/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/160419.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Tuesday, April 19, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 76
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Moody's Raises Rating to B3; Outlook Stable
B A R B A D O S
BARBADOS: PM Responds to No-Confidence Motion, Moody's Downgrade
B R A Z I L
BM&FBOVESPA SA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Foreign Currency Debt Rating
BRAZIL: Lower House Starts Debate on Rousseff's Impeachment
CONCESSAO METROVIARIA: Moody's Rates Planned BRL100MM Notes 'Ba2'
SAO PAULO: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR; Outlook Remains Negative
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
CASTLE INVESTMENT: Creditors Hold Meeting
DOUBLE HAVEN: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 21
DOUBLE HAVEN FEEDER: Members to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 21
KHANJAR OF OMAN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 6
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Shareholders to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 18
MSF CAPITAL: Members to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 22
MSF CAPITAL MASTER: Members to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 22
NORTHERN STAR: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 29
PEPIN FUND: Shareholders to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 19
SHERLOCK FINANCE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 6
WHITE OAK: Members to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 13
WINGS OF OMAN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 6
WINSWAY ENTERPRISES: Creditors to Hold Scheme Meeting on May 2
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Meeting With Haiti Minister 'Momentous'
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Output Declines by 3.9% in 2015 Due to Storm
M E X I C O
ARENDAL S DE RL: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Ratings to 'C'
BANCO AHORRO: S&P Affirms 'B' ICRs; Outlook Remains Stable
MEXICO: Rig Workers Are the Soul of the Crisis-hit Oil Sector
P U E R T O R I C O
ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS: Extends Exchange Offers Until April 21
BTB CORP: Needs More Time to File Amended Disclosure Statement
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Economic Situation Serious, DOMA Says
- - - - -
=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================
ARGENTINA: Moody's Raises Rating to B3; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Argentina's issuer rating
to B3 from Caa1. The rating on Argentina's foreign legislation
and restructured local legislation foreign currency obligations is
also upgraded to (P)B3 from (P)Caa2. The senior unsecured shelf
rating was upgraded to (P)B3 from (P)Caa1. Argentina's short-term
rating was affirmed at Not-Prime (NP).
The outlook on the issuer rating is stable.
The key drivers for the upgrade are:
1. Moody's expectation that Argentina will settle holdout
creditor claims which will result in a lifting of court
injunctions and clear the way for Argentina to access
international capital markets. The likelihood that Argentina
will make payments to restructured bondholders increased
significantly following the April 13, US circuit court ruling
in favor of Argentina.
2. The economic policy improvements since the Macri
administration took office last December. The new government
lifted capital controls and allowed the peso to float more
freely, reduced energy and transportation subsidies and has
begun to address longstanding macroeconomic imbalances.
In addition, Argentina's ratings are now aligned at B3 level,
given the anticipated resolution of prior debt defaults and
Moody's view that both types of obligations will have the same
default probability going forward.
RATINGS RATIONALE
FIRST DRIVER: LIFTING OF THE INJUNCTIONS AND RESOLUTION OF 2014
DEBT DEFAULT
On April 13, the US second circuit court allowed a lower court
ruling that will lift the injunctions barring payments on
restructured debt if Argentina meets two conditions. The first
condition was that the Argentine Congress abrogate both the Lock
Law, which prohibits offering holdouts better terms than those
offered in prior debt swaps, and the Sovereign Payment Law, which
sought to bypass prior rulings by US courts by making bond
payments on Argentina's international law debt within Argentina
rather than through banks domiciled outside the country. These
changes in law were approved in Argentina on March 30.
The second condition requires that Argentina make full payment to
all holdouts with which it reaches an agreement. Since the
February ruling, Argentina has reached agreements with several,
but not all, of the litigating holdouts, and now faces payments of
over $8 billion. Although legal, operational and market related
risks remain that could delay the bond issuance required to meet
those payments we believe the most likely scenario is that
Argentina will pay litigating bondholders in the coming days.
This will allow the lifting of the US court injunctions shortly
thereafter, in turn allowing Argentina also to pay more than $2
billion in debt payments to restructured bondholders blocked since
2014.
SECOND DRIVER: ECONOMIC POLICY IMPROVEMENTS
Since taking office in December 2015 the Macri administration
announced a series of policy adjustments designed to reduce the
country's economic distortions and set the economy on a path to
growth and stability. They include eliminating energy and
transportation subsidies in order to reduce the country's high
fiscal deficit, near and medium-term inflation targets that
contemplate declining inflation, and lifting capital controls,
eliminating multiple exchange rates, and implementing a managed
float exchange rate.
Although the new government inherited a high fiscal deficit, which
remains a key credit challenge, it aims to reduce the deficit
close to balance by 2019. The 2015 reported deficit of 4.8% of
GDP understates the gap between government revenues and spending
because it includes central bank funding as part of revenues.
Excluding this extraordinary funding and adjusting for delayed
payments to certain suppliers raises the deficit to over 7% of
GDP. An increase in electricity consumption and public
transportation tariffs will result in savings of over 1% of GDP.
But at the same time the government has reduced some income and
export taxes and Moody's expects a deficit of over 5% of GDP this
year but declining after that.
Argentina's inflation is among the highest of all rated
sovereigns, likely ending near 30% last year. Reliable numbers
are not available as the current administration is still working
on restoring the quality of the country's economic statistics,
after years of macroeconomic misreporting from the prior
government. Argentina's central bank has raised interest rates in
an effort to limit the impact of the still fast growth of the
monetary base, a marked departure from the prior policy stance.
The government's target is to reduce inflation to single digits by
2019 and we expect that inflation will begin to fall in the second
half of the year and end below 25% in 2017, and declining after
that.
Pressure on official international reserves, which stood at $29.4
billion as of 13 April, fell after the central bank moved to a
managed float exchange rate regime last December. A resolution to
the legal problems and the lifting of capital controls will assist
in increasing capital inflows and investment, and increased
economic activity. Moody's expects real GDP to fall by 1% this
year, as the country seeks to rein in its high deficits and
inflation, but should return to growth in 2017 backed by greater
investment.
RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK
The stable outlook on Argentina's B3 rating balances our
expectations for continued positive reform momentum and
stabilization of reserve levels, with the still formidable
macroeconomic challenges, particularly in reducing high fiscal
deficits and inflation.
WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP
A further positive rating action is dependent on continued and
sustainable progress aimed at reducing macroeconomic imbalances
and bringing down high fiscal deficits and inflation. An
improvement in the quality of the country's data reporting also
would support a positive rating action.
WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN
A negative rating action could result from continued macroeconomic
imbalances, such as sustained high fiscal deficits that
significantly increase the country's debt burden, or an increase
in external vulnerabilities including a sharp drop in available
official international reserves.
COUNTRY CEILINGS
In connection with these rating actions, the long-term foreign
currency bond ceiling is raised to B2 from Caa1, while the short-
term foreign currency bond ceiling is unchanged at NP. The long-
term foreign currency deposit ceiling is raised to Caa1 from Caa2,
while the short-term foreign currency deposit ceiling remains at
NP. The long-term local currency bond and deposit ceilings are
raised to Ba3 from B1, while the short-term local currency bond
and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at NP.
This action was taken:
Issuer: Argentina, Government of
Issuer Rating, Upgraded to B3 from Caa1
Senior Unsecured Shelf, Upgraded to (P)B3 from (P)Caa2
Senior Unsecured Shelf, Upgraded to (P)B3 from (P)Caa1
Senior Unsecured Short-Term Rating, Affirmed NP
Outlook Actions:
Issuer: Argentina, Government of
Outlook, Changed to Stable from Positive
GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 22,299 (2014 Actual) (also
known as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): 2.1% (2015 Actual) (also known as
GDP Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 23.9% (2014 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.5% (2014 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.5% (2014 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 26.6% (2014, Actual)
Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience
Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.
On April 13, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Argentina, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's institutional
strength/framework, have materially increased. The issuer's
governance and/or management, have materially increased. The
issuer has become less susceptible to event risks. An analysis of
this issuer, relative to its peers, indicates that a repositioning
of its rating would be appropriate.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2015.
The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.
===============
B A R B A D O S
===============
BARBADOS: PM Responds to No-Confidence Motion, Moody's Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that Prime Minister Freundel Stuart has
verbally hit back at Leader of the Opposition Mia Mottley ahead of
a planned no-confidence motion.
Prime Minister Stuart is accusing her of trying to clean house in
the guise of filing the action against his government in the House
of Assembly, according to Caribbean360.com.
The report notes that Ms. Mottley has said that the decision is in
response to persistent crises caused by poor governance, including
the most recent downgrade by international credit rating firm
Moody's Investors Service.
But Prime Minister Stuart told a Democratic Labor Party
constituency meeting that the opposition leader is merely putting
up a smokescreen, the report relays.
Prime Minister Stuart suggested that she has resorted to this plan
because her time as chairman of the Barbados Labour Party is
almost at an end due to a term limit stipulation in the party's
constitution.
"Since she cannot stand for re-election, because they have term
limits in that regard, she is not going to be chairman of the
party when the party goes into general elections. She fears that
whoever takes over the party in October this year may reverse much
of what she has already done," Prime Minister Stuart suggested,
the report notes. "What they are saying is 'we don't have to win
the next election. Ms. Mottley is still a relatively young woman,
she can wait so let us clean out the cupboards of the Barbados
Labour Party, [remove] all those people who don't support her and
rebuild the party in her image.'"
If filed, this will be the third no-confidence motion brought by
the BLP against the DLP administration since it took office, the
report relays.
During the meeting, the prime minister also responded to the
latest Moody's downgrade, saying he was not unnerved by it, the
report relays.
While urging residents not to be confused, he said it was
significant that despite the downgrade, the agency's outlook for
Barbados was stable, the report notes.
Prime Minister Stuart said his government intends to continue
pushing its economic program.
"We are restructuring the Barbados economy to make sure that in
the future when things happen beyond Barbados' shores . . .. that
Barbados will be better positioned to absorb these shocks and not
be destabilized as was the case on this occasion and previous
occasions," Prime Minister Stuart added, notes the report.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 5, 2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Barbados'
government bond rating and issuer rating to Caa1 and changed the
outlook to stable.
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
BM&FBOVESPA SA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Foreign Currency Debt Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed BM&FBovespa S.A.'s
(BM&FBovespa) long-term local currency issuer rating of Ba1 and
the long-term senior unsecured foreign currency debt rating of
Ba1. The outlook on all ratings remains negative.
This rating action follows the merger between BM&FBovespa and
Cetip S.A. (Cetip, unrated) announced on April 8, 2016.
RATINGS RATIONALE
In affirming BM&FBovespa's ratings, Moody's acknowledges that the
combination of its activities with Cetip will further enhance the
company's dominant position as the integrated exchange, depositary
and clearing service provider in the Brazilian financial market
and relative to competitive threats. The resulting company will
have total gross revenues of BRL 3.8 billion ($1.1 billion), of
which BM&FBovespa will contribute 64% and Cetip with 36%, and
their high margins will result in earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) relative to net revenues of
approximately 70%. The new company expects its attractive margins
will improve over the coming years as it realizes the potential
revenue synergies and cost savings, which management estimates to
be 10% of operational expenses in the third year.
"Under the deal terms, Cetip's shareholders will receive cash and
BM&FBovespa' shares, the proportion of each will vary according to
the floor and cap prices defined for the exchange's share price.
We estimate the cash payment could range from a maximum of 85% and
minimum of 62.7% of the deal price. Considering that the implied
value attributed to Cetip was about BRL 12 billion, we estimate
that the large majority of cash disbursement in any scenario
within this range will be covered by Cetip's and BM&FBovespa's
current cash position, which was boosted in the last months by the
sale of its 5.1% stake in CME Group Inc. (Aa3 stable).
Consequently, the necessary incremental debt to meet total cash
payment is expected to result in a capital structure that is
consistent with BM&FBovespa's Ba1 current rating, whereby the
total debt to EBITDA is not expected to exceed 2.6x."
"We also note that the strong cash generation of the combined
company, which is estimated to exceed BRL 2.0 billion per year,
coupled with expectations that capital expenditures will remain
low, provide a meaningful financial flexibility to handle higher
leverage ratios, should the terms and conditions of the deal
prompt BM&FBovespa to raise higher-than-expected debt. The
company's cash generation capacity provides it the ability to
consistently reduce debt levels over the course of the next
years."
BM&FBovespa's ratings are positioned one notch above the Ba2
Brazilian government bond rating, to reflect its dominant position
in the local market and systemic importance as an integrated
exchange, depository, and clearing, as well as its role as a
central counterparty via its clearing houses. Its adequate debt
service capacity and the appropriate risk management mechanisms
also support the ratings. At the same time, BM&FBovespa is exposed
to the Brazilian government risk in the form of collateral
holdings of government securities. In addition, the company's cash
position, as well as a significant portion of the settlement funds
that safeguard BM&FBovespa against counterparty default, is
invested in Brazilian government bonds. The negative outlook on
BM&FBovespa's ratings, therefore, follows the negative outlook on
Brazil's sovereign bond rating.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN/UP
A decrease in operational margins that could substantially impact
the company's debt service capacity would have negative
implication for the ratings. Also, a decision to maintain a high
dividend payout and/or share buyback that would lead to higher
leverage ratios could result in the reassessment of the company's
ratings.
Negative pressure on the ratings could also derive from a
downgrade of the sovereign rating.
At the same time, there is limited upward pressure on
BM&FBovespa's ratings, which are already positioned one notch
above the sovereign rating (Ba2 negative) .
Moody's has affirmed the following ratings of BM&FBovespa:
-- Long-term local currency issuer rating of Ba1; negative
outlook
-- Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating of
Ba1; negative outlook
BRAZIL: Lower House Starts Debate on Rousseff's Impeachment
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Daily Observer reports that Brazil's lower house opened a
three-day debate on whether to impeach President Dilma Rousseff on
charges of manipulating budget accounts, after the government lost
a last-ditch appeal before the Supreme Court to halt the process.
Congressmen in favor of her impeachment chanted "Dilma Out" at the
opening of the debate, which is due to conclude with a vote on
April 17, according to The Daily Observer.
Having lost the support of several allied parties in recent weeks,
Rousseff is widely expected to lose the ballot, at which point the
process will pass to the Senate, the report relays.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.
CONCESSAO METROVIARIA: Moody's Rates Planned BRL100MM Notes 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has assigned a Ba2 global scale and a
Aa2.br Brazilian national scale rating (NSR) to the planned senior
unsecured (backed) promissory notes (NPs) of up to BRL100 million
to be issued by Concessao Metroviaria do Rio de Janeiro S/A
("METRORIO" or the "Company"). At the same time, Moody's affirmed
METRORIO's issuer ratings at Ba2 and Aa2.br on the global and
national scales, respectively. The outlook remains negative for
all ratings.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The NPs are expected to have a 180-day maturity from the issuance
date, and will be backed by a corporate guarantee from its parent
company, Investimentos e Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A. --
INVEPAR (B1/Baa1.br negative). The issuance proceeds will be used
to refinance maturing debt and to finance capital expenditures of
the Company. The NPs will be refinanced at maturity with the
planned issuance of senior unsecured debentures, with terms to be
defined. The NPs are not expected to have cross default
provisions with other outstanding debt from the company, from its
parent (INVEPAR), or from any of the parent's subsidiaries or
affiliate companies, nor will they contain financial covenants.
The ratings assigned to the NPs are based on preliminary
information received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date.
Moody's will review the final documentation as soon as it is made
available by the company. Should the issuance terms and/or final
documentation deviate from the indicative terms submitted for
Moody's review, then Moody's will assess the impact that these
differences may have on the ratings, and act accordingly.
The Ba2/Aa2.br ratings reflect METRORIO's relatively stable and
predictable operating cash flows supported by a long-term
concession contract with annual tariff adjustments indexed to
domestic inflation. Despite the ongoing recession in Brazil (Ba2
negative), METRORIO has experienced a positive trend in ridership
in the City of Rio de Janeiro (Ba2 negative), which has had a
positive impact on credit metrics. According to Moody's standard
financial adjustments, in FY2015 METRORIO's Debt-to-EBITDA
declined to 3.4x from a historical average (2013-2015) of 4.3x,
whereas Retained Cash Flow-to-Net Debt increased to 23.9% from a
historical average of 18.9%. However, in FY2015 Funds from
Operation Interest Coverage declined somewhat to 3.1x from 3.3x in
FY2014, although it remained higher than the 2013-2015 2.9x
average.
Despite the overall improvement of METRORIO's credit profile as a
result of a continuous improvement in the company's financial and
operating performance, the negative outlook reflects primarily the
constraint of the sovereign rating and outlook given the domestic
nature of the company's operations.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN
In light of the negative outlook, an upgrade of the ratings is
unlikely in the near term.
Further deterioration in the sovereign's rating could exert
downward pressure on the ratings. A rating downgrade could also
occur in case ridership declines over a prolonged period of time,
the company's liquidity position deteriorates, or if the final
terms of the issuance and/or final documentation deviate from the
indicative terms submitted for Moody's review. Quantitatively, a
rating downgrade could occur if RCF/ Net Debt stays below 7%, and
Fund from Operations (FFO) Interest Coverage remains below 2.0x
for an extended period.
ABOUT METRORIO
Concessao Metroviaria do Rio de Janeiro S.A. -- MetroRio is an
urban railway passenger transportation company, which has the
concession rights to operate Lines 1 and 2 of the subway system in
the City of Rio de Janeiro with an extension of 42 km and 36
stations (the "Concession"). The Concession was granted by the
State Government of Rio de Janeiro in 1998 for a 20-year period.
In December 2007, MetroRio agreed to undertake an expansion and
modernization program with capital expenditures (CAPEX) of BRL 1.2
billion that resulted in the extension of the Concession for an
additional period of 20 years, until January 2038. At the end of
the Concession period, the assets will revert to the State
Government of Rio de Janeiro. In FY2015, according to Moody's
standard adjustments, MetroRio reported net operating revenues of
BRL777 million, EBITDA of BRL392million, and net distributable
income (after unusual and non-recurring items) of BRL85 million,
as compared to net operating revenues of BRL702 million, EBITDA of
BRL305 million, and net income of BRL61 million in FY2014.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Passenger Railway Companies published in March 2013.
Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.
SAO PAULO: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR; Outlook Remains Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its global scale 'BB'
long-term foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on the
state of Sao Paulo. S&P also affirmed its national scale 'brAA-'
rating on the state. The outlook on the long-term foreign and
local currency and national scale ratings remains negative.
RATIONALE
The ratings on Sao Paulo mainly reflect its average budgetary
flexibility, strong budgetary performance, as well as its
satisfactory financial management compared with those of its
domestic and international peers. Despite recession, S&P expects
the state's own-source revenue to remain above 90% of its total
revenue in fiscal 2016 and 2017. And S&P expects that Sao Paulo
will maintain satisfactory financial management and strong
budgetary performance in the next couple of years as a result of
fiscal adjustment measures to keep deficits low in 2016 and 2017.
The state economy, with an estimated GDP per capita of $12,000 for
2015, is stronger than those of other states such as Minas Gerais.
However, S&P assess Sao Paulo's economy as weak in light of its
4.1% contraction in 2015 and Brazil's likely prolonged recession.
As a result, the state's main tax revenue has shrunk during 2015
and so far in 2016. Also, S&P's view of Sao Paulo's liquidity as
weak and its debt burden as high are rating constraints that will
remain unchanged in the next couple of years. However, S&P views
the state's contingent liabilities as moderate. Sao Paulo has
limited ability to cut its operating expenses because about 75% of
them consist of debt interest payments, personnel costs, and
transfers to municipalities. These budgetary constraints are
exacerbated by the limited access to external liquidity and the
borrowing limits that the nation's Fiscal Responsibility Law
imposes on local and regional governments (LRGs).
Sao Paulo has what S&P views as strong budgetary performance
compared with those of its domestic and international peers, with
a deficit after capital expenditures (capex) of less than 1%. S&P
includes in its debt analysis the state's payments to service
suppliers. S&P don't expect Sao Paulo's overall budgetary
performance to weaken significantly in 2016 and 2017, even if
access to external financing becomes more uncertain than in the
past few years.
S&P estimates that the state's operating surplus will be about 4%
of its operating revenue in 2016, down from 5% in 2015 and 8% in
2014. Due to recession, S&P assumes that Sao Paulo's tax revenue
will continue to decline in real terms in 2016 and start to
recover in 2017 if economic performance picks up. In S&P's
opinion, for Sao Paulo to maintain its strong budgetary
performance, it would have to restrict or cut its operating and
capital expenses. Deficits after borrowings close to 5% of total
revenue could hurt the state's finances amid limited external
liquidity, tightening credit conditions, and already high debt
burden. S&P's base-case scenario for 2016 excludes a potential
debt refinancing agreement with the federal government, which
could reduce Sao Paulo's annual debt service cost. However, S&P
considers that if this refinancing occurs, it wouldn't fully
compensate for the state's difficulties in financing this year's
budget.
Sao Paulo may have to maintain its capex levels similar to 2015 or
reduce them if its internal cash flows drop to avoid widening
deficits after capex higher than 1% of total revenue this year.
Our base-case scenario for 2016 assumes the state will obtain
approximately R$5 to $6 billion in loans from government-owned
banks--mainly Banco do Brasil and Caixa Economica Federal--and
from multilateral lending agencies. Sao Paulo will use these
funds mainly to finance public transportation projects.
Sao Paulo's consolidated debt reached R$275 billion as of Feb. 29,
2016, or equivalent to 140% of its expected operating revenue for
that year, which is in line with S&P's base case. Although the
state's debt level is likely to remain high, the debt-to-revenue
ratio should drop to no more than 120% after 2018. Sao Paulo's
debt level is higher than those of most of its domestic peers such
as Santa Catarina but lower than those of its global peers' with
the same rating such as the Autonomous Community of Valencia
(BB/Stable/B). The state's contingent liabilities are moderate;
S&P's analysis incorporates the impact from the cross-default
clauses in Sao Paulo's government-related entities' loan
agreements with the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES).
The state administration of Geraldo Alckmin from the Brazilian
Social Democracy Party, who's currently serving his second term,
maintains prudent fiscal policies that restrict operating spending
amid falling revenue. In addition, S&P believes the
administration will continue improving the quality of public-
sector spending ("smart spending initiatives") and promoting
public-private partnerships and large infrastructure investments
during 2016. The governor has been actively participating with
his counterparts from the Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais states
in negotiations with the federal government on debt refinancing
agreements, because these three states owe the bulk of debt
Brazilian LRGs owe to the federal government.
Sao Paulo generates more than 30% of Brazil's GDP; therefore, its
growth prospects are tightly linked with the country's. The state
is home to about a quarter of the nation's 190 million people.
Given S&P's expectations that Brazil will continue to face grim
economic prospects for the next two years, S&P expects the state
of Sao Paulo's economy to follow a similar trend in 2016 and 2017.
Sao Paulo, similar to its domestic peers, operates in what S&P
views as an evolving and unbalanced institutional framework in
Brazil with a weakening trend. The system that divides the fiscal
powers between the central and the local and regional governments
in Brazil is based on three key parameters that have remained in
place for a long time and have gained strong political and
economic support. S&P don't expect major significant changes in
the intermediate term, and if they do occur, it will reassess its
opinion on Brazilian LRGs' credit quality.
Liquidity
S&P considers Sao Paulo's liquidity as weak based on S&P's view of
its relatively high debt service costs and limited access to
external liquidity amid weak economy, which could delay its
already approved loan disbursements. S&P also incorporates in its
base-case scenario the federal government's restrictions in
authorizing the state's new borrowings. S&P expects Sao Paulo to
have a liquidity-to-debt service coverage ratio of about 60% in
2016. The state's debt service cost continues to be high in 2016
reaching R$18 billion. As of February 2016, the state payed debt
service of R$2.5 billion compared to R$2.2 billion same period
last year.
If the state and the federal government agree on debt refinancing
during 2016, it could save up to R$3 billion in annual debt
service costs, which would benefit its liquidity position mostly
in 2017. However, due to uncertainty over this agreement, S&P is
excluding the savings in its base-case scenario for 2016.
OUTLOOK
The negative outlook on Sao Paulo reflects the outlook on Brazil
because S&P don't believe that the state could have a higher
rating than the sovereign. Also, the negative outlook reflects
the weakening trend in the institutional framework, and the
downward reassessment on the latter would likely trigger
downgrades of most of Brazilian LRGs. S&P could also take a
negative rating action if Sao Paulo's deficits after capex rise to
more than 5% of total revenue, while the state finances them
through additional debt or depletes its cash reserves in doing so.
S&P could revise the outlook to stable to mirror a similar action
on the sovereign.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.
The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.
The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Sao Paulo (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating
Global Scale BB/Negative/--
Brazil National Scale brAA-/Negative/--
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
CASTLE INVESTMENT: Creditors Hold Meeting
-----------------------------------------
The creditors of Castle Investment Fund Limited held a meeting on
March 22, 2016. During the meeting, the creditors were asked to
appoint a liquidation committee.
DOUBLE HAVEN: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 21
------------------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Double Haven Temple Fund will hear on April 21,
2016, at 4:00 p.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-
up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Kanwaljit Singh Bahra
c/o Double Haven Capital (Hong Kong) Limited
Level 41, 4104-08, 248 Queen's Road East
Wanchai
Hong Kong
DOUBLE HAVEN FEEDER: Members to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 21
---------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Double Haven Temple Feeder Fund will hear on
April 21, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Kanwaljit Singh Bahra
c/o Double Haven Capital (Hong Kong) Limited
Level 41, 4104-08, 248 Queen's Road East
Wanchai
Hong Kong
KHANJAR OF OMAN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 6
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Khanjar of Oman Limited will hear on May 6,
2016, at 10:30 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Susan Craig/Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
MOUNTAIN CAPITAL: Shareholders to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 18
---------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Mountain Capital CLO V, Ltd. will hear on
May 18, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Darren Riley
c/o Summit Management Limited
Suite # 4-210
Governors Square
23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
P.O. Box 32311 Grand Cayman KY1-1209
Cayman Islands
MSF CAPITAL: Members to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 22
-------------------------------------------------------
The members of MSF Capital Offshore Fund Ltd. will hear on
April 22, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Walkers Liquidations Limited
Cayman Corporate Centre
27 Hospital Road, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9008
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100
MSF CAPITAL MASTER: Members to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 22
--------------------------------------------------------------
The members of MSF Capital Offshore Master Fund Ltd. will hear on
April 22, 2016, at 10:10 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Walkers Liquidations Limited
Cayman Corporate Centre
27 Hospital Road, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9008
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100
NORTHERN STAR: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 29
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Northern Star Charters, Ltd. will hear on
April 29, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
John Wolf
Campbells Directors Limited
Willow House, Floor 4, Cricket Square
P.O. Box 268 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949-2648
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-8613
PEPIN FUND: Shareholders to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 19
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of The Pepin Fund Limited will hear on April 19,
2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Hugh Dickson
c/o Prudence Pryce
10 Market Street
Camana Bay
P.O. Box 765 Grand Cayman KY1-9006
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 7100
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 7120
SHERLOCK FINANCE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 6
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Sherlock Finance Limited will hear on May 6,
2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Susan Craig/Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
WHITE OAK: Members to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 13
---------------------------------------------------
The members of White Oak Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. will hear
on May 13, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Nicola Cowan
DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
Telephone: (345) 946 7665
Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
dms House, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
WINGS OF OMAN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 6
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Wings of Oman Limited will hear on May 6, 2016,
at 10:15 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Susan Craig/Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
WINSWAY ENTERPRISES: Creditors to Hold Scheme Meeting on May 2
--------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Winsway Enterprises Holdings Limited will hold a
scheme meeting on May 2, 2016, at 10:00 p.m. (BVI time) or May 3,
2016, (Hong Kong time). During the meeting, the creditors will be
asked to consider the Hong Kong Scheme and the BVI Scheme.
The scheme meeting will be held at the offices of Stephenson
Harwood, 18th Floor of United Centre in 95 Queensway, Admiralty,
Hong Kong.
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Meeting With Haiti Minister 'Momentous'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Foreign Minister Andres Navarro
called the meeting with Haiti counterpart Pierrot Delienne
"momentous," and that it marks the formal resumption of the talks
between both governments at the political level.
Minister Navarro said Haiti's government went through a
restructuring process as part of the political situation and the
Dominican government has been "very respectful of that process,"
according to Dominican Today.
Speaking after a mass at Centro de los Heroes to mark the
Immigration Agency's 77th anniversary, Minister Navarro said Port-
au-Prince should solidify and once its political process
stabilizes, the talks between the two countries would follow, the
report relays.
As to Haiti's ban on numerous Dominican products, Minister Navarro
said the government expects it will be lifted, the report notes.
Minister Navarro congratulated the Haitian government because in
his view, it has sent positive signals, with both Congress and the
Executive studying the validity of that measure.
"We have to respect that they undergo their process, but the
Dominican Republic's expectation is that it be properly reviewed
and that, in the short term, can start to show signs of lifting
the restrictions affecting both countries," the report quoted
Minister Navarro as saying.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 3, 2015, Fitch Ratings affirmed the Dominican Republic's
long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B+'. The Rating Outlooks on the long-term IDRs are revised to
Positive from Stable. The issue ratings on the Dominican
Republic's senior unsecured foreign and local currency bonds are
affirmed at 'B+'. The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'BB-' and the
short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Output Declines by 3.9% in 2015 Due to Storm
-----------------------------------------------------------------
An International Monetary Fund mission, led by Mr. Alejandro
Guerson, visited Dominica during March 29-April 11 to conduct the
2016 Article IV consultation.
Mr. Guerson issued the following statement at the mission's
conclusion:
"Tropical storm Erika hit the Dominican economy hard. Output is
estimated to have declined by 3.9 percent in 2015 as a result of
the storm. Tourism activities have largely normalized following
the resumption of full operations at the main airport, and visitor
arrivals showed some recovery. Other sectors will likely need more
time to be fully restored. Agriculture output declined sharply as
the storm affected crops and access to arable land, and
significant areas are now in need of re-planting and soil
treatment. Manufacturing has taken a significant toll as the storm
prompted the closure of operations of the main industrial plant.
In addition, the protracted decline of banks' credit to the
private sector remains a drag on economic activity, underpinned by
high non-performing loans. Inflation has remained subdued, within
a slightly negative range on a year-on-year basis, mainly as a
result of falling fuel prices. Notwithstanding weak exports of
agriculture and tourism, the 2015 current account deficit remained
contained at an estimate of 9.4 percent of GDP on the back of
lower oil imports.
"Output growth is expected to remain subdued in 2016 at 1.3
percent as the economy slowly recovers from the storm and
investment in reconstruction picks up. This growth, however, is
largely conditional on donor grants proceeding according to
expectations. Afterwards, growth is projected to accelerate
somewhat as the economy continues to recover towards potential,
and to stabilize at 1.7 percent per year over the medium-term. The
current account is projected to deteriorate on the back of the
increase in reconstruction investment, and then to gradually
improve as exports of agriculture, tourism and manufacturing
activities recover. The imbalances are expected to be financed
primarily with external capital grants and official concessional
loans.
"The fiscal outturn for FY 2015/16 is strong, estimated at a
surplus of 0.8 percent of GDP. It is benefitting from the increase
of excise taxes and user fees, and the reinstatement of specific
import duties. However, the underlying fiscal performance is
somewhat weaker than the outturn suggests, as it was underpinned
by the collection of tax arrears (in part transitory), higher ECP
revenues (subject to uncertainty), and low capital expenditure.
Going forward, fiscal policy should be calibrated to allow space
for reconstruction expenditure within fiscally sustainable bounds,
consistent with the regional debt target commitment.
Maintaining the Reform Momentum Is Crucial
"The government should continue with its plan to adopt the reforms
needed to support the recovery process and to ensure fiscal
sustainability. The measures already identified are appropriate
and consistent with the commitments in the RCF. These include
further re-prioritization of public investment; wage restraint; a
gradual unwinding of storm-related social assistance; and an
update of off-shore bank licenses. The government should also
start the specification of the second-generation fiscal measures,
which require more time to develop, in amounts consistent with
achieving the debt target. Measures under consideration include
the rationalization of tax expenditures, a property tax reform,
introduction of cost-recovery charges in the provision of health
services, and measures to increase the efficiency of public
education services.
Moreover, complementing these with structural fiscal reforms is
important to make fiscal consolidation gains durable. Such
measures should focus on strengthening and supporting the budget
process and its execution, including systems to improve public
financial management, and improving the transparency of the ECP.
Also, given the recurrence of natural disasters, the authorities
should expedite their plans to build in sufficient fiscal space to
be able to respond in case of such future events, and consider the
creation of a saving fund, using some of the ECP revenues.
"With regard to financial activities, the government has made
substantial progress to revamp regulations, but significant risks
continue to affect the sector. The recent passing of the new
Banking Act and Eastern Caribbean Asset Management Company Act are
important steps to mitigate these. Credit unions are in the
process of consolidation, in agreement with the adoption of the
regional initiatives to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory
framework. Moreover, there has been significant progress in the
AML/CFT legislation. However, the high level of non-performing
loans and low capitalization across the financial industry pose
risk to financial stability. Also, there is risk of losing
correspondent banking relations, as is currently occurring in
other countries in the region.
This risk requires decisive action, aimed at improving the
information position of financial institutions, monitoring for
possible termination or increase in cost of correspondent banking
relations, continuing to strengthen AML/CFT legislation, and
exploring merger possibilities. A review of the lending policies
of the National Bank of Dominica and the AID Bank aimed at
facilitating more targeted programs would minimize distortions in
the allocation of credit and better support developmental needs.
"Improving growth prospects will depend on structural reforms to
facilitate the contribution of the private sector.
The government's Growth and Social Protection Strategy identifies
key areas to increase growth, and reaffirms the role of the
private sector as the main driver. The key areas of focus include
the diversification of agriculture; investment in public
infrastructure; increase of labor productivity; and the reduction
in electricity tariffs.
To further support private sector investment, the government
should adopt measures to enhance the business climate; devise a
strategy for diversification into a broader set of areas in
addition to agriculture; remove impediments to backward linkages
in agriculture and manufacturing; improve access to finance;
increase the resilience of public infrastructure to natural
disasters; improve and enforce construction and zoning codes;
explore alternative sources to reduce the cost of electricity,
including through developing the geothermal potential; and seek
advice to improve education achievement and modernize labor
regulations.
"The IMF will continue to have a close dialogue with the
authorities as they address these challenges. The mission would
like to express its gratitude to the authorities for the close and
constructive dialogue."
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 3, 2015, Fitch Ratings affirmed the Dominican Republic's
long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B+'. The Rating Outlooks on the long-term IDRs are revised to
Positive from Stable. The issue ratings on the Dominican
Republic's senior unsecured foreign and local currency bonds are
affirmed at 'B+'. The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'BB-' and the
short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.
===========
M E X I C O
===========
ARENDAL S DE RL: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Ratings to 'C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings for Arendal, S. de R.L.
de C.V. (Arendal) to 'C' from 'CCC'. A full list of rating actions
follows at the end of this press release.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Restricted Default Appears Imminent
The downgrade reflects the absence of successful refinancing of
Arendal's short-term debt and the increased likelihood that timely
payment on its notes due May 23 will not be met. Over the next
three months more than 70% of Arendal's total debt is due. Such
concentrated debt maturities relative to an insufficient liquidity
position and the working capital needed to fund its project
backlog made it imperative that Arendal refinanced its debt
maturities. The ratings reflect Fitch's view that the company will
use its available cash to support existing operations and execute
its project backlog while it continues to seek funding
alternatives.
Customer and Project Concentration
Arendal has gained progressively larger projects which have
increased its project concentration risks. A single large project
has at times represented 40% of revenues or more. During 2015, the
company also generated about 80% of its revenues from contracts
with Pemex as the ultimate client. Considering the available
backlog, revenues from Pemex will likely continue to represent a
large portion of the company's revenue source and its project
concentration risk is unlikely to diminish in the medium term.
Cash Flow Pressure
During 2015, Arendal's cash flow from operations (CFFO) was
negative MXN893 million, representing about 23% of sales, largely
due to higher working capital requirements. The company's working
capital cycle grew by close to 100 days despite having only
minimal revenue growth. Free cash flow (FCF) was negative MXN1.1
billion. Fitch expects CFFO and free cash flow to be negative in
2016 as the company continues to execute its project backlog.
Fitch believes the capital injection to Pemex promised by the
Mexican government to support its supplier payments will only
minimally impact Arendal's cash flow in the near term as most of
its working capital investments represent costs incurred but not
yet billed.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
A selective payment default or the extension of multiple waivers
or forbearance periods upon a payment default on one or more
material financial obligations, either in series or in parallel
would result in the IDRs being downgraded to Restricted Default
'RD'.
Successful debt refinancing or completion of a debt restructuring
coupled with funding of operations through a combination of
internal and external sources could result in positive rating
actions.
LIQUIDITY
Arendal's liquidity position is insufficient relative to near term
debt maturities and projected negative cash flow generation. The
company's cash balance at year-end 2015 was MXN889 million,
compared to MXN3.9 billion of short-term debt maturities. This
debt amount includes USD100 million of notes maturing May 23,
2016.
FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS
Fitch has downgraded Arendal's ratings as follows:
-- Long-term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'C'
from 'CCC';
-- Long-term Local Currency IDR to 'C' from 'CCC';
-- Unsecured notes due 2016 to 'C/RR4' from 'CCC/RR4'.
BANCO AHORRO: S&P Affirms 'B' ICRs; Outlook Remains Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' global scale
and 'mxBBB-/mxA-3' national scale issuer credit ratings on Banco
Ahorro Famsa S.A. Institucion de Banca Multiple (BAF). The
outlook remains stable.
The issuer credit ratings on BAF reflect its core status to Grupo
Famsa (GFamsa; B/Stable/--) because S&P believes both entities
share the same customer base, brand, and reputation. Also, BAF's
strategy is closely linked with the group's; therefore, it's
highly unlikely that bank will be sold. GFamsa has shown a strong
long-term commitment to the bank by supporting it in the previous
few years under stressful conditions. The issuer credit rating on
BAF received one notch of support, higher than its stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) of 'b-', due to the bank's core status.
The ratings also reflect S&P's view of the bank's business
position as weak mainly due to a revenue concentration in the
Famsa's credit card business. S&P also views its capital and
earnings as adequate, based on its forecasted risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) ratio of 8.7% on average for the next 18 months.
The ratings also reflect S&P's assessment of BAF's risk position
as very weak because its nonperforming assets (NPAs) and net
charge-offs (NCOs) ratios--although gradually improved in the past
12 months--remain weaker than those of banks that operate in
countries with the same Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) economic risk score and of the Mexican financial system
average. The ratings also incorporate S&P's assessment of BAF's
funding as average and its liquidity as adequate.
MEXICO: Rig Workers Are the Soul of the Crisis-hit Oil Sector
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Mexico's offshore oil rigs make their
presence felt in the vast Gulf of Mexico with their imposing size
and powerful engines, providing a home for 16,000 employees of the
state-owned energy company who spend two weeks at a time far from
their families.
On the platforms, pieces of paper with the scribblings of children
or the letters of loved ones back on land cover the walls of these
workers' sleeping quarters, according to EFE News.
"You feel terrible leaving them, abandoning them, but they know
it's for a good reason, for the good of the family," Javier Torres
an employee of state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, and
father of two, says with a knot in his throat, the report notes.
The report relays that the rigs house thousands of people who are
drawn by necessity to form lasting bonds among their colleagues in
their home away from home, where they work for two weeks at sea
before returning to their families for 14 days.
Industrial psychologist Carla Ivon Soriana Roldan, one of six
women working on Pemex's fleet of offshore rigs, told EFE that
many workers bring "reminders, drawings of their family" to combat
feelings of isolation.
The Ku-Maloob-Zaap complex that EFE visited is the most productive
field in Mexico's biggest offshore oil region, the Bay of
Campeche, which accounts for 70 percent of the nation's petroleum
output.
The daily stress of work is ever-present on board the rigs but
Pemex offers a range of amenities to ease the burden, although
smoking or use of drugs or alcohol are prohibited and considered
grounds for dismissal, the report notes.
"It's very pleasant and there's a lot of work here, but there's
also a lot of stress and anxiety," Carla, a woman who works on a
rig together with 214 male colleagues, who she says treat her with
paternal fondness, the report discloses.
The rooms are co-ed and therefore the women must sleep and live
alongside male workers who perform heavier labor in temperatures
that can climb higher than 35 C (95 F), the report says.
The 34-year-old Carla, who has a husband and two children at home,
says she is not afraid, the report notes.
"The risk comes from the materials. The majority of the men are
very respectful" and "take care of us," she said.
Other dangers loom as well, although most employees appeared
unfazed by news from Mexico City about plans for large-scale job
cuts at Pemex, which posted a net loss of US$30.3 billion in 2015,
the report discloses.
That was nearly double that of the previous year and a result that
prompted the government to announce a plan to slash Pemex's 2016
budget by MXN100 billion ($5.68 billion), the report adds.
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS: Extends Exchange Offers Until April 21
---------------------------------------------------------------
ACC Claims Holdings, LLC on April 15 announced the extension of
offers to Eligible Holders to exchange (i) class A limited
liability company interests of ACC Claims Holdings, LLC for up to
all of the outstanding ACC Senior Notes Claims (Class ACC 3)
allowed under the Plan of Reorganization, including any
post-petition pre-effective date interest and post-effective date
interest to and including the extended expiration date of the
offers (the "Senior Claims"), against Adelphia Communications
Corporation, and (ii) class B limited liability company interests
of ACC Claims Holdings, LLC for up to all of the outstanding ACC
Trade Claims (Class ACC 4) allowed under the Plan of
Reorganization, including any post-petition pre-effective date
interest and post-effective date interest to and including the
extended expiration date of the offers (the "ACC 4 Claims"), and
ACC Other Unsecured Claims (Class ACC 5) allowed under the Plan of
Reorganization, including any post-petition pre-effective date
interest and post-effective date interest to and including the
extended expiration date of the offers (the "ACC 5 Claims" and,
together with the ACC 4 Claims, the "Other Claims"; the Senior
Claims and the Other Claims, together, the "Claims"), against
Adelphia Communications Corporation until 5:00 p.m., New York City
time, on Thursday, April 21, 2016. The exchange offers were
previously scheduled to expire at 5:00 p.m., New York City time,
on Thursday, April 14, 2016. As of 5:00 p.m., New York City time,
on Thursday, April 14, 2016, Eligible Holders of $3,512,408,416
original principal amount of Senior Claims outstanding, Eligible
Holders of $249,534,265.15 of ACC 4 Claims outstanding and
Eligible Holders of $44,646,944.11 of ACC 5 Claims outstanding had
validly tendered their Claims pursuant to the exchange offers.
ACC Claims Holdings, LLC recognizes that the Claims will continue
to accrue post-effective date interest between the original
expiration date and the extended expiration date. Therefore, the
consideration offered to Eligible Holders will be increased by a
corresponding amount.
Except as set forth herein, the terms and conditions of the
exchange offers remain unchanged. ACC Claims Holdings, LLC
reserves the right to further extend the exchange offers prior to
the termination of the extended expiration date. ACC Claims
Holdings, LLC does not contemplate any such additional extensions
of the exchange offers at this time.
The exchange offers are being made pursuant to (i) the offers to
exchange, dated March 3, 2016, and supplemented and amended on
March 9, 2016, March 21, 2016, April 1, 2016, April 8, 2016 and on
the date hereof and (ii) the related letter of transmittal, dated
as of March 3, 2016 and supplemented and amended on March 21,
2016.
The exchange offers will only be made, and the offers to exchange
and the related letter of transmittal will only be distributed to,
holders who complete, execute and return an eligibility form
confirming that they are qualified purchasers ("Qualified
Purchasers") as defined in Section 2(a)(51)(A) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended (except to the extent waived by
the managing member of ACC Claims Holdings, LLC), excluding
Benefit Plan Investors (except as provided for and subject to the
terms of the exchange offers, as amended), each of which is (x) a
qualified institutional buyer within the meaning of Rule 144A
under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities
Act"), (y) an institutional investor that qualifies as an
"accredited investor" pursuant to Rule 501(a)(1), (2), (3) or (7)
under the Securities Act or (z) not a U.S. person in an offshore
transaction, in each case as defined in Regulation S under the
Securities Act (such persons, "Eligible Holders"). "Benefit Plan
Investor" means a benefit plan investor, as defined in Section
3(42) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended ("ERISA"), and includes (a) an employee benefit plan (as
defined in Section 3(3) of Title I of ERISA) that is subject to
the fiduciary responsibility provisions of Title I of ERISA, (b) a
plan that is subject to Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended (the "Code"), or (c) any entity whose
underlying assets include, or are deemed for purposes of ERISA or
the Code to include, "plan assets" by reason of any such employee
benefit plan's or plan's investment in the entity. Holders who
desire to obtain and complete an eligibility form should either
visit the website for this purpose at www.dfking.com/adelphia or
call D.F. King & Co., Inc., the information agent and exchange
agent for the exchange offers, at (800) 761-6523 (toll-free) or
(212) 269-5550 (collect for banks and brokers only).
The managing member of ACC Claims Holdings, LLC may, in its sole
discretion, waive the restriction on tenders by Benefit Plan
Investors. However, the managing member is not required to accept
a tender in whole or in part from an investor that is a Benefit
Plan Investor, and reserves the right to reject in its complete
discretion any tender by a Benefit Plan Investor.
About Adelphia Communications
Based in Coudersport, Pennsylvania, Adelphia Communications
Corporation was once the fifth-biggest cable company. Adelphia
served customers in 30 states and Puerto Rico, and offered analog
and digital video services, Internet access and other advanced
services over its broadband networks.
Adelphia collapsed in 2002 after disclosing that founder John
Rigas and his family owed $2.3 billion in off-balance-sheet debt
on bank loans taken jointly with the company. Mr. Rigas was
sentenced to 12 years in prison, while son Timothy 15 years.
Adelphia Communications and its more than 200 affiliates filed for
Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 02-41729) on
June 25, 2002. Willkie Farr & Gallagher represented the Debtors
in their restructuring effort. PricewaterhouseCoopers served as
the Debtors' financial advisor. Kasowitz, Benson, Torres &
Friedman LLP and Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff & Stern LLP represented
the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Adelphia Cablevision Associates of Radnor, L.P., and 20 of its
affiliates, collectively known as Rigas-Managed Entities, were
entities that were previously held or controlled by members of the
Rigas family. In March 2006, the rights and titles to these
entities were transferred to certain subsidiaries of Adelphia
Cablevision LLC. The RME Debtors filed for Chapter 11 protection
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case Nos. 06-10622 through 06-10642) on March 31,
2006. Their cases were jointly administered under Adelphia
Communications and its debtor-affiliates' Chapter 11 cases.
The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Debtors' Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization on Jan. 5, 2007. The Plan became effective on
Feb. 13, 2007.
The Adelphia Recovery Trust, a Delaware Statutory Trust, was
formed pursuant to the Plan. The Trust holds certain litigation
claims transferred pursuant to the Plan against various third
parties and exists to prosecute the causes of action transferred
to it for the benefit of holders of Trust interests. Lawyers at
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP (NYC), represent the
Adelphia Recovery Trust.
BTB CORP: Needs More Time to File Amended Disclosure Statement
--------------------------------------------------------------
BTB Corporation asked the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Puerto Rico to extend to April 7, 2016, the deadline to file
the Debtor's first amended disclosure statement.
On November 20, 2015, the Debtor filed its disclosure statement
and plan of reorganization. The hearing to discuss the approval
of Debtor's disclosure statement was held on January 20, 2016.
During said hearing, the Debtor was granted 30 days to file its
first amended disclosure statement.
Since the Debtor was still in negotiations with its secured
creditor, i.e. Banco Santander, the Debtor sought and obtained
extensions to file an amended disclosure statement.
However, insofar as the agreement with Banco Santander involves a
repayment agreement with a third party, the Debtor needs an
additional 14 days after the expiration of the deadline to file
its amended disclosure statement, Alexis Fuentes-Hernandez, Esq.,
at Fuentes Law Offices, LLC -- alex@fuentes-law.com -- tells the
Court. Hence, the Debtor asks the Court to extend the deadline.
About BTB Corporation
BTB Corporation was organized in 2003 to be engaged in bitumen
supply activities and the rendering of any other services which
may be complementary to such activities. Debtor initiated
operations from a leased terminal and storage facility located in
Penuelas, Puerto Rico.
In 2007, BTB acquired 100% of the stock of The Placco Company of
Puerto Rico, Inc., ("PLACCO"), a corporation organized under the
laws of Puerto Rico on May 10, 1988 primarily to manufacture,
produce, process and sell bitumen and other related or similar
products. PLACCO became a wholly owned subsidiary of BTB, and is
the owner of the bitumen terminal leased by BTB from where BTB
operates its business in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico.
In 2012, the current majority shareholders acquired BTB from IOTC
Asphalt, LLC, retaining Mr. Juan Vazquez as President of the
Company.
BTB Corporation sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case
No. 15-03681) in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, on May 17, 2015.
Samuel Lizardi signed the petition as interim president. The
Debtor disclosed total assets of $16.5 million and total
liabilities of $13.2 million.
BTB said it sought bankruptcy protection as it is unable to meet
obligations as they mature, and creditors are threatening suit and
have threatened to undertake steps to obtain possession of its
assets.
The Debtor tapped Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq., at Fuentes Law
Offices, LLC, as its counsel.
================================
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
================================
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Economic Situation Serious, DOMA Says
--------------------------------------------------------
Leah Sorias at Trinidad Express reports that the Downtown Owners
and Merchants Association (DOMA) expressed concern about the
declining state of industrial relations in this country.
The association, headed by Gregory Aboud, said in a statement that
the current economic situation is serious and it is not temporary,
according to Trinidad Express.
The report notes that it was of the opinion that what Trinidad and
Tobago needs now is direction instead of accusations and sensible
policies instead of threats of disruption.
Highlighting that this country's fiscal predicament has been faced
by many other countries, DOMA said what will differentiate
Trinidad and Tobago from those countries is how it responds to the
serious economic plight, the report relays.
"Already there are worrisome noises from some sectors and
commentators trying to bait us in a game of rich versus poor and
tribe against tribe. This will put everyone on the defence and
worsen our chances of making sensible choices," DOMA said, the
report discloses.
"It will also send a negative message to local and foreign
investors that Trinidad and Tobago is cracking under the pressure
of adjustment. Such a reaction from investors will worsen our
predicament and create even greater hardship than that which is
being complained about now," it added, the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 2, 2016, citing Trinidad Express, Prime Minister Dr. Keith
Rowley said that Trinidad and Tobago is "certainly not bankrupt"
but we do have "cash flow" problems.
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2016. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.
* * * End of Transmission * * *