TCRLA_Public/151127.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, November 27, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 235


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Moody's Says Election May Yield Credit Pos. Policies
ARGENTINA: Moody's Changes Outlook on Caa1 Issuer Rating to Pos.
ARGENTINA: Deutsche Bank Exit Credit Neg. for Securitizations
EDENOR SA: Extends Technical Advisory Contract with EASA
MASTELLONE HERMANOS: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' CCR; Outlook Negative


B E L I Z E

BELIZE: S&P Affirms 'B-' Sov. Credit Rating; Outlook Now Stable


B O L I V I A

BANCO MERCANTIL: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable


B R A Z I L

BANCO DO NORDESTE: Moody's Cuts Deposit Ratings to Ba1
BRAZIL: Awards Rights to Operate 29 Hydro Plants, Raises $4.6BB
BRAZIL: Weakening Economy Poses Liquidity Challenges, Moody's Says
CDHU: Moody's Assigns B1 Global Local Currency Issuer Rating
LIGHT ENERGIA: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Global Scale Issuer Rating

LIGHT SERVICOS: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Corp. Family & Issuer Ratings
LUPATECH S.A.: S&P Affirms 'D' Corporate Credit Rating
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: BTG Pactual Tanks as Probe Leads to Arrest
SETE BRASIL: S&P Affirms 'SD' Corporate Credit Rating
TEGMA GESTAO: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Ratings to B1


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ASTELLON MANAGEMENT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
BANCO BTG (CAYMAN): Moody's Reviews Ba1 Subordinate Debt Rating
CELESTIAL ASSETS: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 8
COOKMAR INVESTMENTS: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 8
ELBROOK OFFSHORE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

HESS (INDONESIA-X): Member Receives Wind-Up Report
HOLBORN FUNDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
JPMP ASIA: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
NSF FINANCE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 30
Q-BLK GLOBAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

QPA SPV: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
STORES INVESTMENTS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
STORES OVERSEAS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
TACLAIM COMPANY: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
TACLAIM NOMINEE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report


C H I L E

LATAM AIRLINES: S&P Revises Outlook on 'BB' CCR to Negative


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

BARRICK PUEBLO: Plant Glitch Cuts Output at Biggest Gold Mine
DOMINICAN REP: Must Spur Local Airlines to Boost the Economy


E C U A D O R

GRENADA: IMF Approves US$2.7 Million Disbursement


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Hike in Food, Crude Oil Prices to Influence Inflation
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR; Outlook Stable


M E X I C O

ABENGOA MEXICO: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B3 / B1.mx
COBRE DEL MAYO: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Rating to 'C'
REYNOSA MUNICIPALITY: Moody's Changes Outlook to Negative


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Governor to Extend Legislature to Address Bill
VENT ALARM: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors


V I R G I N   I S L A N D S

STUDIO CITY: Moody's Retains B2 CFR on Covenant Amendments


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

PETROLEUM CO: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Moody's Says Election May Yield Credit Pos. Policies
---------------------------------------------------------------
The broad economic policy changes already outlined by Argentine
President-elect Mauricio Macri could lay the foundations for an
economic recovery. However, the country still faces significant
challenges in the medium term, says Moody's Investors Service.

Argentina's new president has inherited a weak economy with one of
the highest inflation rates in Latin America. The new government
intends to tackle the country's economic imbalances through policy
changes, such as establishing the central bank's independence and
seeking a resolution with holdout bondholders that would
eventually enable Argentina to borrow in international capital
markets again.

"Macri's election points to the adoption of credit positive
policies," says Gabriel Torres, a Vice President and Senior Credit
Officer at Moody's.

While liberalized policies will likely help attract overseas
investment they will also likely lead to tighter domestic
liquidity conditions, according to the report "Election Outcome
Favors Positive Policy Shift, But Challenges Remain."

The Argentinian peso is still overvalued and while weakening it
further would help stop the decline in the country's international
reserves, it would also create a negative, short-term shock for
the non-financial corporate sector.

In particular, companies with significant debt denominated in
foreign currencies would see their leverage ratios deteriorate.
Importers, especially firms in the electronics manufacturing
sector, would also be hit as the cost of imported components rise.

A sharp rise in interest rates could put pressure on sub-sovereign
issuers, particularly those that need to rollover debt. Higher
rates would also weaken asset quality at banks. However, restored
access to international capital markets would benefit sub-
sovereigns, which have an estimated $2.1 billion in cross-border
bonds maturing over the next two years.

A removal of restrictions on electricity and gas tariffs, which
have been held artificially low, would allow utilities to cover
their costs and invest in new capacity. However, this could eat
into ratepayers' disposable income, putting pressure on borrowers.
Combined with other developments that may further erode purchasing
power, this would impact the performance of structured finance
products, which are largely backed by consumer and auto loans.


ARGENTINA: Moody's Changes Outlook on Caa1 Issuer Rating to Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Argentina's
Caa1 issuer rating to positive from stable.  The outlook on
Argentina's (P)Caa2 foreign legislation and restructured local
legislation foreign currency obligations is also changed to
positive from stable.  The outlook change is based on Moody's view
that the accession of president-elect Mauricio Macri of the
Cambiemos ("Let's Change") coalition will raise the probability of
credit positive policies being implemented, including arriving at
a resolution with holdout creditors, one of Argentina's key credit
constraints.

At the same time, Moody's has affirmed Argentina's Caa1/NP and
(P)Caa2 ratings, as well as the Ca rating on the original
defaulted bonds.  The (P)Caa2 rating on the foreign legislation
and restructured local legislation foreign currency obligations
reflects the likelihood of higher losses to investors from the
continuing default of bonds caught in the ongoing legal
proceedings in US courts, thereby differentiating this portion of
Argentina's debt from the rest.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The main driver of the outlook change to positive from stable is
Moody's expectation that Argentina's policy stance will become
more credit positive in the aftermath of the elections in which
Mauricio Macri was elected Argentina's president for the 2015-19
term.  Running as the nominee of the Cambiemos
coalition -- an alliance of non-Peronist parties -- Mr. Macri won
with 51.4% of the vote, narrowly beating out Daniel Scioli, would-
be successor of outgoing Peronist President Cristina Fernandez de
Kirchner.

President-elect Macri will take office on Dec. 10, becoming only
the third non-Peronist President since 1983.  Mr. Macri has
consistently and increasingly made clear his administration's
policies will represent a major market-friendly break from those
observed during the last 12 years.

A prompt resolution of the holdout saga is a key Macri pledge in
this regard, and is required for the government to borrow abroad,
which it will probably need to do in order to meet upcoming debt
service obligations.  Official reserves have fallen to below $22
billion, raising uncertainty about the government's ability to
meet 2016 debt service obligations and adding pressure for a swift
resolution with holdout creditors.

In addition, Moody's expects the new administration to devote
efforts to improving the economic and institutional environment
over the coming months, through a series of reforms aimed at
tackling persistently high levels of inflation and lack of data
accountability.

At around 25%, Argentina's inflation rate is one of the highest in
the region and among sovereigns rated by Moody's.  The new
government aims to install new central bank leadership, make
inflation reduction a key policy goal, and legally establish
central bank independence.

The incoming administration has also promised to improve the
reliability of official economic statistics which have
increasingly diverged from private sector estimates since 2007.
Macri has pledged to make the statistical institute fully
independent.

Argentina's Caa1 rating balances the country's medium economic
strength and moderate government debt metrics with ongoing
institutional and financial weaknesses linked to the country's
policy mix, political volatility, and limited funding options.
The decision to affirm, rather than raise, Argentina's ratings at
this time reflects the uncertainty that remains around when
Argentina might reach agreement with holdout creditors, and over
how much fiscal and economic reform is likely to be achieved.  The
incoming administration lacks its own legislative majority but
Cambiemos candidates won key posts across the country, and
Argentina's president retains significant influence through its
control of the country's national finances.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP

A further positive rating action is dependent on the nature of
future policy announcements and the anticipated pace of
implementation.  Resolution with holdout creditors would likely
prompt a positive action on the (P)Caa2 rating assigned to foreign
legislation and restructured local legislation foreign currency
obligations.  Likewise, a clear and credible plan for implementing
economic and fiscal reforms would add to upward pressure on the
Caa1 issuer rating.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN

A return to a stable outlook, or other negative rating actions,
could arise from 1) a slower resolution of the holdout issue than
we currently anticipate, or 2) a business-as-usual policy scenario
in which international reserves continue to decline and government
debt ratios continue to increase.  A negative rating action on
Argentina's foreign legislation bonds and restructured local
legislation foreign currency obligations could result if
Argentina's current default due to US court rulings become so
prolonged as to lead to losses greater than 20% for investors.

COUNTRY CEILINGS

As a result of this rating action, the long-term foreign currency
bond ceiling is unchanged at Caa1, while the short-term foreign
currency bond ceiling is unchanged at NP.  The long-term foreign
currency deposit ceiling is unchanged at Caa2, while the short-
term foreign currency deposit ceiling remains at NP.  The long-
term local currency bond and deposit ceilings are unchanged at B1,
while the short-term local currency bond and deposit ceilings
remain unchanged at NP.

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Argentina, Government of
  Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Affirmations:

Issuer: Argentina, Government of
  Issuer Rating (Foreign Currency), Affirmed Caa1
  Issuer Rating (Local Currency), Affirmed Caa1
  Senior Unsecured Short-Term Rating, Affirmed NP
  Senior Unsecured Short-Term Rating (Local Currency), Affirmed NP
  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program (Foreign Currency),
   Affirmed (P)Ca
  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program (Foreign Currency),
   Affirmed (P)NP
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   March 31, 2023, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   March 31, 2023, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   Jan. 30, 2017, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   July 21, 2030, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   June 19, 2031, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   June 19, 2018, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   Jan. 31, 2031, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   Sept. 19, 2027, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   Nov. 13, 2026, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   Sept. 19, 2016, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   Feb. 25, 2019, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   March 31, 2023, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   March 31, 2023, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   Feb. 1, 2020, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency) due
   May 28, 2028, Affirmed Ca
  Senior Unsecured Shelf (Foreign Currency), Affirmed (P)Ca
  Senior Unsecured Shelf (Foreign Currency), Affirmed (P)Caa2
  Senior Unsecured Shelf (Foreign Currency), Affirmed (P)Caa1
  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 22,302 (2014 Actual) (also
   known as Per Capita Income)
  Real GDP growth (% change): 0.5% (2014 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 23.9% (2014 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.5% (2014 Actual) (also known
  as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.1% (2014 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 26.3% (2014 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On Nov. 23, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Argentina, Government of.  Views raised included: The
issuer's governance and/or management, have materially increased.
The systemic risk in which the issuer operates has materially
decreased.  The issuer has become less susceptible to event risks.
The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt
profile, has not materially changed.  The issuer's economic
fundamentals, including its economic strength, have not materially
changed.


ARGENTINA: Deutsche Bank Exit Credit Neg. for Securitizations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Deutsche Bank AG's decision to close its operations in Argentina
and Mexico is credit negative for the Argentine or Mexican
securitizations for which it acts as trustee or common
representative, Moody's Investors Service says in a new report.

Deutsche Bank (Argentina) S.A. acts as trustee in 36
securitizations, while Deutsche Bank Mexico S.A. acts as common
representative in 1,300 transactions.

In the new report, "Deutsche Bank's Exit from Mexico and Argentina
Poses Operational Challenges for Securitizations," Moody's notes
that one of the most important consequences of Deutsche Bank's
announcement is the uncertainty it creates around its support of
its Argentine and Mexican branches.  The assumption of parental
support is vital to the subsidiaries' financial stability, and is
the reason Moody's placed the deposit ratings of Deutsche Bank's
Argentine division on review for downgrade on Nov. 5.

"Deutsche Bank's exit from Argentina and Mexico will affect the
operations of its local trustee divisions in various ways, which
in turn could affect the performance of the transactions in those
countries," says Moody's analyst, Frank Medrisch, CFA.  "Deutsche
Bank is likely to stop investing in its Argentine and Mexican
divisions, for example, which could impair their ability to act as
trustee or common representative in existing securitization
transactions."

Deutsche Bank's exit from Argentina and Mexico could likewise
negatively affect management at the local divisions, compromising
their operational stability, according to the report.  And while
employee turnover will likely rise pending the sale or closure of
the local offices, they could also encounter operational
challenges owing to reduced staffing levels or a lack of
experienced personnel.

"Even if Deutsche Bank is ultimately replaced as trustee or common
representative in Argentine and Mexican securitization
transactions, there will likely be a ramp-up phase before a
substitute party can take control of the operations, which could
also create temporary operational problems," Medrisch says.  "A
transparent and smooth transfer is key to avoiding disruptions in
the payment of obligations where Deutsche Bank acts as trustee or
common representative."


EDENOR SA: Extends Technical Advisory Contract with EASA
--------------------------------------------------------
The Board of Directors of Edenor SA, in its meeting held Nov. 10,
2015, decided to approve the extension of the term of the
Technical Advisory Contract, originally subscribed on April 4,
2006, between Edenor and Electricidad Argentina S.A. (EASA),
according to a regulatory filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.  In compliance of sections 72 and 73 of the Capital
Market Law, the Audit Committee has expressed its approval to the
mentioned addendum.

                          About Edenor SA

Headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Edenor S.A. (NYSE: EDN;
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange: EDN) is the largest electricity
distribution company in Argentina in terms of number of customers
and electricity sold (both in GWh and Pesos).  Through a
concession, Edenor distributes electricity exclusively to the
northwestern zone of the greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area
and the northern part of the city of Buenos Aires.

Edenor SA reported a loss of ARS780 million on ARS3.59 billion of
revenue for the year ended Dec. 31, 2014, compared with profit of
ARS773 million on ARS3.44 billion of revenue for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2013.

As of June 30, 2015, Edenor had ARS 10.74 billion in total assets,
ARS 9.63 billion in total liabilities and ARS 1.11 billion in
total equity.


MASTELLONE HERMANOS: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' CCR; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'CCC-'
corporate credit and issue-level ratings on Mastellone Hermanos
S.A.  The outlook remains negative.

The 'CCC-' foreign currency ratings on Mastellone reflect S&P's
belief that the entity would not be able to continue to honor its
foreign currency obligations under potential restrictions by the
Argentine government to transferring money abroad.  The 'CCC-'
local currency rating reflects S&P's belief that the company won't
be able to generate enough local currency resources to honor all
of its financial obligations under S&P's base-case scenario, which
is heavily influenced by the sovereign's selective default and its
implications for the economic environment that the entity could
potentially face in the next six months, which would lead to a
default on its foreign currency obligations.

Apart from the fact that the company is highly exposed to
Argentina, where it generates around 85% of its revenues,
Mastellone's results remain exposed to the inherent volatility of
the dairy industry and rely significantly on the availability and
price of raw milk, both of which correlate with uncontrollable
factors such as weather and global demand and supply.  On the
other hand, the company's leading market share in several dairy
products in Argentina allows for greater economies of scale.  Its
strong brand recognition and nationwide presence through a large
and efficient distribution network somewhat offset the risks of
operating in the dairy industry.  In addition, Mastellone's sound
domestic competitive position, both as a dairy producer and raw
milk procurer, gives it high bargaining power with dairy farmers.

The negative outlook reflects that on the sovereign, which,
through T&C restrictions, would lead Mastellone to default on its
foreign debt obligations within the next few months.  It also
reflects S&P's view that the credit quality of the Argentine
corporate sector may worsen because of the still-weak domestic
operating environment (including high inflation and gradual
devaluation of the Argentine peso), a challenging refinancing
scenario, and increased regulatory risk.


===========
B E L I Z E
===========


BELIZE: S&P Affirms 'B-' Sov. Credit Rating; Outlook Now Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on the
long-term ratings on Belize to stable from positive.  S&P also
affirmed its 'B-/B' long- and short-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on Belize.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'B-' transfer and convertibility assessment.

RATIONALE

S&P's outlook revision to stable from positive reflects Belize's
weaker fiscal and external positions that increase its
vulnerability to external shocks.

Belize's fiscal outlook has deteriorated.  S&P expects the general
government deficit (and change in debt) to substantially exceed
the initial government's target of 5.1% of GDP for the fiscal year
ending March 2016.  Fiscal slippage is largely because of higher
spending.  In addition to a 13% public-sector wage hike and other
preelection spending, pressure on public finances comes from
compensation payments for utilities that the government
nationalized in 2009 and 2011.  During August and September 2015,
the government paid the former shareholders of the two companies a
total of US$116.5 million.  In the first settlement, the
government paid Fortis, a Canadian energy company, US$35 million
for 37% of Belize Electricity Ltd. (BEL) and returned to the
former controlling shareholder a 33% stake in the utility.  In the
second settlement, the government made an initial US$81 million
payment to Dunkeld Investments Ltd., the BTL Employees Trust, and
British Caribbean Bank for Belize Telemedia Ltd. (BTL) pending a
final court ruling on the total compensation due.  S&P has
included in its projections a working figure of US$50 million for
both fiscal year ending March 2017 and March 2018 for any
remaining compensation, but S&P acknowledges the final amount
could range from zero to US$100 million each year.

Including these payments, Standard & Poor's projects that the
general government deficit will reach 11.2% of GDP in fiscal
2015/2016 from 3.9% of GDP in fiscal 2014/2015.  From this peak,
S&P expects the deficit to narrow and average 4.5% in fiscal years
2016/2017 and 2017/2018.  Belize's fiscal flexibility is
constrained by a low tax base and limited ability to raise tax
revenues, as well as shortfalls in infrastructure.

S&P expects net general government debt to rise to 74% of GDP this
year, from 66% in 2014, and reach 77% of GDP over the next two
years.  Interest payments average 9% of general government
revenue, before rising toward 10% in 2017 and 2018, when there is
a step-up in coupon payments on its US$530 million bond due in
2038.  Belize's government debt is predominantly denominated in
foreign currency and held by nonresidents.  The government has not
tapped global capital markets since its restructuring in 2012.  It
relies on shallow domestic capital markets and external financing
from official creditors.  S&P estimates contingent liabilities to
be limited, as its criteria define the term.

Belize's current account deficit has widened this year owing to
lower commodity prices, weak agricultural exports, the low oil
prices, and higher imports of capital goods for the construction
of a sugar mill.  S&P expects it to reach 10% of GDP before
moderating to an average of 7% in 2016 and 2017.  S&P expects most
of the higher deficit to be financed by net foreign direct
investment (mainly associated with the sugar mill).  After
reaching a peak in 2014, supported by PetroCaribe financing, S&P
expects international reserves to decline to less than
US$400 million.  The projected decline in international reserves
reflects the combination of higher current account deficits, S&P's
assumption that PetroCaribe financing from Venezuela tapers off,
and the U.S. dollar compensation payments to BEL and BTL.  As a
result, S&P expects a weakening of Belize's external liquidity and
indebtedness.  S&P expects narrow net external debt to average 66%
of current account receipts, and gross external financing needs to
average 136% of current account receipts and usable reserves from
2015-2017.

Belize's per capita GDP of about US$4,760 is similar to that of
its peers in the 'B' category, but on average its growth has been
below that of its peers.  S&P expects real GDP growth of 2.4% in
2015, down from 3.6% in 2014, as a result of lower petroleum and
agriculture exports.  S&P's projections of a modest acceleration
of growth toward 2.8% in 2016-2018 rests on stronger tourism,
increased construction, and higher sugar exports.  Unemployment
declined slightly to 10%, from 11% in 2014, but the still-high
level constrains consumption and the government's tax take.
Although the business environment has improved in recent years,
progress remains to be done to attract more private investment and
foster competitiveness.  Recently, the largest investment in
Belize to date (equivalent to 9% of GDP) was made in the sugar
industry for the construction of the sugar mill, which should
boost the country's agricultural GDP and exports.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Dean Barrow, the centre-
right United People's Party won a third term in snap elections
held Nov. 6, 2015.  S&P do not expect a significant shift in
policy or new initiatives.  Belize benefits from a stable
Westminster parliamentary system of government, but S&P finds its
governmental institutions weak and its payment culture marred by
the debt restructurings in 2006 and 2012.

Since 1976, the Central Bank of Belize has pegged the Belizean
dollar to the U.S. dollar at 2 to 1.  As with any fixed exchange
rate regime, the arrangement limits the country's monetary
flexibility because it cedes monetary policy to the host country.
The fixed exchange rate has helped keep price inflation low in
Belize and give investors' confidence in the Belizean dollar as a
store of value, but it, in the past, has led to low reserve
coverage and, at times, private-sector queuing for foreign
exchange.  S&P's rating affirmation is premised on its expectation
that the central bank will maintain its pegged exchange rate and
will take measures to stanch the decline of its reserves.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook balances the weaker-than-expected public
finances and external liquidity against S&P's expectations for
steady growth prospects driven by a recovery in agricultural
exports and investment in tourism-related infrastructure over the
coming year.

S&P could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if the
government's underlying fiscal deficit does not moderate, or if
the central bank's international reserves decline more than S&P
forecasts.  A final Arbitration Tribunal decision--expected by
early 2016--that requires prompt payment above S&P's two $50
million estimates could contribute to this downward pressure.

On the other hand, S&P could raise the ratings if it sees the
government take more decisive steps to reduce fiscal deficits,
build international reserves, and improve the country's
competitiveness.  Support from official creditors could help to
design such measures and provide needed balance of payment support
while they are implemented.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the fiscal flexibility assessment had
deteriorated.  All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action
                                     To                 From
Belize
Sovereign Credit Rating             B-/Stable/B        B-/Pos./B

Ratings Affirmed

Belize
Senior Unsecured                       B-
Short-Term Debt                        B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   B-


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B O L I V I A
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BANCO MERCANTIL: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Rating Services said it raised the long-term
issuer credit on Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A. (BMSC) to 'BB'
from 'BB-'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term
rating.  The outlook on the long-term rating is stable.

The upgrade, and S&P's revision of its capital and earnings
assessment to "moderate" from "weak", stems from the improved RAC
ratio, which S&P forecasts will stand at about 5.8% for the next
18 months.  The improvement reflects higher exposure in lower-risk
asset classes, mainly sovereign bonds, alongside adequate internal
capital generation--despite the implementation of the new banking
law.  At the same time, the bank has slightly reduced its exposure
to market risk.  Combined, these factors yielded an RAC ratio of
5.7% at year-end 2014, up from 5.0% in 2013.

The stable outlook for the next 18 months reflects S&P's
expectation that the bank will maintain an RAC ratio of about 5.8%
-- mainly reflecting sustained internal capital generation and our
expected 16% average loan growth.  Its strong business position as
the largest bank in Bolivia also underpins its RAC ratio.  Also,
S&P's stable outlook reflects manageable asset quality indicators
-- NPAs of less than 3% -- with no credit losses in its loan
portfolio.

S&P could lower the rating over the next 12 to 18 months if the
RAC ratio falls to consistently below 5%, reflected in a higher
risk appetite, additional exposure in its credit portfolio, and
lower internal capital generation.  This could occur of its asset
quality deteriorates or dividend payouts are higher than expected.
If the bank's business position weakens due to lower business
stability because of a weakened market position or significant
deterioration in the bank's revenue stability, S&P could also
lower the ratings.  The ratings are currently at the same level as
the sovereign.  In this regard, a negative rating action on
Bolivia would most likely trigger a similar rating action on the
bank, unless it is able to pass our stress test for ratings above
the sovereign.

Under S&P's base-case, it do not foresee an upgrade for the next
12 to 18 months.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO DO NORDESTE: Moody's Cuts Deposit Ratings to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took rating actions on three regional
Brazilian banks, including Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A. (BNB),
BRB - Banco Regional de Brasilia S.A. (BRB) and Banco do Estado do
Sergipe S.A.(BANESE).

Moody's lowered BNB's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to b1 from
ba2, and downgraded its long-term global local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings to Ba1 from Baa3; its long-term senior
unsecured debt rating to Ba1 from Baa3; its short-term global
local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings to Not Prime from
Prime 3; and its long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating
to Aa1.br from Aaa.br. Simultaneously, Moody's affirmed the short-
term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1. The outlook
on all ratings remains stable.

Moody's has also changed the outlook on the ratings of BRB and
BANESE to negative from stable, including on their long-term
global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings, and their
Brazilian national scale deposit ratings. Moody's affirmed these
banks' ratings and assessments, including their BCAs, except for
the Brazilian national scale ratings assigned to BRB that were
downgraded to A3.br and BR-2, from A2.br and BR-1, for long and
short-term, respectively.

The following ratings and assessments assigned to Banco do
Nordeste do Brasil S.A. were downgraded:

-- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating to Ba1, from
Baa3; stable outlook

-- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating to Ba1, from Baa3;
stable outlook

-- Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to
Ba1, from Baa3; stable outlook

-- Short-term global local-currency deposit rating to Not Prime,
from Prime 3

-- Short-term foreign-currency deposit rating to Not Prime, from
Prime 3

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to Aa1.br,
from Aaa.br

-- Baseline credit assessment to b1, from ba2

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment to b1, from ba2

-- Long-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment to Baa3(cr), from
Baa2(cr)

-- Short-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment to Prime 3(cr),
from Prime 2(cr)

The following ratings and assessments assigned to Banco do
Nordeste do Brasil S.A. were affirmed:

-- Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1

The following ratings and assessments assigned to BRB -- Banco de
Brasilia S.A. were affirmed:

-- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating of Ba3;
negative outlook

-- Short-term global local-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

-- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Ba3; negative
outlook

-- Short-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

-- Baseline credit assessment of ba3

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba3

-- Long-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Ba2(cr)

-- Short-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Not Prime(cr)

The following ratings assigned to BRB -- Banco de Brasilia S.A.
were downgraded:

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to A3.br,
from A2.br

-- Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to BR-2,
from BR-1

The following ratings and assessments assigned to Banco do Estado
de Sergipe S.A. were affirmed:

-- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating of Ba2;
negative outlook

-- Short-term global local-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

-- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Ba2; negative
outlook

-- Short-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of A1.br

-- Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1

-- Baseline credit assessment of ba2

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba2

-- Long-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Ba1(cr)

-- Short-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Not Prime(cr)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions take into account pressures on these banks'
asset quality and profitability arising from the ongoing economic
contraction that reduces households and companies' repayment
capacity, as well as business volumes. As regional government-
owned banks, BNB, BRB and Banese have a large portion of their
books allocated to consumer lending in the form of low risk
payroll loans. However, over the past years, these banks have
gradually expanded into riskier assets, including unsecured
consumer and commercial lending in their respective regions that
increase their vulnerability to the weak economy and rising
unemployment, exposing these banks to higher credit costs.

BANCO DO NORDESTE DO BRASIL (BNB)

In lowering the BCA to b1 from ba2, Moody's considered Banco do
Nordeste do Brasil S.A. (BNB)'s weakening capital position, and
negative pressures on asset risk and profitability.

Moody's ratio of tangible common equity to risk-weighted assets
declined significantly, to 4.0% in June 2015, from 7.4% in
December 2014, influenced by its lower internal revenue generation
and by the high dividend payout ratio of around 65% over the last
18 months.

BNB is also experiencing a rapid increase in problem loans, which
achieved 6.0% of total loans in June 2015, up from 3.3% in
December 2014. Further asset quality pressures in the next 12 to
18 months are likely as the majority of its exposure is allocated
to small and medium companies, the most vulnerable to the weak
economy. A t the same time, Moody's acknowledges that current
problem loans are adequately covered by loan loss reserves, which
stood at 160% in June 2015.

In this context, the lower profitability is mainly driven by loan
loss provisions, which increased by 150% in the first half of 2015
compared to the same period of previous year. As the adverse
operational environment persists, the bank's capacity to increase
capital through internal earnings generation remains threatened.

At the same time, the b1 BCA is supported by BNB's sound liquidity
profile, evidenced by the large amount of liquid resources and
very low dependence on market funds, given its strong access to
granular deposits, judicial deposits and funding from government
related entities.

The deposit and senior debt ratings were also downgraded to Ba1
from Baa3, which derived from the lowered BCA. The deposit rating
incorporates three notches of government support uplift, to
reflect Moody's view of very high likelihood of support, given its
federal government majority control and its important role as a
financial agent supporting the development of the Northeast
region.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

Negative pressures on the ratings and BCA could be driven by
further deterioration of asset risk and profitability; and
lowering capital ratio.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

Positive pressures on its ratings and BCA could result from
consistently improved capital position; enhanced and less-volatile
profitability; and better asset risk.

BRB -- BANCO DE BRASILIA (BRB)

In changing BRB - Banco Regional de Brasilia S.A. (BRB)'s ratings
outlook to negative from stable, Moody's is considering the
negative pressures that may cause a further delinquency increase
and profitability shrinkage. BRB's ratings may also be negatively
weighted by a decrease in capitalization.

BRB's asset quality is positively balanced by its large exposure
to the low-risk payroll loans, representing 52% of total loans in
June 2015. However, the bank has expanded its exposure to the
unsecured consumer loans and to small and medium sized companies
in the Federal District area, which are ultimately susceptible to
the region's activity slowdown. As a result, 90-day past due loans
increased to 4.1% in September 2015, up from 3.4% in December
2014.

Moody's also acknowledges that BRB is already experiencing
profitability pressures, in light of incremental provisions and
higher cost of funds, resulting in a 49% decrease in the net
profit in the first nine months ended in September 2015 over the
same period of previous year.

At the same time, BRB's baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba3
reflects its adequate capitalization and its strong funding
profile, evidenced by a granular deposit base and very low
reliance on market funds.

BRB's deposit ratings of Ba3 derives from its ba3 BCA, which do
not benefit from government support uplift because of the bank's
modest market share of banking system deposits.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

Sharper deterioration in asset quality, further decline in
profitability and lower capital replenishment capacity would
likely lead to a downgrade on the ratings. In addition, corporate
governance issues could cause negative pressures on its BCA and
ratings.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

Given the challenging operating environment, there is limited room
for upgrade on BRB's BCA and ratings at this point. In the long
run, positive pressure could derive from continued improvements in
risk management translating into improved asset risk and
profitability.

BANCO DO ESTADO DE SERGIPE (BANESE)

The affirmation of Banese's ba2 BCA acknowledges its entrenched
local franchise as the wholly-owned bank of the State of Sergipe,
with a relevant 34% market share in the state deposits and loans,
providing the bank with recurring earnings generation. Despite the
high granularity of the bank's loan book, Banese has rapidly
expanded into higher risk unsecured consumer lending over the past
two years, including credit card loans. In September 2015, the
riskier assets classes accounted for roughly 50% of total loans,
including unsecured

products to individuals and loans to small and medium size
companies, while the lower risky payroll loans to civil servants
was 40%.

The negative outlook factors the likelihood that the quality of
Banese's loan portfolio will suffer with the rising unemployment
that reduce borrowers' repayment capacity and lead to increase in
the bank's credit costs, and thus, profitability over the next
quarters. The contraction in business volumes in an environment of
deteriorating credit quality creates additional pressures to the
bank's financial performance.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

There is limited upward pressure on Banese's ratings given the
current negative outlook. The stabilization of Banese's outlook
could derive from its ability to keep adequate asset risk and
profitability, despite the weak economic environment, coupled with
improvement in

capitalization.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN

Persistent losses in its operations, especially sharp asset risk
deterioration affecting its profitability, could have negative
effects on the ratings. As a state-owned bank, any misuse of
Banese by the local government, specifically in policy lending,
could lead to eroded financial fundamentals for the bank and would
have a directly negative influence on the ratings.

LAST RATING ACTIONS & METHODOLOGIES

The last rating action on BNB was on 3 October 2013, when Moody's
reassessed the level of the Brazilian government's capacity to
provide systemic support, resulting in the downgrade of its long-
term local- and foreign-currency deposit rating to Baa3 from Baa2;
the short-term local- and foreign-currency deposit rating to P-3
from P-2; and the long-term foreign currency senior debt rating to
Baa3 from Baa2. At the same time, the outlook on all its ratings
was changed to stable from positive.

The last rating action on BRB was on 11 May 2015, when Moody's
upgraded its BCA to ba3 from b1. At the same time, Moody's
affirmed its global long-term local- and foreign currency deposit
ratings of Ba3; the global short-term local- and foreign-currency
deposit ratings of Not Prime; the long-term Brazilian national
scale deposit rating of A2.br; and the short-term Brazilian
national scale deposit rating of BR-1. The outlook on all ratings
remained stable.

The last rating action on BANESE was on 29 April 2014, when
Moody's assigned a bank financial strength rating of D, which
mapped to a ba2 baseline credit assessment in the global rating
scale; a Ba2 and Not Prime global local- and foreign-currency
long- and short-term deposit ratings, as well as a A1.br and BR-1
Brazilian national scale long- and short-term deposit ratings. The
outlook on the ratings was stable.


BRAZIL: Awards Rights to Operate 29 Hydro Plants, Raises $4.6BB
---------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Brazil's government awarded the rights to
operate 29 existing hydroelectric plants whose licenses have
already expired or will end soon, raising BRL17 billion (nearly
$4.6 billion) in an auction at the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange.

The dams have a combined installed capacity of more than 6,000
megawatts, while the contracts to operate the installations will
run for 30 years from the date they are signed, according to EFE
News.

The report relates that China Three Gorges Corporation, operator
of the world's biggest dam, was awarded Lot E, which includes the
3,400 MW Ilha Solteira and the 1,550 MW Jupia plants, both located
on the Parana River.

CTG agreed to pay BRL13.8 billion (some $3.7 billion) to operate
the two dams and proposed receiving BRL2.38 billion (some $640
million) in annual revenue, the maximum amount specified by the
government, the report relays.

The auction rules state that the new concession holders must pay
65 percent of the total owed for the concession rights on the
contract sign date, which is scheduled for next month, the report
discloses.

Enel Green Power, a unit of Italian multinational utility Enel
Group, was awarded operation of the Mourao I and Paranapanema
hydropower plants, the rights to which cost BRL160.6 million (some
$43.1 million), notes the report.

The report relays that EGP offered to receive BRL43.2 million
($11.6 million) in annual revenue, 1 percent less than the
government's ceiling.

Brazil's Copel Geracao e Transmissao was the only bidder for sub-
lot B1, which includes the Parigot de Souza hydroelectric dam, the
report says.

The report notes that Copel offered to receive BRL130.8 million
(some $35.1 million) in annual revenue, the maximum allowed, and
will pay BRL574 million ($154 million) for the rights to the
concession.

Lot D, which is made up of 18 hydroelectric dams, was awarded to
Brazil's Cemig, which offered to receive BRL498.6 million (some
$134 million) in annual revenue, or 1 percent less than the
maximum allowable amount, the report relays.

Cemig offered BRL2.2 billion (around $595 million) for the rights
to operate the 18 dams, the report discloses.

Another Brazilian company, Celg, was awarded Lot A, which
consisted of just one hydroelectric plant, known as Rochedo, the
report notes.

Celg's annual revenue offer was 13.58 percent lower than the
government's ceiling, while the amount to be paid to operate
Rochedo was BRL15.8 million (some $4.24 million), the report says.

EFE News adds that Lot C, which consists of five hydropower plants
and was the last to be auctioned off, was awarded to Celesc
Geracao, whose annual revenue offer was 5.21 percent below the
maximum allowable level.


BRAZIL: Weakening Economy Poses Liquidity Challenges, Moody's Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
Brazilian companies have already reduced their capital spending
and cut costs to preserve cash as the economy has deteriorated.
However, they still face liquidity challenges as the economy
weakens towards the end of the year, says Moody's Investors
Service.

"Brazil's faltering economy and confidence have led to higher
interest rates, more selective lending, and higher risk premiums,"
says Erick Rodrigues, an Assistant Vice President and Analyst at
Moody's.  "All of this has sharply reduced capital market activity
and made banks more cautious."

On aggregate, rated Brazilian companies will maintain adequate
liquidity in 2016, thanks largely to cost-cutting and reduced
capital spending plans, even though most industries will face
serious challenges.

Oil and gas giant Petrobras is among those companies that will be
tested the most.  The company faces significant refinancing risk
in the coming years and cannot materially reduce its debt burden
without a major asset sale, according to the report "Deteriorating
Domestic Fundamentals Will Test Liquidity in 2016-17."

The homebuilding, engineering and construction sectors will also
face tight-funding conditions through at least early 2017 and the
real's sharp devaluation and weaker demand from corporate
passengers has raised liquidity risk for Brazil's airlines.

Some export-dependent sectors, such as meat, pulp and paper, will
continue to benefit from Brazil's weak currency in 2016.  In fact,
paper and forest products companies have some of the country's
most comfortable corporate liquidity profiles with limited risk to
pulp prices at least through early 2017.


CDHU: Moody's Assigns B1 Global Local Currency Issuer Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina assigned a long- and short-term global
local currency issuer ratings of B1 and Not-Prime -- respectively
-- to Companhia de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado
de Sao Paulo (CDHU), a social housing arm of the State of Sao
Paulo (Baa3, stable). At the same time, Moody's assigned to CDHU
Brazilian national scale issuer ratings of Baa2.br and BR-2, long
and short-term. The outlook on all ratings is stable. Moody's also
assigned a baseline credit assessment of caa1 to CDHU.

This is the first time Moody's assigns ratings to Companhia De
Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano do Estado de Sao Paulo and
the following ratings were assigned:

-- Long-term global local currency issuer rating of B1, stable
    outlook

-- Short-term global local currency issuer rating of Not-Prime

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Baa2.br

-- Short-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of BR-2

-- Baseline credit assessment of caa1

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B1 issuer rating assigned to CDHU reflects both its ownership
by the state government of Sao Paulo (Baa3, stable) and its
established role in providing social housing in the state. Moody's
noted that in accordance with its methodology for rating
Government-Related Issuers (GRIs), the ratings for CDHU are
determined by (1) the Company's intrinsic financial profile, which
is reflected in its baseline credit assessment (BCA) of caa1; and
(2) the incorporation of support from its shareholder, the State
Government of Sao Paulo (Baa3, stable). Moody's assessment of
strong support and very high dependence takes into consideration
its role as an arm of the government and the close links between
CDHU's operations and the state government's social policies.
Moody's expects that the State of Sao Paulo will continue to
provide support in terms of capital and funding needs as they have
done so in the past; from 2012 to 2014, the State of Sao Paulo
transferred R$2.8 billion to CDHU. For that reason, CDHU's B1
issuer rating benefits from three notches of uplift from its caa1
BCA.

In assigning a caa1 BCA to CDHU, Moody's took into account a) its
exposure to subsidized mortgages to low income households in the
state of Sao Paulo that generate significantly high delinquency
ratios, b) the structural net losses it reports due to its
intrinsically high cost base, and c) the Company's susceptibility
in the worsening economic recession in Brazil. In view of its
target client base CDHU's delinquency levels are traditionally
very high, with total past due loans representing 14.9% of its
subsidized loan book as of December 2014 (the company does not
report 90-day past due loans). Provisions for loan losses jumped
by over 80% in 2014, while high cost base stemming from subsidy
costs, production and commercialization costs continued to rise,
resulting in widening losses in the last two years.

Profitability is not a key target of CDHU given its role in
promoting social housing, but in light of Brazil's ongoing
economic recession, Moody's expects the company to face further
deterioration in its asset quality, which will in turn lead to
potentially rising credit costs, representing a further pressure
on CDHU's yearly losses in 2015 and 2016.

To sustain its cash flow and the normal course of its operations,
CDHU is entirely reliant on capital injections from its
shareholder in the form of subscriptions to common equity --
amounting to BRL 1.0 billion in 2014 and BRL 925 million in 2013.
These capital injections are part of the State of Sao Paulo's
yearly budget, however, they are subject to changes depending on
the performance of tax receipts at the State.

Although CDHU's shareholders' equity represents about 85% of total
liabilities, the caa1 BCA also reflects the expected increase in
bank debt, and also, the high level of uncertainty about the
recovery value of its assets -- particularly the mortgage loan
book -- given its unique role in social housing.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

At this juncture, there is no upward rating pressure on CDHU's
standalone ratings, particularly given Brazil's challenging
operating environment.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

A weakening of CDHU's financial fundamentals, particularly
resulting from a significant deterioration in the quality of the
loan book, would have negative effect on the BCA.

CDHU is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil, and had
total assets of BRL9.8 billion ($2.6 billion) and total equity of
BRL8.3 billion ($2.2 billion) as of 31 December 2014.



LIGHT ENERGIA: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Global Scale Issuer Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's confirmed the issuer ratings of Light Energia S.A (Light
Energia, or 'the company') at Ba2 on the global scale and Aa3.br
on Brazil's national scale. At the same time, Moody's confirmed
the local currency ratings of the senior unsecured debentures due
in 2016 at, respectively Ba2 and Aa3.br on the global and national
scales. The outlook for all ratings is negative.

In a related action on 25 November 2015, Moody's confirmed the
issuer rating of Light S.A (Light), the parent company and
guarantor of Light Energia's rated debt securities, to Ba2 on the
global scale, and to Aa3.br on the NSR.

The rating confirmation follows the completion of a number of
amendments to financial covenants contained in the indentures of
the outstanding debentures issued by Light Energia. The
confirmation also follows the progress made in the potential sale
of Light's shares in Renova Energia and the potential conclusion
of such transaction during Q4 2015. This rating action closes a
review Moody's started in 02 September 2015 when Light reported
that it had fail to meet its financial covenants for the second
quarter of 2015.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings confirmation at Ba2/Aa3.br for Light Energia
acknowledges that the modification of financial covenants and
likely selling of Light's 15.87% stake in Renova Energia reduce
the risk that a debt acceleration event will occur in the near
term. Future compliance with the revised schedule will remain
challenging as the required Net Debt/EBITDA ratio (calculated at
the level of Light on a consolidated basis) is set to ratchet down
back to 3.75x by Q4 2016.

The confirmed ratings also reflect (i) recent improvements in the
company's credit metrics evidenced by a Moody's adjusted CFO pre-
WC - Dividends / Total Debt ratio of around 25% in the last twelve
months (LTM) ended 30 September 2015, compared to 23% for the full
year 2014 (for the same periods Moody's adjusted interest coverage
rose to 4.3x from 3.5x); (ii) the company's relatively low
leveraged capital structure illustrated by a Total Debt-to-EBITDA
(as adjusted by Moody's) of 2.4x in LTM ended on 9/30/2015; (iii)
long dated debt maturity profile; (iv) relatively stable operating
cash flows, mainly due to long-term concession contracts which
grant the company the right to operate its generation portfolio
until 2026.

On the other hand the negative outlook captures : (i) the
challenges that Light Energia's parent company Light will continue
to face to sustain its operating performance amid high energy cost
environment, and reduce its leverage such as to comply with its
financial covenants; (ii) the mounting uncertainties in the
electricity sector, which includes the hydrology risk, but also
the uncertainties surrounding the regulatory framework currently
pending a final resolution ; (iii) the relatively high dividend
payout policy and large capital expenditures program although
mitigated by Moody's expectation that both will be kept at a
minimum; and (vii) reduced revenue opportunity resulting from the
decline in the short term (spot) prices.

In the nine months to September 2015, Light Energia's revenues
fell by almost around 5% to BRL 437 million essentially driven by
a reduced volume of spot market sales due to the drop in average
price to BRL 204 per MWh from BRL 677 per MWh in the previous
year. Despite a 6% increase in operating cost, the company's
EBITDA remained flat at around BRL 293 million. In the
anticipation of a resolution to the regulatory uncertainty and
more favorable hydrology conditions, Moody's expects Light
Energia's EBITDA will improve progressively in the coming years.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the number of challenges that the company still faces,
including those associated with the electricity sector in Brazil,
a rating upgrade is not likely in the near term. The outlook could
be stabilized as a result of the normalization of the hydropower
reservoir levels in the current rainy season, which would
significantly reduce the company's exposure to the spot market.

The ratings could be downgraded as a result of a deterioration in
the company's liquidity profile and/or a breach in financial
covenants. The ratings could also be downgraded in the event of
worsening hydrology conditions and/or of consumption levels
leading to a deterioration in the company's metrics such that CFO
pre-WC - Dividends / Total Debt falls below 15%, and interest
coverage below 3.0x on a sustained basis.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro - Brazil, Light Energia operates 5
hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) with 855 MW of combined
installed capacity pursuant to a 30-year concession, which ends in
June 2026. The Company has also direct (full) or shared control of
several other entities dedicated to renewable energy production,
such as Renova Energia S.A. (with a 15.9% stake), Guanhaes Energia
S.A. (51% stake), Sao Judas Tadeu as well as Fontainha wind parks
and Lajes Energia S.A. (with 100% ownership in each). Companhia
Energetica de Minas Gerais ("CEMIG"), rated Ba1/Aa2.br with
negative outlook, is a major shareholder, holding directly and
indirectly, a 26.1% and 32.5% stake, respectively, in Light S.A.


LIGHT SERVICOS: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Corp. Family & Issuer Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. confirmed the Corporate Family and
issuer ratings of Light S.A (Light) and its wholly owned
electricity distribution subsidiary Light Servicos de Eletricidade
S.A ("Light SESA") at Ba2 on the global scale and Aa3.br on
Brazil's national scale. At the same time, Moody's confirmed the
local currency ratings of the senior unsecured debentures due in
2016 at, respectively Ba2 and Aa3.br on the global and national
scales. The outlook for all assigned ratings is negative.

The confirmation follows the completion of a number of amendments
to the financial covenants contained in the indentures of the
outstanding debentures issued by Light SESA. The confirmation also
follows the progress made in the potential sale of Light's shares
in Renova Energia and the potential conclusion of such transaction
during Q4 2015. This rating action closes a review Moody's started
in 02 September 2015 when Light reported that it had fail to meet
its financial covenants for the second quarter of 2015.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings confirmation at Ba2/Aa3.br for Light and Light SESA
acknowledges that the modification of financial covenants and
likely selling of Light's 15.87% stake in Renova Energia reduce
the risk that a debt acceleration event will occur in the near
term. Future compliance with the revised schedule will remain
challenging as the required Net Debt/EBITDA ratio (calculated at
the level of Light on a consolidated basis) is set to ratchet down
back to 3.75x by Q4 2016.

The confirmed ratings also reflect (i) recent improvements in the
company's metrics evidenced by a Moody's adjusted CFO pre-WC -
Dividends / Total Debt ratio of around 26% in the last twelve
months ended 30 September 2015, compared to 22% for the full year
2014 (for the same periods Moody's adjusted interest coverage rose
to 3.9x from 3.3x); (ii) continuing support from the regulatory
framework evidenced by the consistent application of periodic
tariff increases, extraordinary tariff adjustments and other
transfer mechanisms, although the sustainability of such
mechanisms remains unclear; (iii) resilient consumption levels in
Light's area of operations which grew by a modest 0.8% over the
last nine months to 30 September 2015 (including +2.5% in Q3 2015)
mainly driven by commercial activity; and (iv) Light SESA's large
market share and strategic position within the state of Rio de
Janeiro.

The negative outlook captures: (i) limitations over Light SESA's
ability to pass-through the higher electricity acquisition costs
to consumers on a timely basis in the context of Brazil's
deteriorating economic environment. (ii) the company's dependence
on continuing support from the regulator amidst a still evolving
regulatory framework ; (ii) the prevalence of poor hydrology
conditions that will require the ongoing dispatch of thermal power
to preserve water levels at the Brazilian water reservoirs,
driving higher electricity acquisitions costs on the short-term
(spot) market ; (iii) negative pressure on cash flow resulting
from a sizable Capex program and higher interest costs, although
mitigated by Moody's expectation that both Capex and dividend
payouts will be kept at the minimum necessary (iv) weaker
operating profile compared to peers, characterized by higher non-
technical losses and somewhat weaker operational quality
indicators.

In the nine months to September 2015, Light's operating
performance was supported by resilient consumption levels. Light
SESA's revenues grew by almost 47% to BRL 6.7 billion essentially
driven by the impact of tariff transfers such as the transfer from
the CCRBT and ACR accounts, bills from the Tariff Flag mechanism -
- all of which accounted for 26% of reported net revenues during
the period - and from the 22.5% exceptional tariff adjustments
granted to the company by the regulator in March 2015. At the same
time EBITDA margins only eroded slightly by 1 percentage point to
10%, despite an increase in purchased energy costs associated with
the hydrological risk. Moody's expects a similar pattern of slow
EBITDA growth and high energy costs in 2016, although the agency
anticipates progressive reduction in the cost of energy from 2017.

Light SA derives close to 70% of its consolidated EBITDA from its
distribution arm, and does not hold financial debt. As such,
Moody's believes there is a strong linkage between Light SA and
Light SESA's credit profile reflected in the alignment of their
issuer ratings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the number of challenges that the company still faces,
including those associated with the electricity sector in Brazil,
a rating upgrade is not likely in the near term. The outlook could
be stabilized as a result of hydropower reservoirs returning to
historically normal levels leading to a material reduction in
Light SESA's exposure to the spot market and an improvement in
EBITDA margins.

Light SESA's ratings could be downgraded as a result of a
deterioration in the company's liquidity profile and/or a breach
in financial covenants. The ratings could also be downgraded in
the event of worsening hydrology conditions and/or of consumption
levels leading to a deterioration in the company's metrics such
that CFO pre-WC - Dividends / Total Debt falls below 8%, and
interest coverage below 1.8x on a sustained basis.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro - Brazil, Light SESA, holds a
thirty-year concession, which was granted by the Brazilian Federal
Government on June 4, 1996, expiring in July 2026. Light SESA's
concession covers thirty one (31) municipalities in the State of
Rio de Janeiro (not rated), including the municipality of Rio de
Janeiro serving a population of approximately ten (10) million.
Light SESA distributes 70% of the electricity consumed in the
State of Rio de Janeiro, which is the second wealthiest in Brazil.
Light SESA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Light S.A. a Brazilian
integrated utility company with activities in generation,
distribution and commercialization of electricity.

In 2014 Light SESA contributed 69% of Light SA's consolidated
EBITDA, while Light Energia contributed 27%. In the nine months
ended 30 September 2015, Light SA reported BRL 7.36 billion and
BRL 1 billion in consolidated net revenues and EBITDA
respectively. This compares with BRL 5.3 billion and BRL851
million reported during the same period in the previous year.


LUPATECH S.A.: S&P Affirms 'D' Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'D' global and
national scale corporate credit ratings on Brazil-based oil and
gas equipment provider Lupatech S.A.

Although creditors approved the company's Judicial Restructuring
Plan on Nov. 18, 2015, it's still pending the court's approval.
S&P should review the company's credit quality in the next few
months as it emerges from the reorganization proceedings.  At that
time, S&P will incorporate Lupatech's updated capital structure
and business plan.

The Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on May 29, 2015,
reported that Lupatech said in a statement on May 25 that it filed
for bankruptcy in Sao Paulo court and is looking to restructure.
The announcement came less than a year after Lupatech emerged from
bankruptcy in June 2014.


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: BTG Pactual Tanks as Probe Leads to Arrest
---------------------------------------------------------------
Blake Schmidt, Maria Luiza Rabello, and Francisco Marcelino at
Bloomberg News report that Grupo BTG Pactual lost more than a
fifth of its stock market value and saw its financing costs double
after its billionaire founder and chairman was arrested in a
widening corruption probe.

Andre Esteves and Delcidio Amaral, the leader of the government
coalition in the Senate, were detained after allegedly trying to
interfere in testimony related to a pay-to-play scheme at the
state-run oil giant, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, according to a court
document, Bloomberg News notes.  Mr. Amaral is the highest-ranking
politician to be arrested in the scandal.

Bloomberg News says that Mr. Esteves denied any wrongdoing through
his lawyer as BTG Pactual named board member Persio Arida as
interim chief executive.  The lender also said the board approved
a plan to buy back as many as 23 million units over the next 18
months, according to a regulatory filing, Bloomberg News relays.

That didn't stop the stock from falling 21 percent, its steepest
drop since the company went public in 2012, bringing its market
value to BRL22.9 billion ($6.1 billion), according to Bloomberg
News.  The yields on the company's $1 billion of bonds maturing in
2020 surged above 12 percent from about 6.5 percent on Nov. 24.

Bloomberg News says that the arrests usher in a new phase of a
massive graft scandal that has crippled Brazil's economy and left
President Dilma Rousseff fighting for her political survival.  The
nation's currency and stocks, which had stabilized in recent weeks
after being in a free fall for much of the year, posted the worst
drop among major markets amid concern the scandal will prolong
political gridlock and the longest recession since the Great
Depression, Bloomberg News notes.

"The arrest of Mr. Esteves, the most high-profile figure in
Brazilian finance, takes the Petrobras probe to a whole new level
and shows the depth and breadth of a scandal that's engulfing
Brazil's political and corporate establishment," said Nicholas
Spiro, managing director at Spiro Sovereign Strategy, in London,
Bloomberg News discloses.  "The scandal is becoming more
debilitating by the day and is severely undermining the prospects
for any kind of meaningful economic reform," Mr. Spiro added.

Bloomberg News relays that Mr. Amaral allegedly tried to convince
former Petrobras director Nestor Cervero, who was arrested in
January, to not mention him or Mr. Esteves in testimony to federal
prosecutors, according to a document of the accusations read aloud
in Brasilia by Judge Teori Zavascki.  Mr. Cervero's family would
have received BRL50,000 ($13,000) every month in the proposal, and
Mr. Esteves "would bear the burden of financial aid," according to
the document, Bloomberg News notes.  The offer also included a
promised BRL4 million payment to Mr. Cervero's lawyer.

Prosecutors cited in their request for the arrests a taped
conversation in which Mr. Amaral indicated Mr. Esteves had
obtained a copy of testimony by Mr. Cervero, according to court
documents, Bloomberg News notes.  Prosecutors said the former
Petrobras director described in his testimony alleged bribes made
to use the BR Distribuidora brand at a chain of 120 gas stations
Banco BTG Pactual had invested in, Bloomberg News says.  Mr.
Cervero worked as a CFO of the distribution unit until March 2014.

Bloomberg News discloses that Mr. Esteves' lawyer, Antonio Carlos
de Almeida Castro, said in a phone interview that Esteves denies
any wrongdoing.  Mr. Castro said the arrests are based on a
recording in which Mr. Amaral used Mr. Esteves' name unduly, and
that Esteves doesn't know Mr. Cervero, Bloomberg News relays.

"Information is being twisted," he said, adding that Esteves has
completed his testimony to police, Bloomberg News notes.

The report relates that Mr. Esteves was detained in the morning of
Nov. 25 at his house in Rio de Janeiro, Mr. Castro said.
Televised images showed Mr. Esteves, 47, being escorted by a
police officer into the federal police office in Rio de Janeiro.
He sported a white button-down shirt, no tie and light stubble on
his face as he walked past reporters to an elevator.

Bloomberg News notes that Sandra Pires, a partner at law firm Rao
& Pires Advogados, said Mr. Esteves' defense team is researching
the arrest order, which allows for him to be held for as many as
five days and can be extended.  BTG Pactual said in an e-mailed
statement that it is cooperating with the investigation and is
willing to explain whatever is necessary to authorities, Bloomberg
News relays.

Eduardo Marzagao, a spokesman for Mr. Amaral, said he was
"surprised" by the arrest.  "It must be a big mistake," he said,
notes the report.

In an e-mailed statement, Mr. Amaral's lawyer, Mauricio Silva
Leite, said the accusations came from a convicted plea bargainer
seeking to obtain legal favors in exchange for information, and
questioned the legality of an arrest of a senator without formal
charges, Bloomberg News notes.

More than 110 people have already been arrested, including former
executives at Petrobras and at Odebrecht SA, Brazil's biggest
construction conglomerate, Bloomberg News notes.  While most of
the detainees have been released, at least three former Petrobras
directors, three former executives at one of Brazil's largest
construction firms and the former treasurer for the ruling
Worker's Party have been sentenced, Bloomberg News discloses.

The sweeping investigation into Petrobras -- dubbed "Carwash" by
prosecutors after a gas station used to launder money -- has
helped make Brazil's real the world's worst-performing major
currency this year, says the report. Brazil's economy is forecast
to shrink more than 3 percent in 2015, according to a central bank
survey of economists published, Bloomberg News notes.

Bloomberg News says that Mr. Esteves has been involved in various
deals with Petrobras over the years, most notably Sete Brasil.
BTG teamed up with Petrobras and other partners in 2010 to create
the rig-supplier whose former operating chief admitted in plea
bargains to crimes of corruption.

New arrests suggest the full impact of Carwash, or Lava Jato in
Portuguese, "is still to come," Joao Augusto de Castro Neves,
director of Latin America for political consulting firm Eurasia
Group, said in a note to clients, Bloomberg News notes.  "BTG
Pactual has exposure to the oil and gas sector, and the arrest of
its CEO is the first time the Lava Jato probe raises the earnest
prospect of financial contagion," adds Bloomberg News.

                    About Petroleo Brasileiro

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. --
Petrobras (Brazilian Petroleum Corporation) -- explores for oil
and gas and it produces, refines, purchases, and transports oil
and gas products.  The Company has proved reserves of about 14.1
billion barrels of oil equivalent and operates 16 refineries, an
extensive pipeline network, and more than 8,000 gas stations.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on March 6,
2015, that the deepening investigation into the alleged kickback
scheme at Petrobras has triggered concerns for the Brazilian banks
with exposures not only to the state-controlled oil company, but
also to its large base of suppliers, as well as the broader oil
and gas (O&G) and construction industries, says Moody's Investors
Service.

On March 12, 2015, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Investors
Service said the corruption investigation into Petrobras will
negatively affect parts of the public and private sectors, but
government support for the company is likely to help contain the
credit-negative impact.

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded all ratings for
Petrobras, including a downgrade of the company's senior unsecured
debt to Ba2 from Baa3, and assigned a Ba2 Corporate Family Rating
to the company, the TCRLA reported on Feb. 27, 2015.  Its failure
to estimate its losses from the alleged corruption scheme and
produce audited third-quarter results prompted Moody's to cut its
rating to junk, the report said.

Rival agency Standard & Poor's delivered a further blow on March
23 when it revised its outlook on the company from stable to
negative, the TCRLA reported on March 26, 2015.

On Feb. 10, 2015, TCRLA said Fitch Ratings has downgraded the
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and
outstanding debt ratings of Petrobras to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'.
Concurrently, Fitch has placed all of Petrobras' international and
national scale ratings on Rating Watch Negative.


SETE BRASIL: S&P Affirms 'SD' Corporate Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'SD' global and
national scale corporate credit ratings on Sete Brasil
Participacoes S.A.  At the same time, S&P lowered the rating on
Sete Brasil's R$1.85 billion debenture issuance to 'brCC' from
'brCCC'.  S&P is keeping this issue-level rating on CreditWatch
negative.

S&P has downgraded Sete Brasil to 'SD' on March 23, 2015,
following its default and subsequent nonpayment on a $250 million
bilateral bridge loan from Standard Chartered Bank.

Since then and as of the date of this report, Sete Brasil has been
rolling over a standstill with the remaining $3.6 billion in
existing bridge loans with a group of banks.  The company intends
to continue doing so until it finalizes the negotiation of new
commercial terms with Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. -- Petrobras, which
is expected for the short term.

The downgrade on the debentures reflects S&P's view of an imminent
risk of default.  In addition, the CreditWatch listing reflects
another downgrade possibility if the implementation of a distress
exchange occurs or if the debentures are accelerated after
triggering a cross default with the bank loans.  S&P expects to
resolve CreditWatch at the maximum in the upcoming 90 days.

S&P acknowledges that the company hired independent audit,
consulting and law firms, such as KPMG, PWC, Kroll, Veirano, and
Clifford Chance, to review its financials and internal control and
compliance procedures.  These measures could substantially improve
the enterprise's risk management culture and practices.
Nevertheless, S&P views the current corruption investigations
involving former executive members of Sete Brasil as indicative of
the company's failure in the past to identify critical strategic
risks and to determine and deploy meaningful risk limits and
controls.  As such S&P assess its management and governance score
as "weak."  Accordingly, S&P will continue to closely evaluate the
company's management and governance practices track record, which
in due course could lead to a reassessment of S&P's current
management and governance score.


TEGMA GESTAO: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Ratings to B1
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina ("Moody's") downgraded Tegma Gestao
Logistica S.A.'s ("Tegma") corporate family ratings ("CFR") and
its BRL 200 million senior unsecured debentures due in 2018 and
2019 to B1 from Ba3 on the global scale and to Baa3.br from A2.br
on the Brazilian national scale. The outlook for all ratings was
changed to negative from stable.

Issuer: Tegma Gestao Logistica S.A.

Ratings changed:

-- Corporate Family Ratings: to B1 from Ba3 (global scale); to
Baa3.br from A2.br (national scale);

-- BRL200 million senior unsecured debentures due in 2018 and
2019: to B1 from Ba3 (global scale); to Baa3.br from A2.br
(national scale);

The outlook for all ratings was changed to negative from stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade in Tegma's ratings and negative outlook reflect the
worse than expected impact on the company's operating performance
as a consequence of its exposure to the auto-shipment business
that has been in continuous deterioration, and the likelihood that
the negative scenario for the Brazilian auto industry will persist
for an uncertain period of time. The auto-shipment business
represented 84% of the company's revenues during the last twelve
months ended September 2015. More specifically, the negative
rating action accounts for the 18.6% drop in light vehicle sales
in Brazil during the first nine months of 2015, which during the
same period translated into a 23.3% decrease in the number of
vehicles transported by Tegma, an almost 20% reduction in net
sales and 50% decrease in EBITDA. Going forward, we expect an
additional decrease of 15% in the company's revenues in 2016.

Partially offsetting these pressures is the company's "asset-
light" business model that should provide an improvement in its
free cash flow ("FCF") generation due to lower working capital
requirements and lower CAPEX, which will support the service of
upcoming debt amortizations.

Tegma's B1 ratings continue to reflect its leading position as the
largest logistics company for the automotive industry in Brazil,
supported by medium and long-term contracts and longstanding
relationships with its client base. The rating considers the
company's "asset-light" business model, which entails relatively
stable cash flows and more flexible operations in face market
downturns. In addition to its low revenue diversification, other
risk factors include a track record of aggressive dividend
distributions - despite the reduction trend observed in 2014 and
2015- and growth strategy through leveraged acquisitions.

According to Brazil's national association of vehicle
manufacturers (ANFAVEA), licenses and registrations of light
vehicles in Brazil fell 21.5% in the first ten months of 2015 from
year-earlier levels, while production has decreased 16.3%.
Domestic car sales dropped reflecting a general decline in
consumer confidence and lower consumer financing availability as
Brazil's growth and economic trends deteriorate. The federal
government's decision to reduce certain tax incentives and reduced
exports to Argentina added further pressure in production. There
are no signs of recovery in the short to medium term.

Although the overall risk has increased, Tegma's liquidity is
still adequate with a cash balance of BRL 207 million in the end
of September 2015 and about BRL 200 million in debt amortizations
until the end of 2017. In 2018 the company has another important
amortization of BRL 117 million, which could be a concern if
market conditions do not improve until then and the company is not
able to refinance at least part of its indebtedness. Cash position
was reinforced by the BRL 78 million in proceeds received in 2015
related to the sale of its underperforming e-commerce logistics
subsidiary, Direct Express. We expect that the company will use
cash proceeds from its recent asset divesture to reduce gross
leverage and maintain a solid cash balance, while a more
challenging environment for the automotive industry still holds.

The negative outlook considers further negative impact on the
company's future operating performance given its exposure to the
Brazilian automotive industry, consumer products, and the
Brazilian economy in general. None are showing signs of recovery
at this point.

The ratings outlook could be stabilized if there are clear signs
of recovery in the automotive industry and if Tegma is successful
in prudently managing dividends, CAPEX, and consequently leverage
while maintaining solid liquidity position during the downturn
scenario. Tegma is expected to maintain its leadership position,
ensure healthy operating margins and debt protection metrics even
during the down cycle.

The ratings could suffer further downward pressure if the effects
from the economic downturn are larger than anticipated combined
with no clear signs of recovery in the automotive industry or if
the company is not able to generate positive FCF during down
cycle. Quantitatively, the ratings could be downgraded if revenues
decline in by more than 15% in 2016, if FCF turns negative or if
total adjusted debt to EBITDA increases significantly. Further
downgrade pressure may arise in case Tegma cannot sustain its
leading market position. Also, a significant increase in the level
of secured debt could cause a downgrade of the rated unsecured
debentures.

Tegma is a logistics company, primarily focused on supply chain
management and products for the automotive industry mainly in
Brazil. In the last twelve months ended September 30, 2015, Tegma
transported approximately 828 thousand vehicles representing
approximately 26% of Brazil's light vehicle sales. Tegma also
provides delivery services, warehousing, inventory management and
control and other logistic solutions to the consumer product
segment. In the twelve months ended September 30, 2015, Tegma
reported consolidated net revenues of BRL 1.2 billion.

Tegma's largest shareholder is Sinimbu Participacoes Societarias e
Empreendimentos owned by the Itavema group, which controls
approximately 33.9% of total and voting shares, followed by Coimex
Empreendimentos e Participacoes Ltd., the holding company of
Coimex Group, with a 25.4% stake.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ASTELLON MANAGEMENT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Astellon Management Inc. received on Nov. 20,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          c/o Jo-Anne Maher
          Telephone: (345) 814 9255
          Facsimile: (345) 949 4647
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


BANCO BTG (CAYMAN): Moody's Reviews Ba1 Subordinate Debt Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade Banco BTG
Pactual S.A. (BTG Pactual)'s baseline credit assessment (BCA) of
baa3, and its ratings, including the long-term global local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Baa3; the short-term global
local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Prime-3; the senior
unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating of (P)Baa3; the
long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aa1.br; and
short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1. At the
same time, Moody's also placed on review for downgrade all senior,
subordinated and hybrid debt ratings assigned to Banco BTG Pactual
S.A., Grand Cayman and Luxembourg branches.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects Moody's concern that the recent
detention of BTG Pactual's chairman and CEO could have an impact
on the bank's relationship with its customers and counterparties.
While the situation remains in flux, Moody's believes these
events, the outcome and timing of which are highly uncertain,
could have negative implications for the firm's franchise, which
is dependent on market funding. At the same time, we note that BTG
has held a fairly large amount of liquid assets in its balance
sheet, a strategy that is meant to balance its inherent dependence
on market funding and address liquidity risks.

During the review period, Moody's will assess the actions the firm
has taken to ensure the sustainability of its liquidity and
earnings generation, and to mitigate any potential effect that
these developments may have on BTG Pactual's customer and
counterparty relationships. To the extent that the BCA and ratings
are downgraded at the conclusion of the review, Moody's expects
they could be downgraded by one or more notches.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

The review could result in a downgrade if: (1) investigations find
linkages between the actions of the CEO with the bank's operations
that may have negative franchise, regulatory or other legal
implications on the Bank; (2) the capacity to generate business is
damaged; (3) funding is negatively impacted.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

Upward pressures on its BCA and ratings are unlikely, as they are
on review for downgrade.

However, BTG Pactual's ratings could be confirmed at current
levels if Moody's concludes that: (1) the company is able to
maintain its liquidity and revenue generation capacity; (2)
investigations do not find any evidences against the bank.

The following ratings and assessments assigned to Banco BTG
Pactual S.A. were placed on review for downgrade:

-- Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Baa3

-- Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Prime 3

-- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Baa3

-- Short-term global foreign-currency deposit rating of Prime 3

-- Senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating of
(P)Baa3

-- Short-term MTN program (foreign currency) rating of (P)Prime 3

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aa1.br

-- Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1

-- Baseline credit assessment of baa3

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of baa3

-- Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Baa2(cr)

-- Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime 2(cr)

The following ratings and assessments assigned to Banco BTG
Pactual S.A., Grand Cayman Branch were placed on review for
downgrade:

-- Senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating of
(P)Baa3

-- Short-term MTN program (foreign currency) rating of (P)Prime 3

-- Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating of
Baa3

-- Subordinate debt (foreign currency) rating of Ba1

-- Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Baa2(cr)

-- Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime 2(cr)

The following ratings and assessments assigned to Banco BTG
Pactual S.A., Luxembourg Branch were placed on review for
downgrade:

-- Preferred stock non-cumulative debt (foreign currency) rating
of Ba3(hyb)

-- Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Baa2(cr)

-- Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime 2(cr)

Banco BTG Pactual S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil and
had total consolidated assets of BRL290.4 billion ($78.5 billion)
and equity of BRL18.9 billion ($5.1 billion) as of 30 September
2015.


CELESTIAL ASSETS: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 8
--------------------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Celestial Assets Limited will hear on Dec. 8,
2015, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town, Tortola VG1110
          British Virgin Islands


COOKMAR INVESTMENTS: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 8
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Cookmar Investments Limited will hear on
Dec. 8, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town, Tortola VG1110
          British Virgin Islands


ELBROOK OFFSHORE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Elbrook Offshore Fund, Ltd. received on
Nov. 20, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes
          c/o Jo-Anne Maher
          Telephone: (345) 814 9255
          Facsimile: (345) 949 4647
          Elbrook Holdings, LLC
          441 Vine Street Suite 1300
          Cincinnati OH 45202


HESS (INDONESIA-X): Member Receives Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The member of Hess (Indonesia-X) Limited received on Nov. 24,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mr. George C. Barry
          1185 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, N.Y. 10036
          United States of America


HOLBORN FUNDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Holborn Funding Limited received on Nov. 20,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Marcin Czarnocki
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue, George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 2228
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


JPMP ASIA: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of JPMP Asia Fund Investments Company received on
Nov. 24, 2015, the liquidators' report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

          David Martin Griffin
          Andrew Richard Victor Morrison
          FTI Consulting (Cayman) Ltd.
          Suite 3212, 53 Market Street Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 30613 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          c/o Kieran Linton
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 6830


NSF FINANCE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 30
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of NSF Finance Limited will hold their final
meeting on Nov. 30, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Westport Services Ltd
          c/o Gillian Allan
          Telephone: 949-5122
          Facsimile: 949-7920
          P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman, KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


Q-BLK GLOBAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Q-BLK Global Restructuring Fund, Ltd. received
on Nov. 23, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jane Fleming
          Telephone: (345) 945-2187
          Facsimile: (345) 945-2197
          P.O. Box 30464 Grand Cayman KY1-1202
          Cayman Islands


QPA SPV: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------
The shareholders of QPA SPV, Ltd. received on Nov. 23, 2015, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jane Fleming
          Telephone: (345) 945-2187
          Facsimile: (345) 945-2197
          P.O. Box 30464 Grand Cayman KY1-1202
          Cayman Islands


STORES INVESTMENTS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Stores Investments Limited received on
Nov. 20, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Marcin Czarnocki
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue, George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 2228
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


STORES OVERSEAS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Stores Overseas Limited received on Nov. 20,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Marcin Czarnocki
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue, George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 2228
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


TACLAIM COMPANY: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Taclaim Company Ltd. received on Nov. 24,
2015, the liquidators' report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

          Christopher D. Johnson
          Russell S. Homer
          Telephone: (345) 946 0836
          Facsimile: (345) 946 0864
          80 Shedden Road, Elizabethan Square
          P.O. Box 2499 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


TACLAIM NOMINEE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Taclaim Nominee Ltd. received on Nov. 24,
2015, the liquidators' report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

          Christopher D. Johnson
          Russell S. Homer
          Telephone: (345) 946 0836
          Facsimile: (345) 946 0864
          80 Shedden Road, Elizabethan Square
          P.O. Box 2499 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


=========
C H I L E
=========


LATAM AIRLINES: S&P Revises Outlook on 'BB' CCR to Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on 'BB'
global scale corporate credit ratings on Latam Airlines Group and
TAM S.A. to negative from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
these ratings on both companies.  S&P also lowered its national
scale rating on TAM to 'brA+' from 'brAA'.  The outlook on this
rating is negative also.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' issue-level rating on Latam's
and TAM's senior unsecured debt.  S&P also affirmed its 'A-(sf)'
and 'BBB-(sf)' ratings on Latam's class A and class B pass through
certificates, respectively.

The outlook revision reflects the weak airline market conditions
in Brazil.  The stagnant economy has led to overcapacity, lower
demand for international flights and fewer corporate clients,
reducing the company's profitability.  Furthermore, regional
currency depreciations against the dollar have weakened Latam's
consolidated operations, lowering profitability.  S&P expects this
scenario to remain so in 2016 because Brazilian economy is
unlikely to recover in that year.  In addition, higher fuel prices
will further pressure Latam's profitability.

The economic contraction in Brazil changed the passenger mix as
the share of corporate travelers dropped, which reduced Latam's
profitability.  They purchase costlier tickets than leisure
travelers.  Profitability also suffered from the depreciation of
Latin American currencies against the dollar because 65% of
Latam's costs and 58% of its revenues are denominated in the
latter currency.  Although TAM will cut its domestic capacity by
8%-10% in the fourth quarter of 2015, that wouldn't necessarily
improve profitability as further depreciations and increasing fuel
prices would mostly offset efficiency gains and marginal price
increases.


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


BARRICK PUEBLO: Plant Glitch Cuts Output at Biggest Gold Mine
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's biggest gold
mine said the oxygen plant at Pueblo Viejo is offline temporarily,
which affects its production.

Barrick Pueblo Viejo Corp. said it's sending two of the plant's
three motors to the United States for repairs, after experiencing
a technical fault, according to Dominican Today.  It said the
plant is key in the autoclaves process, which produces the gold
and silver ore known as dore, the report notes.

In a press release, says the report, Barrick said it investigates
the cause behind the outage, the report relays.  "For now, the
autoclaves continue to operate, but with a significantly reduced
production," the company said.

The report relays that the miner added it takes the necessary
steps for the autoclaves to return to full capacity as soon as
possible.  "It's estimated that by mid-January the repair process
would be complete and all units will be back in service," the
company said.


DOMINICAN REP: Must Spur Local Airlines to Boost the Economy
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that civil aviation has been paramount for
tourism growth and development, for which the government should
encourage the creation of local airlines and attract new foreign
airlines to Dominican territory and spur the economy.

Lift Air Group president Ryan Polanco made the proposal, and noted
that civil aviation has made significant contributions to tourism
and to the manufacture of Dominican export products, according to
Dominican Today.

The report notes that Mr. Polanco urged the government to partner
with the private sector similar to the arrangement with the power
companies to create a model national airline.

Speaking at the twice-yearly Air Cargo Americas 2015 Conference in
Miami, Polanco said the growth and development of Dominican
Republic's tourism, the main of foreign currency, "was made
possible by civil aviation," the report notes.

"I am among those who think the government should be more involved
in creating and maintaining local airlines, and encourage foreign
airlines to come more here, since their contributions contribute
to economic growth and development," the report quoted Mr. Polanco
as saying.

As examples of what has surmounted, he cited the cases of the
Netherlands, Iceland and Singapore, three small countries that
have developed their civil aviation, making it the "spearhead"
which guarantees sustained economic development and providing
significant revenue for the state, for trade and to its citizens,
the report adds.

                            *     *     *

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May 22,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term
sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic (DR) to 'BB-'
from 'B+'.

The outlook is stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B'
short-term rating.  S&P also raised its transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment to 'BB+' from 'BB'.


=============
E C U A D O R
=============


GRENADA: IMF Approves US$2.7 Million Disbursement
-------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund completed
the third review of Grenada's economic performance under a program
supported by a three-year arrangement under the Extended Credit
Facility (ECF).  The completion of the review enables the
disbursement of the equivalent of SDR2 million (about US$2.7
million), bringing total resources made available to Grenada under
the arrangement to the equivalent of SDR8.04 million (about US$11
million).  The Board's decision on the third review was taken on a
lapse of time basis.

The ECF arrangement in the amount equivalent to SDR 14.04 million
(then about US$21.7 million, or 120 percent of Grenada's quota at
the IMF) was approved by the Executive Board on June 26, 2014.

Grenada's economic performance under the authorities' home-grown
program is on track and has remained strong. All performance
criteria for end-June 2015 were met and all structural benchmarks
for the third review were implemented.

Half-way into the authorities' three-year reform program, fiscal
sustainability and growth prospects are gradually improving.  The
authorities are on track to achieve the first primary surplus in a
decade.  Supported by the recent private debt exchange, the debt-
to-GDP ratio is projected to decline to 90 percent at end 2015,
down from 107 percent in 2013. Economic growth is projected to
remain robust at about 3.5 percent (at market prices) in 2015,
reflecting expanding agriculture output and solid external demand
for Grenada's tourism services.

Continued implementation of the authorities' structural reform
agenda is critical to improve Grenada's long term fiscal prudence
and growth prospects.  The new Fiscal Responsibility Act will help
ensure that medium term fiscal objectives are in line with debt
reduction goals and ultimately debt sustainability.  While the
overhaul of the fiscal policy framework is now close to
completion, fiscal discipline in the long term relies on its
timely implementation.  Reform of the public sector during the
remainder of the program will be essential to safeguard the fiscal
adjustment gains attained thus far and ensure a sustainable
reduction in the government's personnel expenditure.  Continued
focus on strengthening the banking system remains essential for
stability and will contribute more effectively to promoting
private sector growth. Going forward, attention on growth and
competitiveness reforms will help solidify the success of
structural reforms so far and contribute to boost employment.

                            *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Nov.
4, 2014, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'SD/SD'
long- and short-term sovereign issuer credit ratings on Grenada
and its 'D' ratings on Grenada's senior unsecured debt.
Subsequently, S&P withdrew the ratings.  S&P's transfer and
convertibility assessment was 'BBB-' at the time of withdrawal.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Hike in Food, Crude Oil Prices to Influence Inflation
--------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that an uptick in food prices and the cost of oil
is expected to have an impact on inflation in both the December
2015 and March 2016 quarters.

Nevertheless, the Bank of Jamaica is forecasting inflation to end
the 2015/16 financial year within the target range of 5.5 per cent
to 7.5 per cent, according to RJR News.

The movement is predicated on increases in the prices of domestic
agricultural commodities, due to the recent dry conditions as well
as an upward movement in the price of crude oil, the report notes.

Inflation from agricultural commodities is expected to abate in
the latter part of the December 2015 quarter, however, with price
reversals in the March 2016 quarter as the country recovers from
the drought conditions, the report adds.

                          *     *     *

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 29,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' issue
rating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in two
tranches.  The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due in
2028.  The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in 2045.
The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that Jamaica
owes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's 2015/2016
budget.


NATIONAL COMMERCIAL: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its Banking Industry
Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on Jamaica to group '10' from '9'.
At the same time, S&P revised its SACP on National Commercial Bank
Jamaica Ltd. (NCBJ) to 'b' from 'b+' following the BICRA revision.
S&P also affirmed its 'B' long- and 'B' short-term issuer credit
ratings on the bank.  The outlook remains stable.

S&P's ratings on NCBJ currently reflect S&P's "strong" business
position assessment as the largest financial institution in the
country with historically solid market shares; S&P's view of its
"moderate" capital and earnings despite recent acquisitions;
"moderate" risk position as a result of its exposure to the
sovereign and current nonperforming assets (NPAs) levels; and
S&P's view of its "average" funding and "adequate" liquidity.

Jamaican banks' economic risk remains extremely high, in S&P's
view.  Despite the slight reduction in the sovereign's debt, the
financial system continues to be vulnerable to sovereign risk.
S&P expects sovereign debt to be about 118% of GDP in 2015, which
continues to limit the country's fiscal flexibility.  Economic
growth is restrained by heavy dependence on tourism and the
drought that limited agriculture activity for the second year in a
row.  In S&P's view, economic imbalances in Jamaica persist due to
still high current accounts deficit; even though its external
liquidity and net international reserves (NIR) have slowly
improved in the past two years.  S&P believes Jamaica is still
highly vulnerable to external shocks.  Credit risk is extremely
high, in S&P's view, due to the sluggish economy and the
population's limited debt capacity due to the low GDP per capita.

Industry risks have remained very high in Jamaica.  The
significant and persistent exposure of the banks to a weak
sovereign results in market risk, in S&P's view.  The latest debt
exchange program has weakened banks' profitability in the past few
years, and it may push banks to take on a more aggressive
competitive stance to maintain historical profitability levels.
As part of the agreement with the International Monetary Fund,
Jamaica's banking regulation is slowly improving, but still lags
behind international standards.  In S&P's view, the lack of
funding sources continues to be a risk for the system.  S&P
believes the system is somewhat vulnerable to depositor
confidence; however, the deposit base has demonstrated resilience
to a stressed sovereign scenario and currency devaluation.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


ABENGOA MEXICO: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B3 / B1.mx
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico has downgraded Abengoa Mexico S.A. de C.V.'s
issuer rating to B3 / B1.mx from B2/Ba1.mx.  Concurrently, Moody's
downgraded the national scale rating of its up to MXN3 billion
short term certificados burs tiles (local notes) program to MX-4
from MX-3.  The ratings remain under review for possible
downgrade.

Issuer: Abengoa Mexico, S.A. de C.V.

Downgrades:

Issuer Rating, Downgraded to B3 from B2; Placed Under Review for
further Downgrade

Issuer Rating, Downgraded to B1.mx from Ba1.mx; Placed Under
Review for further Downgrade

  Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Downgraded to MX-4 from MX-3;
   Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Confirmations:

  Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, at NP

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade on Abengoa Mexico's ratings mirrors the downgrade to
B3 from B2 of the ratings of Abengoa S.A., Abengoa Mexico's parent
company on Nov. 19, 2015.  The action was driven by a further
deterioration of Abengoa S.A.'s liquidity situation in Q3 2015.  A
negative free cash flow of EUR 510 million led to a severe decline
of immediately available cash sources to EUR 346 million, which
Moody's considers to be insufficient for the company.  The
sizeable cash outflow will nearly completely eliminate the
positive effect from the contemplated rights issue of EUR620
million (net of fees), and put additional pressure on Abengoa S.A.
to seek alternative cash sources, such as asset disposals and
additional commitments from its banks for the next couple of
quarters.

Abengoa Mexico's ratings continue under review for possible
downgrade.  During the review period Moody's will assess the
parent company's ability to execute its plan for liquidity
improvement and reduce corporate leverage through a capital
increase and asset disposals.  Additionally, Moody's will focus on
further analyzing the mechanisms for cash transferring within
Abengoa S.A.'s group.

On a stand-alone basis, Abengoa Mexico's B3/B1.mx issuer ratings
reflect the company's experience in the Mexican construction
market and longstanding relationship with relevant customers like
CFE (Baa1, stable), the Mexican public electric utility.  The
rating also considers positive business prospects in Mexico and
the strong technical capabilities that the company could access
through its parent company, Abengoa S.A.  Furthermore, Moody's
notes that the company has been able to have a strong operating
performance in recent years despite a more challenging operating
environment.  Balancing these positives are the company's small
size in terms of revenues, compared construction companies rated
globally, concentrated market base with public counterparties in
Mexico, and a relatively weak business diversity assessment.  The
rating is further pressured by liquidity risk that could arise
should its parent company's liquidity deteriorate further, given
the inexistence of ring fencing provisions.

For the first nine months of 2015 Abengoa Mexico's operating
results were solid, with a revenue growth rate of 27% when
compared to the same period of prior year, given its strong two-
year backlog as of January 2015, and despite a more challenging
operating environment in the country.  Moreover, the company was
able to add new contracts, further increasing its backlog which
adds visibility for future performance.  In May 2015, the company
announced that it signed a contract with PEMEX to develop, along
with Italian company ENEL S.p.A. (Baa2 stable), a $950 million
cogeneration plant.  As of Sept. 30, 2015, Moody's estimates
backlog / LTM revenues to be around 4 times.

Additionally, Abengoa Mexico's leverage ratio of 2.2x as of
September 2015 is low for the B3 / B1.mx rating and favorably
compares with the universe of rated construction companies.
Abengoa Mexico is involved in the engineering, procurement and
construction of concession projects, but does not bear in its
balance sheet those projects, usually consolidated at the holding
level.  Therefore, its credit metrics are not distorted by the
debt related with equity requirement concessions that usually
affects other construction companies, particularly when
concessions are not in a mature stage.  Also, the company has low
leverage requirements as it can partly fund working capital needs
through withdrawals from its cash position in the group's
centralized treasury.

On the other hand, Abengoa Mexico's ratings also reflect our
assessment that there is a high correlation between Abengoa
Mexico's default risk vis-a-vis the default risk of its parent
company, Abengoa S.A.  Main drivers behind our assessment include
the existence of cash pooling policies between Abengoa Mexico and
Abengoa S.A and a high business dependence of Abengoa Mexico on
Abengoa S.A.

Abengoa Mexico's credit profile has been affected by its parent
company's tight liquidity, given cash pooling practices among both
entities.  The centralized treasury in Abengoa S.A. concentrates
excess cash from all the subsidiaries without restrictions
allowing the group to cover temporary cash shortfalls at a
subsidiary level.  Given Abengoa Mexico's strong cash generation,
it has run surplus in the centralized treasury and we expect this
trend to continue.  However, given the lack of restrictions of the
group to extract cash in the centralized treasury, this may not be
available for Abengoa Mexico's needs should the group's liquidity
continue to weaken.

As of the end of Sept. 2015, net position in the centralized
treasury was MXN 7.4 billion.  This positively compares with the
MXN 3.7 billion the company had as of the end of 2014 reflecting
its strong cash generation.  Although Abengoa Mexico's position in
centralized treasury is enough to cover its cash needs, absent of
it, its liquidity profile is very weak.  As of September, only MXN
103 million were in the Mexican subsidiary's cash balance, which
are not enough to cover short term maturities amounting
MXN 2.1 billion.

Abengoa Mexico's ratings could be downgraded if its credit metrics
deteriorate, for example if adjusted gross debt to EBITDA
increases to 4.0 times and EBITA interest coverage falls below 1.0
times with no recovery prospects.  Further negative pressure would
arise if liquidity deteriorates, most likely due to difficulties
in rolling over short-term debt or from deterioration in the
operating environment stemming from economic slowdown and/or
increased competition.  Likewise, a negative rating action on
Abengoa S.A. could result in a negative rating action for Abengoa
Mexico.

Given the linkage between Abengoa Mexico and its parent company, a
positive rating action for Abengoa Mexico is subject to a positive
rating action to Abengoa S.A.'s rating and not envisioned in the
short run.  On a stand-alone basis, Abengoa Mexico's rating or
outlook could improve if the positive trend continues with the
company consistently growing its revenue base, while diversifying
its backlog with other clients and projects to reduce the revenue
concentration risk.  An upgrade would also require a solid capital
structure with low exposure to short term debt.

Headquartered in Mexico City, Abengoa Mexico is a fully owned
subsidiary of Abengoa S.A.  The company was founded in 1981 to
conduct Abengoa S.A.'s business in Mexico.  The company is well
integrated into its parent's operation, with its main activity
being the engineering & construction (E&C) of projects related
with the energy industry.  For the last twelve months ended in
Sept. 2015, Abengoa Mexico's revenue and Moody's-adjusted EBITDA
margin were USD 254 million and 24.7% respectively.


COBRE DEL MAYO: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Rating to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings of Cobre del Mayo S.A. de C.V.
(CdM) to 'C' from 'CCC', and the rating for its senior unsecured
10.75% notes due 2018 to 'C/RR4' from 'CCC/RR4'.  Fitch also
downgraded CdM's national rating to 'C(mex)' from 'CCC(mex)'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Restructuring Announced:

CdM announced it has hired Jefferies LLC and BCP Securities LLC to
restructure the company following a prolonged period of low copper
prices combined with a number of operational difficulties that
have decreased production levels.  The company announced cash cost
guidance of between $2.10/lb-$2.35/lb for 2016 that remains
elevated above Fitch's prior expectations of between $1.80/lb to
$2/lb, following a high cash cost of $2.69/lb in 3Q15, a level at
which the company was loss making.

No Further Shareholder Support Expected:

Frontera Copper Corp. (FCC), the parent company of CdM, provided a
$13 million secured loan with an interest rate of 10.75% to CdM to
enable it to meet the coupon payment on its $217 million notes due
2018 on Nov. 13, 2015, as expected by Fitch.  This secured loan
has a tenor of one year.  CdM announced that no further
shareholder support should be assumed during its 3Q15 conference
call on Nov. 24, 2015.  Should copper prices remain close to CdM's
production cash cost level, with Fitch's copper price assumptions
at $2.50/lb in 2016 and $2.72/lb in 2017, the company will be
unable to meet its next coupon payment due in May 2016 from
internal cash flow generation.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for CdM include:

   -- Copper price of $2.50/lb in 2016;
   -- C1 cash cost of $2.41/lb during 2016 resulting in a cash
      burn of over negative $20 million absent debt restructuring;
   -- Copper cathodes sold of approximately 25,000 tonnes in
      tonnes in 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A default on the company's debt obligations during 2016 is
considered high.  Fitch's base case indicates that CdM will likely
experience a continued challenging operating scenario next year
due to its third-quartile cost of production, combined with a
continued period of copper prices remaining around CdM's cash cost
of production.

A ratings upgrade is considered unlikely prior to the possible
restructuring that may take place.

LIQUIDITY

CdM's liquidity position is insufficient with cash and marketable
securities of $5.5 million as of Sept. 30, 2015.  The company
received a $13 million secured loan from FCC on Nov. 3, 2015 to
allow it to meet the coupon payment for its 10.75% senior
unsecured $217 million notes due 2018.  The next coupon of
approximately $12 million is due in May 2016.  Fitch's base case
assumptions, absent a debt restructuring, indicate this next
payment will not be met by CdM from its internal cash flow
generation.  Additional shareholder support is not expected.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded these ratings:

Cobre del Mayo S.A. de C.V.

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR to 'C' from 'CCC';
   -- Long-term local currency IDR to 'C' from 'CCC';
   -- Senior unsecured 10.75% notes due 2018 to 'C/RR4' from
      'CCC/RR4';
   -- National long-term rating to 'C(mex)' from 'CCC(mex)'.


REYNOSA MUNICIPALITY: Moody's Changes Outlook to Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico (Moody's) changed the outlook of the
municipality of Reynosa to negative from stable. At the same time,
it affirmed the municipality's ratings at Ba2/A2.mx

RATIONALE FOR RATING AFFIRMATION

The affirmation of Reynosa's ratings at Ba2 and A2.mx reflects
debt levels lower than Mexican peers rated in the Ba2 category, as
well as low own-source revenues. The ratings also reflect
Reynosa's persistent liquidity challenges reflected in its net
working capital (measured as liquid assets minus liquid
liabilities): between 2010 and 2014, Reynosa's net working capital
averaged -15% of total expenditures, a level below the median of
the Ba2 category. Over the same period, Reynosa's gross operating
balance averaged 8.2% of operating revenues, a level broadly in
line with those of peers in the Ba2 category.

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE OF OUTLOOK TO NEGATIVE FROM STABLE

The negative outlook is driven by our expectations that Reynosa's
gross operating balance will continue deteriorating over the next
2 years derived from security related expenditures pressures. In
particular, Moody's expects Reynosa to register operating deficits
in the order of 3-4% in 2015 and 2016, a level that would no
longer be consistent with the Ba2 category. As a result of this
deterioration in operating results, Moody's also expects Reynosa's
liquidity to further deteriorate over this and the next fiscal
year.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook, a rating upgrade in the medium term is
unlikely. However, Reynosa's rating could be stabilized if it
registers positive operating results and presents substantial and
sustained improvements in its liquidity position. Conversely,
further deterioration of the gross operating balance, which could
lead either to a deterioration in net working capital or higher
debt levels, will exert downward pressure on the ratings.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Governor to Extend Legislature to Address Bill
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alexander Lopez at Bloomberg News reports that Puerto Rico
Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla will convene an extraordinary
session of the commonwealth's legislature in the first week of
December after lawmakers failed to address a bill he recommended
that would authorize the restructuring of the island's main
electric utility.

The regular legislative gathering ended Nov. 17.  Under terms of a
debt restructuring agreement reached earlier this month by the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and some bondholders, the
legislature must approve the plan by Nov. 20 or investors can
terminate the pact, according to Bloomberg News.  An extension of
the deadline is possible.  Bondholders agreed to give the utility
more time to negotiate with insurers who have objected to the
terms, Bloomberg News relays.

Bloomberg News notes that they extended preliminary talks 13 times
in the past year.

Lawmakers did pass legislation to create a fiscal adjustment board
that gave the five members less authority than the governor was
seeking, Bloomberg News relays.

"The administration is satisfied with the legislation that was
passed regarding the Fiscal Control Board," Victor Suarez, the
governor's secretary, said during a press conference in San Juan,
Bloomberg News relays.  "It is nearly identical to the legislation
that was presented by the administration and has the necessary and
required powers requested by the administration to accomplish its
objective," Bloomberg News quoted Mr. Suarez as saying.

                      Prepa Agreement

The final draft of the bill differed from the one requested by the
governor.  Among the amendments was a measure to specify that the
board will endorse, rather than approve, the commonwealth's five-
year fiscal and economic plan, Bloomberg News notes.  The board
will also mostly certify, rather than dictate, fiscal practices.
The electric utility, known as Prepa, is trying to restructure
$8.2 billion of debt to reduce its costs and free up cash for
plant upgrades, Bloomberg News relays.  Investors holding about 35
percent of its debt on Nov. 5 agreed to take losses of as much as
15 percent by exchanging their bonds for new securities, Bloomberg
News adds.


                     *       *       *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 14, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its
ratings on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt to
'CC' from 'CCC-' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
they had been placed with negative implications July 20. The
outlook is negative.


VENT ALARM: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
---------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Vent Alarm Corporation
           dba Valcor
           aka Samcor Valcor
        641 Ave. Andalucia
        Puerto Nuevo
        San Juan, PR 00920

Case No.: 15-09316

Chapter 11 Petition Date: November 24, 2015

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Debtor's Counsel: Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq.
                  FUENTES LAW OFFICES, LLC
                  PO Box 9022726
                  San Juan, PR 00902-2726
                  Tel: (787) 722-5216
                  Fax: (787) 722-5206
                  Email: alex@fuentes-law.com

Total Assets: $7.95 million

Total Liabilities: $7.55 million

The petition was signed by Fernando Sosa, president.

A list of the Debtor's 20 largest unsecured creditors is available
for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-09316.pdf


===========================
V I R G I N   I S L A N D S
===========================


STUDIO CITY: Moody's Retains B2 CFR on Covenant Amendments
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service says the successful amendments of
certain covenants on Studio City Company Limited's $1.4 billion
secured credit facilities are credit positive to Studio City
Finance Limited.

However, there is no immediate impact on Studio City Finance's B2
corporate family rating, B3 senior unsecured rating, as well as
negative outlook.

On Nov. 18, Studio City Finance said in a statement to the US
Securities and Exchange Commission that it had received the
requisite lender consent to amend the loan documentation.

The amendments include changing its Studio City project opening
date condition to 250 tables from 400 tables, consequential
adjustments to its financial covenants, and rescheduling the
commencement of financial covenant testing.

"The amendment to lower the required number of gaming tables is
credit positive because it has alleviated the risk of covenant
breach and immediate repayment of the $1.4 billion credit
facilities," says Kaven Tsang, a Moody's Vice President and Senior
Credit Officer.

"The amendments to the financial covenants and the rescheduling of
the testing dates will also reduce the risk of non-compliance in
the near-term, as the initial operation of the Studio City project
will likely stay weak, given the challenging operating environment
in Macau's gaming sector," adds Tsang.

Nevertheless Moody's believes Studio City Finance will benefit
from operational support from its majority shareholder, Melco
Crown Entertainment Limited (unrated).

Such support will help Studio City Finance manage its risks during
the ramp-up phase of its project.

The ratings outlook remains negative, reflecting an expectation of
weak cash flow generation for its Studio City project in the next
12-18 months, which will continue to pressure its liquidity and
delay its deleveraging.

Moody's expects Studio City Finance's adjusted debt/EBITDA to be
around 8x in 2016 -- which weakly positions it at the B2 rating
level -- before it improves to around 5.5x-6.0x in 2017.

Downgrade pressure could emerge if the ramp-up in operations
and/or revenue generation are materially below expectations, such
that debt/EBITDA fails to trend down to around 6x-7x and
EBITDA/interest stays below 1.5x over the next 12-18 months.

On the other hand, the outlook could return to stable if the
company (1) improves its liquidity; and (2) successfully ramps up
the Studio City project with debt/EBITDA trending down to below 6x
and EBITDA/interest trending above 1.5x in the next 12-18 months.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Gaming
Industry published in June 2014.

Studio City Finance Limited is a holding company incorporated in
the British Virgin Islands.  Through its fully owned subsidiary
-- Studio City Company Limited -- it develops and operates the
Studio City project, an Asian-focused integrated gaming and
entertainment resort located at Cotai in Macau.


=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================


PETROLEUM CO: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on Petroleum Co
of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd (Petrotrin) to 'BB' from 'BB+'.  The
outlook is stable.

"The downgrade stems from our expectation that Petrotrin's credit
metrics will weaken further in the next 12-18 months due the
recent revision of our hydrocarbon price assumptions.  We no
longer expect the company's debt to EBITDA to return to less than
5.0x within the next few years.  Funds from operations (FFO) to
debt will remain at levels of less than 12%.  Although we expect
that Petrotrin will rollover its short-term loans--thanks to its
sound relationship with banks due to its government ownership--we
believe liquidity is very tight to cover its capital expenditures
(capex) needs, which could hamper expected production increases,"
S&P said.

"Our ratings on Petrotrin reflect the company's weaker operating
efficiency relative to its peers, primarily measured by
utilization rates, and the occurrence of downtime or outages.  It
also reflects Petrotrin's limited geographic diversification and
asset concentration in refining and oil and gas exploration and
production.  The company has stabilized the declining trend in its
oil production through continued drilling and reactivation
activities.  In addition, we expect refinery performance to
improve and utilization rates to reach 70%-75% in the next few
years.  Moreover, the company is lowering the sulfur content in
its diesel thanks to its new ultra-low sulfur diesel plant that
will allow it to boost volumes of higher quality diesel and
gasoline," S&P noted.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Petrotrin will
maintain its good competitive position in the Caribbean market for
refined oil products, S&P's expectation for ongoing and
extraordinary government support if needed, an improvement in the
company's refinery operations, and higher oil prices for the next
few years

S&P could downgrade Petrotrin in the next six months to one year
if oil prices continue to decrease, leading S&P to assess
Petrotrin's capital structure as unsustainable, and/or if S&P
perceives a decline in government support that leads it to believe
liquidity could be hampered even further.

Although unlikely in the near term, S&P could upgrade Petrotrin if
credit metrics strengthen within the next 12 months and if it
considerably improves its liquidity position.  Such a scenario
would require debt to EBITDA below 5x and FOCF to debt above 10%,
which would mean an improvement in the company's core operations.





                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
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USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
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Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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