TCRLA_Public/151215.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Tuesday, December 15, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 247


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

PETROBAS ARGENTINA: Moody's Cuts Rating on $300MM Notes to 'Ba3'


B A R B A D O S

MONTICELLO INSURANCE: Moody's Cuts IFS Rating to Ba1; Outlook Neg.


B R A Z I L

AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Moody's Reviews for Downgrade 'Ba1' Rating
BANCO PAN: Moody's Cuts Currency Deposit Ratings to 'B1'
BRAZIL: Unprecedented Torrent of Downgrades is Set to Get Worse
CAIXA ECONOMICA: Moody's Cuts FC Sub. Debt Rating to B1(hyb)
CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Moody's Reviews Ba2 CFR for Downgrade

COMPANHIA DE SANEAMENTO: S&P Assigns 'BB' Global Scale CCR
COMPANHIA ENERGETICA: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating for Downgrade
DIBENS LEASING: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating Under Review for Downgrade
MGI - MINAS: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Downgrade
MINAS GERAIS: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating Under Review for Downgrade

RB CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Rating on 3rd Series of Cert. to Ba3
TONON BIOENERGIA: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
VIRGOLINO DE OLIVEIRA: Fitch Withdraws 'RD' Issuer Default Ratings


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

DOMAIN VENTURE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
ETOILE INTERNATIONAL: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
LAURA ENTERPRISE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
LAURA INVESTMENTS: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
MOMBASA INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report

NORDISK INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
PELEO & TETI: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
PELLICANO INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
QUADRELLA INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
SCOTTDALE INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report

TOGIU INTERNATIONAL: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
TREASURE COVE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report


C U B A

CUBA: Reaches Deal to Pay $2.6 Billion in Arrears to Paris Club
CUBA: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Foreign Currency Issuer Rating


M E X I C O

CORPORACION LINDLEY: S&P Raises LT Corp. Credit Rating to 'BBB'


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Utility Wins More Time in Debt Talks
PUERTO RICO: Fitch Keeps Rating Watch Neg. on 'CC' GO Bond Rating
PUERTO RICO: Congress Unlikely to Agree on Rescue by Year's End
PUERTO RICO: Senate GOP Floats Debt Relief Plan


X X X X X X X X X

LATIN AMERICA: Fitch Gives Negative Outlook for Airlines
LATIN AMERICA: Fitch Gives Mixed Outlook for Structured Finance


                            - - - - -



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A R G E N T I N A
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PETROBAS ARGENTINA: Moody's Cuts Rating on $300MM Notes to 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo, ("Moody's)
downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the global scale rating on Petrobras
Argentina S.A.'s USD 300 million in guaranteed Series S notes
(CUSIP 71646JAB5); the accompanying Aaa.ar national scale rating
to the notes remained unchanged. The rating actions reflect
Moody's Investors Service's rating action on December 9, 2015 of
downgrading Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.'s (Petrobras, the guarantor)
global debt ratings to Ba3 from Ba2. The ratings are on review for
downgrade.

The rating and outlook for the unguaranteed ratings of Petrobras
Argentina are unchanged, including the (P)B2 senior unsecured,
positive.

Downgrade:

Issuer: Petrobras Argentina S.A.

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, downgraded to
    Ba3/Aaa.ar from Ba2/Aaa.ar

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on Petrobras Argentina reflect the downgrade of
Petrobras' ratings, on December 9, 2015, to Ba3 from at Ba2 and
the review for downgrade, which in turn were triggered by
Petrobras' higher refinancing risk and Moody's December 9th, 2015
decision to place Brazil's government Baa3 bond rating under
review for possible downgrade.

For further detail on the rating actions on Petrobras Argentina,
Petrobras or Brazil, please refer to moodys.com.


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B A R B A D O S
===============


MONTICELLO INSURANCE: Moody's Cuts IFS Rating to Ba1; Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (MIS) has downgraded the insurance
financial strength (IFS) rating of Monticello Insurance Limited
(Monticello, or MIL) to Ba1, from Baa3, with a negative outlook.
Monticello is the captive reinsurance subsidiary of Brazil-based
Vale S.A. (senior unsecured debt at Baa3, negative outlook), one
of the largest metals and mining companies in the world.  The
downgrade follows Moody's announcement on December 10 of the
downgrade of the captive's parent company - Vale S.A.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade of MIL to Ba1, from Baa3, with a negative
outlook, reflects the downgrade of Vale's rating to Baa3 from
Baa2, also with a negative outlook.  According to Moody's, MIL's
IFS rating benefits from support provided by Vale, reflecting
Monticello's close integration with the global risk management
function of the group.  Therefore, the lowering of the parent's
rating to Baa3 from Baa2, has resulted in a both a somewhat
diminished fundamental credit profile, and weakened level of
support, for Monticello, resulting in the downgrade of the
captive's IFS rating to Ba1.

MIL is a core part of Vale's risk-management program and is the
sole insurance captive utilized in Vale's property insurance and
business interruption program worldwide.  Explicit support from
Vale to MIL, which has been provided through capital injections --
totaling US$240 million over the past three years -- and ongoing
financial support to cover losses is a key driver of MIL's credit
rating, absent which MIL's rating would be lower.  The rating
agency expects that MIL will continue to receive extensive
parental support from Vale, including the parent company's
willingness to backstop MIL's obligations to its fronting
insurance carriers, and to provide additional capital to MIL in
the event that it has insufficient funds to meet its obligations
under the reinsurance assumed.

MIL's rating is constrained by its product risk concentration and
significant risk exposures which has resulted in earnings
volatility, as the company has reported net losses in 2012.  The
weak sovereign credit profile and operating environment of
Barbados, where MIL is domiciled, also constrain the rating.

Given the negative outlook of MIL's rating, an upgrade is
unlikely, but a return to stable outlook for Vale S.A.'s rating
could lead to a restoration of a stable outlook for MIL.
Conversely, MIL's rating could be downgraded if: 1) Vale's rating
is downgraded; 2) support from the group to the captive company is
reduced; 3) the captive reinsurer begins to cover risks of
external (i.e. non-Vale) entities or engages in non-reinsurance
business; or 4) Barbados' sovereign rating (currently B3, negative
outlook) is downgraded.  Moody's notes that MIL's ratings are
above the Ba3 sovereign ceiling for Barbados, primarily reflecting
the fact that Monticello's premiums comes from countries outside
Barbados, as well as the ownership and strong support of the
parent company and its operations outside of Barbados.

Monticello Insurance Limited is based in Barbados.  As of Dec. 31,
2014, its total assets amounted to US$501 million and its
shareholders' equity was US$158 million.  The company's total
annual gross premium for 2014 totaled US$44 million, and the
company recorded a net income of US$64.5 million in 2014.



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B R A Z I L
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AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Moody's Reviews for Downgrade 'Ba1' Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda has placed on review for downgrade the
long-term local currency global and national scale issuer ratings
of Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais S.A. (BDMG), Agencia
de Fomento do Parana S.A. (Fomento Parana) and Desenvolve SP --
Agencia de Fomento do Estado de Sao Paulo S.A. (Desenvolve SP).
These entities' standalone baseline credit assessments and short-
term ratings remained unchanged.

This rating action follows Moody's announcement earlier that it
has placed the ratings of these government-related institutions'
(GRIs) government-shareholders under review for downgrade,
including the State of Minas Gerais, State of Parana and the State
of Sao Paulo. For more information, please refer to Moody's
December 10, 2015 press releases "Moody's places the ratings of
the Brazilian states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, and the
Municipality of Belo Horizonte under review for downgrade" and
"Moody's America Latina places the ratings of the Brazilian states
of Parana, Maranhao, and the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro under
review for downgrade".

The following ratings were placed on review for downgrade:

Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais (BDMG):

Long-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba1

Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aa2.br

Agencia de Fomento do Parana (Fomento Parana):

Long-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba1

Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aa2.br

Desenvolve SP -- Agencia de Fomento do Estado de Sao Paulo S.A.:

Long-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba1

Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aa2.br
The following assessments and ratings remained unchanged:

Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais (BDMG):

Baseline credit assessment of ba2

Short-term global local currency issuer rating of Not Prime

Short-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of BR-1

Agencia de Fomento do Parana (Fomento Parana):

Baseline credit assessment of ba2

Short-term global local currency issuer rating of Not Prime

Short-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of BR-1

Desenvolve SP -- Agencia de Fomento do Estado de Sao Paulo S.A.:

Baseline credit assessment of ba3

Short-term global local currency issuer rating of Not Prime

Short-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of BR-1

RATING RATIONALE

The rating actions on these Brazilian issuers were prompted by the
announcement of the review for downgrade on ratings assigned to
the states of Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo and Parana, which followed
the announcement of a similar review on the sovereign bond rating
on 9 December 2015. The GRIs ratings all benefit from uplift
reflecting the likelihood that they would receive financial
support from their respective shareholders in the event of
financial stress. The amount of uplift depends on the ability of
the shareholders to provide this support, which is captured by
their respective ratings.

The reviews of the support providers' ratings consider the close
macroeconomic and institutional linkages between the credit
quality of state and municipal governments in Brazil and that of
the federal government. The ongoing deterioration of Brazil's
economy has had and will continue to have a direct impact on the
operating environment of Brazilian states and municipalities. In
addition, the fiscal position of Brazilian states and
municipalities weakened during 2015 and will remain pressured by
lower tax revenues and expenditure rigidities in the near future.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

If the support providers ratings are downgraded, the uplift from
which the GRI's ratings benefit will likely decrease, and
consequently their ratings will face downward pressure as well.
The GRIs ratings would likely be confirmed following a
confirmation of their government-shareholders' ratings.

The last rating action on Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais
S.A. was on November 19, 2015, when Moody's America Latina
downgraded BDMG's standalone baseline credit assessment to ba2,
from ba1, and downgraded the bank's long-term Brazilian national
scale issuer rating to Aa2.br, from Aa1.br. The long and short-
term local currency issuer ratings of Ba1/Not Prime, and the
short-term national scale issuer rating of BR-1 were affirmed. The
outlook on these ratings remained stable.

The last rating action on Agˆncia de Fomento do Parana S.A. was on
August 12, 2015, when Moody's America Latina downgraded its long-
term local currency issuer rating to Ba1, from Baa3, and its
short-term local currency issuer rating to Not Prime from Prime-3.
Moody's also downgraded the entity's long-term Brazilian national
scale issuer rating to Aa2.br, from Aa1.br, and affirmed the
short-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of BR-1. The
baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba2 remained unchanged. The
outlook for the global scale issuer rating remained negative. This
action was in line with the downgrade of the State of Paran 's
long-term issuer rating. For more information, please refer to
Moody's August 12, 2015 press release, "Moody's America Latina
downgrades the ratings of the Brazilian states of Paran ,
Maranhao, and the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro."

The last rating action on Desenvolve SP -- Agencia de Fomento do
Estado de Sao Paulo S.A. was on July 7, 2014, when Moody's America
Latina affirmed all ratings assigned to Desenvolve SP, including
the long and short-term issuer ratings of Ba1 and Not Prime,
respectively, and the Brazilian national scale issuer ratings of
Aa2.br and BR-1, long and short-term, respectively. The outlook on
these ratings remained stable. At the same time, Moody's raised
Desenvolve SP's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ba3
from b1.


BANCO PAN: Moody's Cuts Currency Deposit Ratings to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Banco Pan S.A.'s (PAN) long-
term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings to B1 from
Ba2. Moody's also downgraded the senior unsecured MTN program
(foreign currency) rating to (P)B1 from(P)Ba2; the foreign
currency subordinate debt rating to B2 from Ba3; the long-term
Brazilian national scale deposit rating to Baa2.br from A1.br; and
the short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to BR-2
from BR-1. Concurrently, PAN's baseline credit assessment (BCA)
was lowered to b2 from b1. PAN's short-term global local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Not Prime have been affirmed.
The outlook on all ratings is stable.

The following ratings and assessments assigned to Banco Pan S.A.
were downgraded:

-- Long-term global local currency deposit rating to B1, from
    Ba2; outlook stable

-- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating to B1, from Ba2;
    outlook stable

-- Senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating to
    (P)B1, from (P)Ba2

-- Subordinate debt (foreign currency) rating to B2, from Ba3

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to Baa2.br,
    from A1.br

-- Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to BR-2,
    from BR-1

-- Baseline credit assessment to b2, from b1

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment to b1, from ba2

-- Long-term counterparty risk assessment to Ba3(cr), from
Ba1(cr)

The following ratings and assessments assigned to Banco Pan S.A.
were affirmed:

-- Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Not Prime

-- Short-term global foreign-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

-- Short-term MTN program (foreign currency) rating of (P)Not
Prime

-- Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of PAN's ratings, reflects its lower standalone
baseline credit assessment (BCA) as well as the weaker financial
profile of its shareholders, Banco BTG Pactual S.A. (Ba2 review
for downgrade, ba2 BCA) and Caixa Economica Federal (Baa3 review
for downgrade, ba3 BCA), which resulted in reduced ratings uplift
from affiliate support.

The downgrade of PAN's BCA takes into consideration a
deterioration in the bank's weak capital position, as per Moody's
adjusted measurement, as well as its very limited internal capital
generation capacity through recurring earnings. Due largely to an
increase in deferred tax assets, which do not fully provide
immediate loss absorption, Moody's adjusted measure of tangible
common equity to risk-weighted assets fell to 4.9% in September
2015 from 6.3% in December 2014. In addition, PAN relies on gains
from loan assignments in order to break-even, and profitability
will face further pressure arising from the weak economic
environment. The bank remains materially exposed to vehicle loans,
which are vulnerable to the rising unemployment and economic
slowdown, although this exposure has decreased and asset quality
has improved considerably in recent years.

At the same time, the ratings uplift attributable to affiliate
support uplift has been reduced to one notch from two to reflect
the weaker capacity of its controlling shareholders Caixa and BTG
Pactual to provide support, as reflected by their recent
downgrades (BTG's adjusted BCA was lowered to ba2 from baa3 on 1
December 2015, and Caixa's was lowered to ba3 from ba2 earlier).

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Downward pressure on PAN's deposit and senior debt ratings could
be prompted by a downgrade in the adjusted BCA of its controlling
shareholders, coupled with a further downgrade of PAN's BCA, which
could result from an increase in asset risk or further
deterioration to capitalization and/or profitability.

Given the pending rating review on BTG, upward pressure on PAN's
ratings is unlikely at this time.

LAST RATING ACTIONS & METHODOLOGIES

The last rating action on PAN was on 12 June 2015 when Moody's
affirmed the BCA of b1; the adjusted BCA of ba2; the long-term
global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Ba2; the
short-term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of
Not Prime; the senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency)
rating of (P)Ba2; the foreign currency subordinate debt rating of
Ba3; the long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of
A1.br; and the short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating
of BR-1. At the same time, changed the outlook on all ratings to
negative, from stable.


BRAZIL: Unprecedented Torrent of Downgrades is Set to Get Worse
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sebastian Boyd at Bloomberg News reports that amid Brazil's
economic and political tumult, the nation's businesses have seen a
record number of downgrades this year -- and the total is about to
get worse.

Fitch Ratings estimates it may slash the ratings of as many as 10
companies for everyone it upgrades in 2016, according to Bloomberg
News.  Fitch said that grim scenario is most likely if it chops
Brazil's grade, an ever-growing possibility as the country's woes
deepen, Bloomberg News notes.

Bloomberg News says that a top lawmaker initiated impeachment
proceedings against President Dilma Rousseff, a move that may
further undermine the nation's finances and exacerbate the worst
recession in a quarter century.  That spells trouble for companies
already finding it hard to obtain financing in the wake of an
unprecedented corruption scandal at Brazil's state oil company,
Bloomberg News relays.

"That's a perfect storm," said Ricardo Carvalho, Fitch's head of
corporate ratings in Brazil, Bloomberg News notes.

Bloomberg News discloses that Fitch has a negative outlook on
Brazil and on the grades of more than half of the Brazilian
companies it rates.  Its BBB- ranking for sovereign bonds is the
lowest possible investment grade, Bloomberg News relays.  Standard
& Poor's cut the country to junk in September.

Brazilian companies have accounted for 11 of 15 bond defaults in
Latin America this year as a widening bribery probe into Petroleo
Brasileiro SA roils the nation's construction and banking
industries, Bloomberg News notes.  The other four were in
Argentina and Mexico.

Bloomberg News relays that Fitch downgraded investment bank Grupo
BTG Pactual SA to junk from investment grade after its chief
executive officer was arrested for allegedly obstructing the
investigation into bribery Petrobras.

The graft scandal at Petrobras and its contractors has helped push
average borrowing costs for Brazilian companies in dollars up 3.16
percentage points this year to 9.54 percent, according to
Bloomberg's USD Emerging Market Corporate Index.

Rising yields threaten to make it harder for Brazil's debt-laden
businesses to refinance obligations as $30 billion of overseas
bonds come due in the next two years, Bloomberg News notes.

"High leverage and falling growth produces negative cash flow,
which results in downgrades," said Michael Roche, an emerging-
market fixed-income strategist at Seaport Global Holdings LLC in
New York, Bloomberg News discloses.

Soaring interest rates in Brazil also will make it more expensive
to seek funding locally, Bloomberg News notes.  The central bank
has boosted its key lending rate to an eight-year high of 14.25
percent to stem surging inflation in Latin America's second-
biggest economy, Bloomberg News says.

"You will see companies burning cash," Bloomberg News quoted Mr.
Carvalho as saying.  "The cross-border market is closed for
Brazilian companies, and the local market is selective," Mr.
Carvalho added.


CAIXA ECONOMICA: Moody's Cuts FC Sub. Debt Rating to B1(hyb)
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
deposit and foreign currency debt ratings as well as counterparty
risk assessments assigned to 17 Brazilian banks, and their
respective offshore branches and local currency issuer and foreign
currency debt ratings assigned to 2 other financial institutions,
following the announcement of the review for downgrade on Brazil's
government bond rating of Baa3. Moody's also placed on review for
downgrade the BCAs of 10 of these entities that are currently at
the same level of the sovereign bond rating.

At the same time, Moody's downgraded the BCA assigned to Caixa
Economica Federal (Caixa) to ba3, from ba2 and also the foreign
currency subordinated debt rating to B1 (hyb), from Ba3 (hyb),
which is anchored off the BCA. All other ratings and the
counterparty risk assessment assigned to Caixa have been placed
under review for downgrade.

In addition, Moody's placed on review the foreign currency deposit
rating assigned to HSBC Bank Brasil S.A.-- Banco Multiplo's (HSBC
Brasil) as well as its baseline credit assessment of baa3,
constrained by Brazil's foreign currency deposit ceiling and by
the sovereign bond rating respectively. All other ratings assigned
to HSBC Brasil, including local currency deposit and foreign
currency senior unsecured debt ratings, have been on review for
downgrade since 5 August 2015, following HSBC Holdings'
announcement that its Brazilian operations will be acquired by
Banco Bradesco (please refer to the press release "Moody's reviews
down HSBC Brasil's deposit ratings; affirms Bradesco's ratings,"
available on www.moodys.com).

Please refer to the 9 December 2015 press release, "Moody's places
Brazil's Baa3 issuer and bond ratings on review for downgrade" for
more information. The Brazil's domestic currency country deposit
and bond ceiling of A1 and the foreign currency deposit and bond
ceilings of Baa3 and Baa2, respectively, remained unchanged.

The following issuers are covered in this press release:

-- Itau Unibanco S.A.

-- Itau Unibanco Holding S.A.

-- Banco Bradesco S.A.

-- Banco do Brasil S.A.

-- Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econ“mico e Social -- BNDES

-- Caixa Economica Federal (CAIAXA)

-- Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A.

-- Banco Safra S.A.

-- HSBC Bank Brasil S.A.-- Banco Multiplo

-- BM&FBovespa S.A.

-- Banco Citibank S.A.

-- ING Bank N.V. -- Sao Paulo

-- Banco Mizuho do Brasil S.A.

-- Banco Alfa de Investimento S.A.

-- Banco ABC Brasil S.A.

-- Banco Daycoval S.A.

-- Banco BBM S.A.

-- China Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A.

-- Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A.

RATING RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE

These rating actions on Brazilian banks were prompted by the
announcement of the review for downgrade on Brazil's bond rating.
The affected ratings have close economic linkages to the sovereign
credit risk. The review of the sovereign rating will focus on the
authorities' ability and willingness to put fiscal policy back on
track, restore economic growth and arrest and reverse the rise in
the government's debt ratios, in the context of heightened
political uncertainty, declining investor confidence and deeper
than expected recession.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN

A downgrade of the sovereign will likely result in downgrades of
the affected bank ratings. While a confirmation of the government
bond rating would likely be followed by confirmations of the
affected bank ratings, Moody's continues to assess banks' capacity
to withstand a prolonged period of low business volumes and rising
credit costs, and to closely monitor how current weak economic
conditions affect individual banks' performance, particularly
profitably and asset risk. Deterioration of these factors could
put further downward pressure on the affected ratings.

CAIXA ECONOMICA FEDERAL: BCA LOWERED TO BA3

In downgrading Caixa's standalone BCA to ba3, Moody's considered
the increasing challenges the bank is likely to face in the
context of a contracting economy, which will continue to hurt
asset quality and profitability through 2016. The BCA anticipates
a continued rise in asset risk, primarily related to the portfolio
of small and mid-size companies and unsecured consumer loans
following five years of aggressive expansion into those riskier
asset classes. Prospects for profitability are constrained by
decelerating loan growth, a relevant portion of its loans made by
low margins and long-dated maturities, and a material increase in
credit costs over the past three quarters. Provisions for loan
losses increased 87% in the third quarter of 2015 compared the
same period in the previous year, and by 34% versus the second
quarter of 2015. A gradual shift in Caixa's funding structure
towards more expensive alternatives in response to the declining
volume of low-cost savings deposits coupled with portfolio growth
that remains above average, will continue to weigh negatively on
bottom line results in the coming quarters.

Notwithstanding these challenges, Caixa's BCA recognizes its
significant market shares of mortgage financing and core savings
deposits, as well as stable liquidity and a relatively low
dependence on market funds.

Caixa's Baa3 deposit and senior debt ratings were placed on review
for downgrade in line with the review of Brazil's government bond
ratings. The Baa3 ratings incorporate three notches uplift from
Caixa's BCA to reflect the bank's backing by its owner, the
Brazilian government. Caixa's financial operations are closely
intertwined with the government, as evidenced by significant non-
cash capital injections from the central government between 2009
and 2013 as well as large dividend distribution demands.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN

A downgrade of the Baa3 sovereign debt rating would result in a
similar action on Caixa's ratings. In addition, Caixa's BCA and
subordinated debt rating would come under further downward
pressure if asset quality deteriorates more sharply than expected,
causing profitability and/or capital to decline further, though on
its own this would not result in a downgrade of Caixa's senior
debt and deposit ratings.


CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Moody's Reviews Ba2 CFR for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") took the following rating
actions on its portfolio of privately-managed toll roads as well
as water, gas and electric utilities and infrastructure companies
as a result of the placement of Brazil's Baa3 issuer and bond
ratings, as well as the ratings on the States of Sao Paulo, Minas
Gerais and Parana under review for downgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These actions reflect Moody's view that the recent sovereign and
sub-sovereign rating actions, as a result of deteriorating
economic and fiscal perspectives together with worsening
governability and policy paralysis, will negatively affect the
credit quality of the following companies:

Companhia de Eletricidade do Estado da Bahia - COELBA

The Baa3 rating on BRL400 million in senior unsecured global bonds
maturing in April 2016 were placed under review for downgrade.

Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras SA-Eletrobras

Ba2 corporate family rating placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Ba2 rating on USD 1,750 million in senior
unsecured global bonds maturing on October 27, 2021 were placed
under review for downgrade.

Itaipu Binacional

Baa3 issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

Companhia Energetica de Sao Paulo - CESP

Rating (P) Baa3 on USD 1.4 billion senior unsecured MTN program
was also placed under review for downgrade.

QGOG Atlantic / Alaskan Rigs Ltd.

The B1 rating on the USD700 million senior secured global notes
due in 2018 were placed under review for downgrade.

Odebrecht Drilling Norbe VIII/IX Ltd.

The B2 rating on the USD1,500 million senior secured global notes
due in 2021 were placed under review for downgrade.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Since these ratings are currently under review for downgrade an
upgrade of the ratings is unlikely in the near term.

Further deterioration in the respective sovereign or sub-
sovereign's credit quality could exert downward pressure on these
infrastructure issuers. A downgrade would be triggered if Moody's
perceives a further deterioration in the level of governmental
support as well as the, consistency and predictability of the
relevant regulatory frameworks of the country and/or states under
which these companies operate. Political interference in the
normal course of business of these issuers could also be
considered a trigger for a downgrade.


COMPANHIA DE SANEAMENTO: S&P Assigns 'BB' Global Scale CCR
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'brAA-' Brazil
national scale rating on Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado
de Sao Paulo's (SABESP; global scale: BB/Stable/--; national
scale: brAA-/Stable/--) proposed four-year debentures of up to
R$500 million.  The company will use the proceeds to refinance
debt maturing in the first quarter of 2016 and to replenish its
cash position.  S&P also withdrew its '4' recovery ratings on
SABESP's senior unsecured debt.

The rating on the proposed issuance reflects the 'brAA-' corporate
credit rating on SABESP, the largest water utility in Latin
America.  The company also benefits from its scale, scope, and
diversification due to its 364 exclusive contracts--the largest of
which is a 30-year contract with the municipality of Sao Paulo--to
provide water and sewage services to about 28.6 million customers
(including the wholesale segment) in the state of Sao Paulo.

S&P's credit assessment of SABESP reflects its "satisfactory"
business risk profile and its "significant" financial risk
profile.  S&P also assess SABESP's liquidity as "less than
adequate."  This reflects that the measures to preserve water
reservoirs--as a result of the severe drought in the region--and
the steep depreciation of the Brazilian currency during 2015 have
taken a toll on the company's cash flow generation and debt
levels.  The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that SABESP's
operating performance, financial metrics, and liquidity won't
deteriorate further.

The withdrawal of the recovery ratings reflects S&P's
understanding that SABESP, as a government-related entity, won't
be subject to the domestic insolvency regime in case of a default.
This is despite our view that a reorganization would maximize
recoveries for creditors.

RATINGS LIST

Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo
  Corporate credit rating
   Global scale                       BB/Stable/--
   National scale                     brAA-/Stable/--

Rating Assigned

Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo
  R$500 million debentures            brAA-


COMPANHIA ENERGETICA: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. ("Moody's") took the following rating
actions on its portfolio of privately-managed toll roads as well
as water, gas and electric utilities and infrastructure companies
as a result of the placement of Brazil's Baa3 issuer and bond
ratings, as well as the ratings on the States of Sao Paulo, Minas
Gerais and Parana under review for downgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These actions reflect Moody's view that the recent sovereign and
sub-sovereign rating actions, as a result of deteriorating
economic and fiscal perspectives together with worsening
governability and policy paralysis, will negatively affect the
credit quality of the following companies:

Concessionaria do Sistema Anhanguera-Bandeirantes S.A. (AutoBAn)

Baa2/Aaa.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa2/Aaa.br senior unsecured ratings of the
following issuances were placed under review for downgrade:

BRL500 million Brazilian debentures

BRL450 million Brazilian debentures

BRL930 million Brazilian debentures

Concessionaria de Rodovias do Oeste de Sao Paulo -- VIAOESTE S.A.

Baa3/Aaa.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aaa.br senior unsecured ratings of the
following issuances were placed under review for downgrade:

BRL440 million Brazilian debentures

BRL750 million Brazilian debentures

Concessionaria Rodovia Presidente Dutra S.A.

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

Concessionaria de Rodovias do Interior do Oeste S.A. (SPVias)

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br senior unsecured ratings of the
BRL190 million Brazilian debentures were placed under review for
downgrade.

Autovias S.A.

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer rating placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL120 million
senior debentures due in 2017 were placed under review for
downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL300 million
senior debentures due in 2017 were placed under review for
downgrade.

Concessionaria de Rodovias do Interior Paulista S.A.

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer rating placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL600 million
senior debentures due in 2018 were placed under review for
downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL375 million
senior debentures were placed under review for downgrade.

EATE -- Empresa Amazonense Transmissao Energia SA

Baa3/Aaa.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aaa.br ratings on the following
debenture issuances were place under review for downgrade:

BRL 295 million due 2016

BRL159 million due 2020

BRL 150 million due 10/19/2017

ETEP - Empresa Paraense Transmissao de Energia

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL 69 million
debentures due 2020 were placed under review for downgrade.

ENTE - Empresa Norte de Transmissao de Energia SA

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the following
debenture issuances were placed under review for downgrade:

BRL 248 million due 2020

BRL 145 million due 2015

Transmissora Alian‡a de Energia Eletrica S.A. -- TAESA

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on BRL 425 million and
BRL 245 million senior unsecured debentures were placed under
review for downgrade.

Ratings Ba1/Aa2.br on BRL 145 million subordinated debentures were
also placed under review for downgrade.

Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais -- CEMIG

Ba1/Aa2.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

CEMIG Distribuicao S.A.

Ba1/Aa2.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Ba1 on the global scale and Aa2.br on the
national scales of the following issuances were placed under
review for downgrade:

Backed senior unsecured BRL653.67 million Brazilian debentures

Backed senior unsecured BRL1,095.51 million Brazilian debentures

Backed senior unsecured BRL410.82 million Brazilian debentures

CEMIG Geracao e Transmissao S.A.

Ba1/Aa2.br Corporate Family Ratings (CFR) placed under review for
downgrade.

At the same time, the Ba1 on the global scale and Aa2.br on the
national scales of the following issuances were placed under
review for downgrade:

Backed senior unsecured BRL670 million Brazilian debentures

Backed senior unsecured BRL972.75 million Brazilian debentures

Backed senior unsecured BRL480 million Brazilian debentures

Backed senior unsecured BRL27.25 million Brazilian debentures

Backed senior unsecured BRL1,400 million in Brazilian debentures

Backed senior unsecured BRL200 million in Brazilian debentures

Backed senior unsecured BRL349.60 million in Brazilian debentures

Bandeirante Energia SA

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Ba1/Aa2.br ratings on the BRL 390 million
subordinated debentures due 07/01/2016 were placed under review
for downgrade.

Espirito Santo Centrais Eletricas -- Escelsa

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade..

Companhia de Gas de Sao Paulo -- COMGAS

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer rating placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL500 million
senior debentures due in 2025 were placed under review for
downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL540 million
senior debentures due in 2020 were placed under review for
downgrade.

Energest SA

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL 120 million
senior debentures due 04/24/2017 were placed under review for
downgrade.

Duke Energy International Geracao Paranapanema SA

Baa3/Aaa.br issuer ratings placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aaa.br ratings on the following
debenture issuances were place under review for downgrade:

BRL 239 million due 2019

BRL 240 million due 2021

BRL 250 million due 07/16/2018

BRL 250 million due 07/16/2023

BRL 150 million due 2017

AES Tiete S.A.

Baa3/Aa1.br issuer rating placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL498 million
senior debentures due in 2019 were placed under review for
downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL440 million
senior debentures due in 2022 were placed under review for
downgrade.

At the same time, the Baa3/Aa1.br ratings on the BRL300 million
senior debentures due in 2020 were placed under review for
downgrade.

Companhia de Saneamento do Parana - Sanepar

Ba1/Aa2.br issuer rating placed under review for downgrade.

At the same time, the Ba1/Aa2.br ratings on the BRL300 million
senior debentures due in 2020 were placed under review for
downgrade.

Companhia de Saneamento de Minas Gerais S.A. -- COPASA

Corporate Family Rating (CFR) of Ba1/Aa2.br, placed under review
for downgrade.

Ratings on BRL200million in Brazilian debentures due in 2017,
BRL200million in Brazilian debentures due in 2019, BRL350million
in Brazilian debentures issued in August 2015, and BRL250million
in Brazilian debentures issued in February 2015 of Ba1/Aa2.br
placed under review for downgrade

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Since these ratings are currently under review for downgrade an
upgrade of the ratings is unlikely in the near term.

Further deterioration in the respective sovereign or sub-
sovereign's credit quality could exert downward pressure on these
infrastructure issuers. A downgrade would be triggered if Moody's
perceives a further deterioration in the level of governmental
support as well as the consistency and predictability of the
relevant regulatory frameworks of the country and/or states under
which these companies operate. Political interference in the
normal course of business of these issuers could also be
considered a trigger for a downgrade.


DIBENS LEASING: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating Under Review for Downgrade
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda has placed under review for downgrade
the long-term global local currency issuer and debt ratings of
Banco BBM S.A., Banco Daycoval S.A., BNDES Participacoes S.A.
(BNDESPar), Itausa - Investimentos Itau S.A. (Itausa) and Dibens
Leasing S.A., including the local currency subordinated debt
ratings assigned to the outstanding debentures issued by Dibens
Leasing, BFB Leasing S.A. and Itaubank Leasing S.A., all of which
are backed by Dibens Leasing.

These actions follow and are in line with the rating action taken
by Moody's Investors Service (MIS) on 10 December 2015 that placed
on review for downgrade the deposit and foreign currency debt
ratings assigned to several of the banks in Brazil, including
banks affected by this action, and affiliated companies. That
action in turn followed MIS's announcement of a review for
downgrade of Brazil's Baa3 government bond rating on 9 December
2015. (For more information, please refer to the press releases,
"Moody's places Brazil's Baa3 issuer and bond ratings under Review
for Downgrade" and "Moody's places on review for downgrade ratings
of multiple Brazilian banks, one bank-holding company and
BM&FBovespa").

For additional information on bank ratings, please refer to the
webpage containing Moody's related announcements.

The following are Brazilian financial institutions covered in this
press release:

-- Banco BBM S.A.

-- Banco Daycoval S.A.

-- BNDES Participacoes S.A.

-- Itausa -- Investimento Itau S.A.

-- Dibens Leasing S.A. -- Arrendamento Mercantil

-- BFB Leasing S.A. -- Arrendamento Mercantil (backed debt)

-- Itaubank Leasing S.A. -- Arrendamento Mercantil (backed debt)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions taken on these Brazilian banks and bank
affiliates were prompted by the announcement of the review for
downgrade on Brazil's bond rating. The affected ratings have close
economic linkages to the sovereign credit risk. The review of the
sovereign rating will focus on the authorities' ability and
willingness to put fiscal policy back on track, restore economic
growth and arrest and reverse the rise in the government's debt
ratios, in the context of heightened political uncertainty,
declining investor confidence and deeper than expected recession.

What Could Change the Ratings - Down

A downgrade of the sovereign will likely result in downgrades of
the affected bank ratings and affiliated companies' ratings. While
a confirmation of the government bond rating would likely be
followed by confirmations of the affected bank ratings, Moody's
continues to assess banks' capacity to withstand a prolonged
period of low business volumes and rising credit costs, and to
closely monitor how current weak economic conditions affect
individual banks' performance, particularly profitably and asset
risk. Deterioration of these factors could put further downward
pressure on the affected ratings.

The following ratings assigned to Banco BBM S.A. were placed on
review for downgrade:

-- Long-term global local-currency senior unsecured debt rating
    of Baa3

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured debt
    rating of Aa1.br

The following ratings assigned to Banco Daycoval S.A. were placed
on review for downgrade:

-- Long-term global local-currency senior unsecured debt rating
    of Baa3

-- Long-term global local-currency senior unsecured MTN rating of
    (P)Baa3

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured debt
    rating of Aa1.br

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured MTN rating
    of Aa1.br

The following ratings assigned to BNDES Participacoes S.A -
BNDESPAR were placed on review for downgrade:

-- Long-term global local-currency issuer rating of Baa3

-- Long-term global local-currency senior unsecured debt rating
    of Baa3

-- Long-term global local-currency senior unsecured MTN rating of
    (P)Baa3

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured debt
    rating of Aaa.br

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured MTN rating
    of Aaa.br

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aaa.br

The following ratings assigned to Itausa -- Investimento Itau S.A.
were placed on review for downgrade:

-- Long-term global local-currency issuer rating of Ba1

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aa1.br

The following ratings assigned to Dibens Leasing S.A. --
Arrendamento Mercantil were placed on review for downgrade:

-- Long-term global local-currency issuer rating of Baa3

-- Long-term global local-currency senior unsecured MTN rating of
    (P)Baa3

-- Long-term global local-currency subordinate debt rating of Ba1

-- Long-term global local-currency subordinate MTN rating of
    (P)Ba1

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aaa.br

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured MTN rating
    of Aaa.br

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate debt rating of
    Aa1.br

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate MTN rating of
    Aa1.br

The following ratings assigned to Itaubank Leasing S.A. --
Arrendamento Mercantil (backed debt) were placed on review for
downgrade:

-- Long-term global local-currency subordinate debt rating of Ba1

-- Long-term global local-currency subordinate debt rating of Ba1
    (Assumed by Dibens Leasing S.A. -- Arrendamento Mercantil)

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate debt rating of
    Aa1.br

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate debt rating of
    Aa1.br (Assumed by Dibens Leasing S.A. -- Arrendamento
    Mercantil)

The following ratings assigned to BFB Leasing S.A. -- Arrendamento
Mercantil (backed debt) were placed on review for downgrade:

-- Long-term global local-currency subordinate debt rating of Ba1

-- Long-term global local-currency subordinate debt rating of Ba1
    (Assumed by Dibens Leasing S.A. -- Arrendamento Mercantil)

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate debt rating of
    Aa1.br

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate debt rating of
    Aa1.br (Assumed by Dibens Leasing S.A. -- Arrendamento
    Mercantil)


MGI - MINAS: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Downgrade
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has placed the Ba1 (sf) global rating and
Aa2.br (sf) national scale rating of the third issuance of senior
debentures backed by re-performing ICMS taxes issued by MGI-Minas
Gerais Participacoes (MGI) on review for downgrade.

The rating action follows Moody's decision to place the rating of
the State of Minas Gerais on review for downgrade, following a
similar rating action on the Government of Brazil's bond rating.

Issuer: MGI - Minas Gerais Participacoes S.A. third issuance of
debentures backed by re-performing ICMS taxes

   -- Senior Debenture, Ba1 (sf) and Aa2.br (sf) ratings placed on
      review for downgrade;

The senior debentures are backed by the right to receive 60% of
collections resulting from monthly payments of renegotiated ICMS
taxes (Imposto sobre Operacoes Relativas a Circulacao de
Mercadorias e Prestacao Servi‡os de Transporte Interestadual e
Intermunicipal e de Comunicacao) originally owed to the State of
Minas Gerais.

MGI is a public limited company almost wholly owned (99.8%) by the
State of Minas Gerais (Ba1, on review for downgrade).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the State of Minas Gerais was placed on review for
downgrade as a result of the ongoing deterioration of Brazil's
economy and of the federal government's fiscal position that have
a direct impact on the operating environment of the State, as it
relates to the Government of Brazil's government bond Baa3 rating
being placed on review for downgrade.

Although MGI is the sole obligor under the debentures and
investors have no recourse to the State of Minas Gerais under the
transaction, MGI and the State of Minas Gerais are closely related
given the extent of the state's ownership of MGI and the portion
of the transaction's subordinated debt it holds.

The transaction has performed within expectations, with an average
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.24x from January 2015 to
September 2015, above the minimum requirement of 1.8x.  The asset
coverage ratio as of September 2015 was 320%, higher than the 200%
trigger level.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

Factors that would lead to a downgrade include a deterioration of
the collateral performance and a downgrade of the rating of the
State of Minas Gerais.


MINAS GERAIS: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating Under Review for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of the Brazilian
States of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, and of the Municipality of
Belo Horizonte under review for downgrade. The ratings impacted
are as follows:

State of Sao Paulo. Rating of Baa3 (Global Scale, Local and
Foreign Currency).

State of Minas Gerais. Rating of Ba1 (Global Scale, Local and
Foreign Currency).

Municipality of Belo Horizonte. Rating of Ba1 (Global Scale, Local
and Foreign Currency).

Today's action follows Moody's December 09, 2015 rating action in
which the agency placed Brazil's government bond rating under
review for downgrade. (For full details, please see " Moody's
places Brazil's Baa3 issuer and bond ratings under Review for
Downgrade" at link https://www.moodys.com/research/--PR_340103 ).
Macroeconomic and institutional factors closely link the credit
quality of state and municipal governments in Brazil to that of
the federal government.

RATINGS RATIONALE

In Moody's view, macroeconomic and institutional factors closely
link the credit quality of state and municipal governments in
Brazil to that of the federal government. The ongoing
deterioration of Brazil's economy has had and will continue to
have a direct impact on the operating environment of Brazilian
states and municipalities. In addition, the fiscal position of
Brazilian states and municipalities weakened during 2015 and will
remain pressured by lower tax revenues and expenditure rigidities
in the near future.

Moody's also notes that the assigned ratings are supported by a
strong institutional framework and by the close oversight of
Brazil's federal government on states and municipalities in the
country. The agency continues to view Brazil's institutional
framework as a credit positive for states and municipalities
relative to international peers.

DRIVERS OF RATING CHANGE

In light of the review for downgrade, a rating upgrade is unlikely
in the near term. A downgrade on Brazil's government bond ratings
could result in a downgrade of the assigned ratings. A rapid
deterioration in the credit metrics specific to each issuer could
also prompt a rating downgrade.


RB CAPITAL: Moody's Lowers Rating on 3rd Series of Cert. to Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina, Ltda. has downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2
(global scale rating, local currency) and to A3.br from Aa3.br
(national scale rating, local currency) the ratings of 3rd series
of certificates of RB Capital Securitizadora S.A., the 4th series
of certificates of RB Capital Securitizadora S.A and the 42nd
series of certificates of RB Capital Securitizadora S.A.  Ratings
are also placed on review for further downgrade.

These three series of real estate certificates (CRIs) issued by RB
Capital Securitizadora are backed by built-to-suit lease
agreements with Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. -- Petrobras (Ba3 on
review for downgrade).

The rating action follows Moody's decision to downgrade Petrobras'
senior unsecured rating to Ba3 from Ba2 and to place ratings on
review for further downgrade on Dec. 9, 2015, as it relates to the
Government of Brazil's government bond rating being placed on
review for downgrade.

The full rating action is:

Issuer: RB Capital Securitizadora S.A.

3rd series CRIs backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement:

  Downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 (Global Scale Rating, local
   currency); Downgraded to A3.br from Aa3.br (National Scale
   Rating, local currency); Both ratings were placed on review for
   further downgrade;
4th series CRIs backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement:

  Downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 (Global Scale Rating, local
   currency); Downgraded to A3.br from Aa3.br (National Scale
   Rating, local currency); Both ratings were placed on review for
   further downgrade; and

42nd series CRIs backed by a built-to-suit lease agreement:

  Downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 (Global Scale Rating, local
   currency); Downgraded to A3.br from Aa3.br (National Scale
   Rating, local currency); Both ratings were placed on review for
   further downgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's views the certificates as being full pass through of
Petrobras' senior unsecured credit risk under the built-to-suit
lease agreements.

The Ba3 / A3.br ratings, on review for downgrade, of the 3rd, 4th
and 42nd series of certificates issued by RB Capital
Securitizadora are primarily based on Petrobras' ability to make
payments under the underlying lease agreements.  Also, Petrobras
covers taxes and trust expenses and a termination of the lease
agreements would result in a call under the certificates.

The Ba3 global scale, local currency rating has been associated
with a default frequency, over 3--year investment horizons, of
8.52%.

Petrobras, based in Rio de Janeiro, is an integrated energy
company, with total assets of USD 234 billion as of September 30,
2015.  Petrobras dominates Brazil's oil and natural gas
production, as well as downstream refining and marketing.  The
company also holds a significant stake in petrochemicals and a
position in sugar-based ethanol production and distribution.  The
Brazilian government directly and indirectly owns about 46% of
Petrobras' outstanding capital stock and 60.5% of its voting
shares.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Any future changes to the senior unsecured debt rating of
Petrobras will lead to a change in the ratings assigned to the
certificates.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Rating
Transactions Based on the Credit Substitution Approach: Letter of
Credit-backed, Insured and Guaranteed Debts" published in March
2015.


TONON BIOENERGIA: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
-------------------------------------------------
Marcelo Teixeira at Reuters reports that Brazil sugar and ethanol
producer Tonon Bioenergia SA, which operates three mills with a
total capacity to process 8.2 million tonnes of cane per year, has
sought court protection against creditors, the company said.

Tonon said its debt, largely denominated in dollars, soared
following the recent weakening of Brazil's currency, according to
Reuters.  The sugar group's debt in Brazilian reais jumped by 69
percent by the end of September to BRL2.66 billion ($707 million)
compared to the same time a year earlier, the report notes.

"The main objective of this request is to restore the capital
structure and preserve business continuity," the company said in a
statement obtained by Reuters.

More than 70 mills in Brazil have filed for court protection
against creditors in the past three years as a long period of low
sugar and ethanol prices has hurt their profitability, the report
relays.

More recently, the local currency's weakness, despite increasing
the return in reais on sugar export deals, has raised indebtedness
for companies with a large share of their liabilities denominated
in dollars, the report notes.

Tonon also said tough financing conditions in the Brazilian market
further harmed its ability to manage its finances, the report
discloses.  To tackle inflation running in double-digits, the
central bank has signaled it could raise interest rates in January
from a nine-year high of 14.25 percent, the report says.

Tonon's request comes at a time when international sugar prices
are finally recovering from their lowest values in more than five
years and local ethanol prices hit the highest levels since 2011,
the report adds.


VIRGOLINO DE OLIVEIRA: Fitch Withdraws 'RD' Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Virgolino de Oliveira S.A. Acucar e
Alcool's (GVO) 'RD' foreign and local currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) and the company's 'RD(bra)' national scale long-
term rating. Fitch has also withdrawn the ratings on Virgolino
Finance's associated debts. Virgolino Finance is a fully-owned
subsidiary of GVO and is the issuer of GVO's notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings due to lack of updated information
following the company's financial distress.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for
the corporate and debt instruments.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has withdrawn the following ratings

Virgolino de Oliveira S.A. Acucar e Alcool
-- Foreign and local currency IDRs at 'RD';
-- Long term national scale rating at RD(bra).

Virgolino de Oliveira Finance S/A
-- USD300 million senior unsecured notes due 2022 at 'C/RR4'
-- USD135 million senior secured notes due 2020 at 'C/RR4'


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


DOMAIN VENTURE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------
The members of Domain Venture Partners II Limited received on
Dec. 2, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd.
          c/o Richard Gordon
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900


ETOILE INTERNATIONAL: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The members of Etoile International Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


LAURA ENTERPRISE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------
The members of Laura Enterprise Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


LAURA INVESTMENTS: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------
The members of Laura Investments Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


MOMBASA INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The members of Mombasa Investment Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


NORDISK INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The members of Nordisk Investment Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


PELEO & TETI: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------
The members of Peleo & Teti Trading Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


PELLICANO INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The members of Pellicano Investment Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


QUADRELLA INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The members of Quadrella Investment Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


SCOTTDALE INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The members of Scottdale Investment Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


TOGIU INTERNATIONAL: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The members of Togiu International Ltd. received on Dec. 7, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


TREASURE COVE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------
The members of Treasure Cove Investment Ltd. received on Dec. 7,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


=======
C U B A
=======


CUBA: Reaches Deal to Pay $2.6 Billion in Arrears to Paris Club
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Chow at The Wall Street Journal reports that Cuba has
reached a deal with its creditors where the county will pay $2.6
billion in arrears over an 18-year period while $4 billion of its
debt will be forgiven.

The deal comes after months of negotiations between the Communist
nation and the Paris Club, an informal group of developed creditor
nations, according to The Wall Street Journal.  The talks stem
from Cuba's lingering $16 billion debt which it defaulted in 1986.

The report notes that the French Treasury, which heads the group,
said in a statement the Paris Club "welcomed progress made by the
Republic of Cuba towards the normalization of its relations with
creditors and the international financial community."

The group of creditor countries includes Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K, the report
relays.

France, which is Cuba's largest creditor, has agreed to have $240
million of the $470 million in principal and interest owed to be
repaid, said French Finance Minister Michel Sapin, the report
notes.  The rest will be converted into development projects in
Cuba, Mr. Sapin said, adds the report.

Cuba has recently made steps to re-engage with the international
community, the report discloses.  Last year, Cuba and the U.S.
said they would normalize relations after decades of tension,
though the U.S. has maintained its economic blockade against the
island country, the report notes.

Neither France nor the Paris Club detailed the amount of principal
that has been forgiven, the report adds.


CUBA: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Foreign Currency Issuer Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Cuba's Caa2 foreign
currency issuer rating and changed the outlook to positive from
stable.

The key drivers of the rating action are the following:

1) Dependence on Venezuela has lessened since 2014, and despite
pressure on Cuba's external finances from lower economic and
financial support from its main trade partner, risks remain
manageable.

2) Continued reform momentum and increased rapprochement with the
United States have supported favorable macroeconomic performance
and raise the likelihood that US economic sanctions might be eased
further.

The positive outlook on Cuba's Caa2 rating reflects Moody's
expectation that measures to diversify trade and financial links
will contribute to favorable macroeconomic trends and will
coincide with continued easing of economic sanctions by the US.
The positive outlook also anticipates that the Cuban authorities
will maintain the current reform momentum following the Communist
Party Congress in April 2016, while managing challenges stemming
from weaker external finances.

Cuba's long-term local currency country risk ceilings and the
foreign currency bond ceiling remain unchanged at Caa2. The
foreign currency bank deposit ceilings is also unchanged at Caa3.
The short-term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings remain
at NP (Not Prime). These ceilings reflect a range of
undiversifiable risks to which issuers in any jurisdiction are
exposed, including economic, legal and political risks. These
ceilings act as a cap on ratings that can be assigned to the
foreign and local-currency obligations of entities domiciled in
the country.

RATIONALE FOR THE OUTLOOK CHANGE

-- FIRST DRIVER: DEPENDENCE ON VENEZUELA HAS LESSENED, AND
DESPITE PRESSURE ON EXTERNAL FINANCES FROM LOWER ECONOMIC AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ITS MAIN TRADE PARTNER, RISKS REMAIN
MANAGEABLE --

The principal driver of Moody's decision to change the outlook to
positive from stable is that lower Venezuelan support has fostered
diversification and, despite some external liquidity pressures,
the risks remain manageable. In 2014, Venezuela greatly reduced
trade and investment flows to Cuba as economic stress stemming
from lower oil prices and social tensions led to increased
liquidity pressures for the oil exporting nation. As a result of
lower support from its main trade partner and top provider of
financial assistance, Cuba's economic growth slowed significantly
to 1% from 2.7% in 2013. However, measures to diversify trade and
financial links seem to have been successful and have coincided
with a gradual easing of economic sanctions by the US. Although
they have not fully offset the loss of Venezuelan support, the
outlook for stronger inflows remains favorable over the medium
term.

Increased tourism activity has improved the economic outlook for
the country, but tourism earnings have not fully offset the
decrease in Venezuelan financial inflows which has hurt the
balance of payments. Since 2009, the government has substantially
curtailed imports and cut state payrolls and subsidies in order to
maintain an external current account surplus. Despite these
challenges, Moody's believes that external liquidity pressures
remain manageable as the authorities have adopted measures to
ensure balance of payments sustainability since the 2008-09
liquidity crunch and the crisis that followed the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. The country's dependence on Venezuela will
diminish further as Cuba diversifies its trade and financial
relations over the next two-to-three years.

As barriers to investment and financing constraints continue to
ease, supported by continued US rapprochement, the authorities
will have much greater scope to access finance and ease the
current tight external liquidity conditions. Moody's expects an
increase in capital inflows is forthcoming. Both government policy
and the changing relationship with the US will encourage more
inward FDI, as well as official lending, following the
restructuring of commercial and bilateral debt in recent years.

-- SECOND DRIVER: CONTINUED REFORM MOMENTUM AND INCREASED
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US HAVE SUPPORTED FAVORABLE MACROECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE AND RAISE LIKELIHOOD ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MIGHT BE
WEAKENED FURTHER --

The second driver of the outlook change is Moody's expectation
that the cautious reform momentum will be maintained as the US is
likely to continue easing sanctions. The easing of US trade and
travel restrictions came at a crucial time for Cuba, helping to
offset the accelerating loss of Venezuelan economic assistance.
Rapprochement between the US and Cuba has helped increase overall
tourism flows by nearly 16% so far this year. This prompted
Moody's to revise up its real GDP growth forecast for Cuba to 3.5%
(from 2.3%) in 2015 and 3.0% (from 2.9%) in 2016, while the
government expects the economy will expand by 4% this year.

The authorities' expectation of a strong rebound in economic
activity this year may reflect the anticipated effect of thawing
U.S. sanctions. Increasing permissible US participation in the
Cuban economy is likely to have a multiplier effect on economic
activity, as it could "crowd in" investment by non-US investors in
anticipation of increased visitor arrivals to the Caribbean
nation. Moreover, the last Communist Party Congress, held in April
2011, focused on the introduction of economic reforms designed to
create more efficient markets and drive productivity growth.
Moody's believes that the next meeting (to be held in April 2016)
is likely to continue this process by expanding private-sector
activity, reducing price controls, reforming the tax system, and
potentially addressing the issue of the dual currency system.

The public sector payroll has already decreased strongly, media
sources suggest that by 2016 there will be one million fewer state
employees than in 2009, and further reductions could come after
the next Communist Party Congress. This is in line with the
government's strategy to continue expanding the private sector, as
these workers are likely to be absorbed initially into the tourist
sector and then other sectors as investment comes into the
country.

Despite a lack of data availability and transparency that Moody's
continues to highlight as an important rating constraint, official
and publicly available data remain adequate to maintain a rating
on the Cuban sovereign.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

There could be upward pressure on Cuba's rating if there is a
further easing of US economic sanctions that has a material impact
on Cuba's economic prospects and reform momentum is maintained.
More clarity over the political transition at the end of President
Raul Castro's current term would ease concerns over political and
social instability. Enhanced data timeliness and transparency
would also be credit positive.

Conversely, the positive outlook on Cuba's rating would be changed
back to stable if there is no further progress in US rapprochement
and reform momentum is lost. Evidence of increased stress on
Cuba's external finances would also lead to a stabilization of the
outlook.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): Unavailable (also known as Per
Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 1% (2014 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 2.1% (2014 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.6% (2014 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: 3.9% (2014 Estimate) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 14.6 (2014 Estimate)

Level of economic development: Very Low level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On 09 December 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Cuba, Government of. The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including
its economic strength, have materially increased. The issuer has
become less susceptible to event risks. Other views raised
included: The issuer's institutional strength/ framework, have not
materially changed. The issuer's governance and/or management,
have not materially changed. The issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has not materially changed.
The systemic risk in which the issuer operates has materially
decreased.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


CORPORACION LINDLEY: S&P Raises LT Corp. Credit Rating to 'BBB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit and issue-level ratings on Peru-based bottler Corporacion
Lindley S.A. to 'BBB' from 'BB+'.

At the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch
positive, where it had placed them on Sept. 11, 2015, following
the announcement of the transaction.  The outlook is stable.

The rating action reflects the recent completion of ARCA
Continental S.A.B. de C.V.'s (AC; mxAAA/Stable/--) acquisition of
53.16% of Lindley's voting shares for $760 million in cash.
Following the transaction, AC has become Lindley's new controlling
shareholder.

S&P considers that Lindley is now a "strategically important"
subsidiary for AC, according to S&P's group rating methodology.
As such, S&P incorporates two additional notches of support for
its 'bb+' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) for Lindley into S&P's
long-term corporate credit and issue level ratings on the company.

S&P views Lindley as "strategically important" for AC based on:

   -- S&P believes that AC is unlikely to sell Lindley's stake in
      the near term, given the latter's importance for AC.  On a
      pro forma basis, Lindley will represent about 15% and 14% of
      the new combined group's sales and EBITDA, respectively, in
      2015.

   -- S&P believes that Lindley is important to AC's long-term
      strategy to drive growth and further diversify its
      geographic presence in Latin America.

   -- S&P believes that Lindley is likely to receive support from
      AC during financial distress because of S&P's view of
      sufficient long-term commitment from the parent.  Under AC's
      debt documentation, there are cross-acceleration provisions,
      which in S&P's view, represent a strong incentive for the
      parent to provide financial support to its subsidiaries
      (including Lindley) if necessary.

   -- S&P believes that Lindley is reasonably successful in its
      operations and has favorable medium-term prospects relative
      to AC's specific expectations.

In S&P's opinion, Lindley's 'bb+' SACP continues to reflect S&P's
view of the company's "satisfactory" business risk profile and
"significant" financial risk profile.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Utility Wins More Time in Debt Talks
----------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 9, 2015, Michelle Kaske at Bloomberg News reports that
Puerto Rico's main electric utility won another week from
bondholders to get insurance companies to sign onto an agreement
to restructure the agency's $8.2 billion of debt and for
commonwealth lawmakers to approval the proposal.

The agreement extends termination dates on an earlier accord
between Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and investors owning
about 35 percent of the agency's bonds to Dec. 17, the utility
said in a statement obtained by Bloomberg News.

The pact, which was set to expire Dec. 10, was extended for a
third time since being signed last month.  Island officials have
yet to call for an extraordinary session of the legislature needed
to consider a bill authorizing a restructuring of the utility know
as Prepa, Bloomberg News relays.

A Prepa restructuring would be the largest ever in the $3.7
trillion municipal-bond market, says the report.  The U.S. Supreme
Court said it would hear an appeal by the commonwealth to
reinstate a local debt-restructuring law that would allow some
island agencies, including Prepa, to ask bondholders to take
losses, according to Bloomberg News.  Prepa, hedge funds, mutual
funds, and monolines have been in talks since August 2014 on how
to lower the utility's obligations and modernize its plants.

Prepa owes $196 million of interest to investors on Jan 1. U.S.
Bank, the bond trustee, has approximately $24 million in a reserve
account, according to a Dec. 7 event filing on the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board's website, called EMMA, Bloomberg News
says.  Prepa had, as of Sept. 30., $252 million in deposits at the
Government Development Bank for its reserve account, construction
fund and operating account, according to a Nov. 6 financial
filing, notes Bloomberg News.

Prepa's restructuring support agreement with bondholders
"contemplates that some or all of the January 1, 2016 interest
payments would be paid with funding provided to the authority, but
it remains premature to predict whether and to what extent that
will occur," according to the EMMA filing, Bloomberg News
discloses.  "The trustee is currently not holding other funds in
the sinking fund that will be available to pay interest on the
bonds due on January 1, 2016," Bloomberg News relays.

Under the restructuring support agreement, investors would take
losses of about 15 percent in a debt exchange. Bond insurance
companies that guarantee repayment on $2.5 billion of Prepa's
bonds haven't agreed to the plan, Bloomberg News adds.


                            *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July
6, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
and underlying ratings (SPURs) on Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority, (PREPA) P.R.'s electric revenue bonds to 'CC' from
'CCC-'.  The rating remains on CreditWatch with negative
implications.


PUERTO RICO: Fitch Keeps Rating Watch Neg. on 'CC' GO Bond Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained the Rating Watch Negative on the 'CC'
rating for the following Commonwealth of Puerto Rico debt:

-- Commonwealth of Puerto Rico GO bonds;
-- Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) power revenue
    bonds;
-- Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) senior lien
    revenue bonds;
-- Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) senior
    lien sales tax revenue bonds and first subordinate lien sales
    tax revenue bonds;
-- Employees Retirement System of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
    (ERS) pension funding bonds;
-- Puerto Rico Public Buildings Authority (PBA) government
    facilities revenue bonds guaranteed by the Commonwealth and
    rated by Fitch;
-- PRASA Commonwealth guaranty revenue bonds.

The 'CC' rating indicates Fitch's belief that default of some kind
appears probable, with the Rating Watch reflecting the
commonwealth's stated intent to restructure its debt in the near
term.

The commonwealth continues to seek federal assistance, and
numerous proposals are active in the U.S. Congress. These
proposals include granting of bankruptcy authorization, financial
and bonding support, and increased federal oversight. Fitch will
continue to monitor developments at the federal level and evaluate
any enacted legislation for its impact on prospects for
bondholders.

The recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to take up the
appeal of lower court rejections of the 2014 restructuring law
introduces additional uncertainty, particularly for negotiations
with PREPA creditors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

TAX-SUPPORTED DEBT: The commonwealth's tax-supported bonds (GO &
guaranteed, COFINA, and ERS) have been downgraded to the current
level as a result of willingness to pay concerns and liquidity
challenges. The most recent downgrade on June 29, 2015 was
precipitated by public comments made by the governor supporting
broad debt restructuring, a strategy the commonwealth has begun to
pursue since that time. Although the commonwealth made the
decision to make the full debt service payment on GO guaranteed
debt on
Dec. 1, it did so while at the same time ordering that revenues
budgeted to pay debt service on debt of certain public
corporations and instrumentalities (none rated by Fitch) may be
redirected. Fitch believes that the political environment and
liquidity pressures leave all of the commonwealth's debt
vulnerable to default until restructuring plans become clearer.

PREPA: On Sept. 2, 2015, the Authority announced that it had
reached a restructuring agreement in principle with certain
bondholders holding approximately 35% of the aggregate principal
amount of bonds outstanding. The proposal would preclude full and
timely payment of the power revenue bonds according to the
original terms, if approved by the required holders and executed.
Although existing agreements with certain creditors may allow the
scheduled debt service payment to be made on Jan. 1, 2016, Fitch
remains concerned that PREPA's net cash receipts and existing
funds on hand are insufficient to meet longer term working
capital, debt service and other funding requirements.

PRASA: PRASA's rating is driven by and currently capped at the
commonwealth's GO rating given the commonwealth's ability to
affect PRASA's operations materially both directly and indirectly.
Commonwealth officials have indicated that PRASA may not be part
of a larger restructuring of commonwealth debt, citing the fact
that the authority's operations are currently self-sufficient.
However, Fitch does not believe it is appropriate to distinguish
ratings on the commonwealth's debt without greater clarity on the
form any restructuring will take. The authority announced plans to
come to market with a $750 million transaction in August 2015 but
was not successful in selling those bonds. Cash flows have been
severely and negatively affected by delays in the financing.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

COMMONWEALTH DECISIONS: Future rating action will likely be linked
to commonwealth decisions. As issuer-specific plans become
clearer, downgrades to 'C' would be triggered at the point that
default appears inevitable. The commonwealth has declared its debt
unpayable in aggregate without distinction among its numerous
securities. Therefore, at this stage Fitch does not believe that
there is sufficient information available to consider default of
any of the specific credits that Fitch rates to be inevitable.

Any negotiated resolution would be evaluated for its effect on
bondholders. Any restructuring that does not result in full and
timely payment of bonds according to the original terms promised,
would likely result in a further downgrade to 'C' upon agreement
by the required holders and 'D' upon execution.

Fitch's public finance ratings do not address the loss given
default of the rated liability, focusing instead on the
vulnerability to default of the rated liability.

CREDIT PROFILE

The commonwealth has a complex debt structure including GO, sales
tax, guaranteed, and public corporation debt. The $70 billion
reported figure for Puerto Rico's public debt includes not only
debt supported by commonwealth tax revenues and legislative
appropriations but also debt of PREPA and PRASA and other revenue-
supported debt that is not the obligation of the central
government. GO and GO-guaranteed bonds equal 26% of total public
sector debt as reported by the commonwealth and sales tax-backed
COFINA debt another 22%. PREPA, with $9 billion of reported debt
outstanding, equals another 13% and PRASA only about 5%.

SECURITY

GO & GUARANTEED BONDS are secured by the good faith, credit and
taxing power of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Strong legal
provisions for GO debt include a constitutional first claim on
commonwealth revenues, including transportation-related and rum
excise tax revenues that are dedicated to specific authorities and
other bonds.

PREPA BONDS are secured by a senior lien on net revenues of the
electric system.

PRASA BONDS are secured by a gross lien of all authority revenues
related to PRASA's combined water and sewer system. In addition,
certain revenue refunding bonds and loans granted to address
certain regulatory violations are backed by a commonwealth
guarantee.

COFINA BONDS have a security interest in and are payable from
commonwealth sales and use tax revenues. COFINA is an independent
governmental instrumentality of the commonwealth and affiliate of
the GDB established by specific legislation.

ERS BONDS are a limited, non-recourse obligation of the pension
system, payable from and secured by a pledge of statutorily
required employer contributions to the system.

For additional information on Fitch's analysis of the commonwealth
credits please see the following releases:

-- 'Fitch Rates Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority's 2015A
    Sr. Revs 'CC'; Maintains Negative Watch' dated Aug. 17, 2015;
-- 'Fitch Downgrades Puerto Rico's GO and Related Ratings to
    'CC'; Maintains Rating Watch Negative' dated June 29, 2015;
-- 'Fitch Maintains Puerto Rico Electric Power Auth's Rev Bonds
    on Negative Watch' dated Dec. 11, 2014.


PUERTO RICO: Congress Unlikely to Agree on Rescue by Year's End
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kasia Klimasinska, Michelle Kaske, and Kathleen Miller at
Bloomberg News report that less than 10 days before they plan to
adjourn for the Christmas holiday, lawmakers in Congress remain
divided over how to help Puerto Rico as the island rapidly runs
out cash and inches closer toward the first major default on its
bonds.

Top Senate Republicans are moving to extend as much as $3 billion
in aid to the territory as long as it cedes some financial powers
to a federal board, while declining to give Puerto Rico the
ability to file for bankruptcy to cuts its debt, according to
Bloomberg News.

Democrats, who are in the minority, may try to attach a bankruptcy
measure to the spending bill that Congress needs to pass to keep
the U.S. government running, seeing it as the best chance to push
through one of Puerto Rico's key priorities, Bloomberg News notes.

"We don't see how there is a resolution in the week or so that
remains before this Congress leaves for the holidays, and once it
returns this fight could drag on for many months," Guggenheim
Securities analysts led by Jaret Seiberg said in a note to
clients, Bloomberg News discloses.  "It is hard to see how
political leaders find a compromise in front of the election. The
atmosphere is just too charged," the note added.

Bloomberg News relays that the last-minute push comes as Puerto
Rico is running out of time to address a crisis that's been
building for years because of $70 billion of debt, a legacy of
borrowing to paper over budget shortfalls.  The commonwealth this
month narrowly averted a default on government-guaranteed bonds
for the first time and may be unable to cover $957 million of
interest due Jan. 1, Bloomberg News says.

Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla said that the island is "out of
cash" and has been pushing for Congress to give it the legal tools
to restructure debt in court, just as U.S. cities can, Bloomberg
News notes.   Without that, the government is dependent on
negotiations with creditors, a potentially lengthy process that
could get bogged down in litigation, Bloomberg News discloses.
The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority has yet to reach a final
deal to reduce its debt despite more than a year of talks with
bondholders and insurers, Bloomberg News relays.

Garcia Padilla's office welcomed the Republican lawmakers' initial
push to help the island while stopping short of endorsing it,
notes the report.

"The presentation of the project in the U.S. Senate demonstrates
the urgency and the seriousness of Puerto Rico's situation," Jesus
Manuel Ortiz, spokesman in San Juan for Garcia Padilla, said in a
statement obtained by Bloomberg News.  "We will continue
conversations and we are confident that the final language will be
positive for the country and will deal with the depth of the
problem," Mr. Padilla added.

Bloomberg News relays that Puerto Rico's crisis has dragged down
the prices of its bonds, which have been little changed since the
Republican proposal was announced.  General obligations maturing
July 2035, which were first sold for 93 cents on the dollar in
March 2014, traded Dec. 10 for an average of 74.8 cents, compared
with 74.6 cents a day earlier.

Some bondholders and analysts were skeptical that Congress will be
able to come to an agreement.

"I don't see anybody gaining any strength with a solution yet,"
said Matt Dalton, chief executive officer of Rye Brook, New York-
based Belle Haven Investments, which oversees $3.4 billion of
municipal bonds, including Puerto Rico securities, Bloomberg News
notes.  "I'm not running in one direction or trying to bet on
whether I should or I shouldn't buy Puerto Rico based on these
bills," Mr. Dalton added.

Bloomberg News relays that the Republican plan wasn't fully
embraced in Puerto Rico. Senate President Eduardo Bhatia called it
"shameful" and "unworthy."

"No Puerto Rican should have to accept a fiscal control board with
as much powers over Puerto Rico as that which Senator Orrin
Hatch's bill confers," Mr. Bhatia said in a statement, Bloomberg
News noted.

That bill, introduced by Senators Hatch, Chuck Grassley and Lisa
Murkowski, would set up a new authority to help craft and oversee
the budget, Bloomberg News says.  It would also have the power to
borrow on Puerto Rico's behalf, a mechanism that could help the
island restructure its debt, notes the report.

Bloomberg News discloses that Mr. Grassley, the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, has expressed skepticism about allowing
Puerto Rico to file for bankruptcy, which bondholders oppose.

Representative Sean Duffy, a Republican who sits on the House
Financial Services committee, introduced such a bill, despite the
objections of others in his party, Bloomberg News relays.

Senator Charles Schumer, a New York Democrat, told reporters in
Washington that he is seeking to include language in the spending
bill that would allow Puerto Rican agencies to file for Chapter 9
proceedings, Bloomberg News notes.  Senator Schumer shrugged off
the measure offered by his Republican colleagues.

"They need to come to an agreement that both sides support -- like
in most other things," Senator Schumer said, Bloomberg News adds.

                          *       *       *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 14, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its
ratings on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt to
'CC' from 'CCC-' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
they had been placed with negative implications July 20.  The
outlook is negative.


PUERTO RICO: Senate GOP Floats Debt Relief Plan
-----------------------------------------------
Jonathan Randles at law360.com reports that Senate Republicans
introduced legislation intended to provide financial relief to
Puerto Rico, but the package doesn't include an option pushed by
Democrats that would allow the commonwealth to restructure its
massive debts through bankruptcy.

The bill calls for a 50 percent cut in payroll taxes for Puerto
Rico employees and would create a new authority that would have
the power to borrow on the behalf of the commonwealth, which has
about $72 billion in debts, according to law360.com.

                        *       *       *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 14, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its
ratings on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt to
'CC' from 'CCC-' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
they had been placed with negative implications July 20.  The
outlook is negative.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATIN AMERICA: Fitch Gives Negative Outlook for Airlines
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has published a new report on the 2016 outlook for
Latin American Airlines sector.

'The outlook for the Latin America Airline sector is negative in
2016,' said Debora Jalles, a Director at Fitch. 'The tough
environment will test companies' market positions, management
effectiveness, and capacity to balance business growth and their
hubs' strategies against capital structure strength.'

Fitch expects negative rating actions to prevail for Latin
American airline companies during next year. Market fundamentals
will be harsh in 2016, as a weakening macro environment, fierce
competition and devaluated currencies across the region will
continue to burden companies' operating cash flow generation.

Leverage ratios are already high for Latin America Airlines.
Rating headroom is tight for LATAM Airlines Group S.A. (LATAM) and
Avianca Holding S.A. (Avianca) given their weak positions within
the 'BB' rating category. GOL Linhas Aeresas S.A.'s (GOL) 'B-'
rating reflects the company volatile cash flow swings, but a
recent cash burn trend increased credit risks.

Airline companies in the region are holding adequate liquidity,
but the intensity of cash flow erosion during 2016 is a concern.


LATIN AMERICA: Fitch Gives Mixed Outlook for Structured Finance
---------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook is mixed across sectors for Latin American structured
finance (SF), with 81.0% of Rating Outlooks being Stable or
Positive, compared to 90.0% last year, according to Fitch Ratings.

The Outlook is Stable for consumer asset backed securities (ABS).
Adequate levels of credit enhancement and structural features
continue to protect Fitch-rated Brazilian consumer ABS against
deteriorating macro conditions. Fitch expects delinquencies to
peak in mid-to-late 2016, but at a lower share compared to those
observed in 2012. The agency expects Mexican consumer ABS to
continue to perform well in 2016.

Performance of Fitch-rated Latin American residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) continues to improve. This year featured
a larger percentage of rating affirmations/upgrades to downgrades
than 2014. The Stable Outlook for Mexican RMBS reflects
macroeconomic stability and seasoned underlying portfolios.
Despite falling real income and increasing unemployment in Brazil,
the Outlook remains Stable for Brazilian RMBS due to generally
favorable loan characteristics.

The Outlook is Negative for Fitch-rated commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS), the majority of which come from Brazil. The
Negative Outlook for Brazilian CMBS reflects a challenging
environment ahead for regional shopping mall-backed transactions.
Negative Outlooks remain for Brazilian credit-tenant-lease
transactions with Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) as obligor.

Negative rating actions outpaced upgrades by a ratio of more than
3:1 in the year as of end of November. The majority of downgrades
concerned transactions exposed to the Brazilian oil and
homebuilder sectors. From late 2014 through third-quarter 2015,
Fitch took multiple negative rating actions on oil vessel-backed
transactions, as this sector was severely impacted by depressed
oil prices and extraordinary corporate scandal.

Certain SF issuances are sensitive to a prolonged recession in
Brazil with higher-than-expected unemployment growth. Oil vessel-
backed SF and local Brazil transactions remain exposed to
uncertainties related to Petrobras and the Lava Jato
investigations.



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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