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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, September 30, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 193


                            Headlines



B E R M U D A

BERMUDA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Puts Ba2 ICR on Review for Downgrade


B O L I V I A

BANCO DO ESTADO: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Long-Term Deposit Rating
BANCO FIE: Moody's Assigns Ba3/Aa1.bo Rating on Debt Issuance


B R A Z I L

AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Fitch Cuts Short-Term IDR to 'B'
BANCO SOFISA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating, Outlook Stable
CAMARGO CORREA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative
GOL LINHAS: Moody's Affirms B3 Ratings on Perpetual & Sr. Notes
INVESTIMENTOS E PARTICIPACOES: S&P Affirms 'BB' Global Rating

VRG LINHAS: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating, Outlook Negative


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BLUECREST EQUITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 14
CHARTER BRIDGE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CHARTER BRIDGE P: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
KORTIS CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 5
MOKSHA CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 14

MOONSTONE HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ODEBRECHT OFFSHORE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Notes to Caa1
SHARPE FUNDS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 13
TAURASI CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
TAURASI CAPITAL MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

VITA CAPITAL IV: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 5


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Exports Still Nagged by Red Tape, Misgivings


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Going After Business Solutions Market
JAMAICA: Bauxite-Alumina Industry Revival Tied to Improved Supply


M E X I C O

CEMEX SAB: Shares Tumble Most on Index Amid Global Growth Concerns
RASSINI AUTOMOTRIZ: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable
VOLKSWAGEN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Deposit Rating


P U E R T O    R I C O

ANNA'S LINENS: Has Final Authority to Obtain $80MM DIP Loan
PUERTO RICO: Bill Proposed to Give Protection to Investors
PUERTO RICO: Weak Economy Puts Banks on Great Risk, Moody's Says
STANDARD REGISTER: Plan, Disclosures Hearing Set for Nov. 16


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Staring at Recession


                            - - - - -

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B E R M U D A
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BERMUDA COMMERCIAL: Moody's Puts Ba2 ICR on Review for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
ratings of Bermuda Commercial Bank Limited (BCB), including the
bank's long-term deposit and long term issuer ratings of Ba2, the
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba2, and
counterparty risk assessment of Ba1(cr).  The bank's short term
ratings and counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Not Prime and Not
Prime(cr), respectively, are unaffected by this action.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The review for downgrade reflects the concern that BCB is taking
on increased asset risk through its September 18th acquisition of
Private and Commercial Finance Group PLC (PCFG) from its parent
holding, Somers Limited (unrated), a financial services investment
holding company.  This transaction reflects a major repositioning
of BCB's business and risk profile and shift in strategy.  Going
forward, auto loans will make up the majority of the bank's loans.

In its ratings review, Moody's will consider the effects of the
PCFG acquisition on its risk profile, focusing on the quality of
the acquired loans, its growth strategy, and BCB management's
capacity to manage a portfolio of high-yielding loans originated
in the United Kingdom.  A downgrade could occur if Moody's
determines that the bank's overall asset risk is significantly
impaired.  The review will also focus on the acquisition's effect
on the bank's liquidity and capital profiles.  The review will
also consider the credit benefits of the acquisition in
diversifying BCB's assets and earnings.  The ratings could be
confirmed if Moody's believes that the change in BCB's asset mix
does not increase the bank's risk profile or that the
diversification benefits of the transactions outweigh the increase
in asset risk.

PCFG is a UK-based finance house that offers consumer auto finance
and small and medium-sized enterprise business and leasing
finance.  BCB is acquiring the equity and convertible loan notes
of PCFG from Somers, and will convert the loan notes to equity as
of 30 September, giving it an approximate 75% holding in PCFG,
which will then become a consolidated subsidiary of the bank.

BCB has at the same time sold to its parent its entire holding
(42.06%) in West Hamilton Holdings Limited (WHH), a limited
liability company that owns two commercial properties, which help
to offset most of the cost of the PCFG purchase.

Moody's last rating action on Bermuda Commercial Bank Limited was
on May 21, 2015, when Moody's affirmed all the bank's ratings and
assigned the bank Ba1(cr)/NP(cr) Counterparty Risk (CR)
assessments under the new rating methodology for banks.



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B O L I V I A
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BANCO DO ESTADO: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Long-Term Deposit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed all ratings and assessments
assigned to Banco do Estado do Para S.A. (Banpara), including the
global long and short-term deposit ratings of Ba3 and Not Prime,
the long and short-term Brazilian national scale deposit ratings
of A2.br and BR-2, and the baseline credit assessment (BCA) of
ba3.  The outlook on all ratings remains stable.

These ratings and assessments assigned to Banco do Estado do Para
S.A. (Banpara) were affirmed:

  Baseline credit assessment of ba3

  Long-term global local-currency deposit rating: Ba3, stable
   outlook

  Short-term global local-currency deposit rating: Not Prime

  Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating: Ba3, stable outlook

  Short-term foreign-currency deposit rating: Not Prime

  Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit ratings: A2.br

  Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit ratings: BR-2

  Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Ba2(cr)

  Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

RATING RATIONALE

In affirming Banpara's ratings, Moody's notes the bank's narrow
geographic focus on the State of Para, a state with a lot of
mineral wealth but a poor population, as well as its limited
business diversification, given its heavy dependence on payroll
lending.  The bank's geographic and business concentration --
roughly 66% of total revenues related to public servants --
exposes it to asset quality and earnings risk.  Banpara focuses
specifically on lending to state-government employees -- mainly
offering payroll and personal loans.  While the bank's share of
the local loan market is nearly 15%, its efforts to build a new
middle market platform have been challenged by the weak operating
environment.

However, these credit weaknesses are somewhat offset by strengths
including the bank's ample reported Tier 1 capitalization of 19%
reported in June 2015.  This provides strong buffers to absorb
increased loan losses expected to result from the bank's higher-
than-industry average growth at a time of very weak economic
activity.  Over the past two years, the bank has seen a modest
rise in delinquencies as a result of its foray into SME lending as
well as credit card operations, with its non-performing loans
ratio reaching a peak of 2.8% in March 2014 from well below 1% in
previous years, a move that required management to slow down new
business and return to its core product.  In June 2015, the 90-day
delinquency loans accounted for 1.7% of total loans.

Banpara also exhibits a high degree of deposit concentration, with
25% of its funding derived from government deposits and an
additional 17% from judiciary deposits.  While these resources
have historically been very stable, the government deposits could
face pressure should continuing economic deterioration weaken the
state's finances, forcing it to rely on its savings.  The bank has
attempted to reduce its dependence on government-related funding
through diversification, but these efforts have not been
particularly effective to date.  Moreover, the strategy if
successful will expose the bank to higher funding costs, which
could put pressure on future profitability indicators in times of
reduced business volumes.  In addition, Banpara's rating also
reflects the risk that its role as a policy bank for the State of
Para could expose it to political interference from the local
government in its asset allocation decisions, though there has
been no evidence that this has occurred to date.

Banpara's Ba3 global local-currency (GLC) deposit rating derives
from the baseline credit assessment of ba3, and does not
incorporate government support given the small size of the bank in
the Brazilian system.  While the bank's owner, the State of Para
(unrated), has supported the bank's expansion by maintaining a
conservative dividend distribution policy, the ratings do not
incorporate uplift related to the likelihood of extraordinary
support from the state government either.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

Upward movement on ratings could result if the bank successfully
manages the economic cycle while sustaining adequate asset
quality, profitability and capital base.  As the bank pursues its
strategy towards a more diversified loan book and funding
structure, positive rating movement could arise from preservation
of asset quality and profitability.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

A significant decline in asset quality due to the current economic
slowdown or aggressive expansion in riskier loans such as
unsecured credit cards and SME lending could put downward pressure
on the rating.  Negative rating movement could also come from a
sharp deterioration in profitability or a substantial increase in
credit costs.

LAST RATING ACTION & USED METHODOLOGIES

The last rating action on Banpara, was on Oct. 11, 2013, when
Moody's assigned ratings for the first-time to Banpara, including
the Ba3 long-term global local and foreign currency deposit
ratings, as well as a A2.br and BR-2 long and short-term Brazilian
national scale ratings.  At the same time, Moody's assigned a bank
financial strength rating of D- (D minus), which mapped to a
baseline credit assessment of ba3.  The outlook on the ratings was
stable.


BANCO FIE: Moody's Assigns Ba3/Aa1.bo Rating on Debt Issuance
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned a Ba3 global scale rating and a Aa1.bo national scale
rating to Banco Fie's first takedown under its senior debt program
of Bs600 million (Programa de Emisiones de Bonos Banco Fie 2).

The issuance, for up to Bs200 million, will be split into two
different classes due in 2,160 days (Class A) and 3,060 days
(Class B).  The outlook on all ratings is stable.

These ratings were assigned to Banco Fie S.A.:

  Bs600 million senior debt program:

  Global Local-Currency Debt Rating: (P)Ba3

  Bolivian National Scale Local-Currency Debt Rating: Aa1.bo

  Expected issuance of Bs100 million - Class A - Tenor: 2,160 days
   - Interest Rate: 4.00%:

  Global Local-Currency Debt Rating: Ba3

  Bolivian National Scale Local-Currency Debt Rating: Aa1.bo

  Expected issuance of Bs100 million - Class B - Tenor: 3,060 days
   - Interest Rate: 4.50%:

  Global Local-Currency Debt Rating: Ba3

  Bolivian National Scale Local-Currency Debt Rating: Aa1.bo

RATINGS RATIONALE

Fie's ratings reflect its well-established position among Bolivian
microfinancers, which supports its historically robust interest
margins.  However, Fie has sought to diversify its business model
by continuing to bank its customers as they move up the income
ladder and graduate to small and medium-sized companies (SMEs).
The ratings also consider Fie's manageable asset risk indicators,
healthy reserve coverage and capital levels.  These strengths more
than offset its modest total liquidity and pressures on
profitability stemming from government regulation.

Profitability remains sound, with a return on assets of 1.28% in
the six months to June 2015.  However, government-imposed lending
rate caps on mandated loans and deposit rate floors will
increasingly weigh on Fie's profitability metrics given that
government-mandated loans currently account for almost 40% of its
total loan book.  In order to maintain profitability, the bank has
been seeking to diversify its income sources towards fees and
commissions and to reduce its cost structure.  The bank's cost to
income ratio was a high 78% as of June 2015.

Fie's asset quality remains sound, with a non-performing loan
ratio of just 1.45% as of June 2015 despite a modest increase in
the previous six months.  The bank maintains a robust reserve
coverage which should enable to absorb potential losses in adverse
circumstances.  With Tangible Common Equity on Risk Weighted
Assets ratio at 9.6%, capital remains adequate as the bank
continues to reinvest a high proportion of earnings to support its
expansion plans.

Total liquid assets accounted for 17% of the bank's total assets
as of June 2015, which is lower than the banking system average.
However, Moody's notes that Fie maintains relatively high deposit
granularity, and limited mismatches in the term structure and
currency denomination of assets and liabilities.

The ratings could face downward pressure if the government
regulations continue to impair the entity's asset quality and
profitability.  While Fie's national scale ratings could face
upward pressure if the operating environment and the bank's
financial fundamentals improve, its global scale ratings will
remain constrained by Bolivia's Ba3 sovereign rating.

Banco Fie is headquartered in La Paz, with assets of Bs8.94
billion and equity of Bs715 million as of June 2015.



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B R A Z I L
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AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Fitch Cuts Short-Term IDR to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Agencia de Fomento do Estado do Rio
de Janeiro S.A.'s (AgeRio) long- and short-term local and foreign
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs), long- and short-term
National Ratings and Support Rating. The Rating Outlook on the
long-term IDRs and National Rating is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS -- IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATINGS

The rating action mirrors the recent action on Agerio's parent,
the State of Rio de Janeiro (ERio, long-term foreign currency and
local currency IDRs 'BB+'/Negative Outlook).

AgeRio's ratings are driven by expected support from ERio and
equalized to those of its parent. Therefore, the downgrade of the
ratings reflects ERio's reduced capacity to support AgeRio. This
is also reflected in the downgrade of AgeRio's Support Rating to
'3' indicating Fitch's view that the probability of support would
be moderate, in case of need. Fitch does not assign a Viability
Rating to AgeRio, as it is a development agency.

Fitch views AgeRio as strategically important for ERio, as it acts
as the state's development arm and implements its economic
development policies. ERio controls 99.99% of AgeRio. Furthermore,
by state law ERio's stake in AgeRio's voting shares cannot fall
below 51%, and it is the financial agent or administrator of three
state funds. A track record of frequent capital injections by ERio
reinforces Fitch's view. According to Fitch, AgeRio's small size
in relation to the GDP and the budget of ERio makes the cost of
potential support relatively low and increases ERio's propensity
to support AgeRio.

As of June 2015, AgeRio remained highly capitalized and posted a
regulatory capital ratio of 66.97% (70.95% in December 2014).
Further, the development agency's profitability was solid, as
evidenced by its average ROA that reached 2.84% (1.49% in December
2014). On the other hand, impaired loans classified in the D-H
range of the central bank's risk scale rose to 10.07% of total
loans (5.37% in December 2014), while impaired loan coverage by
reserves fell to 42.69% (89.67% in December 2014). This suggests
that, given the weak operating environment, there could be an
increase in provisioning expenses.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATINGS

Changes in Parental Support: AgeRio's ratings are aligned with
those of ERio. Therefore, any further changes in ERio's ratings or
Rating Outlooks, or willingness to provide support to AgeRio, or
in Fitch's evaluation of AgeRio's strategic importance to its
parent, would result in changes in AgeRio's ratings.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

-- Foreign and Local Currency long-term IDR downgraded to 'BB+'
    from 'BBB-', Outlook Negative;

-- Foreign and Local Currency short-term IDR downgraded to 'B'
    from 'F3';

-- Long-term National Rating downgraded to 'A+(bra)' from 'AA-
    (bra)', Outlook Negative;

-- Short-term National Rating downgraded to 'F1(bra)' from
    'F1+(bra)';

-- Support Rating downgraded to '3' from '2'.


BANCO SOFISA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the long- and short-term
local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Banco Sofisa S.A.
at Ba2 and Not Prime, respectively.  Moody's also affirmed
Sofisa's long- and short-term Brazilian national scale deposit
ratings at Aa3.br and BR-1, and the long-term foreign currency
senior unsecured debt rating on the GMTN Program of (P)Ba2.  At
the same time, Moody's affirmed Sofisa's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA at ba2, and its long- and short-
term Counterparty Risk Assessments (CRA) at Ba1(cr) and Not
Prime(cr).  The outlook on all ratings remains stable.

These ratings and assessments of Banco Sofisa were affirmed:

  Long-term global local-currency deposit rating of Ba2, with
   stable outlook;

  Short-term global local-currency deposit rating of Not Prime;

  Long-term global foreign-currency deposit rating of Ba2, with
   stable outlook;

  Short-term global foreign-currency deposit rating of Not Prime;

  Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating,
   assigned to GMTN Program, of (P)Ba2, with stable outlook;

  Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aa3.br;

  Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1;

  Baseline credit assessment of ba2;

  Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba2;

  Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Ba1(cr);

  Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of Sofisa's standalone BCA at ba2 reflects the
bank's heavy focus on loans to small and medium-sized companies
(SMEs) and significant borrower and depositor concentration as
well as modest profitability, offset by low delinquency ratios,
strong loss absorption capacity, and ample liquidity.  The SME
segment, which represents 98% of the bank's loan book, is exposed
significantly to the current downturn in economic activity in
Brazil.  While the bank's delinquency ratios have remained below
1.6% since December 2013 thanks to Sofisa's emphasis on short-
term, highly collateralized lending, there is some risk that they
could rise in the next 12 to 18 months.

As a wholesale bank, Sofisa also exhibits a high level of borrower
concentration compared to retail banks, as its 20 largest
borrowers represented 53.2% of the bank's tangible common equity
(TCE), while its largest segment exposure accounted for 56.9% of
TCE in June 2015.  However, the bank compares well in this regard
to its closest peers.  Management's efforts to mitigate asset risk
include requiring high levels of collateral and maintaining
diligent control on credit limits to individual borrowers.

In addition to high borrower concentration, Sofisa also exhibits a
high level of depositor concentration, with the 20 largest
investors accounting for 37% of deposits, as well as strong
reliance on wholesale funding, at roughly 75% of total funding.
Efforts to offset liquidity risks, such as potential volatility
should any of its larger depositors decide to withdraw their
funds, include maintaining a free cash balance equivalent to 62.5%
of deposits.

The ratings also consider Sofisa's profitability, which went up in
June 2015 due to increased loan revenues, but also because of
gains from securities trading and foreign exchange operations.
Despite that, Moody's expects profitability to remain modest in
the near-term owing to the weak performance of SMEs in the current
economic environment.

Sofisa's credit challenges are somewhat mitigated by the bank's
ample loan loss reserves and capitalization, which provide a
significant cushion against an increase in non-performing loans.
Loan loss reserves equaled nearly three times non-performing loans
as of June 2015, while the bank's ratio of tangible common equity
to risk-weighted assets was 17.95%.

Sofisa's ratings do not benefit from any uplift from either
affiliate or government support.  Moody's assesses a low
likelihood of government support for the bank, reflecting its
small deposit market share.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS

The ratings could move down if asset quality weakens
significantly, profitability deteriorates, and/or capitalization
declines.  Positive pressure on the bank's ratings is limited in
the near-to-medium term owing to the recent decline in Sofisa's
business volumes and the challenging operating environment.  In
the long run, however, the ratings could benefit from stronger
profitability indicators, a more balanced funding structure, and a
more diversified loan portfolio, while maintaining current low
delinquency ratios.

LAST RATING ACTION

Moody's took its last rating action on Banco Sofisa S.A. on
June 12, 2015, when the rating agency assigned Counterparty Risk
Assessments (CR Assessments) of Ba1(cr) and Not Prime(cr), long-
and short-term, respectively, to Sofisa.  All other assessments
and ratings remained unchanged.

Banco Sofisa S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and had
total assets of BRL3.8 billion (US$1.23 billion) and total equity
of BRL680 million (US$219 million) as of 30 June 2015.


CAMARGO CORREA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' global scale
corporate credit and debt ratings on Camargo Correa S.A. (CCSA)
and InterCement do Brasil S.A.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'brA-' national scale ratings on Camargo's senior unsecured debt
and the national scale corporate credit rating on InterCement.
The outlooks on both global and national scale ratings remain
negative.

S&P's senior unsecured debt ratings on CCSA are the same as the
national scale corporate credit rating, incorporating the group's
diversification and good recovery prospects from unencumbered
liquid assets that, in S&P's view, mitigate potential structural
subordination to priority liabilities at the operating
subsidiaries' level.

"The rating affirmation is based on our expectation that the group
will continue to maintain some financial flexibility to refinance
its short-term maturities," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Felipe Speranzini.

Access to favorable financing conditions for the domestic
engineering and construction (E&C) companies that are under the
corruption investigation is shrinking.  However, S&P believes that
the group's business diversification beyond E&C and the
unencumbered shares on liquid investments under the concession
unit, CCR S.A. (brAA+/Negative/--) and CPFL Energia
S.A.(brAA/Negative/--), is easing its refinancing efforts.  S&P
also believes those equity investments could be monetized, if
needed.  Furthermore, the consolidated cement division, through
InterCement do Brasil, posts a sound liquidity position and smooth
amortization profile amid restricted demand in Brazil and
challenges to pass through costs increases.

In August 2015, Construcoes and Comercio Camargo Correa S.A.,
CCSA's E&C subsidiary, agreed to pay around R$700 million to
compensate state-run companies for damage related to "Lava-Jato"
investigations.  It also agreed to cooperate with the
investigations and improve its compliance program.  In S&P's view,
these agreements should sharply reduce the uncertainties over
CCSA's potential cash outflows and business sanctions for its E&C
arm, including the prohibition to operate with public companies.
S&P believes backlog replenishing from its E&C subsidiary is still
vulnerable to the reputational damages from the investigations.


GOL LINHAS: Moody's Affirms B3 Ratings on Perpetual & Sr. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the B3 ratings assigned to Gol
Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. (Gol) and Gol Finance's perpetual
notes and senior notes due in 2017 that are guaranteed by Gol.
The outlook for all ratings was changed to negative from positive.

Ratings affirmed:

Issuer: Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. (Gol)

   -- Corporate Family Rating: B3 in the global scale

Issuer: Gol Finance LLP (Gol Finance)

   -- 7.5% USD 225 million guaranteed senior unsecured notes due
      2017: B3 in the global scale

   -- 8.75% USD 200 million guaranteed senior unsecured perpetual
      notes: B3 in the global scale

Outlook actions:

The outlook for all ratings: changed to negative from positive.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Gol's B3 rating considers the company's high exposure to foreign
currency and fuel price volatility, as well as the recessionary
Brazilian economy, the near term challenges in the Brazilian
aviation industry due to lower corporate activity and evolving
competitive environment.  On the other hand, the rating
incorporates Gol's solid position in the Brazilian domestic market
supported by its strong brand name and low-cost structure based on
a modern operating fleet of 142 Boeing 737 aircrafts, along with
an experienced management team.  The rating also reflects the
company's adequate liquidity position and staggered debt maturity
profile.

The negative outlook considers the expected deterioration in Gol's
credit metrics over the next twelve months, due to volatile
foreign exchange rates and weak corporate demand.  Despite the
steep drop in global jet-fuel prices of approximately 20% in 2015,
the higher dollar denominated costs will keep the company's
profitability and cash flow generation under pressure at least
through 2016.

Gol's leverage metrics, as measured by the gross debt to lease
adjusted EBITDA ratio, reached 6.7 times in the last twelve months
ended June 2015 (5.3 times in December 2014), while the operating
profit declined to 2.3% (5% in 2014) and the interest coverage
fell to 0.6 times (0.8 times in 2014).  Assuming a currency rate
of BRL3.8 per USD at year end, the company's leverage metrics will
likely exceed 11.0 times in 2015 as operating margins becomes
negative.  Nevertheless, Gol's management strategy to adjust
capacity and improve yields should limit further deterioration in
credit metrics through 2016.

Despite the anticipated higher costs, the company's recent
capitalization and ongoing liability management strategies should
be enough to improve its liquidity position and maintain an
adequate cash cushion during the rest of this year.  So far, Gol
has been able to maintain large cash balances in excess of 20% of
its annual revenues, which provide an adequate coverage to its
short term debt maturities and volatile industry fundamentals.

In September 2015, Gol concluded a capital increase of
approximately BRL460 million.  The company also raised USD300
million in 5-year term loan backed by Delta Air Lines, Inc (Ba2
positive).  This cash injection was part of the shareholder's plan
to strengthen the company's capital structure, building up its
cash position to about BRL3 billion to face large upcoming
corporate debt maturities of BRL1.2 billion over the next twelve
months.  Furthermore, the company expects to issue another BRL1.0
billion in a new amortizing debenture by the end of this month
with final maturity date in 2019, to redeem other local debentures
and improve its debt maturity profile.

Downward pressure on Gol's ratings will occur if its credit
metrics continue to deteriorate over the next few quarters without
expectation of recovery.  Quantitatively, negative ratings
pressure increases if adjusted gross Debt to EBITDA increases
above 8.0x for a prolonged period, or should cash trend towards
15% of revenues.  Moody's perception of a material deterioration
in the company's financial flexibility to meet capital
requirements could also lead to a negative rating action for Gol.

An upgrade of Gol's ratings is unlikely at this time.  Positive
ratings pressure requires sustained adjusted leverage below 6.0
times on a gross basis along with an EBIT interest coverage above
1.0x, and unrestricted cash that represents at least 25% of net
revenues.

Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A., headquartered in Sao Paulo,
Brazil, is the largest low-cost and best-fare carrier in Latin
America, offering approximately 900 daily passenger flights to
connect Brazil's major cities and various destinations in South
America and the Caribbean, along with cargo and charter flight
services.  In the last twelve months ended June 30, 2015, Gol
reported consolidated net revenues of R$9.8 billion ($3.7 billion)
and lease adjusted EBITDA of R$1.5 billion ($561 million).


INVESTIMENTOS E PARTICIPACOES: S&P Affirms 'BB' Global Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Rating Services affirmed its 'BB' global scale
and 'brAA-' national scale rating on Investimentos e Participacoes
em Infraestrutura S.A. - Invepar.  The outlook on both ratings is
stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'brAA-' national scale
corporate credit and issue-level ratings on Invepar's toll road,
Concessionaria Auto Raposo Tavares S.A. (CART).

Also, S&P assigned a 'brA+' rating to Invepar'a proposed
R$2.0 billion nine-year senior secured debentures issuance.

The ratings on Invepar reflect the strong growth prospects of its
portfolio of assets while the company invests in several
concessions in toll roads, subways, and airports, including the
subway in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Concessao Metroviaria do Rio
de Janeiro SA [MetroRio]) and Latin America's largest airport,
Aeroporto Internacional de Sao Paulo Andre Franco Montoro (GRU
Airport).  Even though the development of its portfolio of nine
operating assets and five shared-control partnerships continue to
pressured Invepar's credit metrics, S&P believes their main assets
are well structured and will start to generate cash flows in the
next two years while the company meets their debt service costs.

S&P's issue-level senior secured debt rating is one notch below
the issuer credit rating (ICR) on the group, incorporating the
structural subordination to priority liabilities at the operating
subsidiaries' level.  In addition, the 'brA+' issue rating
reflects our expectation of 50%-70% recovery (at the lower end of
the range) -- corresponding to a recovery rating of '3' -- under
S&P's hypothetical default scenario, based on the guarantee
package of the proposed debenture and the estimated residual value
of the discounted cash flow of Linha Amarela S.A. (LAMSA) until
the concession matures in 2037, net of its priority claims.

Invepar's "satisfactory" business risk profile reflects the
benefits of operating a diversified portfolio of transportation
infrastructure projects in Brazil, as the regulatory and
concession frameworks have proven to be fairly stable.  Despite
its exposure to volume risk, most of Invepar's assets operate
almost as monopolies due to unmet demand for infrastructure and
absence of alternative modes of transportation, especially for
commuter services provided by LAMSA, MetroRio, and Linea Amarillia
S.A.C. (LAMSAC).  These factors offer a strong offset to Brazil's
GDP retraction.

"We assess Invepar's financial risk profile as "aggressive."  Our
analysis is based on Invepar's consolidated numbers because we
assume the group will support the projects and subsidiaries in
which it has a controlling stake, especially those that receive
financing from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), such as
CART, GRU Airport, and MetroRio.  We also adjust EBITDA for the
amortization of the concession grant fees, in particular of the
payment of the one for GRU Airport, which we analyze as an
operational expense.  We continue to believe project ramp-up and
investment combined with tighter macroeconomic conditions for 2015
and 2016 should pressure its leverage metrics, with debt to EBITDA
of 8.6x and funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 5.6% in 2014,
with a slight recovery to 7.5x-9.0x and 5.0%-8.0%, respectively,
in the next two years.  On the other hand, we see FFO interest
coverage remaining in the range of 1.5x-2.0x over the same period
(from 1.9x in 2014), reflecting the actual cash generation in
relation to leverage and cash flow adequacy, and to its relative
long-term maturities," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that despite the
Brazilian economic downturn the company will continue to post a
gradual improvement in margins due to diluting operating costs,
following the ramp-up of new projects such as the tolling of Via-
040 in July 2015 and Metrobarra in June 2016.  On the other hand,
given the still-high capex plan until the end of 2017, we expect
Invepar to post an FFO to debt ratio around 4.0%-5.0% in 2015
improving to 7.0-9.0% in 2016, while maintaining debt to EBITDA at
around 7.5x-9.0x, and FFO interest coverage above 1.5x in the next
two years," S&P added.


VRG LINHAS: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Rating, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina, Ltda. affirmed the B3 and Ba3.br ratings
assigned to VRG Linhas Aereas S.A.'s fifth debentures due in 2017.
At the same time, Moody's Investors Service affirmed the B3 global
scale Corporate Family Rating assigned to Gol Linhas Aereas
Inteligentes S.A.(Gol).  The outlook for all ratings was changed
to negative from positive.

Ratings affirmed:

Issuer: VRG Linhas Aereas S.A (VRG)

   -- BRL 500 million guaranteed senior unsecured debentures (V
      issue): B3 in the global scale and Ba3.br in the national
      scale

Outlook actions:

The outlook for all ratings: changed to negative from positive.

RATING RATIONALE

Gol's B3 rating considers the company's high exposure to foreign
currency and fuel price volatility, as well as the recessionary
Brazilian economy, the near term challenges in the Brazilian
aviation industry due to lower corporate activity and evolving
competitive environment.  On the other hand, the rating
incorporates Gol's solid position in the Brazilian domestic market
supported by its strong brand name and low-cost structure based on
a modern operating fleet of 142 Boeing 737 aircrafts, along with
an experienced management team.  The rating also reflects the
company's adequate liquidity position and staggered debt maturity
profile.

The negative outlook considers the expected deterioration in Gol's
credit metrics over the next twelve months, due to volatile
foreign exchange rates and weak corporate demand.  Despite the
steep drop in global jet-fuel prices of approximately 20% in 2015,
the higher dollar denominated costs will keep the company's
profitability and cash flow generation under pressure at least
through 2016.

Gol's leverage metrics, as measured by the gross debt to lease
adjusted EBITDA ratio, reached 6.7 times in the last twelve months
ended June 2015 (5.3 times in December 2014), while the operating
profit declined to 2.3% (5% in 2014) and the interest coverage
fell to 0.6 times (0.8 times in 2014).  Assuming a currency rate
of BRL3.8 per USD at year end, the company's leverage metrics will
likely exceed 11.0 times in 2015 as operating margins becomes
negative.  Nevertheless, Gol's management strategy to adjust
capacity and improve yields should limit further deterioration in
credit metrics through 2016.

Despite the anticipated higher costs, the company's recent
capitalization and ongoing liability management strategies should
be enough to improve its liquidity position and maintain an
adequate cash cushion during the rest of this year.  So far, Gol
has been able to maintain large cash balances in excess of 20% of
its annual revenues, which provide an adequate coverage to its
short term debt maturities and volatile industry fundamentals.

In September 2015, Gol concluded a capital increase of
approximately BRL460 million.  The company also raised USD300
million in 5-year term loan backed by Delta Air Lines, Inc (Ba2
positive).  This cash injection was part of the shareholder's plan
to strengthen the company's capital structure, building up its
cash position to about BRL3 billion to face large upcoming
corporate debt maturities of BRL1.2 billion over the next twelve
months.  Furthermore, the company expects to issue another BRL1.0
billion in a new amortizing debenture by the end of this month
with final maturity date in 2019, to redeem other local debentures
and improve its debt maturity profile.

Downward pressure on Gol's ratings will occur if its credit
metrics continue to deteriorate over the next few quarters without
expectation of recovery.  Quantitatively, negative ratings
pressure increases if adjusted gross Debt to EBITDA increases
above 8.0x for a prolonged period, or should cash trend towards
15% of revenues.  Moody's perception of a material deterioration
in the company's financial flexibility to meet capital
requirements could also lead to a negative rating action for Gol.

An upgrade of Gol's ratings is unlikely at this time.  Positive
ratings pressure requires sustained adjusted leverage below 6.0
times on a gross basis along with an EBIT interest coverage above
1.0x, and unrestricted cash that represents at least 25% of net
revenues.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Passenger Airlines published in May 2012.

Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A., headquartered in Sao Paulo,
Brazil, is the largest low-cost and best-fare carrier in Latin
America, offering approximately 900 daily passenger flights to
connect Brazil's major cities and various destinations in South
America and the Caribbean, along with cargo and charter flight
services.  In the last twelve months ended 30 June 2015, Gol
reported consolidated net revenues of R$9.8 billion ($3.7 billion)
and lease adjusted EBITDA of R$1.5 billion ($561 million).



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BLUECREST EQUITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 14
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Bluecrest Equity Strategies Investment Fund
Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 14,
2015, to be included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Sept. 1, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Kim Charaman
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


CHARTER BRIDGE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 1, 2015, the shareholders of Charter Bridge Capital
Partners (Cayman), Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Charter Bridge Capital Management
          c/o 188 E. 64th Street
          Apt 3501, New York, NY 10065
          USA
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 6365


CHARTER BRIDGE P: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 1, 2015, the shareholders of Charter Bridge P Fund, Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Charter Bridge Capital Management
          c/o 188 E. 64th Street
          Apt 3501, New York, NY 10065
          USA
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 6365


KORTIS CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 5
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Kortis Capital Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Oct. 5, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Sept. 4, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Carl Gosselin
          Wilmington Trust (Cayman), Ltd.
          P.O. Box 32322 Grand Cayman KY1-1209
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 640-6712


MOKSHA CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 14
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Moksha Capital Partners RE (O) Ltd. are required
to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 14, 2015, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Russell Smith
          c/o Antoine Powell
          Telephone: (345) 815 4558
          BDO CRI (Cayman) Ltd.
          Building 3, Floor 2
          Governors Square
          23 Lime Tree Bay Ave
          P.O. Box 31229 Grand Cayman KY1 1205
          Cayman Islands


MOONSTONE HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 3, 2015, the sole shareholder of Moonstone Holdings
Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Patrick Storchenegger
          Telephone: (345) 949-0488
          Facsimile: (345) 949-0364
          P.O. Box 1990 Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands


ODEBRECHT OFFSHORE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Notes to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the 144A/Reg S senior
secured global notes issued by Odebrecht Offshore Drilling Finance
Limited to Caa1 from B2 negative, and has placed the Notes on
review for further downgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the Sept. 23, 2015, announcement by
Odebrecht Oil and Gas ("OOG", not rated) that Petroleo Brasileiro
S.A. ("Petrobras", Ba2 stable) terminated the charter agreement
and the services agreement with ODN Tay IV, one of the four
vessels that have been chartered to Petrobras under the OODFL
transaction.  ODN Tay IV's 7-year charter and services agreements
had a scheduled expiration in 2020.  This action by Petrobras
followed a more than 60-day downtime period of ODN Tay IV, which
we believe was the basis for termination of the charter agreement.
We understand that the three other vessels in the OODFL
transaction, ODN I,ODN II and Norbe VI, remain in operation and
that the termination action by Petrobras relates only to the ODN
Tay IV charter and services agreement.

ODN Tay IV is a 5th generation ultra-deep water semi-submersible
drilling platform capable of operating in water depths of 2,400m
and drilling depth of 9,143m which was purchased by OOG in 2011.
ODN Tay IV's hull was originally built around 1981.  In 1999 it
was converted into a semi-submersible drilling rig.

Petrobras is the sole contractual off-taker (charterer) and source
of cash flows for OODFL's debt service.  Given that ODN Tay IV
accounted for approximately 28% of the total cash flows available
for debt service, the termination of both the charter agreement
and services agreement will have a material adverse effect on the
results of the operations and financial condition of OODFL,
therefore significantly affecting its ability to make scheduled
debt service payments of the Notes.

The rating action and placement on review also reflect our
expectation that Petrobras will aggressively seek to re-negotiate
or terminate contracts for vessels that have any material
operational weaknesses; the short timeframe that OODFL has to re-
contract the vessel given the extremely challenging conditions
that prevail in the re-contracting market for offshore vessels and
the resultant pressure on asset values.

The rating review will focus on these and other issues, including
an assessment of OOG's expected liquidity position in certain
stress scenarios, potential impacts on other entities in the
Odebrecht group whose credit standing affects OODFL, and the
potential impact on the issuer and operator as a result of the
ongoing Petrobras alleged corruption investigations.

What Could Change the Rating UP/DOWN

Moody's does not anticipate an upward pressure on the rating or
outlook in the near or medium term.

OODFL's rating could be downgraded if the ODN Tay IV contract
termination leads to insufficient liquidity at OODFL resulting
from any payment acceleration or deterioration in the quality or
sufficiency of its liquidity arrangements.  A downgrade could also
occur if there were a deterioration in: (i) credit profile of OOG,
the operator of the assets, (ii) OODFL's performance relative to
the standards in the remaining charter agreements with Petrobras,
including uptime performance of ODN I, ODN II or Norbe VI and/or
(iii) the re-contracting market for offshore vessels.

OODFL is a tax-exempted company organized under the laws of the
Cayman Islands and is indirectly owned by OOG.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Generic
Project Finance Methodology published in December 2010.


SHARPE FUNDS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 13
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Sharpe Funds SPC are required to file their
proofs of debt by Nov. 13, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Peter Anderson
          c/o Catherine Anderson-Bond
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands


TAURASI CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
On Sept. 4, 2015, the sole shareholder of Taurasi Capital Offshore
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Taurasi Capital Management LLC
          c/o Daniella Skotnicki
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands


TAURASI CAPITAL MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 4, 2015, the sole shareholder of Taurasi Capital Master
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Taurasi Capital Management LLC
          c/o Daniella Skotnicki
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands


VITA CAPITAL IV: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 5
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Vita Capital IV Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Oct. 5, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Sept. 14, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Carl Gosselin
          Wilmington Trust (Cayman), Ltd.
          P.O. Box 32322 Grand Cayman KY1-1209
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 640-6712



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Exports Still Nagged by Red Tape, Misgivings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that there are no incentives to spur farm
exports as hurdles that affect the sector in the country still
endure, said Dominican Exporters Association (ADOEXPO) President
Sadala Khoury.

Mr. Khoury cited the lack of soft loans to develop a national
export strategy as one of the obstacles which has been affecting
exports the most, while acknowledging that the government's one-
stop window has taken a step forward, according to Dominican
Today.

The report notes that among the hurdles Mr. Khoury said exporters
have to obtain as many as five certifications in various agencies
to complete the red tape.  "There is no motivation to export," Mr.
Khoury added.

The report relays Mr. Khoury said Dominican business leaders have
misgivings with exports while public officials "have reserves,
because we are not oriented or aligned in a way for growth to
conquer new markets through exports."

Interviewed on Telesistema Channel 11, Mr. Khoury said Dominican
Republic exports US$1.5 billion to Haiti, accounting for 15%, and
RD$10.0 billion to the United States, or 57%, the report adds.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


DIGICEL GROUP: Going After Business Solutions Market
----------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Digicel Group Limited is planning to double
its revenues as it scales up its presence in the business
solutions sector.

The media and communications group, which is poised to start a
US$2.3 billion Initial Public Offer in New York within days, has
told investors that opportunities in its markets for business
solutions could total revenues of up to US3$ billion, according to
RJR News.

Last year, Digicel Group generated revenues of US$2.8 billion,
with operating profits of US$707 million, the report notes.

The report relates that slowing growth in its core prepaid mobile
markets has seen the company transform itself into a cable TV,
broadband, business services and communications business.

The change in consumer habits has seen an explosion of smartphone
usage. The expansion of data is expected to surpass the fall-off
in voice traffic by the end of the year, the report discloses.

Cable and television are also seen as high potential growth
opportunities for the company, as there are very low penetration
rates in Digicel's key markets, the report relays.

Digicel, meanwhile, has tapped into immigrant communities in the
US and UK to generate US$128 million in annual revenue by allowing
customers to top-up relatives' mobile phone accounts back home,
the report discloses.

Digicel is targeting a population of 10 million emigrants living
in countries across the world, who remit about US$9 billion to
their home countries every year, the report notes.

The report relays that Digicel said, in order to develop its
Diaspora product, it established a team in Miami, and also
marketing presences in London, New York, Los Angeles, and Canada.

The company pointed out that the US has a large immigrant
community of Jamaicans and Haitians, while there's also a large
Jamaican community in the UK, the report adds.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 25, 2015, Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Digicel
Group Limited (DGL) and its subsidiaries Digicel Limited (DL) and
Digicel International Finance Limited (DIFL), collectively
referred to as 'Digicel' as follows.

DGL

  -- Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' with a Stable
     Outlook;

  -- USD 2.5 billion 8.25% senior subordinated notes due 2020 at
     'B-/RR5';

  -- USD 1 billion 7.125% senior unsecured notes due 2022 at 'B
     -/RR5'.

DL

  -- Long-term IDR at 'B' with a Stable Outlook;

  -- USD 250 million 7% senior notes due 2020 at 'B/RR4';

  -- USD 1.3 billion 6% senior notes due 2021 at 'B/RR4';

  -- USD 925 million 6.75% senior notes due 2023 at 'B/RR4';

DIFL

  -- Long-term IDR at 'B' with a Stable Outlook;

  -- Senior secured credit facility at 'B+/RR3'.


JAMAICA: Bauxite-Alumina Industry Revival Tied to Improved Supply
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Coy Roache, Managing Director of Jamaica
Bauxite Mining, believes various proposals to improve the
country's energy supply could revive its bauxite mines and help
lead to an increase in alumina production.

Mr. Roache, a reliance on expensive, imported energy has seen much
of Jamaica's alumina industry temporarily shuttered, but foreign
operators are working on plans they hope will slash costs and
kick-start production, according to RJR News.  He was quoted by
the website metalbulletin.com.

The Government of Jamaica estimates around 10 million barrels of
oil are imported annually by the country's bauxite and alumina
industry, the report notes.

Jamalco, a joint venture between Noble Group and Clarendon Alumina
Production, is currently using 42 megawatts of energy and is
proposed to boost this to 50 megawatts, the report adds.

                             *     *     *

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 29,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' issue
rating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in two
tranches.  The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due in
2028.  The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in 2045.
The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that Jamaica
owes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's 2015/2016
budget.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


CEMEX SAB: Shares Tumble Most on Index Amid Global Growth Concerns
------------------------------------------------------------------
Emma Orr and Nacha Cattan at Bloomberg News report that Cemex SAB,
the biggest cement maker in the Americas, declined for a fifth day
as concern over a slowdown in China and other developing economies
roiled building-material stocks.

Cemex SA shares fell 3 percent to 11.74 pesos at 10:31 am on Sept.
24 in Mexico City, the most on the benchmark IPC Index, which lost
1 percent, according to Bloomberg News.

Bloomberg News relates that the Mexican peso touched a record low
Sept. 24 and has fallen 20 percent against the U.S. dollar in the
past 12 months.

The currency slump combined with slowing global growth are
delivering a blow to Cemex, according to Invex Casa de Bolsa,
Bloomberg News relates.

While 80 percent of Cemex's cash flow comes from Latin America, 80
percent of its debt is U.S. dollar denominated, causing a foreign
currency "mismatch" that is capping the company's stock
performance, Morgan Stanley said, Bloomberg News discloses.

"There are more and more concerns about global economic growth,"
Hugo Mendoza, an analyst at Invex, said in a phone interview with
Bloomberg News from Mexico City.  "While the company has announced
price increases in local currency, that won't compensate for such
a strong depreciation in emerging-market exchange rates," Mr.
Mendoza added.

Bloomberg News relays that Morgan Stanley analysts Nikolaj Lippman
and Lilian Starke cut their price target to $11 from $13 in a
report released September 17th, stating that stocks will be hurt
as long as macro volatility persists or until management lowers
risk and debt.  They retain an overweight recommendation on the
stock, Bloomberg News adds.

                         *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 30, 2015, Fitch Ratings has upgraded CEMEX, S.A.B. de C.V.'s
"CEMEX" Issuer Default Rating IDR to 'BB-'from 'B+'. The upgrade
is supported by the strengthening of CEMEX's capital structure
during the past two years due to the conversion of about $820
million of convertible bonds to equity plus the refinancing of
around $8.6 billion of debt that has lowered the company's annual
interest expense by approximately $200 million per year.


RASSINI AUTOMOTRIZ: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3 Rassini
Automotriz, S.A. de C.V.'s corporate family rating.  The outlook
is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The ratings upgrade reflects Rassini's strong credit metrics for
the rating category with modest leverage and ample interest
coverage; its leading position in the leaf spring suspension
components for light and commercial vehicles market; and its key
supplier relationships with several major automakers", said Alonso
Sanchez, a Vice President at Moody's.  Also incorporated in the
ratings are the inherent cyclicality of the auto manufacturing
industry; the company's sales concentration with the top three US
OEMs, which account for 75% of its revenues; its reliance in North
America, which accounts for 87% of revenues; and its product focus
into three main segments with the same demand drivers.

The company's credit metrics are strong for the rating category.
Over the last 18 months, Rassini's leverage (adj. debt/EBITDA) has
improved steadily from 2.6 times as of March 2014 to 2.0 times as
of June 2015.  Similarly, Rassini's quarterly adj.  EBITA/Interest
expense has improved to 4.9 times in the 2Q15 when compared to the
2.5-4.0 times range during 2014.  For the twelve months ended June
30, 2015, Rassini's adj.  EBITA/Interest Expense was 3.6 times.
Going forward, by year-end Moody's estimates gross adjusted
leverage will decrease toward 1.6 times and interest coverage to
remain above 4 times.

According to Rassini's estimates, it is the world's largest
producer of leaf spring suspension components for light and
commercial vehicles with significant market shares in the NAFTA
region and Brazil.  Rassini's operations are nonetheless closely
linked to the performance of the automotive industry in North
America, where 87% of its revenues are derived.  For example,
Rassini's sales declined by 21% in 2009 as a result of the
worldwide economic crisis and the impact of General Motors and
Chrysler Chapter 11 filings.  Moody's current outlook for the
global automotive manufacturing industry is stable.  Moody's
expects global light vehicle sales to grow by 2.8% in 2015 and 3%
in 2016, with US sales projected to increase by 2.8% in 2015 and
2.4% in 2016.

Rassini has a broad customer base with more than 30 clients
worldwide and serving several platforms including seven of the top
ten selling light vehicles in the region, which provides some
revenue diversification.  While the Big 3 US OEMs (Ford, GM and
Chrysler) account for 75% of revenues, the balance is sold to
other European and Asian OEMs including Toyota, Volvo, Nissan,
Scania, MAN, Mercedes, and VW, amongst others.

Rassini's liquidity is good.  The company had cash on hand of
MXN1.0 billion as of June 30, 2015, covering 80% of its short-term
debt.  Free cash flow (defined as cash from operation minus
dividends minus capex) has been positive since 2011 and at MXN780
million over the twelve months ended June 30, 2015, its highest
level since 2011.  Moody's expects the company to continue posting
positive free cash flow over the next few years.  The company does
not have committed lines of credit; instead, it manages its
seasonal working capital needs with a revolving credit facility
for around USD13 million.  In addition, the company has factoring
lines available of USD175 million (50% used) and working capital
lines of USD33 million (100% used) and USD25 million (60% used) to
discount Ford, FM and Chrysler receivables.

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Rassini will
maintain its strong credit metrics and profitability while further
reducing its leverage ratio.

Under its current business model, an upgrade is unlikely at this
time.  The ratings could be upgraded if the company maintains its
positive free cash flow generation and strong credit metrics with
adjusted gross debt/EBITDA below 1.5 times and EBITA/Interest
expense over 5.0 times.  To be considered for an upgrade the
company would also need to achieve greater size and
diversification while demonstrating continuity of prudent
financial policies and adequate liquidity.

The rating could be downgraded if the company's margins are
affected by unfavorable dynamics such as a change in the pass-
through steel price agreements with OEMs or adverse changes in the
company's market position.  Also, a deterioration of credit
metrics with debt/EBITDA increasing over 3.5 times with
EBITA/Interest expense declining below 3.0 times or negative free
cash flow generation can led to a downgrade.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Automotive Supplier Industry published in May 2013.

Rassini Automotriz, S.A. de C.V., headquartered in Mexico City,
Mexico, is the leading manufacturer of leaf spring suspension
components for light trucks and commercial vehicles in the NAFTA
region and Brazil.  The company is the main leaf spring suspension
components supplier for GM, Ford and Chrysler light trucks in the
NAFTA region and for a number of heavy truck manufacturers in
Brazil.  The company also operates brake rotor and coil spring
suspension divisions, which account for about 31% and 13% of
sales, respectively.  For the twelve months ended June 30, 2015,
Rassini reported sales of MXN12.2 billion.


VOLKSWAGEN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Deposit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico has changed the outlooks on Volkswagen Bank,
S.A's (VW Bank Mexico) and Volkswagen Leasing S.A. de C.V.'s (VW
Leasing Mexico) senior unsecured debt ratings to negative from
stable.  At the same time, Moody's affirmed the Aa3 ratings on
their debt.  Moody's also affirmed VW Bank Mexico's Ba2/Not-Prime
local and foreign currency long- and short-term deposit ratings,
and maintained their stable outlook.  In addition, the rating
agency affirmed both entities' Mexican National Scale ratings, as
well as the bank's ba2 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adj.
BCA) and its Ba1(cr)/Not-Prime(cr) counterparty risk assessment
(CR Assessment).

RATINGS RATIONALE

NEGATIVE OUTLOOK ON THE LONG-TERM DEBT RATINGS

The negative outlooks on VW Bank Mexico's and VW Leasing Mexico's
Aa3 long-term senior unsecured debt ratings follow today's
decision by Moody's Investors Service to revise the outlook on
Volkswagen Financial Services AG (VW FS AG), the parent of both
entities, to negative.  In turn, VW FS AG's outlook was revised to
negative following a similar action on the outlook of its parent,
car manufacturer Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (Volkswagen AG).
VW Bank Mexico's and VW Leasing Mexico's debt ratings benefit from
full and unconditional guarantees from VW FS AG (i.e. credit
substitution).  Consequently, their Aa3 debt ratings and outlook
reflect the Aa3/Negative senior unsecured debt rating of VW FS AG.

CREDIT SUBSTITUTION

The parental guarantees provided to VW Bank Mexico and VW Leasing
Mexico meet seven out of nine Moody's core principles for Credit
Substitution, as they (i) are irrevocable and unconditional; (ii)
promise full and timely payment of the underlying obligations;
(iii) cover payment -- not merely collection; (iv) cover
preference payments, fraudulent conveyance charges, and other
payments that have been rescinded, repudiated, or "clawed back";
(v) their terms extends as long as the terms of the underlying
obligations; (vi) are enforceable against the guarantor, and (vii)
are governed under German law, a jurisdiction hospitable to the
enforcement of guarantees.

The guarantees do not satisfy two of Moody's core principles of
Credit Substitution: (i) the guarantor does not waive all
defenses. Unless all these defenses have been expressly waived,
collection from the guarantor could require complex fact-based
litigation, thus increasing the risk that debt service payments
may not be made on a timely basis, and (ii) the guarantees do not
explicitly prohibit the transfer, assignment or amendment of the
guarantee by the guarantor unless said action does not result in a
deterioration of the credit support provided by the guarantee.

Nevertheless, these weaknesses are offset by: (i) the strategic
fit and importance of the Mexican entities to VW FS AG and
Volkswagen AG as captive finance companies to support the sales of
car manufacturer Volkswagen Mexico, S.A. (the second largest car
seller in Mexico with a market share of nearly 17%), (ii) the fact
that both companies share the Volkswagen name, and (iii) the
reputational risk that a default by either entity would represent
for VW FS AG and Volkswagen AG.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK ON VW BANK MEXICO'S GLOBAL SCALE
DEPOSIT RATINGS

The bank's Ba2 local currency long-term deposit rating
incorporates the b2 standalone BCA and three notches of uplift
based on our assessment of a very high likelihood of extraordinary
support from VW FS AG.  Even in the case of a downgrade of the
parent's adjusted BCA, Moody's believes the likelihood of such
support would remain very high and the Mexican bank's deposit
ratings would not be affected; hence the stable outlook for the
deposit ratings.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

VW Bank Mexico's and VW Leasing Mexico's global scale debt ratings
will be downgraded if the rating of their guarantor, VW FS AG, is
downgraded.  Even if the global scale ratings are downgraded,
however, the Aaa.mx National Scale ratings will be unaffected.
Notwithstanding the negative outlook on the rating of Volkswagen
and the downward pressure on the BCA of VW FS AG, the BCA of VW
Bank Mexico itself currently faces limited downward pressure as it
already accommodates potential significant deterioration in asset
quality and profitability.  If the BCA were to be downgraded,
however, it could have a negative impact on VW Bank Mexico's
deposit ratings.

The long- and short-term Mexican National Scale ratings of
Aaa.mx/MX-1 demonstrate the strongest creditworthiness relative to
other domestic issuers.  The long- and short-term Mexican National
Scale ratings of A2.mx/MX-2 present above-average creditworthiness
relative to other domestic issuers.

The sources and items of information used to determine VW Bank
Mexico 's and VW Leasing Mexico 's ratings include 2015 and 2014
interim financial statements (sources: VW Bank Mexico and VW
Leasing Mexico); year-end 2014 and 2013 audited financial
statements (sources: VW Bank Mexico and VW Leasing Mexico, audited
by Pricewaterhouse Coopers, S.C.); guarantees from parent bank
(sources: VW Bank Mexico and VW Leasing Mexico); and regulatory
capital information (source: Banxico).

The methodologies used in these ratings were Banks published in
March 2015 and Finance Company Global Rating Methodology published
in March 2012.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Volkswagen Bank, S.A.'s and Volkswagen Leasing, S.A. de
C.V. ratings is between 01/01/2010 and 06/30/2015 (source:
Moody's, VW Bank and VW Leasing).

VW Bank Mexico and VW Leasing Mexico are headquartered in Puebla,
Mexico.  As of June 2015, the bank had total assets of Mx$5.2
billion and Mx$1.5 billion in shareholder's equity.  VWFS is
headquartered in Braunschweig, Germany and is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Volkswagen AG.  VWFS is responsible for coordinating
the worldwide financial services activities of the Volkswagen
Group.  As of June 2015, VWFS AG had total assets of
EUR114 billion.

LIST OF AFFECTED ENTITIES

Volkswagen Bank, S.A. (VW Bank Mexico)

These ratings were affirmed:

   -- Long-term global local currency senior unsecured debt: Aa3,
      outlook changed to Negative from Stable

   -- Long-term global local currency provisional senior unsecured
      MTN: (P)Aa3

   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale senior unsecured debt:
      Aaa.mx, Stable outlook

   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale senior unsecured MTN:
      Aaa.mx

   -- Long-term global local currency deposits: Ba2, Stable
      outlook

   -- Short-term global local currency deposits: Not-Prime

   -- Long-term foreign currency deposits: Ba2, Stable outlook

   -- Short-term foreign currency deposits: Not-Prime

   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale bank deposits: A2.mx

   -- Short-term Mexican National Scale bank deposits: MX-2

   -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment: ba2

   -- Long-term counterparty risk assessment: Ba1(cr)

   -- Short-term counterparty risk assessment: Not-Prime(cr)

   -- Overall outlook: Stable(m)

Volkswagen Leasing, S.A. de C.V. (VW Leasing Mexico)

These ratings were affirmed:

   -- Long-term global local currency senior unsecured debt: Aa3,
      outlook changed to Negative from Stable

   -- Long-term global local currency provisional senior unsecured
      MTN: (P)Aa3

   -- Short-term global local currency provisional senior
      unsecured: (P)Prime-1

   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale senior unsecured debt:
      Aaa.mx, Stable outlook

   -- Short-term Mexican National Scale senior unsecured debt:
      MX-1

   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale senior unsecured MTN:
      Aaa.mx

   -- Overall outlook: Negative(m)



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


ANNA'S LINENS: Has Final Authority to Obtain $80MM DIP Loan
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of
California, Santa Ana Division, authorized Anna's Linens, Inc.,
on a final basis, to obtain a senior secured super-priority
revolving credit facility from Salus Capital Partners, LLC.

The DIP Lender agrees to provide for a non-amortizing revolving
credit facility of up to $80,000,000 for revolving advances to the
Debtor.  The proceeds of which will be used solely to: (a)
extinguish certain Pre-Petition Obligations in the amount of
approximately $66.425 million, consisting of approximately (1) $63
million in principal and interest, (2) $3.2 million in early
termination fees, and (3) $225,000 in credit monitoring fees; (b)
pay fees, costs and expenses in connection with the DIP Financing
Agreement, including payment of the Agent's and DIP Lender's
reasonable attorney's fees and other out of pocket expenses; (c)
pay Debtor's postpetition operating expenses incurred in the
ordinary course of business; (d) pay costs and expenses of
administration of this Chapter 11 Case, including payment of the
Debtor's professional fees; and, (e) pay other amounts as
specified in the Approved Budget and/or operative documentation
and allowed by the Bankruptcy Court, in the case of (c) through
(e), in amounts and categories consistent with the Approved
Budget.

The DIP Facility accrues interest at LIBOR plus 8.5%, with a
minimum interest rate of 8.75%, paid monthly in arrears. During an
event of default, the applicable rate will increase by 4%.
The DIP Facility also provides for a closing fee equal to 0.5% of
the aggregate DIP Facility commitment amount of approximately $20
million in excess of the Prepetition Obligations, which fee will
be fully earned and due and payable on the Closing Date. An exit
fee equal to 1.0% of the aggregate of the aggregate DIP Facility
commitment amount of approximately $20 million in in excess of the
Prepetition Obligations, which fee will be fully earned on the
Closing Date, and concern sale so exit fee will be reduced to
0.5%.

The Court overruled all objections to the final approval of the
DIP financing request.  Shewak Lajwanti Home Fashions, Inc., P & A
Marketing, Inc., and Panda Home Fashions, LLC, objected to the DIP
financing request.

In response, the Debtor asserted that it is disingenuous for the
creditors to re-argue their opposition to the financing under a
guise of a "Limited Objection" to form of order.  Salus joined in
the Debtor's response and explained that the Motion was heavily
negotiated by the Debtor, the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors and the DIP Agent.  The parties, Salus told the Court,
worked hard to reach a compromise that would allow this Chapter 11
Case to proceed in a manner that will maximize value in the
assets.

A full-text copy of the Final DIP Order with Budget is available
at http://bankrupt.com/misc/ANNASdipord.pdf

The Debtor is represented by:

          David B. Golubchik, Esq.
          Eve H. Karasik, Esq.
          Juliet Y. Oh, Esq.
          Lindsey L. Smith, Esq.
          LEVENE, NEALE, BENDER, YOO & BRILL L.L.P.
          10250 Constellation Boulevard, Suite 1700
          Los Angeles, California 90067
          Tel: (310) 229-1234;
          Fax: (310) 229-1244
          Email: dbg@lnbyb.com
                 ehk@lnbyb.com
                 jyo@lnbyb.com
                 lls@lnbyb.com

The DIP Agent, Salus Capital Partners, LLC, is represented by:

          Howard J. Steinberg, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, California 90067
          Tel: (310) 586-7700
          Fax: (310) 586-7800
          Email: steinbergh@gtlaw.com

             -- and --

          Jeffrey M. Wolf, P.C., Esq.
          Joseph P. Davis, P.C., Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          One International Place
          Boston, Massachusetts 02110
          Tel: (617) 310-6000
          Fax: (617) 310-6001
          Email: wolf@gtlaw.com
                 davis@gtlaw.com

             -- and --

          Nancy A. Mitchell, P.C., Esq.
          Paul T. Martin, P.C., Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          200 Park Avenue
          New York, New York 10166
          Tel: (212) 801-9200
          Fax: (212) 801-6400
          Email: mitchell@gtlaw.com
                 martin@gtlaw.com

                      About Anna's Linens

Anna's Linens is a specialty retailer offering home textiles,
furnishings and decor at attractive prices.  Headquartered in
Costa Mesa, California, operates a chain of 268 company owned
retail stores throughout 19 states in the United States (including
Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C.) generates over $300 million in
annual revenue and employs a workforce of over 2,500 associates.

Anna's Linens sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. Case No. 15-13008) in Santa Ana, California, on June 14,
2015.

The case is assigned to Judge Theodor Albert.  The Debtor tapped
Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Brill LLP as counsel.  The Debtor
estimated assets of $50 million to $100 million and debt of $100
million to $500 million.

The U.S. trustee overseeing the Chapter 11 case of Anna's Linens
Inc. appointed seven creditors to serve on the official committee
of unsecured creditors.


PUERTO RICO: Bill Proposed to Give Protection to Investors
----------------------------------------------------------
Mary Williams Walsh at DealBook reports that 75 years ago, when
the federal government set out to regulate mutual funds,
investment firms in Puerto Rico were deemed too far off the beaten
track to merit scrutiny. So mutual funds on the island, and other
United States territories, were excluded from regulation under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.

Now, Puerto Rico's economy is teetering, investors in its bonds
have suffered big losses and at least one member of Congress says
the 75-year-old exclusion has outlasted its shelf life, according
to DealBook.  Nydia M. Velazquez, Democrat of New York, introduced
an amendment to the 1940 act that would give mutual fund investors
in Puerto Rico the same regulatory protection that their
counterparts have on the United States mainland, the report
relates.

The bill, if it becomes law, will not replace the money the
investors have lost, but it will bar some of the activities that
led to their losses -- activities that are already illegal on the
mainland, the report notes.

Mutual funds cater to individual investors who want professionally
managed investments.  The 1940 act protects them by barring those
professional investors from engaging in certain kinds of
transactions that suggest self-dealing, among other things, the
report relates.  But because of the exclusion, such transactions
are still legal in Puerto Rico, the report notes.

A transaction from 2008 shows the repercussions.  UBS, a major
provider of financial services on the island, advised Puerto
Rico's pension fund for government employees and was hired to take
an unusual $2.9 billion bond deal to market, the report discloses.
The pension fund had a big shortfall, and officials hoped to
borrow the money and invest on behalf of the retirees.  The deal
was expected to be successful as long as the investment rate of
return was higher than Puerto Rico's borrowing rate, the report
relays.  That did not happen and now the pension fund shortfall is
even bigger, the report discloses.

UBS had difficulty selling the bonds in the tough market
conditions of 2008.  It ended up packaging about half of the issue
in its own family of closed-end mutual funds, which were marketed
to wealthy Puerto Ricans as a good, tax-sheltered source of
retirement income, the report notes.

The report relays that the interest on pension obligation bonds is
not exempt from federal income taxes, because the Internal Revenue
Service considers these securities speculative.  But residents of
Puerto Rico do not pay federal income taxes, and the Puerto Rican
government exempted the bonds from its own estate and gift taxes,
the report notes.

On the mainland, a bank underwriting a municipal bond issue would
run afoul of the 1940 act if it packaged the bonds in mutual funds
and sold them. But affiliated transactions are allowed in Puerto
Rico, the report discloses.

"This practice constitutes a flagrant conflict of interest, and it
must stop," Ms. Velazquez said, the report relays.  Her bill is
co-sponsored by Representative Maxine Waters, Democrat of
California, who is the ranking member of the House Financial
Services Committee, the report notes.  Chances of passage are
unclear because of widely divergent views on what should be done
to address Puerto Rico's debt crisis.  The Senate Committee on
Finance has scheduled a hearing on some of the issues, the report
adds.

Puerto Ricans who invested in the affected mutual funds have filed
more than 800 arbitration claims against UBS with the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority, known as Finra, a self-regulatory
body, the report notes.  They are seeking more than $1.1 billion,
basing their claims on regulations that are not part of the 1940
act's exclusion for territories, the report relays.

The Securities and Exchange Commission has also penalized UBS
under other laws and collected a $26.6 million settlement for
distribution to the harmed investors, the report discloses.

But Ms. Velazquez said that without an amendment, such things
could happen again, the report notes.

"This archaic exemption is long overdue for repeal," she said.


PUERTO RICO: Weak Economy Puts Banks on Great Risk, Moody's Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Puerto Rico's banks can withstand the island's defaults, but the
weak economy and upcoming legal battles will expose them to
greater asset risk, said Moody's Investors Service.

In a new report, Moody's said Puerto Rico's continuing economic
contraction and fiscal crisis could lead to deteriorating asset
quality at the island's banks.  Moody's analysts said the banks'
consolidated non-performing assets are already extremely high
relative to their total gross loans and other real estate owned -
currently, 8.7% at Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 10.3% at Banco
Santander Puerto Rico, and 12.4% at FirstBank Puerto Rico.

"Despite their best efforts, the banks in Puerto Rico are still
holding a significant number of problem loans in their
portfolios," said Moody's Vice President Joseph Pucella.  "The
longer the island stays in this recession, the higher the chances
are that its banks will experience further asset quality
deterioration."

On Sept. 1, Moody's downgraded the standalone baseline credit
assessments (BCA) of Banco Santander Puerto Rico (issuer rating
Baa2 stable, BCA ba3), Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (issuer rating
B2 negative, BCA b1) and FirstBank Puerto Rico (issuer rating Caa1
negative, b3).  Moody's said the negative outlooks for Popular and
FirstBank reflected their vulnerability to further economic
deterioration.  While Santander's Puerto Rico unit also shares
that vulnerability, the bank's outlook remains stable, benefitting
from its connection with Santander's US affiliate, which has a
stable outlook.

Though the island's public sector defaults will force its banks to
incur sizeable losses, Moody's said these losses will be
manageable given their strong capital levels.  However, Puerto
Rico's attempts to restructure its public debt could bring further
challenges for its banks.

While Puerto Rico's recently announced debt restructuring proposal
aims to pay down the island's public debt in an orderly fashion
and limit damage to the economy, Moody's said the potential for
protracted litigation and a deepening recession could have
negative credit implications for the island's banks.

"Even with this proposal on the table, it's going to be difficult
for Puerto Rico to avoid a long legal battle," said Moody's Vice
President Joseph Pucella.  "Should the island's financial turmoil
spark a deeper recession and higher unemployment, we expect the
banks will start taking bigger hits."


STANDARD REGISTER: Plan, Disclosures Hearing Set for Nov. 16
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Brendan L. Shannon of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware will convene a hearing on Nov. 16, 2015, at
10:00 a.m. (ET) to consider approval of the disclosure statement
explaining SRC Liquidation Company, f/k/a The Standard Register
Company, et al.'s First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation and
confirmation of the Plan.

Objections, if any, to approval of the Disclosure Statement and/or
confirmation of the Plan must be submitted on or before Nov. 2.

The Debtors' Plan proposes to pay 1% of the allowed claims of
general unsecured creditors.

According to the explanatory Disclosure Statement, the Debtors'
assets were sold to Taylor Corp., a privately held company in the
same business as the Debtors.  The proceeds from the Taylor Sale
were used to (i) repay the Debtors' Postpetition DIP Financing,
(ii) pay the Claims of the First Lien Term Lenders, (iii) pay a
portion of the Claims of the Second Lien Term Lenders, and (iv)
fund the $5 million GUC Cash Payment.

Taylor also assumed certain limited obligations of the Debtors and
advanced approximately $15.076 million to the Debtors to be used
by the Debtors for the payment of claims related to the wind-down
of the Debtors and their Chapter 11 Cases.  The Debtors used a
portion of the Wind-Down Amount to loan $600,000 to the GUC Trust
as the GUC Trust Seed Funding Amount.  Any portion of the Wind-
Down Amount that is not used to pay claims related to the wind-
down of the Debtors and to wind down the Chapter 11 Cases will be
returned to Taylor, although it is not currently anticipated that
there will be any excess Wind-Down Amount to return to Taylor.

A full-text copy of the Disclosure Statement dated Sept. 22 is
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/SRCds0921.pdf

                     About Standard Register

Standard Register provides market-specific insights and a
compelling portfolio of workflow, content and analytics solutions
to address the changing business landscape in healthcare,
financial services, manufacturing and retail markets.  The Company
has operations in all U.S. states and Puerto Rico, and currently
employs 3,500 full-time employees and 16 part-time employees.

The Standard Register Company and 10 affiliated debtors sought
Chapter 11 protection in Delaware on March 12, 2015, with plans to
launch a sale process where its largest secured lender would serve
as stalking horse bidder in an auction.

The cases are pending before the Honorable Judge Brendan L.
Shannon and are jointly administered under Case No. 15-10541.

The Debtors have tapped Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP and Young
Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP as counsel; McKinsey Recovery &
Transformation Services U.S., LLC, as restructuring advisors; and
Prime Clerk LLC as claims agent.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors tapped Lowenstein
Sandler LLP as its counsel and Jefferies LLC as its exclusive
investment banker.



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Staring at Recession
---------------------------------------
Sasha Harrinanan at Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that the
economy is "either in recession or is on the cusp of one", says
president of the Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers Association
(TTMA) Dr. Rolph Balgobin.  Dr. Balgobin was responding to the
Central Bank's (CBTT) recent announcement that "provisional
estimates" indicate the local economy contracted by close to two
percent in the first half of this year, according to Trinidad and
Tobago Newsday.

"Manufacturers would not be surprised at this news and many have
been seeing some caution in demand and forward supply contracts,"
Dr. Balgobin told Newsday.

Dr. Balgobin also cited the "global economic malaise which is
accentuated in our case by persistently low energy prices and
oversupply", which Dr. Balgobin Balgobin said was exacerbated in
2014 by tremendous uncertainty about the CBTT's ability to manage
the floating exchange rate mechanism and the general fear that a
devaluation was both warranted and imminent, the report notes.

The long campaign prior to the September 7 General Election was
another factor, according to Dr. Balgobin, as it would have slowed
down "State contract commitments, depress State demand and delay
corporate investments until an outcome was determined," the report
relays.  Dr. Balgobin said however, TTMA members have "not yet
reported widespread contractions and certainly, we are of the view
that now is not the time to panic."  "It is early days and we are
very much still in control of the elements we can control. So
there is some room to move to manage the economy for a flattened
decline and ready it for an upturn," Dr. Balgobin told Newsday.

In the September 25 edition of its Monetary Policy Announcement,
the CBTT said the "domestic economic outlook has deteriorated",
with continued shortfalls in natural gas production leading to an
estimated 3.5 percent energy sector decline in the first six
months of 2015, the report relays.

While the non-energy sector, "which has provided support to the
overall economy for the past few years lost momentum, declining by
around one percent in the first half of 2015," the report notes.
The CBTT said this decline was mainly due to a slowdown in
construction, distribution and manufacturing and that "early
indicators point to continued sluggish economic performance in the
third quarter of 2015."  While the standard definition of a
recession is two consecutive quarters of negative growth, former
CBTT Governor, Ewart Williams, once said this was more suited to
developed economies and that developing countries like TT should
have recorded five consecutive quarters of negative growth before
their economies can be considered to be in a recession, the report
relays.

Questioned about this, Dr. Balgobin told Newsday while there is
merit to Williams' argument, he "wouldn't split hairs at this
point." The TTMA president also said he agreed with Prime Minister
Dr Keith Rowley that "the sky isn't falling".

"What is happening," Dr. Balgobin stated, "is that we are clear
that there is a slowdown of economic activity in several places,
and a reversal of gains in still other parts of our economy, the
aggregate effect of which is negative growth.  I am inclined to
accept Mr. Williams' point and submit that in (this) case it
perhaps matters less, since the outlook and trend continue to head
down for the time being, so we could easily get to five quarters
of negative growth.  Only time will tell."  Asked what steps
should be taken to address the contraction of TT's economy, the
TTMA president pointed out that the Rowley administration has
several "weapons" at its disposal, the report notes.

Namely, fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate management,
moral suasion and so on, the report relays.

All of which Dr. Balgobin said are all tools which can be used to
manage the economy out of difficulty, the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
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Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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