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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Tuesday, March 29, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 61


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Hedge Funds Dealt Setback as US Sides on Bonds


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Economic Woes Deepen Amid Political Crisis
BRAZIL: DBRS Cuts LT Foreign Currency Issuer to BB (high)
BRAZIL: Ba2 Rating Under Pressure from Weak Economy, Moody's Says
LIBRA TERMINAL: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB'; Outlook Negative
PDG REALTY: S&P Corrects Rating by Lowering to 'SD'

QGOG CONSTELLATION: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-'; Outlook Negative
VOTORANTIM SA: S&P Puts 'BB+' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ADVENTURE PETROLEUM: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
ANAMIE LTD: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
BLUE ELEPHANT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
BRANTA HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CAL CAM: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29

CALEDONIAN ASSET: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
CALEDONIAN BANK: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
CI INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 30
CORNERSTONE HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
DRIER HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

GILAN HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 12
INTERLEND HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Today
ODEBRECHT DRILLING: Fitch Lowers Rating on Sr. Sec. Notes to 'CCC'
OMP INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Today
PURSUIT CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

PURSUIT OPPORTUNITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SIRAJ GLOBAL: Placed Under Voluntary Liquidation
SKYLINE FEEDER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
SKYLINE MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
SUNBELL LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


C H I L E

LATAM AIRLINES: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+'; Outlook Negative


C O L O M B I A

AVIANCA HOLDINGS: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B'; Outlook Negative


M E X I C O

MEXICO: Peso is Looking Tame After a Very Bumpy Start to 2016


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Wins More Time to Draft Rate Proposal


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Food Prices Up, TT Dollar Down


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Hedge Funds Dealt Setback as US Sides on Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Alexandra Stevenson at The New York Times reports that the United
States government has weighed in on the legal battle between
Argentina and a group of New York hedge funds, lending its support
to the struggling country and dealing a setback to the investors.

In a "friend of the court" or amicus curiae, brief filed at the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York,
the Justice Department said it supported an American federal
judge's decision to lift an injunction that had prevented
Argentina from raising new money in the bond markets or paying its
creditors, according to The New York Times.

After his recent visit to Cuba, President Obama traveled to Buenos
Aires, where he held high-level talks with Argentina's president,
Mauricio Macri -- the first in 20 years between leaders of the two
countries, the report notes.

"The United States has significant foreign policy interests in
support of a swift resolution of this long-running litigation,"
the Justice Department said in the brief, the report relays.

It is a move that will increase the pressure on a group of holdout
bondholders that refused to take part in two debt restructurings
by Argentina after it defaulted on $100 billion of debt in 2001,
the report notes.  The appeals court has often deferred to
opinions of the American government.

On Feb. 28, Argentina agreed to pay $4.65 billion to four hedge
funds in a deal that looked poised to end a 12-year battle that
began when the hedge funds sued Argentina, seeking full repayment
of their defaulted bonds, the report says.  The funds, led by Paul
E. Singer's firm, NML Capital, were the last group of major
investors to reach an agreement, the report adds.

But that was not the end. NML Capital objected to a Feb. 19 ruling
by Judge Thomas P. Griesa of Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York that would lift the injunction,
which had locked Argentina out of international markets, the
report notes.  Judge Griesa set the condition that Argentina must
repeal laws that prevented it from making payments to the holdout
investors and make full payments to the bondholders that settled
by Feb. 29, the report relays.

Argentina requested that the injunction be lifted after it made an
offer to pay $6.5 billion to settle lawsuits from other holdout
bondholders on Feb. 5, according to the WSJ.

Complicating matters, there is another group of bondholders not
included in the $4.65 billion deal between Argentina and the four
hedge funds who have argued that they will get far worse terms if
they agree to Argentina's $6.5 billion proposal, the report
relays.

NML Capital appealed Judge Griesa's ruling, and the matter has
since been held up because the appeals court stayed the ruling.

In Argentina, the newly elected president, Mr. Macri, has been
working to repair relations with the international financial
world, which has largely shunned Argentina for more than a decade,
the report notes. The lower house of Argentina's legislature has
approved the holdout debt deals, and the bill is being weighed by
the Senate, which is expected to vote by March 30, the report
discloses.

Since the inauguration of Mr. Macri in December, "Argentina has
taken significant steps to normalize its relations with its
creditors," the United States said in the brief, adding that the
lifting of the injunction is "in the public interest," the report
adds.

A spokesman for NML Capital declined to comment, notes the NY
Times.


                          *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in March 24,
2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Argentina's Long-term local-
currency Issuer Default Rating (LT LC IDR) to 'B' from 'CCC', with
a Stable Outlook. Fitch has affirmed Argentina's Long-term
foreign-currency (FC) IDR at 'RD' and the short-term FC IDR at
'RD'. In addition, Fitch has upgraded the Country Ceiling to 'B'
from 'CCC'.

On Nov. 27, 2015, that Moody's Investors Service has changed the
outlook on Argentina's Caa1 issuer rating to positive from stable.
The outlook on Argentina's (P)Caa2 foreign legislation and
restructured local legislation foreign currency obligations is
also changed to positive from stable.  The outlook change is based
on Moody's view that the accession of president-elect Mauricio
Macri of the Cambiemos ("Let's Change") coalition will raise the
probability of credit positive policies being implemented,
including arriving at a resolution with holdout creditors, one of
Argentina's key credit constraints.

On Aug. 1, 2014, reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its
debt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a
US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a
court- appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff
between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking full
payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.  A
U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed.  The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.

On April 22, 2015, Moody's Investors Service expanded the portion
of Argentina's debt that is rated (P)Caa2. The (P)Caa2 rating
reflects the higher risk of default for both Argentina's
restructured foreign legislation debt (as before) and,
additionally now, its restructured local legislation foreign
currency obligations, as compared with the risk of default on
other debt instruments issued by Argentina.  Argentina's local
currency debt and its non-restructured foreign currency debt are
rated Caa1. The debt that remains in default since Argentina's
2001 default is rated Ca.

But that was not the end. NML Capital objected to a Feb. 19 ruling
by Judge Thomas P. Griesa of Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York that would lift the injunction,
which had locked Argentina out of international markets. Judge
Griesa set the condition that Argentina must repeal laws that
prevented it from making payments to the holdout investors and
make full payments to the bondholders that settled by Feb. 29.

Argentina requested that the injunction be lifted after it made an
offer to pay $6.5 billion to settle lawsuits from other holdout
bondholders on Feb. 5.

Complicating matters, there is another group of bondholders not
included in the $4.65 billion deal between Argentina and the four
hedge funds who have argued that they will get far worse terms if
they agree to Argentina's $6.5 billion proposal.

NML Capital appealed Judge Griesa's ruling, and the matter has
since been held up because the appeals court stayed the ruling.

In Argentina, the newly elected president, Mr. Macri, has been
working to repair relations with the international financial
world, which has largely shunned Argentina for more than a decade.
The lower house of Argentina's legislature has approved the
holdout debt deals, and the bill is being weighed by the Senate,
which is expected to vote by March 30.

Since the inauguration of Mr. Macri in December, "Argentina has
taken significant steps to normalize its relations with its
creditors," the United States said in the brief, adding that the
lifting of the injunction is "in the public interest."

A spokesman for NML Capital declined to comment.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: Economic Woes Deepen Amid Political Crisis
--------------------------------------------------
John Lyons at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's
economic crisis is as bad as its political one.

Latin America's biggest economy appears headed for one of its
worst recessions ever, according to WSJ.  It stalled in 2014,
shrank 3.8% last year and now faces a similar contraction this
year, the report notes.  Unemployment rose to 9.5% on March 24 as
wages fell 2.4%, both trends forecast to worsen, the report
relays.  One in five young Brazilians is out of work, and Goldman
Sachs says Brazil may be facing a depression.

The deteriorating outlook forms a dire backdrop for Brazil's
political straits, WSJ discloses.  President Dilma Rousseff,
deeply unpopular, faces impeachment proceedings in Congress amid a
widening corruption scandal surrounding the state oil company,
Petroleo Brasileiro SA, the report says.

That situation is consuming so much energy from policy makers and
Congress that the economic downturn isn't getting the attention it
needs, observers say, the report notes.

"The gravity of the situation is this: We have the kind of
problems where if nothing is done, things will definitely get
worse," said Marcos Lisboa, a former finance ministry official who
is now president of the Insper business school in Sao Paulo, the
report relays.  "Pretty soon we could be talking about the
solvency of the federal government," he added.

Brazil fended off the results of the 2008 global downturn with
stimulus spending, and is trying to again inject money into the
economy to spur demand, the report notes.  In January, the
Rousseff administration unveiled some $20 billion of subsidized
loans from state-owned banks such as the BNDES to boost
agriculture and builders of big infrastructure projects, the WSJ
discloses.

But this time, the country has less leeway to fund stimulus
measures, the report relays.  Brazil's tax take is diminishing,
and the Planning Ministry said the government needs to cut around
$5.9 billion of spending to meet its budget target, the report
notes.  Finance Minister Nelson Barbosa asked Congress to loosen
the target to allow a bigger deficit in 2016.

Some investors say stimulus policies such as cheap credits from
state banks haven't done much long-term good, because they
produced big deficits and the money was often poorly invested in
money-losing dams and refineries, the report discloses.

Brazil's stock market and currency have risen since March 17 on
optimism that Ms. Rousseff will be impeached on allegations she
used accounting tricks to hide Brazil's budget holes, the report
says.

"Just getting rid of something very bad will start to make things
better, and then we will see what comes next," said Leonardo
Monoli, a partner at Jive Investments in Sao Paulo, a $200 million
fund-management firm invested mostly in distressed debt, the
report notes.

Ms. Rousseff has denied wrongdoing and described the impeachment
drive as a coup attempt by conservatives who disdain her
government's focus on the poor, the report relays.  In speeches,
she has blamed Brazil's downturn on global economic troubles,
saying its crisis would be worse had her government not funded
important welfare and stimulus measures, the report notes.

Brazil has wobbled between economic booms and busts for much of
the past century, the report says.  What helps it now its cushion
of $374 billion in central-bank reserves, the report discloses.
And unlike in some past crises, government debt is mostly in its
own currency.  In past decades, Brazil's heavy borrowings in
dollars became difficult to pay back when its currency crashed;
that is less of a risk now, the report adds.

All the same, debt is a growing problem, notes the report.  During
a decadelong commodity boom, Brazil's federal government, major
companies and even credit-card-wielding consumers borrowed on
optimism that the country, rich in iron, oil and soybeans, had
locked in permanently higher growth rates, the report notes.
Brazil's government debt tripled to around $1 trillion in the past
nine years, central bank data show, the report relays.

Now the bill is coming due.  Brazil's debt amounts to around 67%
of its gross domestic product, the report notes.  Brazil's rising
debt and slowing growth have prompted credit-ratings firms to cut
Brazil's bonds to junk status, as economists are predicting that
ratio may rise to 80% by 2017, the report relays.  Part of the
problem: Brazil's budget shortfall of 10% of GDP is so big the
country must borrow money to meet payments on what it already
owes, the report discloses.

Brazilian companies are also struggling with debt. Corporate
borrowing rose more than threefold to around $290 billion between
2002 and 2015, according to the Bank for International
Settlements, the report notes.  Several firms embroiled in
Brazil's corruption scandal, such as engineering firm Grupo OAS,
have declared bankruptcy, the report relays.

Others firms not involved in the scandal are facing hard times,
too, the report notes.  On March 18, the heavily indebted
steelmaker Usiminas said it would suspend some loan payments to
banks, the report relays.  Standard & Poor's declared the firm in
default.

Phone company Oi SA said it lost $1.24 billion in the fourth
quarter. Its payments to service debt tripled in 2015 compared
with 2014, the firm said, the report notes.

Aspiring working-class consumers who helped drive the domestic
economy during the boom are now straining under credit-card debt,
the report relays.  A record 54.1 million Brazilians were behind
on loans totaling some $60 billion at the end of 2015, according
to the credit-rating company Serasa Experian, the report
discloses.

The slowing growth and rising debt have put Brazil on a precarious
path, and the deepening political impasse is making it harder to
turn around, experts say, the report notes.

"The interaction between political crisis and the economic
outcomes have become self-reinforcing," said Samar Maziad, a
senior analyst at Moody's Investors Service who follows Brazil,
adds the report.


BRAZIL: DBRS Cuts LT Foreign Currency Issuer to BB (high)
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. has taken the following action on the Federative
Republic of Brazil:

-- Downgraded the long-term foreign currency issuer rating to BB
    (high) from BBB (low) and changed the trend to Negative from
    Stable.
-- Downgraded the long-term local currency issuer rating to BBB
    (low) from BBB and changed the trend to Negative from Stable.
-- Downgraded the short-term foreign currency issuer rating to R-
    3 from R-2 (middle) and changed the trend to Negative from
    Stable.
-- Downgraded the local currency issuer rating to R-2 (middle)
    from R-2 (high) and changed the trend to Negative from Stable.

Elements that drove this action were: (1) high and rising
political uncertainty from a corruption probe into a graft scheme
surrounding state oil company Petr¢leo Brasileiro S.A.
(Petrobras), which has caused political paralysis, (2) an
inadequate fiscal policy response, evident in a stalled fiscal
adjustment and structural reform effort, and (3) the reduction in
economic activity over the last four quarters, and erosion of
social gains, with few signs of recovery. These factors have
resulted in a loss of macroeconomic stability, a sharp increase in
the fiscal deficit, and worsening debt dynamics.

If political uncertainty continues and the fiscal policy response
remains inadequate, debt dynamics would likely continue to worsen
and the ratings would come under downward pressure. Alternatively,
a more stable political environment and policy action that
demonstrates a bigger commitment to fiscal consolidation, could
result in stronger economic activity and a stabilization of the
ratings.

The corruption probe, now approaching its two year mark, has
broadened to senior policymakers and legislators, including a
filing of charges by Sao Paulo state prosecutors for the arrest of
former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva for allegedly
concealing his ownership of a luxury beachside apartment. In
parallel, an auditing tribunal has ruled that President Dilma
Rousseff improperly used funds from state banks to cover budget
shortfalls. This has led to impeachment proceedings. The Federal
Electoral Court is also conducting a review of President
Rousseff's campaign finances. The scope of the probe has revealed
a much greater level of corruption than DBRS had previously
assessed. Several opposition lawmakers -- many of whom are also
under investigation -- have threatened to block all legislation
until the impeachment proceedings against President Rousseff move
ahead. Popular demonstrations for and against the President
continue, suggesting that social discord is on the rise. Taken
together, these events suggest that coordinated action on policy
to address the fiscal and economic weakness has become more
uncertain.

The knock-on effects of the corruption probe to real economic
activity appear to have been significant. This is partly a result
of the increasing number of high profile executives indicted
across various sectors, and partly from a decline in consumer and
business confidence to historic lows. Combined with the decline in
world commodity prices, which has resulted in a 21.7% fall in
Brazilian exports since August 2011, the collapse in all
components of domestic demand caused real GDP to decline by 3.8%
in 2015. Consensus forecasts point to a decline of 3.5% in 2016.

Unemployment has increased to 9% and is likely to continue rising.
Notwithstanding a recent strengthening of the currency, low
confidence has led to significant Real depreciation, contributing
to upward pressure on domestic prices. Consumer price inflation
stood at 10.4% in February 2016. The Central Bank of Brazil hiked
overnight interest rates to 14.25% through July 2015 and has kept
the target constant since then. Tighter monetary policy is helping
to stabilize inflation. However, anchoring inflation expectations
is proving to be challenging.

The poor fiscal and structural policy response to the crisis
contributed to a deterioration in the general government deficit
to 10.3% of GDP in 2015. The primary balance, targeted at 0.15% of
GDP in July 2015, declined to a deficit of 1.9% of GDP by yearend.
Tighter financial conditions have resulted in sharply higher bond
yields, thereby increasing the cost of financing the public debt.
These factors resulted in an increase in gross public sector debt
to 66.2% of GDP in 2015 from 57.2% in 2014.

In the months ahead, one of two paths is likely to be taken. The
first path is that political tensions continue, stalling fiscal
consolidation and reform initiatives. The adoption of a fiscal
adjustment program would be a signal of a stronger commitment to
resolving the crisis, and would likely be needed to restore
confidence. In the absence of fiscal adjustment, the economy is
likely to remain in recession. A very slow fiscal adjustment could
eventually result in a return to growth.

A second path involves a political change caused by one of several
events. These could include the TSE electoral court ruling that
irregularities in the 2014 re-election campaign of President
Rousseff amount to an abuse of power, thereby invalidating the
election. This could result in the calling of new elections, or an
impeachment of the President. A political change could also occur
if Congress impeaches the President over the use of state bank
financing to plug a hole in the 2014 budget. Alternatively,
President Rousseff could resign. Any of these changes would likely
result in a transfer of presidential power, and an eventual fiscal
adjustment and reforms. At this point, there is limited visibility
on which path will be taken, but events over the next few months
are expected to gradually provide more clarity on the direction
that the country is taking. As far-reaching as it is, the
corruption investigation is a testament to the strengthening of
Brazilian institutions. This has become an important supporting
factor for the ratings.


BRAZIL: Ba2 Rating Under Pressure from Weak Economy, Moody's Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A severe contraction that was preceded by several years of below-
trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative) underlying
economic strength, despite the country's large and diversified
economy, says Moody's Investors Service.  The country's credit
rating is also coming under pressure from the government's high
level of mandatory spending.

In a report, titled "Government of Brazil -- Ba2 Negative - Annual
Credit Analysis," Moody's elaborates on Brazil's credit rating in
terms of the analytical factors that are used in its Sovereign
Bond Rating Methodology.

On Feb. 24, 2016, Moody's downgraded Brazil's credit rating two
notches to Ba2 and placed a negative outlook on the rating.  The
action was driven by deteriorating government debt indicators
against the backdrop of a weak economy, as well as the challenging
political environment.

"Growth dynamics will remain weak in the coming years increasing
the pressure on fiscal policy," said Samar Maziad, a Vice
President and Senior Analyst at Moody's.  "Additionally, we expect
interest rates to remain elevated in real terms, making debt less
affordable."

The decision by Petrobras to cut its capital spending to $130
billion from $221 billion in the period 2015-19 is also weighing
on Brazil's economy.  The national oil company is the largest
company in Brazil and accounts for about 10 percent of the
country's total investment.


LIBRA TERMINAL: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB'; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings on Libra Terminal Rio
S.A. (Libra Rio) as:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
      (IDRs) to 'BB' from 'BB+';
   -- National Scale Rating to 'AA-(bra)' from 'AA(bra)';
   -- Senior unsecured debentures issuance of BRL270 million due
      2019 to 'AA-(bra)' from 'AA(bra)'.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.

Libra Rio's ratings incorporate the analysis of the Libra group on
a consolidated basis.  In Fitch's view, there are strong
operational and financial linkages between the issuer and the
whole group.  Libra Rio is the key EBITDA generator of the Libra
Group and used to be the main dividend distributor for its parent,
Libra Holding S.A. (Libra Holding).

Libra Rio's ratings were downgraded due to the severe
deterioration in its operating cash flow and weakening of its
credit metrics.  The strong economic slowdown coupled with
important macroeconomic variable, such as foreign exchange
depreciation, increasing competition and the higher cost reduction
of the vessel owners, led to significant decline of consolidated
volumes and profitability f Libra Holding, with material negative
impact in its net leverage ratios.  Consolidated adjusted
debt/EBITDAR should reach 5.0x by the end of 2015, compared with
Fitch's initial expectation of 3.5x for the period, and average
2.4x from 2011 to 2014.

The Negative Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that 2016 will
be hard to Libra's businesses, compared to the previous year, with
continued reduction in its consolidated operating cash flow.  The
Negative Outlook also reflects how the group has compulsory capex
to be completed from 2017 onwards, thus, operating cash generation
needs to recover.  Fitch also considered that measures to adjust
costs and enhance liquidity have begun and will be concluded over
the next six months, in order to avoid continued deterioration of
consolidated leverage and, mainly, to preserve the current
adequate short-term debt coverage ratios.  If these measures do
not occur, additional downgrades may result.

The ratings continue to be supported by the group's solid business
profile, based on port terminal operations in Rio de Janeiro and
in Santos.  Historically, this industry in Brazil has demonstrated
positive long-term fundaments, based on moderately high
profitability and relatively predictable demand.  The short-term
challenges are related to the weak industrial activity,
significantly pressured by the macroeconomic environment within
the country.  Fitch believes that Brazilian port activity tends to
rapidly benefit from eventual economic recovery.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Leverage Should Remain up to 2017

Libra Holding's consolidated leverage is high for the rating
category.  Positively, the group has a long track record of
conservative capital structure.  However, the severe contraction
of consolidated EBITDAR and the lack of expectation for recovery
during 2016 will prevent Libra Holding from deleveraging its
balance sheet up to 2017.  As of Sept. 30, 2015, the consolidated
adjusted net debt/EBITDAR, according to the agency's methodology,
was 4.6x.  Fitch expects this ratio to reach 5.0x by 2015 and
2016, and a slight decline by 2017.  A material decline will come
in the following years, when demand is expected to start
recovering and the group will be able to capture volume increases.

As of Sept. 30, 2015, Libra Holding's total adjusted debt was
BRL1.9 billion, including around BRL332 million of port authority
obligations, according to Fitch's calculation.  About 40% of
consolidated debt is dollar-denominated, including Resolucao 4131
(trade finance debt), which is compulsorily hedged.  The group is
engaged in derivative instruments to hedge 55% of its foreign
currency debt and benefits from dollar-denominated revenues that
represents 25% of the foreign currency debt.  These two factors
provide the groups reasonable protection of cash flow against FX
exposure.  The refinancing challenge is concentrated in 2017, when
the group has BRL500 million of debt to be amortized.  Libra group
has presented adequate access to credit lines, even during the
current more restricted credit environment in Brazil.

Challenges of Operational Cash Flow Generation

Libra Holding's operating cash flow has significantly weakened
over the last two years.  The company has exhibited solid
consolidated operational cash flow up to 2013, based on a
relatively stable volumes of cargo handled and stored combined
with increasing port tariffs.  During 2014 and 2015, the sluggish
economic environment combined with increasing competition in
Santos Port threated Libra group's operation, putting pressure on
its revenues and operating margins.  The devaluation of the BRL
materially affected the handling and storage of import goods,
which present operating margins significantly higher than the
services related to export flow.

As of Sept. 30, 2015, consolidated EBITDAR significantly
contracted to BRL337 million, negatively compared to BRL426
million in 2013.  Fitch forecasts that Libra Holding will post
consolidated EBITDAR below BRL300 million by December 2015, as a
result of a 10% - 15% contraction in handling and stored volumes
in both terminals(Rio de Janeiro and Santos).

The company does not release interim cash flow statements.  During
the last five years, Libra Holding has posted strong consolidated
CFFO.  The negative FCF during this period resulted from
expressive dividend distribution.  Fitch does not expect Libra
Holding to distribute dividends during 2016 and 2017.  Fitch
expects negative FCF of about BRL50 million in 2016; however, it
should decline in the following years due to the significant capex
plan.

Fitch foresees a more challenging scenario for container port
activity in Brazil during 2016, following industrial slowdown.
This is likely to result in a severe decline in prices and volumes
for port activity.  These factors are expected to pull 2015 net
revenues, EBITDAR and margins to the lowest levels since 2011.
Consolidated EBITDAR margins have been relatively high, around 38%
over the last five years and are expected to slightly decline to
around 32% as a result of the loss of scale.

Capex Plan Expected to Pressure Cash Flow

From 2017, the group has a significant compulsory investment
program of BRL800 million up to 2027.  This obligation is linked
mainly to renewal of terminal concessions in Santos, in September
2015.  The capex plan foresees BRL 150 million of investment in
2017, with increases in the coming years.  Among others, the group
must incur BRL450 million of investment in Santos terminals by
2019, related mainly to increase capacity.  These obligations will
put pressure on the consolidated FCF.  These investments should be
financed by a combination of long-term debt, operating cash flow
and funds from grant power.

Business Risk Will be Strongly Tested

Libra Rio operates in a low-risk industry in Brazil.  Although the
industry's operational variables, such as volumes and tariffs, has
deteriorated and is not expected to resume during 2016, the port
sector benefits from solid long-term business fundamentals, such
as moderately high operating margins and predictable demand.  The
lack of logistics infrastructure in Brazil, mainly port terminals,
combined with an increase in international trading over the last
decade, supports the medium to long-term operational trends of the
country's current ports.  On the other hand the negative outlook
for the Brazilian economic scenario may threaten the industry in
the short term, since sluggish industrial activity puts pressure
on port volumes and prices.

Adequate Business Profile

Libra Rio is a mature operation in Rio de Janeiro Port.  It has
held a solid concession contract since 1998, which was renewed in
2011, and expires in 2048.  It provides clear visibility of the
company's future cash flow.  This terminal is the third largest
operator in the Rio de Janeiro Port, with 25% of market share.

The group's activity is Santos Port started in 1995 and its
concession contract was renewed up to 2035.  The market share at
Santos Port is about 13% and represents 32% and 15% of
consolidated net revenues and EBITDA, respectively.  Libra Santos
and Codesp (the regulator) agreed to enter into an arbitrage
process, related to concession contingencies.  The uncertainty
over the outcome of the arbitrage process, related to the amount
and payment schedule, supports Fitch's decision not to consider
this assumption in its base case.  Any decision will be considered
an event which could affect the ratings by several notches.

The Libra group's consolidated operations are more concentrated in
the port sector compared to other Fitch rated peers in the
infrastructure sector.  In 2015, about 66% and 87% of Libra
group's consolidated net revenues and EBITDA, respectively, was
generated by port activity, and the second-largest business
(logistics) is also closely related to port business.  Libra Rio
represented 34% and 73% of the consolidated net revenues and
EBITDA, while Libra Santos represented 32% and 15%, respectively.

Libra group's port business has an important track record of
successfully operating in Brazil for almost 20 years.  While Libra
Rio has not faced aggressive competition over the last several
years, its sister company, Libra Santos, has faced some operating
challenges due to the entrance of new players in the market during
2013, which has enhanced competition.  The main challenge Libra
Rio now faces is recovering over the next two years the cargo it
lost during 2015, due to market pressures and works related to the
dredging of the port access channel and its draft, in charge of
the the grant power (Brazilian Secretary of Ports).

                           KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Decline in volumes of Libra Santos and Libra Rio of 3.5% and
      20%, respectively, in 2016;
   -- EBITDA margin contraction to 32% in 2016;
   -- Capex of BRL50 million in a consolidated basis in 2016; and
      BRL400 million from 2017 to 2019.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a negative rating action include:

   -- Consolidated net adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR ratio consistently
      above 4.5x, in 2017, and above 3.5x in 2018, in sustainable
      basis;
   -- Cash/short-term debt below 2.0x; and
   -- EBITDAR margins below 28.0% on a consistent basis.

An upgrade is unlikely in the medium term due to the challenges of
the company to the next two years.  The Outlook may be revised to
Stable from Negative, supported by the reduction of the current
high leverage ratios above Fitch' expectation, along with the
Libra group keeping its business profile and maintaining adequate
short term debt coverage ratios.

                              LIQUIDITY

Historically, Libra Holding has maintained satisfactory
consolidated liquidity, although this metric has weakened during
the last years.  The average coverage ratio of short-term debt by
cash and short-term debt by cash+CFFO, from 2011 to 2014, have
been strong, at 2.1x and 3.2x, respectively.  As of Sept. 30,
2015, LTM, cash/short-term debt was 1.1x.  On this date, cash was
BRL386 million.  Fitch expects the group to strengthen its
liquidity in the short term which should support the current
rating.

The challenge will come during 2017 when the company has BRL150
million of mandatory capex to be financed and BRL500 million of
debt maturity to meet.  This will make the company strongly
dependent on significant increasing operating cash flow generation
and additional debt issuance in order to roll over short-term debt
and finance capex.


PDG REALTY: S&P Corrects Rating by Lowering to 'SD'
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected its ratings on PDG
Realty S.A. Empreendimentos E Participacoes (PDG) because S&P has
misapplied the "Rating Implications Of Exchange Offers And Similar
Restructurings" and "Methodology: Timeliness Of Payments: Grace
Periods, Guarantees, And Use Of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings" because
there was no clear compensation provided for missed payments
before the latter on the company's debentures were missed.  As a
result, S&P should have lowered the ratings on PDG to 'SD' in
September 2015 when it first missed payments on the debentures.

Even though future terms and conditions of renegotiated debt might
include some compensation for the missed payments, S&P will treat
that as part of the terms of a post-default restructuring while
reassessing the issuer's repayment capacity.

Therefore, S&P lowered its global scale and Brazil national scale
corporate ratings on PDG to 'SD' from 'CCC-' and from 'brCCC-',
respectively.  S&P also lowered its national scale unsecured
issue-level rating to 'D' from 'brCCC-', while a recovery rating
of '4' remains unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation for average
recovery (30%-50%; the lower half of the range) in the event of
payment default.  Finally, S&P affirmed its 'brCCC' national scale
secured issue-level rating, with a recovery rating of '2',
indicating S&P's expectation of  very high recovery (70%-90%; the
high end of the range) of principal for lenders in the event of a
payment default.  S&P also removed all ratings from CreditWatch
negative.

The downgrade reflects that PDG has missed several payments on a
portion of its debt while it restructures its capital structure
according to its cash generation prospects.

The 'SD' corporate credit ratings reflect S&P's understanding that
the company is currently not seeking to suspend payments or change
terms and conditions on its senior secured debentures.

Nevertheless, the secured issue-level rating of 'brCCC' still
reflects the company's vulnerability to non-payment or potential
distress exchange offer in the short term.  The senior secured
issue-level national scale rating is one notch above S&P's senior
unsecured debt rating, reflecting its expectation of very high
recovery prospects (70% to 90%; in the high end of the range),
under a conventional default scenario on those notes.


QGOG CONSTELLATION: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-'; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its corporate credit
and issue-level ratings on QGOG Constellation S.A. (QGOG) to 'B-'
from 'B+'.  The outlook is negative.

The downgrade follows S&P's reassessment of QGOG's risks based on
our new project developer rating criteria, which S&P released on
March 21, 2016.

The business risk profile of QGOG, as a project developer, is
fair, in S&P's view, essentially reflecting the quality of
distributions, QD, from subsidiaries to cover corporate-level
obligations and the overall level of industry risk and country
origination of these distributions.  S&P's QD assessment for QGOG
for the next two years is '4' (with '1' reflecting the lowest risk
and '6' as the highest risk), and is based primarily on the asset
base of nine drillships, which contributes more than 90% of top-
level distributions, and S&P's view of the developer's geography
and client concentration.  Also, S&P views the expected cash flows
as relatively stable, which is mainly supported by the existence
of intermediate- and long-term contracts that will guarantee
revenues at least until the end of 2018.  However, the project
level is exposed to refinancing risk that increases the risk of
dividends interruption.  S&P views industry risk for developers as
moderately high risk by the very nature of reliance on
distributions from leveraged subsidiaries.

S&P assess QGOG's financial risk profile as aggressive.

The combination of the fair business risk profile and aggressive
financial risk results in an anchor score of 'bb-'.  However, the
final corporate credit rating is constrained by QGOG's exposure to
a single counterparty, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras
(B+/Negative/--), which currently charters eight of the
developer's drillships.  Although S&P believes some alternative
offtakers could charter the vessels, it believes the timing and
pricing for the re-contracting is uncertain and could hurt the
project level cash flows.  S&P caps the rating on QGOG at the
level of Petrobras' SACP, and not its credit rating, because S&P
believes the SACP reflects the risk associated with the nature of
these contractual obligations.  S&P could envision scenarios of
stress for Petrobras under which the sovereign provides
extraordinary support through, for example, liquidity injections,
loans from public banks, or other types of credit facilities.
However, S&P believes that this extraordinary support won't
necessarily occur on a timely basis to meet the liabilities of
drillship suppliers.

S&P continues to assess QGOG's liquidity as adequate.

Finally, although neutral from a rating perspective, S&P changed
its management and government assessment to satisfactory from
fair.  According to the developer's information, Petrobras has
lifted its provisional ban and closed its administrative procedure
against QGOG in February 2016.  This action follows the Brazilian
Controller General's Office's November 2015 completion of analysis
of QGOG's connection with the ongoing corruption investigation at
Petrobras.  Also, S&P views QGOG as an insulated company because
it's directly owned by the Queiroz Galvao family.


VOTORANTIM SA: S&P Puts 'BB+' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Rating Services placed its 'BB+' global scale
corporate credit ratings on Votorantim S.A. and Votorantim
Cimentos S.A. (VC), and its 'brAA+' Brazilian national scale
credit rating on Votorantim on CreditWatch negative.

S&P revised its CreditWatch implications on Votorantim's issue-
level ratings to negative from developing.  This debt was either
issued or guaranteed by the Votorantim and VC.  At the same time,
S&P assigned a recovery rating of '3H' on these rated bonds,
indicating its expectation that lenders would receive meaningful
(50%-70%; upper half of the range) recovery of their principal in
the event of a payment default.

The CreditWatch negative listing indicates that there is at least
a 50% likelihood that S&P could lower its global scale ratings on
Votorantim and VC by one notch within the next 90 days.  This
would result from a potentially higher simulated contingent
liability from Votorantim's banking business (Banco Votorantim
S.A.; global scale: BB/Negative/B; national scale:
brA+/Negative/brA-1) under the hypothetical scenario of a
sovereign default in Brazil.

"Our rating approach for Votorantim basically consists of
assessing the group's industrial arm's credit quality and then
incorporating in our base case the bank's potential liability that
the group might need to cover in light of existing regulation in
Brazil.  The size of such potential support would increase as the
bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) deteriorates.  In order
for the Votorantim group to have a higher rating than the
sovereign's, we take even more conservative assumptions associated
with the capitalization amount that the group might need to inject
into the bank to maintain its minimum regulatory capital,
according to our internal calculations.  Those assumptions are
linked with conditions associated with a hypothetical sovereign
default and its impact on domestic financial system and on Banco
Votorantim's balance sheet.  Today's CreditWatch placement is
strictly related to the sovereign's and the bank's lower credit
quality that would prompt us to reassess the size of the potential
contingent liability that the group could face under the Brazil's
hypothetical default scenario," S&P said.

"Under our simulated scenario, we believe the contingent
liabilities to the group could increase sharply given Banco
Votorantim's lower SACP and Brazil's recent downgrade, with the
equalization of foreign and local currency ratings.  We expect a
more prolonged adjustment process in Brazil, with a slower
correction in fiscal policy as well as another year of steep
economic contraction.  This could dampen the bank's
creditworthiness, weighing on our contingency analysis under a
sovereign default scenario.  Furthermore, we now expect reversal
in Brazil's fiscal performance deterioration to take longer than
expected, reducing the sovereign's capacity to service its real-
denominated debt, which represents about 28% of Banco Votorantim's
total assets as of December 2015.  As a result, we could see the
group's ability to withstand the simulated stress scenario
weaken," S&P noted.

On a stand-alone basis, S&P believes the Votorantim group has
efficient operations that are in line with those of its global
peers, sizable capacity, dominant position in several markets
(mainly cement), high brand recognition, as well as a prudent risk
management.  This is based on the group's favorable liability
management activities and sale of non-core assets to preserve its
solid liquidity position.  Also, in S&P's view, the group's
revenue base is diverse by geography and segments, which should
continue to mitigate the effect of the Brazilian market's
downturn, especially the steep drop in cement sales.

According to S&P's estimates, Brazil's recession has reduced the
group's cement sales by 9%-10% due to lower spending on
infrastructure and housing construction, the higher debt burden on
households, and tighter credit availability.  Also, in S&P's view,
the group's ability to pass-through cost inflation to consumers
has weakened.  Even though S&P expects this trend to continue or
even worsen in 2016, its effect on the group's consolidated
results should be mitigated by the weak Brazilian currency that
would bolster Votorantim's exports and international operations,
which together account for about 45% of the company's revenues.
The group is in a heavy investment cycle that will peak in 2016
and 2017, limiting its free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation.
However, S&P expects Votorantim to accelerate its debt reduction
afterwards.  S&P incorporates this factor and the group's business
strengths in its 'bbb' SACP on Votorantim.  Any reversals in these
trends or a weaker operating efficiency could pressure the SACP.

S&P's ratings on VC mirror the ratings on its parent company,
Votorantim, because S&P considers the cement division as the
group's core subsidiary, with both entities bearing the same
default risk.  S&P's analysis is based on the assumption that VC
will remain the main cash generator for Votorantim, and that the
latter would continue to exercise control over the use of VC's
cash flows and determine its main financial policies.  Therefore,
S&P regards VC as a core subsidiary to the group.  According to
S&P's analysis, it considers that the risk of default for both
companies is the same, even though S&P considers VC's 'bb+' SACP
weaker than the group's mainly because of its heavier balance
sheet.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ADVENTURE PETROLEUM: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 1, 2016, the sole shareholder of Adventure Petroleum
Investments Inc. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
March 21, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Keith High
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 - 6090
          Hampson and Company
          P.O. Box 698 Grand Cayman KY1-1107
          Cayman Islands


ANAMIE LTD: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------
On Feb. 9, 2016, the sole member of Anamie Ltd. resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


BLUE ELEPHANT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 11, 2016, the shareholder of Blue Elephant Offshore
Consumer Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ahees Jain
          One Bridge Street
          Suite 87
          Irvington
          New York 10533
          United States of America


BRANTA HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 18, 2016, the sole shareholder of Branta Holdings Limited
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stephen Nelson
          Collas Crill
          Willow House, 2nd Floor
          Cricket Square
          P.O. Box 709 Grand Cayman KY1-1107
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949.4544
          Facsimile: (345) 949.8460


CAL CAM: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
-----------------------------------------------
The creditors of Cal Cam Nominees Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by March 29, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 15, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Keiran Hutchison
          c/o Joe Gaastra
          Ernst & Young Ltd,
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 9052
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529


CALEDONIAN ASSET: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Caledonian Asset Management Inc. are required to
file their proofs of debt by March 29, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 16, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Keiran Hutchison
          c/o Joe Gaastra
          Ernst & Young Ltd,
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 9052
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529


CALEDONIAN BANK: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Caledonian Bank (Nominees) Limited are required
to file their proofs of debt by March 29, 2016, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 16, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Keiran Hutchison
          c/o Joe Gaastra
          Ernst & Young Ltd,
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 9052
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529


CI INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 30
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of CI Investment 8 Inc. (Cayman) are required to
file their proofs of debt by March 30, 3016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The shareholders will also hold a meeting on April 4, 2016, at
11:00 a.m., to approve the final distribution of the company's
dividend.

The company's liquidators are:

          James Porcelli
          John Vele
          150 Millford Road
          East Windsor, NJ 08520
          USA


CORNERSTONE HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 12, 2016, the shareholders of Cornerstone Holdings Limited
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alexandria Bancorp Limited
          c/o Barbara Conolly
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 2428 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 945-1111


DRIER HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
On Feb. 9, 2016, the sole member of Drier Holdings Limited
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
March 21, 2106, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


GILAN HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 12
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Gilan Holdings Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by April 12, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 11, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town
          Tortola VG 1110
          British Virgin Islands
          c/o Philip C Pedro
          HSBC International Trustee Limited
          Compass Point
          9 Bermudiana Road
          Hamilton HM 11
          Bermuda
          Telephone: (441) 299-6482
          Facsimile: (441) 299-6526


INTERLEND HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Today
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Interlend Holdings Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt today, March 29, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 11, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


ODEBRECHT DRILLING: Fitch Lowers Rating on Sr. Sec. Notes to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the series 2010-1 senior secured
notes issued by Odebrecht Drilling Norbe VIII/IX Ltd. to 'CCC'
from 'B' and assigned a recovery estimate (RE) of 'RE80' to the
notes.

The notes are backed by the flows related to the charter and
services agreements signed with Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.
(Petrobras) for the use of the dynamically positioned UDW
drillships Norbe VIII and Norbe IX.  The transaction also benefits
from a naval mortgage over the vessels.  The transaction sponsor
and operator of the drillships is Odebrecht Oleo e Gas S.A. (OOG),
the oil and gas arm of the Odebrecht Group.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects the heightened risk of contract termination
due to the deterioration in credit quality of OOG.  Termination
clauses within the underlying contracts for Norbe VIII and Norbe
IX expose the transaction to potential bankruptcy of OOG.
Petrobras has demonstrated a willingness to terminate existing
charter agreements related to less strategic assets when a
termination clause is breached.

On March 17, 2016, OOG exercised its right to a 30-day grace
period with respect to a $9.6 million interest payment due on its
7.00% unsecured perpetual notes.  OOG's credit profile has
deteriorated during the last six months due to lower-than-expected
dividends from its operating companies, including Odebrecht
Offshore Drilling Finance Ltd., which has operated with reduced
cash flows since cancellation of the Tay IV contracts.

                        RECOVERY ESTIMATE

Fitch has assigned a 'RE80' to the notes.  Fitch assigns REs to
all classes rated 'CCC' or below.  REs are forward-looking, taking
into account Fitch's expectations for principal repayments on a
distressed structured finance security.  Fitch's RE considers
estimated cash reserves and underlying asset values as reflected
by a discounted cash flow analysis of net revenues generated
during the remaining useful life of the contracted vessels
(including cashflows generated under the Petrobras' contracts).
REs are not intended to represent the actual recovery noteholders
may get upon sale of the underlying vessels or potential
restructuring of the notes.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings are sensitive to changes in the Brazilian oil and gas
industry dynamics and Fitch's perception of the strength of the
payment obligation.  Additionally, the ratings are sensitive to
changes in the credit quality of OOG and the operating performance
of the underlying assets.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provide or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

Fitch has taken this rating action:

Odebrecht Drilling Norbe VIII/IX Ltd.
   -- Series 2010-1 senior secured notes downgraded to 'CCC' from
      'B' and assigned a 'RE80'.


OMP INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Today
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of OMP Investments are required to file their proofs
of debt today, March 29, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 11, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


PURSUIT CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Feb. 3, 2016, the shareholders
of Pursuit Capital Partners Master (Cayman) Ltd. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

The company's liquidators are:

          Anthony Schepis
          Frank Canelas
          34 E. Putnam Ave, St 113 Greenwich
          Connecticut
          Unites States of America 06830


PURSUIT OPPORTUNITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Feb. 3, 2016, the shareholders
of Pursuit Opportunity Fund I Master, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

The company's liquidators are:

          Anthony Schepis
          Frank Canelas
          34 E. Putnam Ave, St 113 Greenwich
          Connecticut
          Unites States of America 06830


SIRAJ GLOBAL: Placed Under Voluntary Liquidation
------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 5, 2016, the Grand Court of Cayman Islands entered an
order to voluntarily liquidate the business of Siraj Global Fund.

The company's liquidators are:

          Eleanor Fisher
          Tammy Fu
          Zolfo Cooper, 38 Market Street
          2nd Floor, Canella Court
          Camana Bay, Grand Cayman KY1-9006
          Cayman Islands


SKYLINE FEEDER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Skyline Feeder Fund Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by March 29, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 12, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


SKYLINE MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due March 29
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Skyline Master Fund Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by March 29, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 12, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


SUNBELL LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 8, 2016, the sole shareholder of Sunbell Limited resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


=========
C H I L E
=========


LATAM AIRLINES: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+'; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded LATAM Airlines Group S.A.'s long-term
foreign currency Issuer Default Rating to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  In
addition, Fitch has downgraded TAM S.A.'s (TAM) foreign and local
currency IDRs to 'B+' from 'BB-' and its national long-term rating
to 'A-(bra)' from 'A (bra)'.  Fitch has also downgraded LATAM and
TAM's unsecured notes to 'B+/RR4' from 'BB-'.  The Rating Outlook
for the corporate ratings has been revised to Negative from
Stable.

The ratings downgrade and Negative Outlook reflect LATAM's weaker-
than-expected consolidated operational performance during 2015,
and Fitch's view that the company's key credit metrics, mainly
operating margins, leverage, and FCF generation, will remain
pressured over the next 12 to 18 months.  Fitch believes that
prevailing unfavorable economic conditions in Latin America will
make it more difficult for the company to execute deleveraging
during 2016-2017.  The Negative Outlook also considers LATAM's
higher leverage and weaker operational performance versus its
global peers within the rating category.

LATAM's ratings incorporate its diversified business model,
important regional market position, and adequate liquidity, which
are tempered by its high gross adjusted leverage and ongoing weak
operational performance.  Despite the company's solid business
position in the domestic and international Brazilian market, the
company has failed to mitigate volatility in its operational
results within these markets through the economic cycle.  Brazil's
subdued macroeconomic conditions will continue to challenge the
company's operational performance during 2016.

The ratings of LATAM and TAM and their subsidiaries take into
account the credit linkage between the two companies, which stems
from their legal, operational, and strategic ties.  These links
are reflected in the existence of cross-guarantee and cross-
default clauses related to the financing of aircraft acquisitions
for both LATAM and TAM.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Operational Performance below Expectations:

LATAM's 2015 net revenues reached USD10.1 billion, representing a
decline of 18.8% when compared with 2014 net revenues.  This
considers a 19% and 22.4% decrease in passenger and cargo
revenues, respectively.  The company's 2015 top line was primarily
driven by a sharp 21% decline in passenger yields, while
transported passenger remained relative stable.  The company's
2015 total costs declined by 20%, which included a 36.4% reduction
in fuel cost during the period.  The company's 2015 operational
performance was below expectations incorporated in the ratings.
LATAM's 2015 EBIT margin was 5.1% after reaching 4.9% and 4.1%
during 2013 and 2014, respectively.

Fitch anticipates the company's 2016 net revenues declining by the
single digits as a result of continued decline in yields.
Although yields should remain under pressure during 2016, Fitch
expects the company's 2016 operational performance to reach some
improvement, as the company expects to benefit from several
initiatives aimed at reducing ex-fuel cost as well as lower fuel
cost - with a more favorable hedge position in terms of fuel cost
management in 2016 against 2015.

High Adjusted Leverage of 6.4x:

LATAM's adjusted gross leverage metric is high and remains weak
for the rating category.  The company's increase in its adjusted
gross leverage during 2015 primarily reflects its limited capacity
to improve the operational performance during last year.  Although
Fitch's rating case is assuming the company will improve its
operational performance during 2016, this is not expected to
result in a material reduction in the company's adjusted gross
leverage, with levels still above 6x.

LATAM's adjusted gross leverage, measured as total adjusted
debt/EBITDAR, was 6.4x at Dec. 31, 2015, compared with 6.1x in
2014.  The company's total adjusted debt was $12.9 billion at
Dec. 31, 2015.  This debt includes $9 billion in on-balance-sheet
debt and $3.7 billion in off-balance-sheet obligations related to
operating leases with combined rental payments of around $525
million in 2015.  The company's total on-balance-sheet debt is 79%
secured debt, while the remaining (21%) is unsecured as of
Dec. 31, 2015.

Moderate Consolidated Capacity Increase:

The company's consolidated capacity is expected to grow around
1% - 2% in 2016 after increasing 2.8% in 2015.  LATAM's main
efforts to reduce capacity during 2016 will be in the Brazilian
domestic market and international markets.  By segment, LATAM's
capacity management in 2015 was +6.4% (-2%, 2014) in the
international segment, -2.5% (-1%, 2014) in Brazil's domestic
segment, +4.8% (+4%, 2014) in the Spanish-speaking domestic
segment, and -1.9% (-6%, 2014) in the cargo segment.  LATAM plans
capacity increases/decreases) in 2016 of between +3% and +5% in
the international segment, -8% to -10% in Brazil's domestic
segment, between +6% and +8% in the Spanish-speaking domestic
segment, while the cargo segment should see a contraction in the
range of 0% to -2%.

Fitch expects the company's exposure to the Brazilian market will
continue to challenge its operational performance, as the
Brazilian airline industry is facing a business environment
characterized by declining demand, low corporate travel activity,
and weak economic growth expectations coupled with a declining
yield atmosphere.  Operations in Brazil represented approximately
34% of the company's total revenues during 2015.  The company is
expected to counterbalance the negative impact of these factors by
focusing on capacity management, cost control, and consolidating
its network strategy around its position in Guarulhos, Brasilia,
and Congonhas airports

Adequate Liquidity:

Fitch views the company's liquidity position as adequate for the
rating category.  At Dec. 31, 2015, the company had cash of USD1.2
billion, along with USD105 million in unused committed credit
lines.  This level of liquidity, measured as total cash and
marketable securities plus unused committed credit lines over LTM
revenues, represents 13.1% of the company's revenues for LTM
Dec. 31, 2015.  This ratio is expected to be around 17% to 13%
during 2016.  The company plans to close by the end of March 2016
a 3-year senior secured revolving credit facility (RCF) of
approximately USD300 million.  The RCF will be collateralized by a
combination of aircraft, spare engines and spare parts.  In
addition, LATAM faces debt amortizations of USD1.1 billion and
USD1.1 billion during 2016 and 2017, respectively, which will be
primarily addressed through refinancing.  Furthermore, the
company's coverage ratio, measured as EBITDAR/(Net Interest Exp. +
Rents), was 2.3x in 2015 and it is expected to remain at this
level during 2016-2018.

2016-2018 Fleet Commitments and Revised Fleet Capex Incorporated:

During March 2016, LATAM reached a USD2.9 billion reduction in
fleet commitments for 2016 - 2018; this is in line with the
company's previously announced plans to achieve a 40% reduction in
its fleet commitments for the period.  In addition to this plan,
the company sold four Airbus A330s, redelivered three Airbus
A330s, one Boeing 767, and four Airbus A320s and subleased one
Boeing 777 Freighter to a third party during 2015, and continues
to seek opportunities to adjust fleet commitments beyond the USD3
billion announcement.  LATAM maintains a capex plan - including
fleet and non-fleet capex - that calls for capex levels of USD1.2
billion and USD1 billion during 2016 and 2017, respectively.

During 2015, the company's free cash flow (FCF) generation was
negative USD246 million, resulting in FCF margin (LTM FCF/LTM
revenues) of negative 2.4%.  The 2015 FCF calculation reflects
USD1.3 billion, USD1.6 billion, and USD35 million in cash flow
from operations, net capex; and paid dividends, respectively.  The
company's 2015 negative FCF trend results primarily from its net
capex, which represented approximately 16% of total revenues
during the period.  Fitch expects the company to manage its
capital intensity, measured as the capex/revenue ratio, at around
13%, 10%, and, 11% during 2016, 2017, and 2018 respectively. Fitch
is projecting the company's FCF margin to be basically neutral
during 2016-2018.

Strong Credit Linkage:

LATAM indirectly maintains substantially all of the economic
rights and 20% of the voting rights in TAM, which is an affiliate
company of LATAM.  The ratings of LATAM and TAM also incorporate
the strong credit linkage between both entities with significant
legal, operational and strategic ties existing between the two
companies.  In addition, financing of the combined fleet plan
capex is primarily implemented through LATAM, with the new
aircraft being subleased to TAM.  Furthermore, the view of strong
legal ties existing between LATAM and TAM is supported by cross
default clauses incorporated in LATAM's USD500 million unsecured
notes due in 2020.

                          KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for LATAM include:

   -- 2016 total transported passengers to increase around 3.4%
   -- 2016 consolidated yield to decline by high single digits
   -- 2016 net revenues to decline around 8%
   -- 2016 EBIT margin approximately 6.5%
   -- 2016 gross adjusted leverage, measured as total adjusted
      debt to EBITDAR, around 6.3x
   -- 2016 Coverage ratio, EBITDAR/(Net Interest Expense + Rents),
      around 2.33x
   -- 2016 Liquidity, measured as readily available cash plus
      unused committed credit facilities over LTM net revenues,
      around 13%
   -- 2016 Net Capex levels around USD1.2 billion
   -- 2016 FCF generation neutral to slightly negative at around
      USD200 million.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Considerations that could lead to a negative rating action (Rating
or Outlook):

   -- Sustained negative free cash flow;
   -- Liquidity, cash/LTM revenues, consistently below 10%
   -- Gross adjusted leverage consistently above 5.5x;
   -- EBIT margin consistently below 7%;
   -- Coverage ratio, measured as total EBITDAR/(Interest Expenses
      + Rents), consistently below 2.25x

Considerations that could lead to a positive rating action (Rating
or Outlook):

Fitch may take a positive rating action if a combination of these
factors takes place:

   -- Liquidity, cash/LTM revenues, consistently above 15%
   -- Gross adjusted leverage consistently approaching 4.5x;
   -- Neutral to positive FCF generation;
   -- Coverage ratio, measured as the total EBITDAR/(Interest
      Expenses + Rents), consistently above 2.5x
   -- EBIT margin moving to 8%.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

LATAM Airlines Group S.A.:
   -- Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) downgraded to 'B+'
      from 'BB-';
   -- National Equity Rating downgraded to 'Primera Clase Nivel 3
      (cl)' from 'Primera Clase Nivel 2 (cl)'.
   -- USD500 million senior unsecured note due 2020 downgraded to
      'B+/RR4' from 'BB-'.

TAM S.A.
   -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-';
   -- Local currency IDR downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-';
   -- National long-term rating downgraded to 'A-(bra)' from
      'A(bra)'.

Tam Linhas Aereas S.A.
   -- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-';
   -- Local currency IDR downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-';
   -- National long-term rating downgraded to 'A-(bra)' from
      'A(bra)'.

Tam Capital Inc.
   -- USD300 million senior unsecured note due 2017 downgraded to
      'B+/RR4' from 'BB-'.

Tam Capital Inc. 3
   -- USD500 million senior unsecured note due 2021 downgraded to
     'B+/RR4' from 'BB-'.

The Rating Outlook for the corporate ratings has been revised to
Negative from Stable.


===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


AVIANCA HOLDINGS: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B'; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings for Avianca Holdings and
its subsidiaries as:

Avianca Holdings S.A.:

   -- Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' from 'BB-';
   -- Long-term local currency IDR to 'B' from 'BB-';
   -- USD550 million unsecured notes due in 2020 to 'B-/RR5' from
      'B+/RR5'.

Aerovias del Continente Americano S.A. (Avianca):

   -- Long-term IDR to 'B' from 'BB-';
   -- Long-term local currency IDR to 'B' from 'BB-';

Grupo Taca Holdings Limited (Grupo Taca):

   -- Long-term IDR to 'B' from 'BB-'.

Avianca Holdings, Grupo Taca, and Avianca Leasing are co-issuers
under the USD550 million unsecured notes.

The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

The rating downgrade reflects Avianca Holding's ongoing financial
profile deterioration amid a difficult operating environment, and
Fitch's view that any material recovery in its credit profile will
remain challenging in the short to medium term.  The company's
gross adjusted leverage trend during the last 24 months has been
worse than Fitch's previous expectation, with its total adjusted
debt/EBITDAR reaching 7.4x at end-2015.  Fitch previously
forecasted the company's leverage to be in the range of 5.0-5.5x
during 2015 followed by additional deleveraging over the medium
term.

The Negative Outlook reflects Fitch's views that Avianca Holdings'
gross adjusted leverage and operating margins will remain weak for
the rating category during the next 12 to 18 months due to the
current macro and business conditions prevailing in its main
markets.  In addition, the Negative Outlook also incorporates a
review of Avianca Holdings' weakening credit metrics compared to
its global peers within the rating category.

The ratings incorporate Avianca Holdings' regional market position
as the lead carrier in Colombia and Central America, and its
geographic diversification.  The ratings also consider the
vulnerability of the company's cash flow generation to fuel price
variations and the inherent risks of the airline industry, as well
as the carrier's capacity to maintain operational margins based on
the leader position in the markets where it operates.  A positive
factored in the ratings is the company's ability to maintain its
liquidity position - through the monetization of assets sales -
during 2015.

The 'B-/RR5' recovery rating of the company's unsecured notes
incorporates the subordination of the company's unsecured notes
with respect to significant levels of secured debt, resulting in
below-average-recovery prospects in the event of default.  The
unsecured notes are co-issued by Avianca Holdings, Grupo TACA Ltd,
and Avianca Leasing LLC.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Adjusted Gross Leverage (7.4x):

Avianca Holdings' financial leverage has deteriorated during the
last two years as a result of increasing debt levels and declining
operational performance.  The company's gross adjusted leverage,
as measured by total adjusted debt/EBITDAR was 7.4x at the end of
December 2015.  This level represents a continued deterioration
over the 2013 and 2014 adjusted gross leverage metrics of 5x and
6.8x, respectively.  Fitch expects the company's gross adjusted
leverage ratio to trend to levels around 7.2x by the end of 2016
driven by better operational margins, which is still deemed weak
for the rating category.

The company's cash flow generation, as measured by EBITDAR was
USD767 million during 2015, similar to USD777 million during the
2014, with a 2015 EBITDAR margin of 17.6%.  The company had
approximately USD5.7 billion in total adjusted debt at the end of
December 2015, which was an increase from USD5.3 billion and
USD4.2 billion in adjusted debt as of Dec. 31 2014, and Dec. 31,
2013, respectively.  The company's debt, as of Dec. 31, 2015,
consists primarily of USD3.5 billion of on-balance-sheet debt,
most of which is secured, and an estimated USD2.2 billion of off-
balance-sheet debt associated with lease obligations.  The
company's rentals payments during 2015 were USD318 million (USD299
million in 2014).

Yields Remain under Pressure:

The company's 2015 EBIT margin fell to 5.1% (5.7% excluding one-
off charges) from 2014 level of 6%.  The decline in the company's
operational margin in 2015 reflects more challenging macro and
business environment faced by the company in its main markets due
to strong currency depreciation and economic slowdown pressuring
consumer spending.  Avianca Holdings' 2015 operational margin was
below Fitch's expectations, which incorporated initially an EBIT
margin at around 9% for 2015.

The company's 2016 - 2017 EBIT margin is expected to be around
6.5% driven primarily by lower fuel cost and the company's
continued efforts to reduce ex-fuel cost levels.  Fitch views the
company's capacity to manage its yields, avoiding material
deterioration, as the key factor driving its 2016 operational
performance.  During 2016, the company's net revenue is expected
to decline by around 8%, with lower yields offsetting a single-
digit increase in the number of transported passengers.  Avianca
Holdings' 2015 average yield fell 18.6% compared to 2014.  Fitch
expects the company's yields to remain under pressure in 2016 as a
result of continued weak macro and business environment.  The
company's passengers transported figure increased by 6.6% and 7.9%
during 2014 and 2015, respectively, and it is expected to increase
around 4.5% in 2016.

Capacity Adjustments and Capex Reduction Incorporated:

Key components in the company's business strategy during 2016
include a more moderate capacity increase, significant reduction
in capital expenditures (capex) levels; and continued cost
reduction efforts.  Avianca Holdings' available seat kilometers
were 38.8 billion, 41.2 billion and 44.5 billion in 2013, 2014 and
2015, respectively.  These levels represented annual growth rates
of 6%, 5.9%, and 8.3%, respectively.  Avianca Holdings is
targeting a more moderate capacity growth for 2016 in the 3%-5%
range, slowing from levels observed in prior years.  The lower
target in terms of capacity growth for 2016 is oriented to improve
the company's revenue and cost per capacity unit.  The company's
2016 lower capacity target also incorporates its decision of
reducing capital expenditures levels during 2016-2018.

Capex Continue to Limit FCF Generation:

During 2015, the company's Free Cash Flow (FCF) generation was
negative USD160 million, resulting in FCF margin (LTM FCF/LTM
revenues) of negative 3.7%.  The 2015 FCF calculation reflects
USD215 million, USD304 million; and USD71 million in cash flow
from operations, net capex; and paid dividends, respectively.  The
company's 2015 negative FCF trend results primarily from its net
capex, which represented approximately 7% of the total revenues
during the period.  Fitch expects the company to manage its
capital intensity, measured as the capex/revenue ratio, at levels
around 5.6%, 13%; and, 12% during 2016, 2017, and 2018
respectively. Fitch forecasts the company's 2016 FCF margin to be
neutral to slightly positive, but to turn negative again during
2017 - 2018. The company's expected annual net capex levels during
2017 - 2018 will remain high at above USD500 million and limit its
capacity to sustain positive FCF generation.

Liquidity Adequate for the Rating Category:

During 2015 the company executed the sale of a 30% stake in
Avianca Holdings S.A.'s loyalty program to Advent International
(Advent).  In connection with this transaction Avianca Holdings
S.A. received total proceeds of USD301 million.  During 2015 the
company recognized a loss of USD237 million due to its cash
exposure in Venezuela.  Fitch's liquidity analysis already
excluded the company's cash exposure to Venezuela for the
calculation of its readily available cash.

As of Dec. 31, 2015, Avianca Holdings had cash and equivalents
balance of USD479 million, the company does not maintain unused
committed credit lines.  The company's liquidity, measured as
total cash and equivalents represented 10% of LTM revenue as of
Dec. 31, 2015, which Fitch considers to be adequate for the rating
category.  Upcoming debt maturities are high but manageable for
the company's liquidity and expected free cash flow generation
during the next 24 months.  The company's debt maturities during
2016 and 2017 are US$412 million and US$358 million, respectively.
Fitch expects Avianca Holdings to cover its capital expenditures
and debt maturities with a combination of its own cash flow
generation and further borrowing during 2016-2017.

Credit Linkages and Notes' Guarantees Structure Incorporated:

The ratings also reflect Avianca Holdings' corporate structure and
the credit linkage with its subsidiaries, Avianca and Grupo Taca.
Combined, these two operating companies represent the main source
of cash flow generation for the holding company.  The significant
legal and operational linkages between the two operating companies
are reflected in the existence of cross-guarantee and cross-
default clauses related to the financing of aircraft acquisitions
for both companies.  Avianca Holdings, Grupo Taca, and Avianca
Leasing are jointly and severally liable under the USD550 million
unsecured notes as co-issuers.  Avianca Leasing is a wholly owned
subsidiary incorporated under the laws of Delaware, United States.
Avianca Leasing's obligations as a co-issuer of the notes are
unconditionally guaranteed on an unsecured, senior basis by
Avianca up to 2/3 of the total issuance amount.

                           KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Avianca
Holdings include:

   -- 2016 total transported passenger to increase around 4.5%;
   -- 2016 consolidated yield to decline in high single digit;
   -- 2016 net revenues to decline around 8%;
   -- 2016 EBIT margin approximately 6.3%;
   -- 2016 gross adjusted leverage, measured as total adjusted
      debt to EBITDAR ratio, around 7.2x;
   -- 2016 Coverage ratio, EBITDAR/(Interest Exp + Rents), around
      1.75x;
   -- 2016 Liquidity, measured as the readily available cash over
      LTM net revenues ratio, around 10%;
   -- 2016 Net Capex levels around USD225 million;
   -- 2016 FCF generation neutral to slightly positive of around
      USD50 million.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Considerations that could lead to a negative rating action (Rating
or Outlook)

   -- Adjusted gross leverage remaining above 6.5x;
   -- EBIT margin consistently below 7%;
   -- Coverage ratio, measured as the total EBITDAR/(Int. Expenses
      + Rents) ratio, consistently below 2x;
   -- Liquidity, cash/ LTM revenues, consistently below 10%;
   -- Sustained negative free cash flow.

Considerations that could lead to a positive rating action (Rating
or Outlook)

   -- Adjusted gross leverage trending to levels around 5x;
   -- EBIT margin consistently above 7%;
   -- Coverage ratio, measured as the total EBITDAR/(Int. Expenses
      + Rents) ratio, consistently above 2.25x;
   -- Liquidity, cash/ LTM revenues, consistently above 12%;
   -- Moving towards a neutral to positive free cash flow.

                    FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded these ratings for Avianca Holdings and its
subsidiaries as:

Avianca Holdings S.A. (Avianca Holdings):
   -- Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' from 'BB-';
   -- Long-term local currency IDR to 'B' from 'BB-';
   -- USD550 million unsecured notes due in 2020 to 'B-/RR5' from
      'B+/RR5'.

Aerovias del Continente Americano S.A. (Avianca):
   -- Long-term IDR to 'B' from 'BB-';
   -- Long-term local currency IDR to 'B' from 'BB-';

Grupo Taca Holdings Limited (Grupo Taca):
   -- Long-term IDR to 'B' from 'BB-'.

Avianca Holdings, Grupo Taca, and Avianca Leasing are co-issuers
under the USD550 million unsecured notes.

The Rating Outlook remains Negative


===========
M E X I C O
===========


MEXICO: Peso is Looking Tame After a Very Bumpy Start to 2016
-------------------------------------------------------------
Benjamin Bain at Bloomberg News reports that options traders'
expectations for swings in the Mexican peso fell to a two-month
low, signaling the success of policy makers' move to sell dollars
directly to banks at their discretion and end a rules-based
intervention program.

The shift by central bank Governor Agustin Carstens in mid-
February jolted markets and helped curb one-month implied
volatility in the peso, which had jumped to a two-year high,
according to Bloomberg News.  The currency has rebounded 7.5
percent since the government's announcement, which also included a
surprise interest-rate increase along with budget cuts, even after
falling Wednesday, March 23 with major dollar counterparts,
Bloomberg News notes.

The fall in implied volatility is the second-biggest in emerging
markets, trailing only the decline for Russia's ruble, Bloomberg
News says.  Mexico's government had complained that the peso, the
most-traded emerging-market currency, was trading apart from its
fundamentals given that it is often used by traders to hedge
against other risks, Bloomberg News discloses.  Moving away from
regularly-scheduled auctions made it harder for traders to take
advantage of the auctions as entry points, according to Eduardo
Suarez, a strategist for Latin America at Bank of Nova Scotia,
Bloomberg News notes.

"You added two-way risk to bets versus the peso," he said in an e-
mailed response to questions, Bloomberg News relays.  "It's both
the intervention strategy, plus a general better tone in emerging-
market foreign exchange," Mr. Suarez added.

A gauge of emerging-market currencies reached its highest since
November on March 17, Bloomberg News notes.

Earlier this month, Mr. Carstens said that policy makers' moves in
mid-February were the result of meticulous analysis by the
nation's monetary and fiscal authorities, Bloomberg News notes.
"We won't question using them again if it's necessary," he added.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Wins More Time to Draft Rate Proposal
-----------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske at Bloomberg News reports that Puerto Rico gained
another week to file a proposed rate charge to the island's energy
commission, a fee that would back debt used to restructure about
$9 billion owed by its main electric utility.

Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority creditors agreed to give
officials until March 30 to submit their petition to implement a
new customer fee, called a securitization charge, according to a
statement from the utility, according to Bloomberg News.  A
January agreement between Prepa, as the utility's known,
bondholders and bond-insurance companies was set to expire
Wednesday, March 23, 2016, unless the energy commission received
the rate petition, the report notes.

The restructuring would be the first step in the commonwealth's
pursuit to cut its $70 billion debt load after Puerto Rico and its
agencies borrowed for years to fix budget deficits, Bloomberg News
relays.  The island's economy has struggled to grow since 2006 and
it has already defaulted on some agency debt, Bloomberg News
discloses.  Prepa faces a $1.13 billion payment to investors and
lenders on July 1 that it won't be able to pay without the
creditor agreement, Bloomberg News says.

The commonwealth's three-member energy commission will have 75
days to weigh in on the new fee once it's submitted, Bloomberg
News notes.  Prepa needs the proposed securitization to be
approved so it can execute its restructuring deal under which
investors agreed to take a 15 percent loss by swapping their
securities for new bonds, Bloomberg News relays.  The proposed
securitization charge would repay the debt.

Prepa and its creditors agreed to the debt exchange after first
signing a contract in August 2014 that kept negotiations out of
court, Bloomberg News discloses.  The restructuring will allow
Prepa to modernize a system that relies on petroleum to produce
electricity, Bloomberg News adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 21, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services maintained its
'CC' long-term and underlying ratings (SPURs) on Puerto Rico
Electric Power Authority's (PREPA) electric revenue bonds.
However, the ratings remain on CreditWatch, where they were
originally placed with negative implications on June 18, 2014.

As of June 30, 2015, PREPA had about $8.44 billion of long-term
debt outstanding, and an additional $730 million due to
noteholders.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Food Prices Up, TT Dollar Down
-------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that food price inflation is climbing
while the TT dollar continues to fall.

And Trinidad and Tobago continues to face the economic challenges
posed by lower energy prices, operational issues and maintenance-
related activities in the domestic energy sector, the Central Bank
said in its latest Monetary Policy announcement, according to
Trinidad Express.

Initial estimates suggest that the energy sector contracted by
around 5.0 per cent (year-on-year) in the fourth quarter of 2015,
while provisional information also allude to anaemic activity in
the non-energy sector, the report notes.

"Early indications for 2016, including a slowdown in new car sales
and cement, are that the lull in economic activity may have
continued into the new year," the Bank noted, the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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