peso benefits producers of chemicals, metals,
and paper and forest products, which are export-dependent.

Moody's also notes that sectors that already have global exposure
or can expand globally will be better able to weather this period
of slower economic growth and lower consumer spending.

Five of the 11 rated Chilean companies had negative outlooks at
the end of June 2015, which reflect company-specific conditions,
such as tight liquidity, debt-financed expansions or weaker demand
for commodities, rather than Chile's macroeconomic environment.

"Chile's economy is recovering from a growth rate of 1.9% in 2014,
its weakest growth rate in five years," says Mattos. "As the
economy continues to recover in 2015 and 2016, companies will
continue to benefit from Chile's solid financial system."


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Poll Says Retailers Upbeat on Business Climate
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the president of the national
retailers grouped in the ONEC said that the implementation of the
one-stop window, the measures against informality and the approval
of the Mortgage Development and Trust Market have spurred the
country's business climate for retailers, but noted that there's
still work to be done.

Antonio Ramos said "it's a reality, the investment climate in
Dominican Republic has been favored," according to Dominican
Today.

The report notes that Mr. Ramos responded to the results of the
Deloitte Business Barometer, which found that 66.7% of businesses
call their situation very positive.

Mr. Ramos said the actions by the Customs Agency and the Internal
Taxes (DGII) to counter informality are a step forward, the report
relates.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Migrant 'Crisis' Must be Dealt With, OAS Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Organization of American States (OAS)
secretary general Luis Almagro called on Haiti and Dominican
Republic officials to meet to deal with what he describes as an
immigration crisis on Hispaniola.

"We need to address the issue with some urgency.  We would like to
have a meeting with both sides at once," Mr. Almagro told CNN En
Espanol, according to EFE News.   "The mission (OAS) met with
Dominican and Haitian authorities separately.  We have to bring
both parties together to compare the ideas and implement a program
to solve this," Mr. Almagro said, the report notes.

OAS political affairs director Francisco Guerrero headed the
delegation, which visited Haiti and the Dominican Republic from
July 10 to 14 invited by both countries to "build bridges,"
gathered information with which to render a detailed report, EFE
News discloses.

The mission's report will be concluded, Mr. Almagro said, EFE News
relates.  "There's good progress but we need to achieve a
definitive solution to this problem," Mr. Almagro added.


====================
E L  S A L V A D O R
====================


BANCO AGRICOLA: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
for Banco Agricola S.A. and Banco Davivienda Salvadoreno
(Davivienda Sal) to 'BB' from 'BB+' following the downgrade of El
Salvador's Long-Term Rating and Country Ceiling.  Fitch also took
negative rating actions on both banks' Viability Ratings.

In addition the Rating Outlooks for both Agricola and Davivienda
Sal has been revised to Stable from Negative.  The revision of the
Rating Outlooks mirrors the revision in the Sovereign Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

AGRICOLA'S & DAVIVIENDA SAL'S IDRS, SUPPORT AND AGRICOLA SENIOR
TRUST'S LOAN PARTICIPATION NOTES

The downgrade of Agricola's and Davivienda Sal's IDRs follows
Fitch's downgrade of El Salvador's IDR to 'B+' from 'BB-' and
Country Ceiling to 'BB' from 'BB+'.  Both bank's IDRs are
currently capped by the Country Ceiling.

Agricola and Davivienda Sal's IDRs reflect Fitch's opinion of
potential support from each of the companys' main shareholders
domiciled in Colombia, Bancolombia, S.A. (Bancolombia;
'bbb'/'BBB'/Outlook Positive by Fitch) and Banco Davivienda, S.A.
(Davivienda; rated 'bbb-'/'BBB-'/Outlook Positive) and,
respectively.  Agricola and Davivienda Sal are relevant
subsidiaries to their respective parents' growth and
diversification in Central America, while providing a recurring
share of revenues.  Fitch views the probability of support from
both parents as moderate, resulting in a Support rating of '3'.

The rating of Agricola Senior Trust's(AST) unsecured loan
participation notes (notes) is at the same level of Agricola's
long-term IDR, as these are senior obligations with no additional
collateral.  The downgrade in the rating mirrors those of the
bank's IDR.

DAVIVIENDA SAL'S KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR

The downgrade reflects the high influence that the operating
environment has on Fitch's assessment of the bank's intrinsic
creditworthiness.  The agency expects Davivienda Sal's financial
performance will remain constrained by sluggish economic
prospects.  Davivienda Sal's VR is also influenced by its solid
capital position, sound funding and adequate asset quality ratios,
which balance the bank's modest profitability and limited income
diversification.

AGRICOLA'S KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR

Fitch continues to believe that Agricola's intrinsic credit
profile meets the criteria for its VR to be rated above the
sovereign rating as its financials are exceptionally strong in the
context of the domestic market.  However, in the agency's opinion,
the notching above the sovereign is now limited to one notch as
the operating environment increases its influence on the bank's
future development.

Agricola's VR reflects its dominant domestic franchise and market
position, stable and granular deposit base, strong capitalization,
conservative reserve coverage, sustained good asset quality and
solid profitability.  Fitch also recognizes Agricola's efficient
management and high execution capabilities, together with its
strong risk management and conservative risk appetite along
economic cycles.  Fitch also factors in that the bank's financial
profile is sensitive the development of the local economy and may
result in negative changes in its asset quality, profitability and
capitalization trends compared to its previous averages.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

AGRICOLA'S AND DAVIVIENDA SAL'S IDR AND SUPPORT

The IDRs are capped by the Country Ceiling.  Movements of El
Salvador's Country Ceiling, although unlikely at present, could
lead to similar changes of Agricola's and Davivienda Sal's Long-
Term IDRs.

The support rating is sensitive to a change in Davivienda's and
Bancolombia's ability or propensity to provide support to their
subsidiaries.

AGRICOLA SENIOR TRUST'S LOAN PARTICIPATION NOTES RATING
SENSITIVITIES

The rating of AST's notes is in line with Agricola's IDR and is
therefore sensitive to any changes in the latter.

AGRICOLA'S RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR

Upside potential in the VR is limited due to the high influence of
the operating environment on the bank's ratings.  Changes in
Agricola's ratings should move in tandem with those of the
sovereign.  Although not the agency's base scenario, a sharp
decrease in Agricola's profitability and capitalization levels
could, in turn, pressure the VR.

DAVIVIENDA'S RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR

[Davivienda's VR upside potential is limited as the operating
environment highly influences the bank's ratings.  The VR could be
pressured downward by a significant decline in asset quality
and/or financial performance that affects its capital position.

The rating actions are:

Banco Agricola S.A.:
   -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook Revised
      to Stable from Negative;
   -- VR downgraded to 'bb-' from 'bb+';
   -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B';
   -- Support affirmed at '3'.

Agricola Senior Trust:
   -- Loan Participation Notes downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'.

Banco Davivienda Salvadoreno, S.A.:
   -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative;
   -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B';
   -- VR downgraded to 'b+' from 'bb-';
   -- Support affirmed at '3'.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


CIBONEY GROUP: Incurs J$5 Million Loss During 12-Months to May 15
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Ciboney Group has ended another year of
financial losses.

During the twelve months to May 15, the company lost J$5 million,
according to RJR News.

The report notes that this was a decline, however, from the J$8.7
million loss recorded in the previous year.

Headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, Ciboney Group Limited is
engaged in the operation of a holding company and the orderly
disposition of the Company's investments in the hospitality
industry. The Company is a subsidiary of Crown Eagle Life
Insurance Company Limited and its ultimate parent company is
Finsac Limited. The Company's subsidiaries include Luxury Resorts
Enterprises Limited and Ciboney Hotels Limited.


=======
P E R U
=======


PERU: Moody's Says Credit Quality Will Remain Stable Through 2016
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Modest growth in private consumption and public investment will
sustain the credit quality of Peru's non-financial corporate
issuers at current levels, says Moody's Investors Service in the
report "Corporate Credit Quality in Peru: Modest Recovery Points
to Stable Environment Through Mid-2016."

Although economic growth will accelerate to 4.5% in 2016 from
about 3.6% in 2015, investor sentiment remains negative and
continues to pressure key sectors including construction, mining,
agriculture and fishing.

In addition, non-financial Peruvian companies issued $2.2 billion
in debt in international financial markets in the first five
months of 2015, compared to $3.3 billion for the full year 2014
and $4.2 billion in 2013., straining corporate credit metrics and
limiting companies' funding options.

"The amount of corporate debt that Peruvian companies have issued
in foreign markets has dropped steadily since 2013 as they try to
increase local issuance and avoid additional currency exposure,
says Veronica Amendola, a Moody's Vice President and Senior
Analyst. "However, the domestic market may not be large enough to
support these companies' expansion plans."

Peru's metals and mining companies are also scaling back their
expansion plans in response to the continued slowdown in China,
the market for 40% of the world's base metals. Peru's mining
companies have had to curtail exploration and new mine development
while labor, energy and raw materials costs continue to increase,
hurting their liquidity and increasing their reliance on debt.

However, Peru's government is trying to spur investment activity
by promoting private investment in public infrastructure through
public-private partnerships (PPPs) and deferred-payment mechanisms
to back debt. The government is hoping that PPPs will help fill an
estimated $35 billion-$80 billion infrastructure gap.

The possibility of a stronger-than-expected El Nino also threatens
positive growth in the agriculture and fishing sectors. Peru
expects the fishing sector, whose credit metrics are already
weakened by a 25.3% decline in 2014, to grow 17.2% in 2015, but
the threat of a stronger El Nino puts this recovery at risk.

In addition, there is greater exchange rate risk for companies
exposed to international financing. "Local retailers have tapped
international financing to expand their growth for several years,
but Peruvian companies generate most of their revenues in nuevo
soles, whose devaluation has made it harder to retire foreign-
denominated debt," says Amendola.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


AES PUERTO RICO: Fitch Retains 'CC' Sr. Bond Rating on Watch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained the Rating Watch Negative on these
AES Puerto Rico L.P. (AES PR) securities issued through the Puerto
Rico Industrial, Tourist, Educational, Medical & Environmental
Control Facilities Financing Authority:

   -- $161.87 million cogeneration facility revenue bonds, series
      A (tax-exempt bonds) due June 2026 at 'CC';

   -- $33.1 million cogeneration facility revenue bonds, series B
      (taxable bonds) due June 2022 at 'CC'.

The 'CC' rating reflects Fitch's view of the credit quality of the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA).  PREPA is the
revenue counterparty under AES PR's power purchase agreement
(PPA).  PREPA's 'CC' rating with a Rating Watch Negative
constrains the rating of AES PR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Contracted Revenue Profile - Revenue Risk: Weaker
The 25-year tolling-style PPA with a non-investment-grade
counterparty effectively mitigates some risk of exposure to
capacity price, energy margin, and dispatch risks throughout the
debt term, subject to project availability and heat rates.
However, concerns loom regarding the offtaker's ability to make
future contractual payments.

Improving Operations - Operation Risk: Weaker
AES PR has historically been susceptible to forced outages that
have reduced availability and capacity payments.  Further, the
operating cost profile has exceeded original estimates.  However,
management has taken a proactive approach to limit future forced
outages with encouraging initial results.

Manageable Supply Risk - Supply Risk: Midrange
Fuel supply risk is mitigated by a three-year, fixed-price fuel
supply agreement sufficient to meet the project's expected fuel
requirements through 2017.  The short term of the agreement is
mitigated by the historical precedence for renewal and liquid
market for coal.  Fuel price risk is mitigated by the tolling-
style PPA, subject to heat rates.  Ash inventory is actively
managed by the project via the sale of its various ash products.
AES PR's efforts have helped to offset near-term ash disposal
concerns, but cash flow uncertainty is heightened without a
permanent solution.

Weak Structural Features - Debt Structure: Weaker
The project's bonds are fixed-rate and mature within the PPA term,
but have back-loaded amortization profiles.  The equity
distribution, leverage, and debt service reserve provisions are
consistent with standard project finance structures.  AES PR does
not have O&M or major maintenance reserves, which increases the
importance of operational stability and heightens the project's
reliance on other sources of liquidity.  Approximately 55% of the
total debt outstanding, including unrated bank loans, is variable
rate with over 80% synthetically fixed with investment-grade
counterparties.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive/Negative - Counterparty Rating: The rating is currently
capped by PREPA's rating.  A change in PREPA's long-term rating
would likely impact the rating on AES Puerto Rico.

Positive - Operational Performance: Sustained improvements to
plant availability or heat rate could enhance the long-term
profile.

SUMMARY OF CREDIT

PREPA and its creditors have maintained forbearance agreements
since August 2014 to provide temporary relief related to PREPA's
maturing bank lines of credit to allow for additional time for
negotiations with creditors.  The current agreements extend the
forbearance to Sept. 15, 2015.  Negotiations are ongoing and PREPA
has stated that a comprehensive restructuring plan is coming by
Sept. 1.  Fitch believes that a restructuring of PREPA's debt
obligations remains likely and has therefore maintained the rating
of PREPA's power revenue bonds at 'CC' with a Negative Watch.

At AES PR, recent plant operations have improved substantially and
the 2014 effective forced outage rate of 1.2% was the best in the
plant's history.  Average heat rates have also demonstrated
considerable stability in recent quarters.  The sponsor attributes
improved performance to a renewed commitment to fund major capital
expenditures since 2012.

The project has also added new agreements for fuel supply and ash
management that support cash flow stability.  The fuel supply
agreement extends through 2017, offers more favorable and stable
pricing, and provides more flexible payment terms.  The ash
management agreements promote the disposal of AES PR's ash
products to on-island landfills for beneficial use, and are
expected to be sufficient to cover all the project's ash
management needs.


DORAL FINANCIAL: FDIC Can Repudiate Servicing Agreement with Bank
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York modified the automatic stay imposed
in the Chapter 11 case of Doral Financial Corporation to permit
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to exercise its rights
to repudiate a master servicing agreement between the Debtor and
Doral Bank.

The FDIC asserted that it should be permitted to repudiate the
burdensome servicing agreements that interfere with orderly
administration of the failed bank's affairs.

Doral Financial Corporation is represented by:

         Mark I. Bane, Esq.
         Meredith S. Tinkham, Esq.
         ROPES & GRAY LLP
         1211 Avenue of the Americas
         New York, NY 10036-8704
         Tel: 212 596-9000
         Fax: 212 596-9090
         Email: mark.bane@ropesgray.com
                meredith.tinkham@ropesgray.com

            -- and --

         James A. Wright III, Esq.
         ROPES & GRAY LLP
         Prudential Tower
         800 Boylston Street
         Boston, MA 02199-3600
         Tel: 617 951-7000
         Fax: 617 951-7050
         Email: james.wright@ropesgray.com

The FDIC is represented by:

         Christopher K. Kiplok, Esq.
         Gabrielle Glemann, Esq.
         HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP
         One Battery Park Plaza
         New York, NY 10004-1482
         Tel: (212) 837-6000
         Fax: (212) 422-4726
         Email: gabrielle.glemann@hugheshubbard.com

            -- and --

         B. Amon James, Esq.
         Nicholas Katsonis, Esq.
         FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
         501 Fairfax Drive, Room VS-D-7060
         Arlington, VA 22226
         Tel: (703) 562-2089
         Fax: (703) 562-2475
         Email: bajames@FDIC.gov
                nkatsonis@FDIC.gov

                      About Doral Financial

Doral Financial Corporation is a holding company whose primary
operating asset was equity in Doral Bank.  DFC maintains offices
in New York City, Coral Gables, Florida and San Juan, Puerto Rico.

DFC has three wholly-owned subsidiaries: (i) Doral Properties,
Inc., (ii) Doral Insurance Agency, LLC ("Doral Insurance"), and
(iii) Doral Recovery, Inc.

On Feb. 27, 2015, regulators placed Doral Bank into receivership
and named the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as receiver.  Doral
Bank served customers through 26 branches located in New York,
Florida, and Puerto Rico.

DFC sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
15-10573) in Manhattan on March 11, 2015.  The case is assigned to
Judge Shelley C. Chapman.

DFC estimated $50 million to $100 million in assets and $100
million to $500 million in debt as of the bankruptcy filing.

The Debtor tapped Ropes & Gray LLP as counsel.

The Debtor's Chapter 11 plan and Disclosure Statement are due July
9, 2015.  The initial case conference is set for April 10, 2015.

The U.S. trustee overseeing the Chapter 11 case of Doral Financial
Corp. appointed five creditors of the company to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors.


PUERTO RICO: Failed to Send Money for Bond Payments
---------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske at Bloomberg News reports that Puerto Rico said one
of its agencies didn't provide funds needed to cover debt payments
as the cash-strapped commonwealth reels from an escalating fiscal
crisis.

The Public Finance Corp. didn't direct money due July 14 to a bond
trustee because the legislature failed to appropriate the funds
when it passed the budget last month, Puerto Rico's
Government Development Bank said in a bond filing, according to
Bloomberg News.

"In accordance with the terms of these bonds, the transfer was not
made due to the non-appropriation of funds," Melba Acosta,
president of the GDB, said in an e-mailed statement obtained by
Bloomberg News.

Bloomberg News notes that it's unclear whether Puerto Rico will
still make a $36.3 million payment on bonds maturing Aug. 1 that
was to be covered with the money.

If it doesn't pay investors next month, that would mark the first
time Puerto Rico has defaulted on a debt payment and would come as
it's seeking to negotiate with creditors to restructure $72
billion of obligations, Bloomberg News relates.

Bloomberg News notes that last month, lawmakers included about
$300 million in the current budget to repay GDB debt.  The bank
may be able to use the money to pay bondholders next month, though
it would need legislative approval to do so, Bloomberg News notes.
The legislature is out of session until mid-August.

The Public Finance Corp., which has borrowed to help pay the
government's bills, has $36.3 million of bonds maturing Aug. 1,
according to data compiled by Bloomberg.  The debt traded July 1
at an average 68 cents on the dollar, a record low, Bloomberg News
relays.

"While the payment is not large and is primarily due to on-island
creditors, the payment is likely to be the first skipped coupon by
a GDB-backed entity," Daniel Hanson, an analyst at Height
Securities, a broker dealer, wrote in a July 13 report, Bloomberg
News discloses.

Puerto Rico is in need of cash because investors have effectively
closed the island's access to the capital markets by demanding
high interest rates, Bloomberg News notes.  The development bank,
a source of available cash for the commonwealth, had $778 million
of net liquidity as of May 31, down from $2 billion in October,
Bloomberg News relays.  To avoid running out of cash by Sept. 30,
the bank wants to exchange its notes for longer-maturity debt.

Another $140 million of development bank bonds mature Aug. 1,
Bloomberg data show.  The GDB said it may purchase its notes "from
time to time" with cash, new securities or a combination,
Bloomberg News relays.  Such purchases are expected to be at
prices "that are materially less than par," according to a filing
through the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.

Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla last month directed island
officials to create a debt-restructuring plan by Aug. 30.

The governor says Puerto Rico cannot afford to repay what it owes,
Bloomberg News notes.

The island's financial crisis has drawn attention in Washington.

Key Democrats including U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer, who represents
New York, are backing legislation that would allow Puerto Rico's
public corporations to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection,
just as U.S. cities can, Bloomberg News notes.  A bill to do so
has stalled for lack of Republican support.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July
3, 2015, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico's general obligation (GO) and guaranteed bonds as
well as its senior lien Sales Tax Financing Corporation (Sr
COFINA) bonds to Caa3 from Caa2.  Moody's also lowered ratings
assigned to other securities, including bonds of the Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, which also were downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2.  Bonds already in the Ca category were affirmed at that
level. In all, about $55.5 billion was affected by these actions.
With the GO rating action, the seventh downgrade in the past five
years, the commonwealth's rating has declined 12 notches since
2011. The outlook for all affected securities remains negative.



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


TRINIDAD CEMENT: Profits as Cement Sales Increase
-------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that an increase in cement sales has
driven up Trinidad Cement Ltd's revenue by 11 per cent for the
second quarter of 2015.

According to its interim consolidated financial results for the
six months ended June 30, 2015, the company realized TT$572.9
million in profits, compared to TT$514.9 million in the first
quarter of 2015, Trinidad Express notes.

Results showed that cement sales in the second quarter were eight
per cent higher than the first quarter, according to Trinidad
Express.

The report notes that combined results for the first and second
quarter of 2015 stood at TT$1.1 billion, an increase of one per
cent over the 2014 half year, while net profit was TT$335.2
million, compared to TT$32 million for the same period last year.

In a statement to the Stock Exchange, TCL Group Chairman Wildred
Espinet and director Nigel Edwards noted that as a result of the
achievements of the first quarter, the company was able to
successfully refinance its restructured debt, allowing it to take
advantage of the maximum discount that was negotiated with
creditors in May 2015, the report relays.

"Net of fees incurred for the new financing, we were able to
benefit from prepayment discounts of TT$194.2 million, all of
which has been reflected in our Q2 results," Mr. Espinet said, the
report relates.

"The restructured debt agreement that was concluded in Q1 was
refinanced in May 2015 using proceeds from a Bridge Loan of US$245
million and US$15.8 million of internal cash," the directors said,
the report notes.

They stated that revenue for the second quarter of 2015 was
TT$12.9 million (2 per cent) higher than the same period last year
and this was mainly due to 2014 price increases as well as higher
clinker sales, the report notes.

Concrete and aggregate sales volumes were ten per cent and five
per cent higher than the second quarter of 2014 respectively, they
noted, the report relates.

TCL's annual general meeting is scheduled to take place at the
Hilton and Conference Centre Trinidad today, the report adds.

                             *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2015, Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Foreign and Local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Trinidad Cement Limited
(TCL) to 'B-' from 'D' and assigned an expected rating to the
company's proposed senior secured term loan of 'B-(EXP)/RR4'. The
Rating Outlook is Stable.


=============
U R U G U A Y
=============


ACI AIRPORT: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to $200MM Sr. Sec. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB+' rating on
ACI Airport Sudamerica S.A.'s (ACI or the project) $200 million
senior secured notes due in 2032.  The outlook is stable.  These
ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P assigned on
April 9, 2015.

The rating assignment follows ACI's notes issuance and S&P's
receipt and satisfactory review of all transaction documentation,
including legal opinions.

Cerealsur, the owner of PdS' shares, is ultimately controlled by
America Corporation International S.A.R.L which is part of
Argentina-based Corporacion America Group (CA -- not rated).
Corporacion America operates more than 50 airports, with
significant concentration in South America.

ACI Airport Sudamerica S.A. is a special purpose vehicle that
issued the guaranteed $200 million notes.  Proceeds from the
issuance were used to cancel bank loans at PdS that were used to
finance the extension of the concession contract (of approximately
$14 million); pay transaction fees and expenses; and make a one-
time dividend payment to Cerealsur's parent company.

Cerealsur will use dividends from PdS to pay off most of the
notes.  Therefore, S&P views the debt as a project holding debt,
structurally subordinated to PdS' $60.9 million senior notes due
in October 2021.  In the final version of the Offering Memorandum,
the sponsors included a clause that mandate that after the date on
which the existing PdS senior notes mature, PdS will become the
irrevocable and unconditional guarantor of ACI's notes on a joint
and several basis.  S&P views this inclusion as a positive ratings
factor because--after the senior debt is fully repaid--ACI's
structural subordination to the operating company's debt will be
eliminated.  S&P's base-case assumptions for ACI's issuance have
not changed materially since S&P assigned the preliminary rating
on April 9, 2015.  The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that
Cerealsur's, and in turn ACI's, repayment capacity will benefit
from PdS' strong cash flow, structured to flow to the holding
company in the form of dividends.  In turn, PdS benefits from the
airport's track record for financial and traffic performance,
following the opening of the new terminal in late 2009 and Pluna's
bankruptcy in July 2012.  Under S&P's base case scenario, and
considering a relatively conservative 2.5% average traffic growth
for the life of the transaction, S&P projects ACI's minimum and
average DSCR will be about 1.22x and 1.77x, respectively.

A rating upside is unlikely at this stage.  However, S&P could
take a positive rating action if the holding company consistently
reaches a minimum DSCR of 1.4x or more, for example, due to
higher-than-expected passenger traffic growth at the Montevideo
Airport or if PdS pays down its debt sooner than S&P expected,
which would, in turn, upstream higher dividends to the holding
company.

In addition, once the senior debt at PdS is fully amortized, S&P
could take a positive rating action because it would eliminate the
two-notch negative structural adjustments to the operations SACP
from the weak cash flow waterfall at PdS.  At that stage, the
notes will be guaranteed by PdS.

On the other hand, S&P could lower the ratings if passenger
traffic declines at the airport and minimum DSCR drops to less
than 1.15x.  In addition, a higher debt burden at PdS' level or
difficulties in the mechanism to distribute dividends could lead
S&P to revise the rating on the project.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating
                               From                    To

ACI Airport Sudamerica S.A.
Senior Secured                (Prelim)BB+/Stable       BB+/Stable


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 13 to July 17, 2015
----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name     Cpn   Bid Price Maturity Date Country    Curr
-----------     ---   --------- ------------- -------    ----
PDVSA            8.5     56.25   11/2/2017      VE       USD
PDVSA            8.5     66.7    11/2/2017      VE       USD
PDVSA            5.25    42.09   4/12/2017      VE       USD
Venezuela
Int'l Bond       12.75   44.7    8/23/2022      VE       USD
Transocean Inc    6.8    73.8    3/15/2038      KY       USD
PDVSA            12.75   47.52   2/17/2022      VE       USD
Venezuela



Int'l Bond       11.95   41.95    8/5/2031      VE       USD
CSN Islands

XII Corp          7      70.25                  BR       USD
Banco Mercantil
do Brasil SA      9.62    45.5    7/16/2020     BR       USD
Banco do
Brasil SA/Cayman  6.25    68.5                  KY       USD
Transocean Inc    3.8     73.8    10/15/2022    KY       USD
MIE Holdings
Corp              7.5     60.12    4/25/2019    HK       USD
PDVSA             9       39.5    11/17/2021    VE       USD
Anton Oilfield    7.5     68.85   11/6/2018     CN       USD
PDVSA             5.37    31.84    4/12/2027    VE       USD
PDVSA             6       33.15    5/16/2024    VE       USD
PDVSA             6       32.24   11/15/2026    VE       USD
PDVSA             9.75    38.25    5/17/2035    VE       USD
Schahin II
Finance Co
SPV Ltd           5.87    60.5     9/25/2022    KY       USD
Odebrecht Oil
& Gas
Finance Ltd       7       54.5                  KY       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd     10.25    57       1/8/2020     CN       USD
Venezuela
Int'l Bond       11.75    41.75   10/21/2026    VE       USD
Offshore Group
Investment Ltd    7.5     57.27   11/1/2019     KY       USD
PDVSA             5.5     31.5     4/12/2037    VE       USD
PDVSA             5.12    60.25   10/28/2016    VE       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd      9       51.5     6/6/2019     CN       USD
Cimento Tupi SA   9.75    40       5/11/2018    BR       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd      6.87    52.12    4/22/2016    CN       CNY
Honghua
Group Ltd         7.45    53.75    9/25/2019    CN       USD
Venezuela
Int'l Bond        7.75    36.75   10/13/2019    VE       USD
Venezuela
Int'l Bond        9.37    37.9     1/13/2034    VE       USD
Venezuela
Int'l Bond        6       34.75    12/9/2020    VE       USD
Automotores
Gildemeister SA   8.25    40.25     5/24/2021   CL       USD
Tonon
Bioenergia SA     9.25    29.75     1/24/2020   BR       USD
Gol Finance       8.75    68.4                  BR       USD
MIE Holdings
Corp              6.87    68        2/6/2018    HK       USD
Venezuela
Int'l Bond        9       37.1      5/7/2023    VE       USD
Venezuela
Int'l Bond        7       40.95    12/1/2018    VE       USD
Mongolian
Mining Corp       8.87    70        3/29/2017   MN       USD
USJ Acucar
e Alcool SA       9.875   45        11/9/2019   BR       USD
Venezuela
Int'l Bond        9.25    37.4       5/7/2028   VE       USD
Automotores
Gildemeister SA   6.75    34         1/15/2023  CL       USD
Offshore Group
Investment Ltd    7.12    53.95      4/1/2023   KY       USD
CA La
Electricidad
de Caracas        8.5     37         4/10/2018  VE       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd      8       66.2      12/20/2015  CN       CNY
Venezuela
Int'l Bond       13.62    68         8/15/2018  VE       USD
Inversiones
Alsacia SA        8       67.03     12/31/2018  CL       USD
Polarcus Ltd      2.87    51.40      4/27/2016  AE       USD
China Precious
Metal Resources
Holdings          7.25     49.83      2/4/2018  HK       HKD
SMU SA            7.75     71.8       2/8/2020  CL       USD
NQ Mobile Inc     4        65        10/15/2018 CN       USD
Glorious
Property
Holdings Ltd      13.25    63.37      3/4/2018  HK       USD
Schahin II
Finance Co
SPV Ltd           5.87     60.715     9/25/2022 KY       USD
BA-CA Finance
Cayman Ltd        1.21     61.625               KY       EUR
Odebrecht
Finance Ltd       8.25     74.35      4/25/2018 KY       BRL
BCP Finance Co    2.10     56.375               KY       EUR
Polarcus Ltd      8        25.5       6/7/2018  AE       USD
Newland
International
Properties Corp   9.5      38.5       7/3/2017  PA       USD
PSOS Finance
Ltd              11.75     73.25      4/23/2018 KY       USD
BA-CA Finance
Cayman 2 Ltd      0.69     60.5                 KY       EUR
Polarcus Ltd      8.73     25         7/8/2019  AE       NOK
Inversora de
Electrica
de Buenos
Aires SA IEBA     6.5      44.5       9/26/2017 AR       USD
Tonon
Bioenergia SA     9.25     30.35      1/24/2020 BR       USD
PDVSA             8.5      66.6      11/2/2017  VE       USD
MIE Holdings
Corp              7.5      69.5       4/25/2019 HK       USD


Banco do Brasil
SA/Cayman         6.25     67.25                KY       USD
General
Exploration
Partners Inc      11.5     73.5      11/13/2018 CA       USD
PDVSA              6       32         5/16/2024 VE       USD
ESFG
International Ltd  5.75     0.326               KY       EUR
USJ Acucar
e Alcool SA        9.87    46        11/9/2019  BR       USD
Odebrecht Oil
& Gas Finance
Ltd                7       54                   KY       USD
PDVSA             12.75    53.25     2/17/2022  VE       USD
Automotores
Gildemeister SA    6.75    34.5      1/15/2023  CL       USD
Mongolian
Mining Corp        8.87    70.25     3/29/2017  MN       USD
Automotores
Gildemeister SA    8.25    36.31     5/24/2021  CL       USD
PDVSA              9       37.12    11/17/2021  VE       USD
Venezuela
Government
Int'l Bond         13.62   61.88     8/15/2018  VE       USD
Anton Oilfield
Services
Group/Hong Kong     7.5    70       11/6/2018   CN       USD
EDNAR              10.5    84.5     10/9/2017   AR       USD
Cimento Tupi SA     9.75   48        5/11/2018  BR       USD
Honghua Group Ltd   7.45   54.75     9/25/2019  CN       USD
Banco Mercantil
do Brasil SA        9.625  42.625    7/16/2020  BR       USD
PDVSA               9.75   38.7      5/17/2035  VE       USD
EDNAR               9.75   74       10/25/2022  AR       USD
Greenfields
Petroleum Corp      9      25.05     5/31/2017  US       CAD
CSN Islands
XII Corp            7      70.47                BR       USD
Gol Finance         8.75   65.875               BR       USD
Argentina Bocon    21.875  73.73      1/4/2016  AR       ARS
Newland
International
Properties Corp      9.5   37.75      7/3/2017  PA       USD
Venezuela
Government
TICC Bond            5.25  55.36     3/21/2019  VE       USD
SMU SA               7.75  72.44     2/8/2020   CL       USD
Provincia
de Tucuman
Argentina            0.40   42.7     9/5/2015   AR       USD
Ruta del Bosque
Sociedad
Concesionaria
SA                   6.3     65.67   3/15/2021  CL       CLP
Cia Cervecerias
Unidas SA            4       53.32  12/1/2024   CL       CLP
Cia Sud
Americana
de Vapores SA        6.4     54.31  10/1/2022   CL       CLP
Provincia
del Chaco            4       68.01  12/4/2026   AR       USD
Talca Chillan
Sociedad
Concesionaria SA     2.75    48.77  12/15/2019  CL       CLP
Venezuela
Government
Int'l Bond           7.65    34.5    4/21/2025  VE       USD
Venezuela
Government
Int'l Bond           7       35      3/31/2038   VE      USD
Decimo Primer
Fideicomiso
de Bonos de
Pres                 4.54    66.5   10/25/2041   PA      USD
Venezuela
Government
Int'l Bond          13.62    66.12   8/15/2018   VE      USD
Venezuela
Government
Int'l Bond           8.25    35.4   10/13/2024   VE      USD
Venezuela
Government
Int'l Bond           9.25    40.25   9/15/2027   VE      USD
Empresa de
los Ferrocarriles
del Estado           6.5     71.4    1/1/2026    CL      CLP



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *