TCRLA_Public/160215.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Monday, February 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 31


                            Headlines



A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A

LIAT: Allows Rebooking, Cancellation to Zika-Affected Countries


A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Targets Injunctions in Debt Settlement Talks
ARGENTINA: Ends Mining Export Tax to Boost Output, Investment

* Argentina Moves to Address Rating Constraints, Fitch Says


B R A Z I L

QGOG CONSTELLATION: Ratings to Withstand Deteriorating Dayrates
RUMO LOGISTICA: Cancelled Capital Increase Pressures Ratings


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

1794 COMMODORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
1794 EVENT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
336263 LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
AFRICA HORIZONS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ALTANA CORPORATE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

AUDLEY INVESTMENTS I: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
AUDLEY INVESTMENTS II: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
CONUS FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
CONUS FUND MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
KROM RIVER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

MIURA GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MODULA CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
POTOMAC RIVER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
T.A.M.P. LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
WHITE LOTUS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Fitch Raises IDR to 'B' & Revises Outlook to Stable


M E X I C O

BANCO AHORRO: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' Rating
GRUPO FAMSA: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR


N I C A R A G U A

NICARAGUA: S&P Assigns 'B+' LT Sovereign Credit Rating


P U E R T O    R I C O

MORGANS HOTEL: FelCor to Sell Royalton and Morgans Hotels
MORGANS HOTEL: Units Extend Notes and Loans Maturity Date to 2017
PUERTO RICO: Bondholders Make First Counteroffer to Debt Plan
PUERTO RICO: Top Adviser Debates Bond Insurer on Bankruptcy


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Chinese Finance to Region Soars to $29 Billion in 2015

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Feb. 8 to Feb. 12, 2016


                            - - - - -



===============================
A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A
===============================

LIAT: Allows Rebooking, Cancellation to Zika-Affected Countries
---------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that regional airline LIAT, operating as
Leeward Islands Air Transport, has followed the lead of
international airlines and is now allowing customers who were
booked on flights to destinations where the mosquito-borne Zika
virus has surfaced, to change or cancel their travel plans.

The Antigua-based carrier has announced that passengers have until
March 14 to make the changes, which will be free of charge,
according to Caribbean360.com.

It said in a statement that customers who booked tickets on or
before February 10 may change the dates of travel at no charge;
cancel the booking entirely and receive a full credit -- valid for
a year -- without having to pay a cancellation fee; or change
their destination without incurring a change fee, the report
notes.

However, in the latter case, passengers would be required to pay
the difference in fares if the cost of travel to the new
destination is higher than the original reservation.

LIAT said changes to bookings that were made after February 10
will incur the normal change and cancellation fees, the report
relates.

Several airlines have already made similar offers to passengers.
Some have even allowed employees to change their schedules to
avoid work in areas affected by the outbreak, the report adds.

                               About LIAT

LIAT, operating as Leeward Islands Air Transport, is an airline
headquartered on the grounds of V. C. Bird International Airport
in Antigua.  It operates high-frequency inter-island scheduled
services serving 21 destinations in the Caribbean.  The airline's
main base is VC Bird International Airport, Antigua and Barbuda,
with bases at Grantley Adams International Airport, Barbados and
Piarco International Airport, Trinidad and Tobago.

                         *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
8, 2015, the Daily Observer reports that LIAT, operating as
Leeward Islands Air Transport, is attempting to lose excess
baggage as part of measures to make the carrier "a smaller airline
in 2015."  In a document, signed by Director of Human Resources
Ilean Ramsey, eligible employees were asked to opt to apply for
voluntary separation or early retirement packages to avoid being
made redundant, according to The Daily Observer.

TCRLA reported on Dec. 2, 2014, Caribbean360.com said that
chairman of the shareholder governments of the financially
troubled regional airline LIAT, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves said while he
is unaware of the details regarding any possible retrenchment of
employees, the airline needs to deal with its high cost of
operations.

The TCR-LA on March 10, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, reported
that LIAT said it will take "decisive action" to deal with
unprofitable routes as the Antigua-based airline seeks to make its
operations financially viable.

On Sept. 23, 2013, the TCRLA, citing Trinidad and Tobago Newsday,
reported that there's much upheaval at the highest levels of LIAT
-- the Board and the Executive. Following the sudden resignation
of Chief Executive Officer Captain Ian Brunton, David Evans
replaced Mr. Brunton as chief executive officer



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: Targets Injunctions in Debt Settlement Talks
-------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Randles at Law360.com reports that Argentina creditors
holding claims and legal judgments over the republic's 2001 debt
default will have until Feb. 18 to explain why a court injunction
limiting the country's ability to pay individual investors
shouldn't be lifted in light of the country's $6.5 billion
settlement offer, a New York federal judge ordered.

U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa said creditors suing Argentina
have to show why the so-called "pari passu" injunction shouldn't
be vacated if the country repeals two local laws and agrees to
settle litigation with bondholders, according to Law360.com.

                        *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in Nov. 27,
2015, that Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
Argentina's Caa1 issuer rating to positive from stable.  The
outlook on Argentina's (P)Caa2 foreign legislation and
restructured local legislation foreign currency obligations is
also changed to positive from stable.  The outlook change is based
on Moody's view that the accession of president-elect Mauricio
Macri of the Cambiemos ("Let's Change") coalition will raise the
probability of credit positive policies being implemented,
including arriving at a resolution with holdout creditors, one of
Argentina's key credit constraints.

On Aug. 1, 2014, reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its
debt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a
US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a
court- appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff
between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking full
payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.  A
U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed.  The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.

On April 22, 2015, Moody's Investors Service expanded the portion
of Argentina's debt that is rated (P)Caa2. The (P)Caa2 rating
reflects the higher risk of default for both Argentina's
restructured foreign legislation debt (as before) and,
additionally now, its restructured local legislation foreign
currency obligations, as compared with the risk of default on
other debt instruments issued by Argentina.  Argentina's local
currency debt and its non-restructured foreign currency debt are
rated Caa1. The debt that remains in default since Argentina's
2001 default is rated Ca.


ARGENTINA: Ends Mining Export Tax to Boost Output, Investment
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Argentine President Mauricio Macri announced
the elimination of a 5 percent tax on mineral exports, a move
aimed at boosting production and investment in the mining sector.

"Today the (export taxes) on mineral exports come to an end," the
business-friendly conservative, inaugurated in December, said in a
ceremony in the northwestern highland province of San Juan,
according to EFE News.

In a statement, the president's office said Mr. Macri urged mining
companies to conduct their productive activities "with absolute
respect for the environment," the report notes.

Mr. Macri made the announcement in Barreal, a town in the Andean
foothills, accompanied by San Juan Gov. Sergio Unac and Interior
Minister Rogelio Frigerio, among others.

Argentina has been among the South American countries hard hit by
the end of the commodity boom, notes the report.

The country's mining exports amounted to $3.36 billion in the
first 11 months of 2015, 7.5 percent less than in the same period
of 2014, according to the IES Investigaciones Economica private
consulting firm, EFE News says.

Between January and November of last year, Argentina exported 1.72
billion tons of minerals, with gold accounting for 60.7 percent of
the total. Copper's share of total mineral exports was 11.1
percent, while aluminum and silver each accounted for 6.1 percent,
the report discloses.

Besides announcing the elimination of the levy, Mr. Macri also
recalled the historic crossing of the Andes by Gen. Jose de San
Martin and his troops in 1817, part of Argentina's struggle for
independence from Spain.

                        *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in Nov. 27,
2015, that Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
Argentina's Caa1 issuer rating to positive from stable.  The
outlook on Argentina's (P)Caa2 foreign legislation and
restructured local legislation foreign currency obligations is
also changed to positive from stable.  The outlook change is based
on Moody's view that the accession of president-elect Mauricio
Macri of the Cambiemos ("Let's Change") coalition will raise the
probability of credit positive policies being implemented,
including arriving at a resolution with holdout creditors, one of
Argentina's key credit constraints.

On Aug. 1, 2014, reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its
debt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a
US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a
court- appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff
between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking full
payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.  A
U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed.  The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.

On April 22, 2015, Moody's Investors Service expanded the portion
of Argentina's debt that is rated (P)Caa2. The (P)Caa2 rating
reflects the higher risk of default for both Argentina's
restructured foreign legislation debt (as before) and,
additionally now, its restructured local legislation foreign
currency obligations, as compared with the risk of default on
other debt instruments issued by Argentina.  Argentina's local
currency debt and its non-restructured foreign currency debt are
rated Caa1. The debt that remains in default since Argentina's
2001 default is rated Ca.


* Argentina Moves to Address Rating Constraints, Fitch Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
President Mauricio Macri's government has demonstrated its
willingness to reach an agreement with Argentina's holdout
creditors, but the timing and terms of the eventual outcome remain
uncertain, Fitch Ratings says.  Implementation of an agreement
with creditors is key to lifting Argentina out of default, but the
degree to which the new administration can ease financing
constraints and strengthen the consistency and credibility of the
policy framework will determine Argentina's post-default rating
and be important to the pace and scale of future changes.

Argentina's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating has
been in Restricted Default (RD) since July 2014 due to the
sovereign's inability to resolve the default on external market
debt.  The resumption of timely debt service on the defaulted
bonds could lead to an upgrade of the foreign currency rating.
The extent of the upgrade would depend on Fitch's assessment of
the government's progress in improving the policy mix and
increasing financing sources.  It would also depend on the
country's solvency and external liquidity ratios at the time of
the upgrade.  Should Argentina exit default, policy and financing
developments will continue to be important rating factors while
the Macri government implements its economic plan.

During its first two months in office the Macri administration has
also made progress with the removal of macroeconomic distortions
and rebalancing Argentina's policy mix.  The government removed FX
controls in December, and the Argentine peso's depreciation
reduced exchange rate distortions but did not lead to
destabilizing FX pressures.  The central bank tightened monetary
policy and moved quickly to reduce excess liquidity resulting from
the record fiscal expansion in 2015.

In addition, the central bank was able to secure a one-year loan
of USD5 billion from international commercial banks, boosting
Argentina's international reserves to USD30 billion.  The
government also proposed a gradual fiscal consolidation strategy
that aims to reach a primary balance by 2019.  The fiscal deficit
topped 5% of GDP (including central bank and social security
transfers) in 2015.  A reduction in energy subsidies would support
these efforts, but lower growth and expenditure pressures could
challenge the speed of the consolidation.

The Macri administration's economic plan aims at maintaining
inflation between 20% and 25% in 2016.  However, a late-2015
inflation spike to nearly 30%, the Argentine peso depreciation and
the rise in utility tariffs are likely to put upward pressure on
the authorities' projections.  Moreover, the outcome of salary
negotiations with unions will determine policymakers' abilities to
lower inflation and anchor expectations.

The Argentine government formally presented a two-pronged proposal
to the holdout creditors.  It includes a base offer to bondholders
outside of the pari passu injunction equivalent to 150% of
principal.  The proposal also includes a pari passu offer that
would pay bondholders up to 72.5% of claims or court awards that
include penalty and accumulated interest in addition to principal.
Earlier Argentina reached an agreement with Italian bondholders
(reportedly close to USD1.35 billion).

An agreement with the holdout creditors and Macri's fiscal
proposals must be approved by Argentina's congress sometime after
it resumes in March.  Macri's coalition does not have a majority
in the chamber, highlighting the need for the government to create
alliances with opposition members to move the economic agenda
forward.  The reconfiguration of the Peronist party could foster
an environment for dialogue between the government and opposition.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


QGOG CONSTELLATION: Ratings to Withstand Deteriorating Dayrates
---------------------------------------------------------------
With the majority of QGOG Constellation S.A.'s (Constellation)
contracts set to expire after 2018, the company's credit ratings
should be able to withstand declining dayrates, according to the
latest report in Fitch Ratings' 10-report series title '10 Most
Distressed LatAm Corporates.'

'As long as operating expenses are at or below historical levels,
and fleet performance remains strong, Constellation can weather
deteriorating dayrates declining to an average of USD300,000 for
the ultra-deepwater rigs and USD150,000 for the midwater rigs
without a downgrade,' said Cinthya Ortega, Director.

Fitch projects that Constellation's free cash flow (FCF) and
EBITDA will remain solid in 2016 and 2017.  Fitch expects USD250
million of FCF and 4.2x of total net leverage in 2016, and USD327
million of FCF and 3.4x of total net leverage in 2017.  As of the
last 12 months ended September 2015, EBITDA was USD650 million.

Fitch's base case assumption presumes rigs will remain contracted
and that Petrobras will not attempt to renegotiate contracted
dayrates.


RUMO LOGISTICA: Cancelled Capital Increase Pressures Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
The frustrated initiative of Rumo Logistica Operadora Multimodal
S.A. to issue up to BRL650 million in new capital, pressures the
company's ratings, as well as the ratings of its subsidiaries,
according to Fitch Ratings.

On Feb. 3, 2016, Rumo announced that would cancel the private
capital issuance due to a fall in share price, as potentially new
subscribers would not be interested in such a transaction.

Fitch expects Rumo to conclude, during the first half of this
year, material improvements to its capital structure and financial
position and to seek healthier credit metrics that are more in
line its cash flow generation.  Improvements in its operating
margins and cash flow generation during 2016 are also key factors
to avoid further rating downgrades.

Rumo, America Latina Logistica S.A. (ALL) and its subsidiaries'
ratings continue to be pressured by the weak liquidity, relevant
debt refinancing needs and high leverage.  On Sept. 30, 2015, Rumo
reported consolidated cash and marketable securities of BRL949
million and short-term debt of BRL1.8 billion.  In September 2015
(LTM), Rumo reported EBITDAR of BRL1,443 million and net adjusted
debt/EBITDAR of 8.2x), on a consolidated proforma basis, according
to Fitch's methodology.

Fitch rates Rumo and ALL Foreign and Local Currency IDRs 'BB-' and
Long-Term National Scale Rating 'A(bra)'.  The Rating Outlook is
Negative.  ALL's subsidiaries' Long-Term National Scale Rating are
rated 'A(bra)'.  The Rating Outlook is Negative.

The Negative Outlook reflects Rumo challenges to improve its
aggressive capital structure and finance its expressive capex of
BRL7.9 billion up to 2019 and the operating challenge to increase
cargo volumes, during a weak macroeconomic and credit environment.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================



1794 COMMODORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the sole
shareholder of The 1794 Commodore Overseas Fund, Ltd. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


1794 EVENT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the sole
shareholder of The 1794 Event Driven Overseas Fund, Ltd. resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


336263 LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Dec. 2, 2015, the
shareholders of 336263 Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the
company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidators are:

          Philip Carlton
          Ross Collins
          23-25 Broad Street St Helier
          Jersey JE4 8ND
          Telephone: + 44 1534 282345
          Facsimile: + 44 1534 282400


AFRICA HORIZONS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 11, 2015, the members of
Africa Horizons G.P. Ltd resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


ALTANA CORPORATE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 9, 2015, the sole shareholder of Altana Corporate Bonds
Fund resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lee Robinson
          Altana Wealth SAM
          33 Avenue St Charles
          Monaco 98000
          Telephone: +377 97 97 59 69


AUDLEY INVESTMENTS I: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 9, 2015, the sole shareholder of Audley Investments I
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Russell Homer
          c/o Tanya Armstrong
          Telephone: (345) 946-0820
          Facsimile: (345) 946-0864
          P.O. Box 2499, George Town
          Grand Cayman KYl-1104
          Cayman Islands


AUDLEY INVESTMENTS II: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 9, 2015, the sole shareholder of Audley Investments II
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Russell Homer
          c/o Tanya Armstrong
          Telephone: (345) 946-0820
          Facsimile: (345) 946-0864
          P.O. Box 2499, George Town
          Grand Cayman KYl-1104
          Cayman Islands


CONUS FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------
On Dec. 11, 2015, the sole shareholder of The Conus Fund Offshore
Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Conus Partners, Inc.
          c/o Justin Savage
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


CONUS FUND MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 11, 2015, the sole shareholder of The Conus Fund Offshore
Master Fund Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Conus Partners, Inc.
          c/o Justin Savage
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands


KROM RIVER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On Dec. 11, 2015, the sole member of Krom River General Partner
Inc resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David McGeough
          Piccadilly Centre,
          2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 697GT 28 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands


MIURA GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the members of
Miura Global Telecom And Broadband Master Fund, Ltd. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


MODULA CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 11, 2015, the sole shareholder of Modula Capital One (MC-
1) resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 13, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Victor Murray
          MG Management Ltd.
          Landmark Square, 2nd Floor
          64 Earth Close Seven Mile Beach
          P.O. Box 30116 Grand Cayman KY1-1201
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 749 8181
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 743 6767


POTOMAC RIVER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------
On Dec. 11, 2015, the sole shareholder of Potomac River Capital
SPV, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Potomac River Capital, LLC
          c/o Justin Savage
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


T.A.M.P. LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 8, 2015, the sole member of T.A.M.P. Limited resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alan Turner
          Turners Management Ltd.
          Strathvale House
          90 North Church Street
          P.O. Box 2636 Grand Cayman, KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 0700


WHITE LOTUS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
On Dec. 9, 2015, the sole shareholder of White Lotus Holdings
Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 11, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Golden Eagle Holdings Ltd.
          c/o Barclays Trust Company (Cayman) Limited
          FirstCaribbean House, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 487 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7128


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Fitch Raises IDR to 'B' & Revises Outlook to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Jamaica's Long-term foreign and local
currency IDRs to 'B' from 'B-' and revised the Rating Outlooks to
Stable from Positive.  In addition, Fitch upgrades Jamaica's
senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-Currency bonds to 'B' from
'B-'.  The Country Ceiling has been affirmed at 'B' and the Short-
Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of Jamaica's IDRs reflects the following key rating
drivers:

The government has continued to adhere to the fiscal primary
surplus targets agreed with the IMF, passing the 10th review of
the programme in December.  Austerity has proved unpopular, but
Fitch believes that the policy stance will remain unchanged after
the general election on February 25, as the goals of the IMF
programme are backed by diverse stakeholders.  While the IMF and
Jamaica agreed to a slight relaxation in the targeted primary
fiscal surplus in December (which will allow the government to
increase public investment), it will still reach 7.25% of GDP in
FY15 and 7% of GDP in FY16.  This is consistent with a small
overall budget deficit of less than 0.5% of GDP.  Reforms and tax
hikes in 2015 have boosted revenues above budget, despite below-
target economic growth.

The decline in public debt has slightly outpaced Fitch's
expectations.  The government has reduced its debt stock and
demonstrated access to both external and domestic markets.  A
buyback of Petrocaribe debt in July 2015 owed to Venezuelan
national oil company PDVSA, for half of its face value, reduced
debt by 10pp of GDP and alleviates the external debt repayment
burden.  Jamaica funded the buyback by issuing USD2 billion in
Eurobonds in July 2015.  The bond issue also prefunded the
repayment of JMD45 billion of a JMD60.9 bil. (3.6% of GDP)
domestic debt maturity in February.  The government made its first
medium-term domestic debt issue since a 2013 restructuring. Re-
establishing market access will help the government to meet a
spike in maturities to 11.6% of GDP in FY2017-2018.  Government
debt repayments in the coming FY2016-2017 are relatively light at
just 3.3% of GDP.

External finances continue to improve.  Lower oil prices slashed
the import bill in 2015 and helped drive down the current account
deficit to 3% of GDP, from 7.7% of GDP in 2014.  Subdued energy
prices, a change in the energy mix and a more competitive Jamaican
dollar promise to keep the CAD in check through 2017.  Tourism and
remittances, the main sources of foreign exchange, are performing
well.  Reserves increased USD441m (or by 17.8%) during 2015,
boosted by external government borrowing, as well as FX purchases
and borrowing by the Bank of Jamaica.  Reserves now cover between
four and five months of current external payments (CXP), closing
the gap with the 'B' median.

Falling energy prices have helped lower inflation to an average of
3.7% in 2015, and allowed the Bank of Jamaica (BoJ) to lower its
policy interest rate by 50bps during 2015 to 5.25%.  The BoJ is
taking steps towards inflation targeting.  Reforms to the
securities dealer sector, which has channelled savings into
government bonds through so-called "retail repos", have reduced
risks to financial stability.  Commercial banks' non-performing
loan portfolios are falling and credit growth is picking up.

Jamaica's 'B' IDRs also reflect the following key rating drivers:

Government debt/GDP is still very high at an estimated 124.7% of
GDP in March 2016, compared with a 'B' median of 52% of GDP and
over 60% of it is denominated in foreign currency.  Fitch's debt
dynamics analysis suggests that public debt including guarantees
will stay above 100% of GDP until 2020, even if the primary
surplus is maintained at 7% of GDP.  Debt interest payments still
consume 27% of revenues, and current spending accounts for over
90% of the total, squeezing the amount available for investment.
While Jamaica has avoided imposing punitive losses on bondholders,
it has twice re-profiled domestic debt (in 2010 and 2013), which
constitutes a default under Fitch's methodology.

Economic growth is a longstanding relative rating weakness for
structural reasons; growth has averaged 0.7% over the past five
years, compared with 4.6% for the 'B' median.  There are signs of
a recovery as the impact of a drought eases, and public employees
receive the first base wage increase after a five-year freeze.
Real GDP grew 1.5% year on year in 3Q15 (July - September 2015),
the latest period for which data is available, and Fitch expects
it to reach 1% year on year in calendar 2015, and 2% in calendar
year 2016.  Growth will be supported by the opening of new and
refurbished capacity in the tourism industry and new private
infrastructure investments such as a major north-south highway,
investment in a port and special economic zones.

Structural indicators such as governance, human development and
per capita income are better than the 'B' median.  Business
environment indicators are improving.  Jamaica rose seven places
in the World Bank 2016 Doing Business survey to 64th place, on a
number of regulatory changes.  As a small open, island economy,
Jamaica is vulnerable to shocks, including natural disasters,
which have adversely affected growth and public finances in the
past.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

These risk factors could individually or collectively lead to
positive rating action:

   -- Higher economic growth and improved fiscal performance
      leading to faster debt reduction.

   -- Further reserve accumulation and strengthening in the
      balance of payments would improve confidence in the Jamaican
      dollar.  This would ease pressure on government solvency and
      inflation.

These factors could lead to a negative rating action:

   -- Failure to adhere to the IMF programme would remove a source
      of balance of payments support and hurt private sector and
      creditor confidence, renewing concerns about fiscal and
      external financing.

   -- A sustained fiscal deterioration that worsens debt dynamics.

   -- Confidence shocks that lead to macroeconomic and financial
      sector instability.

                          KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch expects that the fiscal policy stance will remain broadly
unchanged after the general election called by prime minister
Portia Simpson-Miller for Feb. 25 and that the next government
will adhere to the IMF programme through March 2017.

U.S. growth and employment will underpin steady growth in
remittances, which form the second largest source of hard currency
after tourism.

Oil prices (Brent) will average USD45/b in 2016 and USD55/b in
2017.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


BANCO AHORRO: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlook on Banco
Ahorro Famsa (BAF) to stable from negative.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed the 'B' global scale and 'mxBBB-/mxA-3' national scale
ratings on the bank.

The rating action on Banco Ahorro Famsa follows a similar action
on Grupo Famsa, S.A.B. de C.V.  (Grupo Famsa; B/Stable/--), which
directly owns 100% of BAF.  S&P maintains its view of BAF as core
entity of Grupo Famsa.

The ratings on BAF continue to reflect its core status to Grupo
Famsa, since BAF's business activities are mainly related to the
group.  Also, BAF offers most of its products through the group's
stores as well as customer of its other subsidiaries and
suppliers.  In addition, the bank follows the same strategy as the
group, and has the same risk management controls.  The bank has
weak business position, adequate capital and earnings, very weak
risk position, average funding and adequate liquidity, in S&P's
opinion.

The stable outlook on the global scale ratings reflects that of
its parent, Grupo Famsa, since S&P considers it a core subsidiary;
thus, the ratings on the bank will continue to move in tandem with
those on the parent.  The stable outlook on Grupo Famsa reflects
S&P's view that the company will continue improving its operating
performance amid solid same-store sales (SSS) growth.  S&P also
expects BAF's improved asset quality and stable deposits and
growth in personal loans will support Grupo Famsa's revenues,
given its reliance on banks deposits as a source of funding and on
personal loans as a source of revenues.  This, along with the
company's market position and expertise in the industry, will
allow it to gradually improve its credit metrics with consolidated
(unadjusted) EBITDA margins above 11%.

S&P could lower the ratings in the next 12 months it Grupo Famsa's
expansion program becomes more aggressive than S&P expects,
resulting in higher debt.  S&P could also lower the ratings if the
company faces higher competition due to a weakening economy,
pressuring its revenues and EBITDA growth.  This would result in
debt to EBITDA consistently above 5x and consolidated EBITDA
margin near 10%.

A downgrade on BAF will follow a similar action on Grupo Famsa.
S&P also could downgrade the ratings on BAF if S&P no longer
considers the bank a core subsidiary of Grupo Famsa.

S&P could upgrade Grupo Famsa in the next 12 months if its
strategy at its retail and banking divisions improves the revenues
and EBITDA growth beyond S&P's expectations.  S&P could also raise
the ratings if Grupo Famsa reduces its exposure to the dollar
further than S&P expects, which could boost its cash flow
generation and liquidity.  An upgrade is also possible if Mexico's
economy strengthens beyond S&P's expectations, spurring the SSS
growth with debt to EBITDA consistently below 3x.  Such scenario
could prompt S&P to revise its comparable rating analysis
assessment and/or financial risk profile.

An upgrade on BAF will follow a similar action on Grupo Famsa.


GRUPO FAMSA: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Grupo
Famsa S.A.B. de C.V. (GFamsa) to stable from negative.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' corporate credit and debt ratings
on the company.  The recovery rating of '3L' on the debt remains
unchanged.

The outlook revision reflects GFamsa's improved revenue, SSS
growth, and profitability, which would result in consolidated
(unadjusted including the bank's) EBITDA margins above 11% in
2015, in line with the company's announced preliminary numbers.
S&P expects the unadjusted marginswill be near 11.5% in the next
two years.  The outlook revision also reflects BAF's improved
asset quality and its deposits growth that we expect will reach
the low-double digits in 2015, 2016, and 2017, which will continue
supporting the company's expansion program and a portion of its
working capital needs.  In light of these factors, GFamsa should
maintain relatively stable debt levels and gradually improve its
credit metrics.  Finally, S&P's outlook revision also considers
GFamsa's efforts to reduce its exposure to its dollar-denominated
debt, which will continue strengthening its debt maturity profile
and capital structure.

"GFamsa's business risk profile assessment incorporates our view
that the Mexican retail operations will continue to be GFamsa's
main revenue driver, representing about 87% of its sales in the
next two years.  We also expect the company will continue to
operate in a highly competitive retail industry that, although not
in our base-case scenario, could weaken its profitability amid
more challenging economies in Mexico and the U.S.  We expect the
company to maintain a smaller market share than that of its
domestic peers and a smaller scale than those of regional and
global players.  The mitigating factors are GFamsa's strategy to
enhance its profitability and sales at the retail division, as
well as BAF's improved asset quality through better collection,
control of origination, and strengthening of its platform and
portfolio management.  These factors will maintain GFamsa's
stronger profitability than those of its global and local peers,"
S&P said.

S&P's assessment on GFamsa's financial risk profile incorporates
S&P's view that the company will continue to fund most of its
expansion program and working capital needs with bank deposits and
cash flow generation and, to a lower extent, with debt.  S&P's
assessment also incorporates the company's still-high dollar-
denominated debt which represents about 50% of total after the
refinancing of its euro-denominated commercial paper in January
2016.

S&P believes that it needs a longer track record of a SSS growth
and BAF's solid results in order for GFamsa to align with global
and regional retailers S&P rates that have posted a consistent
revenue growth in the past couple of years.

Moreover, S&P believes that a steep depreciation of the Mexican
peso could undercut the consumers' confidence and maintain a
fierce competition.  Such scenario would increase the risk of a
lower market share for GFamsa because it still faces significant
challenges, including exposure to the dollar, which makes it more
vulnerable than other companies that have low or no exposure to
that currency.


=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================


NICARAGUA: S&P Assigns 'B+' LT Sovereign Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
local and foreign currency sovereign credit ratings to the
Republic of Nicaragua.  The outlook on the long-term ratings is
stable.  S&P also assigned 'B' short-term local and foreign
currency sovereign credit ratings.

S&P also assigned a transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment
of 'BB-' to Nicaragua.

                             RATIONALE

Nicaragua's low per capita income, monetary policy rigidities, and
vulnerability to external shocks constrain the ratings.  The low
general government debt and debt-service burdens, and the
country's political stability support the ratings.

S&P estimates GDP per capita will be just above $2,000 in 2016
despite steady economic growth in recent years.  GDP growth per
capita averaged 2.6% during the last decade, similar to the growth
rate of other countries S&P rates with a similar level of economic
development.  Over the next three years, trend GDP growth is
likely to be just above 4%, assuming stable growth in the U.S.
economy and broad continuity in domestic economic policies.  S&P
projects per capita GDP growth to average 3.2% over the next three
years.  However, the country is vulnerable to commodity price
volatility and to natural disasters.

The combination of a crawling peg exchange rate, a high level of
dollarization, and a small domestic capital market limits the
effectiveness of monetary policy.  The exchange rate is expected
to depreciate 5% annually against the U.S. dollar, contributing to
an average inflation rate likely around 7% during 2016-2019.  The
level of dollarization of the financial system is high.  Dollar
deposits account for 75% of total deposits, while 91% of all loans
are in dollars.

Nicaragua has a low debt burden and favorable debt profile thanks
to debt relief, modest fiscal deficits, and stable economic
performance in recent years.  S&P expects that general government
debt (which includes the central government, the central bank, and
the city of Managua) will increase on average by 3.6% of GDP
annually during 2016-2019 due to both moderate fiscal deficits and
steady planned depreciation of the currency.  S&P projects net
general government debt to be 34% of GDP this year and to remain
broadly stable in 2017-2019.  Moreover, interest payments on the
debt are projected to remain at less than 5% of general government
revenues.

However, the country's shortfall in basic services and
infrastructure is likely to continue to constrain fiscal
flexibility.  All of the general government debt is denominated in
foreign currency or indexed to a foreign currency, which poses a
potential vulnerability to unexpected changes in the exchange
rate.

Nicaragua's political stability and its political consensus on
pragmatic economic policies, as well as its low crime rate
compared with other Latin American countries, should sustain
private-sector investment in the coming three years.  The success
of anticrime policies has largely insulated the country from the
drug-related violence common throughout Central America and Mexico
and has facilitated private investment and tourism.  The
government and the private sector have established formal policy
cooperation through social dialogue and official mechanisms for
consultation.

S&P expects broad continuity in economic policies after the
November 2016 national elections.  However, a weak system of
checks and balances restricts institutional and governance
effectiveness in Nicaragua.  Moreover, although the government has
made important strides in recent years in improving the collection
of economic data and is working to address the issue with the
technical assistance of the International Monetary Fund,
shortcomings in data on the country's balance of payments reduce
transparency.

S&P expects that Nicaragua will be able to manage a potential
sudden loss of funding from Venezuela through its PetroCaribe
program.  Such inflows have diminished in recent years, along with
low oil prices.  A sudden loss of Venezuelan financing could lead
the government to begin paying directly through its budget for
some of the quasifiscal social spending currently undertaken by
other nongovernment companies under the PetroCaribe program.
Under such a scenario, S&P expects that the government will take
additional fiscal measures to contain the negative impact of such
spending on its fiscal deficit.  All debt owed under the
PetroCaribe program is classified as private-sector debt and does
not have a sovereign guarantee.

S&P expects gross external financing needs (current account
payments, short-term debt, plus all other debt maturing within a
year) to average 100% of current account receipts (CARs) and
usable reserves (official reserves less required reserves for
foreign currency bank deposits by residents) for 2016-2019.  S&P
also projects that narrow net external debt (all external debt
less foreign exchange reserves and external liquid assets held by
the rest of the public sector and the financial sector) will be
103% of CARs in 2016.

S&P estimates that contingent liabilities are limited, according
to its criteria.  Total banking-sector assets as a share of GDP
are estimated at 56% in 2015.  S&P believes that contingent
liabilities from public-sector enterprises are also limited.

                              OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Nicaragua will
continue to enjoy a favorable debt profile thanks to moderate
fiscal deficits, good access to official funding on concessional
terms, and steady GDP growth above 4%.  Economic expansion will be
supported by economic diversification and improving physical
infrastructure.  S&P also expects continuity in key economic
policies (fiscal and monetary) in the coming three years.

S&P may raise the ratings over the next year or longer if
Nicaragua is able to substantially strengthen its external
liquidity and reduce its external vulnerabilities.  S&P could also
raise the rating if structural reforms improve public finances and
gradually reduce the general government debt burden.  Moreover,
the ratings could benefit from improvements in the quality of
economic data that reduce uncertainty.

On the other hand, S&P could lower the ratings if external shocks-
-such as slower-than-expected growth in the U.S. economy or
further drops in commodity export prices--increase Nicaragua's
external financing needs as a share of CARs and usable foreign
exchange reserves.  Similarly, the general government debt burden
could increase more than S&P currently expects as a result of
unexpected fiscal slippage or if the government unexpectedly
decides to assume private-sector debt owed under the PetroCaribe
program, leading to a downgrade.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating; Outlook Stable

Nicaragua (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating                B+/Stable/B

New Rating

Nicaragua (Republic of)
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BB-


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


MORGANS HOTEL: FelCor to Sell Royalton and Morgans Hotels
---------------------------------------------------------
Morgans Hotel Group Management LLC entered into amendments to each
of the hotel management agreements relating to Royalton hotel and
Morgans hotel, both owned by affiliates of FelCor Lodging Trust
Incorporated.  In connection with FelCor's potential sale of each
of Royalton and Morgans, Morgans and FelCor agreed to allow FelCor
to sell the hotels unencumbered by the current hotel management
agreements.  Under each of the amendments, FelCor has the right to
terminate the hotel management agreements at any time upon at
least 30 days' prior written notice in exchange for paying Morgans
$3.5 million for each of the hotels upon a termination of each
agreement (for a total of $7.0 million).  FelCor has stated that
it expects that Morgans will continue to manage the hotels for
FelCor until they are sold.

                    About Morgans Hotel Group

Based in New York, Morgans Hotel Group Co. (Nasdaq: MHGC) --
http://www.morganshotelgroup.com/-- is widely credited as the
creator of the first "boutique" hotel and a continuing leader of
the hotel industry's boutique sector.  Morgans Hotel Group
operates and owns, or has an ownership interest in, Morgans,
Royalton and Hudson in New York, Delano and Shore Club in South
Beach, Mondrian in Los Angeles and South Beach, Clift in San
Francisco, Ames in Boston, and Sanderson and St Martins Lane in
London.  Morgans Hotel Group and an equity partner also own the
Hard Rock Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas and related assets.  Morgans
Hotel Group also manages hotels in Isla Verde, Puerto Rico and
Playa del Carmen, Mexico.  Morgans Hotel Group has other property
transactions in various stages of completion, including projects
in SoHo, New York and Palm Springs, California.

Morgans Hotel reported a net loss attributable to common
stockholders of $66.6 million on $235 million of total revenues
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2014, compared with a net loss
attributable to common stockholders of $58.5 million on $236
million of total revenues during the prior year.

As of Sept. 30, 2015, the Company had $515 million in total
assets, $774 million in total liabilities and a $259 million total
deficit.


MORGANS HOTEL: Units Extend Notes and Loans Maturity Date to 2017
-----------------------------------------------------------------
As disclosed in a Form 8-K report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, certain subsidiaries of Morgans Hotel Group
Co. exercised their first option to extend the initial maturity
date of the nonrecourse mortgage notes and the mezzanine loans
outstanding under the Hudson/Delano 2014 Mortgage Loan from Feb.
9, 2016, to Feb. 9, 2017.

In connection with the initial maturity date extensions, the
Borrowers prepaid approximately $28.2 million, with cash on hand,
of outstanding indebtedness under the Hudson/Delano 2014 Mortgage
Loan to satisfy the condition precedent that requires the Debt
Yield (as defined in the agreements governing the Hudson/Delano
2014 Mortgage Loan) to be no less than 7.25% at the time of
exercise of the first extension option.  Following the prepayment,
the aggregate principal amount of indebtedness outstanding under
the Hudson/Delano 2014 Mortgage Loan was reduced from $450 million
to approximately $421.8 million, which provides the Company with
lower leverage and expected annual cash flow savings of
approximately $1.7 million.  In connection with the loan
extension, the Company entered into an interest rate cap
agreement, which effectively caps the interest rate at 5.94%
through the extended maturity date.  Other than the exercise of
the option to extend the initial maturity dates, no other
modifications were made to the terms of the agreements governing
the Hudson/Delano 2014 Mortgage Loan.

The Borrowers entered into the original financing arrangements on
Feb. 6, 2014, with Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. and Bank
of America, N.A., as lenders, consisting of an aggregate principal
amount of $300 million of nonrecourse mortgage notes and an
aggregate principal amount of $150 million of mezzanine loans,
resulting in an aggregate principal amount of $450 million of
indebtedness, secured by mortgages encumbering the Delano South
Beach hotel and the Hudson hotel and pledges of equity interests
in certain subsidiaries of the Company.  Pursuant to the
agreements governing the Hudson/Delano 2014 Mortgage Loan, the
Borrowers have three, one-year extension options that permit them
to extend the maturity date of the Hudson/Delano 2014 Mortgage
Loan to Feb. 9, 2019, if certain conditions are satisfied at the
respective extension dates, including achievement by the Company
of a specified Debt Yield.  After the exercise of the first
extension option on the date hereof, the Company has two, one-year
extension options remaining under the Hudson/Delano 2014 Mortgage
Loan.

                  About Morgans Hotel Group

Based in New York, Morgans Hotel Group Co. (Nasdaq: MHGC) --
http://www.morganshotelgroup.com/-- is widely credited as the
creator of the first "boutique" hotel and a continuing leader of
the hotel industry's boutique sector.  Morgans Hotel Group
operates and owns, or has an ownership interest in, Morgans,
Royalton and Hudson in New York, Delano and Shore Club in South
Beach, Mondrian in Los Angeles and South Beach, Clift in San
Francisco, Ames in Boston, and Sanderson and St Martins Lane in
London.  Morgans Hotel Group and an equity partner also own the
Hard Rock Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas and related assets.  Morgans
Hotel Group also manages hotels in Isla Verde, Puerto Rico and
Playa del Carmen, Mexico.  Morgans Hotel Group has other property
transactions in various stages of completion, including projects
in SoHo, New York and Palm Springs, California.

Morgans Hotel reported a net loss attributable to common
stockholders of $66.6 million on $235 million of total revenues
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2014, compared with a net loss
attributable to common stockholders of $58.5 million on $236
million of total revenues during the prior year.

As of Sept. 30, 2015, the Company had $515 million in total
assets, $774 million in total liabilities and a $259 million total
deficit.


PUERTO RICO: Bondholders Make First Counteroffer to Debt Plan
-------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske at Bloomberg News reports that an investor group
that owns about $1.6 billion of Puerto Rico senior sales-tax bonds
is proposing a plan that would allow them to be repaid in full
rather than accept the discounted amount the commonwealth has
offered under its restructuring proposal.

Goldentree Asset Management, Whitebox Advisors and Metropolitan
Life Insurance are among the bondholders proposing that some
investors of the securities, referred to as Cofinas because of
their Spanish acronym, wait longer to be repaid and avoid
accepting losses on their principal holdings through Puerto Rico's
debt-exchange offer, according to Bloomberg News.  The creditor
plan would still give Puerto Rico the debt-service relief it's
asking for by spreading out payments over time, said Susheel
Kirpalani, a partner at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, which
is representing the investors in negotiations with the
commonwealth.

"Without Congress passing a bill, all these proposals are
worthless," said Matt Dalton, chief executive officer of Rye
Brook, New York-based Belle Haven Investments, which oversees $3.9
billion of municipal bonds, including Puerto Rico securities,
Bloomberg News notes.  "These bondholders can go back and forth,
and demand this, and wish for that, and hope for this, but it's a
problem that has just continued to snowball," Mr. Dalton added.

The commonwealth released a restructuring proposal that would cut
its obligations by 46 percent where investors accept losses in a
voluntary debt exchange, Bloomberg News says.  The Cofinas
proposal is the first sign that Puerto Rico's different creditors,
which include hedge funds, municipal bond mutual-funds, individual
holders and bond-insurance companies, are moving toward presenting
their own alternatives to the commonwealth's plan rather than
offering one unified creditor proposal, notes the report.

"Rather than be just another creditor group that's whining and
complaining and saying -- 'we don't like, we won't give, we won't
do,' -- we're trying to meet the commonwealth where they are,"
Kirpalani said in an interview with Bloomberg News.  The proposal
was submitted, he said.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 28, 2015, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded $1.09
billion of Puerto Rico appropriation bonds issued by the Public
Finance Corporation (PFC) to C from Ca, while maintaining other
ratings assigned to the US territory's debt.


PUERTO RICO: Top Adviser Debates Bond Insurer on Bankruptcy
-----------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske and Alexander Lopez at Bloomberg News report that
the question of whether bankruptcy is a good option for Puerto
Rico came to a head at an investor conference featuring the
island's top restructuring adviser and head of one of the bond
insurers with the most exposure to the commonwealth's securities.

According to Bloomberg News, Jim Millstein, founder of Millstein &
Co. and the commonwealth's restructuring expert, said bankruptcy
would help bring all creditors together to make concessions.
Nader Tavakoli, the chief executive officer of Ambac Financial
Group, which guarantees repayment on $10.4 billion of Puerto Rico
principal and interest payments through 2054, disagrees, notes the
report.

The island needs to reduce spending and must repay its
obligations, Mr. Tavakoli said, which sparked applause at the 2016
Puerto Rico Investment Summit in San Juan, where hedge-fund
manager John Paulson is a keynote speaker, reports Bloomberg News.

"Bankruptcy is a huge mistake," Tavakoli said during the panel
with Millstein and Lisa Donahue, chief restructuring officer of
the island's main power provider, the report relays.  "Puerto Rico
has a liquidity problem, not a solvency problem.  Also, Puerto
Rico has a spending problem," she added.

Bloomberg News notes that commonwealth officials have lobbied the
Congress to allow it to access bankruptcy, a provision that U.S.
territories don't have.  They say it would better allow Puerto
Rico to pull together its various creditors -- hedge funds, mutual
funds, individual bondholders and insurance companies -- that hold
or guarantee a range of commonwealth securities with different
repayment pledges and legal protections.  For Tavakoli and other
bond-insurance companies, granting bankruptcy access would change
the rules in the middle of the game and not address the island's
structural problems, he said.

Bloomberg News relays that congressional lawmakers are working on
legislation that may give Puerto Rico some sort of bankruptcy
powers and also implement a federal control board that would
manage budgets and debt issuance.  House Speaker Paul Ryan has
asked members to craft legislation by the end of March to help the
commonwealth address its debt crisis.

Puerto Rico unveiled its restructuring proposal, which seeks to
reduce its obligations by 46 percent through a voluntary debt
exchange, notes the report. Recovery rates on the island's
different securities range from 39 percent to 72 percent,
Bloomberg News adds.

After years of borrowing by various administrations to fill budget
gaps, Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla in June 2015 said the
island was unable to repay all of its obligations on time and in
full and would ask investors to take losses, Bloomberg News says.
Two Puerto Rico agencies have defaulted on debt payments since
then, the report recalls.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 28, 2015, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded $1.09
billion of Puerto Rico appropriation bonds issued by the Public
Finance Corporation (PFC) to C from Ca, while maintaining other
ratings assigned to the US territory's debt.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: Chinese Finance to Region Soars to $29 Billion in 2015
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Chinese loans to Latin American and
Caribbean governments and that region's state-owned firms climbed
sharply in 2015 despite the global economic slowdown, rising to
$29 billion and focused once again on Venezuela, Brazil and
Ecuador, the Inter-American Dialogue public policy think tank said
in its annual report.

The volume of finance was the highest since 2010 and marked a
nearly 200 percent increase from the $10 billion registered in
2014, according to EFE News.

Chinese bilateral loans eclipsed the combined lending to the
region by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and
the Development Bank of Latin America, known as the CAF, Kevin
Gallaher, a Boston University professor and coordinator of the
report, said at a press conference, the report notes.

The report relates that Mr. Gallagher said the data showed that
China was increasing its lending to Latin America at a time of
cutbacks by other institutions, including the World Bank and the
IDB, whose loans to the region fell to $8 billion and $11.5
billion last year, a decline of 8 percent and 14 percent,
respectively.

Mr. Gallagher added that a key development this year was that a
majority of the Chinese loans were for infrastructure projects as
opposed to the extractive industries, the report notes.

Brazil received $10.65 billion last year, followed by Venezuela
with $10 billion and Ecuador with $7 billion, the report relays.

Bolivia received $850 million in state-to-state financing from
China, while Costa Rica and Barbados obtained $400 million and
$170 million, respectively, the report adds.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Feb. 8 to Feb. 12, 2016
---------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name     Cpn   Bid Price Maturity Date Country    Curr
-----------     ---   --------- ------------- -------    ----
PDVSA            8.5     56.25   11/2/2017      VE       USD
PDVSA           12.75    53.5    2/17/2022      VE       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd     8.87    65.5    3/19/2018      CN       USD
Venezuela       12.75    52.5    8/23/2022      VE       USD
PDVSA            5.25    47.5    4/12/2017      VE       USD
PDVSA            5.37    34.65   4/12/2027      VE       USD
PDVSA            6        6.5   11/15/2026      VE       USD
Venezuela        5.75    61.5    2/26/2016      VE       USD
PDVSA            9.75    46      5/17/2035      VE       USD
Venezuela       11.95    49      8/5/2031       VE       USD
PDVSA            6       37.5    5/16/2024      VE       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd     9       82      6/6/2019       CN       USD
PDVSA            9       43.5   11/17/2021      VE       USD
PDVSA            5.5     36.9    4/12/2037      VE       USD
Venezuela       13.62    56      8/15/2018      VE       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd    10.25    69       1/8/2020      CN       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd    12.87   108       9/18/2017     CN       USD
Odebrecht Oil
& Gas Finance
Ltd              7       68                     KY       USD
CSN Islands
XII Corp         7       74.5                   BR       USD
Venezuela        8.25    44      10/13/2024     VE       USD
Honghua Group
Ltd              7.45    58.5     9/25/2019     CN       USD
PDVSA            5.12    53.48    10/28/2016    VE       USD
Venezuela        7.75    42.5     10/13/2019    VE       USD
Banco do Brasil
SA/Cayman        6.25    75                     KY       USD
Venezuela        7       44.5     12/1/2018     VE       USD
Venezuela        9       44.5      5/7/2023     VE       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd     6.87    74.423    4/22/2016    CN       CNY
Venezuela        9.37    44.5      1/13/2034    VE       USD
Venezuela        6       39       12/9/2020     VE       USD
Venezuela        7       40.5      3/31/2038    VE       USD
CA La
Electricidad
de Caracas       8.5     40        4/10/2018    VE       USD
Venezuela        9.25    44.5      5/7/2028     VE       USD
Offshore Group
Investment Ltd   7.5     74.87    11/1/2019     KY       USD
Venezuela        7.65    35.5      4/21/2025    VE       USD
Automotores
Gildemeister SA  8.25    45.87     5/24/2021    CL       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd     8       70       12/20/2015    CN       CNY
Venezuela       13.625   48        8/15/2018    VE       USD
Agile Property
Holdings Ltd     8.25    75.05                  CN       USD
McDermott
International
Inc              8       70.5      5/1/2021     US       USD
USJ Acucar e
Alcool SA        9.875   73       11/9/2019     BR       USD
Tonon
Bioenergia SA    9.25    62.3      1/24/2020    BR       USD
Offshore Group
Investment Ltd   7.125   68.06     4/1/2023     KY       USD
Automotores
Gildemeister SA  6.75    44.75     1/15/2023    CL       USD
SMU SA           7.75    76.5      2/8/2020     CL       USD
Mongolian
Mining Corp      8.87    66.5      3/29/2017    MN       USD
Polarcus Ltd     8       40.08     6/7/2018     AE       USD
PSOS Finance
Ltd              11.75   75        4/23/2018    KY       USD
PDVSA             8.5    57.45    11/2/2017     VE       USD
Herbalife Ltd     2      73.7      8/15/2019    US       USD
Cia Energetica
de Sao Paulo      9.75   72.87     1/15/2015    BR       BRL
BA-CA Finance
Cayman Ltd        1.21   63.249                 KY       EUR
Hidili Industry
International
Development Ltd   8.625  76       11/4/2015     CN       USD
China Precious
Metal Resources
Holdings Co Ltd   7.25   52.067    2/4/2018     HK       HKD
Inversora de
Electrica de
Buenos Aires SA   6.5     28.5     9/26/2017    AR       USD
NQ Mobile Inc     4       70.448  10/15/2018    CN       USD
Glorious Property
Holdings Ltd      13.25   71.971   3/4/2018     HK       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd       8.875  93.5     3/19/2018    CN       USD
PDVSA              6      37.63   11/15/2026    VE       USD
PDVSA             12.75   51.83    2/17/2022    VE       USD
Polarcus Ltd       8.9    39.854   7/8/2019     AE       NOK
Polarcus Ltd       2.87   68.7     4/27/2016    AE       USD
Empresa
Distribuidora
Y Comercializadora
Norte              9.75    72.42  10/25/2022    AR       USD
PDVSA              6       39.65   5/16/2024    VE       USD
Argentina Bond     1.18     8.12  12/31/2038    AR       ARS
Venezuela Bond    13.625   50.941  8/15/2018    VE       USD
McDermott
International Inc  8       84.5    5/1/2021     US       USD
Tonon
Bioenergia SA      9.25    71      1/24/2020    BR       USD
Argentina
Bonar Bonds       23.00    5.5     9/10/2015    AR       ARS
BCP Finance Co     2.15   61.25                 KY       EUR
Newland
International
Properties Corp    9.5     32      7/3/2017     PA       USD
BA-CA Finance
Cayman 2 Ltd       2.03    62.31                KY       EUR
Odebrecht Oil
& Gas Finance
Ltd                7       69                   KY       USD
PDVSA              9       44     11/17/2021    VE       USD
Honghua Group
Ltd                7.45    58.5    9/25/2019    CN       USD
Argentine Bonad
Bonds              2.4     68      3/18/2018    AR       USD
Automotores
Gildemeister SA    8.25    60      5/24/2021    CL       USD
PDVSA              9.75    43      5/17/2035    VE       USD
Automotores
Gildemeister SA    6.75    59.5    1/15/2023    CL       USD
ESFG
International
Ltd                5.753    0.68                KY       EUR
Greenfields
Petroleum Corp     9        20     5/31/2017    US       CAD
USJ Acucar e
Alcool SA          9.87     73     11/9/2019    BR       USD
CSN Islands
XII Corp           7        73.99               BR       USD
SMU SA             7.75     75.25   2/8/2020    CL       USD
Mongolian
Mining Corp        8.875    66.5    3/29/2017   MN       USD
Banco do Brasil
SA/Cayman          6.25     74                  KY       USD
Argentina Bocon    2        42.288  1/3/2016    AR       ARS
Venezuela
TICC Bond          6.25     73.195  4/6/2017    VE       USD
Hidili Industry
International
Development Ltd    8.625    75      11/4/2015   CN       USD
Cia Energetica
de Sao Paulo       9.75     72.87    1/15/2015  BR       BRL
Venezuela TICC
Bond               5.25     52.627   3/21/2019  VE       USD
Newland
International
Properties Corp    9.5      47       7/3/2017   PA       USD
Empresa
Distribuidora
Y Comercializadora
Norte              9.75     72     10/25/2022   AR       USD
Banif Finance
Ltd                1.449                        KY       EUR
BPI
Capital
Finance Ltd        2.63     39.5               KY       EUR
Cia Cervecerias
Unidas SA          4        51.90  12/1/2024   CL       CLP
Banco BPI
SA/Cayman Islands  4.15     71.37  11/14/2035  KY       EUR
Argentina Bond     5.83     14     12/31/2033  AR       ARS
Cia Sud
Americana
de Vapores SA      6.4      58.45  10/1/2022   CL       CLP
Venezuela TICC
Bond               9.12     74.29   9/15/2017  VE       USD
Venezuela Bond     9.25     48      9/15/2027  VE       USD
Ruta del Bosque
Sociedad
Concesionaria SA   6.3      69.2    3/15/2021  CL       CLP
Talca Chillan
Sociedad
Concesionaria SA   2.75     47.78  12/15/2019  CL       CLP
Venezuela Bond    11.75     50.5   10/21/2026  VE       USD
Provincia
de Rio Negro       1.6716   72      5/4/2024   AR       ARS
Provincia
Corrientes         0.0204    8      1/1/2016   AR       ARS
Provincia del
Chaco              4        61.25  12/4/2026   AR       USD
Decimo Primer
Fideicomiso de
Bonos de
Prestamos
Hipotecar         4.54       59    10/25/2041  PA       USD
Decimo Primer
Fideicomiso de
Bonos de
Prestamos
Hipotecar          6         70.8  10/25/2041  PA       USD
Empresa de los
Ferrocarriles
del Estado         6.5       69.91   1/1/2026  CL       CLP



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *