TCRLA_Public/160301.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Tuesday, March 1, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 042


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

BANCO BRADESCO: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2010-1 Notes to Ba1
BANCO BTG: Fitch Maintains 'BB-' IDRs on Rating Watch Negative
BANCO DO BRASIL: Moody's Lowers Loc. Curr. Deposit Rating to Ba2
BANCO ITAU: Moody's Affirms B1 Global Scale Rating
BRAZIL: Power Bills to Drop as Expensive Thermo Plants Shut Down

BRAZIL: Taxi Drivers Call for Peaceful Debate on Uber
CIELO SA: Moody's Lowers Foreign Currency & Debt Rating to Ba1
GAIA AGRO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Certs.' 14th Issuance to Ba1
GAIA AGRO: Moody's Lowers Global Scale LC Rating to Ba1
GAIA SECURITIZADORA: Moody's Lowers Global Scale LC Rating to Ba2

GLOBO COMUNICACAO: Moody's Lowers Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba1
LOCALIZA RENT: Moody's Lowers Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba2
OI SA: Billionaire's Fund Withdraws Support for Oi-TIM Merger
OI S.A.: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+', Placed on CreditWatch Negative
OI S.A.: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B'

RB CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on 80th Series
RB CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings 3 Series of 1st CRI to 'Ba2'
SUL AMERICA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating, Outlook Remains Negative
SUZANO PAPEL: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Global Scale LC Rating
SUZANO TRADING: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Sr. Unsec. Notes

TELEFONICA BRASIL: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Debentures to Ba1
VALE SA: Moody's Lowers Global Scale Local Currency Rating to Ba3
VALE SA: Moody's Lowers Ratings to Ba3, Outlook Negative
VOTORANTIM CIMENTOS: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Debt to Ba2
VOTORANTIM SA: Moody's Lowers Rating to Ba2, Outlook Negative

VOTORANTIM SA: Moody's Lowers Rating on Foreign Debts to Ba2


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ACS CAYMAN: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
ALCHEMY INDIA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
BLACKPINE PRIVATE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
CALLAWAY CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
COMMON SENSE BPI: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

COMMON SENSE BPI SPV: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
COMMON SENSE ENHANCED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
COMMON SENSE EVERGREEN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
COMMON SENSE LONG-BIASED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
COMMON SENSE OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

COMMON SENSE PARTNERS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CONDOR CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
DOUBLE HAVEN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
DOUBLE HAVEN FEEDER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ELIGIO LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

ENFOCA EN MAESTRO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
FAMA BRAZIL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
JASMINE INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
MERIT INVESTMENTS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
ST ALPHA EVENT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


C O S T A   R I C A

BANCO INTERNACIONAL: S&P Puts 'BB' ICR on CreditWatch Negative


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO AGROMERCANTIL: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR, Outlook Remains Stable


J A M A I C A

NATIONAL COMMERCIAL: Fitch Hikes Issuer Default Ratings to 'B'


M E X I C O

CONSUBANCO SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR, Outlook Stable
CREDITO REAL: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
FINANCIERA INDEPENDENCIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR, Outlook Stable


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Lenders Tell Justices Debt Law Preempted


S U R I N A M E

SURINAME: Fitch Cuts LT Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'B+'


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Orders Certification of Mineral-Rich Belt's Reserves


                            - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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BANCO BRADESCO: Moody's Cuts Rating on 2010-1 Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
diversified payment rights (DPR) programs sponsored by Banco
Bradesco S.A., Banco do Brasil S.A. and HSBC Bank Brasil S.A. --
Banco M£ltiplo.  The rating for the HSBC Bank Brasil S.A. program
is maintained on review for further downgrade.

This action is prompted by the downgrade of the counterparty risk
assessments (CR Assessment) of the sponsoring banks, following
Moody's Feb. 24, 2016, rating action in which Brazil's government
bond rating was downgraded to Ba2 (negative outlook) from Baa3
(under review for downgrade).  The CR Assessment is generally
considered as the attachment point for DPR programs.

The full rating action is:

SPONSOR: Banco Bradesco S.A. (Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment:
Ba1(cr), long-term)
Issuer (Program): International Diversified Payment Rights Company

   -- Series 2010-1 notes: downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2 global
      foreign currency rating; previously placed on review for
      downgrade on Dec. 11, 2015.

SPONSOR: Banco do Brasil S.A. (Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment :
Ba1(cr), long-term)
Issuer (Program): Dollar Diversified Payment Finance Company

   -- Series 2008-2 notes: downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 global
      foreign currency rating; previously placed on review for
      downgrade on Dec. 11,2015.

SPONSOR: HSBC Bank Brasil S.A. -- Banco Multiplo (Counterparty
Risk (CR) Assessment: Baa2(cr), long-term, ratings under review
for downgrade)
Issuer (Program): HSBC Brazil DPR Finance (No. 1) Limited

   -- Series 2006-A notes and underlying notes: downgraded to Baa2
      from A3, global foreign currency rating, ratings maintained
      on review for further downgrade; previously downgraded and
      maintained on review for further downgrade on Aug. 24, 2015.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of the programs is driven by Moody's downgrade of
the counterparty risk assessments for each of the sponsoring
banks.  The counterparty risk assessment for Banco Bradesco, Banco
do Brasil and HSBC Bank Brasil were downgraded following the
decision to downgrade the sovereign's government bond rating to
Ba2 (negative outlook) from Baa3 (on review for downgrade).

The counterparty risk assessment reflects an issuer's ability to
avoid defaulting on certain senior operating bank obligations and
other contractual commitments, but is not a rating.  The
counterparty risk assessment takes into account an issuer's
standalone strength as well as the likelihood of affiliate and
government support in the event of need, reflecting the
anticipated seniority of counterparty obligations in the
liabilities hierarchy.  The counterparty risk assessment also
takes into account other steps authorities can take to preserve
the key operations of a bank in a resolution.

Under the ratings methodology, in future flow transactions where
the originator is a bank, Moody's will generally use the bank's
counterparty risk assessment rather than its local currency
ratings to measure the probability that it will no longer be able
to generate future receivables.

Credit risk related to the bank's local currency senior unsecured
debt rating could still exist, depending on (1) the structure of
the transaction, (2) the lack of true sale or transfer of security
interest and (3) Moody's analysis of the originator and its
market.

Moody's notes that both DPR programs are performing as expected.
As of November 2015, quarterly debt service coverage ratios were
as follows:

International Diversified Payment Rights Company (Banco Bradesco
as sponsor): 103 times (trigger level of 7 times)

Dollar Diversified Payment Finance Company (Banco do Brasil as
sponsor): 670 times (trigger level of 6 times)

HSBC Brazil DPR Finance (No. 1) Limited (HSBC Bank Brasil S.A --
Banco Multiplo as sponsor): 520 times (trigger level of 7 times)

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

Any future changes to the counterparty risk assessment of the
sponsoring banks will lead to a change in the ratings assigned to
the respective notes.


BANCO BTG: Fitch Maintains 'BB-' IDRs on Rating Watch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has the Rating Watch Negative on Banco BTG Pactual
S.A.'s (BTG Pactual) Issuer Default Ratings IDRs of 'BB-', as well
as on all the other of its ratings and those of its subsidiaries
previously placed on this status.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

BTG Pactual Group (BTG Pactual, BTG Investments and BTG Pactual
Holding)

Fitch estimates that BTG Pactual's liquidity position has
stabilized after its funding franchise experienced severe stress,
following the impact on its reputation caused by the arrest of its
former CEO and main shareholder, Andre Esteves. The bank's
contingency measures taken to bolster its liquidity and withstand
the substantial withdrawal of funds have proven effective - the
bank's liquidity balance has reached even higher levels than those
recorded prior to the crisis.

One important source of funding relief was a BRL 6 billion funding
line obtained by BTG Pactual from FGC - Fundo Garantidor de
Credito, the Brazilian Deposit Insurance Fund. This was aimed at
easing liquidity pressure at the bank and helped it to implement
its contingency liquidity plan to divest assets and monetize
investments in an orderly manner.

Such measures included a divestment plan for up to BRL14 billion,
which culminated with the recently announced sale of BTG Pactual's
asset management subsidiary in Switzerland, BSI Bank S.A. (BSI),
to EFG International AG, which is still waiting on regulatory
approvals. BTG has stated that once the transaction is finalized
and payment is received, it intends to fully repay the FGC funding
line.

In addition, an active sale of loan portfolios and investment
holdings was carried out at an adequate price, and have also
reinforced the bank's liquidity while also reducing its credit
risk exposure at an opportune time as credit profiles of several
large corporate names have deteriorated over the last 90 days.

The reduction of BTG's global markets and merchant banking
exposures at the group level were already part of the group's
strategic plan and were accelerated by the push to improve
liquidity levels.

Another important initiative was the formation of a Legal Counsel
team hired by independent members of the group's Board. The team
is composed of leading litigation law firms and consulting firms
specializing in forensic analysis to conduct a thorough
investigation and review of several transactions mentioned in the
media where some type of wrongdoing could have occurred. The
investigation is expected to be concluded over the next 90 days.

Fitch has maintained the Rating Watch Negative, which reflects the
prevailing uncertainties surrounding the bank's future ability to
originate new business and how its earnings generation and funding
franchise will be restored amidst a very unfavorable operating and
economic environment.

All the Long-term International- and National-scale ratings of BTG
Pactual's subsidiaries (in Brazil and abroad) included in this
review are based on the support expected from BTG Pactual, except
for Banco Pan's, which are detailed below. Hence, the rating
actions on the subsidiaries mirror those on their parent company.

SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES
PAN, BFRE, BM, BS

The IDRs of Banco Pan and its subsidiaries (Brazilian Finance &
Real Estate S.A. [BFRE], Brazilian Mortgages Cia Hipotecaria [BM],
and Brazilian Securities Cia de Securitizacao [BS]), are rated two
notches below Caixa Economica Federal's (Caixa) IDR. In Fitch's
opinion, after the difficulties BTG faced in the very recent past,
Caixa is the most likely source of potential support for Pan, if
needed, as has been stated by Caixa's management. However, BTG
continues to share control of Pan (controlling share of 51%)
meaning that further reviews of BTG's ratings can impact Pan's
ratings too. Maintaining the Negative Watch reflects potential
implications for Pan's financial flexibility from possible
contagion to its reputation arising from its relationship with
BTG. It also reflects challenges imposed by Pan's shareholder
structure.

Pan's Viability Rating (VR) at 'b' factors in that the bank's
business plan has been largely constrained over the last years by
the weak operating environment, which has limited a complete
turnaround of its operating performance. Such constraints have
overshadowed improvements in the company profile, its risk
management framework and overall corporate governance, which are
reflected in improved but still weaker-than-average asset quality
ratios, and relatively weak capitalization reflected by the bank's
still weak operating profitability.

An unfavorable market scenario has further deteriorated and not
allowed the bank to grow as fast as necessary to achieve targeted
profitability improvements. In fact, the economic recession
scenario has led to additional cost control measures, such as the
reduction of the number of executives on its executive board,
aimed at matching the bank's team to a lower business volume,
which should have a positive effect on the bank's results in the
medium term.

Fitch believes that Pan's subsidiaries (BFRE, BM and BS) will also
receive the same support from Caixa in case of need. This is
justified by the subsidiaries' active role, synergies and full
integration with Pan. BFRE, BM and BS are fully owned subsidiaries
of Pan that operate in an integrated manner with the bank and are
fully consolidated in the bank, being subject to same regulatory
oversight.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
BTG Pactual Group

BTG Pactual's ratings could be removed from the Negative Watch
once Fitch is comfortable about the stability of the financial
aspects of the company, its liquidity, and franchise. Important
steps toward a more stable business include the bank's ability to
rebuild its funding base, originate business in its core business
areas, and have a clear, reviewed business model and strategic
plan to rebuild the bank's franchise. The bank's ability to
demonstrate that it has restored its debt refinancing capacity in
the financial markets is also considered a critical step in the
removal of the Negative Watch. The Rating Outlook assigned once
the Watch has been resolved could be Negative, depending on the
entity's prospects at the time and also considering any
developments in the operating and economic environment.

On the other hand, BTG Pactual's ratings could be downgraded in
the event of any new accusations and official investigations
related to the bank's business and deals that could weigh on the
bank's reputation and further weaken its franchise and financial
profile. Similarly, a formal accusation of wrongdoing involving
the bank's operations and transactions could also lead to an
additional downgrade.

Pan and Subsidiaries

Pan's IDRs could be downgraded if Caixa reduces its willingness or
capacity to provide support to Pan. Changes in funding limits and
credit sales agreement limits provided by Caixa, or in Pan's
shareholder structure could also trigger a negative rating action.
Also, the emergence of any new risk event affecting BTG's image
negatively could undermine Pan's capacity to generate new business
and thus trigger a negative rating action.

A downgrade to Pan's VR could be triggered by successive net
losses combined with a backdrop of capital ratios falling to even
lower levels (Fitch Core Capital ratio stood at 9.3% in December
2015).

Any changes in BTG Pactual's ratings or its willingness to support
its subsidiaries would affect the ratings of the subsidiaries.

BTG Pactual is a regional investment bank with a leadership
position in Brazil and a growing franchise in Latin America,
mostly focused on investment banking activities, asset management,
and securities and commodities trading.

Fitch has maintained the ratings on Rating Watch Negative:

Banco BTG Pactual S.A.

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'BB-';
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B';
-- Viability Rating 'bb-';
-- Long-term National Rating 'A-(bra)';
-- Short-term National Rating 'F2(bra)';
-- Senior unsecured notes, due in March 2016, foreign currency
    rating 'BB-';
-- Senior unsecured notes, due in July 2016, foreign currency
    rating 'BB-';
-- Senior unsecured notes, due in September 2017, foreign
    currency rating 'BB-';
-- Senior unsecured notes due in January 2020, foreign currency
    rating 'BB-';
-- Senior unsecured notes due in January 2034, foreign currency
    rating 'BB-';
-- Subordinated notes due in September 2022, foreign currency
    rating 'B';
-- Perpetual non-cumulative junior subordinated notes, foreign
    currency rating 'B-'.

BTG Investments LP

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B+';
-- Support Rating '4';
-- Senior guaranteed notes 'BB-'.

BTG Pactual Holding S.A.

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'BB-';
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating 'A-(bra)';
-- Short-term National Rating 'F2(bra)'.

Banco Pan S.A.

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'BB-';
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B';
-- Viability Rating 'b';
-- Support Rating '3';
-- Long-term National Rating 'A+(bra)';
-- Short-term National Rating 'F1(bra)'.

Brazilian Finance & Real Estate S.A.

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'BB-';
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating 'A+(bra)';
-- Short-term National Rating 'F1(bra)'.

Brazilian Mortgages Cia Hipotecaria

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'BB-';
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating 'A+(bra)';
-- Short-term National Rating 'F1(bra)'.

Brazilian Securities Cia de Securitizacao

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'BB-';
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating 'A+(bra)';
-- Short-term National Rating 'F1(bra)'.

BTG Pactual Colombia S.A.

-- Long-term National Rating 'A(col)';
-- Short-term National Rating 'F1(col)'.


BANCO DO BRASIL: Moody's Lowers Loc. Curr. Deposit Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
downgraded Banco do Brasil S.A. (BDBB)'s global long term local
currency deposit rating to Ba2 from Ba1.  At the same time,
Moody's affirmed the bank's long term foreign currency deposit
rating at B1, short term local and foreign currency deposit
ratings at Not Prime, and the long and short term national scale
local and foreign currency deposit ratings at Aaa.bo/BO-1 and
Aa2.bo/BO-1, respectively.  Moody's also affirmed BDBB's long and
short term counterparty risk assessments at Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr).

The outlook for all ratings is stable with the exception of the
global local currency deposit rating which carries a negative
outlook.

This rating was downgraded:

Issuer: Banco do Brasil S.A. (Bolivia)

  Long term global local-currency deposit rating: to Ba2 from Ba1,
   negative outlook

These ratings and assessments were affirmed:

Issuer: Banco do Brasil S.A. (Bolivia)
  Long term global foreign currency deposit rating: B1, stable
   outlook
  Long Term National Scale Local Currency Deposit Rating: Aaa.bo
  Long Term National Scale Foreign Currency Deposit Rating: Aa2.bo
  Short Term Global Local and Foreign Currency Deposit Ratings:
   Not Prime
  Short Term National Scale Local and Foreign Currency Deposit
   Ratings: BO-1
  Long and Short Term Counterparty Risk Assessment: Ba1(cr)/Not
   Prime(cr)

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Banco do Brasil S.A. (Bolivia)
  Outlook, Changed To Negative(m) From Stable

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

BDBB's global local currency deposit rating downgrade follows the
downgrade of Banco do Brasil S.A. (BDB) to Ba2 from Baa3 on 25
February 2016, which in turn followed the downgrade of Brazil's
government bond rating the previous day.  As a branch of BDB, BDBB
does not have a standalone baseline credit assessment, but rather
carries the same ratings as the head office, subject to Bolivia's
country ceilings.  As Bolivia's foreign currency deposit ceiling
of B1 remains below BDB's foreign currency deposit rating of Ba3,
BDBB's foreign currency deposit rating did not change.

BDBB initiated its operations in Bolivia in 1960, focusing on
trade finance operations between Brazil and Bolivia.  The bank
benefits from head office's financial and managerial support,
including its risk management and control frameworks.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

BDBB's local currency deposit rating would be downgraded again if
Banco do Brasil S.A.'s ratings, which also carry a negative
outlook, were downgraded further.  The bank's global foreign
currency deposit ratings could go up/down if Bolivia's country
ceiling is upgraded/downgraded as BdB's global foreign-currency
deposit rating is currently constrained by the country ceiling.

Banco Do Brasil S.A. (Bolivian Branch) is headquartered in La Paz,
Bolivia, and it had assets of Bs. 525 million and equity of
Bs.192.7 million, as of December 2015.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


BANCO ITAU: Moody's Affirms B1 Global Scale Rating
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
affirmed Banco Itau Argentina S.A.'s (BIA) B1 global scale and
Aaa.ar national scale local currency deposit and senior unsecured
ratings as well as the Caa2 global scale and Ba2.ar national scale
foreign currency deposit ratings.  The outlook for all ratings is
stable.  At the same time, Moody's downgraded the bank's adjusted
baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ba3 from ba2.

These ratings and assessments were affirmed:

Issuer: Banco Itau Argentina S.A.

  Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, B1(cr)
  Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Not Prime(cr)
  Short-Term Global Local and Foreign-Currency Deposit Rating: Not
   Prime
  Long-Term Global Local-Currency Senior Unsecured MTN Rating:
   (P)B1
  Argentinean National Scale Local-Currency Senior Unsecured MTN
   Rating and Senior Unsecured: Aaa.ar
  Long-Term Global Foreign-Currency Senior Unsecured MTN Rating:
   (P)Caa1
  Argentinean National Scale Foreign-Currency Senior Unsecured MTN
   Rating: Baa1.ar
  Long-Term Global Local-Currency Senior Unsecured Rating: B1
  Long-Term Global Local-Currency Deposit Rating: B1
  Argentinean National Scale Local-Currency Deposit Rating: Aaa.ar
  Long-Term Global Foreign-Currency Deposit Rating: Caa2
  Argentinean National Scale Foreign-Currency Deposit Rating:
   Ba2.ar

This assessment was downgraded:

  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, to ba3 from ba2

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions follow the downgrade of BIA's parent, Itau
Unibanco S.A. (BIU), to Ba2 from Baa3 on 25 February 2016, which
in turn followed a similar action on Brazil's government bond
rating the previous day.  BIA's adjusted BCA derives from its caa1
standalone credit assessment and incorporates uplift from
affiliate support to be provided to the bank by its main
shareholder.  The downgrade of the adjusted BCA reflects BIU's
reduced capacity to provide support to its Argentine subsidiary,
though Moody's continues to assess BIU's willingness to provide
support as very high.  This assessment reflects BIA's strategic
importance to the parent given its plan of regional expansion and
its goal to become a leading player in the Latin American market,
as well as the reputational risk that a default in its Argentine
subsidiary would entail to BIU.  Nevertheless, as BIA's ratings
were affirmed, they continue to be constrained by Argentina's
local and foreign currency deposit and bond ceilings, all of which
remain below the bank's adjusted BCA.  Owing to affiliate support,
Itau Argentina remains one of the strongest credits in Argentina,
as reflected in its Aaa.ar national scale local currency debt and
deposit ratings.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The ratings could go up if Argentina's country ceilings are
upgraded as BIA's global local and foreign-currency deposit and
debt ratings are currently constrained by the country ceilings.
On the other hand, the bank's stable outlook indicates that the
ratings are unlikely to be affected even if BIU, which has a
negative outlook, is downgraded further.  However, the ratings
could go down if the country ceiling is downgraded, which is
unlikely at this stage given that the sovereign carries a positive
outlook.

Banco Itau Argentina S.A. is headquartered in Buenos Aires, with
assets of ARS 22.9 billion and equity of ARS 2.6 billion as of
December 2015.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


BRAZIL: Power Bills to Drop as Expensive Thermo Plants Shut Down
----------------------------------------------------------------
Marilia Nestor Santos at Bloomberg News reports that electricity
prices will start falling in Brazil next month as Latin America's
largest country shuts down some of its thermoelectric power
plants, taking pressure off the fastest inflation in over a
decade.

Brazil will turn off 15 thermoelectric plants in March as cheaper
sources of power generation including hydro come back online,
Energy Minister Eduardo Braga said, according to Bloomberg News.

That comes in addition to seven thermo plants the government this
month said it would shut down, the report notes.  The reduced
dependence on thermoelectricity will allow regulators to start
phasing out a surcharge that was established so consumers could
help bear the cost of operating the more expensive plants,
Bloomberg News relates.

"We guarantee that, by April, consumers won't have to bear that
burden anymore," Bloomberg News quoted Mr. Braga as saying.

The minister said the good news is the result of reduced
electricity use and increased rainfall, Bloomberg News says.  The
electricity industry also will benefit, saving an estimated BRL8
billion (US$2 billion) a year from the reduced dependence on
thermoelectricity, he said, Bloomberg News notes.
Lower electricity bills will be particularly welcome in Brazil,
where annual inflation last year hit double digits for the first
time since 2003, Bloomberg News discloses.  That, coupled with
rising unemployment and increasing borrowing costs, has strained
an economy now headed for its longest recession in more than a
century, Bloomberg News notes.

Analysts surveyed by the central bank estimate consumer prices
will continue to surge this year, with inflation ending 2016 at
7.6 percent, Bloomberg News relays.  The government targets annual
inflation of 4.5 percent.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 26, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Brazil's
issuer and bond ratings to Ba2 and changed the outlook to
negative.


BRAZIL: Taxi Drivers Call for Peaceful Debate on Uber
-----------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that about 1,500 taxi drivers took to the streets
of Sao Paulo to demand a peaceful debate on ride-sharing service
Uber and other transportation companies in this Brazilian city.

"Our union doesn't want violence, we'll never lead a union
incentivized by violence," Sao Paulo Taxi Drivers Union president
Natalicio Bezerra told the G1 news Web site, according to EFE
News.

Since arriving in Brazil in 2014, Uber has been at the center of a
heated debate over the legitimacy and legality of its ride-sharing
application, with regulators now investigating the allegedly
"anti-competitive" practices of taxi companies, the report relays.

The taxi drivers union, for its part, alleges that Uber is engaged
in unfair competition, while users of the ride-sharing service
contend they are getting more personalized service at a lower cost
based on kilometers traveled and not minutes, the report notes.

Brazil's CADE anti-monopoly agency agreed late last year to take
up a complaint from Uber and investigate the practices of the taxi
industry and its affiliated organizations, which the ride-sharing
service accused of engaging in "violence" and making "serious
threats" against drivers and customers who used the app, the
report discloses.

The report relays that Mr. Bezerra rejected using the path of
"hostility" to find a solution to the situation, adding that the
protest in Sao Paulo was aimed at showing that the taxi industry
was "united."

The protesters, who carried a banner that said "Taxi Drivers
United for Legality and Justice," wound their way down Avenida
Paulista and ended the march at the Sao Paulo Art Museum or MASP,
the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 26, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Brazil's
issuer and bond ratings to Ba2 and changed the outlook to
negative.


CIELO SA: Moody's Lowers Foreign Currency & Debt Rating to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Cielo S.A's foreign currency
senior unsecured rated debt to Ba1 from Baa2.  At the same time,
Moody's assigned a Ba1 corporate family rating to Cielo.  The
outlook is negative.

The rating action follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016, of
Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition to
downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 10, 2015.

Ratings downgraded:

Cielo S.A.

   -- USD 475 million 3.75% senior unsecured notes due 2022: to
      Ba1 from Baa2

Cielo USA Inc.

   -- USD 400 million 3.75% senior unsecured notes due 2022: to
      Ba1 from Baa2

Ratings Assigned:

Cielo S.A.

   -- Corporate Family Rating: Ba1

The outlook for all ratings is negative.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade of Cielo's ratings to Ba1 was prompted by the
downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3,"
explained Moody's Vice President and Senior Analyst, Marcos
Schmidt.

"Cielo's Ba1 rating still ranks one notch above Brazil's
government bond rating of Ba2, which is granted only on
exceptional basis for issuers with fundamentals that are much
stronger than the sovereign.  In the case of Cielo, this is
indicated by its strong credit metrics, its leading position in
the Brazilian payment card market, and its widespread footprint
over the large Brazilian territory.  Moody's also takes into
consideration the favorable fundamentals for the sector in Brazil
as well as the close business support received from its main
shareholders, Banco do Brasil S.A. ("BB") (Ba3, Negative) and
Banco Bradesco S.A. ("Bradesco") (Ba3, Negative)", added Marcos.

As per Moody's methodology "How Sovereign Credit Quality Can
Affect Other Ratings", published on March 16, 2015, deterioration
in sovereign credit quality can directly affect the credit
standing of issuers domiciled within the country, but issuers with
fundamentals that are much stronger than the sovereign could be
rated above it on an exceptional basis.

Despite the prospects for GDP contraction for the next couple of
years relative to the average growth of 3.3% in the last decade,
the environment is still supportive of the cards industry, as is
the continued shift in consumers' preference for electronic means
of payment over cash and checks.

On the other hand, the ratings are constrained by Brazil's
government bond rating of Ba2, and the expected increase in
competition following the change to a multi-branded structure in
the Brazilian industry.  As the industry matures, market share and
net merchant discount rate (MDR) will further decrease.  In
addition, despite the recent decrease to 30% from 50%, minimum
payout dividends will likely remain considerable over the next
several years.

The joint venture (JV) announced by Cielo and BB in November 2014
is credit positive for Cielo given the increase in revenue
diversification in the form of the far more stable interchange
fees during a period of increasing competition and margin
compression in its merchant acquiring and payment processing
business.  The JV will be responsible for the management of credit
and debit card transactions under BB's Arranjo Ourocard, excluding
pre-paid, private label and government cards, originated from
cards issued by BB with Visa, Mastercard, American Express and Elo
brands.

The negative outlook reflects the change in outlook of Brazil's
government bond rating to negative.

An upgrade of Cielo's rating would depend on an upgrade of
Brazil's government bond rating combined with the resilience of
the company's credit metrics to the expected increase in the
sector's competition.

Negative pressure would arise if Moody's were to further downgrade
Brazil's government bond rating, if Cielo's liquidity or credit
metrics were to deteriorate significantly, or if free cash flow
generation were to remain negative.  Downward pressure would also
arise in the case of a weakening in the company's market position.

Headquartered in the city of Barueri, Brazil, Cielo is the leading
corporation in the merchant acquiring and payment processing
industry in Brazil, with presence in almost all Brazilian
municipalities.  With shares listed in BM&F Bovespa, Cielo is
controlled by BB and Bradesco, which together hold 57.3% of the
company's voting stocks.  Revenues, including net prepayment of
receivables business, reached BRL 13.5 billion (USD 4.1 billion at
the average exchange rate) and Moody's adjusted EBITDA margin was
of 57.2% for the fiscal year ended December 2015.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.


GAIA AGRO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Certs.' 14th Issuance to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 (global
scale, local currency) and to Aa1.br from Aaa.br (national scale)
the ratings of the first series of the 14th issuance of
agribusiness receivables certificates ("certificados de recebiveis
do agronegocio" or CRA) issued by Gaia Agro Securitizadora S.A.
(Gaia Agro, not rated), following the downgrade of the underlying
agricultural production financial note ("cedula de produto rural
financeira" or CPRF) to Ba1 from Baa3 (global scale, local
currency) and to Aa1.br from Aaa.br (national scale).

The CRA are backed by a CPRF issued by Raizen Energia S.A.
(Raizen) with a guarantee from Raizen Combustiveis S.A. (Raizen
Combustiveis).

This rating action follows Moody's downgrades of Raizen's and
Raizen Combustiveis' ratings on Feb. 25, 2016, following Moody's
Feb. 24, 2016, rating action in which Brazil's government bond
rating was downgraded to Ba2 (negative outlook) from Baa3 (under
review for downgrade).

Issuer: Gaia Agro Securitizadora S.A.

  1st series / 14th issuance of agribusiness certificates:
   Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 (global scale, local currency) and
   to Aa1.br from Aaa.br (national scale).

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings assigned to the CRA are based mainly on the
willingness and ability of Ra°zen (as debtor) and Ra°zen
Combustiveis (as guarantee provider) to honor the payments defined
in transaction documents, reflecting the Ba1 / Aa1.br (negative
outlook) ratings of the underlying CPRF backing the transaction.
Any change in the ratings of the CPRF will lead to a change in the
credit quality, and thus, the ratings of the CRA.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

Any changes in the rating of the underlying CPRF will lead to a
change in the ratings on the CRA.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on Jan. 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC closed on
February 22.

                        RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.


GAIA AGRO: Moody's Lowers Global Scale LC Rating to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 (global
scale, local currency) and to Aa1.br from Aaa.br (national scale)
the ratings of the first and second series of the 10th issuance of
agribusiness receivables certificates ("certificados de recebiveis
do agronegocio" or CRA) issued by Gaia Agro Securitizadora S.A.
(Gaia Agro, not rated).

The certificates are backed by two agricultural production
financial notes ("cedulas de produto rural financeira" or CPRF)
issued by Raizen Energia S.A. with a guarantee from Raizen
Combust°veis S.A. (Raizen Combustiveis).

This rating action follows Moody's downgrades of Raizen's and
Raizen Combustiveis' ratings on Feb. 25, 2016, following Moody's
Feb. 24, 2016, rating action in which Brazil's government bond
rating was downgraded to Ba2 (negative outlook) from Baa3 (under
review for downgrade).

Issuer: Gaia Agro Securitizadora S.A.

  1st series / 10th issuance of agribusiness certificates:
   Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 (global scale, local currency) and
   to Aa1.br from Aaa.br (national scale).

  2nd series / 10th issuance of agribusiness certificates:
   Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 (global scale, local currency) and
   to Aa1.br from Aaa.br (national scale).

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings assigned to both series of CRA are based mainly on the
willingness and ability of Raizen (as debtor) and Raizen
Combustiveis (as guarantee provider) to honor the payments defined
in transaction documents.  The ratings also reflect Raizen's Ba1 /
Aa1.br (negative outlook) backed senior unsecured ratings and
Raizen Combustiveis' Ba1 / Aa1.br (negative outlook) corporate
family ratings.  Any change in their ratings will lead to a change
in the credit quality, and thus, the ratings of the CRA.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

Any changes in Raizen's backed senior unsecured ratings or Raizen
Combustiveis's corporate family ratings will lead to a change in
the ratings of the CRA.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on January 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC closed on
February 22.

RATING METHODOLOGY:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Rating
Transactions Based on the Credit Substitution Approach: Letter of
Credit-backed, Insured and Guaranteed Debts," published in
December 2015.


GAIA SECURITIZADORA: Moody's Lowers Global Scale LC Rating to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has downgraded to Ba2 (sf) from Baa3
(sf) (global scale, local currency) and to Aa2.br (sf) from Aaa.br
(sf) (national scale) the ratings of the 22nd series of the fifth
issuance, the 45th series of the fourth issuance, the 73rd series
of the fourth issuance and 83rd series of the fourth issuance of
real estate certificates (certificados de recebiveis imobiliarios)
issued by Gaia Securitizadora S.A. (GaiaSec, not rated). This
action concludes the review Moody's initiated on Dec. 11, 2015,
when it placed the ratings under review for downgrade.

GaiaSec issued all four series of real estate certificates (CRI),
each backed by its own static pool of residential real-estate
loans originated and serviced by Banco do Brasil S.A. (seller,
originator and primary servicer, Ba2/Aa2.br LT Bank Deposits
ratings).  All four CRI benefit from credit support from the
seller, as the assignment agreement stipulates that Banco do
Brasil must repurchase any loans over 35 days in arrears.

The rating action follows Moody's decision to downgrade Banco do
Brasil's LT Bank Deposits ratings to Ba2 (negative outlook) from
Baa3 (under review for downgrade) (global scale, local currency)
and to Aa2.br from Aaa.br (under review for downgrade) (national
scale) on 25 February 2016, following Moody's February 24, 2016
rating action in which Brazil's government bond rating was
downgraded to Ba2 (negative outlook) from Baa3 (under review for
downgrade).

The full rating action is:

Issuer: Gaia Securitizadora S.A.

  22nd series / fifth issuance CRI backed by residential
   mortgages: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) from Baa3 (sf) (global scale,
   local currency) and to Aa2.br (sf) from Aaa.br (sf) (national
   scale ratings);

  45th series / fourth issuance CRI backed by residential
   mortgages: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) from Baa3 (sf) (global scale,
   local currency) and to Aa2.br (sf) from Aaa.br (sf) (national
   scale ratings);

  73rd series / fourth issuance CRI backed by residential
   mortgages: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) from Baa3 (sf) (global scale,
   local currency) and to Aa2.br (sf) from Aaa.br (sf) (national
   scale ratings);

  83rd series / fourth issuance CRI backed by residential
   mortgages: Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) from Baa3 (sf) (global scale,
   local currency) and to Aa2.br (sf) from Aaa.br (sf) (national
   scale ratings).

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's views the certificates as being full pass through
securities of Banco do Brasil' local-currency deposit ratings,
given that under of the assignment agreement, Banco do Brasil is
required to repurchase any loans that become over 35 days in
arrears during the course of the transaction.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

A future change to the local-currency deposit ratings of Banco do
Brasil could lead to a change in the ratings assigned to the
certificates.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on January 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC closed on
February 22.

                        RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Rating
Transactions Based on the Credit Substitution Approach: Letter of
Credit-backed, Insured and Guaranteed Debts," published in
December 2015.


GLOBO COMUNICACAO: Moody's Lowers Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Globo Comunicacao e
Participacoes S.A.'s foreign currency senior unsecured rated debt
to Ba1 from Baa2.  At the same time, Moody's withdrawn Globo's
issuer rating and assigned a Ba1 Corporate Family Rating.  The
outlook was changed to negative.

The rating action follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016, of
Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition to
downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 10, 2015.

Ratings downgraded:

   -- USD 200 million with a 5.307% coupon in senior global notes
      due in 2022: to Ba1 from Baa2

   -- USD 300 million with a 4.875% coupon in global notes due in
      2022: to Ba1 from Baa2

   -- USD 325 million in global bonds due in 2025: to Ba1 from
      Baa2

Ratings withdrawn:

Globo Comunicacao e Participacoes S.A.

   -- Issuer Rating: previously Baa2

Ratings assigned:

Globo Comunicacao e Participacoes S.A.

   -- Corporate Family Rating: Ba1

The outlook for all ratings is negative.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade of Globo's foreign currency ratings to Ba1 was
prompted by the downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to
Ba2 from Baa3," explained Moody's Vice President and Senior
Analyst, Marcos Schmidt.

"Globo's Ba1 rating still ranks one-notch above Brazil's
government bond rating of Ba2, which is granted only on an
exceptional basis for issuers with fundamentals that are much
stronger than the sovereign.  In the case of Globo this is
evidenced by its exceptionally strong credit metrics, ample
liquidity and a foreign-exchange exposure that is managed through
hedges and mitigated by revenues generated outside of Brazil that
are sufficient to service its near-term debt servicing
obligations.  These factors outweigh Globo's close links with the
Brazilian economy," added Marcos.

As per Moody's methodology "How Sovereign Credit Quality Can
Affect Other Ratings", published on March 16, 2015, deterioration
in sovereign credit quality can directly affect the credit
standing of issuers domiciled within the country, but issuers with
fundamentals that are much stronger than the sovereign could be
rated above it on an exceptional basis.

Globo's ratings are mainly supported by its very strong credit
metrics and liquidity, as well as its leading market position in
the Brazilian TV broadcasting market with 37% of the overall
average national audience share and 41% during prime time, in the
last twelve months ended in September 2015.  The rating also
reflects Globo's demonstrated progress in diversifying away from
advertising revenues into the higher margin content and
programming segment that reached 31% of revenues in September
2015.  Globo's high quality content with 92% of its prime time
programming produced in-house is an additional credit positive.

The main factors constraining Globo's ratings are Brazil's
government bond rating at Ba2 negative, the company's
concentration of revenues in the cyclical Brazilian TV advertising
market, with a degree of foreign exchange exposure, as well as the
company's high fixed cost base, stemming from its high quality
programming strategy, and competition that pressures its margins.
The company's improved, but still evolving corporate governance
and lack of independent board members, are also factors
constraining Globo's rating.

The negative outlook reflects the change in outlook of Brazil's
government bond rating to negative.

An upgrade on Globo's rating, would depend on an upgrade of
Brazil's government bond rating and on the maintenance of strong
credit metrics, liquidity and market positioning.  A gap of more
than one notch with Brazil's government bond rating is unlikely.

Conversely, negative pressure could arise should Brazil's
government bond rating be further downgraded or the Brazilian
economy and TV advertising market experience a greater-than-
expected decline that causes Globo's credit metrics, liquidity and
market positioning to deteriorate.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro and owned by the Marinho Family,
Globo is Brazil's largest media group and leading broadcast TV
network with BRL 15.8 billion (equivalent to USD 5.3 billion) in
net revenues in the last 12 months ended in September 2015.  Globo
has other business activities including pay-TV production and
programming, sound recording, magazine publishing, internet
businesses engaged through its subsidiaries.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Broadcast and Advertising Related Industries published in May
2012.


LOCALIZA RENT: Moody's Lowers Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. downgraded Localiza Rent a Car S.A's
senior unsecured rated debt to Ba2 from Baa3.  The national scale
ratings were also downgraded to Aa2.br from Aa1.br.  At the same
time Moody's assigned a Ba2 corporate family rating in the global
scale and Aa2.br in the national scale.  The outlook was changed
to negative.

The rating action follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016, of
Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition to
downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 11, 2015.

Ratings downgraded:

   -- BRL 500 million Senior unsecured Brazilian debentures due
      2021: to Ba2 from Baa3 (Global Scale) and Aa2.br from Aa1.br
      (National Scale)

Ratings assigned:

Localiza Rent a Car S.A

   -- Corporate Family Rating: Ba2 (Global Scale) and Aa2.br
      (National Scale)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade of Localiza's ratings to Ba2 was prompted by the
downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3,"
explained Moody's Vice President and Senior Analyst, Marcos
Schmidt.

Localiza's rating continues to be supported by the company's
stable operating performance and resilient business model, which
entails relatively stable cash flows and more flexible operations
-- a positive, especially during the current scenario of auto
market slowdown.  Localiza's leading market share position in both
the car and fleet rental segments also supports the rating.  The
company continues to maintain robust profitability as a result of
low fleet maintenance requirements, high utilization rates,
attractive discounts from automobile manufacturers and expertise
on the used cars sales market.  The ratings also reflect the
company's adequate corporate governance practices and strong
liquidity position.

On the other hand, the capital intensive nature of the car rental
business constrains Localiza's ratings, as does the company's
small size when compared to its global industry peers and the lack
of significant international footprint.  The rating is further
pressured by the expected more challenging environment for the
automotive industry until at least the end of 2016 and weaker than
expected economic prospects for Brazil for the next couple of
years.

The negative outlook reflects the change in outlook of Brazil's
government bond rating to negative.

An upgrade of Localiza's ratings would depend on an upgrade of
Brazil's government bond rating.  In addition, positive rating
momentum would be triggered by further gains in market share,
geographic diversification and revenues while maintaining healthy
credit metrics on a sustained basis.  The implementation of
financial policies that include maximum leverage and minimum cash
amounts, as well as a long-term committed bank credit facility
that would reduce reliance on capital markets to refinance
existing debt maturities, would also be considered as an
enhancement to the company's liquidity profile and overall credit
quality.

Localiza's ratings could come under downward pressure if Brazil's
government bond rating should be further downgraded, or if
Localiza fails to reduce its fleet size during a major downturn in
the Brazilian car rental market, such as car rental utilization
rates fall below the 60% range for a prolonged period (70.7% in
September 2015).  Quantitatively, Localiza's rating could come
under downward pressure if EBITDA interest coverage falls below
3.0 times or if Gross Debt to EBITDA exceeded 3.5 times on a
sustained basis.

Localiza Rent a Car S.A., founded in 1973 and headquartered in
Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil, operates car rental, fleet
rental, and used car businesses in Brazil.  It also franchises
rental car operations throughout Latin America.  As of Sept. 30,
2015, Localiza had a total fleet of 104,274 company-owned cars and
13,175 cars from franchisees in Brazil and other seven countries.
Localiza is the market leader in Brazil for both car and fleet
rental with the largest number of car rental locations and
presence at the principal Brazilian airports.  For the last twelve
months ended Sept. 30, 2015, Localiza reported net revenues of BRL
4.0 billion and net income of BRL 399 million.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Equipment and
Transportation Rental Industry published in December 2014.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on Jan. 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC closed on
Feb. 22.


OI SA: Billionaire's Fund Withdraws Support for Oi-TIM Merger
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the LetterOne Group, an investment fund
controlled by Russian billionaire Mikhail Fridman, has withdrawn
its support for a possible merger of Brazilian telecoms operators
Oi and TIM Participacoes due to the latter's resistance to a tie-
up, Oi said in a securities filing.

Oi SA said in its filing with the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange that it
was informed by L1 Technology, a unit of The LetterOne Group, that
TIM "does not wish to enter into further discussions about a
business combination with Oi in Brazil," according to EFE News

The investment fund, which is based in London but mainly operates
in Russia, said "without TIM's participation, L1 Technology can't
now proceed with the proposed transaction as previously
envisaged," the report notes

EFE News discloses that LetterOne had offered last October to
provide Oi with $4 billion to finance the acquisition of TIM,
Telecom Italia's Brazilian unit and the South American country's
second-largest wireless operator.

Telecom Italia signaled in 2014 that it would like to sell its
Brazilian subsidiary and rumors of mergers have popped up
regularly since then, the report notes.

Oi SA has Brazil's biggest fixed-line network and is the country's
fourth-leading mobile operator behind Vivo (the local unit of
Spain's Telefonica), TIM and Claro (the local subsidiary of
Mexico's America Movil, controlled by billionaire Carlos Slim),
the report relays.

Oi SA was looking to merger with TIM to strengthen its position in
Brazil's mobile market and allow it to compete on a better footing
with Telefonica and America Movil, which offer fixed-line
telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access and pay TV service,
the report notes.

A TIM-Oi tie-up "would have created a well-positioned
telecommunications operator to compete against global players
already operating in Brazil," L1 Technology said in a statement,
the report discloses.

Oi said it would "evaluate the impact of this announcement on the
possibility of consolidation of the Brazilian market," the report
relays.

Despite the failure of the negotiations, LetterOne said it was
still interested in investing in Brazil, "a country with good
long-term growth potential" despite the current "challenging macro
environment" in the recession-hit South American country, the
report notes.

The proposal to inject capital into Oi was necessary for the Rio
de Janeiro-based company to reduce its high debt load, the report
says.

Oi's elevated indebtedness stemmed from its problematic -- and
uncompleted -- 2013 merger with Portugal Telecom, a tie-up that
effectively unraveled when Oi sold Portuguese assets it had
acquired from PT to Luxembourg's Altice, the report adds.


OI S.A.: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+', Placed on CreditWatch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its global scale
corporate credit and issue-level ratings on Oi S.A. to 'B+' from
'BB-'.  S&P also lowered its national scale ratings on the company
to 'brBBB-' from 'brA-'.  The recovery ratings on the company's
rated debt remain unchanged at '4', indicating S&P's expectation
for average (30%-50%) recovery for noteholders in the event of a
payment default.  At the same time, S&P placed all the ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrade and CreditWatch placement follow the announcement
that Telecom Italia doesn't wish to enter into further discussions
about a business combination of its Brazilian subsidiary, TIM
Participacoes SA, with Oi.  The merger would have accompanied a
capital injection of up to $4 billion from LetterOne Holdings, the
investment group, into Oi.  Although S&P's base case for Oi
excluded this potential transaction, S&P viewed it as the most
viable way for the company to improve its capital structure in the
short term.  Now that this deal won't materialize, S&P believes
that Oi's management will seek other options to reduce its high
debt.  However, as time passes, the company will continue to post
a shortfall in free operating cash flow, eroding its still
significant cash position, which totaled R$16.4 billion as of
Sept. 30, 2015.

The CreditWatch negative listing indicates that S&P might lower
the ratings again by more than one notch, depending on S&P's view
of company's future capital structure, liquidity, and competitive
position because Oi hasn't invested at the same pace as its
competitors, and now acknowledging that the business combination
with TIM won't occur.  S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch
during the next three months as soon as it has more detailed
information on Oi's strategy to reduce debt.


OI S.A.: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Oi S.A.'s (Oi) long-term foreign- and
local-currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) and its senior
unsecured notes to 'B' from 'BB'. Fitch has also downgraded the
company's National Long-term rating and local debentures rating to
'BBB-(bra)' from 'AA-(bra)'. All ratings have been placed on
Rating Watch Negative.

The downgrades reflect Oi's failure to proceed with the merger
with TIM Participacoes S.A. (TIM), and Fitch's view that any
meaningful turnaround in the company's credit profile based on its
stand-alone operational fundamentals is unlikely in the short- to
medium-term. The Negative Watch also reflects Fitch's view that
the company will likely face serious liquidity issues from 2017
on. While the company's cash balance remains sufficient to cover
its debt maturity in 2016, its access to capital markets for
refinancing will remain constrained given its precarious balance
sheet amid continued negative free cash flow (FCF) generation.
Oi's ratings will be downgraded further should the company fail to
secure any viable refinancing sources within the next three-to-six
months.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Failed Merger Attempt:

Fitch does not expect any meaningful improvement in Oi's credit
profile in the absence of industry consolidation given its
weakening market position and perennial cash burn. Oi has actively
implemented cost-saving initiatives which enabled a modest EBITDA
growth during the first nine months of 2015, but it has been
insufficient to curb the ongoing negative FCF generation due to
high interest expenses and capex requirement. EBITDA improvement
driven by cost savings is unsustainable without gradual top-line
growth, which Fitch does not expect to be achievable given the
company's continued under-investments in network upgrades.

Refinancing Risk:

Fitch forecasts Oi will face a serious liquidity problem from 2017
on, as its access to capital markets for refinancing will be
limited because of investors' concerns as to the company's
operational sustainability. Oi's debt maturities for 2016 and 2017
amount to BRL11.4 billion and BRL9 billion, respectively, of which
capital market debt comprised about 54% and 75% of those
maturities in 2016 and 2017, respectively. The company held a
readily-available cash balance of BRL16.4 billion at end-September
2015, while it also signed an agreement with China Development
Bank for a USD1.2 billion credit facility, which will help serve
its debt obligation in 2016.

However, Fitch forecasts Oi's negative FCF generation to amount to
about BRL4 billion in 2016. Without any refinancing, aside from
the already-agreed-upon China Development Bank credit facility,
Fitch expects the company will face difficulty in meeting its debt
maturities in 2017, which could force a debt restructuring. In
addition, there is low visibility on Oi's potential sale of its
75% stake in Africatel in the near term, given the ongoing legal
disputes with other shareholders.

Weak Cash Flow; High Leverage:

Oi's current capital structure is not deemed sustainable. The
company's total gross debt, net of hedging derivatives, amounted
to BRL53.7 billion as of Sept. 30, 2015, which compares to its LTM
EBITDA generation of BRL7.6 billion, resulting in a net leverage
ratio of 4.9x. Fitch estimates the company's interest expenses
would consume more than 70% of its EBITDA generation in 2016,
leaving limited room for other cash outflow items, such as capex,
working capital requirements, as well as judicial deposits. As
such, its uncurbed negative FCF generation will continue to erode
its cash balance.

Oi's management is reviewing its strategic options as to how to
turn around the company's financial profile. A lack of tangible
evidence that it could improve its capital structure in a timely
manner will immediately result in further ratings downgrade.

Tough Operating Environment:

Brazil remains one of the most competitive markets in Latin
America, while its mobile market has increasingly become
saturated. Oi has the lowest mobile market share among the four
major players, with about an 19% subscriber share. Mobile data and
fixed services, including broadband and pay-TV, have become the
key growth drivers for the industry, but Oi's rivals have made
more aggressive investments in those services than the company so
far. Without industry consolidation, the competitive landscape
will remain fierce, limiting any market share recovery for Oi.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Oi include:

-- Muted revenue growth in 2016;

-- EBITDA margin at around 26% in 2016

-- Negative FCF generation, including judicial deposits, amount
    to BRL4 billion in 2016;

-- Cash balance to fall to below BRL3 billion by end-2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch's key credit focus for Oi remains its ability to refinance
its upcoming debt maturities given limited credit access. Further
ratings downgrades will be forthcoming if there is a lack of
indication that the company has secured viable refinancing
sources.

Conversely, any positive rating action is unlikely at the current
juncture given the company's weak cash flow generation and
liquidity risk.

LIQUIDITY

Oi's medium-term liquidity profile is vulnerable given the large
upcoming debt maturities in 2016 and 2017, and the company's
limited access to capital markets. The company held a readily
available cash balance of BRL16.4 billion as of Sept. 30, 2015
which compares to its debt maturities of BRL12.4 billion by end-
2016, including the fourth quarter of 2015. Fitch projects this
cash balance will be quickly eroded given continued negative FCF
generation.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded and placed the following ratings on Rating
Watch Negative:

Oi S.A.

-- Long-term foreign-currency and local-currency IDRs to 'B' from
    'BB'/Outlook Negative;

-- National Long-term rating to 'BBB-(bra)' from 'AA-
    (bra)'/Outlook Negative;

-- Telemar Norte Leste, S.A.'s (Telemar) senior notes, originally
    due 2017, 2019, and 2020, to 'B+/RR3' from 'BB';

-- All outstanding foreign-currency senior unsecured notes to
    'B/RR4' from 'BB';

-- Local debentures to 'BBB-(bra)' from 'AA-(bra)'.

Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. (Oi Netherlands)

-- EUR600 million senior notes due 2021 to 'B/RR4' from 'BB'.

Telemar notes, rated 'B+/RR3', reflect good recovery prospects in
the event of default, given Telemar's position as the main cash
flow generator with operating assets. Securities rated 'RR3' have
characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering
51%-70% of current principal and related interest. However,
despite structural seniority compared to Oi's other unsecured
notes, Fitch has low visibility as to whether these notes would be
entitled to seniority under Brazil's legal system upon any
potential reorganization or debt restructuring of Oi. Oi's other
senior unsecured notes, with Recovery Ratings of 'RR4', represent
average recovery prospects of 31%-50% given default.


RB CAPITAL: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on 80th Series
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has affirmed the Ba2 (global scale, local
currency) and the Aa2.br (national scale) ratings of the 80th
series of real estate certificates ("certificados de recebiveis
imobiliarios" or CRI) issued by RB Capital Companhia de
Securitizacao and the 68th series of agribusiness certificates
("certificados de recebiveis do agronegocio" or CRA) issued by Eco
Securitizadora de Direitos Creditorios do Agronegocio S.A.,
following the affirmation of the ratings of the respective
underlying assets.

The CRI are backed by CCI ("cedulas de credito imobiliario") where
Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A. (Suzano, Ba2/Aa2.br) is the debtor.

The CRA are backed by an export credit note (NCE) issued by
Suzano.

This rating action follows Moody's affirmation with stable outlook
of the ratings of the underlying CCI and NCE payable by Suzano
that backs the CRI and the CRA respectively on Feb. 26, 2016,
following Moody's Feb. 24, 2016, rating action in which Brazil's
government bond rating was downgraded to Ba2 (negative outlook)
from Baa3 (under review for downgrade).

Issuer: RB Capital Companhia de Securitizacao.

  80th Series / 1st Issuance: affirmed at Ba2 (global scale, local
   currency) and Aa2.br (national scale) ratings

Issuer: Eco Securitizadora de Direitos Creditorios do Agronegocio
S.A.

  68th series / 1st issuance: affirmed at Ba2 (global scale, local
   currency) and Aa2.br (national scale) ratings

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings assigned to the CRI and CRA are based mainly on the
willingness and ability of Suzano (as debtor) to honor the
payments defined in transaction documents, reflecting the Ba2 /
Aa2.br ratings of the underlying CCI and NCE backing each
transaction.  Any change in the ratings of the underlying assets
could lead to a change in the credit quality, and thus, the
ratings, of the CRI and CRA.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

Any changes in the rating of the underlying assets could lead to a
change in the ratings on the CRI and CRA.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on January 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which
Moody's currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC
closed on February 22.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.


RB CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings 3 Series of 1st CRI to 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1
(global scale, local currency) and affirmed the Aa2.br (national
scale) ratings of the 97th, 98th and 99th series of the 1st
issuance real estate certificates (CRI) issued by RB Capital
Companhia de Securitizacao (RB Capital, the Issuer or the
Securitizadora).

RB Capital issued the three series of CRI, backed by real estate
credits rights derived from two shopping malls located in Brazil
(real estate credits) and benefit from: (i) an irrevocable and
unconditional guarantee (fianáa) provided by BR Malls
Participacoes S.A. (BR Malls, rated Ba2/Aa2.br, negative outlook)
on the Real Estate Credits, (ii) a pledge of the Real Estate
Assets (alienacao fiduciaria) in favor of the issuer, (iii) a
pledge of cash flows derived from the shopping mall operation,
including the parking lot (cessao fiduciaria), and (iv) a pledge
of the escrow account where rental payments are deposited (cessao
fiduciaria).

The rating action follows Moody's decision to downgrade BR Malls'
ratings to Ba2 (negative outlook) from Ba1 (global scale, local
currency) and to affirm with negative outlook the Aa2.br (national
scale) on Feb. 25, 2016, following Moody's February 24, 2016
rating action in which Brazil's government bond rating was
downgraded to Ba2 (negative outlook) from Baa3 (under review for
downgrade).

The full rating action is:

Issuer / Securitizadora: RB Capital Companhia de Securitizacao

  97th Series / 1st issuance CRI: Downgraded ratings to Ba2 from
   Ba1 (global scale, local currency) and affirmed Aa2.br
   (national scale);

  98th Series / 1st issuance CRI: Downgraded ratings to Ba2 from
   Ba1 (global scale, local currency) and affirmed Aa2.br
   (national scale);

  99th Series / 1st issuance CRI: Downgraded ratings to Ba2 from
   Ba1 (global scale, local currency) and affirmed Aa2.br
   (national scale)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The certificate ratings reflect the guarantee provided by BR Malls
and are based on its ability to make payments under the guarantee
(fianáa), as reflected by its Ba2 / Aa2.br (negative outlook)
senior unsecured rating.  Any future change in the senior
unsecured rating of BR Malls will lead to a change in the ratings
of the CRI.  Moody's does not given credit to the pledged real
estate backing the certificates, or the pledged real estate
receivables (pledged tenancy revenues).

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING:

Any future changes in the senior unsecured rating of BR Malls will
lead to a change in the CRI's ratings.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on January 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC closed on
February 22.

                       RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Rating
Transactions Based on the Credit Substitution Approach: Letter of
Credit-backed, Insured and Guaranteed Debts," published in
December 2015.


SUL AMERICA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating, Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
The ratings on Sul America reflect S&P's view of the company's
satisfactory business risk profile and less than adequate
financial risk profile, based on a sound market position, good
brand recognition, and a healthy business mix.  The company's
significant exposure to Brazilian government securities caps S&P's
financial risk profile at less than adequate.  Furthermore, Sul
America's liquidity position deteriorated as a result of Brazil's
sovereign downgrade since S&P increases the haircuts for these
securities under its liquidity analysis.

"We revised our assessment on Sul America's financial risk profile
to less than adequate from lower adequate as a result of the
company's significant exposure to Brazil's sovereign bonds and
following the sovereign downgrade.  Currently, the company's
portfolio weighted average asset credit quality falls under the
'BB' category; therefore we cap our financial risk profile
assessment in the less than adequate category, which reflects our
concern over the company mainly investing in non-investment grade
securities," S&P said.

S&P is revising its liquidity assessment to less than adequate
from strong, as a result of deteriorating credit quality in the
company's investment portfolio following Brazil's sovereign
downgrade.  Sul Americas investments are now receiving a higher
haircut under S&P's liquidity assessment (risk charge raised to
35% from 10%) as S&P no longer considers Brazil's local currency
debt to be investment grade.  Consequently, S&P's liquidity ratio
declined to 72% from 110%.  S&P is not expecting its liquidity
assessment to improve, since this would take a major change in the
company's investment portfolio or a significant decline in the
company's business.  A less than adequate liquidity assessment
also sets a rating cap at the 'BB+' level.

S&P's negative outlook on Sul America reflects that on the
sovereign ratings.  S&P's ratings on Sul America are limited by
the sovereign ratings, given the high exposure of the company to
government securities.  Consequently, S&P could downgrade the
ratings if the sovereign ratings are lowered.

There is a greater than one in three likelihood that S&P could
lower the ratings on Brazil and, consequently, Sul America.  S&P
anticipates that, within the next year, a sovereign downgrade
could stem, in particular, from potential key policy reversals
given Brazil's fluid political dynamics, including lack of
cohesion within the cabinet, inconsistent policy initiatives, and
uncertainties during or following the impeachment process.  A
downgrade could also result from greater economic turmoil than S&P
currently expects, either due to governability issues or the
weakened external environment.

A positive rating action is highly unlikely given the sovereign
ratings and negative outlook.  S&P may consider an upgrade if,
within the next few years, the company establishes policies or
investment strategies that would allow it to withstand S&P's
sovereign stress test, leading to an improvement in the company's
liquidity position.


SUZANO PAPEL: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Global Scale LC Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has affirmed the Ba2 in the global scale
local currency and Aa2.br in the national scale rating (NSR) and
the ratings assigned to the senior unsecured notes issued by
Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A.  The outlook changed to stable from
positive.

The change in outlook follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016,
of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition
to downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.
This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 9, 2015.

Ratings affirmed as:

Issuer: Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A.

  LT Corporate Family Rating: Ba2 (global scale)/Aa2.br (national
   scale)
  USD123MM notes due 2019: Ba2 (global scale) / Aa2.br (national
   scale)
  USD18MM notes due 2024: Ba2 (global scale) / Aa2.br (national
   scale)

The outlook for the ratings is stable.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Suzano's Ba2 ratings incorporate the company's position as a low
cost producer of bleached eucalyptus kraft pulp (BEKP) and paper,
with leading stakes the global BEKP market and Brazilian printing
and writing paper and paperboard sectors.  The company benefits
from a high level of vertical integration with substantial self-
sufficiency in wood fiber and energy, in addition to the proximity
of its pulp mills to its own forests and port facilities, as well
as the favorable location of its paper plants within Brazil's most
industrialized region.  Furthermore its diversity towards pulp and
paper translates into exposure to different market dynamics and
contributes to strong operating margins even amid a lower growth
outlook for the paper industry in Brazil.

Additional rating positives are the company's comfortable
liquidity profile, with cash balance at the end of 2015 sufficient
to cover short term debt maturities by 1.3 times and our
expectations that leverage and credit metrics will continue
improve in the higher share of pulp in the company's Ebitda.

Constraining the ratings are the volatile nature of the pulp
industry, which should represent around 60-65% of Suzano's
revenues onwards and the still high leverage related mostly to its
pulp expansion in the state of Maranhao.  Furthermore, the
weakness in the Brazilian economy limits volumes and margins
expansion in the paper segment.

The stable outlook reflects Brazil's sovereign ratings outlook,
but also incorporates Moody's expectations that Suzano's credit
metrics will continue to improve in the next 12-18 months thanks
to the enhanced cash flow generation in the pulp segment,
supported by our outlook of flat hardwood pulp prices in the same
period, which will contribute to continued positive free cash flow
generation and gradual deleverage.  The maintenance of a robust
liquidity position is also incorporated in the stable outlook.

An upgrade is unlikely in the short term.  Over time, given the
current level of Brazil's government bond ratings, an upgrade on
Suzano's ratings would depend on improvements in credit metrics
and maintenance of a strong market positioning.  An upgrade
consideration would be dependent on the company proving limited
risk of deterioration due to the impact of weak domestic economic
fundamentals and limited reliance on domestic banks or capital
markets for funding.  Quantitatively, that would also require
leverage -- as measured by Total Adjusted Gross Debt to EBITDA --
to be below 3.5x and interest coverage -- expressed by Adjusted
EBITDA to Interest Expense -- to remain above 4.0x on a consistent
basis.

Negative pressure on the rating could result if adjusted leverage
remains above 4.5x for a prolonged period without prospects for
reduction, or in case the company's liquidity position is
insufficient to cover near term debt service requirements.

Headquartered in Salvador - Brazil, Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A.
is a leading low-cost producer of bleached eucalyptus market pulp,
printing and writing paper and paperboard, having reported
consolidated net revenues of BRL10 billion in 2015.  The sales mix
(73% pulp and 27% paper) gives the company cash flow stability due
to the different supply-demand and pricing dynamics for each of
the segments.  The company benefits from its vertical integration
and 70% self-sufficiency in wood and 100% in energy on a
consolidated basis (with excess capacity of 30MW) and also from
prudent financial management, solid liquidity position and good
risk management practices.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Paper and
Forest Products Industry published in October 2013.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on January 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC closed on
Feb. 22.


SUZANO TRADING: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on Sr. Unsec. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 senior unsecured
rating of the notes issued by Suzano Trading Ltd.  The outlook
changed to stable from positive.  At the same time, Moody's
AmÇrica Latina has affirmed the Ba2 in the global scale local
currency and Aa2.br in the national scale rating (NSR) and the
ratings assigned to the senior unsecured notes issued by Suzano
Papel e Celulose S.A.

The change in outlook follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016,
of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition
to downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.
This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 9, 2015.

Ratings affirmed as:

Issuer: Suzano Trading Ltd

  USD650 million due 2021: Ba2

The outlook for the ratings is stable.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Suzano's Ba2 ratings incorporate the company's position as a low
cost producer of bleached eucalyptus kraft pulp (BEKP) and paper,
with leading stakes in the global BEKP market and Brazilian
printing and writing paper and paperboard sectors.  The company
benefits from a high level of vertical integration with
substantial self-sufficiency in wood fiber and energy, in addition
to the proximity of its pulp mills to its own forests and port
facilities, as well as the favorable location of its paper plants
within Brazil's most industrialized region.  Furthermore its
diversity towards pulp and paper translates into exposure to
different market dynamics and contributes to strong operating
margins even amid a lower growth outlook for the paper industry in
Brazil.

Additional rating positives are the company's comfortable
liquidity profile, with cash balance at the end of 2015 sufficient
to cover short term debt maturities by 1.3 times and our
expectations that leverage and credit metrics will continue to
improve due to the higher share of pulp in the company's Ebitda.

Constraining the ratings are the volatile nature of the pulp
industry, which should represent around 60-65% of Suzano's
revenues onwards and the still high leverage related mostly to its
pulp expansion in the state of Maranhao.  Furthermore, the
weakness in the Brazilian economy limits volumes and margins
expansion in the paper segment.

The stable outlook incorporates Moody's expectations that Suzano's
credit metrics will continue to improve in the next 12-18 months
thanks to the enhanced cash flow generation in the pulp segment,
supported by our outlook of flat hardwood pulp prices in the same
period, which will contribute to continued positive free cash flow
generation and gradual deleverage.  The maintenance of a robust
liquidity position is also incorporated in the stable outlook.

An upgrade is unlikely in the short term.  Over time, given the
current level of Brazil's government bond ratings, an upgrade on
Suzano's ratings would depend on improvements in credit metrics
and maintenance of a strong market positioning.  An upgrade
consideration would be dependent on the company proving limited
risk of deterioration due to the impact of weak domestic economic
fundamentals and limited reliance on domestic banks or capital
markets for funding.  Quantitatively, that would also require
leverage -- as measured by Total Adjusted Gross Debt to EBITDA --
to be below 3.5x and interest coverage -- expressed by Adjusted
EBITDA to Interest Expense -- to remain above 4.0x on a consistent
basis.

Negative pressure on the rating could result if adjusted leverage
remains above 4.5x for a prolonged period without prospects for
reduction, or in case the company's liquidity position is
insufficient to cover near term debt service requirements.

Headquartered in Salvador - Brazil, Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A.
is a leading low-cost producer of bleached eucalyptus market pulp,
printing and writing paper and paperboard, having reported
consolidated net revenues of BRL10 billion in 2015.  The sales mix
(73% pulp and 27% paper) gives the company cash flow stability due
to the different supply-demand and pricing dynamics for each of
the segments.  The company benefits from its vertical integration
and 70% self-sufficiency in wood and 100% in energy on a
consolidated basis (with excess capacity of 30MW) and also from
prudent financial management, solid liquidity position and good
risk management practices.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Paper and
Forest Products Industry published in October 2013.


TELEFONICA BRASIL: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Debentures to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. downgraded Telefonica Brasil S.A.'s
senior unsecured debentures to Ba1 from Baa2.  At the same time,
Moody's withdrew Telefonica Brasil's issuer rating and assigned a
Ba1/Aa1.br corporate family rating.  The national scale ratings
were downgraded to Aa1.br from Aaa.br for the senior unsecured
debentures.  The ratings outlook was changed to negative.

The rating action follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016, of
Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition to
downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 10, 2015.

Ratings downgraded:

   -- BRL 2.0 billion non-convertible unsecured debentures due in
      2017: to Ba1 from Baa2 (global scale).
   -- BRL 2.0 billion non-convertible unsecured debentures due in
      2017: to Aa1.br from Aaa.br (national scale).

Ratings Withdrawn:

Telefonica Brasil S.A.

   -- Issuer Rating (global scale): previously Baa2
   -- Issuer Rating: previously Aaa.br (national scale)

Ratings Assigned:

Telefonica Brasil S.A.

  Corporate Family Rating: Ba1 (global scale)
  Corporate Family Rating: Aa1.br (national scale)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade of Telefonica Brasil's global scale ratings to Ba1
was prompted by the downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating
to Ba2 from Baa3," explained Moody's Vice President and Senior
Analyst, Marcos Schmidt.

"Telefonica Brasil's Ba1 rating still ranks one-notch above
Brazil's government bond rating of Ba2, which is granted only on
exceptional basis for issuers with fundamentals that are much
stronger than the sovereign.  In the case of Telefonica Brasil,
this is evidenced by its position as the largest integrated
telecom company in Brazil in terms of revenue and number of
wireless subscribers, as well as a strong brand name and service
quality in the wireless segment.  In addition, Telefonica Brasil
has a conservative financial profile, robust credit metrics, solid
liquidity position, strong brands and good geographic presence in
the country." added Marcos.

As per Moody's methodology "How Sovereign Credit Quality Can
Affect Other Ratings", published on March 16, 2015, deterioration
in sovereign credit quality can directly affect the credit
standing of issuers domiciled within the country, but issuers with
fundamentals that are much stronger than the sovereign could be
rated above it on an exceptional basis.

On the other hand, the ratings are constrained by Brazil's
government bond rating of Ba2, and by Telefonica Brasil's still
meaningful exposure to the wireline business, which accounted for
42% of net revenues in the LTM ended December 2015.  Moody's
expects revenue and profitability in this segment to continue to
decline due to lines in service (LIS) disconnections, tougher
competition in the broadband segment, and expensive TV content as
the telco companies enhance their triple and four play packages
offerings.  Additional credit negatives are the company's negative
free cash flow due to high capex and high dividend payout, which
is likely to be maintained during the next several years.
Negative free cash flow is, however, mitigated by Telefonica
Brasil's low leverage.

The negative outlook reflects the change in outlook of Brazil's
government bond rating to negative.

An upgrade on Telefonica Brasil's rating would depend on an
upgrade of Brazil's government bond rating.  In addition,
Telefonica Brasil's ratings are constrained by the highly
competitive operating environment in Brazil in all segments and
the still-high revenue contribution of the mature and declining
wireline business.

Telefonica Brasil's ratings could come under downward pressure if
Telefonica S.A.'s credit profile and liquidity position
deteriorate, if Brazil's government bond rating should be further
downgraded or if competitive threats adversely affect Telefonica
Brasil's operating performance more than expected, causing a
meaningful decline on revenues and margins.  Ratings would also be
negatively affected in the event that the company pursues a
material debt financed return on capital strategy or M&A activity.

Telefonica Brasil is the largest integrated telecom operator in
Brazil with BRL 40.2 billion (USD 12.0 billion) in revenues during
the LTM ended December 2015.  Revenues from mobile and fixed
services represented 58% and 42% of the total, respectively, in
the LTM ended December of 2015.  The acquisition of GVT in May
2015, a non-cash equity financed transaction, has enhanced its
broadband capacity and presence in the pay-TV market.  Spain-based
Telefonica S.A. (Baa2 stable) is the largest shareholder, holding,
directly and indirectly, 94.5% of voting shares and 73.6% of total
shares.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on Jan. 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC closed on
February 22.


VALE SA: Moody's Lowers Global Scale Local Currency Rating to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina downgraded Vale S.A.'s ratings to Ba3 from
Baa3 in the global scale local currency and to A3.br from Aa1.br
in the national scale rating (NSR) and the ratings assigned to the
senior unsecured notes (Debentures de Infraestrutura) issued by
Vale S.A.  At the same time, Moody's has withdrawn Vale S.A.'s
issuer rating and assigned a Ba3 corporate family rating.  The
outlook is negative.  These rating actions conclude the review
initiated on Jan. 21, 2016.

Rating Actions:

Assigned:

Issuer: Vale S.A.

  LT Corporate Family Rating: Ba3 (global scale); A3.br (national
   scale)

Downgraded:

  BRL 1.35 billion Senior Unsecured Notes (Debentures de
   Infraestrutura) due 2020 and 2022 -- downgraded to Ba3 (global
   scale); A3.br (national scale)

  BRL 750 million Senior Unsecured Notes (Debentures de
   Infraestrutura) -- downgraded to Ba3 (global scale); A3.br
   (national scale)

Withdrawals:

Issuer: Vale S.A.

  Issuer Rating: Baa3 (global scale) / Aa1.br

The outlook for all ratings is negative

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Vale's ratings to Ba3 reflects our expectation of
weaker performance over the next 12 months resulting from the
substantial decline in iron ore and base metals prices observed in
2015 and our expectation that prices will not likely experience
any meaningful recovery before 2017.  The rating action also
incorporates Moody's view that there has been a fundamental
downward shift in the mining sector with the downturn being deeper
and prospects for a recovery extended, resulting in increased
credit risk and weaker metrics for Vale as well as the global
mining sector.  Consequently, ratings need to be recalibrated to
reflect expected performance over a more protracted challenging
operating environment.  The slowing economic growth rates in China
materially impact the demand for base metals while the reducing
steel production rates impact demand for iron ore and
metallurgical coal - leading to lower prices.  Supply imbalances,
particularly in iron ore, the major earnings and cash flow driver
for Vale, will maintain pressure on prices for several years.
While lower oil prices, lower freight costs, and currency
depreciation contribute to reduced costs, the drop in prices has
and will continue to significantly impact performance.

As a consequence, Vale's revenues and cash flows will continue to
drop and credit metrics, particularly leverage and interest
coverage, will remain challenged, with total debt to Ebitda
trending above 4x and EBIT to interest expenses below 2x
(incorporating Moody's standard adjustments).  The substantial
progress Vale has made on reducing costs, and the increase in
volumes and ore grades resulting from ongoing investments will
help offset low commodity prices, but will not be fully reflected
in the company's credit metrics until 2017-2018.  Although Moody's
recognizes that Vale continues to undertake a number of steps to
respond to the challenging business environment and adjust
operations accordingly, the level of adjustment required may be
higher, while the timing of asset sales, which will allow a
reduction in debt levels, remain uncertain.

Vale's Ba3 rating is supported by the company's diversified
product base and competitive cost position, and substantive
portfolio of long lived assets.  While Vale has diversified its
geographic footprint through various acquisitions in Canada,
Australia and elsewhere, the dominant revenue, earnings and cash
flow driver continues to be its Brazilian-based iron ore
operations and its major position in the seaborne iron ore markets
(Vale, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton combined having an approximate
70% - 75% market share).  The rating acknowledges Vale's more
focused and disciplined approach to project development, capital
allocation, resizing of its asset portfolio to strategically
important business segments, divestiture of such non-strategic
assets, and focus on cost reduction, which better positions Vale
to withstand the challenges of prices for the company's major
products over the next twelve to eighteen months.

Constraining the ratings is the negative outlook for iron ore and
base metals prices, and our expectation that prices will not
experience any meaningful recovery before 2017, as a consequence
of the slowdown in China's economic growth and steel production,
which brings heightened uncertainty over demand for iron ore and
base metals in the next few years.  The new industry wide supply
coming on line and the strength of the US dollar will also
contribute to continued pressure on prices.  Low iron ore, base
metals (nickel/copper) and coal prices for a prolonged period will
pressure Vale's credit metrics and cash flow generation, reducing
the company's ability to reduce leverage.

The negative outlook reflects the deterioration in market
fundamentals for iron ore and base metals in a period in which
Vale is undergoing a large expansion phase with substantial
capital expenditures.  As a consequence, margins, leverage and
coverage rations will remain challenged through 2016.
Additionally, the outlook incorporates potential penalties, fines
and claims related to the accident with Samarco's dams.

A stabilization of the outlook could be considered if iron ore and
base metals prices improve and are sustained above our sensitivity
ranges (from USD 40 to USD 45/ton for iron ore in Moody's base
case), easing existing pressure on metrics.  An upward rating
movement would require that Vale maintains a strong liquidity
position and reduce debt levels, with adjusted total debt/EBITDA
below 3.5x and EBIT/interest expense above 3.5x times, at a
minimum.

The ratings or outlook could suffer negative pressure should
conditions in iron ore and base metals remain weak, leading to
lower profitability, and Vale is not able to make meaningful
progress in cost reduction.  Downward pressure could also affect
the ratings if the company is unable to continue with its asset
divestiture and partnership strategies, which will help Vale to
maintain stable debt levels and reduce pressure on leverage.  A
downgrade could be considered if leverage ratio (total debt to
Ebitda) trends towards 4x or above.  A marked deterioration in the
company's liquidity position, or dividends at levels such that the
cash from operations less dividends to debt ratio remains below
15% for a prolonged period, could also precipitate a downgrade.

Negative pressure would arise to the extent which Vale is required
to provide material financial support to Samarco, or faces
liabilities from litigation and class actions resulting from the
Samarco's accident.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Vale is one of the
largest mining enterprises globally, with substantive positions in
iron ore and nickel, and participation in copper, coal and
fertilizers, as well as supplemental positions in energy and steel
production.  Vale is the largest global supplier of iron ore, with
approximately 359 million metric tons (t) of production in the
full year 2015 (including its share of Samarco), and the largest
global producer of nickel, with around 291,000 t produced during
the same period.  Vale's principal mining operations are located
in Brazil, Canada, Australia, Indonesia, and Mozambique.  In
addition, the company is active in exploration activities in nine
countries.  For the twelve months through Dec. 31, 2015, Vale had
net operating revenues of $25.6 billion.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on January 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to our
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs. The comment period for this RFC closed on
February 22.


VALE SA: Moody's Lowers Ratings to Ba3, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating for Vale S.A. and
related ratings to Ba3 from Baa3, including Vale's senior
unsecured rating and the ratings on the foreign currency debt
issues of Vale Overseas Limited (guaranteed by Vale).  Moody's
also downgraded to B2 from Baa3 the senior unsecured ratings of
Vale Canada Ltd. (not guaranteed by Vale).  The outlook is
negative.  These rating actions conclude the review initiated on
Jan. 21, 2016.

At the same time, Moody's America Latina downgraded Vale's ratings
to Ba3 from Baa3 in the global scale local currency and to A3.br
from Aa1.br in the national scale rating (NSR) and the ratings
assigned to the senior unsecured notes (Debentures de
Infraestrutura) issued by Vale S.A.  At the same time, Moody's has
withdrawn Vale S.A.'s issuer rating and assigned a Ba3 corporate
family rating.

Rating Actions:

Issuer: Vale S.A.

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Sept. 11, 2042,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, March 24, 2018,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Jan. 10, 2023,
   Downgrade to Ba3

Issuer: Vale Canada Ltd.

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Sept. 15, 2032,
   Downgrade to B2

Issuer: Vale Overseas Limited

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Jan. 17, 2034,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Jan. 17, 2034,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Jan. 23, 2017,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Nov. 21, 2036,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Sept. 15, 2019,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Nov. 10, 2039,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Sept. 15, 2020,
   Downgrade to Ba3
  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Jan. 11, 2022,
   Downgrade to Ba3

Outlook for all ratings is negative.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Vale's ratings to Ba3 reflects Moody's
expectation of weaker performance over the next 12 months
resulting from the substantial decline in iron ore and base metals
prices observed in 2015 and our expectation that prices will not
likely experience any meaningful recovery before 2017.  The rating
action also incorporates Moody's view that there has been a
fundamental downward shift in the mining sector with the downturn
being deeper and prospects for a recovery extended, resulting in
increased credit risk and weaker metrics for Vale as well as the
global mining sector.  Consequently, ratings need to be
recalibrated to reflect expected performance over a more
protracted challenging operating environment.  The slowing
economic growth rates in China materially impact the demand for
base metals while the reducing steel production rates impact
demand for iron ore and metallurgical coal - leading to lower
prices.  Supply imbalances, particularly in iron ore, the major
earnings and cash flow driver for Vale, will maintain pressure on
prices for several years. While lower oil prices, lower freight
costs, and currency depreciation contribute to reduced costs, the
drop in prices has and will continue to significantly impact
performance.

As a consequence, Vale's revenues and cash flows will continue to
drop and credit metrics, particularly leverage and interest
coverage, will remain challenged, with total debt to Ebitda
trending above 4x and EBIT to interest expenses below 2x
(incorporating Moody's standard adjustments).  The substantial
progress Vale has made on reducing costs, and the increase in
volumes and ore grades resulting from ongoing investments will
help offset low commodity prices, but will not be fully reflected
in the company's credit metrics until 2017-2018.  Although Moody's
recognizes that Vale continues to undertake a number of steps to
respond to the challenging business environment and adjust
operations accordingly, the level of adjustment required may be
higher, while the timing of asset sales, which will allow a
reduction in debt levels, remain uncertain.

Vale's Ba3 rating is supported by the company's diversified
product base and competitive cost position, and substantive
portfolio of long lived assets.  While Vale has diversified its
geographic footprint through various acquisitions in Canada,
Australia and elsewhere, the dominant revenue, earnings and cash
flow driver continues to be its Brazilian-based iron ore
operations and its major position in the seaborne iron ore markets
(Vale, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton combined having an approximate
70% - 75% market share).  The rating acknowledges Vale's more
focused and disciplined approach to project development, capital
allocation, resizing of its asset portfolio to strategically
important business segments, divestiture of such non-strategic
assets, and focus on cost reduction, which better positions Vale
to withstand the challenges of prices for the company's major
products over the next twelve to eighteen months.

Constraining the ratings is the negative outlook for iron ore and
base metals prices, and our expectation that prices will not
experience any meaningful recovery before 2017, as a consequence
of the slowdown in China's economic growth and steel production,
which brings heightened uncertainty over demand for iron ore and
base metals in the next few years.  The new industry wide supply
coming on line and the strength of the US dollar will also
contribute to continued pressure on prices.  Low iron ore, base
metals (nickel/copper) and coal prices for a prolonged period will
pressure Vale's credit metrics and cash flow generation, reducing
the company's ability to reduce leverage.

The negative outlook reflects the deterioration in market
fundamentals for iron ore and base metals in a period in which
Vale is undergoing a large expansion phase with substantial
capital expenditures.  As a consequence, margins, leverage and
coverage rations will remain challenged through 2016.
Additionally, the outlook incorporates potential penalties, fines
and claims related to the accident with Samarco's dams.

The downgrade of Vale Canada senior unsecured rating to B2
reflects the weaker operating performance of its business, and the
fact that Vale does not guarantee the notes.  The rating continues
to reflect this subsidiary's major position in the global nickel
market, its asset base and strategic importance to its parent.

A stabilization of the outlook could be considered if iron ore and
base metals prices improve and are sustained above our sensitivity
ranges (from USD 40 to USD 45/ton for iron ore in Moody's base
case), easing existing pressure on metrics.  An upward rating
movement would require that Vale maintains a strong liquidity
position and reduce debt levels, with adjusted total debt/EBITDA
below 3.5x and EBIT/interest expense above 3.5x times, at a
minimum.

The ratings or outlook could suffer negative pressure should
conditions in iron ore and base metals remain weak, leading to
lower profitability, and Vale is not able to make meaningful
progress in cost reduction.  Downward pressure could also affect
the ratings if the company is unable to continue with its asset
divestiture and partnership strategies, which will help Vale to
maintain stable debt levels and reduce pressure on leverage.  A
downgrade could be considered if leverage ratio (total debt to
Ebitda) trends towards 4x or above.  A marked deterioration in the
company's liquidity position, or dividends at levels such that the
cash from operations less dividends to debt ratio remains below
15% for a prolonged period, could also precipitate a downgrade.
Negative pressure would arise to the extent which Vale is required
to provide material financial support to Samarco, or faces
liabilities from litigation and class actions resulting from the
Samarco's accident.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Vale is one of the
largest mining enterprises globally, with substantive positions in
iron ore and nickel, and participation in copper, coal and
fertilizers, as well as supplemental positions in energy and steel
production.  Vale is the largest global supplier of iron ore, with
approximately 359 million metric tons (t) of production in the
full year 2015 (including its share of Samarco), and the largest
global producer of nickel, with around 291,000 t produced during
the same period.  Vale's principal mining operations are located
in Brazil, Canada, Australia, Indonesia, and Mozambique.  In
addition, the company is active in exploration activities in nine
countries.  For the twelve months through Dec. 31, 2015, Vale had
net operating revenues of $25.6 billion.


VOTORANTIM CIMENTOS: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Debt to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Votorantim Cimentos S.A.'s
senior unsecured rated debt to Ba2 from Baa3.  At the same time,
Moody's withdrew Votorantim Cimentos' issuer rating and assigned a
Ba2 Corporate Family rating.  The outlook was changed to negative.

The rating action follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016, of
Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition to
downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 10, 2015.

Ratings downgraded:

   -- EUR 650 million senior unsecured notes due 2021: to Ba2 from
      Baa3

   -- EUR 500 million Senior unsecured notes due 2022: to Ba2 from
      Baa3

   -- USD 1150 million senior unsecured notes due 2041:to Ba2 from
      Baa3

Ratings assigned:

Votorantim Cimentos S.A.

  Corporate Family Rating: Ba2

Ratings withdrawn:

Votorantim Cimentos S.A.

  Issuer Rating: previously Baa3

The rating outlook was changed to negative

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade of Votorantim Cimentos' ratings was prompted by the
downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3,"
explained Moody's VP Senior Analyst, Marcos Schmidt.

Votorantim Cimentos' Ba2 ratings continue to reflect the company's
leading position in the Brazilian cement market, strong credit
metrics, adequate liquidity, as well as its large scale and
integrated operations, that translates into leading market share
and above-average Ebitda margins when compared to global peers.
The ratings also take into consideration the company's affiliation
with Votorantim S.A. (Ba2, Negative) and its relevance to the
parent company, as it contributes with 57% of its total EBITDA
generation, as of September 2015.

Votorantim Cimentos has a good liquidity profile, based on the
maintenance of a large cash balance relative to short-term debt.
Cash balance of BRL 3.6 billion as of September 2015 covers short-
term debt by almost 2.6x.  Moreover, the company has revolving
credit facilities amounting to USD882 mil. (approximately BRL 3.5
billion) with maturity in 2019 and 2020.

Votorantim Cimentos also has a comfortable amortization schedule
with an average debt maturity of 9.6 years and funding mix mainly
concentrated in bonds (54% of total reported debt) and debentures
(22% of total reported debt), as of September, 2015.

Constraining the ratings are the still modest operating
performance in the United States, Europe and Asia, economic
slowdown and corruption investigations affecting the heavy
construction market in Brazil, and CADE's (Brazil antitrust
authority) decision to rule against the largest cement companies
in the country, including Votorantim Cimentos, which was convicted
for cartel formation and fined approximately BRL 1.5 billion.  As
part of CADE's decision the company would also be obliged to sell
certain assets.  The company denied its involvement in cartel
practices and judicially appealed to the imposed sanctions, but it
is uncertain how long the appeal process will take.  In 2015
Votorantim Cimentos was granted with an injunction suspending the
effects of CADE's decision until final judgment, however CADE may
appeal.

The negative outlook reflects the change in outlook of Brazil's
government bond rating to negative, and our expectations that
market conditions for cement producers in Brazil will remain
challenging.

An upgrade of Votorantim's ratings would depend on an upgrade of
Brazil's government bond rating, and improvements in the
conditions for the Brazilian cement industry in which the company
is able to improve its operating performance such that adjusted
EBIT to interest expense is sustained above 4.0x (2.0x in the LTM
ended September 2015) and adjusted retained cash flow ("RCF") to
net debt increases to levels above 20% (10.9% in the LTM ended
September 2015), while decreasing leverage to below 3.5x (5.1x in
the LTM ended September 2015).  All ratios incorporate Moody's
standard adjustments.

The ratings could be downgraded if Brazil's government bond rating
should be further downgraded, or if the company's liquidity
profile deteriorates or if its capital structure weakens, with
adjusted Debt to Ebitda above 5.0x after the execution of the
expansion plans without prospects for reduction.  Performance
falling below our expectations, indicated by retained cash flow
("RCF") to net debt below 10% for a sustained period could also
lead to negative rating actions.

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, and one of the main subsidiaries of
Votorantim S.A., Votorantim Cimentos S.A. (Votorantim Cimentos or
VC) is the 7th largest cement company worldwide in terms of
installed cement production capacity of around 55 million tons,
excluding China capacity.  In the last twelve months ended
September 2015, Votorantim Cimentos reported consolidated revenues
of BRL 13.5 billion.  The company has operations in North and
South America, Europe, Africa and Asia.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Building
Materials Industry published in September 2014.


VOTORANTIM SA: Moody's Lowers Rating to Ba2, Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. downgraded Votorantim S.A's ratings
to Ba2 from Baa3.  At the same time, Moody's withdrew Votorantim
S.A.'s issuer ratings and assigned a Ba2/Aa2.br corporate family
rating.  The outlook was changed to negative.

The rating action follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016, of
Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition to
downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 10, 2015.

Ratings Withdrawn:

Issuer: Votorantim S.A.

   -- Issuer Rating: Previously Baa3 (global scale) and Aa1.br
      (national scale)

Ratings assigned

Issuer: Votorantim S.A.

   -- Corporate Family Rating: Ba2 (global scale)
   --  Corporate Family NSR: Aa2.br (National Scale)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade of Votorantim's global scale ratings was prompted
by the downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from
Baa3," explained Moody's VP Senior Analyst, Marcos Schmidt.

Votorantim's ratings continues to be supported by the company's
size and scale, as one of the largest conglomerates in Brazil, and
its diversified business portfolio in cement, metals and mining,
long steel, pulp, orange juice, banking and financial services -
which benefits from different end-market dynamics and mitigates
the effects of cyclicalities in any particular industry.  The
rating is also backed by the group's cost-competitive operations,
resulting from its high vertical integration, and by its strong
liquidity profile, supported by the maintenance of high cash
position and extended debt maturity, committed credit facilities
and large degree of unencumbered assets.  While depending on the
Brazilian economy to generate a substantial portion of its
consolidated Ebitda, Votorantim benefits from leading market
positions in virtually all of its operating segments.

Constraining the ratings are the commodity nature of a substantial
portion of Votorantim's business portfolio (namely metals and
mining), the challenging operating environment for its cement
business and the company's leveraged capital structure when
compared to other companies rated at the same level.
Notwithstanding, we expect Votorantim to prudently manage its
investment program in order to maintain acceptable leverage for
its rating category, most likely by improving its cash flows and
through deleverage initiatives.

The negative outlook reflects the change in outlook of Brazil's
government bond rating to negative, and Moody's expectations that
market conditions for cement producers in Brazil and Europe will
remain challenging, and that zinc, nickel and aluminum prices will
continue to be pressured by weakening global macroeconomic growth
indicators.  Nonetheless, Moody's believes that Votorantim will
prudently manage capital expenditures and dividend distributions
in order to maintain adequate liquidity to service its financial
obligations.  The outlook also assumes that should prices retreat
further the company will make the necessary adjustments in its
capital spending to maintain its financial profile.

An upgrade of Votorantim's ratings would depend on an upgrade of
Brazil's government bond rating.  A positive pressure on
Votorantim's ratings or outlook could occur if total debt to
EBITDA is sustainable below 3.0x (3.9x at the LTM ending September
2015) and (Cash flow from operations - dividends) to total debt
approaches 25% on a sustainable basis (15% at the LTM ending
September 2015).  Also, the maintenance of strong liquidity would
be necessary for a positive rating action.

Votorantim's ratings could come under downward pressure if
Brazil's government bond rating should be further downgraded, or
due to an unexpected liquidity deterioration could place negative
pressure on the rating or outlook.  Additionally downgrade
pressure on the ratings would arise in case Votorantim is unable
to deleverage.  Specifically, should total debt to EBITDA stay
above 4.0x consistently in the upcoming quarters together with
lower profitability, measured by EBIT margin below 5% (16.8% at
the LTM ending September 2015), the rating could come under
pressure.  All credit metrics are adjusted according to Moody's
standard adjustments and definitions.

Votorantim S.A. is the holding company of one of Brazil's largest
conglomerates with a diverse business portfolio that includes
cement, metals and mining, long steel, pulp, orange juice, banking
and financial services.  Since its financial arm represented by
Banco Votorantim S.A. started to be accounted under the equity
method in 2013, the group's industrial activities account for 100%
of Votorantim's revenues.  As of LTM ended September 2015,
Votorantim reported consolidated net revenues of BRL 30.6 billion.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

POTENTIAL MAPPING RECALIBRATION FROM GLOBAL SCALE TO NATIONAL
SCALE RATINGS

With the recent downgrade of the government of Brazil on the
global rating scale and other issuers whose risk profiles are
affected by related credit considerations, the distribution of
national scale ratings (NSRs) among issuers in Brazil has become
compressed, particularly at the Aa2.br level.  As a result, the
current mapping of global scale ratings to national scale ratings
may no longer be adequately serving one of its intended purposes,
which is to provide greater credit differentiation among issuers
in Brazil than is possible on the global rating scale.  However,
if Moody's NSR methodology is revised as proposed in the Request
for Comment (RFC) entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings" published on January 20, the resulting new
Brazilian scale would likely imply that many Brazil global scale
ratings would be remapped to higher ratings on the national scale.

While the RFC included a new proposed national scale map for
Brazil, given the aforementioned ratings changes, the new map
design for Brazil will likely differ from the specific map
proposal included in the RFC.  In addition to the proposed
Brazilian map, the RFC comprised a proposed update to Moody's
methodology for mapping national scale ratings from global scale
ratings, including guidelines for the design of new national scale
maps and changes to existing maps, as well as proposed new
national scale maps for each of the other countries in which we
currently offer NSRs.  The comment period for this RFC closed on
February 22.


VOTORANTIM SA: Moody's Lowers Rating on Foreign Debts to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Ba2 the foreign currency
debts guaranteed by Votorantim S.A and its subsidiaries and issued
by Companhia Brasileira de Aluminio ("CBA").  The outlook was
changed to negative.

The rating action follows Moody's downgrade on Feb. 24, 2016, of
Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3.  In addition to
downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded the country's senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from
Baa3, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Baa3.  The outlook was changed to negative.  The rating agency
also changed Brazil's country ceiling that went to Ba1 from Baa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
Dec. 10, 2015.

Ratings downgraded:

Issuer: Companhia Brasileira de Aluminio

   -- USD 750 million global bonds guaranteed by Votorantim due
      2021: to Ba2 from Baa3 (global scale)

   -- USD 400 million global bonds guaranteed by Votorantim due
      2024: to Ba2 from Baa3 (global scale)

The outlook is Negative.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade of Votorantim's global scale ratings was prompted
by the downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2 from
Baa3," explained Moody's VP Senior Analyst, Marcos Schmidt.

Votorantim's ratings continues to be supported by the company's
size and scale, as one of the largest conglomerates in Brazil, and
its diversified business portfolio in cement, metals and mining,
long steel, pulp, orange juice, banking and financial services -
which benefits from different end-market dynamics and mitigates
the effects of cyclicalities in any particular industry.  The
rating is also backed by the group's cost-competitive operations,
resulting from its high vertical integration, and by its strong
liquidity profile, supported by the maintenance of high cash
position and extended debt maturity, committed credit facilities
and large degree of unencumbered assets.  While depending on the
Brazilian economy to generate a substantial portion of its
consolidated Ebitda, Votorantim benefits from leading market
positions in virtually all of its operating segments.

Constraining the ratings are the commodity nature of a substantial
portion of Votorantim's business portfolio (namely metals and
mining), the challenging operating environment for its cement
business and the company's leveraged capital structure when
compared to other companies rated at the same level.
Notwithstanding, we expect Votorantim to prudently manage its
investment program in order to maintain acceptable leverage for
its rating category, most likely by improving its cash flows and
through deleverage initiatives.

The negative outlook reflects the change in outlook of Brazil's
government bond rating to negative, and our expectations that
market conditions for cement producers in Brazil and Europe will
remain challenging, and that zinc, nickel and aluminum prices will
continue to be pressured by weakening global macroeconomic growth
indicators.  Nonetheless, Moody's believes that Votorantim will
prudently manage capital expenditures and dividend distributions
in order to maintain adequate liquidity to service its financial
obligations.  The outlook also assumes that should prices retreat
further, the company will make the necessary adjustments in its
capital spending to maintain its financial profile.

An upgrade of Votorantim's ratings would depend on an upgrade of
Brazil's government bond rating.  A positive pressure on
Votorantim's ratings or outlook could occur if total debt to
EBITDA is sustainable below 3.0x (3.9x at the LTM ending September
2015) and (Cash flow from operations - dividends) to total debt
approaches 25% on a sustainable basis (15% at the LTM ending
September 2015).  Also, the maintenance of strong liquidity would
be necessary for a positive rating action.

Votorantim's ratings could come under downward pressure if
Brazil's government bond rating should be further downgraded, or
due to an unexpected liquidity deterioration could place negative
pressure on the rating or outlook.  Additionally downgrade
pressure on the ratings would arise in case Votorantim is unable
to deleverage.  Specifically, should total debt to EBITDA stay
above 4.0x consistently in the upcoming quarters together with
lower profitability, measured by EBIT margin below 5% (16.8% at
the LTM ending September 2015), the rating could come under
pressure.  All credit metrics are adjusted according to Moody's
standard adjustments and definitions.

Votorantim S.A. is the holding company of one of Brazil's largest
conglomerates with a diverse business portfolio that includes
cement, metals and mining, long steel, pulp, orange juice, banking
and financial services.  Since its financial arm represented by
Banco Votorantim S.A. started to be accounted under the equity
method in 2013, the group's industrial activities account for 100%
of Votorantim's revenues.  As of LTM ended September 2015,
Votorantim reported consolidated net revenues of BRL 30.6 billion.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ACS CAYMAN: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------
On Dec. 21, 2015, the sole shareholder of ACS Cayman Holdings
Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Padraig Hoare
          Telephone: +1 (345) 815 1415
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 945-6265
          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands


ALCHEMY INDIA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------
On Dec. 22, 2015, the sole shareholder of Alchemy India Fund
(Cayman) Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 27, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Atul Sharma
          78 Bayshore Road
          #05-22 Costa Del Sol
          469991 Singapore
          Telephone: (+65) 6597-7082
          Facsimile: (+65) 6410-9590


BLACKPINE PRIVATE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 21, 2015, the sole shareholder of Blackpine Private Equity
SLP Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 13, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lawrence Sheng Yu Chu
          Unicorn Garden, Flat E3, 3rd Floor
          11 Shouson Hill Road East
          Shouson Hill
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 3700 9700
          Facsimile: +852 3579 1918


CALLAWAY CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 23, 2015, the shareholders of Callaway Capital GP resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 28, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Susan Craig/Jennifer Chailler
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


COMMON SENSE BPI: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of Common Sense Long-Biased
BPI, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fort Rock Asset Management, LLC
          c/o Mike Wietecki
          15350 SW Sequoia Parkway
          Suite 250, Portland
          Oregon 97224
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (503) 603 2516


COMMON SENSE BPI SPV: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of Common Sense Partners
BPI SPV, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fort Rock Asset Management, LLC
          c/o Mike Wietecki
          15350 SW Sequoia Parkway
          Suite 250, Portland
          Oregon 97224
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (503) 603 2516


COMMON SENSE ENHANCED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of Common Sense Enhanced
Return Offshore SPC resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fort Rock Asset Management, LLC
          c/o Mike Wietecki
          15350 SW Sequoia Parkway
          Suite 250, Portland
          Oregon 97224
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (503) 603 2516
          e-mail: mwietecki@fort-rock.com


COMMON SENSE EVERGREEN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of Common Sense Evergreen
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fort Rock Asset Management, LLC
          c/o Mike Wietecki
          15350 SW Sequoia Parkway
          Suite 250, Portland
          Oregon 97224
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (503) 603 2516


COMMON SENSE LONG-BIASED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of Common Sense Long-Biased
Offshore, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fort Rock Asset Management, LLC
          c/o Mike Wietecki
          15350 SW Sequoia Parkway
          Suite 250, Portland
          Oregon 97224
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (503) 603 2516


COMMON SENSE OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of Common Sense Offshore,
Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fort Rock Asset Management, LLC
          c/o Mike Wietecki
          15350 SW Sequoia Parkway
          Suite 250, Portland
          Oregon 97224
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (503) 603 2516


COMMON SENSE PARTNERS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of Common Sense Partners
BPI, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fort Rock Asset Management, LLC
          c/o Mike Wietecki
          15350 SW Sequoia Parkway
          Suite 250, Portland
          Oregon 97224
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (503) 603 2516


CONDOR CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 16, 2015, the sole shareholder of Condor Capital
Management Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Arnaud Cayla
          30 Place de Madeleine
          75008 Paris
          France
          Telephone: +33 1 53 43 20 43


DOUBLE HAVEN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 22, 2015, the sole member of Double Haven Temple Fund
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kanwaljit Singh Bahra
          c/o Double Haven Capital (Hong Kong) Limited
          Level 41 4104-08
          248 Queen's Road East
          Wanchai
          Hong Kong


DOUBLE HAVEN FEEDER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 22, 2015, the sole member of Double Haven Temple Feeder
Fund resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kanwaljit Singh Bahra
          c/o Double Haven Capital (Hong Kong) Limited
          Level 41 4104-08
          248 Queen's Road East
          Wanchai
          Hong Kong


ELIGIO LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
On Jan. 4, 2016, the sole shareholder of Eligio Limited resolved
to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Feb. 4, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Eagle Holdings Ltd.
          c/o Barclays Trust Company (Cayman) Limited
          FirstCaribbean House, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 487 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7128


ENFOCA EN MAESTRO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 17, 2015, the sole shareholder of Enfoca En Maestro Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

           Enfoca Asset Management Ltd.
           c/o Jesus Zamora Leon
           Enfoca, Av. Jorge Basadre 310
           Piso 7 San Isidro
           Telephone: (511) 823 0226


FAMA BRAZIL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
On Dec. 21, 2015, the sole shareholder of Fama Brazil Fund
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andre Lederman
          c/o Jonathan Turnham
          Travers Thorp Alberga
          Harbour Place, 2nd Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 472, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (3450 949 0699
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8171


JASMINE INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2015, the sole shareholder of Jasmine Investment
Company resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Feb. 4, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Eagle Holdings Ltd.
          c/o Barclays Trust Company (Cayman) Limited
          FirstCaribbean House, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 487 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7128


MERIT INVESTMENTS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 17, 2015, the sole shareholder of Merit Investments
Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Feb. 4, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Eagle Holdings Ltd.
          c/o Barclays Trust Company (Cayman) Limited
          FirstCaribbean House, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 487 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7128


ST ALPHA EVENT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 14, 2015, the sole shareholder of St Alpha Event Fund Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stone Toro Asset Managment LLC
          313 Commons Way
          Princeton
          New Jersey 08540
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (609) 748 1936



===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================


BANCO INTERNACIONAL: S&P Puts 'BB' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed the 'BB' long-
term issuer credit ratings on Banco Internacional de Costa Rica
(BICSA) on CreditWatch with negative implications.  The short-term
rating is unchanged at 'B'.

The rating action follows the downgrade of Costa Rica's long-term
foreign and local currency rating to 'BB-' from 'BB'.  The outlook
on the sovereign is negative.  The CreditWatch negative reflects
the possibility that S&P could downgrade the long-term ratings to
the level of the sovereign ratings if the results of the stress-
test show that the bank will fail to pay its obligations in a
hypothetical scenario in which Costa Rica defaults both in local
and in foreign currency.  S&P will also assess the possible
negative impact that the probable deterioration in Costa Rica's
economic risk will have on BICSA's RAC ratio.



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


BANCO AGROMERCANTIL: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR, Outlook Remains Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long-term 'BB' and
short-term 'B' issuer credit ratings (ICRs) on Banco Agromercantil
de Guatemala S.A. (BAM).  The outlook remains stable.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' issue-level rating to Intertrust SPV
(Cayman) Ltd.'s $300 million senior notes due April 10, 2019.
Intertrust SPV acts as trustee of the Agromercantil Senior Trust.
BAM fully guarantees the notes, so the rating on the notes is the
same as the long-term ICR on the bank.

S&P's ratings on BAM reflect: its adequate business position due
to its position as the fourth largest bank in the Guatemalan
banking system and the stability of its operating revenues;
adequate capital and earnings, based on a forecasted RAC ratio of
6.8% for the next 12-18 months; moderate risk position that
reflects the proportion of dollar-denominated loans on its balance
sheet and some concentration in terms of group exposures; and a
combination of average funding and adequate liquidity.  The bank's
stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains at 'bb'.

S&P considers the bank has adequate liquidity.  BAM is not exposed
to significant refinancing risks in the short term, due to the low
proportion of wholesale funding and the maturity of the notes
until 2019.  The bank's broad liquid assets to short-term
wholesale funding has been consistently above 2.0x, reflecting
that the bank's securities portfolio is mainly comprised by
government securities and that it mainly funds its operation with
deposits.  Nonetheless, S&P views liquidity only as adequate
because most of its securities trade in the local and undeveloped
capital market, limiting its liquidity.

The stable outlook on BAM reflects that on the sovereign, and
S&P's expectation that the bank will maintain an RAC ratio of
about 6.8% in the next 12 to 18 months with high quality of
capital and earnings, through more-moderate loan portfolio growth
and adequate internal capital generation, despite a higher
dividend payout ratio.  S&P also expects the bank to maintain
adequate asset quality indicators, despite the challenging
economic conditions.

S&P could raise the ratings on the bank if it upgrades the
sovereign ratings on Guatemala and if its SACP and group status to
Grupo Bancolombia remain unchanged.

On the other hand, S&P could revise the bank's SACP if it revised
its business position to strong, if the bank strengthens its
market share within the Guatemalan banking system in terms of
loans, while maintaining the positive trend in its operating
revenues.  S&P could also raise the bank's SACP if S&P revised its
assessment of its risk position, should loan portfolio
concentrations in terms of group exposures decrease and the bank's
dollarization of its balance sheet decrease to the average of the
banking system in Guatemala (to around 40% of the total loan
portfolio), while maintaining asset quality metrics in line with
the system.  Nonetheless, either improvement would be reflected in
a higher ICR only in the event of a sovereign upgrade.

If the bank's SACP weakens--as a result of an RAC ratio
consistently below 6.75% or if credit losses increase and exceed
those of the system--a downgrade is still unlikely, because the
ICR would reflect notches of support only up to the foreign
currency ratings on Guatemala.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


NATIONAL COMMERCIAL: Fitch Hikes Issuer Default Ratings to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgraded National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited's
(NCBJ) long-term foreign currency and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) and Support Rating Floor (SRF) to 'B' from
'B-', its Viability Rating (VR) to 'b' from 'b-' and its Support
Rating (SR) to '4' from '5'. Short-term foreign and local currency
IDRs were affirmed at 'B.' A full list of rating actions is at the
end of this rating action commentary.

The IDRs and VR have been upgraded to reflect the improving
operating environment. On Feb. 11, 2016, Fitch upgraded Jamaica's
foreign and local currency IDRs to 'B' from 'B-' in light of the
government's continued adherence to targets agreed with the IMF.
In addition, falling energy prices and the satisfactory
performance of remittances and tourism have supported business
confidence and credit growth. The Rating Outlook has been revised
to Stable from Positive.


KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS and VR

The bank's IDRs and VR reflect the high influence of the operating
environment given its large exposure to the sovereign as well as
its reach into the major sectors of the Jamaican economy through
its diverse corporate and retail banking, insurance and securities
services.

NCBJ's asset quality is directly correlated with the sovereign due
its large holdings of government securities, representing 46.7% of
total assets on a consolidated basis at December 2015. While
NCBJ's loan quality indicators have registered steady improvement
since 2014, they continue to lag behind regional peers (Latin
American banks with VRs of 'b-'/'b'/'b+').

NCBJ's non-performing loans (NPLs) declined to 4.8% of gross loans
at December 2015, compared to 5.4% at fiscal year-end (FYE) 2014.
Fitch expects that NPLs will continue to improve as the bank works
out a large legacy problem credit. Loan quality indicators may
also benefit from an improving business environment and better
credit information through the relatively new credit bureau. The
bank's loan loss reserves in the contra-asset account are weaker
than regional peers but are mitigated by non-distributable
reserves in the capital account. Considering these additional
reserves, reserve coverage increases to 109.3% of impaired loans
at December 2015.

NCBJ's ratings also reflect the bank's resilient financial
performance despite two sovereign debt restructurings from 2010 to
2013, thanks to its diversified sources of income. The bank has
mitigated a declining net interest margin through fees and
commissions from an expanding suite of services.

The bank's capital position compares favourably to regional peers
thanks to a moderated rate of asset growth, stable earnings and a
reasonable dividend distribution policy. In November 2015, it was
announced that NCBJ had agreed to purchase a 29.9% stake in
Guardian Holdings the Caribbean's leading insurer. While details
of the transaction are not yet public, the acquisition, which is
subject to regulatory approval, is not expected to materially
impact the bank's capital position. Given NCBJ's systemic
importance, the Bank of Jamaica requires that NCBJ maintain a
regulatory capital ratio of 12.5% compared to the 10% regulatory
minimum. In addition, local capital calculation rules are more
stringent than Fitch or Basel standards in several ways, the most
significant of which is the deduction of retained earnings from
qualifying capital.

NCBJ reports a solid liquidity profile, surpassing local
requirements, thanks to its liquid investment portfolio. At
December 2015, liquid assets, including cash, bank deposits and
available for sale securities, covered customer deposits by
108.7%. However, given the Jamaican government's speculative grade
rating, NCBJ's portfolio of government bonds could become illiquid
during a period of stress.

NCBJ's ratings also reflect its strong company profile and leading
franchise. It is the largest financial institution in the country
with a market share among commercial banks of 41% by assets and
37% by deposits at FYE 2015.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The Support Rating Floor of 'B' is equalized with the sovereign
rating, reflecting NCBJ's systemic importance. However,
notwithstanding the government's record of extraordinary support
to the banking system during prior crises, NCBJ's Support Rating
of '4' reflects uncertainties over the sovereign's capacity to
provide future support in light of its high levels of
indebtedness.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, VR and SRF

The bank's IDRs, VR and SRF are sensitive to a change in Fitch's
view of the sovereign, given the bank's sizeable government
exposure. In addition, a sustained deterioration in financial
performance, including a decline in asset quality, weakened
profitability that pressures the bank's capital position, or
sudden deposit instability, to a level that is inconsistent with
its peers, could result in a negative rating action.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

While Fitch views the sovereign's propensity to provide timely
support to NCBJ as high due to the bank's systemic importance,
NCBJ's SR has limited upside potential as the government's high
level of indebtedness is not expected to improve in the near term.
The SR is potentially sensitive to any change in assumptions
around the propensity or ability of the sovereign to provide
timely support to the bank.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs upgraded to 'B' from
    'B-'; Outlook revised from Positive to Stable;

-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';

-- Viability Rating upgraded to 'b' from 'b-';

-- Support Rating upgraded to '4' from '5';

-- Support Rating Floor revised to 'B' from 'B-'.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


CONSUBANCO SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the foreign- and local-currency long-
and short- term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Consubanco, S.A.,
Institucion de Banca Multiple (Consubanco) at 'BB' and 'B',
respectively.  Fitch also affirmed the bank's Viability Rating
(VR) at 'bb' and its long- and short-term National Scale ratings
at 'A(mex)' and 'F1(mex)', respectively.

The Rating Outlook on the long-term rating is Stable.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

VR, IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT RATINGS

The bank's IDRs, VR, National Scale and senior debt ratings
reflect its strong and growing business franchise in the public
sector employees' pay-roll-deducted loan segment, its consistent
financial performance throughout the economic cycle, reflected in
sound and recurring profitability ratios driven by wide margins
and strong efficiency levels.  Additionally, the ratings consider
the bank's continued, albeit moderate, improvement in asset
quality metrics and its sustained ample loan loss reserve coverage
ratio.  Consubanco's adequate loss absorption capacity reflected
in its capitalization ratios were also factored on its ratings.

Consubanco's ratings are constrained by the high level of
concentration of its balance sheet (business mix and funding
base), the challenging operating and competitive environment of
its business segment, and the operational and political risks
inherent to the latter.

Consubanco's financial performance continues to be strong.  Its
profitability is underpinned by the consistently high net interest
margins of its products, which, together with high balance sheet
growth and contained credit costs, provide an ample and recurrent
income base.  This, coupled with adequate and stable operational
efficiency metrics, results in strong profitability ratios that
compare favorably to its peers.  Operating ROA and ROE improved to
11.8% and 43.2%, respectively in 2015, compared to 10% and 38.4%,
registered in 2014.

Fitch estimates that the NIM (net interest income / average
earning assets) will be pressured moderately in 2016 given the
recent increases in the reference interest rate announced by the
central bank, considering that all of Consubanco's funding is
composed of variable-rate lending, and it lends at fixed-rate for
an average term of 44 months.

As of December 2015, the impairment ratio (considering employer
delays overdue by more than 90 days) stood at 7.6%; while the
impairment ratio adjusted for gross charge-offs (impaired loans +
gross charge-offs / gross loans + gross charge-offs) stood at
9.9%.  Both metrics improved in 2015, as they stood at 8.5% and
11.2%, respectively, in 2014, and compare favorably to those of
its peers, though comparability is difficult due to the different
non-performing loan recognition policies.  Consubanco's loan loss
reserves are strong and amply cover the impaired loans balance.
Concentrations per employer continue to be high and increased over
the past year; the 20 largest accounted for 65.6% of gross loans
and 1.4x equity as of December 2015 (2014: 56.8% and 1.2x).

Over the past years, Consubanco's funding base has shifted towards
more flexible sources and unsecured issuances, benefitting from
the ability to issue commercial paper and certificates of deposit
under its banking license.  However, the bank's funding mix
remains highly concentrated on wholesale funding (debt issuances:
44%; certificates of deposit: 51%).  Consubanco expects to
diversify its funding with retail deposits once its strategic
efforts to grow its retail banking operations materialize.
However, in Fitch's opinion, developing a sizable and stable base
of core deposits is challenging under most circumstances and may
only occur in the medium term.

The bank has been able to comfortably comply with the local
regulatory requirement of attaining a 60% Basel III Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR) in 2015.  Although it exhibited volatility
throughout the year, it expects it to stabilize above the minimum
requirement of 70% in 2016.

Consubanco's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) Ratio, which adjusts
reported equity for intangible assets and capitalized fee
expenses, decreased to 11% in 2015, compared to the 16.8%
registered in 2014.  The pressure arises from the 66.9% increase
in pre-paid fees to brokers.  The bank's strong earning generation
capacity partially mitigates this decrease in its capitalization
ratio.  Its regulatory capital ratio stood at 18.1%, as it deducts
less items related to deferred assets compared to the FCC ratio.

Fitch considers that, other than traditional credit risks,
Consubanco is also somewhat exposed to operational, political and
event risk.  Failure to properly implement the agreements with
employers or unwillingness from public sector entities to timely
and fully disburse retained collections, changes in municipal and
federal leadership, among others, are potential risk factors that
could affect Consubanco under certain circumstances.

   KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The bank's SR of '5' and SRF of 'NF' are driven by its low
systemic importance and reflect Fitch's opinion that external
support for the bank in case of need, although possible, cannot be
relied upon.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR, IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT RATINGS

Fitch believes that Consubanco's ratings upside potential is
limited in the short term.  Fitch would consider upgrading these
ratings in the medium term, when the bank's business volume
increases while it achieves important balance sheet
diversification on both sides of its balance sheet, while
maintaining asset and liability tenors relatively matched, and a
comfortable cash flow schedule.

The bank's VR, IDRs, National and senior debt ratings could be
downgraded if asset quality deteriorates to such an extent that
operating (ROA) falls below 5%, or if its Fitch core capital ratio
(adjusted for capitalized fee expenses) decreases below 10%.  A
material impact derived from negative developments in political
and/or business risks could also affect the ratings

             SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Given the limited systemic importance of the bank and negligible
share of retail deposits, Fitch believes that the SR and SRF are
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

Consubanco, S.A., Institucion de Banca Multiple

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR at 'BB';
   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B';
   -- Long-term local currency IDR at 'BB';
   -- Short-term local currency IDR at 'B';
   -- Viability rating at 'bb';
   -- Long-term senior unsecured notes at 'BB';
   -- Support rating at '5';
   -- Support rating floor at 'NF';
   -- Long-term national-scale rating at 'A(mex)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating at 'F1(mex)';
   -- Long-term national-scale rating for local unsecured debt at
      'A(mex)'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


CREDITO REAL: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB+' global scale
and 'mxA+/mxA-1' national scale ratings on Credito Real S.A.B. de
C.V. SOFOM, E.R. on CreditWatch negative.

The CreditWatch negative listing reflects S&P's assessment of
Credit Real's higher risk appetite, which is being reflected in
increasing market and refinancing risk.  The acquisition of
Maravalley, which Credito Real announced, was funded with a $100
million unsecured credit line due February 2018 from Credit
Suisse.  Amortizations are to be paid in the next 12, 18, and 24
months.  The credit line has a fixed rate in pesos for the
interest payments, but principal payments are in dollars.  This
exposure is not hedged, and the company expects to pay it with the
cash flows mainly from the Costa Rica operations.  In S&P's
opinion, this unhedged debt represents incremental market risk for
the company, particularly considering current financial market
volatility.

In addition, incremental debt increases the company's debt
maturity concentrations in the next few years.  This raises S&P's
concern about Credit Real's liquidity amid current market
conditions.  Credito Real has significant market and banking debt
amortizations in 2016 and in the next three years.  Amortizations
represented 36% of the outstanding debt in 2016, as of December
2015.

S&P needs to reassess Credito Real's RAC, including higher-than-
expected loan growth in 2015 and for the next two years.

Credito Real acquired 70% of Maravalley, which is a holding
company based in Panama with operations mainly in Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, and Panama under the 'Instacredit' brand.  This company
is focused on consumer finance, and its loan portfolio consists of
personal, auto, and small and midsize enterprises loans.  As of
September 2015, the company's loans in Costa Rica represented 87%
of its total loans, in Nicaragua (11%), and in Panama (2%).

The CreditWatch negative listing reflects the downgrade
possibility.  S&P will resolve the CreditWatch once it completes
its assessment of the impact of rising market risk on the
company's risk position and funding profile, as well as S&P's
forecast of Credito Real's RAC for the next two years.  If S&P's
new forecast shows that this ratio will be consistently between 7%
and 10% due to accelerated lending growth -- that's not offset
with internal capital generation -- or due to higher intangibles,
S&P could revise its capital and earnings on the company to
adequate from strong.  S&P could also reassess its funding
assessment to moderate from adequate if Credito Real holds a
significant portion of unhedged assets in foreign currency or if
its debt maturity profile reflects higher refinancing risk.  The
combination of these factors could result in a one- or two-notch
downgrade.  S&P could remove the CreditWatch listing and affirm
the ratings if the forecasted RAC remains above 10% despite higher
lending growth and if the company has a reliable plan to reduce
refinancing and currency risks.


FINANCIERA INDEPENDENCIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the foreign and local currency long-
and short-term Issuer Default Ratings of Financiera Independencia
S.A.B. de C.V. at 'BB-' and 'B'.  The long-term and short-term
national scale ratings for Findep and its Mexican subsidiary Apoyo
Economico Familiar S.A. de C.V. Sofom, E.N.R. (AEF) have been
affirmed at 'A-(mex)' and 'F2(mex)'; while the long-term and
short-term national scale ratings of Findep's group-lending
subsidiary Financiera Finsol, S.A. de C.V. Sofom E.N.R. (Finsol
Mexico) were affirmed at 'BBB+(mex)' and 'F2(mex)'.  The Rating
Outlook of Findep's long-term IDR is Stable.

Findep's senior unsecured debt issuance was affirmed at 'BB-'.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

FINDEP's IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

Findep's IDRs, National and senior debt ratings considers its
stable and well-anchored franchise in the microfinance sector
through a strong position on unsecured personal lending in Mexico
and its still relatively small presence in the U.S. and Brazil.
The ratings also consider its relatively improved capitalization
base given its adequate and stable capital internal generation and
its low loan growth, its weak asset quality although sustained
year over year (2015-2014) and its funding structure which
although it is entirely wholesale, Fitch believes it has access to
a reasonably diversified funding mix by source and maturity.
Findep's adequate liquidity management which benefits from its
revolving portfolio and adequate liability maturities was also
factored in this ratings affirmation.

The ratings also reflect the recently pressured financial
performance of Findep given the challenges of the entity to resume
lending and revert asset quality trends, factors that led by year-
end 2015 (YE15) to pressured operating profits and overall
profitability metrics.  However, Fitch also considers the ability
of Findep to rapidly adapt its strategies to a more complex
operating environment that has deteriorated consumer portfolio
quality over the past few years.

Findep has several years focusing its strategy on enhancing its
loan portfolio quality and profitability, rather than loan growth.
Although revenue diversification has been improving and earnings
have been relatively resilient, given the unfavorable economic
conditions in Mexico and Brazil's economies together with an
affected microfinance industry; Fitch believes that the company
has been active in identifying areas for improvement on its
processes and underwriting standards in order to sustain its
earnings in the near future.

As of December 2015, the company's operating return on assets
(ROA) diminished to 2.5% from 4.11% in 2014 mainly affected by a
planned reduction in Independencia's (core product) loans in order
to enhance origination standards and credit quality, personnel
cuts and other operational reductions (branches, offices).  The
company is planning to continue working on the improvement of the
operation and portfolio quality of Independiencia, while enhancing
the growth of its more profitable subsidiaries such as AEF and
AFI, while continuing reinforcing Finsol Mexico and Brazil (group
based methodology subsidiaries).  Given the economic expectations
and the higher interest rates in Mexico, Fitch considers its
profitability metrics could be further pressured.  Nevertheless, a
less competitive environment due to a more stringent regulation
regarding this type of entities could aid on Findep's earnings
recovery.

During 2015, Findep managed to somehow sustain its asset quality
ratios; however, these are still considered high by Fitch.  By
YE15, on a consolidated basis, the non-performing loan (NPL)
adjusted ratio considering 12-month charge-off loans, stood at
22.5% and remained practically unchanged compared to YE14 (22.2%).
Fitch recalls that total charge-offs are elevated in the
microfinance sector due the customer segment targeted (low-income
and unbanked clients).  Adjusted delinquency ratios were mainly
affected by further deterioration at Independencia's loan
portfolio, in which the company took actions to contain
impairments increase by establishing more stringent criteria for
acceptance which resulted in a reduction of the total portfolio.
In Fitch's opinion, Finsol Mexico and AEF indicators also remain
elevated, although contained or moderately improving.  The company
still maintains 100% loan loss reserve coverage.

Findep's capital base was further improved in 2015, as a result of
low organic growth and a stable internal capital generation,
although it still has not compensated for the goodwill generated
from the acquisitions of its subsidiaries.  An element that has
also aided on a relatively strengthened capital base and will
continue supporting Findep's commitment to restore capital, is the
management's decision to temporarily suspend dividends, As of
December 2015, tangible equity-to-tangible assets stood at 13.70%
(YE14 11.90%).  If loan growth is resumed, the entity faces the
challenge to avoid its deterioration.

The nature of Findep's funding base is concentrated on wholesale
funding, given its legal limitation to receive retail deposits.
Fitch believes that the entity has access to a reasonably
diversified funding mix by source and maturity, with a combination
of commercial and development bank facilities, and national and
international public debt placements, as well as foreign currency
liabilities to meet its loans placements abroad.  Fitch considers
that liquidity management is adequate for Findep, and relies on
its revolving portfolio and adequate liability maturities which
drive the positive cumulative gaps for the next three years.

          AEF AND FINSOL MEXICO'S NATIONAL SCALE RATINGS

National ratings of AEF and Finsol Mexico are based on the
likelihood of support from its parent, Findep, if needed.

Fitch believes that AEF is a core subsidiary to its parent, given
its strong, sustained and growing contribution to the consolidated
results and internal capital generation.  AEF offers individual
loans.  Its importance is marked by the strong synergies in
funding, corporate governance and operation, and also on the
knowledge transfer between the two companies.  As of December
2015, AEF's loans represented 20.8% of Findep's total loans and
27.1% of its equity.  The acquisition of AEF was relevant to the
parent in terms of product and geographical diversification.
AEF's ratings are affirmed at the same national scale rating level
of its parent.

Fitch considers Finsol Mexico as a strategically important
subsidiary to Findep given the strong synergies among the
companies in terms of corporate governance, operation and funding.
Over the past years, Findep has focused on enhancing the
performance and loan quality of Finsol Mexico.  The company
specializes in group based lending (working capital loans mainly
granted to women) and it has been relevant to Findep in terms of
product diversification, representing 11.4% of the total loan
portfolio and 6.5% of the equity as of December 2015.  Findep's
actions to strengthen the performance of Finsol Mexico, resulted
in an enhancement of the profits over the past two years.  At
YE15, operational ROAA and ROAE were 5.4% and 24.2% respectively.
Finsol's long-term rating is notched down by one level from the
national scale rating of its parent.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

FINDEP'S IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

Findep's ratings could be downgraded if the operating ROA weakens
consistently to below 2%; the NPLs plus 12-month written-off loans
ratio is sustained above 25%; and/or the tangible equity-to-
tangible assets ratio falls below 12%.  A downgrade could also
arise from a compromised funding profile and liquidity management.
On the other hand, Findep's ratings could only benefit from a
substantial enhancement of its tangible capital ratios to above
20% steadily and from a quicker than expected recovery and
substantial improvement of its overall performance.

          AEF AND FINSOL MEXICO'S NATIONAL SCALE RATINGS

National ratings of AEF and Finsol Mexico are based on the
likelihood of support from its parent, Findep, if needed.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

Findep

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs at 'BB-'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs at 'B';
   -- USD200 million senior unsecured notes at 'BB-';
   -- National scale long-term rating at 'A-(mex)'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- National scale short-term rating at 'F2(mex)'.

AEF

   -- National scale long-term rating at 'A-(mex)'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- National scale short-term rating at 'F2(mex)'.

Finsol Mexico

   -- National scale long-term rating at 'BBB+(mex)'; Outlook
      Stable;
   -- National scale short-term rating at 'F2(mex)'.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Lenders Tell Justices Debt Law Preempted
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Randles at Law360.com reports that Puerto Rican banks
that have lent more than $550 million to the island's distressed
utility Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) urged the
U.S. Supreme Court to let stand rulings that scuttled legislation
that would have created a local regime for restructuring the
territory's debt, saying it's at odds with federal bankruptcy law.

Scotiabank de Puerto Rico, agent to a group of banks that extended
credit to PREPA, filed an amicus brief with the high court arguing
against the local government's attempt to revive its Recovery Act
law, according to Law360.com.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 21, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services maintained its
'CC' long-term and underlying ratings (SPURs) on Puerto Rico
Electric Power Authority's (PREPA) electric revenue bonds.
However, the ratings remain on CreditWatch, where they were
originally placed with negative implications on June 18, 2014.

As of June 30, 2015, PREPA had about $8.44 billion of long-term
debt outstanding, and an additional $730 million due to
noteholders.



===============
S U R I N A M E
===============


SURINAME: Fitch Cuts LT Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'B+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Suriname's long-term foreign and
local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B+' from 'BB-'.
The Rating Outlook is revised to Negative from Stable. The Country
Ceiling has been downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-'. The short-term
foreign currency IDR is affirmed at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of Suriname's long-term IDRs reflects the following
key rating drivers:

Suriname's external finances have weakened since the last review,
driven by a shock to commodity export prices. A widening current
account deficit, -11.7% of GDP after net mining FDI inflows, and
defence of the currency peg drained international reserves in
2015, and a parallel exchange rate emerged. External liquidity has
deteriorated as international reserves fell to 1.7 months of CXP
($US 308.7 million) in January. The government has requested IMF
balance of payments support, although agreement has not yet been
reached and there are execution risks around any eventual
programme. Further reserve burn could undermine the capacity to
meet sovereign external debt service - largely concessional,
multilateral debt - or minimum import payments.

Three-quarters of Suriname's gross external financing needs were
financed by $US 295 million international reserves and $US 233
million net external borrowing by the government and monetary
authority in 2015. Fitch's baseline scenario assumes that import
compression (through fiscal and exchange rate adjustment) narrows
the current account deficit in 2016 and that a new gold mine
opening in 2017 supports international reserve accumulation.
Imports related to mining investment and refinery construction
services should also decline from 2015 levels.

Reflecting pressure on international reserves, a parallel exchange
rate has emerged despite the 21% currency devaluation on Nov. 18,
2015. The central bank announced plans to start weekly FX auctions
to unify Suriname's exchange rate and adopt a market-determined
foreign exchange regime (managed float). Exchange rate
depreciation will help external adjustment to the terms of trade
shock but will magnify the burden of foreign currency denominated
government and private sector debt.

The government deficit rose sharply in 2015 to 9% of GDP, driven
by falling commodity revenues, election-related fiscal slippage,
and recognition of larger-than-expected arrears to private
suppliers. The high 60% foreign-currency composition of government
debt exposes government debt dynamics to further currency
depreciation. The expansionary deficit and arrears (including from
previous years) increased government debt by +12.8pp to 39.3% of
GDP, still below, though converging rapidly towards, the 'B' and
'BB' medians. The government has begun to address the fiscal
imbalance and targets a 2.4% of GDP deficit in 2016. Fitch expects
the result could be wider, up to 4.4% of GDP, if economic weakness
causes new fuel and customs tax revenues to underperform and
capital spending is used as economic stimulus.

The government began reducing expenditure and clearing arrears in
H2-2015, cut capital investment, and started a three-phase
increase of the electricity tariff to remove the subsidy, worth
7.1% of GDP (2015). The authorities expect fiscal adjustment in
2016-2017 to be supported by institutional reforms to liberalize
the energy sector, increase profitability of loss-making state-
owned companies, and improve public-financial management with a
new medium-term budgetary framework.

However, there are implementation and downside political risks to
the pipeline of pledged reforms. The opposition parties abstained
from the 2016 budget vote, and cabinet statements in January cast
doubt on continuation of the electricity reform. The austerity
plan cuts capital investment to 2% of GDP for 2016-2017 during an
economic recession. The structure of public finances remains weak
-- reflecting the government's narrow revenue base, vulnerability
to commodity price volatility, and rigidity of the large public-
sector wage bill (9.2% of GDP in 2015). Fitch expects Suriname's
interest expense could rise from 7.9% of revenues in 2015 if the
government reduces its reliance upon central bank financing in
favour of domestic capital market sources.

Macroeconomic performance has also worsened. The economy is
projected to enter a second year of recession, contracting by 2%-
3% in 2016, and real per capita income is projected to decline for
the first time since 2000, while unemployment rises. Expanded gold
production is expected to accelerate growth in 2017. Inflation
averaged 6.9% in 2015 but ended 2015 at 25% year-over-year (yoy).
Fitch expects SRD depreciation and electricity tariff increases to
sustain higher inflation through the end of 2016. Suriname has
higher trend inflation and CPI volatility than the 'BB' and 'B'
medians.

Suriname's credit ratings are underpinned by its higher per capita
income and governance indicators than peers. Political stability,
respect for long term mining contracts and absence of resource
nationalism continue to attract foreign investment into the
development of new gold and oil reserves. However, the business
environment for small investors, quality of economic and public
finance statistics, and institutional capacity constrain
Suriname's ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could lead to a rating downgrade are:

-- Further deterioration of external liquidity and/or sovereign
    external debt service capacity;

-- Continued macroeconomic instability;

-- Failure to consolidate public finances.

The current Rating Outlook is Negative. Consequently, Fitch does
not currently anticipate developments with a material likelihood
of leading to an upgrade. The following factors however could lead
to the Outlook returning to Stable:

-- Strengthened external liquidity;

-- Consolidation of public finances consistent with an improving
    macroeconomic environment;

-- More predictable and consistent fiscal and macroeconomic
    framework leading to macroeconomic stability.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch assumes that Suriname secures an IMF program and receives
disbursements of external financial support in the near term.

Fitch forecasts Brent crude to average $US 35/b in 2016 and $US
45/b in 2017.

Fitch forecasts gold export prices to average $US 1,050 per troy
oz. in 2016 and $US 1,000 in 2017.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Orders Certification of Mineral-Rich Belt's Reserves
---------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that President Nicolas Maduro has issued a decree
ordering the certification of reserves in a mineral-rich belt in
southeastern Venezuela, a move that comes as the crisis-hit
country looks to lower its dependence on oil revenues.

The head of state said that once the mineral reserves contained in
the Orinoco Mining Arc are quantified and certified "we'll be able
to speak to the world more properly about the projects and the
reserves of gold, diamonds, copper, etc," according to EFE News

Mr. Maduro made the remarks at an event in Caracas attended by
representatives of more than 150 companies from 35 foreign
countries, signing deals with those executives for the
certification of three areas of the mining belt, the report notes.

That region, which covers an approximately 111-sq.-kilometer
(42.8-sq.-mile) area extending from the Guayana Esequiba, a
territory administered by Guyana and claimed by Venezuela, to the
border with Colombia, is home to large reserves of gold, coltan,
diamonds, iron ore, bauxite and other minerals, the report relays.

"For 150 companies to come, the biggest mining companies in the
world, taking up our invitation and ready to work, is not
insignificant. It's a demonstration of faith, of trust in
Venezuela," the report quoted Mr. Maduro as saying.

Mr. Maduro added that based on experts' projections Venezuela
could have more than 7,000 tons of gold reserves, or second-most
worldwide after the United States, the report notes.

"The same with diamond reserves . . . We already have the sixth-
biggest diamond reserves in the world," the president said, the
report relays.

The meeting with mining executives was part of the oil-dependent
nation's plan to bolster nine other economic sectors, among them
petrochemicals, agrifood, mining, telecommunications and tourism,
and rescue its economy, which has been battered by the collapse in
crude prices, the report says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 5, 2015, Moody's Investors Service says the political outlook
in Venezuela (Caa3 stable) will likely face increased challenges
should opposition parties make significant gains in the country's
upcoming congressional elections.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding,
electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited
without prior written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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