TCRLA_Public/150914.mbx           T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                       L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, September 14, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 181


                            Headlines




A R G E N T I N A

COLCAR SERIE I: Moody's Gives Ca Global Scale Rating on 2 Tranches
ICBC PRENDARIOS II: Moody's Gives B1 Rating to 2 Tranches
ROYAL & SUN ALLIANCE: Moody's Affirms B1 Global Scale LC Rating


B R A Z I L

BANCO DO ESTADO: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
BRAZIL: Central Bank Intervenes to Lift Battered Real
BRAZIL: Junk Relapse Makes Its Bonds Even Riskier Than Russia
OAS CONSTRUTORA: Highway Construction Workers Shut Down Project
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: S&P Cuts Global Scale Ratings to 'BB'


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AFRICA HORIZONS: Shareholders to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 1
GOLVIS ASIA: Shareholders to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 17
GOLVIS OPPORTUNITIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 17
JAT PRIME FUND: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
JAT PRIME INTERMEDIATE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report

JAT PRIME MASTER: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
LONGAN HOLDINGS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
MORINOMIYA HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
LONGAN INVESTMENTS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
NAOSHAN INTERNATIONAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

OHMORI HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
TACHIKAWA AKEBONOCHO: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

P U E R T O  R I C O

ACADEMIA SAGRADO: Case Summary & 11 Largest Unsecured Creditors
HORNED DORSET: Taps Pedro J. Rivera & Assoc. as Accountants
PUERTO RICO: S&P Lowers Rating on Tax-Backed Debt to 'CC'


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Sept. 7 to Sept. 11, 2015


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


COLCAR SERIE I: Moody's Gives Ca Global Scale Rating on 2 Tranches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America has assigned ratings to the Class A (VRDA),
Class B (VRDB), Class C (VRDC) and Participation Certificates (CP)
of Fideicomiso Financiero Colcar Serie I, to be issued by TMF
Trust Company (Argentina) S.A., acting solely in its capacity as
Issuer and Trustee.

As of Sept. 10, 2015, the securities for this transaction have not
yet been placed in the market. Additionally, this transaction is
pending the approval from the regulator (Comision Nacional de
Valores). If any assumption or factor Moody's considers when
assigning the ratings change before closing, the ratings may also
change.

ISSUANCE: Fideicomiso Financiero Colcar Serie I

  VRDA: A2.ar (sf) (national scale) and B3 (sf) (global scale,
  local currency)

  VRDB: B3.ar (sf) (national scale) and Caa3 (sf) (global scale,
  local currency)

  VRDC: Ca.ar (sf) (national scale) and Ca (sf) (global scale,
  local currency)

  CP: Ca.ar (sf) (national scale) and Ca (sf) (global scale, local
  currency)

The transaction will be backed by an amortizing pool of closed-end
savings plans (planes de ahorro) and loans for the acquisition of
chassis for Mercedes Benz' vehicles. The loans have been
originated by Colcar Merbus S.A. (NR) and the saving plans by
Colservice S.A. de Ahorro para Fines Determinados (NR). Colcar
Merbus is the largest dealer of Mercedes Benz buses in Argentina.
The receivables are backed by a first-priority security interest
on the vehicles.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are based mainly on the following factors:

-- The available credit enhancement in the transaction, as an
initial subordination of 33.36% for the VRDA, 32.38% for the VRDB,
30.75% for VRDC and 18.44% for the CP (calculated over the nominal
amounts of loans assigned to the trust). In addition the
transaction benefits from reserve funds.

-- The value of the collateral, represented by receivables
related to 122 closed-end savings plans and 12 loans with a
current weighted average LTV of approximately 45.16%.

-- The ability of TMF Trust Company (Argentina) S.A. to act as
trustee.

-- The first-priority security interest on the Mercedes Benz
buses and trucks.

-- The ability of Colservice to act as primary servicer in the
transaction.

-- The availability of several reserve funds.

-- The concentrated nature of the obligors in the pool, that
mainly consists of small and medium sized companies in the
transportation industry.

Colcar and Colservice, acting as sellers, will assign fixed
installments related to closed-end saving plans and loans to
finance the purchase of chassis new or used Mercedes Benz buses
and trucks. Moody's notes that the pool is highly concentrated in
the transportation and tourism industry in Argentina. A negative
economic environment affecting these sectors may impact a large
number of securitized receivables. The pool is highly concentrated
by borrower, as the 134 receivables included in the transaction
correspond to borrowers of 82 economic groups. Also, the top 10
borrowers represent 32.19% of the original pool balance. This risk
is mitigated by: 1) the low average loan CLTV of 45.16%, 2) the
fact that the vehicles backing the securitized receivables are, in
general, a key component of the borrower's working capital, which
is expected to have a lower probability of default in comparison
with other company obligations, 3) the historical performance of
similar pools and the initial subordination which will increase
over time due to a turbo-sequential payment structure. Moody's
modeled the effect of the concentration in the pool performance
and stressed the pool's default rate significantly above the
historical observed default rates of similar portfolios. These
concentrations result in potential high rating volatility.

Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this
transaction through the initial subordination levels for each
rated class, as well as the historical performance of similar
portfolios and previous transactions. In addition, Moody's
considered factors common to equipment financing securitizations
such as obligor concentration levels, delinquencies, prepayments
and losses; as well as specific factors related to the Argentine
market, such as the probability of an increase in losses if there
are changes in the macroeconomic scenario in Argentina.

To determine the rating assigned to the tranches, Moody's has used
an expected loss methodology that reflects the probability of
default for each tranche times the severity of the loss expected
for the securities. For rating this transaction Moody's used two
models: CDOROM and ABSROM. Moody's used CDOROM to derive the
default distribution applicable to this transaction. The Moody's
CDOROM(TM) model is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes borrower
specific Moody's default probabilities as input. In order to
allocate losses to the securities in accordance with their
priority of payment and relative size, Moody's has used a cash-
flow model (ABSROM) that reproduces many deal-specific
characteristics: the main input parameters of the model are
described below. Weighting each loss scenario's severity result on
the tranches with its probability of occurrence, the model has
calculated the expected loss level for each series. Moody's model
then compares the quantitative values to the Moody's Idealized
Expected Loss table for each tranche.

Stress Scenarios:

In assigning the rating to this transaction, Moody's assumed a
Caa2 rating for all obligors to determine the default definition
in CDOROM. Also, Moody's assumed a lognormal distribution for
recoveries with a 40% mean and a 50% coefficient of variation.
These assumptions are derived from the historical performance of
similar portfolios originated by Colcar and Colservice.

The model results showed 4.63% expected loss for VRDA, 23.86%
expected loss for VRDB, 39.69% for VRDC, and 63.60% for the CP.

Parameter sensitivities provide a quantitative, model-indicated
calculation of the number of notches that a Moody's-rated
structured finance security may vary if certain input parameters
used in the initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes
that the deal has not aged. It is not intended to measure how the
rating of the security might migrate over time, but rather, how
the initial rating of the security might differ as certain key
parameters vary.

Moody's ran parameter sensitivities applying an assumed rating of
Caa3 for all obligors. Under this parameter sensitivity, the
global scale ratings of the VRDA would be downgraded to Caa2 (sf).
The ratings for VRDB would be downgraded to Ca (sf). However, the
ratings for the VRDC and residual class would remain unchanged.

Colservice is a company of the Colcar Group and was constituted in
2006 to originate closed-end saving plans for the purchase of
Mercedes-Benz buses. Colcar is the largest Mercedes-Benz dealer in
Argentina. Colcar is also the largest seller of chassis of buses
used for public transportation in Argentina. The company is
divided in six business lines: buses, commercial vehicles, cars,
equipment, services and spare parts. Moody's believes that
Colservice's origination and servicing practices are adequate.
Colservice is regulated by the Inspecci¢n General de Justicia in
Argentina and received periodic audits of procedures from
Mercedes-Benz.

Finally, Moody's also evaluated the servicing arrangements in the
transaction. Multiconex, a late payment collection company that
provides service to several banks and consumer finance companies
in the Argentine market, will perform some servicing functions for
this transaction: it will contact borrowers on a monthly basis to
inform the amounts due and the payment dates. It will also
instruct borrowers to make payments directly into the trust
account.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans
published January 2015.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

A receivables performance consistently better than original
projections by Moody's could lead to an upgrade of the ratings. A
deterioration in the performance of the receivables or a severe
downturn in the Argentine economy could lead to a downgrade in the
rating of the securities.


ICBC PRENDARIOS II: Moody's Gives B1 Rating to 2 Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has rated
Fideicomiso Financiero ICBC Prendarios II. This transaction will
be issued by TMF Trust Company (Argentina) S.A., acting solely in
its capacity as issuer and trustee.

As of Sept. 10, 2015, the securities for this transaction have not
yet been placed in the market and the transaction is pending
approval from the Comision Nacional de Valores. If any assumption
or factor Moody's considers when assigning the ratings change
before closing, the ratings may also change.

  ARS223,554,657 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities (VDF
  TVA) of "Fideicomiso Financiero ICBC Prendarios II", rated
  Aaa.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and B1 (sf) (Global
  Scale, Local Currency)

  ARS 2,903,307 in Class B Floating Rate Debt Securities (VDF
  TVB) of "Fideicomiso Financiero ICBC Prendarios II", rated
  Aaa.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and B1 (sf) (Global
  Scale, Local Currency)

  ARS 63,872,761 in Certificates (CP) of "Fideicomiso Financiero
  ICBC Prendarios II", rated A1.ar (sf) (Argentine National
  Scale) and B3 (sf) (Global Scale, Local Currency).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rated securities are payable from the cash flow coming from
the assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of 8,043
eligible auto loans denominated in Argentine pesos, with a fixed
interest rate, originated by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (Argentina) S.A. "ICBC (Argentina)" in an aggregate amount
of ARS 290,330,725.

The auto loans backing the rated securities are granted to ICBC
(Argentina) clients. The monthly loan installment is deducted
directly from the borrower's bank account. ICBC (Argentina) local
currency deposits are currently rated Aaa.ar (Argentine National
Scale) and B1 (Global Scale, Local Currency). ICBC (Argentina) has
a Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA) of B1(cr).

The securities benefit from strong credit enhancement in the form
of 23% of subordination for the Class A Floating Rate Debt
Securities and 22% for the Class B Floating Rate Debt Securities.
In addition, the transaction has various reserve funds, including
an interest service liquidity fund covering the next coupon
payment, to be funded from collections. The transaction also
benefits from a turbo-sequential payment structure that traps any
available excess spread.

The ratings also consider the solid historical performance of
comparable loans originated by ICBC (Argentina) as well as the
strong performance of Fideicomiso Financiero ICBC Prendarios I,
the previous auto loan securitization sponsored by the bank.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed
when rating this transaction. Although Moody's analyzed the
historical performance data of previous transactions and similar
receivables originated by ICBC (Argentina), the actual performance
of the securitized pool may be affected, among other factors, by
the economic activity, high inflation rates compared with nominal
salaries increases and the unemployment rate in Argentina.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo
sequential payment structure, when compared with the level of
projected losses in the securitized pool.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this
transaction through the initial subordination levels for each
rated class, as well as the historical performance of ICBC
(Argentina)'s portfolio. In addition, Moody's considered factors
common to auto loans securitizations such as delinquencies, LTVs,
prepayments and losses; as well as specific factors related to the
Argentine market, such as the probability of an increase in losses
if there are changes in the macroeconomic scenario in Argentina.
These factors were incorporated in a cash flow model in order to
determine the expected loss for the rated securities.

Moody's evaluated historical performance data from July 1, 2012
and ending June 30, 2015. Moody's key ratings-model assumptions
for this transaction include various performance statistics,
including log normal estimate of the default rate with a mean
default rate of 5% and a coefficient of variation of 50%. Recovery
rates on defaults were assumed at 40%. Other model input
assumptions include a conditional prepayment rate of 6.94% per
annum.

To determine the rating assigned to the securities, Moody's has
used an expected loss methodology that reflects the probability of
default for each tranche times the severity of the loss expected
for the tranche. In order to allocate losses to the tranches in
accordance with their priority of payment and relative size,
Moody's has used a cash-flow model (ABSROM) that reproduces many
deal-specific characteristics: the main input parameters of the
model are described above. Weighting each loss scenario's severity
result on the securities with its probability of occurrence, the
model has calculated the expected loss level for each tranche as
well as the expected average life. Moody's model then compares the
quantitative values to the Moody's Idealized Expected Loss table
for each tranche.

The model results showed 0.00% expected loss for the Class A
Floating Rate Debt Securities, 0.06% for the Class B Floating Rate
Debt Securities and 3.93% for the Certificates.

Finally, Moody's also evaluated the back-up servicing arrangements
in the transaction. If ICBC (Argentina) is removed as servicer,
TMF Trust Company (Argentina) S.A. will be appointed as the back-
up servicer.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's ran several stress scenarios, including increases in the
default rate assumptions. If default rates increased 10% from the
base case scenario for the pool (i.e., mean of 15% and a
coefficient of variation of 50%), the ratings of the Class B
Floating Rate debt securities and the Certificates would likely be
downgraded to B2 (sf) and Caa3 (sf) respectively. The ratings of
the Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities would likely be
unchanged.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS"
published in January 2015.


ROYAL & SUN ALLIANCE: Moody's Affirms B1 Global Scale LC Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed
the B1 (global local currency) and Aaa.ar (Argentina's national
scale) insurance financial strength (IFS) ratings of Royal & Sun
Alliance Seguros ("RSA Argentina"). The outlook of RSA Argentina
is negative, in line with the negative outlook on sovereign bonds
of Argentina and most local financial institutions.

These rating actions follow RSA Group's announcement on September
8 that it has reached an agreement to sell its Latin American
operations to Grupo de Inversiones Suramericana, S.A. ("Grupo
SURA" -- unrated by Moody's). RSA Argentina is the property and
casualty (P&C) insurance subsidiary of U.K.-based Royal & Sun
Alliance Insurance plc (IFSR A2/STA).  The transaction is subject
to the authorizations of the local insurance regulators in each
country and to other conditions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings affirmation of RSA Argentina’s B1/Aaa.ar IFS
ratings mainly reflects the pending sale of the company by RSA
Group to a new parent company with a somewhat lower ratings
profile (e.g. Seguros Generales Suramericana S.A. at Baa2/stable
IFS) yet still financially much stronger than this Argentine
insurer, and with a clear regional expansion strategy. The larger
financial resources and stronger ratings profile of the key
entities of Grupo SURA, compared to RSA Argentina, are sufficient
to maintain the current two notches of parental explicit and
implicit support from its current standalone credit profile of B3.

Moody's explained that RSA Argentina's intrinsic credit strengths
include its diversified distribution channels (including direct
and telemarketing platforms, insurance agents, and international
brokers) and a sustained profitability in the last five fiscal
years. Among the company's main credit concerns and risks are its
considerable exposure to below-investment grade securities
(reflecting local regulatory restrictions on all insurers from
investing in foreign assets) and Argentina's weak operating
environment. RSA Argentina's Aaa.ar national scale insurance
financial strength (IFS) rating is based on the application of
Moody's mapping criteria for a B1 IFS global local currency rating
to the Argentine national scale. Aaa.ar is the only possible
outcome on the Argentine national scale for a B1 global local
currency rating.

With regards to RSA Argentina, given its current negative outlook,
an upgrade is unlikely, but the following factors could lead the
outlook to move back to stable from negative: (1) Argentine
sovereign rating outlook returning to stable from negative and (2)
improvement of Argentina’s operating environment. Conversely, the
following factors could add downward pressures to the affirmed
ratings: (1) downgrade of Argentina’s government bond rating
and/or deterioration in Argentine's operating environment, (2)
significant deterioration in underwriting results (e.g. combined
ratio consistently above 105%), (3) sustained increase in
underwriting leverage (e.g. above 9x), (4) sustained net losses
and 5) sharp deterioration in the ratings profile of new owner or
a multi-notch downgrades of the key rated entities of new parent.

Based in Buenos Aires, RSA Argentina reported net income of ARS81
million and gross premiums written of ARS3.112 million for the
2014/15 fiscal year ended June 30, 2015. As of that date, the
company reported total assets in excess of approximately ARS3.5
billion and shareholders' equity of approximately ARS575 million.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Property and Casualty Insurers published in August 2014.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO DO ESTADO: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its global
scale and national scale issuer credit ratings on Banco do Estado
do Rio Grande do Sul S.A. (Banrisul) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and
'brAA' from 'brAAA', respectively.  The outlook is negative.

The ratings on Banrisul reflect its "adequate" business position,
"moderate" risk position, "adequate" capital and earnings, "above
average" funding, and "adequate" liquidity, as S&P's criteria
define these terms.

"We are changing Banrisul's risk position to moderate from
adequate, based on deteriorating asset quality, which is in line
with that of other Brazilian banks," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Guilherme Machado.

With non-performing loans (NPLs) rising to 3.9% in fiscal 2014 and
4.7% in the first half of 2015, from 2.9% in fiscal 2013, Banrisul
is facing a more difficult scenario for its credit transactions,
especially in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which should
lead to further asset quality deterioration.  S&P forecasts NPLs
will continue to grow gradually along 2015, potentially surpassing
5% for some time, while charge offs, which grew to 2.0% in the
first half of 2015 from 1.6% in fiscal 2014, should surpass 3.0%
this year.  S&P's forecast considers almost no portfolio growth in
2015, a material net interest margin increase following spreads
and interest rates recovery, and NPLs doubling from 2014 levels
(first half of 2015 NPLs almost equal fiscal 2014 NPLs).


BRAZIL: Central Bank Intervenes to Lift Battered Real
-----------------------------------------------------
EFE reports that Brazil's Central Bank on September 10 announced
it would sell $1.5 billion via an auction of repurchase agreements
in a bid to arrest the steep drop of the real, which tumbled to a
rate of 3.90 to the dollar after Standard & Poor's downgraded the
country's credit rating to junk status.

The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange's Ibovespa index opened sharply lower
in response to the loss of Brazil's coveted investment-grade
rating, but it had recovered by mid-session and was down just 0.11
percent from September 9's close, notes the report.

According to EFE, the real slid 2.58 percent at September 10's
market opening, but it strengthened to around 3.84 per dollar at
mid-session after the Central Bank's latest intervention.

The Central Bank last week sold $2.4 billion via repurchase
agreements to counteract the strong greenback, which has risen
roughly 40 percent against the real since Jan. 1, says the report.

Concerns over the debt downgrade also prompted President Dilma
Rousseff to call an emergency Cabinet meeting to analyze the new
economic and political scenario, the report relates.

In its decision, notes EFE, S&P said the country's fiscal
situation had deteriorated and predicted that the government's
mounting political challenges would hamper its "ability and
willingness to submit a 2016 budget to Congress" consistent with
its goal of balancing its accounts.

The report relates that Brazil's economy is technically in
recession and the government is projecting a 1.49 percent
contraction this year, while private sector analysts are
forecasting the country's gross domestic product will shrink 2.44
percent in 2015.

Brazil also is being hard-hit by an inflation rate that is nearly
in double digits, an unemployment rate that recently hit a five-
year high and a massive corruption scandal centered on state-
controlled oil company Petrobras that has implicated the country's
leading construction companies and dozens of politicians, EFE
adds.


BRAZIL: Junk Relapse Makes Its Bonds Even Riskier Than Russia
-------------------------------------------------------------
Juan Pablo Spinetto and Julia Leite of Bloomberg News report that
Brazil's plunge into junk status may be far from finished.

The report recalls that on Sept. 9, Standard & Poor's stripped
Latin America's biggest country of its investment grade, lowering
it to BB+ and keeping a negative outlook on its debt.

With Brazil headed for its longest recession since the 1930s, bond
traders are bracing for more rating cuts as political gridlock
stymies desperately needed economic reforms, says the report.
Brazil's borrowing costs have soared and its $2.15 billion of
bonds due in 2023 now yield just 0.06 percentage point less than
similar-maturity debt from Bolivia -- which is rated one level
lower and is South America's poorest nation. The advantage is the
smallest on record.

"The negative outlook makes it somewhat likely that there will be
another downgrade within a year," Barclays Plc said in a research
report, notes Bloomberg News.

While Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings still have
investment-grade ratings on Brazil, Societe Generale emerging-
market strategist Bernd Berg said another downgrade is likely in
the next two months, the report relays.

Bloomberg News says it also now costs 0.22 percentage point more
to protect Brazil's debt securities than those issued by Russia, a
nation battered by sanctions and plunging oil prices. S&P, which
was the first rating company to award Brazil an investment grade
in 2008, also rates Russia BB+, notes the report.

Brazil's three rating cuts in the past 18 months have triggered a
wave of corporate downgrades, the report recall. Excluding
financial firms, there have been 186 ratings cuts this year, more
than double last year's record tally of 69, data compiled by
Bloomberg show.

"There is likely more bad news to come," Geoff Dennis, a
strategist at UBS AG, said in an e-mailed report, notes Bloomberg
News.

OAS CONSTRUTORA: Highway Construction Workers Shut Down Project
---------------------------------------------------------------
Carolyn Kissoon and Susan Mohammed, writing for Trinidad Express,
report that there was chaos at the headquarters of OAS Construtora
on September 9, with hundreds of highway construction workers
locking the gates to the company, demanding answers about the
future of the project.

According to the report, the workers locked the gates at 7 a.m.
saying they had seen an article posted on social media that OAS
Construtora, the Brazilian main contractor for the Solomon Hochoy
Highway extension to Point Fortin, had intentions of pulling out
of the project.


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: S&P Cuts Global Scale Ratings to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
Brazilian corporates and infrastructure entities.

S&P lowered the ratings on the following entities by one notch on
the global scale foreign currency rating to 'BB+' and on the
national scale to 'brAA+', with the exceptions of Eletrobras and
Itaipu whose global scale local currency ratings were lowered to
'BBB-' and national scale remained at 'brAAA'.  The outlook on
these entities is negative:

   -- Companhia de Gas de Sao Paulo - Comgas;
   -- Companhia Energetica do Ceara - Coelce;
   -- Elektro Eletricidade e Servicos S.A. (Elektro);
   -- Eletrobras-Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A.;
   -- Transmissora Alianca de Energia Eletrica S.A. (TAESA);
   -- Neoenergia S.A.;
   -- Companhia de Eletricidade do Estado da Bahia - COELBA;
   -- Companhia Energetica do Rio Grande do Norte - COSERN;
   -- Companhia Energetica de Pernambuco - CELPE;
   -- Itaipu Binacional;
   -- Atlantia Bertin Concessoes S.A. (AB Concessoes);
   -- Rodovia das Colinas S.A.;
   -- Triangulo do Sol Auto-Estradas S.A.;
   -- Arteris S.A.;
   -- Autopista Planalto Sul S/A.;
   -- CCR S.A.;
   -- Autoban - Concessionaria do Sistema Anhanguera Bandeirantes
      S.A.;
   -- Concessionaria da Rodovia Presidente Dutra S.A.;
   -- Rodonorte Concessionaria de Rodovias Integradas S.A.;
   -- Ecorodovias Concessoes e Servicos S.A.;
   -- Concessionaria Ecovias dos Imigrantes S.A.; and
   -- Santos Brasil Participacoes S.A.

S&P has also lowered its global scale ratings on Petroleo
Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras to 'BB' from 'BBB-' and its national
scale ratings to 'brAA' from 'brAAA'.  The outlook on both ratings
is negative.

S&P also downgraded Samarco Mineracao S.A. to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' on
global scale and to 'brAA+' from 'brAAA' on national scale.  The
outlook on both ratings is stable.

At the same time, S&P lowered the global scale ratings on these
entities by one notch with negative outlooks, while S&P affirmed
its 'brAAA' national scale ratings on them.  The outlook on the
national scale ratings on the Votorantim group, Ultrapar, and
Multiplan is negative, while that on AmBev's national scale
ratings remained stable.  The ratings on these entities remain
above Brazil's foreign currency rating:

   -- AmBev - Companhia de Bebidas das Americas (AmBev);
   -- Globo Comunicacao e Participacoes S.A. (Globo);
   -- Multiplan Empreendimentos Imobiliarios S.A. (Multiplan);
   -- Ultrapar Participacoes S.A. (Ultrapar);
   -- Votorantim Participacoes S.A.;
   -- Votorantim Industrial S.A.; and
   -- Votorantim Cimentos S.A.

Also, S&P placed the ratings on these entities on CreditWatch with
negative implications:

   -- Braskem S.A.;
   -- Klabin S.A.;
   -- Odebrecht Engenharia e Construcao S.A.;
   -- Baesa - Energetica Barra Grande S.A.
   -- Duke Energia International Geracao Paranapanema S.A.; and
   -- Tractebel Energia S.A.

S&P affirmed the ratings with no changes to the outlook on these
entities:

   -- Ache Laboratorios Farmaceuticos S.A.;
   -- BRF S.A.;
   -- Embraer S.A.;
   -- Fibria Celulose S.A.;
   -- Gerdau S.A.;
   -- Natura Cosmeticos S.A.;
   -- Telefonica Brasil S.A.;
   -- Vale S.A.; and
   -- Vale Canada Ltd.

S&P affirmed the global scale ratings and revised the outlooks to
negative on these entities.  The outlook on the national scale
ratings were also revised to negative, except for Raizen which
remained stable:

   -- Raizen (which is the combination of Raizen Energia S.A. and
      Raizen Combustiveis S.A.);
   -- Localiza Rent a Car S.A.;
   -- Ampla Energia e Servicos S.A;
   -- Cachoeira Paulista Transmissora de Energia S.A.; and
   -- Norte Brasil Transmissora de Energia S.A.

Finally, S&P lowered its national scale ratings by one notch to
'brAA' on these entities.  The outlook on these ratings is
negative:

   -- Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais S.A.;
   -- Cemig Distribuicao S.A.;
   -- Cemig Geracao e Transmissao S.A.;
   -- CPFL Energia S.A.;
   -- Companhia Paulista de Forca e Luz;
   -- Companhia Piratininga de Forca e Luz;
   -- Rio Grande Energia S.A.;
   -- Bandeirante Energia S.A.; and
   -- Espirito Santo Centrais Eletricas S.A.

The downgrade of Comgas, Coelce, Elektro, TAESA, Neoenergia and
its subsidiaries, Atlantia Bertin and its subsidiaries, Arteris
and its subsidiary, CCR and its subsidiaries, and Ecorodovias and
its subsidiary reflects S&P's view of an appreciable likelihood
that they would default under a scenario where the sovereign
defaults on its foreign currency obligations.  The electric
distributors and toll roads would follow the sovereign in a
default scenario because S&P believes that their regulated status
makes them vulnerable if the sovereign's credit quality weakens
significantly (i.e. potential tariff controls, revenue collection,
and credit availability would suffer in such scenario).

The downgrade of Eletrobras, Itaipu, and Petrobras is in line with
S&P's criteria for government-related entities (GREs).  S&P views
the likelihood of extraordinary government support for Eletrobras
as "almost certain," so S&P equalizes the ratings on the company
with those on the sovereign.  Itaipu Binacional benefits from an
"extremely high" likelihood of support from the government.  As
such, all ratings on Itaipu Binacional are equalized with those on
the sovereign at this point, considering its 'bb+' stand-alone
credit profile (SACP).  Petrobras was downgraded to 'BB' due to
the two-notch downgrade on Brazil's local currency rating.
Because S&P assign a "very high" likelihood of support from the
government and Petrobras' SACP is assessed as 'b+', the resulting
corporate rating is 'BB' for a 'BBB-' local currency rating on the
sovereign, according to our GRE methodology.  The outlook on
global and national scale ratings on these three entities is
negative, reflecting that of the sovereign.

S&P downgraded Samarco because it wouldn't benefit from parent
support in a sovereign distress scenario.  However, the outlook on
both global and national scale ratings on Samarco remains stable,
mainly reflecting the company's stand-alone strengths that would
support the current ratings even under lower foreign currency
ratings on the sovereign.

The one-notch downgrade of AmBev, Globo, Multiplan, Ultrapar, and
the Votorantim group--and the negative outlook on these entities
and on Localiza and Raizen--reflect S&P's view that these entities
are currently rated at the maximum number of notches above the
sovereign foreign currency rating or T&C assessment due to their
intrinsic credit factors, sensitivity to country risk, and
liquidity cushion under the sovereign stress tests that S&P runs
for an entity whose rating is above the sovereign's.  The latest
individual reports on these entities provide more insight on the
amount of notches above the sovereign rating level each company
can reach.

S&P placed the ratings on Braskem, Klabin, Odebrecht, Baesa, Duke,
and Tractebel on CreditWatch negative because it needs to further
test their resiliency to a potential sovereign distress
considering each company's sensitivity to country risk and other
specific factors.  However, S&P believes there's at least a 50%
chance for a downgrade as well.  S&P expects to resolve these
CreditWatch listings in the next 90 days.

The ratings affirmations on Ache, BRF, Embraer, Fibria, Gerdau,
Natura, Telefonica Brasil, and Vale and its subsidiary reflect
S&P's belief that under a sovereign default these companies would
have enough liquidity to cover their obligations at least for a
certain period of time.  Also, some of these companies have
characteristics that partly insulate them from the Brazil's
stagnant economy, such as their exports, foreign operations,
manageable foreign currency debt maturities, etc.  S&P will
continue to further evaluate how the weakening economic conditions
could affect these companies' ratings.

Lastly, the outlook revision on Ampla, Cachoeira Paulista, and
Norte Brasil and the rating changes on Santos Brasil, Cemig, CPFL,
Bandeirante Energia, and Espirito Santo Centrais Eletricas mirror
that of the sovereign and reflect S&P's view that if a further
downgrade on the sovereign occurs, S&P might lower ratings on
these entities due to their regulated status and exposure to the
domestic economy.  S&P's national scale ratings have a correlation
to the global scale, but also reflect their comparative
creditworthiness within the rating category.

S&P's ratings on Companhia Brasileira de Distribuicao, Iguatemi
Empresa de Shopping Centers S.A., JBS S.A., Lojas Renner S.A., MRS
Logistica S.A., Qualicorp S.A., Grupo RBS, Sao Martinho S.A., and
Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A. are not immediately affected by the
sovereign downgrade.  However, S&P could revise the outlook on
these entities to negative during the next 90 days because it
needs to further test their resiliency to a hypothetical sovereign
default scenario.

For all the entities that S&P downgraded to 'BB+' and/or 'brAA+',
it expects to assign recovery ratings for their rated debt within
the next 90 days.

S&P will continue to assess the overall credit quality of the
corporate portfolio on an ongoing basis in light of weakening
sovereign credit quality and weaker macroeconomic prospects.

      Minister Shrugs Off Rate Cut, Says "Worst is Over"

Brazil's mines and energy minister on September 11 downplayed
Standard & Poor's decision to lower Petrobras' credit rating by
two notches, saying the state-controlled oil giant has already
absorbed the impact of a massive corruption scandal, reports EFE.

"The (lowering of) Petrobras' rating is a consequence of the
country's rating," the report quoted Eduardo Braga as saying,
referring to S&P's decision to downgrade Brazilian sovereign debt
to BB+, or "junk" territory, stripping the country of the
investment-grade status it had enjoyed since 2008.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


AFRICA HORIZONS: Shareholders to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 1
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Africa Horizons Ltd will hear on Oct. 1, 2015,
at 4:00 p.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor,
          P.O. Box 1344, Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


GOLVIS ASIA: Shareholders to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 17
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Golvis Asia Opportunities Master Fund Limited
will hear on Oct. 17, 2015, at 11:00 a.m., the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Highwater Limited
          c/o Nicole Gagliano
          Telephone: (345) 943 2295
          Facsimile: (345) 943 2294
          Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          1st Floor, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 31855, Grand Cayman, KY1-1207
          Cayman Islands


GOLVIS OPPORTUNITIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 17
------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Golvis Opportunities Fund are required to file
their proofs of debt by Sept. 17, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 3, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Highwater Limited
          c/o Nicole Gagliano
          Telephone: (345) 943 2295
          Facsimile: (345) 943 2294
          Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          1st Floor, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 31855, Grand Cayman, KY1-1207
          Cayman Islands


JAT PRIME FUND: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------
The members of Jat Prime Fund, Ltd. received on Sept. 9, 2015, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


JAT PRIME INTERMEDIATE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------
The members of Jat Prime Intermediate Fund, Ltd. received on
Sept. 9, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


JAT PRIME MASTER: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------
The members of Jat Prime Master Fund, Ltd. received on Sept. 9,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


LONGAN HOLDINGS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Longan Holdings Limited received on Sept. 8,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


MORINOMIYA HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Morinomiya Holding received on Sept. 8, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


LONGAN INVESTMENTS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Longan Investments Limited received on
Sept. 8, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


NAOSHAN INTERNATIONAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Naoshan International Group Limited received
on Sept. 8, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


OHMORI HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ohmori Holding received on Sept. 8, 2015, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


TACHIKAWA AKEBONOCHO: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Tachikawa Akebonocho Holding received on
Sept. 8, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands



====================
P U E R T O  R I C O
====================


ACADEMIA SAGRADO: Case Summary & 11 Largest Unsecured Creditors
---------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Academia Sagrado Corazon, Inc.
        PO Box 11368
        San Juan, PR 00910

Case No.: 15-06955

Chapter 11 Petition Date: September 9, 2015

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Debtor's Counsel: Wigberto Mercado Barbosa, Esq.
                  WIGBERTO MERCADO LAW OFFICES
                  PO Box 9020281
                  San Juan, PR 00902-0281
                  Tel: 787-840-5800/787-269-8844
                  Email: lcdowmercado@yahoo.com

Total Assets: $1.2 million

Total Liabilities: $220,979

The petition was signed by Dr. Julia Malave, president.

A list of the Debtor's 11 largest unsecured creditors is available
for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-06955.pdf


HORNED DORSET: Taps Pedro J. Rivera & Assoc. as Accountants
-----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico
authorized Horned Dorset Primavera Inc., to employ CPA Pedro J.
Rivera & Assoc.

The Debtor need the services of the firm to analyze and prepare
the financial documentation required in a Chapter 11 proceeding.

CPA Pedro J. Rivera has agreed to perform accounting services at
fees commensurate with its normal hourly rates:

        CPA Pedro J. Rivera                 $90
        Experience Staff Accountant         $65
        Staff Accountant                   $45

The Debtor also agreed to pay out-of-pocket expenses.

To the best of the Debtor's knowledge, CPA Rivera & Assoc. is a
"disinterested person" as that term is defined in Section 101(14)
of the Bankruptcy Code.

                   About The Horned Dorset Primavera

The Horned Dorset Primavera Inc. operates the Horned Dorset
Primavera, a small luxury hotel located in northwestern Puerto
Rico, two miles from the town of Rincon.  The hotel --
http://www.horneddorset.net/-- is set among rolling hills at
the edge of the beautiful Caribbean Sea and is known for  reserved
European service executed in an atmosphere unique in  Puerto Rico
and the award-winning Restaurant Aaron.  The hotel  is a member of
Relais & Chateaux.

The Horned Dorset Primavera Inc. commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
case (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-03837) in Old San Juan, Puerto
Rico on May 22, 2015.

According to the docket, the Debtor's Chapter 11 plan is due Nov.
18, 2015.

The Debtor has tapped Isabel M Fullana, Esq., at Garcia Arregui &
Fullana PSC, as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: S&P Lowers Rating on Tax-Backed Debt to 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt to 'CC' from 'CCC-'
and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where they had been
placed with negative implications July 20.  The outlook is
negative.

These rating actions follow the Sept. 9 release by the Working
Group for the Fiscal and Economic Recovery of Puerto Rico (a
special commission recently appointed by the governor) of a
special fiscal commission report (the report) recommending
restructuring all tax-backed debt, including general obligation
(GO) and Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp. (COFINA) sales tax
debt.

S&P believes a default or restructuring is highly likely and could
take the form of either a missed debt service payment or a
distressed exchange that it would characterize as a default.  In a
follow-up address to the commonwealth, Gov. Alejandro Garcia
Padilla stated that if creditors are not willing to partake in
restructuring negotiations, the government would have no
alternative but to proceed without them even if it involved "years
of litigation and defaults."

S&P rates debt 'CC' when it expects default to be a virtual
certainty, regardless of the anticipated time to default.  In
S&P's view, all of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt is highly
vulnerable to nonpayment.

In his television address, Gov. Padilla announced the appointment
of a team of debt restructuring experts to negotiate with
creditors.  Although at this point the report is technically only
a recommendation, the report specifically references measures to
address all of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt obligations,
including GO and COFINA sales tax debt.

The report projects Puerto Rico's treasury will exhaust its
liquidity in November 2015, even after undertaking extraordinary
measures to preserve cash, while the Puerto Rico Government
Development Bank (GDB) is projected to exhaust its liquidity
before the end of calendar 2015.  It projects Puerto Rico will not
have fully sufficient resources in fiscal 2016 to make payment on
its scheduled tax-supported debt, including GO debt.  The report
further forecasts a total central government deficit as a whole,
including the general fund, GDB net revenue, COFINA, federal
programs, and Puerto Rico Highways & Transportation Authority
(HTA) net revenue, in fiscal 2016 of $3.2 billion, or about 16% of
expenditures, including payment of debt service.  The report
projects only a $924 million surplus available before payment of
debt service--insufficient, in S&P's view, to pay $1.8 billion of
GO and GO-guaranteed debt service (GO debt service alone is
$1.2 billion), much less total central government debt service,
including GO debt, of $4.1 billion.

S&P rates all Puerto Rico tax-backed debt at the same 'CC' level,
except for Puerto Rico Public Finance Corp. (PFC) debt, which is
currently in default and rated 'D', reflecting the report's
projection of limited liquidity to meet all debt service before
the end of calendar 2015, including GO debt service, and the
report's recommendation to enter restructuring discussions with
all tax-backed debt holders.

The report also makes various other revenue and expenditure
recommendations, although the governor stated in his follow-up
address that he does not expect to make any further reductions to
the number of commonwealth employees.  In addition, the report
recommends that the governor establish a five-member financial
control board with oversight authority over most governmental
entities, including the commonwealth, GDB, and the public
corporations except Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority (PRASA)
and Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority.  Creating such a board
would, however, that would require new legislation.  In S&P's
view, it may be difficult for the governor to obtain the requisite
legislative approval to cede significant fiscal power to a
financial control board.  The report also anticipates the
provision of additional federal health care funding not in current
law and other U.S. actions in future years that might not
materialize.

Apart from the information and recommendations contained in the
report, S&P believes Puerto Rico's very difficult near-term fiscal
situation is demonstrated by:

   -- A large $703 million fiscal 2015 operating deficit, despite
      the enactment on paper of a balanced budget;

   -- Constraints on external market access for needed cash flow
      financing, which has contributed to what S&P views as the
      current precarious liquidity position--in fiscal 2015 the
      commonwealth was able to sell $1.2 billion of cash flow
      financing notes, but has been unable to sell external cash
      flow financing to date in fiscal 2016;

   -- The recent default on PFC annual appropriation-secured debt
      as the result of non-appropriation of debt service by the
      legislature;

   -- A recent decision to no longer make monthly GO debt service
      set-asides in advance of the commonwealth's next Jan. 1 GO
      debt service payment date in order to preserve liquidity;

   -- The administration's embrace of an earlier report released
      on June 29 (the Kreuger report), that similarly recommended
      debt restructuring as part of a comprehensive fiscal
      solution; and

   -- A weak long-term fiscal outlook due to pressures from
      projected rising healthcare costs, pension payments, and
      debt service, which increases Puerto Rico's incentive to
      pursue debt restructuring.

OUTLOOK

If any specific debt issues fell into default, S&P would lower its
rating on the debt to 'D'.  Although S&P do not expect it to
occur, if liquidity improved to the extent it believes likely for
the commonwealth to avoid near-term default, S&P could potentially
raise its rating back to the 'CCC' category.

DEBT AND LIABILITY UPDATE

New debt figures were released with this report.  Using these
figures, S&P calculates Puerto Rico's total tax-backed debt as of
June 30, 2015, at $48.5 billion, which includes $13.1 billion GO
debt; $5.5 billion commonwealth-guaranteed debt, including $1.1
billion of PRASA debt guaranteed by the commonwealth; $4.1 billion
appropriation of Public Building Authority lease supported debt;
$2.9 billion Employees Retirement System debt secured by the
commonwealth and local employer contributions, but in S&P's view
ultimately paid by the general fund; $15.2 billion COFINA sales
tax bonds; $554 million Puerto Rico Convention Center District
Authority hotel tax bonds; $6.5 billion HTA transportation tax-
secured bonds; a $246 million petroleum tax-backed note held by
GDB; and $300 million of cash flow notes; but excludes Puerto Rico
Infrastructure Financing Authority debt secured by federal rum
excise taxes on product sold in the U.S., as well as local
municipal debt, and nonguaranteed debt secured by electric and
water and sewer utilities.  S&P's calculation of total tax-backed
debt equals a very high $13,714 per capita, 76.0% of personal
income, and 46.7% of gross domestic product.

"We also view Puerto Rico's unfunded pension obligations as very
high.  Puerto Rico has disclosed a preliminary actuarial valuation
of its multi-employer Employees Retirement System as of June 30,
2014, with a net pension liability of $30.0 billion, and a 0.7%
funded ratio.  The system's net assets were projected to be
exhausted in fiscal 2015, but due to the $2.9 billion of pension
obligation bonds outstanding, its gross assets were not projected
to be depleted until fiscal 2021.  However, because a significant
amount of the system's assets are loaned to its members, and
Puerto Rico funded less than its actuarial recommendation in
fiscal 2015, we believe the system's assets will likely be
exhausted before then.  Puerto Rico's Teachers Retirement System
had a preliminary June 30, 2014 valuation showing a $13.1 billion
net pension liability and an 11.5% funded ratio.  The
commonwealth's Judiciary Retirement System had a preliminary $62.1
million net pension liability and a 12.3% funded ratio," S&P
noted.

Puerto Rico also projects that without additional federal funding
under the Affordable Care Act its health care insurance program
deficit could rise to $2.0 billion by fiscal 2019, up from $59
million in fiscal 2014, which could potentially require general
fund subsidies.

The commonwealth's tax-backed debt rated 'CC' with a negative
outlook includes:

   -- Puerto Rico GO bonds;

   -- COFINA first-lien and second-lien sales tax bonds;

   -- Puerto Rico Municipal Finance Agency's, the Puerto Rico
      Employees Retirement System's, and the commonwealth's
      general fund-supported appropriation and moral obligation
      bonds (excluding PFC debt, which is currently in default and
      rated 'D');

   -- Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority's (rum tax);

   -- Puerto Rico Convention Center District Authority's (hotel
      tax) debt; and

   -- Puerto Rico HTA's rated debt.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Sept. 7 to Sept. 11, 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name       Cpn   Bid Price   Maturity Date  Country  Curr
-----------       ---   ---------   -------------  -------  ----
Anton Oilfield    7.50     62.00      11/6/2018      CN      USD
Anton Oilfield    7.50     43.38      11/6/2018      CN      USD
Argentina Boco   21.06     51.70       1/4/2016      AR      ARS
Argentine Bona    1.75     75.74     10/28/2016      AR      USD
Argentine Bona    2.40     75.18      3/18/2018      AR      USD
Automotores Gi    8.25     46.15      5/24/2021      CL      USD
Automotores Gi    6.75     46.75      1/15/2023      CL      USD
Automotores Gi    8.25     48.75      5/24/2021      CL      USD
Automotores Gi    6.75     46.13      1/15/2023      CL      USD
Autopistas Met    6.75     72.84      6/30/2035      PR      USD
Autopistas Met    6.75     72.84      6/30/2035      PR      USD
Banco BPI SA/C    4.15     74.50     11/14/2035      KY      EUR
Banco do Estad    7.38     73.75       2/2/2022      BR      USD
Banco do Estad    7.38     95.40       2/2/2022      BR      USD
Banco Hipoteca    2.00     74.00       9/4/2018      AR      USD
Banco Mercanti    9.63     70.54      7/16/2020      BR      USD
Banco Mercanti    9.63     67.63      7/16/2020      BR      USD
CA La Electric    8.50     43.00      4/10/2018      VE      USD
CFG Investment    9.75     59.75      7/30/2019      PE      USD
CFG Investment    9.75     60.88      7/30/2019      PE      USD
China Precious    7.25     41.86       2/4/2018      HK      HKD
CSN Islands XI    6.88     61.25      9/21/2019      KY      USD
CSN Islands XI    6.88     88.75      9/21/2019      KY      USD
Decimo Primer     6.00     65.50     10/25/2041      PA      USD
Decimo Primer     4.54     54.25     10/25/2041      PA      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.50     66.23     11/25/2024      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.50     65.59       1/1/2024      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.36     67.52       9/5/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.50     72.57      5/20/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    4.30     73.04      3/12/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.50     65.42      12/1/2023      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.21     64.22     12/30/2023      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.21     63.97       1/1/2023      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    7.00     70.08      5/20/2022      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.50     65.45      11/1/2023      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.93     64.02       9/5/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    4.30     68.78      10/4/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.64     65.32      10/1/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.36     66.48      12/1/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     70.97      12/1/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    7.00     70.38       3/6/2024      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.21     64.46     11/25/2023      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.61     61.34      12/1/2022      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.64     63.08       9/5/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.93     64.01      10/1/2021      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.64     65.07      11/1/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.93     63.87      11/1/2021      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.36     67.20      10/1/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    4.30     68.34     10/29/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.93     63.63       1/1/2022      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.21     64.93       9/5/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.93     63.75      12/1/2021      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     72.07      10/1/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     70.43       1/1/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     70.87       9/5/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.36     66.13       1/1/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     71.51      11/1/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.36     66.83      11/1/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     74.18      4/26/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     74.47      4/11/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     72.43      7/26/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     70.80     10/29/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     71.32      9/26/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     69.39      1/29/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     73.77      5/17/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     73.77      5/17/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     73.13      6/20/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.21     64.11      11/1/2022      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.64     64.83      12/1/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     74.31      4/19/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     71.82      8/28/2018      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     67.20      7/30/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     65.69     11/25/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     68.04      5/26/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     68.11      5/21/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.07     66.50     12/30/2019      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.64     61.62     11/25/2021      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.93     63.37     11/25/2022      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.36     63.19     11/25/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.36     63.71     12/30/2020      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.93     64.13     12/30/2022      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    5.64     62.51     12/30/2021      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    6.40     67.81      6/12/2024      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    7.95     72.32      6/20/2024      EC      USD
Ecuador Govern    7.95     73.16      6/20/2024      EC      USD
Energia Eolica    6.00     55.13      8/30/2034      PE      USD
Energia Eolica    6.00     55.13      8/30/2034      PE      USD
General Explor   11.50     63.63     11/13/2018      CA      USD
Glorious Prope   13.00     74.00     10/25/2015      HK      USD
Glorious Prope   13.25     57.75       3/4/2018      HK      USD
Greenfields Pe    9.00     10.00      5/31/2017      US      CAD
HC Internation    5.00     67.10     11/27/2019      CN      HKD
Hidili Industr    8.63     74.00      11/4/2015      CN      USD
Hidili Industr    8.63     63.98      11/4/2015      CN      USD
Honghua Group     7.45     39.02      9/25/2019      CN      USD
Honghua Group     7.45     39.75      9/25/2019      CN      USD
Inversiones Al    8.00     55.00     12/31/2018      CL      USD
Inversiones Al    8.00     55.50     12/31/2018      CL      USD
Inversora Elec    6.50     51.00      9/26/2017      AR      USD
Kaisa Group Ho   10.25     48.00       1/8/2020      CN      USD
Kaisa Group Ho    6.88     50.13      4/22/2016      CN      CNY
Kaisa Group Ho    9.00     47.25       6/6/2019      CN      USD
Kaisa Group Ho    8.00     69.83     12/20/2015      CN      CNY
MIE Holdings C    7.50     54.00      4/25/2019      HK      USD
MIE Holdings C    6.88     59.50       2/6/2018      HK      USD
MIE Holdings C    7.50     66.00      4/25/2019      HK      USD
Mongolian Mini    8.88     50.24      3/29/2017      MN      USD
Mongolian Mini    8.88     36.25      3/29/2017      MN      USD
Newland Intern    9.50     36.63       7/3/2017      PA      USD
Newland Intern    9.50     36.63       7/3/2017      PA      USD
Noble Holding     5.25     66.66      3/15/2042      KY      USD
Noble Holding     6.05     74.00       3/1/2041      KY      USD
Noble Holding     6.20     73.61       8/1/2040      KY      USD
NQ Mobile Inc     4.00     66.25     10/15/2018      CN      USD
Odebrecht Dril    6.35     52.50      6/30/2021      KY      USD
Odebrecht Dril    6.35     52.00      6/30/2021      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    4.38     60.00      4/25/2025      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    7.13     61.00      6/26/2042      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    5.13     71.75      6/26/2022      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    5.25     58.25      6/27/2029      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    8.25     62.55      4/25/2018      KY      BRL
Odebrecht Fina    6.00     77.25       4/5/2023      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    4.38     62.00      4/25/2025      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    5.25     59.75      6/27/2029      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    7.13     59.94      6/26/2042      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    5.13     83.00      6/26/2022      KY      USD
Odebrecht Fina    6.00     79.00       4/5/2023      KY      USD
Odebrecht Offs    6.63     40.00      10/1/2022      KY      USD
Odebrecht Offs    6.75     40.74      10/1/2022      KY      USD
Odebrecht Offs    6.63     40.00      10/1/2022      KY      USD
Odebrecht Offs    6.75     41.00      10/1/2022      KY      USD
Offshore Group    7.50     39.25      11/1/2019      KY      USD
Offshore Group    7.13     38.25       4/1/2023      KY      USD
Oi SA             5.75     66.00      2/10/2022      BR      USD
Oi SA             5.75     65.50      2/10/2022      BR      USD
Peru Governmen    3.27     74.53      2/12/2054      PE      PEN
Petroleos de V    8.50     73.00      11/2/2017      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    5.25     50.50      4/12/2017      VE      USD
Petroleos de V   12.75     49.00      2/17/2022      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    5.13     71.10     10/28/2016      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    9.00     38.15     11/17/2021      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    9.75     38.91      5/17/2035      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    5.38     33.10      4/12/2027      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    6.00     33.76      5/16/2024      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    6.00     33.53     11/15/2026      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    5.50     32.91      4/12/2037      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    8.50     72.95      11/2/2017      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    6.00     32.91      5/16/2024      VE      USD
Petroleos de V   12.75     44.15      2/17/2022      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    6.00     33.25     11/15/2026      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    9.75     34.15      5/17/2035      VE      USD
Petroleos de V    9.00     38.03     11/17/2021      VE      USD
Polarcus Ltd      8.00     13.00       6/7/2018      AE      USD
Polarcus Ltd      5.60     57.91      4/27/2018      AE      USD
Polarcus Ltd      8.53     22.31       7/8/2019      AE      NOK
Provincia del     4.00     66.32      12/4/2026      AR      USD
Schahin II Fin    5.88     28.00      9/25/2022      BR      USD
Schahin II Fin    5.88     30.50      9/25/2022      BR      USD
Sylph Ltd         3.35     55.91      6/22/2035      KY      USD
Telemar Norte     5.50     75.00     10/23/2020      BR      USD
Telemar Norte     5.50     74.25     10/23/2020      BR      USD
Telemar Norte     5.50     77.75     10/23/2020      BR      USD
Tonon Bioenerg    9.25     34.08      1/24/2020      BR      USD
Tonon Bioenerg    9.25     33.25      1/24/2020      BR      USD
Transocean Inc    6.80     71.50      3/15/2038      KY      USD
Transocean Inc    4.30     71.56     10/15/2022      KY      USD
Transocean Inc    7.50     73.47      4/15/2031      KY      USD
Transocean Inc    7.85     74.50     12/15/2041      KY      USD
Transocean Inc    7.45     74.39      4/15/2027      KY      USD
Uruguay Govern    3.70     73.92      6/26/2037      UY      UYU
USJ Acucar e A    9.88     37.00      11/9/2019      BR      USD
USJ Acucar e A    9.88     37.88      11/9/2019      BR      USD
Vale SA           5.63     70.43      9/11/2042      BR      USD
Vantage Drilli    5.50     58.25      7/15/2043      US      USD
Venezuela Gove   12.75     44.75      8/23/2022      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove   11.75     40.50     10/21/2026      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove   13.63     59.18      8/15/2018      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    7.75     34.50     10/13/2019      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    9.38     36.13      1/13/2034      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    9.25     36.00       5/7/2028      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    9.00     36.00       5/7/2023      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    8.25     35.40     10/13/2024      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    7.00     37.50      12/1/2018      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    7.65     35.05      4/21/2025      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    7.00     34.63      3/31/2038      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove   13.63     53.80      8/15/2018      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove   11.95     41.00       8/5/2031      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    9.25     41.10      9/15/2027      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    6.00     34.75      12/9/2020      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove   13.63     53.80      8/15/2018      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    5.25     41.84      3/21/2019      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    6.25     66.38       4/6/2017      VE      USD
Venezuela Gove    9.13     64.22      9/15/2017      VE      USD
VRG Linhas Aer   10.75     73.67      2/12/2023      BR      USD
VRG Linhas Aer   10.75     74.00      2/12/2023      BR      USD





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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *