TCRLA_Public/150916.mbx           T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                       L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, September 16, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 183


                            Headlines




A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Creditors Want Access to $539MM Held at BoNY Mellon


B A H A M A S

BAHA MAR: Objects to Rosewood Hotels's Bid to Modify Stay
ULTRAPETROL (BAHAMAS): S&P Lowers Rating to 'B-', Outlook Neg.


B A R D B A D O S

BARBADOS: S&P Affirms 'B' Sovereign Credit Rating; Outlook Neg.


B R A Z I L

SAMARCO MINERACAO: S&P Corrects Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating to BB+


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AMG HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 30
ASIA DORSET: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 28
DC HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
GEGIAN INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21
GLS 193: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

GLS GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
HONUA REAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21
OAKWOOD INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 23
PANTIL SECURITIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21
RX PROPERTIES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

SKYSTREET INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SM TOPCO: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
YIELD STRATEGIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21


C H I L E

SOCIEDAD DE INVERSIONES: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating, Outlook Neg.


P U E R T O  R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Help Country Access Bankruptcy, Treasury Told
PUERTO RICO: Calls For Tax Changes, Spending Cuts in Debt Plan


                            - - - - -
=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Creditors Want Access to $539MM Held at BoNY Mellon
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Randles at Bankruptcy Law360 reported that attorneys
representing bondholders who have obtained court judgments on
defaulted Argentine debt urged the Second Circuit on September 11
to allow them to tap into $539 million held by Bank of New York
Mellon Corp., arguing they should be afforded priority status over
the country's other creditors.

During a hearing in Manhattan, notes the report, counsel
representing two groups of bondholders told a three-judge panel
that it should overturn a 2014 order by U.S. Judge Thomas P.
Griesa blocking them from tapping a substantial portion of the
funds in the BNY Mellon account to satisfy the judgments. The
appeal is part of a slew of litigation over Argentina's 2001
default on billions in investment bonds.

Bankruptcy Law360 says creditors involved in the appeal are among
a group that declined Argentina's previous exchange offers, which
would have returned a fraction of their original investment,
according to court papers. Most creditors agreed to the deal,
though, and BNY Mellon serves as an indenture trustee to these so-
called exchange bondholders.

In June 2014, the report recalls, Argentina made a $539 million
payment into BNY Mellon's accounts in the country's central bank
to cover payments due on the exchanged bonds. However, the
payments violated previous court orders requiring the country to
make payments to major creditor NML Capital Ltd., giving rise to
the current dispute.

Throughout the hearing, the judges questioned the bondholders'
position that they should be given a favored status over the
exchange bondholders, the report relates. Judge Gerard Lynch
repeatedly suggested that there was no evidence presented on the
record to suggest the appealing bondholders should have a
"superior interest" over other creditors who may be entitled to
funds.

According to the report, Anthony J. Costantini of Duane Morris
LLP, who is representing a group of mostly Italian bondholders,
suggested at the hearing that the distinction between the two
groups of creditors is a matter of timing: Argentina's obligations
to bondholders who obtained court judgments against the country
came years before its obligations to the exchange bondholders.

Meanwhile, Mirim Skolnik of Herzfeld & Rubin PC, who is
representing another group of bondholders, argued that the entire
transfer of funds to Bank of New York Mellon is illegal, and
therefore the terms of the indenture trustee agreement don't apply
to the funds, as the bank has indicated, says the report.

"The transfer itself was illegal," the report quoted Skolnik as
saying.

The Second Circuit reserved judgment.

The arguments come after the Second Circuit said creditors
couldn't pin Argentina's failure to pay billions in defaulted debt
and judgments on the country's central bank, adds the report.

The Applestein plaintiffs are represented by Anthony J. Costantini
and Suzan Jo of Duane Morris LLP.

The Dussault plaintiffs are represented by Miriam Skolnik and
David Hamm of Herzfeld & Rubin PC.

Argentina is represented by  Carmine D. Boccuzzi Jr. and Daniel
Northrop of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.

                         *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 9, 2015,
reported that EFE News said U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa has
handed down a new decision against Argentina in a long-running
debt case, ruling that the country must pay $5.4 billion to a
group of "me-too" creditors based on an equal-treatment provision
in their bond contracts.  The more than 500 plaintiffs hold debt
that Argentina defaulted on in 2001 and refused to join the vast
majority of creditors in accepting steep haircuts in 2005 and 2010
restructurings.

Judge Griesa ruled in 2012 in favor of another group of holdout
bondholders led by two hedge funds -- NML Capital Ltd., a unit of
Paul Singer's Elliott Management Corp., and Aurelius Capital
Management -- ordering Argentina to pay them $1.3 billion plus
interest.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 1, 2014, reported that Argentina defaulted on
some of its debt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed.

The country hasn't been able to access international credit
markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA related that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.

On April 22, 2015, Moody's Investors Service expanded the portion
of Argentina's debt that is rated (P)Caa2. The (P)Caa2 rating
reflects the higher risk of default for both Argentina's
restructured foreign legislation debt (as before) and,
additionally now, its restructured local legislation foreign
currency obligations, as compared with the risk of default on
other debt instruments issued by Argentina.  Argentina's local
currency debt and its non-restructured foreign currency debt are
rated Caa1. The debt that remains in default since Argentina's
2001 default is rated Ca.



=============
B A H A M A S
=============


BAHA MAR: Objects to Rosewood Hotels's Bid to Modify Stay
---------------------------------------------------------
Northshore Mainland Services Inc., Baha Mar Enterprises Ltd., et
al., filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware, an objection to the motion of Rosewood
Hotels and Resorts International Limited for an order modifying
the automatic stay to allow termination of license agreement and
related agreements with the Debtor Baha Mar Ltd.

The Debtors said that as a matter of law, alleged non-monetary
defaults may be cured if the default is not material or did not
cause substantial economic harm.  According to the Debtors,
Rosewood's assertion that such defaults are "incurable," however,
is incorrect as a matter of both fact and law. Notwithstanding
Rosewood's conclusory and unsupported statements to the contrary,
the Debtors said they either have the ability to cure the
purported defaults, or are not required to cure them because they
are neither material nor have caused substantial economic harm to
Rosewood. In either event, these alleged defaults do not serve as
a bar to the Debtors' potential assumption of the Rosewood Hotel
Agreements. Any purported defaults under the Rosewood Hotel
Agreements are capable of cure, or are not required to be cured to
be assumed or assigned.

Land ownership can be cured and Rosewood has suffered no
demonstrable harm as a result of the technical default.

The Debtors also said the technical default is capable of being
cured upon assumption: Baha Mar Ltd. could cause its wholly owned
subsidiaries to transfer the Land to Baha Mar Ltd. upon receipt of
certain approvals by, among other third parties, the Government of
The Bahamas.

The Debtors also argued that modifying the stay will cause great
prejudice to the Debtors. Rosewood fails to cite even a single
fact to support its hollow assertion that the Debtors will not be
"greatly prejudiced" by a modification of the automatic stay to
allow Rosewood to terminate the Rosewood Hotel Agreements. To the
contrary, lifting the automatic stay to allow Rosewood to
terminate the Rosewood Hotel Agreements will cause significant
harm to the Debtors. With the Project approximately 97% complete,
keeping the various brand agreements, including Rosewood's, is
critical.  They are an integral part of what Baha Mar will be -- a
3.3 million square foot world-class resort complex consisting of
many first-class amenities, four premier hotels, a convention
center, golf course, spa and racquet club. Any potential acquirer
of the Debtors' assets (or financier of the chapter 11 cases)
would discount the value of the Debtors' estates (to the detriment
of all creditors and parties in interest) if the Rosewood Hotel
Agreements were terminated.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors filed its Joinder to
the Debtors' objection to motion of Rosewood Hotels for an order
modifying the automatic stay to allow termination of license
agreement and related agreements with Debtor Baha Mar.  The
Committee said the request should be denied.

Northshore Mainland Services Inc., et al. are represented by:

          Laura Davis Jones, Esq.
          James E. O'Neill, Esq.
          Colin R. Robinson, Esq.
          Peter J. Keane, Esq.
          919 North Market Street, 17th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Tel: (302) 652-4100
          Fax: (302) 652-4400
          Email: ljones@pszjlaw.com
                 joneill@pszjlaw.com
                 crobinson@pszjlaw.com
                 pkeane@pszjlaw.com

               - and -

          Paul S. Aronzon, Esq.
          Mark Shinderman, Esq.
          MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & McCLOY LLP
          601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Tel: (213) 892-4000
          Fax: (213) 629-5063
          Email: paronzon@milbank.com
                 mshinderman@milbank.com

               - and -

          Tyson M. Lomazow, Esq.
          Thomas J. Matz, Esq.
          Steven Z. Szanzer, Esq.
          MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & McCLOY LLP
          28 Liberty Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Tel: (212) 530-5000
          Fax: (212) 530-5219
          Email: tlomazow@milbank.com
                 tmatz@milbank.com
                 sszanzer@milbank.com

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors is represented by:

          Christopher M. Samis, Esq.
          L. Katherine Good, Esq.
          WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON LLC
          The Renaissance Centre, Suite 500
          405 North King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Tel: (302) 353-4144
          Email: csamis@wtplaw.com
                 kgood@wtplaw.com

               - and -

          Lawrence C. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Jeffrey L. Cohen, Esq.
          Richelle Kalnit, Esq.
          Jeremy Rothstein, Esq.
          COOLEY LLP
          1114 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Tel: (212) 479-6000
          Email: lgottlieb@cooley.com
                 jcohen@cooley.com
                 rkalnit@cooley.com
                 jrothstein@cooley.com

                         About Baha Mar

Orlando, Florida-based Northshore Mainland Services Inc., Baha Mar
Enterprises Ltd., and their affiliates sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 29, 2015 (Bankr. D.Del.,
Case No. 15-11402).  Baha Mar owns, and is in the final stages of
developing, a 3.3 million square foot resort complex located in
Cable Beach, Nassau, The Bahamas.

The bankruptcy cases are assigned to Judge Kevin J. Carey.  The
Debtors are represented by Paul S. Aronzon, Esq., and Mark
Shinderman, Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in Los
Angeles, California; and Gerard Uzzi, Esq., Thomas J. Matz,
Esq.,and Steven Z. Szanzer, Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy LLP, in New York.  The Debtors' Delaware counsel are Laura
Davis Jones, Esq., James E. O'Neill, Esq., Colin R. Robinson,
Esq., and Peter J. Keane, Esq., at Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones
LLP, in Wilmington, Delaware.  The Debtors' Bahamian counsel is
Glinton Sweeting O'Brien.  The Debtors' special litigation counsel
is Kobre & Kim LLP.  The Debtors' construction counsel is Glaser
Weil Fink Howard Avchen & Shapiro LLP.

The Debtors' investment banker and financial advisor is Moelis
Company LLC.  The Debtors' claims and noticing agent is Prime
Clerk LLC.


ULTRAPETROL (BAHAMAS): S&P Lowers Rating to 'B-', Outlook Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its ratings on
Ultrapetrol (Bahamas) Ltd. to 'B-' from 'B'.  At the same time,
S&P lowered the issue-level rating on the company's senior secured
notes to 'B-' from 'B'.  The outlook on the issuer credit rating
remains negative.

The downgrade on Ultrapetrol's ratings mainly reflects S&P's
expectation that it will continue to post free cash flow deficits
for the next several quarters due to weak market conditions, while
short term debt and capex, although reduced, will further weaken
the company's liquidity position.  The combination of lackluster
performance and cash flow pressures from debt coming due will
increase the company's refinancing risks over the next 18 months.

The negative outlooks reflects S&P's view that ongoing weak
performance driven by soft demand and challenging market
conditions, coupled with Ultrapetrol's debt amortization schedule,
will continue to deteriorate the company's liquidity position over
the next few quarters.  S&P could downgrade Ultrapetrol's ratings
over the next six months if the company's debt refinancing plan
does not unfold as expected in terms of improving liquidity.

Although an upgrade is unlikely at this point, S&P could revise
Ultrapetrol's outlook to stable if the company is able to present
sustainably stronger liquidity, either because of improved market
conditions that can drive stronger cash generation, or because the
company finds adequate resources to offset the pressures of its
short term obligations.



=================
B A R D B A D O S
=================


BARBADOS: S&P Affirms 'B' Sovereign Credit Rating; Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' long-term
sovereign credit ratings on Barbados.  The outlook remains
negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit
ratings.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment is
unchanged at 'B'.

RATIONALE

Large fiscal deficits, a high debt burden that continues to rise,
and narrower financing options constrain Standard & Poor's ratings
on Barbados.  Financing the government deficit continues to rely
on official and central bank funding given a reduced appetite in
both local and external capital markets.  The government did,
however, issue a small amount of savings bonds in the local market
in June 2015.  The National Insurance Scheme (NIS) is less able to
finance the government than in the past because of its declining
surpluses.  Financing from local banks is increasingly based on
shorter tenors and higher interest rates.  The last government
issuance in global capital markets was in 2013.

The government succeeded in lowering the central government
deficit to 7.3% of GDP by the end of March 2015, from 12.2% of GDP
in the previous fiscal year ended March 2014.  This is a
significant reduction, reflecting the government's commitment.
However, the government didn't fully meet its planned target of
reducing transfers to public institutions--a critical, albeit
difficult adjustment--by 2% of GDP.  In general, budgetary
supplementals -- or requests for additional spending at fiscal
year-end by public institutions--have been a key source of
slippage in recent years.  S&P expected some slippage from
official fiscal targets given the risks associated with this
component.  Moreover, S&P expected the weak economy would continue
to weigh on revenue performance.

Planned additional deficit reduction this year, toward an official
central government deficit target of 4% of GDP, relies mostly on
additional revenue measures, such as higher property and excise
taxes and widening the value-added tax base, as well as further
austerity at public institutions.  S&P expects the general
government deficit, which incorporates NIS surpluses that it
estimated at about 2.5% of GDP in 2014-2015, to decline below 5%
of GDP in fiscal 2015 and fiscal 2016, from 5% of GDP in fiscal
2014 and 9.8% in 2013.  This decline reflects the government's
ongoing fiscal consolidation plan.  However, risks remain from a
slow pickup in the economy, high unemployment, and potential
spending pressures, such as the recent setback with labor unions.

S&P expects the net general government debt burden to rise a bit
further and stabilize at 88%-90% of GDP in 2015-2018 from 85% in
2014 and 78% in 2013.  Barbados uses more than 15% of general
government revenues to pay interest on its debt (excluding the
interest that the government pays on government debt, which the
NIS holds).

Barbados has a stable, predictable, and mature political system,
which has traditionally benefited from consensus on major economic
and social issues.  While consensus supports and acknowledges the
need for adjustment, private-sector confidence in the government's
ability to deliver has been mixed.  This is reflected in delays in
putting forth a comprehensive adjustment plan.  Sharp fiscal
deterioration and a decline in international reserves in 2013
prompted the government to take corrective actions.  In August and
December 2013, the government announced a series of adjustment
measures that included tax increases (for the municipal tax, bank-
assets tax, and consolidation tax), as well as spending cuts.
About 3,000 public-sector employees, essentially at government
agencies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), were to be laid off.
Cuts centered on the agencies and SOEs because control over their
finances had been lax.  To end this pattern, the government
established a Special Oversight Committee on SOEs in 2014 to
monitor and control their spending.  This committee complements
monitoring by the Management Accounting Unit of the Ministry of
Finance and receives monthly status reports from the agencies and
SOEs.  S&P views this as a positive development, but ongoing
execution is key.  Given that arrears continued to build last
year, with an incomplete stock outstanding of at least 4% of GDP,
according to the International Monetary Fund, additional efforts
to contain agencies' spending is important.

Barbados' economic fundamentals remain weak, reflecting not only
subdued global economic conditions, but also competitiveness and
other structural shortcomings.  Its narrow and open economy has
continued to suffer since the 2008 global financial crisis.  Real
GDP growth declined, on average, 0.2% per year during 2010-2014.
This year, S&P expects the economy to grow by about 1%, after
growth of 0.2% in 2014.  So far, growth is about 0.5% in the first
half of the year, with tourism arrivals up 14%.  Tourism from the
U.S. and Canada (which, combined, are just under 40% of tourists)
increased by 24% in the first six months of 2015, while tourism
from the U.K. (the single largest market, making up more than one-
third of total tourists) has showed strong growth.  A reduction in
airlifts to Barbados earlier in 2014 evened out, and tourism from
the U.S. and Canada picked up since last year.  Real GDP growth
should increase somewhat this year to 1.2% and move toward 2% in
2016-2017.

Although S&P expects investment in the tourism sector to pick up,
uncertainty about the timing and extent of new projects remains.
The most concrete project is a Sandals resort, which opened at the
end of January 2015 and is currently planning a further expansion.
The government extended the tax concessions it awarded to Sandals
to other projects as well.  A Hyatt hotel could start construction
in October, delayed from earlier this year, and the same developer
is looking to set up a Park Hyatt as well.  Some, but not all, of
the other villa and high-end residence projects appear set to
advance as well.

OUTLOOK

The negative rating outlook reflects the potential for a downgrade
if the government doesn't succeed in lowering its high fiscal
deficit, if growth resulting from key investment projects fails to
materialize, or if external pressures of persistent current
account deficits mount.  This scenario would likely lead to
further deterioration in the availability of financing for large
fiscal deficits.  S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the
government succeeds in reining in the deficit in line with its
targets and maintains access to financing, especially from private
creditors.  This, in turn, would help improve government debt and
interest burdens.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Barbados
Sovereign Credit Rating                   B/Negative/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment      B
Senior Unsecured                          B



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B R A Z I L
===========


SAMARCO MINERACAO: S&P Corrects Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its rating on Samarco
Mineracao S.A.'s senior unsecured notes by lowering it to 'BB+'
from 'BBB-'.  The rating error occurred on Sept. 10, 2015, when
S&P lowered its corporate credit ratings on Samarco following a
downgrade of Brazil.  The issue-level rating should have been
lowered to mirror the new corporate credit rating because S&P
rates the senior unsecured debt at the same level of the credit
rating on Samarco.  S&P expects to assign recovery ratings to
Samarco's rated debt within 90 days from the date of the rating
action on the issuer.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================

AMG HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of AMG Holdings Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by Sept. 30, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 14, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Peter Goulden
          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          c/o Mourant Ozannes
          Attorneys-at-Law for the Company
          94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Reference: NDL
          Telephone: (+1) 345 949 4123
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 949 4647; or


ASIA DORSET: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 28
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Asia Dorset Fund are required to file their
proofs of debt by Sept. 28, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 18, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Victor Murray
          P.O. Box 30116
          Landmark Square, 2nd Floor
          64 Earth Close
          Seven Mile Beach
          Grand Cayman KY1-1201
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 749 8181
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 743 6767


DC HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
On July 29, 2015, the shareholders of DC Holdings resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Avalon Ltd.
          Reference: GL
          Telephone: (+1) 345 769 4422
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 769 9351
          Landmark Square, 1st Floor, 64 Earth Close
          P.O. Box 715, Grand Cayman KY1-1107
          Cayman Islands


GEGIAN INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21
---------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Gegian Investment Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Sept. 21, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Aug. 18, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand CaymanKY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


GLS 193: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------
On Aug. 10, 2015, the sole shareholder of GLS 193 Fund, Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Geoff Symonds
          30 Chelsea Park Gardens
          London SW3 6AA
          United Kingdom
          Telephone: +44 2076593131
          e-mail: gsymonds@glscapital.com


GLS GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On Aug. 7, 2015, the sole shareholder of GLS Global Opportunities
Master Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Geoff Symonds
          30 Chelsea Park Gardens
          London SW3 6AA
          United Kingdom
          Telephone: +44 2076593131


HONUA REAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Honua Real Estate Holdings Limited are required
to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 21, 2015, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Aug. 17, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman Ky1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


OAKWOOD INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 23
-----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Oakwood Investments Ltd are required to file
their proofs of debt by Sept. 23, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 10, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd.
          c/o Richard Gordon
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


PANTIL SECURITIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21
---------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Pantil Securities Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Sept. 21, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on June 17, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand CaymanKY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


RX PROPERTIES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On Aug. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of RX Properties Fund Ltd
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Julien Leonard
          c/o Sophie Kassam
          Walkers (Dubai) LLP
          The Exchange Building, Fifth Floor
          Dubai International Financial Centre
          P.O. Box 506513 Dubai
          United Arab Emirates
          Telephone: +971 4 363 7919


SKYSTREET INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------
On July 31, 2015, the sole member of Skystreet Investment Fund SPC
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kirsten Le Pape
          Turners Management Ltd.
          Strathvale House
          90 North Church Street
          P.O. Box 2636 Grand Cayman, KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 0721


SM TOPCO: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------
On July 29, 2015, the sole shareholder of SM Topco resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Avalon Ltd.
          Reference: GL
          Telephone: (+1) 345 769 4422
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 769 9351
          Landmark Square, 1st Floor, 64 Earth Close
          P.O. Box 715, Grand Cayman KY1-1107
          Cayman Islands


YIELD STRATEGIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Yield Strategies Fund II Master Fund, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 21, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 12, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          c/o Jo-Anne Maher
          Telephone: (345) 814-9255
          Facsimile: (345) 949-4647
          94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands



=========
C H I L E
=========


SOCIEDAD DE INVERSIONES: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating, Outlook Neg.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' ratings on
Sociedad de Inversiones Pampa Calichera S.A..  The outlook remains
negative.

The rating affirmation follows Pampa's announcement of a cash
tender for up to $70 million of its outstanding $250 million
senior secured notes that amortizes between 2018 and 2022.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for distressed exchange and
offers, it views the proposed cash tender offer as opportunistic.
Although the company is offering less value than the original
promise ($980 for each $1,000 of principal amount), S&P don't
expect a conventional default in the near term, in case the
investors don't accept the proposed offer.  After the recent bank
loan refinancing for approximately $84 million, the company will
face only marginal maturities in the next 18 months.  In addition,
the transaction would help to improve Pampa's covenant cushion on
its need to maintain a 3 times collateral on its bonds with a
pledge of its Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile S.A.'s (SQM,
BBB/Negative/--) shares, which is currently about 15%.



====================
P U E R T O  R I C O
====================


PUERTO RICO: Help Country Access Bankruptcy, Treasury Told
----------------------------------------------------------
Maya Rajamani at Bankruptcy Law360 reports that Latino U.S.
lawmakers urged the U.S. Department of the Treasury to help
prevent an "economic catastrophe" in Puerto Rico, saying on
Sept. 14 the agency must move beyond providing "technical
assistance" and work to open bankruptcy protections to the
commonwealth.

In a letter penned by Rep. Nydia M. Velazquez, D-N.Y., eight
Democratic legislators implored the Treasury to help resolve
Puerto Rico's $73 billion in outstanding debt obligations by
bringing creditors and debtors to the table, "as it did in the
financial crisis of 2008," says the report.


PUERTO RICO: Calls For Tax Changes, Spending Cuts in Debt Plan
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chelsea Naso, writing for Law360, reports that Puerto Rico
released a restructuring plan on Sept. 9 calling for spending cuts
and sweeping corporate tax changes as the territory continues to
grapple with $73 billion in debt.

The five-year Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan, prepared by the
Working Group for the Fiscal and Economic Recovery of Puerto Rico,
encourages policymakers to amend the corporate tax regime,
stimulate the labor force, revamp welfare programs and cut
government spending, among other things, says Bankruptcy Law360.

The report found that if Puerto Rico fails to take action, it will
likely see a $27.8 billion financing gap between the 2016 and 2020
fiscal years. However, even if all the suggested changes are
implemented, the report expects Puerto Rico to still see a $14
billion gap.

Puerto Rico Gov. Alejandro Garcia Padilla highlighted the actions
the territory has taken since the financial crisis, including
raising tuition at the University of Puerto Rico, raising utility
rates, raising taxes and implementing a sales tax for the first
time, the report relates.

Garcia also called on U.S. lawmakers to take action.

"As in any jurisdiction, Washington also has a role in this
effort," the report quotes Mr. Garcia as saying.  "They have to
hear the call that Puerto Ricans need to receive fair allocations
of Medicaid and Medicare, that the decision of the IRS regarding
contributions paid by foreign companies under Act 154 becomes
permanent and that we must have a legal framework to meet the
commonwealth's obligations in an orderly manner."

He also cautioned creditors that if they don't willingly come to
the table to discuss the territory's crippling debt, Puerto Rico
will have to move forward without their input, Bankruptcy Law360
says.

"If creditors are not willing to partake in this process, Puerto
Rico will have no alternative but to proceed without them," he
said, notes the report. "That path doesn't suit us, nor them, and
will result in years of litigation and defaults and a major
humanitarian crisis."

The report comes after Puerto Rico in August urged the U.S.
Supreme Court to take up an appeal seeking to revive legislation
that would have allowed the territory's utilities to restructure
$20 billion in debt, telling justices the situation is dire and it
can't depend on Congress for help.

The territory's petition seeks review of a First Circuit decision
that held legislation passed by lawmakers in the territory to
establish a restructuring regime was unconstitutional. Puerto
Rican officials have said that if the legislation were blocked by
the courts, it could force public utilities to cut back services
and require more extreme austerity measures, notes the report.

Puerto Rico's quest to implement its own restructuring regime has
put a spotlight on the unusual way the U.S. has treated the
territory, the report further notes. It passed legislation to
create its own restructuring regime because unlike U.S. states,
Puerto Rico is precluded from accessing Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the same provision that Detroit and a handful of
other cities have used to restructure their debts.

However, adds Bankruptcy Law360, the First Circuit ruled this year
that Puerto Rico -- although unable to access Chapter 9 -- is also
preempted by a provision of the code from enacting its Recovery
Act. Puerto Rico said that decision has put it in an untenable "no
man's land" because the territory lacks any legal mechanism to
restructure its debts, notes the report.


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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