TCRLA_Public/160302.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, March 2, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 43


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

CEAGRO AGRICOLA: S&P Affirms 'D' CCRs, Sr.  Unsec. Debt Rating
RIO OIL: S&P Lowers Rating on Fixed-Rate Notes to 'B+'


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ADAPA NEW MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
ADAPA NEW OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
EJF OPPORTUNITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GOLDMAN SACHS PEP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GOLDMAN SACHS PERRY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

GOLDMAN SACHS PRIVATE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GOLDMAN SACHS VINTAGE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GROWTH AND EMERGING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GROWTH AND EMERGING MANAGERS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GS MOUNT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

GS PEP 2002: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GSV HEYDEN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
IONIC EVENT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
IONIC EVENT MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PEP MAMMOTH: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

PEP XI HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PEP XI OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PRIVATE EQUITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
QUEST BRAZIL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up


C O L O M B I A

COLOMBIA: IDB OKs $9.3MM Loan for Energy Expansion Services


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO G & T: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings


M E X I C O

PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: Loss Rises 96% to $30.31 Billion in 2015


P U E R T O    R I C O

LA CASA DE LAS PUERTAS: Case Summary & 5 Unsecured Creditors


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

BP TRINIDAD: Jobs May Be on the Line
TRINIDAD  &  TOBAGO: To Finance Budget Deficit by Borrowing


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Rosneft OJSC to Pay $500MM to Up Stake
VENEZUELA: Fitch Says Policies Fail to Address Credit Weaknesses
VENEZUELA: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Sovereign Credit Rating


                            - - - - -


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


CEAGRO AGRICOLA: S&P Affirms 'D' CCRs, Sr.  Unsec. Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'D' global scale
and Brazil national scale corporate credit ratings and senior
unsecured debt rating on Ceagro Agricola.  At the same time, S&P
is revising its recovery rating on the company's senior unsecured
debt to '6', indicating recovery prospects below 10%, from '3'.

The affirmation reflects the company's missed interest payment on
its 2016 senior secured debt on May 2015.  Ceagro is still under a
general debt restructuring process, completion of which S&P still
have no information about.  Once completed, S&P will reevaluate
the company's overall credit quality.

At the time of the default, S&P's recovery rating on the company's
senior unsecured debt was '3', indicating a meaningful recovery
between 50% and 70%, in the higher range of the band.  S&P revised
the recovery rating to '6', which indicates a negligible recovery
of below 10%.  The company's receivables and inventories as of
Dec. 31, 2014, were much lower than as of the prior quarter,
decreasing S&P's assessment of the company's value at liquidation.
Recovery prospects can further change if S&P has more updated
numbers from the company.


RIO OIL: S&P Lowers Rating on Fixed-Rate Notes to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on Rio Oil
Finance Trust's fixed-rate notes series 2014-1 and series 2014-3
to 'B+' from 'BB' and removed them from CreditWatch negative.

The note issuances are backed by current and future receivables
generated from Rio de Janeiro State's (RJS') oil royalty and
special participation rights assigned to Rioprevidencia, a social
security fund for RJS state employees, after mandatory deductions.

The rating actions follow the lowering of S&P's foreign currency
sovereign credit rating on Brazil to 'BB/Negative/B' from
'BB+/Negative/B' and subsequent revisions to Brazilian
corporations and financial services companies.  They also reflect
S&P's view of the credit quality of the underlying assets,
generated mostly by Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras') oil and
gas production and payments to the Brazilian federal government,
the transaction's structural assessment, and the risk of sovereign
interference.

The downgrade on the Federative Republic of Brazil reflects S&P's
view that the sovereign's credit profile has weakened further
since our last rating actions on Sept. 9, 2015.  The political and
economic challenges Brazil faces remain considerable.  S&P now
expects a more prolonged adjustment process with a slower
correction in fiscal policy, as well as another year of steep
economic contraction.

S&P also lowered its global scale rating on Petrobras to 'B+' from
'BB' and S&P's national scale rating to 'brBBB-' from 'brA+', in-
line with S&P's criteria for government-related entities.  The
outlooks on both remain negative.  Based on S&P's assessment of a
high likelihood of government support and on Petrobras' 'b-'
stand-alone credit profile (SACP), an additional downgrade may
follow a downgrade on Brazil's local currency rating or if
Petrobras' SACP weakens to 'ccc' or lower.

On Oct. 1, 2015, S&P placed the ratings on CreditWatch negative
following the occurrence of a trigger event and event of default
under the transactions' documents.  The event of default was
primarily driven by the decline in oil price assumptions and by
lower-than-expected oil and gas production in some of the fields
and consequent production assumptions for the transactions'
remaining lives.  The CreditWatch placements reflected S&P's need
for additional information to define these:

   -- The extent of the decline in reported flows of royalty and
      special participation because of lower oil prices and
      production in some fields, which led to a trigger event and
      event of default.

   -- As a result, S&P needed to redefine its price and production
      cash flow assumptions.

   -- A potential waiver that could affect the transactions'
      structures and/or assumptions.

Per the transactions' documents, the annualized average and
minimum average forward-looking debt service coverage (DSC) are
defined as the average of any four consecutive quarters until bond
maturity preceding the reference date and the average for the next
four, respectively.  If either of these falls to less than 2.0x, a
trigger event will occur.  If either drops to less than 1.5x, a
default event will occur.

S&P expected to resolve the CreditWatch placements when it
received further information regarding the transactions'
performances through the next quarterly report (which was
delivered by the end of December 2015).  Moreover, S&P expected to
receive notification from the indenture trustee on whether
noteholders approved to waive the declaration of an event of
default in order to evaluate its potential impact on the current
deal structure.

As of Feb. 29, S&P has received the last quarterly report of 2015
(dated Dec. 24, 2015) and have seen further deterioration in the
reported flows of royalties and special participations and in the
DSC ratios, given the continuing drop in oil prices that have
affected the overall flows of the transaction, which have led to
continuing breaches of the thresholds set by the transactions'
documents.  The Dec. 24 quarterly report indicated that the
annualized average DSC ratio for both series was 3.2x compared
with 5.0x from the previous report.  However, the minimum average
forward-looking DSC ratio decreased to 0.9x from 1.2x as of the
previous quarterly report from Sept. 24, 2015.  In both cases, the
minimum average forward-looking DSC ratio continues to be mainly
driven by the repayment of federal debt obligations, which peak in
first- and second-quarter 2016.

The reason for this continuing decline is twofold.  On one hand,
the price assumptions defined by the bond administrator per the
transactions' documents were significantly reduced again (oil
price assumptions for first- and second-quarter of 2016 were
reduced to $36.11 and $38.28 from $51.42 and $53.29 in the last
report, respectively).  On the other hand, a production haircut
was again applied to all fields producing less than expected;
however, no adjustment was applied for those producing more than
expectations.  It is important to note that this ratio does not
include reserves, and it assumes the application of Law 12,734,
which reduces the total allocation of royalty and special
participation receivables to RJS, which has not been approved by
Congress, and its approval is still uncertain.  Consequently,
despite higher reported collection levels of royalty and special
participation revenues, the forward-looking analysis in the report
shows significantly lower revenues as compared with historical
data.

As a result, S&P has redefined its cash flow assumptions with
updated production assumptions on a field-by-field basis in
addition to S&P's updated oil and gas price assumptions.
Additionally, the noteholder waiver mentioned above was passed
with several conditions that alter the interest rate paid on the
notes, as well as a waiver fee to be paid to noteholders from the
excess flows of the transaction, after paying principal and
interest according to schedule (as of Feb. 29, all waiver fees
have been paid to noteholders).  Overall, the cash flow results
are in line with the current rating and are still above the
transaction's thresholds, including reserves.

This current rating ('B+') reflects S&P's criteria for assessing
securitizations of future flow receivables through the three
building blocks of an emerging markets future flow transaction
rating.  It is weak-linked to the lowest of these:

   -- The corporate performance risk assessment, which addresses
      Petrobras' ability to continue operating the oil and gas
      fields despite a restructuring or default on its corporate
      debt obligations.  However, in this analysis, given the
      exposure to Petrobras as obligor, S&P's rating has
      considered Petrobras' foreign currency rating as opposed to
      its corporate performance risk;

   -- The structural assessment, which addresses the receivables'
      ability to generate sufficient cash flows to repay the notes
      and key structural features, early amortization triggers,
      reserves, and the legal transfer of the assets; and

   -- A sovereign interference assessment that considers the
      possibility of government interference in the transaction.

Despite adequate cash flow results, including reserves, the rating
on both series of notes reflects the dependency on Petrobras'
issuer credit rating (i.e., the corporate performance risk
assessment) as key originator of the flows.  Moreover, following
S&P's counterparty criteria, its 'B+' rating is consistent with
the maximum potential rating for the transaction per the ratings
on Petrobras as an obligor, Banco do Brasil (foreign currency
'BB/Negative/B') as a bank account provider, and Brazil's
government (foreign currency 'BB/Negative/B') as a paying agent.

S&P would expect further downgrades of the notes in line with
rating actions on Petrobras, which in turn reflect S&P's view of
the credit quality of the flows.

S&P will continue to monitor the ratings on these structured
finance transactions and revise the ratings as necessary to
reflect any changes in the transactions' underlying credit
quality.

RATINGS LOWERED AND REMOVED FROM CREDITWATCH

Rio Oil Finance Trust

                 Rating
Series         To      From
2014-1         B+      BB/Watch Neg
2014-3         B+      BB/Watch Neg


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ADAPA NEW MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 22, 2015, the sole shareholder of Adapa New Asia Master
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Jody Powery-Gilbert
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


ADAPA NEW OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 22, 2015, the sole shareholder of Adapa New Asia Offshore
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Jody Powery-Gilbert
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


EJF OPPORTUNITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 16, 2015, the shareholders of EJF Opportunity Offshore
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GOLDMAN SACHS PEP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of Goldman Sachs Pep Asia
Offshore Advisors, Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GOLDMAN SACHS PERRY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of Goldman Sachs Perry
Private Opportunities Offshore Advisors, Inc. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GOLDMAN SACHS PRIVATE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of Goldman Sachs Perry
Private Opportunities Offshore Holdings Advisors, Inc. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GOLDMAN SACHS VINTAGE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of Goldman Sachs Vintage
Fund IV Offshore Holdings Advisors, Inc. resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GROWTH AND EMERGING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of Growth and Emerging
Markets Private Equity Managers: 2011 Offshore Advisors Inc.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GROWTH AND EMERGING MANAGERS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of Growth and Emerging
Markets Private Equity Managers: 2011 Offshore Holdings Advisors
Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GS MOUNT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of GS Mount Kellett Capital
Partners Access Offshore Advisors, Inc. resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GS PEP 2002: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of GS PEP 2002 Offshore
Holdings Advisors, Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


GSV HEYDEN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of GSV Heyden Holdings
Advisors, Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


IONIC EVENT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 22, 2015, the sole shareholder of Ionic Event Driven Fund
II Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Stephen Sargison
          31 Woodland Drive, Lower Valley
          P.O. Box 414 SAV Grand Cayman KY1-1502
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 947 2390


IONIC EVENT MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 22, 2015, the sole shareholder of Ionic Event Driven
Master Fund II Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Stephen Sargison
          31 Woodland Drive, Lower Valley
          P.O. Box 414 SAV Grand Cayman KY1-1502
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 947 2390


PEP MAMMOTH: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of PEP Mammoth Advisors,
Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


PEP XI HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 16, 2015, the sole shareholder of Pep XI Offshore Holdings
Advisors, Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


PEP XI OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 16, 2015, the sole shareholder of Pep XI Offshore
Advisors, Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


PRIVATE EQUITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 21, 2015, the sole shareholder of Private Equity Holdings
VA Offshore, Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


QUEST BRAZIL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
On Dec. 21, 2015, the sole shareholder of Quest Brazil Equity Fund
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walter Maciel Neto
          c/o Giorgio Subiotto
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


COLOMBIA: IDB OKs $9.3MM Loan for Energy Expansion Services
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), through the Banca
Nacional de Desarrollo, has announced the approval of a loan for
$9.3 million to promote private investment in the generation of
renewable energy in areas of Colombia that are isolated or not
interconnected.

About 60 percent of Colombia's territory is not connected to the
electricity grid, and roughly 1.8 million of its people rely on
limited and scattered power services.  Thanks to the IDB loan,
private sector companies that supply and administer public
electricity services, as well as providers of renewable energy
technology that have a history of experience and credit with mini-
grids, will be able to expand their services.

By the end of the program in 2020, it's expected that emissions of
greenhouse gases will have been reduced by 67,900 tons.

The program is one of the innovative mechanisms for public-private
financing that the IDB has been promoting to increase private
investment in renewable energy.  The operation, which will use
funds from the Climate Investment Funds, has a payout period of
five years, with a 10.5-year grace period and an interest rate
fixed at .75 percent.  The implementing agency will be the Banco
de Comercio Exterior de Colombia S.A. (Bancoldex).


=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


BANCO G & T: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB/B'
counterparty credit ratings on Guatemala-based Banco G&T
Continental S.A.  The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains at
'bb+'.  The outlook is stable.

The ratings reflect Banco G&T's strong business position,
considering its high market penetration as one of the largest
financial institutions in the country, S&P's expectation of
moderate risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratios between 5.3% and 5.4%
over the next two years, and a moderate risk position, given the
high dollarization in its balance sheet with adequate credit
expansion and asset quality metrics, compared with the industry.
In addition, the bank has shown adequate funding and liquidity
ratios, and a stable and growing customer deposit base.  The
ratings are limited to the ratings on the Republic of Guatemala
mainly because of the bank's high exposure to its sovereign (90%
of its total assets), and because S&P do not believe Banco G&TC
can withstand stress on its liquidity and capital, assuming
massive deposits, severe devaluation, and a sharp increase in
nonperforming assets (NPAs) without support from the central bank.

Its liquidity also remains adequate, in S&P's opinion.  As of
December 2015, the bank's broad liquid assets to short-term
wholesale funding ratio stood at 2.56x with a three year average
of 3.15x.  This adequate liquidity is underpinned by what S&P sees
as a manageable refinancing risk, as a consequence of a
comfortable debt maturity profile and modest short-term liquidity
needs.  S&P also continues to hold that, as part of the second-
largest financial group in Guatemala, the bank has access to
several resources through its interbank lines, bonds, and other
financial products, which could at some point be a liquidity
resource for the bank.  S&P views its liquidity as only adequate
because of the potential risk in an undeveloped capital market,
like Guatemala, under an adverse economic and financial stress
scenario.

Going forward, S&P expects liquidity to remain adequate, given the
bank's manageable refining risk and S&P's expectation that it will
maintain its ample deposit base.

S&P's stable outlook mirrors that on the sovereign as Banco G&TC's
SACP remains at 'bb+'.  Thus, the ratings will move in tandem with
those on the sovereign.  The stable outlook also reflects S&P's
expectation that the bank will maintain its moderate capital
assessment through internal capital generation and lower dividend
payments.  Its strong business position bolsters S&P's outlook.

Given that the ratings on the sovereign constrain those on Banco
G&TC, an upgrade would follow a similar rating action on the
sovereign.

On the other hand, S&P believes that a downgrade scenario is very
unlikely.  In order to downgrade the current ratings on Banco
G&TC, S&P would have to revise the bank's SACP downward by two
notches, considering that the current SACP is 'bb+'.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: Loss Rises 96% to $30.31 Billion in 2015
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that state-owned oil giant Petroleos Mexicanos,
or Pemex, said it posted a net loss of $30.31 billion last year,
up 96.4% from the $15.43 billion net loss it had in 2014.

The oil company said loss of taxes and rights accounted for $22.85
billion of the loss, while exchange rate losses totaled $8.97
billion and operating losses came in at $5.7 billion, according to
EFE News.

The report notes that revenues totaled $67.78 billion last year,
down 26.5 percent from 2014, Pemex said, adding that exports fell
35.4 percent to nearly $23.67 billion.

Oil production totaled 2.27 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2015,
down 6.7 percent from the previous year, the report relays.

Total debt soared 30.6 percent to $86.79 billion last year,
compared to 2014, of which 87 percent is long-term debt, the
report notes.

Pemex plans to cut spending by VEB100 billion ($5.48 billion) amid
the slump in global oil prices, the report adds.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


LA CASA DE LAS PUERTAS: Case Summary & 5 Unsecured Creditors
------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: La Casa De Las Puertas, Inc.
        #80 Guayama St.
        Hato Rey, PR 00917

Case No.: 16-01444

Chapter 11 Petition Date: February 26, 2016

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Judge: Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan

Debtor's Counsel: Nicolas A. Wong, Esq.
                  NICOLAS A. WONG LAW OFFICES
                  PO Box 361193
                  San Juan, PR 00936-1193
                  Tel: 787-370-0322
                  Email: lcdo.nwong@gmail.com

Total Assets: $865,000

Total Liabilities: $1.65 million

The petition was signed by Luis A. Tarrido Rosario, president.

A list of the Debtor's five largest unsecured creditors is
available for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb16-01444.pdf


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


BP TRINIDAD: Jobs May Be on the Line
------------------------------------
Clint Chan Tack at Trinidad Newsday reports that BP Trinidad and
Tobago (BPTT) confirmed it has begun a consultation process with
employees who are likely to be affected by Groupwide
organisational changes.

In a statement, BPTT said, "As a result, the company anticipates
that at the end of this process approximately 2.5 percent (two
point five percent) of its national employees will be impacted and
over 50 percent of its expatriate staff in Trinidad will be re-
repatriated," according to Trinidad Newsday.  Contacted, company
officials could not say which part of its operations the 2.5
percent of TT employees would come from, the report notes.  They
said the process has now started and no decisions have been made
at this time, the report relays.

BPTT President Norman Christie said, "Decreasing staff is never
our first option," the report discloses.  Mr. Christie continued,
"These changes are part of the company's ongoing plans to improve
efficiency and manage cost as it responds to the challenges of the
global energy markets," the report relays.

Indicating that BPTT has also undertaken extensive reviews of
third party costs, activity prioritization and process
simplification, Mr. Christie said, "These difficult decisions
follow in depth reviews of our 2016 and future plans," notes the
report.

Mr. Christie reiterated, "we remain committed to TT and to our
future development plans," says the report.  In his address at the
opening of the TT Energy Conference at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in
Port-of-Spain on January 18, Mr. Christie said, "So while our
focus on improving efficiency may result in job losses, we will
consistently follow all laws and ensure that employees are treated
with respect," the report relays.

The statement said the changes are part of the programs BP has in
place throughout its businesses worldwide to simplify
organizations and improve efficiencies to help meet the challenge
of the current low oil price environment, the report adds.


TRINIDAD  &  TOBAGO: To Finance Budget Deficit by Borrowing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that Trinidad and Tobago Finance Minister
Colm Imbert said government would be financing its budget deficit
from borrowings on the local and external financial markets.

Responding to a question from Opposition Senator Wade Mark in the
Senate at Parliament Chamber, International Waterfront Centre,
Port of Spain, Mr. Imbert said the government had not yet
finalized the quantum of borrowing from the local and foreign
markets, according to Trinidad Express.

The report notes that Mr. Imbert also disclosed that Trinidad
Generation Unlimited (TGU) had paid government to date, US$300
million for monies advanced for the construction of the power
plant in La Brea, leaving a balance of US$251 million.

The report relays that Mr. Imbert also disclosed that Central Bank
Governor Dr. Alvin Hilaire had been appointed as the chairman of
the Deposit Insurance Corporation.  The term of the last chairman,
Jwala Rambarran, former Central Bank governor, expired in August
2015, the report says.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Rosneft OJSC to Pay $500MM to Up Stake
--------------------------------------------------------------
Microcap Magazine reports that Russia's Rosneft OJSC agreed to pay
$500 million to Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) to increase its
stake in their Petromonagas crude-processing joint venture.

The deal will increase Rosneft's stake in the upgrader that
converts heavy oil into synthetic crude to 40 percent, PDVSA said
in an e-mailed statement, confirming earlier comments by President
Nicolas Maduro, according to microcapmagazin.  Rosneft previously
held 16.7 percent, and PDVSA owned the remainder.

"The $500 million in new investment for production in the
Venezuelan oil industry comes amid a crisis," President Maduro
said during a broadcast of a ceremony where Rosneft and PDVSA
officials signed the deal in Caracas, the report notes.

The report relays that Venezuela, holder of the world's largest
oil reserves, is enduring its deepest recession in a decade after
oil prices slumped amid a global supply glut.  In a bid to counter
shrinking government revenues, President Maduro raised gasoline
prices for the first time in almost two decades and devalued the
nation's currency to get more bolivars for its petrodollars, the
report says.

The Petromonagas project located in Venezuela's Orinoco belt
produced an average of 133,600 barrels a day of the synthetic
crude in April, according to the latest data available from PDVSA,
the report says.  The upgrader prepares the oil to be processed in
traditional refineries, the report discloses.

Rosneft and PDVSA also signed an agreement for the development of
the Mejillones and Patao offshore natural gas fields, part of the
Mariscal Sucre project, the report notes.

Venezuela has been asking its partners to increase investment in
joint ventures for several years to raise cash, the report says.
In 2013, the report recalls, then Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez
sought to give companies operating in the Orinoco Belt more
autonomy to make decisions related to investments and operations,
inviting them to bring in their own rigs, goods and services and
financing for the joint projects.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 21, 2015, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Petroleos de Venezuela,
S.A.'s (PDVSA) foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'CCC'.  Fitch has also affirmed the rating for
approximately USD30 billion of senior unsecured debt outstanding
at 'CCC/RR4'.  Concurrently, Fitch has affirmed PDVSA's national
long-term rating at 'AA(ven)'.


VENEZUELA: Fitch Says Policies Fail to Address Credit Weaknesses
----------------------------------------------------------------
Despite recent measures by the Maduro administration to relieve
Venezuela's financial and macroeconomic stress, the combined
impact of lower oil prices, the lack of material foreign
financing, and political uncertainty will continue to weigh on
Venezuela's rating, Fitch Ratings says.

President Maduro announced a series of economic measures that
include a devaluation of the official subsidized CENCOEX rate, an
exchange rate used for imports, including food and medications.
The rate will go from 6.3 bolivares to 10 per $US  without
reducing balance of payments pressures. One US dollar buys over
1000 bolivares on the parallel market. The government also
announced the first increase in gasoline prices in 17 years.
Despite rising by over 6,000%, gasoline remains cheaper in
Venezuela than in most countries. More importantly, the announced
measures have not been accompanied by a broader set of adjustments
that would lead to increased consistency between FX and fiscal
policies. Hence, recession, inflation and fiscal imbalances are
likely to deepen.

The decline (and lack of meaningful recovery) of oil prices
continues to pressure Venezuela's finances. Oil accounts for
around 95% of total exports and close to 45% of central government
revenues. International reserves have fallen by $US 7 billion
since 2014 and by $US 1.7 billion YTD to $US 14.5 billion or
roughly 3 months of 2015 current external payments. Moreover, the
operational liquidity of international reserves is constrained, as
approximately two-thirds are held in gold, directly by the
sovereign. Venezuela's sources of FX financing are also limited.
It last issued a global bond in 2011. We do not expect significant
FX funding to materialize this year beyond the roll-over of
existing oil facilities with China.

The sovereign's payment records and public pronouncements signal
continued willingness to service debt, but the economic and social
costs from import compression continue to rise. Venezuela made a
$US 1.5 billion bond amortization on Friday, Feb. 26. No sovereign
external market payments are due in 2017. However, current oil
prices would mean that external financing requirements (current
account deficit plus external debt amortizations) could reach $US
32 billion in 2016.

Venezuela's political uncertainty will continue to hamper the
adoption of a credible and sustainable strategy intended to adapt
to lower oil prices and reduce macroeconomic instability. The
opposition party won a majority in the National Assembly election
in December. Since then President Maduro's party has sought to
bypass the legislature with the support of other state
institutions such as the Supreme Court. The opposition is
considering strategies to shorten President Maduro's term, either
through a constitutional amendment or through a recall referendum.
Hence, political calculations could continue to be the determinant
factor guiding economic policy decisions, thus deepening
polarization and increasing the risk of social unrest due to the
deep economic crisis.

Year-end 2015 government figures showed that inflation had risen
to 180.9% and the economy shrank 5.7% by the end of last year.

Venezuela's current LTFC IDR of 'CCC' reflects the sovereign's
weakened external buffers, high commodity dependence, rising
macroeconomic distortions, reduced transparency in official data,
and continued policy and political uncertainty.


VENEZUELA: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Sovereign Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency ratings.  In addition, S&P affirmed its
'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the sovereign.

                             RATIONALE

S&P's 'CCC' rating on Venezuela signals that S&P believes the
sovereign will default absent an unforeseen positive development.
On Feb. 26, 2016, Venezuela paid $1.5 billion on an external bond,
and the central government's external debt servicing is light for
the remainder of 2016.  The rest of Venezuela's credit profile,
however, reveals deep distress.  The country's politics are highly
polarized, and the economy is in a depression.  It is experiencing
shortages of basic consumer goods because of import and foreign
exchange restrictions.  Consumer price rises are approaching
hyper-inflation.  The government lacks monetary, fiscal, and
exchange-rate flexibility.  On the other hand, Venezuela has the
second-largest proven oil reserve in the world.

Recent national assembly elections revealed the depth of divisions
within society and the political class.  The opposition coalition
decisively won the election with 57% of the popular vote.
However, S&P do not expect the government of President Nicolas
Maduro to make substantial changes in the executive branch's
economic policies, given the legacy of Chavismo and the country's
wide societal divides.

Prolonged low oil prices have exacerbated the consequences of
inconsistent macroeconomic policies, which have led to the
currently poor state of the economy.  Venezuela derives about 15%
of its GDP, about half of government revenues, and 95% of exports
from the hydrocarbons sector.  In mid-January 2016, Standard &
Poor's lowered its oil price assumptions for average Brent by
about $20 per barrel over 2016-2019.  S&P now assumes $40 per
barrel in 2016, with a gradual increase to $50 in 2018 and beyond.

The combination of poor monetary, fiscal, and other policies has
resulted in rising inflation.  Reported economic data (whose
disclosure has decreased and delays in reporting have mounted
recently) needs to be taken with a grain of salt, making forecasts
even more tentative.  That said, inflation was likely nearly 200%
in 2015 and threatens to spiral toward 700% this year.  The
economy is likely to contract more than 7% in 2016 in real terms,
following a contraction of likely 10% in the previous year.  Per
capita GDP growth was an estimated negative 2% on average during
2011-2015, a much worse performance than most other energy-based
economies. It is likely to be negative during 2015-2017.

The country's trend rate of GDP growth is uncertain and depends on
political developments.  It is difficult to envisage a recovery of
GDP growth absent dramatic changes in policy.  An unexpected
increase in oil revenues might alleviate immediate shortages of
foreign exchange but would likely fail to stabilize the economy.

Low oil prices have undermined fiscal policy, resulting in large
budget deficits and inflationary financing from the central bank.
Various private-sector estimates suggest that the central
government's fiscal deficit was likely around 20% of GDP in 2015,
much of which the central bank funded.  The fiscal deficit is
likely to be around 20% of GDP again in 2016, but the range of
possible outcomes is wide, given the different possible paths for
prices.  The current account likely declined toward a small
deficit of 1% of GDP in 2015 and is likely to again run a deficit
this year.

Venezuela's external indicators started to deteriorate before the
fall in oil prices and continued to erode in the last two years.
S&P estimates that the country's gross external financing needs in
2015 were equivalent to 137% of current account receipts plus
reported reserves, up from 102% in 2014.  S&P expects they may
rise toward 150% in 2016.  S&P expects Venezuela to finance this
need by the public sector running its arrears with most of its
suppliers and non-commercial creditors, and liquidating external
assets.  (S&P's rating addresses the central government's capacity
and willingness to service its commercial debt.)  S&P expects the
private sector will address its external debt requirements either
through liquidating external assets, import substitution, or
default.  S&P expects Venezuela's external debt net of reported
public- and financial-sector assets to rise toward 200% of current
account receipts by year-end 2016 from 152% in 2015.

S&P expects reported net general government debt to be around 50%
of GDP in 2016.  Under S&P's base case, the change in net general
government debt could be as much as 20% of GDP in the coming three
years, given rising and volatile inflation, loss of fiscal
control, and potentially a large foreign exchange devaluation.
Moreover, Venezuela's reported debt and liquidity ratios may be
misleading because of distortions created by multiple exchange
rates and stringent controls on current and capital account
transactions.

With nearly 300 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, Venezuela
has a rich resource endowment.  Nevertheless, its state-owned
energy company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), continues to
miss its production targets.  Crude oil output likely declined to
2.3 million barrels per day in 2015 from 2.7 million barrels per
day in 2014 (down from 3.3 million in 2004).  Oil output may
decline again in 2016. PDVSA also has debt equivalent to US$67
billion, most of it denominated in dollars.  PDVSA is not
guaranteed by the government, and the government's debt does not
have cross-default clauses to its national oil company.  A default
by PDVSA would not in itself automatically trigger an 'SD' rating
on the sovereign.

Although the central government has given priority to paying
external debt servicing over current expenditure, S&P believes
pressure is growing for it to reschedule its commercial debt or
undertake a debt exchange that S&P would view as tantamount to
default. Absent an improvement in Venezuela's terms of trade or
other positive development, S&P believes there is at least a one-
in-two chance that it will lower the sovereign rating on the
government to 'SD' this year or next.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the heightened risk of the
Venezuelan government defaulting or undertaking a distressed debt
exchange due to prolonged low oil revenues, growing budget
deficits, rising inflation, and severe economic contraction.
Failure to introduce substantial corrective measures to stabilize
the economy, alleviate shortages, and strengthen public finances
could further compromise the government's ability to finance
itself.  That, along with lower external assets and sustained
political polarization, would increase the risks of a government
debt default over the next year or two.

S&P's negative outlook also reflects the risk that the government
may not be able to implement adjustment measures (such as a
devaluation or fiscal adjustment) effectively because of the
growing social and political discontent and disagreements within
the government coalition.  Failure to act in time to staunch
diminishing external liquidity could lead to a downgrade.

Steps to defuse the heightened political tensions in Venezuela
would reduce the risks of eroding governability and greater
volatility in economic policies.  That, along with prompt,
corrective reforms that begin to address the country's economic
imbalances and to strengthen its external liquidity, could lead to
a stabilization of the ratings at their current level.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that "debt" had deteriorated.  All other key
rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
Sovereign Credit Rating                   CCC/Negative/C
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment      CCC
Senior Unsecured                          CCC


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *