TCRLA_Public/160224.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, February 24, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 38


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Can Drop Injunctions to Pay Debt, Judge Says
FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Rating on Certs.


B E R M U D A

ORTHO-CLINICAL BERMUDA: S&P Assigns 'B-' Corporate Credit Rating


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Battered Carmakers Say Worst Isn't Over as Job Cuts Loom
BRAZIL: OECD Sees 2016 Recession Deepening to 4 Percent Drop
DUKE ENERGY: S&P Lowers Global Scale Credit Rating to 'BB'
MINAS GERAIS: S&P Lowers GS LT FC and LC Credit Rating to 'BB-'
SUL AMERICA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-term LC and FC IDRs


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

336263 LIMITED: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
AFRICA HORIZONS: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
ALTANA CORPORATE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
AUDLEY INVESTMENTS I: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
AUDLEY INVESTMENTS II: Members Receive Wind-Up Report

BINJAI HILL: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
BINJAI HILL (NON-US FEEDER): Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
CASCABEL FUND: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
CHINA CHAMPION: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
CHINA CHAMPION HOLDINGS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

CONUS FUND: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
EIP ENERGY: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
I.A.P. LIMITED: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
NAKKAR INVESTMENT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
RAMIUS CONVERTIBLE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

RAMIUS CREDIT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
RAMIUS CREDIT SEGREGATED: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
RAMIUS ENTERPRISE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
RAMIUS MULTI-STRATEGY (EURO): Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
T.A.M.P. LIMITED: Members Receive Wind-Up Report


M E X I C O

AXTEL S.A.B.: Posts MXN2,832MM Revenue in Fourth Quarter 2015
AXTEL S.A.B.: Shareholders Approve Merger With Alestra
AXTEL S.A.B.: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB' & Removes from Watch Positive
AXTEL S.A.B.: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3; Outlook Stable


P U E R T O    R I C O

DORAL FINANCIAL: Banco Popular Buys P.R. Buildings for $21.8MM


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Can Drop Injunctions to Pay Debt, Judge Says
-------------------------------------------------------
Carmen Germaine at Law360.com reports that a New York federal
judge has indicated he is willing to lift court orders restricting
Argentina's ability to pay individual bondholders, saying the
injunctions are no longer necessary now that Argentina's new
president has proposed a $6.5 billion settlement to end debt
default litigation.

Argentina asked the Second Circuit to remand its appeal of some of
the so-called pari passu injunctions, which require the country to
make ratable payments to all bondholder groups, according to
Law360.com.

                           *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in Nov. 27,
2015, that Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
Argentina's Caa1 issuer rating to positive from stable.  The
outlook on Argentina's (P)Caa2 foreign legislation and
restructured local legislation foreign currency obligations is
also changed to positive from stable.  The outlook change is based
on Moody's view that the accession of president-elect Mauricio
Macri of the Cambiemos ("Let's Change") coalition will raise the
probability of credit positive policies being implemented,
including arriving at a resolution with holdout creditors, one of
Argentina's key credit constraints.

On Aug. 1, 2014, reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its
debt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a
US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a
court- appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff
between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking full
payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.  A
U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed.  The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.

On April 22, 2015, Moody's Investors Service expanded the portion
of Argentina's debt that is rated (P)Caa2. The (P)Caa2 rating
reflects the higher risk of default for both Argentina's
restructured foreign legislation debt (as before) and,
additionally now, its restructured local legislation foreign
currency obligations, as compared with the risk of default on
other debt instruments issued by Argentina.  Argentina's local
currency debt and its non-restructured foreign currency debt are
rated Caa1. The debt that remains in default since Argentina's
2001 default is rated Ca.


FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Rating on Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
withdrawn the Caa1 / Baa2.ar of the VRDA, the Caa1 / Baa2.ar of
the VRDB and the Ca / Ca.ar ratings of the certificates of
Fideicomiso Financiero EISA 2014 due to business reasons.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.


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B E R M U D A
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ORTHO-CLINICAL BERMUDA: S&P Assigns 'B-' Corporate Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its corporate credit
rating on Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics Inc. (OCD) to 'B-' from 'B'.
The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our issue-level rating on
the company's senior secured facilities to 'B-' from 'B'. The
recovery rating remains '3', reflecting our expectation for
meaningful (50% to 70%, at the higher end of the range) recovery
in the event of default.

"We also lowered our issue-level rating on the company's senior
unsecured notes to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'. The recovery rating on this
debt remains '6', reflecting our expectation for negligible (0% to
10%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

"Subsequently to the downgrade, we are withdrawing our 'B-'
corporate credit rating on OCD. At the same time, we are assigning
a 'B-' corporate credit rating to Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics
Bermuda Co. Ltd. because the company's financial statements are
consolidated under Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics Bermuda Co. Ltd.'s
name. It is also the parent and the owner of both OCD's
international and U.S. operations."

The issue-level ratings will remain assigned to Ortho-Clinical
Diagnostics Inc. and Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics S.A., which are
the co-borrowers of the company's debt. S&P views the debt issuing
subsidiaries as core to the OCD group based on similar names and
businesses, along with their significant contribution to the
consolidated entity.

"The rating downgrade follows Ortho-Clinical's continued operating
underperformance lasting for several quarters," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Maryna Kandrukhin. OCD's projected 2015
revenue and EBITDA (both adjusted to include the Day 2 countries)
are trending below our previous projections, by around $150
million and $100 million, respectively. When combined with
significant stand-alone costs, this resulted in leverage of more
than 8.0x and a $114 million cash flow deficit for the first three
quarters of 2015.

"While we recognize that the company's revenues and earnings
suffered substantially from the unfavorable currency environment
in 2015 (which we consider temporary), we think OCD's business
continues to face meaningful challenges that account for the rest
of operating weakness. In our view, OCD's competitive position has
materially weakened over the last year. This manifests through
continued pricing pressures, the company's struggle to defend its
market share in the U.S. and Europe, and few new product launches.
In addition, we recognize there is still a significant risk to the
company's ability to effectively operate as a stand-alone entity,
given how long the transition period is taking," said S&P.

S&P's stable rating outlook reflects its expectation that in 2016
Ortho-Clinical's revenue will remain relatively flat and EBITDA
margin will remain in the mid-20% area. While S&P expects
continued separation costs to result in cash flow deficit
persisting though 2016, S&P thinks the company's $140 million cash
balance will be sufficient to cover separation costs and provide
necessary liquidity for the remainder of the transition period.
S&P expects Ortho-Clinical to start generating modest free
operating cash flow in 2017.

S&P said, "We could consider a higher rating if the company
successfully completes its separation from Johnson & Johnson,
stabilizes its operating performance, and starts expanding market
share. This would be evidenced by stable margins at or higher than
our projections, healthy positive cash flow generation, and
low-to-mid-single-digit revenue growth, in line with the in-vitro
diagnostic market. We think, over the next few years, the
company's profitability will be pressured by increased investments
into research and development (R&D) and selling, general, and
administrative (SG&A), so we view an upgrade as unlikely over the
next 12 months. However, if the resulting innovation and new
product launches help the company regain its competitive strength
and pricing power over time, and it is evidenced by revenue
growth, improved stable margins, and healthy cash flow generation,
we could consider a higher rating.

"We see two paths to a potential downgrade. In the short term, we
could consider a 'CCC' rating category if Ortho-Clinical's
separation process requires significantly more investment than
expected, resulting in depleted liquidity position and
jeopardizing the company's ability to meet its short-term
financial obligations.

The longer-term path would materialize if, post-transition, the
company's operating performance continues to deteriorate.
Currently, the company does not have much headroom for further
performance deterioration. While we assume 2016 still will be a
transition year for Ortho-Clinical, if in 2017 the company's
revenues continue to decline at a single-digit-rate, its EBITDA
margin further contracts by around 150 basis points, and cash flow
deficit persists, we will likely deem OCD's capital structure
unsustainable and will consider a 'CCC' rating category."



===========
B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Battered Carmakers Say Worst Isn't Over as Job Cuts Loom
----------------------------------------------------------------
Leonardo Lara and Fabiola Moura at Bloomberg News report that
Brazilian car manufacturers are bracing for more job cuts as a
once-in-a-century recession in Latin America's largest economy
drags on.

Idle capacity at Brazil's 65 car plants has skyrocketed to 30
percent after vehicle sales tumbled 27 percent in 2015 from the
previous year, according to Luiz Moan Yabiku Junior, president of
the national automakers association known as Anfavea. Already,
carmakers have fired almost 15,000 people in 2015, according to
Bloomberg News.

"Companies need to have a positive outlook in order to maintain
that personnel surplus without work," Moan said in an interview at
Bloomberg's Sao Paulo office.  "If we don't have that outlook, the
way to go is to adjust the workforce."

Halfway through a two-year recession that's forecast to be the
worst since at least 1901, Brazil finds itself stuck in a grinding
cycle of job loss and falling consumer spending, Bloomberg News
notes.   National unemployment has climbed to 9 percent as retail
sales tank and industrial production contracts for 22 straight
months, government reports show, Bloomberg News says.

While Anfavea expects auto sales to fall 7.5 percent more this
year, even that estimate may prove to be overly optimistic,
Bloomberg News relays.  The association's January forecast was
based on a 2.9 percent economic contraction in 2016.  But
economists in the most recent central bank survey published say
Brazil is set to shrink 3.4 percent, Bloomberg News notes.

That leaves carmakers searching for ways to further trim their
labor costs, Mr. Moan said, Bloomberg News discloses.   In
addition to the job cuts, companies have also placed 6,000
employees on mandatory leave and cut back the hours of 36,000
others as part of a government-subsidized program that aims to
minimize job losses during economic rough patches, Mr. Moan added.
As part of the program, carmakers agree to hang onto workers in
exchange for the government covering part of the salaries,
Bloomberg News says.

FCA Fiat Chrysler Automoveis do Brasil Ltda. and General Motors do
Brasil Ltda., the two biggest carmakers operating in Brazil,
declined to comment.

"In 40 years working in this industry, I've never seen such a
complicated situation," Bloomberg News quoted Mr. Moan as saying.
Last year was "much worse" than expected because of political
turmoil and a corruption scandal that's hindering efforts to
kickstart the economy, Bloomberg News discloses.  "We can't keep
mixing politics with economics because everyone loses," Mr. Moran
added.


BRAZIL: OECD Sees 2016 Recession Deepening to 4 Percent Drop
------------------------------------------------------------
David Biller at Bloomberg News reports that the OECD more than
doubled its forecast for Brazil's 2016 recession, projecting it
will be even worse than last year.  That makes it more bearish
than the International Monetary Fund and most analysts surveyed by
Bloomberg.

Brazil's economy will contract 4 percent this year after a 3.8
percent recession in 2015, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development said in a report, Bloomberg News
notes.  The 2016 forecast was revised down from a prior 1.2
percent decline, and is worse than estimates of all but two of 35
analysts surveyed by Bloomberg.  Their median forecast is for a
2.8 percent drop this year after a 3.7 percent decline last year.

Latin America's largest economy is sinking as demand withers,
notes Bloomberg News. Consumers who for most of the past decade
have been Brazil's growth engine have had their confidence shot by
rising joblessness and double-digit inflation, according to
Bloomberg News.  At the same time, investment has been rattled by
the nation's largest-ever corruption scandal, and the government
is struggling to implement a fiscal adjustment to shore up its
finances, Bloomberg News says.

"Looking at the data we've had over the last couple of weeks, we
don't seem to be out of the woods yet," Jens Arnold, head of the
OECD's Brazil desk, told Bloomberg News by phone from Paris.
"There is still a lot of negative news, and that's why we're still
continuously revising downward," he added.

Last month, the International Monetary Fund cut its outlook for
Brazil's economic activity to a 3.5 percent contraction this year
after a 3.8 percent decline in 2015, Bloomberg News says.  Like
the IMF, the OECD forecasts stagnation for 2017, down from a prior
forecast for 1.8 percent growth, Bloomberg News notes.

Standard & Poor's downgraded Brazil's sovereign debt to the
second-highest junk rating, saying a prolonged fiscal adjustment
and political uncertainty are preventing the economy from resuming
growth.  The ratings company forecasts a contraction of about 3
percent in 2016, following a 3.6 percent recession last year.
Brazil's statistics agency will release fourth-quarter GDP data on
March 3, notes the report.

The OECD report cited ongoing political uncertainty and rising
inflation as prompting the deeper 2016 recession in Brazil,
Bloomberg News discloses.  The OECD's less optimistic view for
global economic growth also dragged down the forecast, Mr. Arnold
said, Bloomberg News notes.


DUKE ENERGY: S&P Lowers Global Scale Credit Rating to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
"On Feb. 17, 2016, we lowered our foreign and local currency
ratings on the Federative Republic of Brazil to 'BB/B' from
'BB+/B' and to 'BB/B' from 'BBB-/A-3', respectively. The outlook
is negative.  We also revised downward our transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'."

"We have also lowered our national scale rating on Brazil to
'brAA-' from 'brAAA' and maintain the negative outlook on this
rating. As a result, we're taking negative rating actions on 17
Brazilian  infrastructure entities and three project finance
transactions. We will continue monitoring economic conditions to
incorporate further potential impacts on these companies'
ratings."

On Feb. 18, 2016, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various
rating actions on 20 Brazilian infrastructure entities and project
finance transactions.

S&P lowered the global scale credit ratings to 'BB' and the
national scale credit ratings to 'brAA-' on the following two
entities:

Duke Energy International Geracao Paranapanema S.A.; and
Itaipu Binacional.

The outlook on these ratings remains negative.

S&P affirmed the 'BB' global scale credit rating and revised its
outlook on Investimentos e Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A.
Invepar to negative from stable. S&P also lowered the national
scale credit rating on the company and on its core subsidiary
Concessionaria Auto Raposo Tavares S.A. to 'brA+' from 'brAA-'.
The outlook on these ratings is negative.

S&P lowered the national scale credit ratings to 'brAA-' on the
following entities:

Atlantia Bertin Concessoes S.A.;
Rodovia das Colinas S.A.;
Triangulo do Sol Auto-Estradas S.A.;
Concessionaria Ecovias dos Imigrantes S.A.;
Ecorodovias Concessoes e Servicos S.A.;
Santos Brasil Participacoes S.A.;
Autopista Planalto Sul S/A.; and
Arteris S.A.
The outlook on these ratings is negative.

S&P also lowered the national scale credit ratings to 'brAA-' and
kept them on CreditWatch with negative implications on the
following companies:

CCR S.A.;
Autoban - Concessionaria do Sistema Anhanguera Bandeirantes S.A.;
Concessionaria da Rodovia Presidente Dutra S.A.; and
Rodonorte Concessionaria de Rodovias Integradas S.A.

S&P also lowered the national scale issue-level ratings to 'brAA-'
on the following companies:

Cachoeira Paulista Transmissora de Energia S.A.;
Baesa - Energetica Barra Grande S.A.;
CCR S.A.;
Autoban - Concessionaria do Sistema Anhanguera Bandeirantes S.A.;
Concessionaria da Rodovia Presidente Dutra S.A.
Autopista Planalto Sul S/A.;
Arteris S.A.;
Concessionaria Ecovias dos Imigrantes S.A.;
Ecorodovias Concessoes e Servicos S.A.; and
Santos Brasil Participacoes S.A.

The outlook on Cachoeira Paulista's issue-level rating is
negative, while CCR and its subsidiaries' issues remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P lowered the national scale issue-level ratings on Rodovia das
Colinas S.A and Triangulo do Sol Auto-Estradas S.A. to 'brAA'.

S&P lowered the national scale issue-level ratings Auto Raposo
Tavares and Iracema Transmissora de Energia to 'brA+'. The outlook
on Iracema's issue-level rating is negative.

Finally, S&P lowered the 'brAA-' preliminary national scale issue-
level rating on Metrobarra to 'brA+'. The outlook is negative.

The rating action on the Republic of Brazil reflects its
considerable political and economic challenges and S&P's
expectation of a now more prolonged adjustment process with a
slower correction in fiscal policy as well as another year of
steep economic contraction. Execution risks to corrective
fiscal policy remain high in the near term following the inability
to pass some budgetary measures in late 2015, which are now
complicated by impeachment proceedings. With a GDP per capita
expected to decline to about $7,300 in 2016, Brazil's growth
prospects are, in our opinion, below that of other countries at
similar stage of development. S&P estimates that real GDP
contracted by 3.6% in 2015 and expect S&P to contract again 3%
this year, before resuming growth in 2017. The negative outlook on
the sovereign reflects S&P's view that there is a greater than a
one in three likelihood that S&P could lower Brazil's ratings
again. In S&P's view, a downgrade in 2017 could stem in
particular from potential key policy reversals given the fluid
political dynamics, including lack of cohesion within the cabinet,
inconsistent policy initiatives, and uncertainties during or
following the impeachment process. A downgrade could also result
from greater economic turmoil than S&P currently expects either
due to governability or the weakened external environment.

Once political uncertainties settle, restoring macroeconomic
balance and advancing microeconomic reform will be key to support
investment and growth. During 2015, the government placed renewed
emphasis on private-sector participation in infrastructure
projects, but advancements currently have been slow.

The downgrade of Duke, Atlantia Bertin, Santos Brasil, Baesa,
Ecorodovias, CCR, and Arteris to 'brAA-' reflects S&P's view of an
appreciable likelihood that they would default under a scenario in
which the sovereign defaults on its obligations. These entities
would follow the sovereign in a default scenario because S&P
believes that their regulated status and/or dependency on
the economic activity make them vulnerable if the sovereign's
credit quality deteriorates (i.e. potential tariff controls,
revenue collection, and credit availability would suffer in such
scenario). CCR's ratings remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications, reflecting S&P's view of the company's refinancing
risk due to significant maturities in the next 12 months. Absent a
successful implementation of the ongoing refinancing strategy, S&P
could further downgrade CCR within the next 90 days.

The downgrade of Planalto Sul, Autoban, Rodonorte, Rodovia
Presidente Dutra, Ecovias, Rodovia das Colinas, and Triangulo do
Sol to 'brAA-' reflects their importance within their respective
economic groups and to their parents, Arteris, in the case of
Planalto; CCR in the case of Autoban, Rodonorte, and Rodovia
Presidente Dutra; Ecorodovias in the case of Ecovias; and Atlantia
Bertin in the case of Rodovia das Colinas and Triangulo do Sol.

S&P lowered the issue-level ratings on Rodovia das Colinas and
Triangulo do Sol to 'brAA', which is one notch higher than their
corporate credit ratings, given the recovery prospects of their
rated obligations.

The downgrade of Cachoeira Paulista's senior secured debt to
'brAA-' reflects S&P's view that the project would likely default
under a scenario where the sovereign defaults on its obligations
due to the regulated nature of the company's business.

S&P said, "We affirmed Invepar's global scale credit rating but
revised the outlook to negative to reflect our view of an
appreciable likelihood that the company would default under a
scenario where the sovereign defaults on its obligations. We also
lowered Invepar's national scale credit rating to 'brA+' to
reflect our view that in addition to not passing a sovereign
default scenario, the company has a weaker credit standing than
those that we downgraded to the sovereign level. The main
difference is related to Invepar's aggressive financial risk
profile, which leads us to differentiate between entities on the
Brazilian national scale. Our issue-level senior secured debt
rating on Invepar continues to be one notch below the issuer
credit rating on the group, because it incorporates the structural
subordination to priority liabilities at the operating
subsidiaries' level. The downgrade of Concessionaria Auto Raposo
Tavares to 'brA+' reflects its core status for its parent company,
Invepar. In addition, the downgrade of Metrobarra's notes to
preliminary 'brA+' due to the existence of a guarantee from its
owner, Invepar.

"We downgraded Iracema's senior secured debt to 'brA+' to reflect
our view that in addition to not passing a sovereign default
scenario, the project has a weaker credit quality than other
entities rated at the sovereign level."

The downgrade of Itaipu Binacional is in line with S&P's criteria
for government-related entities (GREs). S&P said, "We view the
likelihood of extraordinary government support for Itaipu
Binacional as extremely high, so all its ratings are equalized
with those on the sovereign at this point, considering the
company's 'bb' stand-alone credit profile (SACP). The outlook on
global and national scale credit ratings on Itaipu Binacional is
negative, reflecting that of the sovereign."

S&P said, "We will continue to assess the overall credit quality
of the infrastructure portfolio in light of the sovereign's
weakening credit quality and gloomier macroeconomic prospects."

The negative outlook on Itaipu Binacional, Duke, Atlantia Bertin,
Santos Brasil, Baesa, Ecorodovias, CCR, Cachoeira Paulista, and
Arteris reflects their downgrade potential following the
sovereign's downgrade because S&P believes these entities would
not be able to  withstand a sovereign default scenario. In
addition, the outlook reflects S&P's view that credit quality for
the Brazilian infrastructure sector may continue to deteriorate in
the next 12 months based on a weaker operating environment
(including higher inflation, GDP contraction, and gradual
devaluation of the domestic currency), and tighter credit
conditions, which could in turn trigger specific company
downgrades.

The negative outlook on Planalto Sul, Autoban, Rodonorte, Rodovia
Presidente Dutra, Ecovias, Rodovia das Colinas, and Triangulo do
Sol reflects their downgrade potential following a downgrade of
their parent companies, Arteris, CCR, Ecorodovias, and Atlantia
Bertin, to which these entities are core.

The negative outlook on Invepar and Iracema also reflects S&P's
view that credit quality for the Brazilian infrastructure sector
may continue to deteriorate in the next 12 months based on a
weaker operating environment, and more challenging refinancing
scenarios. In addition, a downgrade of the sovereign of more than
one notch on national scale would also result in a downgrade of
these two entities because S&P doesn't believe they could
withstand a sovereign default scenario.

If S&P upgrades the sovereign or revise outlook to stable, the
ratings or outlook on Duke, Atlantia Bertin and its subsidiaries,
Santos Brasil, Baesa, Ecorodovias and the latter's subsidiaries,
Cachoeira Paulista and Arteris, are likely to follow the same
path.

An outlook revision on, or an upgrade of, Itaipu Binacional would
follow a similar action on the sovereign.

More unlikely, if S&P changes its view of all these companies'
ability to withstand a hypothetical sovereign stress scenario, S&P
could evaluate differentiating their ratings from that of the
sovereign.

An upgrade of Invepar, Iracema, and CCR is unlikely at this point,
but it would require improvements on both the sovereign as well as
the companies' financial profile.

RATINGS LIST

                         To                           From

Itaipu Binacional
  Local Currency       BB/Negative/--       BBB-/Negative/--
  Foreign Currency     BB/Negative/--       BB+/Negative/--
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAAA/Negative/--

Duke Energy International Geracao Paranapanema S.A.
  Local Currency       BB/Negative/--       BBB-/Negative/--
  Foreign Currency     BB/Negative/--       BBB-/Negative/--
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAAA/Negative/--

Santos Brasil Participacoes S.A.
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAA+/Negative/--
  Sr. Unsecured Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-                brAA+

CCR S.A.
Rodonorte Concessionaria de Rodovias Integradas S.A.
Autoban - Concessionaria do Sistema Anhanguera Bandeirantes S.A.
Concessionaria da Rodovia Presidente Dutra S.A.
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Watch Neg/--   brAA/Watch Neg/--
  Sr. Unsecured Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Watch Neg/--   brAA/Watch Neg/--

Rodovia das Colinas S.A.
Triangulo do Sol Auto-Estradas S.A.
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAA+/Negative/--
  Sr. Secured Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA                 brAAA

Atlantia Bertin Concessoes S.A.
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAA+/Negative/--

Arteris S.A.
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAA+/Negative/--
  Sr. Unsecured Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-                brAA+
  Sr. Secured Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-                brAA+

Autopista Planalto Sul S/A.
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAA+/Negative/--
  Sr. Unsecured Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-                brAA+

Ecorodovias Concessoes e Servicos S.A.
Concessionaria Ecovias dos Imigrantes S.A.
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAA+/Negative/--
  Sr. Unsecured Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-                brAA+

Investimentos e Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A.
- Invepar  Local Currency
        BB/Negative/--       BB/Stable/--
  Foreign Currency     BB/Negative/--       BB/Stable/--
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brA+/Negative/--     brAA-/Stable/--
  Sr. Secured Brazilian National Scale
                       brA                  brA+

Concessionaria Auto Raposo Tavares S.A.
  Brazilian National Scale
                       brA+/Negative/--     brAA-/Stable/--
  Sr. Secured Brazilian National Scale
                       brA+                 brAA-

Baesa - Energetica Barra Grande S.A.
  Subordinated Notes Brazil National Scale
                       brAA-                brAA+

Cachoeira Paulista Transmissora de Energia S.A.
  Sr. Secured Brazilian National Scale
                       brAA-/Negative/--    brAA+/Negative/--

Iracema Transmissora de Energia S.A.
Sr. Secured Brazilian National Scale
                       brA+/Negative /--    brAA/Stable/--

Metrobarra S.A.
Sr. Secured Brazilian National Scale
               brA+(Prelim)/Negative/--  brAA-(Prelim)/Stable/--


MINAS GERAIS: S&P Lowers GS LT FC and LC Credit Rating to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 18, 2016, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its
global scale long-term FC and LC credit ratings on the states of
Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina to 'BB' from 'BB+' and on the state
of Minas Gerais to 'BB-' from 'BB+' following Brazil's downgrade.
S&P also lowered its FC and LC ratings on the city of Rio de
Janeiro to 'BB/B' from 'BBB-/A-3'. At the same time, S&P affirmed
its 'BB-' FC and LC ratings on the state of Rio de Janeiro.
Additionally, S&P lowered its national scale ratings on Sao Paulo
and Santa Catarina to 'brAA-' from 'brAA+', on Minas Gerais to
'brA' from 'brAA', and on the city of Rio de Janeiro to 'brAA-'
from 'brAAA'. In addition, S&P affirmed its 'brA' rating on the
state of Rio de Janeiro. The outlook on long-term FC, LC, and
national scale ratings remains negative.

RATIONALE

The rating actions on these local and regional governments (LRGs)
reflect a similar action on Brazil (captioned "Brazil Foreign and
Local Currency Ratings Lowered To 'BB/B'; Outlook Negative,"
published Feb. 17, 2016) and their close links to the sovereign.

S&P said, "We still view Brazilian LRGs' institutional framework
as evolving and unbalanced, despite the most recent downgrade of
the sovereign to 'BB'. However, we view the institutional
framework assessment with a weakening trend, reflecting Brazil's
very difficult macroeconomic and political environment, which
could undermine LRGs' already strained finances in the next
two years. It also reflects the rigidity of fiscal laws amid
stagnating economy. Although we would expect LRGs in the 'BB'
rated sovereigns to operate in a volatile and unbalanced
institutional framework, we currently don't expect the one in
Brazil to weaken in 2016. This stems from our view that the
sovereign ratings currently don't have implications on the
predictability, transparency, and accountability of Brazilian
LRGs' institutional framework."

A prolonged economic contraction has taken a toll on Brazilian
LRGs because they're struggling to control or cut expenditures
while their revenues have been shrinking. S&P expects Brazil's
recession to continue undermining LRGs' economic growth,
employment levels, and revenues in 2016 and 2017. Although
subnational governments have made efforts to cut operating and
capital expenditures during fiscal 2015, their ability to do so
during 2016 is hampered given their high and structurally rigid
operating costs. Infrastructure projects are likely to be delayed
or funding for them decreased as LRGs' borrowing is likely to
remain scarce in 2016. In addition to facing similar economic
challenges, LRGs and the federal government share critical
links because the former owe most of their debt to the latter,
subnational governments receive financing through public banks
such as the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), and require
approval for new debt issuance.

The 'BB' global scale LC rating on the city of Rio de Janeiro is
two notches below its 'bbb-' stand-alone credit profile (SACP).
The SACP of the states of Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina is 'bb',
and the SACP of the states of Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro is
'bb-'. The SACP is not a rating but a means of assessing the
intrinsic creditworthiness of an LRG under the assumption that
there is no sovereign rating cap.

The SACP results from the combination of S&P's assessment of an
LRG's individual credit profile and the institutional framework in
which it operates. All Brazilian LRGs operate under an evolving
and unbalanced institutional framework. However, S&P considers
that the credit profile of the city of Rio de Janeiro is stronger
than those of its domestic peers. The city has a strong financial
management, cash reserves to cover more than 2x its 2016 debt
service, and lower debt than those of its national peers, though
S&P expects weaker budgetary performance in 2016. Nevertheless,
the city of Rio de Janeiro is the only Brazilian LRG with a SACP
of 'bbb-'.

The global long-term ratings on the states of Sao Paulo and Santa
Catarina are at the same as on Brazil, which reflect their fiscal
performance and prudent fiscal management amid very tough economy.
The sovereign's downgrade weakened credit quality of these two
states because S&P still thinks that they don't meet the criteria
under which we would rate them higher than the sovereign
(captioned "Methodology: Rating A Regional Or Local Government
Higher Than Its Sovereign," published Dec 15, 2014). This is
mostly due to limited external liquidity.

According to this methodology, an LRG can have a higher rating
than its sovereign only if the former can maintain stronger credit
characteristics in a stress scenario, operates under a predictable
institutional framework that limits central government's
interference, and displays high financial flexibility. S&P thinks
that due to the high debt levels and our overall view of weak
liquidity positions, these two states don't meet all these
conditions. Furthermore, their economies are to a large extent
tightly linked with the sovereign's.

The downgrade of Minas Gerais is based on Brazil's downgrade and
the state's weaker budgetary performance, as seen in wide fiscal
deficits during 2015 that are likely to continue in 2016. Also,
the state holds a consistently weak liquidity position in relation
to financial obligations. Finally, its debt is higher than those
of domestic peers such as Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina.

The downgrade of the city of Rio de Janeiro reflects the following
factors:

-- The downgrade of Brazil.

-- S&P's opinion that the city no longer passes the stress test
    in order to have a higher rating than the sovereign. When the
    sovereign LC and FC ratings are the same, S&P has to run a
    more stressful scenario on an LRG associated with the
    sovereign's foreign and local currency default. For example,
    S&P assumes that the Brazilian real loses 50% of its value,
    inflation doubles, and the market value for the LRG securities
    drops to 30% of their face value (captioned "Ratings Above The
    Sovereign-Corporate and Government Ratings: Methodology and
    Assumptions," published Nov. 19, 2013). Under these more
    stressed conditions, S&P believes that the city's liquidity,
    though currently strong, wouldn't be sufficient to cover its
    debt service.

The state of Rio de Janeiro maintained high fiscal deficit in
2015, which S&P expects will continue in 2016 and 2017, along with
a weak financial management with relatively limited room to cut
operating and capital spending. A weak liquidity position, high
debt, and the state's pension liabilities continue pressuring its
ratings.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the states of Sao Paulo, Santa Catarina,
and city of Rio de Janeiro primarily reflects the outlook on
Brazil because S&P doesn't believe these LRGs could have a higher
rating than the sovereign. The negative outlook on the states of
Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais reflects S&P's expectation of
their inability to narrow their fiscal deficits, which will
remain wider than those of their peers in the next two years, in
part due to a likely deeper and longer economic contraction. In
addition, S&P expects these two states' finances to stagnate in
2016. Another downgrade is possible if their deficits after
borrowing are consistently wider than S&P's expectations.

The negative outlook on all of these LRGs also reflects the
weakening trend in their institutional framework. A weaker
assessment on the institutional framework would trigger downgrades
of all Brazilian LRGs.

The negative outlook on Brazil reflects S&P's view that there is a
greater than one in three likelihood that S&P could lower its
ratings again. S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Brazil's
political uncertainties and conditions for consistent policy
execution were to improve across branches of government to
staunch fiscal deterioration and strengthen GDP growth prospects.
S&P expects that these improvements would support a quicker
turnaround and could help Brazil exit from the current recession,
facilitating improved fiscal performance and providing more room
to maneuver in the face of economic shocks.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded
                            To                 From
Sao Paulo (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating
Global Scale              BB/Negative/--     BB+/Negative/--
Brazil National Scale     brAA-/Negative/--  brAA+/Negative/--

Minas Gerais (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating
Global Scale              BB-/Negative/--    BB+/Negative/--
Brazil National Scale     brA/Negative/--    brAA/Negative/--

Rio de Janeiro (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating
Global Scale              BB/Negative/B      BBB-/Negative/A-3
Brazil National Scale     brAA-/Negative/--  brAAA/Negative/--

Santa Catarina (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating
Global Scale              BB/Negative/--     BB+/Negative/--
Brazil National Scale     brAA-/Negative/--  brAA+/Negative/--

Ratings Affirmed

Rio de Janeiro (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating      BB-/Negative/--
Brazil National Scale    brA/Negative/--


SUL AMERICA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-term LC and FC IDRs
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Sul America S.A.'s (SASA) long-term
local and foreign currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'
and its short-term local and foreign currency IDRs at 'B'. The
Rating Outlook on SASA's long-term IDRs is Negative and mirrors
the Negative Outlook of Brazil's sovereign ratings (long-term IDR
'BB+'/Outlook Negative).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of SASA's ratings reflects its strong franchise
led by a significant presence in the health and auto segments, its
consistent and adequate operating performance throughout economic
cycles, adequate liquidity and capitalization, and robust risk
management practices. The rating action also takes into account
the constraints posed by Brazil's sovereign ratings on SASA's
IDRs, reflecting the full concentration of its operations in
Brazil and its large Brazilian government securities holdings
(approximately 1.8 times its total equity at September 2015).

SASA posted solid premium growth in its core businesses in the
first three quarters of 2015. This enabled it to maintain its
ranking as the second and fourth largest insurer in health and
auto insurance segments, where its premiums were up 15% and 17%,
respectively, compared to September 2014. The Brazilian insurance
sector has so far remained resilient to the very weak economic
backdrop, characterized by a severe recession, increasing
unemployment and inflation, and worsening fiscal performance.
Fitch expects sector premium growth to decelerate in 2016 but
expects the key credit metrics of SASA, and the insurance sector
in general, to remain adequate.

As of September 2015, SASA's profitability remained strong, as
evidenced by an operating ratio and an average ROA of 94.6% and
2.9%, respectively (94.1% and 3.1%, respectively, in 2014).
Profitability was supported by good technical results and solid
financial income.

SASA's leverage, measured by the net liabilities/equity ratio, and
operating leverage, measured by net earned premiums/equity, are
slightly higher than peer averages in Latin America. At September
2015, these stood at 3.6x and 3.4x, respectively, broadly
unchanged from a year ago. Meanwhile, the debt/equity ratio
declined to 20.2% at September 2015 from 25.9% in December 2014,
as SASA started amortizing its old debt in 2015. Fitch expects
leverage to stabilize at the existing levels, but any continued
increase could become a negative rating driver in the future.

SASA's liquidity remained adequate at September 2015. Its liquid
assets/net technical reserves ratio was 1.08x, broadly unchanged
from the 2013-2014 average.

Fitch applied exceptional notching for a ring-fenced regulatory
environment between the implied insurance operating company and
holding company IDRs. Notching was compressed by one relative to
standard notching, as sovereign related risks have so far not
affected SASA's key credit metrics, which remain stable and
adequate for its ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In case of an additional downgrade to Brazil's sovereign ratings,
SASA's IDRs would be subject to a review that could result in a
range of rating actions from affirmation to a two notch downgrade
based on Fitch's insurance rating criteria that allows flexibility
on how sovereign considerations are factored into insurance rating
notching. The ultimate decision would be driven by the rationale
for the sovereign rating action and Fitch's view of how this
impacts SASA's operating environment, investment risk and overall
creditworthiness.

In addition, a sustained and material deterioration in
profitability, characterized by an ROA below 0.5%; the
deterioration of the liabilities/equity ratio to above 5.0x; an
increase in the financial leverage (financial debt/equity) to
above 25% for a sustained period; a fall in the interest coverage
ratio to below 2.0x; or a significant reduction in the holding's
liquidity, could negatively affect the ratings.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


336263 LIMITED: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of 336263 Limited received on Jan. 22, 2016, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

           Philip Carlton
           Ross Collins
           Steering Group S.A.
           Telephone: + 44 1534 282345/ 01534 282345
           Facsimile: + 44 1534 282400
           23-25 Broad Street St Helier
           Jersey, JE4 8ND


AFRICA HORIZONS: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Africa Horizons G.P. Ltd received on Jan. 21,
2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


ALTANA CORPORATE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Altana Corporate Bonds Fund received on
Jan. 14, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lee Robinson
          Altana Wealth SAM
          33 Avenue St Charles
          Monaco 98000
          Telephone: +377 97 97 59 69


AUDLEY INVESTMENTS I: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The members of Audley Investments I received on Jan. 15, 2016, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Graham Robinson
          c/o Tanya Armstrong
          Telephone: (345) 946-0820
          Facsimile: (345) 946-0864
          P.O. Box 2499, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


AUDLEY INVESTMENTS II: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The members of Audley Investments II received on Jan. 15, 2016,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Russell Homer
          c/o Tanya Armstrong
          P.O. Box 2499, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946-0820
          Facsimile: (345) 946-0864


BINJAI HILL: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Binjai Hill Asian Acorns Fund received on
Jan. 12, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Justin Murray Guy Kendrick
          4 Binjai Hill, 589921
          Singapore


BINJAI HILL (NON-US FEEDER): Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Binjai Hill Asian Acorns (Non-US Feeder) Fund
received on Jan. 12, 2016, the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Justin Murray Guy Kendrick
          Binjai Hill, 589921
          Singapore


CASCABEL FUND: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Cascabel Fund Cayman Ltd. received on Jan. 13,
2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

           Cascabel Management LP
           c/o Justin Savage
           Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
           Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


CHINA CHAMPION: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of China Champion Group Limited received on
Jan. 14, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morna Chisholm
          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


CHINA CHAMPION HOLDINGS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of China Champion Holdings Limited received on
Jan. 14, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morna Chisholm
          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


CONUS FUND: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholder of The Conus Fund Offshore Master Fund Limited
received on Jan. 12, 2016, the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Conus Partners, Inc.
          c/o Justin Savage
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


EIP ENERGY: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of EIP Energy Income Fund Offshore, Ltd. received
on Jan. 14 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Energy Income Partners, LLC
          c/o Nandita Hogan
          449 Riverside Avenue
          Westport
          Connecticut 06880
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (203) 349 8232
          e-mail: nhogan@energymlp.com


I.A.P. LIMITED: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------
The members of I.A.P. Limited received on Jan. 22, 2016, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alan Turner
          Turners Management Ltd.
          Strathvale House
          90 North Church Street
          P.O. Box 2636 Grand Cayman, KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 0700


NAKKAR INVESTMENT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Nakkar Investment Ltd. received on Jan. 19,
2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


RAMIUS CONVERTIBLE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ramius Convertible Arbitrage Segregated Ltd
received on Jan. 11, 2016, the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ramius Advisors, LLC
          c/o Michael Benwitt
          599 Lexington Avenue, 19th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          USA
          Telephone: (212) 823 0226


RAMIUS CREDIT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ramius Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd received
on Jan. 11, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ramius Advisors, LLC
          c/o Michael Benwitt
          599 Lexington Avenue, 19th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          USA
          Telephone: (212) 823 0226


RAMIUS CREDIT SEGREGATED: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ramius Credit Opportunities Segregated Ltd
received on Jan. 11, 2016, the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ramius Advisors, LLC
          c/o Michael Benwitt
          599 Lexington Avenue, 19th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          USA
          Telephone: (212) 823 0226


RAMIUS ENTERPRISE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ramius Enterprise Segregated Ltd received on
Jan. 11, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ramius Advisors, LLC
          c/o Michael Benwitt
          599 Lexington Avenue, 19th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          USA
          Telephone: (212) 823 0226


RAMIUS MULTI-STRATEGY (EURO): Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ramius Multi-Strategy Fund (Euro) Ltd received
on Jan. 11, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ramius Advisors, LLC
          c/o Michael Benwitt
          599 Lexington Avenue, 19th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          USA
          Telephone: (212) 823 0226


T.A.M.P. LIMITED: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------
The members of T.A.M.P. Limited received on Jan. 22, 2016, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alan Turner
          Turners Management Ltd.
          Strathvale House
          90 North Church Street
          P.O. Box 2636 Grand Cayman, KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 0700



===========
M E X I C O
===========


AXTEL S.A.B.: Posts MXN2,832MM Revenue in Fourth Quarter 2015
-------------------------------------------------------------
Axtel, S.A.B. de C.V. disclosed its unaudited fourth quarter
results ended December 31, 2015.

Revenues from operations totaled MXN2,832 million in the fourth
quarter of year 2015 from MXN2,383 million for the same period in
2014, an increase of MXN449 million or 19%.

Revenues from operations totaled MXN10,150 million in the twelve
month period ended December 31, 2015, compared to MXN10,597
million in the same period in 2014, a decrease of MXN447 million,
or 4%.

A full text copy of the company's financial report is available
free at:

                        http://is.gd/RfHF5z


AXTEL S.A.B.: Shareholders Approve Merger With Alestra
------------------------------------------------------
Axtel, S.A.B. de C.V. disclosed that holders of 97% of its shares
approved the merger of AXTEL and Onexa, S.A. de C.V., parent
company of Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V.  Additionally, on January
11, 2016, Mexico's Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores issued
the exception necessary to proceed with the Merger Transaction
without a tender offer.

AXTEL also signed a credit agreement in the amount of $750
million, which will be used to redeem all its outstanding 7.625%
Senior Notes due 2017, its 9.00% Senior Notes due 2019 and its
Senior Secured Notes due 2020.  The redemption date for the 2017
Notes, the 2019 Notes and the 2020 Notes will be February 19,
2016.

With the approval of AXTEL shareholders and the authorization from
CNBV, as well as the closing of the Credit Agreement, all
conditions precedent for the Merger Transaction have been
satisfied.  The Merger Transaction will become effective on
February 15, 2016.

"This merger is a relevant strategic transaction that creates
significant value to all AXTEL and ALESTRA's stakeholders", said
Tomas Milmo Santos, current Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
of AXTEL, and future Co-Chairman of the Board of the combined
company.  "This value results from the benefits of combining two
strong telecom networks and commercial platforms that, in addition
to creating significant synergies, strengthens the competitive
position of the combined entity."

As disclosed in the Folleto Informativo, available to shareholders
since December 15, 2015, AXTEL will issue new shares to Alfa
S.A.B. de C.V., representing 51% of the post-Merger Transaction
ownership (calculation excludes 43.4 million of Certificados de
Participacion Ordinaria in underlying financial instruments owned
by AXTEL).  On the Effective Date, AXTEL will become an ALFA
subsidiary. All details concerning the Merger Transaction approval
are disclosed in the resolutions of AXTEL shareholders' meeting.


AXTEL S.A.B.: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB' & Removes from Watch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its corporate credit
rating on Axtel S.A.B. de C.V. to 'BB' from 'B-'.  S&P also
removed this rating from CreditWatch positive, where it placed it
on Oct. 2, 2015.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time S&P withdrew the company's existing issue-level
ratings.

The upgrade reflects the legal completion of the merger between
Axtel and Alestra.  S&P now views Axtel as a moderately strategic
subsidiary of Alfa S.A.B. de C.V. (BBB/Stable/--), benefiting from
a one-notch uplift relative to its 'bb-' stand-alone credit
profile.  Axtel is a successful and profitable business, unlikely
to be sold in the short term, and S&P believes it's likely to
receive support from its parent company, if necessary.


AXTEL S.A.B.: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Axtel, S.A.B. de C.V.'s
corporate family rating to Ba3 from B3.  The outlook is stable.

This action concludes the review for upgrade initiated on Nov. 30,
2015.  The upgrade reflects Axtel's enhanced credit profile pro
forma for the merger with Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V. (unrated),
subsidiary of Alfa S.A.B. de C.V. (Baa3, stable).

On Feb. 15, 2016, Axtel announced completion of the planned merger
with Onexa, S.A. de C.V., holding company of Alestra.  Under the
new structure, Alfa holds approximately 51% of the combined entity
and Alestra is a wholly owned subsidiary of Axtel.  Axtel will
continue to act as an operating and publicly traded company while
being fully consolidated by Alfa.

Axtel's credit profile and capital structure are strengthened by
the integration with Alestra, which contributes stronger margins
and a lighter debt profile.  The larger size of the newly formed
entity will also increase both companies' competitive capacity in
Mexico's fragmented telecommunications industry, while benefiting
from economies of scale and operational synergies.  Furthermore,
Axtel will benefit from Alfa's stronger credit profile and will be
governed under the group's solid financial policies.

Axtel's Ba3 rating is supported by its solid margins and strong
customer base in the enterprise segment, pro-forma for the merger
with Alestra.  The company's focus on the high-income residential
segment and the long-term nature of its contracts with businesses
and corporations promote operating stability.  The rating reflects
the company's good liquidity, comfortable debt maturity profile
and corporate governance under Alfa's financial policies.  On the
other hand, the rating considers the company's small size and
limited market shares in Mexico's highly competitive and
fragmented telecom industry.  The rating also incorporates
execution risk arising from the merger, although this risk is
partially mitigated by Alfa's management track record in
integrating acquisitions.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations for steady to
increasing operating margins and cash flow generation for Axtel,
while maintaining its market positioning.  The outlook takes into
consideration integration costs and negative free cash flow during
the integration phase of the Axtel-Alestra merger.  The outlook
also assumes that the company will maintain good liquidity while
investing adequate levels of capex to strengthen its competitive
capacity.

The rating could be upgraded if Axtel is able to maintain adjusted
EBITDA margin above 40% while maintaining leverage (adj.
Debt/EBITDA) around 2.5 times and sustained positive free cash
flow generation of at least 10% of total debt.

The rating could be downgraded if EBITDA margin falls below 30%,
or adj.  Debt/EBITDA rises above 3.5 times, while generating
ongoing negative free cash flow.  The rating could also be
downgraded if the company's market position or liquidity weaken.

Based in Monterrey, Mexico, Axtel is an integrated
telecommunications company providing IT and telecom solutions to
business customers and bundled voice, internet and video services
to consumer customers within Mexico.  During the last twelve
months ended Sept. 30, 2015, the company reported revenues of
USD634 million.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


DORAL FINANCIAL: Banco Popular Buys P.R. Buildings for $21.8MM
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Shelley C. Chapman has entered an order authorizing Doral
Financial Corp., et al., to sell certain real estate assets,
including an office building, and two warehouse buildings, and a
parking lot in San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico.

Specifically, Banco Popular acquired:

     (a) Doral Properties, Inc.'s office building, parking deck,
related land and other related assets commonly known as Doral
Plaza located at 1451 Franklin D. Roosevelt Avenue in San Juan,
Puerto Rico, and Doral Properties' two adjacent but independent
warehouse buildings, related land and other related assets located
in the Desarrollo Industrial Constitucion, San Patricio Ward, San
Juan, Puerto Rico for a total of $20.3 million, and

     (b) Doral Financial Corporation's open air parking lot which
is adjacent to the Buildings for $1.5 million.

A copy of the Asset Purchase Agreements is available for free at:

       http://bankrupt.com/misc/Doral_F_488_BP_APA.pdf

Banco Popular was the stalking horse bidder, agreeing to purchase
the real estate assets for a total of $21.8 million, absent higher
and better offers from other parties.  The Court-approved bidding
procedures set a Jan. 8 deadline for counteroffers.  One
counteroffer was received, but the bid was withdrawn prior to the
auction due to the bidder's inability to resolve a condition to
its bid.  As a result, the Jan. 12, 2016 auction was cancelled and
Banco Popular was named the successful bidder.

Following a sale hearing on Jan. 14, Judge Shelley Chapman entered
an order approving the sale to Banco Popular.  A copy of the Sale
Order is available for free at:

    http://bankrupt.com/misc/Doral_F_488_Sale_Ord_RE_Assets.pdf

Ownership of the OA Parking Lot is disputed between Doral
Financial and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in its
capacity as Receiver of Doral Bank Puerto Rico (the "FDIC-R").
Pursuant to a Stipulation and Agreed order Regarding Proceeds of
Proposed Sale of Certain Assets (the "FDIC Stipulation"), FDIC-R
and Doral Financial have agreed and stipulated that Banco Popular
will take title to the OA Parking Lot pursuant to the Sale Order
free and clear of any ownership interest, liens, claims,
encumbrances or other interests of FDIC-R.  As a result,
regardless of whether Doral Financial or FDIC-R is ultimately
determined to have ownership of the OA Parking Lot prior to entry
of the Order, upon the entry of the Order title will be
transferred to Banco Popular.

Banco Popular is the largest commercial bank in Puerto Rico with
total assets of $27.6 billion and deposits of $22.1 billion as of
Sept. 30, 2015.

The buyer can be reached at:

         BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO
         Popular Center, 3rd Floor
         208 Ponce de Leon Avenue
         San Juan, PR 00918
         Attention: Javier D. Ferrer
         Telecopier: (787) 751-8645
         E-mail: javier.ferrer@popular.com

Banco Popular's attorneys:

         PIETRANTONI MANDEZ & ALVAREZ LLC
         Popular Center, 19th Floor
         208 Ponce de Leon Avenue
         San Juan, PR 00918
         Attention: Donald E. Hull
         Telecopier: (787) 274-1470
         E-mail: dhull@pmalaw.com

              - and -

         SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
         One Rodney Square, 7th Floor
         Wilmington, DE 19801
         Attention: Mark S. Chehi
         Telecopier: (302) 651-3001
         E-mail: mark.chehi@skadden.com

                     About Doral Financial

Doral Financial Corporation is a holding company whose primary
operating asset was equity in Doral Bank.  DFC maintains offices
in New York City, Coral Gables, Florida and San Juan, Puerto Rico.
DFC has three wholly-owned subsidiaries: (i) Doral Properties,
Inc., (ii) Doral Insurance Agency, LLC ("Doral Insurance"), and
(iii) Doral Recovery, Inc.

On Feb. 27, 2015, regulators placed Doral Bank into receivership
and named the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as receiver.  Doral
Bank served customers through 26 branches located in New York,
Florida, and Puerto Rico.

DFC sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
15-10573) in Manhattan on March 11, 2015.  The case is assigned to
Judge Shelley C. Chapman.

DFC estimated $50 million to $100 million in assets and $100
million to $500 million in debt as of the bankruptcy filing.

The Debtor tapped Ropes & Gray LLP as counsel.

The U.S. trustee overseeing the Chapter 11 case of Doral Financial
Corp. appointed five creditors of the company to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors.  The Committee is
represented by Brian D. Pfeiffer, Esq., and Taejin Kim, Esq., at
Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

On Nov. 25, 2015, Doral Properties filed a voluntary petition with
the Court for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Office of the U.S. Trustee appointed five creditors to the
official committee of unsecured creditors.  Schulte Roth & Zabel
LLP represents the committee.




                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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