TCRLA_Public/160427.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Wednesday, April 27, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 82


                            Headlines



A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A

STANFORD INTERNATIONAL: July 8 Settlement Approval Hearing Set


A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Bans on Bond Payments Dropped by U.S. Judge
ARGENTINA: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 129 Rated Bond Funds
CMA CRECIMIENTO: Moody's Assigns B-bf GS Bond Fund Rating


B R A Z I L

BANCO BONSUCESSO: Moody's Affirms B2 Currency Deposit Rating
BRAZIL: Analysts Expect Sharper GDP Decline
SANTA CATARINA: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR; Outlook Negative
TRANSBRASIL SA: 11th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Unseal Docs


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

47 DEGREES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
A & B FINANCE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 31
ATLAS ASSET: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 3
CELLO LONG/SHORT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 17
EVO CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 26

HARBORNE INVESTMENTS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 10
KYROS INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 25
LOCOMOTIVE 1 LEASING: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 31
SANDHURST LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 16
SMILE JAPAN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 13

SUNRISE GLOBAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 4
T1 T2 FINANCE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 31
ZAIS INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 5


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating; Outlook Neg


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Small, Medium Enterprises to Benefit From Loans, Grants
JAMAICA: Companies Expect Inflation Decline in 2016


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Moving Closer to Deal With Some Bank Bondholders


S U R I N A M E

SURINAME: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Rating to 'B+'


                            - - - - -


===============================
A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A
===============================


STANFORD INTERNATIONAL: July 8 Settlement Approval Hearing Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. STANFORD INTERNATIONAL
BANK, LTD., et al., Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-00298-N (N.D. Tex.)
A FEDERAL COURT AUTHORIZED THIS NOTICE.
THIS IS NOT A SOLICITATION FROM A LAWYER.

To: Those who ever held a certificate of deposit, CD, depository
account, or investment with, or who are parties in any action
concerning, or who are interested in, Robert Allen Stanford, or
any entity of any type owned or controlled by Robert Allen
Stanford, including, without limitation, Stanford International
Bank, Ltd., Stanford Trust Company Ltd., and Stanford Development
Company

There is a proposed global settlement ("Settlement") between Ralph
S. Janvey, as Receiver for Robert Allen Stanford and related
persons and entities (the "Receiver"), (ii) the Official Stanford
Investors Committee, and (iii) Marcus A. Wide and Hugh Dickson as
joint liquidators of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. and
Stanford Trust Company Ltd., and Marcus A. Wide and
Hordley Forbes as joint liquidators of Stanford Development
Company (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), and (iv) Kroll, LLC (f/k/a
Kroll Inc.) and Kroll Associates, Inc. (together, "Kroll")
concerning Allen Stanford and all related persons and entities.

This notice is only a summary of important information about the
Settlement, the Bar Order and Judgment that will be entered if the
Settlement is approved, and a Hearing on the Settlement.
More details can be found at
www.StanfordFinancialReceivership.com

Settlement Amount: US$24,000,000 (the "Settlement Amount") to be
paid to the Receiver.

Distribution: The Receiver plans to distribute the Settlement
Amount, minus court-approved attorneys fees, expenses, and costs,
among those who held a certificate of deposit, CD,
depository account, or investment with Stanford and who have an
allowed claim amount recognized by the Receiver.  Plaintiffs'
counsel will apply to the Court for attorneys' fees of no
more than US$6 million and expenses of no more than US$25,000.

Bar Order and Judgment: The Settlement is conditioned upon the
Court's entry of a Bar Order and Judgment permanently enjoining
and barring all claims by Plaintiffs and anyone else in the world
against Kroll concerning Robert Allen Stanford and any related
persons or entities.

Date for Court Hearing and Objections: On July 8 2016, at
10:00 a.m. the Honorable David C. Godbey in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, United States
Courthouse, 1100 Commerce Street, Dallas, Texas 75242, Courtroom
1505, will hold a Hearing to consider whether to approve the
Settlement and enter the Bar Order and Judgment. You may
object and attend the Hearing.  The time for the Hearing is
subject to change, so you should confirm the Hearing time by
visiting the website www.StanfordFinancialReceivership.com
before attending.  Any and all objections to the Settlement or the
Bar Order and Judgment must be filed with Court and served on or
before May 18, 2016.  Filing and service instructions may
be found in the Court's Scheduling Order at
www.StanfordFinancialReceivership.com

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Bans on Bond Payments Dropped by U.S. Judge
------------------------------------------------------
Jef Feeley and Bob Van Voris at Bloomberg News report that
Argentina's officially back in the international credit markets.
A judge overseeing lawsuits tied to Argentina's 2001 sovereign
debt default dropped orders barring the nation from issuing bonds
and sanctioning its return to the global debt markets after a 15-
year absence.

U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa's order came after the world's
eighth-largest country said it dropped a law barring payment to
holdout creditors and paid bondholders who settled earlier this
year, including a $2.3 billion deal with Paul Singer's Elliott
Management Corp., according to Bloomberg News.  The judge set
those conditions for the orders to be dropped.

Argentina now can go ahead with a planned $15 billion bond sale to
pay off the holdout creditors from a 2001 default, Bloomberg News
notes.

"We had a mandate from the people of Argentina, which told us, we
no longer want to be part of the previous framework, we want to be
part of the world," Finance Minister Alfonso Prat-Gay said at an
April 19 news conference, Bloomberg News relates.  "We're entering
a new phase, where Argentina can set sail, leaving the troubled
waters behind and focusing on everything we'll be able to do to
transition into a growing, orderly economy," Minister Prat-Gray
added.

Argentina's defaulted bonds due 2033, which trade with accrued
interest, fell 0.8 cent to 126.9 cents on the dollar at 11:07 a.m.
on April 22 in New York, after eight days of gains that brought
the bond to a record high on April 21, Bloomberg News relays.

Elliott and other hedge funds won the injunctions to block
Argentina from paying on its restructured debt to try to force the
nation to the negotiating table, Bloomberg News says.  They
triggered a new default in 2014 when Argentina refused to pay the
hedge funds, Bloomberg News discloses.

After the election of Argentine President Mauricio Macri in
December, the county reopened talks with the hedge funds and
settled, Bloomberg News notes.  Macri's predecessor, Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner, had refused to negotiate and Argentina
frequently defied the orders of U.S. judges, Bloomberg News adds.

The case is NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 08-cv-06978,
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

                            *     *     *

On April 19, 2016, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Moody's Investors Service upgraded on April 15,
2016, Argentina's government bond rating to B3 from Caa1, with the
outlook changed to stable from positive.  The key drivers for the
upgrade are (i) Moody's expectation that Argentina will settle
holdout creditor claims which will result in a lifting of court
injunctions and clear the way for Argentina to access
international capital markets, as well as the likelihood that
Argentina will make payments to restructured bondholders increased
significantly following an April 13, US circuit court ruling in
favor of Argentina, and (ii) the economic policy improvements
since Mauricio Macri's administration took office last December.
The new government lifted capital controls and allowed the peso to
float more freely, reduced energy and transportation subsidies and
has begun to address longstanding macroeconomic imbalances.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.

On March 24, 2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Argentina's Long-
term local-currency Issuer Default Rating (LT LC IDR) to 'B' from
'CCC', with a Stable Outlook. Fitch has affirmed Argentina's Long-
term foreign-currency (FC) IDR at 'RD' and the short-term FC IDR
at 'RD'. In addition, Fitch has upgraded the Country Ceiling to
'B' from 'CCC'.


ARGENTINA: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 129 Rated Bond Funds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has taken
rating actions on all 129 of its rated bond funds in Argentina,
following Moody's Investors Service's recently announced upgrade
of the Argentine government's bond rating to B3/stable from
Caa1/positive, and the concurrent raising of Argentina's long-term
local currency and deposit ceilings to Ba3 from B1, on 15 April
2016.  The global scale bond fund ratings of 29 bond funds were
upgraded, and those of the remaining 100 funds were affirmed.  The
national scale bond fund ratings of 125 bond funds were placed
under review, with 118 national scale ratings placed under review
direction uncertain and seven national scale ratings placed under
review for downgrade.  Additionally, the national scale ratings of
four bond funds were affirmed.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

GLOBAL SCALE RATINGS

The rating upgrades of 29 bond fund global scale ratings reflect
the beneficial impact of the sovereign upgrade on the portfolios'
maturity-adjusted weighted average credit quality.  For the 100
bond funds whose national scale ratings were affirmed, the
affirmation reflects the comparatively more modest impact the
sovereign upgrade had on the credit profiles of these portfolios.

NATIONAL SCALE RATINGS

The national scale ratings (NSRs) of 118 bond funds are being
placed under review direction uncertain pending a potential
revision of the Argentina's NSR map.  Following the recent upgrade
of Argentina's sovereign rating and the increase of its local
currency country ceiling to Ba3 from B1, the current mapping of
global scale ratings to national scale ratings may no longer
adequately serve one of its intended purposes, which is to provide
greater credit differentiation among issuers in Argentina than is
possible on the global rating scale.  As a result, the lowest
global scale rating that maps to Aaa.ar is likely to rise to Ba3
in line with the new country ceiling, and the new map is likely to
associate lower NSRs with a given global scale rating than does
the current map.  Assuming the map is revised in line with current
expectations, Moody's would anticipate that the large majority of
NSRs being placed under review will be confirmed at their current
levels when the reviews conclude, though a small number may be
raised or lowered.

For the four bond funds with Ba-bf/Aaa-bf.ar ratings, their NSRs
were affirmed as it is unlikely that the new map will associate a
Ba-bf global rating with a NSR lower than Aaa.ar.

For with the seven bond funds with B-bf/Aaa.ar-bf ratings, their
NSRs are being placed on review for downgrade, as it is likely
that the new map will associate a B-bf global rating with a NSR of
Aaa.ar-bf.

For a detailed list of the affected bond fund ratings, please
click on this link:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189201

The principal methodology used in rating the funds were Moody's
Revised Bond Fund Rating Methodology and Symbols, dated May 2013.


CMA CRECIMIENTO: Moody's Assigns B-bf GS Bond Fund Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned bond fund ratings to CMA Crecimiento (the Fund), a new
short-term bond fund managed by Capital Markets S.A.SGFCI. SA

The ratings assigned are:

   -- Global scale bond fund rating: B-bf
   -- National scale bond fund rating: Aa-bf.ar (under review
      direction uncertain)

RATINGS RATIONALE
GLOBAL SCALE RATING

The B-bf fund rating reflects Moody's expectation that the Fund
will invest primarily in Lebacs (Tbills) denominated in local
currency.  Additionally, Moody's expects that the Fund's will
invest its liquidity in sight deposits at local banks.  The B-bf
rating also incorporatesan expectation that if the current spread
between Tbills and corporates widens, the Fund's investment
strategy would shift to include more corporate bond investments.

The rating agency noted that CMA Crecimiento FCI is a new fund
with no prior track record, but it is managed by an experienced
manager.  Moody's analysis was performed on a model portfolio
provided by the fund sponsor.  The rating agency expects the Fund
to be managed in line with the model portfolio.  However, Moody's
noted that if the Fund's invested portfolio deviates materially
from the model portfolio, the Fund's ratings could be changed.

"Based on the Fund's pro-forma portfolio, the Fund's credit
quality profile is comparable to those of similarly rated peers",
said Assistant Vice President - Analayst Carlos DeNevares.

                       NATIONAL SCALE RATING

The Aa-bf.ar rating under review direction uncertain reflects a
potential revision of Argentina's national scale rating map.
Following the recent upgrade of Argentina's sovereign ratings and
the increase of its local currency country ceiling to Ba3 from B1,
the current mapping of global scale ratings to national scalre
ratings may no longer adequately serve one of its intended
purposes, which is to provide greater credit differentiation among
issuers in Argentina than is possible on the global rating scale.
As a result, the lowest global scale ratings that maps to Aaa.ar
is likely to rise to Ba3 in line with the new country ceiling, and
the new map is likely to associate lower NSRs with a given global
scale rating than does the current map.  Assuming the map is
revised in line with current expectations, we would anticipate
that the large majority of NSRs being placed under review will be
confirmed at their current levels when the reviews conclude,
though a small number may be raised or lowered.

Capital Markets S.A.S.G.F.C.I, is a middle size asset manager in
the Argentinean mutual fund Industry with 0.54% of market share.
As of March 2016, CMA S.A.SGFCI, managed approximately AR$1,112.9
million in assets under management.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO BONSUCESSO: Moody's Affirms B2 Currency Deposit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed all ratings assigned to Banco
Bonsucesso S.A. (Bonsucesso), including the global local and
foreign currency long and short-term deposit ratings of B2 and
Not-Prime, as well as the long-term foreign currency subordinated
debt rating of B3, and the Brazilian national scale long- and
short-term deposit ratings of Ba1.br and BR-4.  At the same time,
Moody's also affirmed Bonsucesso's baseline credit assessment
(BCA) of b2, and long and short-term counterparty risk assessments
of B1(cr) and Not Prime(cr).  The outlook on all ratings remains
stable.

These ratings and assessments of Banco Bonsucesso S.A. were
affirmed:

   -- Long-term global local currency deposit rating of B2, stable
      outlook
   -- Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Not-Prime
   -- Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of B2, stable
      outlook
   -- Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not-Prime
   -- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Ba1.br
   -- Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-4
   -- Baseline credit assessment of b2
   -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of b2
   -- Long-term counterparty risk assessment of B1(cr)
   -- Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not-Prime(cr)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating affirmation incorporates risks associated with
Bonsucesso's success in repositioning its franchise following the
conclusion of the transfer of its payroll lending operation to
Banco Bonsucesso Consignado S.A. (BBC), a joint venture (JV)
created with Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A., especially given the
challenging macroeconomic environment in Brazil.  In view of the
weak economic conditions, the bank has also been steadily reducing
its exposure to the sector of small and medium sized companies
(SMEs).  As a result of the overhaul of its business model, the
bank's loan portfolio shrank by 74% in 2015, following a decline
of approximately 30% over the two previous years.  To offset lower
revenues from lending operations with SMEs, Bonsucesso is now
focused on increasing fee-based revenues, particularly foreign-
exchange products and services, and is developing operation as an
acquirer bank for credit card transactions.  However, it faces a
number of well-established competitors in these market segments.
While the bank exhibited very strong return on assets in 2015,
this was largely driven by non-recurring revenues.  Currently, the
banks only significant recurring revenue stream comes from
dividends from the JV with Santander.

Bonsucesso's ratings also incorporate the bank's weak asset
quality, despite the bank's efforts to reduce loan delinquencies,
which are related mostly to the SME portfolio now.  As the payroll
loans that were transferred to the joint-venture were of
relatively high credit quality, Bonsucesso's problem loan ratio
increased sharply in 2015.  Consequently, nearly 8% of its loan
book was delinquent more than 90 days as of December 2015, up from
6% a year earlier.

A positive consequence of the bank's deleveraging was a sharp
increase in capitalization and liquidity.  Bonsucesso's ratio of
tangible common equity (TCE) to risk weighted-assets, according to
Moody's standard adjustments, went up to a robust 17.23%, from
12.71% in December 2014, while liquid assets now account for
nearly 40% of tangible banking assets, more than double their
level a year earlier.  However, it is unlikely that capital and
liquidity will remain at current levels as the bank's business
model transition progresses.  Moody's expects that management will
seek to deploy capital and liquidity to support the development of
a sustainable business model.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

While unlikely at this time given Brazil's challenging operating
environment, Bonsucesso's ratings would face upward pressure if
the bank successfully repositions its franchise and is able to
demonstrate a meaningful and sustainable improvement in core
profitability and asset quality.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

Ratings could be negatively affected if Bonsucesso is unable to
successfully execute its strategy to establish itself in the
market for foreign-exchange products and services, and
consequently develop a meaningful new source of recurring
earnings.  The rating could also face downward pressure if asset
quality deteriorates further.

                        LAST RATING ACTION

The last rating action on Bonsucesso occurred on June 12, 2015,
when Moody's affirmed all debt and deposit ratings in the global
and national scales, and baseline credit assessments (BCAs) of
Bonsucesso and assigned a counterparty risk (CR) assessment to the
bank.  The outlook on all ratings was stable.

METHODOLOGY USED

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.

Banco Bonsucesso S.A. is headquartered in Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
As of Dec. 31, 2015, the bank had total assets of approximately
BRL2.1 billion ($538 million) and equity of BRL473 million ($120
million).


BRAZIL: Analysts Expect Sharper GDP Decline
-------------------------------------------
Latin American Herald Tribune reports that private sector analysts
expect Brazil's economy to contract by 3.88 percent this year, a
sharper decline than in 2015, the Central Bank said.

Analysts turned more pessimistic about Brazil's gross domestic
product (GDP) in the past week, according to Latin American Herald
Tribune.

The GDP and inflation figures come from the Boletin Focus, a
weekly Central Bank survey of analysts from about 100 private
financial institutions on the state of the national economy, the
report relays.

The report notes that the latest negative revision brings to 14
the number of consecutive weeks in which analysts have projected
sharper declines in GDP.

If the forecasts turn out to be correct, Brazil's economy will
contract for two years in a row for the first time since 1930, the
report discloses.

The worsening economic outlook for Brazil comes amid the political
crisis surrounding President Dilma Rousseff, who could be
impeached and removed from office, the report notes.

The government reported last month that Brazil's economy
contracted by 3.8 percent in 2015, marking the worst economic
downturn in the past 25 years, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service.  The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.


SANTA CATARINA: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its global scale 'BB'
long-term foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on the
State of Santa Catarina.  S&P also affirmed its national scale
'brAA-' rating on the state.  All ratings were removed from
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The outlook on all
ratings is negative.

                             RATIONALE

The ratings on Santa Catarina mainly reflect its satisfactory
financial management and strong budgetary performance, as well as
its moderate debt burden and moderate contingent liabilities.
Despite the adverse economic context for the state and the
country, S&P expects its fiscal balances to improve gradually in
the next two to three years as a result of recent consolidation
measures.  The state's weak economy, weak budgetary flexibility,
and weak liquidity constrain the ratings.  Furthermore, S&P
considers the institutional framework for all Brazilian states to
be evolving and unbalanced with a weakening trend.

Concerns about the state's willingness to pay its debt to the
federal government--after the state did not pay its February debt
installment in a timely manner--triggered S&P's decision to place
the ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications in March
2016.  Since then, Santa Catarina has demonstrated its commitment
to paying its future debt installments to the federal government
regardless of the final outcome of the current negotiations with
the ministry of finance and the final decision of the Supreme
Court of Justice (STF, its Portuguese acronym).  As a result, S&P
removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications.

Santa Catarina has been leading the negotiations over the states'
debt owed to the federal government with the ministry of finance
(R$9 billion at year end 2015 in the case of Santa Catarina, or
43% of the state's total debt stock).  At the same time, Santa
Catarina initiated legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of
Justice against the federal government, along with other states,
in order to change the calculation of this debt.  A final decision
of the STF on the case's merit is expected shortly.  The result of
these negotiations and the outcome of the legal process are still
very uncertain given the political context in Brazil.  In the
meantime, S&P would expect the state to continue meet its
financial obligations in a timely manner.  S&P is not including
alternative scenarios (based on the results of the proceedings and
negotiations) in S&P's projections at the moment.  However, it is
likely that they will have an impact on of Santa Catarina's credit
profile--as well as those of other states--over the next two
years.

Beyond that, the state administration of Governor Raimundo Colombo
from the Social Democratic Party, who is currently serving his
second term, maintains prudent fiscal policies that aim to
restrain operating spending.  Recently, the state launched new
measures to contain wage increases.  In addition, some important
changes were approved last year in order to reduce the pension
system deficit.

"We assess Santa Catarina's debt as moderate.  Total debt reached
R$21 billion as of December 2015, around 104% of operating
revenues.  We expect the debt burden to remain below 110% of
operating revenues in the next two to three years--and to decline
gradually to 103% in 2018--which is a lower ratio than some of its
national peers (such as Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais) albeit
relatively high by international standards.  Considering the
state's limited access to external and domestic liquidity,
borrowings should pick up slowly in the next two to three years.
The state's contingent liabilities are moderate; our analysis
incorporates the impact from the cross-default clauses in Santa
Catarina's government-related entities' (GREs) loan agreements
with the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)," S&P said.

The state economy had an estimated GDP per capita of $10,640 in
2015; a drop from 2014 as a consequence of the real depreciation
and the economic recession (Santa Catarina's GDP suffered a 2.7%
contraction).  Its economy is weak by international standards but
stronger than the national average.  The State's economic
activities are well-diversified and benefit from adequate public
infrastructure.  S&P expects the state of Santa Catarina's economy
to remain sluggish in 2016-2017 and to start to recover in 2018.

In S&P's opinion, the state's budgetary flexibility is weak.
Santa Catarina's own-source revenue represents 74% of its
operating revenues, below Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais.  S&P
considers that the state will have a limited capacity to increase
its own source revenues over the next two to three years as the
government is committed to not increasing tax rates; the
government's ability to improve tax collection is restricted.  As
a result, S&P expects the state to continue generating around 73%-
74% of its operating revenues.  Santa Catarina also presents
limited flexibility in terms of expenses.  Public-sector employee
wages (including pensions) and interest payments represent the
bulk of its expenditures.  S&P expects a slow positive impact on
spending from the measures taken on wages and pensions.  Capital
expenditures (capex) declined to 9.3% of total expenditures last
year from 11.4% in 2014.  S&P expects capex to remain around 8%-9%
of total expenses over the next three years, slightly above its
Brazilian peers, given its limited access to new borrowings.

The state's budgetary performance is strong due to its ongoing
operating surpluses and contained deficits after capex, expected
to continue for the next two years.  S&P's assessment reflects
operating surpluses of about 7.6% for the past five years (2010-
2015) and deficits after capex of less than 5% of total revenues,
despite a deterioration in finances since 2014 as a result of the
weak domestic economy.  S&P expects an operating surplus of 5.8%
of operating revenues in 2016, slightly down from 6.3% in 2015,
given the projected deceleration of the state's own revenues and
federal transfer growth.  S&P expects operating surpluses to
continue increasing in 2017-2018, parallel with Brazil's gradual
economic recovery.  Its deficit after capex will be around 2.3% of
total revenues in 2016 as Santa Catarina continues to reduce its
capital spending.  S&P expects deficits after capex to turn into a
small surplus in 2018.

Santa Catarina, similar to its domestic peers, operates in what
S&P views as an evolving and unbalanced institutional framework in
Brazil, with a weakening trend.  The system that divides the
fiscal powers between the central and the LRGs in Brazil is based
on three key parameters that have remained in place for a long
time and have gained strong political and  economic support.  If
significant changes occur, S&P will reassess its opinion of
Brazilian LRGs' credit quality.

Liquidity

S&P views the state's liquidity position as weak.  Average cash
reserves are likely to cover 60% of projected debt service for
2016 (R$887 million in interest and R$1,005 million in principal).
S&P expects cash reserves to be slightly more restricted in 2016
compared to 2015.

In addition, S&P assess Santa Catarina's access to external
liquidity as limited.  S&P considers that the state's access to
external commercial debt is limited, considering Brazil's Banking
Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) group of '6'.  S&P also
incorporates the federal government's restrictions to new
borrowing authorization in S&P's base-case scenario.

If Santa Catarina obtains debt relief of its debt owed to the
federal government, its annual debt service costs would be
reduced, which could strengthen its liquidity position.  However,
S&P's base case scenario does not include this outcome at the
moment because it is still very uncertain.

                            OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on Santa Catarina primarily reflects the
outlook on Brazil as S&P do not believe that the state could be
rated above the sovereign.

Also, the negative outlook reflects a one-in-three likelihood that
Santa Catarina's credit quality could deteriorate as a result of
the weakening trend in the institutional framework.  S&P could
also take a negative rating action if Santa Catarina's operating
surpluses are lower than 5% of operating revenues or if deficits
after capex are larger than 5% of its total revenues.  Finally,
S&P could lower its ratings if Santa Catarina's own source
revenues were to decline more than expected in the next 12-18
months.  On the other hand, S&P could revise the outlook to stable
to mirror a similar action on the sovereign.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                             To              From
Santa Catarina (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Global Scale               BB/Neg./--      BB/Watch Neg/--
  Brazil National Scale      brAA-/Neg./--   brAA-/Watch Neg/--


TRANSBRASIL SA: 11th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Unseal Docs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs/Appellants Marigrove, Inc., Cave Creek Holdings, Corp.,
and Cel-Air Incorporated appeal the district court's order
affirming in part and reversing in part the bankruptcy court's
order on their motion to unseal.

The underlying action is a Chapter 15 bankruptcy action, an
ancillary action to assist foreign insolvency proceedings.  The
documents at issue are a collection of motions and orders that
enabled the trustee for the estate of Debtor Transbrasil S.A.
Linhas Aereas to conduct confidential discovery into the allegedly
misappropriated assets of the debtor. The bankruptcy court sealed
the documents to prevent public dissemination of the Trustee's
ongoing investigation. After learning that they were the objects
of several discovery requests submitted to third parties under a
"gag order," the Appellants appeared in the underlying action and
moved to unseal the sealed documents arguing that the documents
were sealed improperly. The bankruptcy court denied the
Appellants' request that previously sealed documents be unsealed
but granted the Appellants' request to the extent that any future
documents would be sealed only upon separate order of the
bankruptcy court. Although this case has a complicated
procedural history, only one issue is before this Court: whether
the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by declining to unseal
the documents sealed prior to April 24, 2014.

In a Decision dated March 3, 2016, which is available at
http://is.gd/0txm2ofrom Leagle.com, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the
bankruptcy court.

The Eleventh Circuit found that there is no abuse of discretion in
the bankruptcy court's decision to preserve the seal.

The Eleventh Circuit held, "Under the Bankruptcy Code, any paper
filed in a bankruptcy action is public record and open to
examination. Some categories of information, however, are
specifically excluded from the public record and must be protected
by a bankruptcy court. At issue in this appeal is the statutory
exclusion to "protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or
confidential research, development, or commercial information."
The Trustee argues that the documents should remain sealed because
they reflect the Trustee's confidential research into the
allegedly misappropriated assets of the debtor. The Appellants
argue that the statutory exception for confidential research
applies only to proprietary commercial confidential research."

The Appellants also argue that the bankruptcy court failed to
identify a compelling interest to seal the documents. The Eleventh
Circuit found no support in the statute for the Appellants'
interpretation.

The appeals case is MARIGROVE, INC., CAVE CREEK HOLDINGS, CORP.,
CEL-AIR INCORPORATED, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GUSTAVO HENRIQUE
SAUER DE ARRUDA PINTO, ALFREDO LUIZ KUGELMAS, Defendants-
Appellees, No. 15-11596, Non-Argument Calendar (11th Cir.),
relating to In re: TRANSBRASIL S.A. LINHAS AEREAS, Debtor.

                      ABOUT TRANSBRASIL S.A.

Transbrasil S.A. Linheas Areas filed a Chapter 15 petition (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. Case No. 11-19484) in Miami, Florida, on April 7, 2011.

Gustavo Henrique Sauer de Arruda Pinto, acting as co-judicial
administrator or trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Transbrasil,
signed the Chapter 15 petition.

The trustee is asking the Miami court for entry of an order
recognizing as a foreign main proceeding a bankruptcy action
pending before the 19th Civil Court of Sao Paulo, Brazil.

Prior to its bankruptcy, Transbrasil was one of the three largest
airlines in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s.  It was
incorporated on Jan. 5, 1955, under the name "Sadia S.A.
Transportes Aereos," by Omar Fontana.  Omar was a member of the
Fontana family, owners of one of Brazil's largest business
conglomerates, including its main company Sadia, a leading
producer of frozen food and poultry in Brazil.  While in
operation, Transbrasil provided passenger jet air travel service
to numerous airports within Brazil and to various international
destinations, such as New York, Miami, Orlando, Buenos Aires,
Washington, Amsterdam and London.

On Oct. 20, 1981, Transbrasil formed a wholly-owned subsidiary,
Transbrasil Airlines, Inc., which was incorporated and based in
Florida.  TAI was a major part of Transbrasil's business, as it
handled U.S.-based operations and through it the airplane
accessories and parts for Transbrasil's planes were acquired.
In 1998, Omar Fontana became ill.  As a result, control of
Transbrasil was transferred to others.  Omar, once one of the
wealthiest men in Brazil, died on Dec. 8, 2000, at the age of 73.

The Transbrasil Trustee said in a court filing that since the
transfer of control in 1998, the airline experienced financial
difficulties that became increasingly more dire.  "By December
2001, the Company had run out of cash and credit, it had no fuel
with which to fly its airplanes, was several months behind in
payment of employees' salaries, and had unpaid bills dating to
mid-2000.  Transbrasil continued to operate until it stopped
flying and ceased trading activities on Dec. 3, 2001," the Trustee
said.

"As a result of the financial collapse, the companies that had
leased aircraft to Transbrasil terminated the leases and took back
the leased aircraft, leaving the company with only 3 outdated
Boeing 767 planes.  Due to the ceasing of its operations, many
thousands of customers were left with pre-paid tickets that could
not be used.  As well, thousands of employees were laid off or
stopped receiving salaries, and creditors were left being owed
millions of dollars in unpaid debts."

The Transbrasil Trustee said that to date, he has been able to
procure only limited information as to what happened to
Transbrasil's assets after the collapse.  The assets identified to
date consist mainly of a few airplanes that have been stripped of
parts, some spare parts and some real estate property, some of
which has being seized by Brazilian Labor Courts, the combined
value of which is some US$8 million.  In comparison, the estimated
value of Transbrasil's liabilities is in excess of US$500 million.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


47 DEGREES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of 47 Degrees North Capital Management Limited are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 24, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 22, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Joe Gaastra
          Ernst & Young Ltd, 62 Forum Lane
          Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510, Grand Cayman, KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 9052
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529


A & B FINANCE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 31
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of A & B Finance Limited will hear on May 31,
2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fides Limited
          c/o Dwight Dube
          The Grand Pavilion, 2nd Floor
          Commercial Centre
          P.O. Box 10338 Grand Cayman KY1-1003
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone (345) 949 7232


ATLAS ASSET: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 3
-------------------------------------------------
The members of Atlas Asset Opportunities Fund will hold their
final meeting on May 3, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


CELLO LONG/SHORT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 17
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Cello Long/Short Real Estate Fund, Ltd. will
hold their final meeting on May 17, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Antoine Schetritt
          MG Management Ltd.
          Landmark Square, 2nd Floor, 64 Earth Close
          Seven Mile Beach
          P.O. Box 30116
          Grand Cayman KY1-1201
          Cayman Islands


EVO CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 26
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Evo Capital Partners Fund will hold their
final meeting on May 26, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


HARBORNE INVESTMENTS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 10
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Harborne Investments Limited will hold their
final meeting on May 10, 2016, at 2:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          T Edward G. Bayman
          Telephone: +44 (1) 534 787878
          Facsimile: +44 (1) 534 787879
          c/o Pentera Trust Company Limited
          26 Esplanade
          St. Helier
          Jersey JE4 8PS


KYROS INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 25
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Kyros Investment Management Ltd are required to
file their proofs of debt by May 25, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 1, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


LOCOMOTIVE 1 LEASING: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 31
------------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Locomotive 1 Leasing Limited will hear on
May 31, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fides Limited
          c/o Dwight Dube
          The Grand Pavilion, 2nd Floor
          Commercial Centre
          P.O. Box 10338 Grand Cayman KY1-1003
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone (345) 949 7232


SANDHURST LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 16
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Sandhurst Ltd are required to file their proofs
of debt by May 16, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 31, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Westport Services Ltd.
          c/o Bonnie Willkom
          P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 5122
          Facsimile: (345) 949 7920


SMILE JAPAN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 13
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Smile Japan Company will hear on May 13, 2016,
at 10:15 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Susan Craig/Jennifer Chailler
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


SUNRISE GLOBAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 4
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Sunrise Global Diversified Master Fund Ltd.
will hold their final meeting on May 4, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andre Slabbert
          Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd.
          c/o Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd.
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900


T1 T2 FINANCE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 31
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of T1 T2 Finance Limited will hear on May 31,
2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Fides Limited
          c/o Dwight Dube
          The Grand Pavilion, 2nd Floor
          Commercial Centre
          P.O. Box 10338 Grand Cayman KY1-1003
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone (345) 949 7232


ZAIS INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 5
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Zais Investment Grade Limited VII will hold
their final meeting on May 5, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road
          George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating; Outlook Neg
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook to negative from
stable on the long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings
of Guatemala's Banco de los Trabajadores ("Bantrab").  At the same
time, the rating agency affirmed the bank's long-term and short-
term local and foreign currency deposit ratings at Ba3/Not Prime.

In addition, Moody's changed the outlook to negative from stable
on the Ba3 long-term foreign currency senior debt rating of
Bantrab Senior Trust, a Cayman-Island based trust guaranteed by
Bantrab.

These ratings were affirmed, with the outlook changed to negative
from stable:

Banco de los Trabajadores:
  Long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Ba3

Bantrab Senior Trust:
  Long-term foreign currency senior debt rating of Ba3

These ratings were affirmed:
Banco de los Trabajadores:
  Short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Not
   Prime

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's outlook change to negative on Bantrab's long-term deposit
ratings reflects the higher funding and profitability risks
stemming from the seizure by Guatemala's Public Ministry (PM) of
non-voting preferred shares that were held by Panama-based DHK
Finance, Inc.  The seizure was in response to allegations by
Guatemala's Superintendency of Banks that the funds used to
purchase these shares were obtained illegally, and that the bank
may potentially have been involved in wrongdoing during the sale
of those shares to DHK.

Bantrab has experienced only a mild contraction of deposits thus
far since the share seizure.  Moreover, the bank's thick liquidity
buffers should allow it to manage moderate strains that might
arise from tighter funding conditions.  However, the allegations
could have a more serious negative impact on the bank's largely
retail deposit funding if further evidence is produced or action
taken by Guatemalan authorities that diminishes public confidence
in Bantrab's governance and oversight.  This would drive up
funding costs as the bank is forced to obtain more expensive
replacement funding.  The bank's deposit funding costs are already
higher than those of larger banks in the system, and additional
increases will pressure its net interest margin and earnings.

Bantrab's loan growth may also be curtailed as a result of the
investigation on DHK, as management focuses on addressing possible
flaws in its internal controls rather than growing its business,
which would put further pressure on the bank's profitability.

The negative outlook on Bantrab Senior Trust's Ba3 senior debt
rating is in line with the negative outlook on Bantrab's Ba3 local
currency deposit rating.  Payment of principal and interest on the
notes is absolutely, unconditionally, and irrevocably guaranteed
by Bantrab.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

Downward pressures on Bantrab's ratings would be triggered if the
investigation reveals that the bank committed wrongdoings when
selling the preferred shares to DHK, evidencing shortcomings in
its corporate governance, risk management and control procedures.
The ratings could also be downgraded if funding and profitability
deteriorate meaningfully while the investigation is ongoing or as
a result of its findings.

The outlook on the ratings might be stabilized if the
investigation concludes that the funds used by DHK to purchase the
preferred shares did not come from illicit sources, and if the
bank's funding structure and loan growth are not negatively
affected by findings of the investigation.

The last rating action on Bantrab and on Bantrab Senior Trust was
on June 2015, when Moody's affirmed with a stable outlook all of
the bank's and trust's ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Based in Guatemala City, Banco de los Trabajadores reported total
consolidated assets of about $2.2 billion (GTQ17 billion) and
shareholders' equity of around $210 million (GTQ1.6 billion), as
of December 2015.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Small, Medium Enterprises to Benefit From Loans, Grants
----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that small and medium enterprises are to benefit
from loans and grants to be provided by the Government this fiscal
year.

J$850 million has been allocated in the 2016/17 Estimates of
Expenditure to facilitate this and other initiatives under the
Jamaica Foundation for Competitiveness and Growth project, in the
Ministry of  Economic Growth and Job Creation, according to RJR
News.

It is also expected that a regulatory authority will be
established for the new Special Economic Zone regime and a
feasibility study of the proposed Caymanas Economic Zone will
commence, the report notes.

The draft Logistics Hub Initiative Master Plan will also be
prepared, the report adds.

                           *     *     *

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 29,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' issue
rating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in two
tranches.  The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due in
2028.  The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in 2045.
The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that Jamaica
owes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's 2015/2016
budget.


JAMAICA: Companies Expect Inflation Decline in 2016
---------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaican companies are expecting a decline
in inflation during 2016.

This is one of the findings of the February Survey of Businesses
Inflation conducted by the Bank of Jamaica, according to RJR News.
Businesses expect inflation of 4.1 per cent, lower than what was
expected for 2015, the report notes.

The perception of inflation control improved in the February
survey, relative to the previous survey, the report relays.  The
Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) reported that consumer
prices dipped for a third straight month in March, the report
discloses.  Prices fell by 0.1 per cent.

It means that, since the start of the year, consumer prices have
fallen 1.3 per cent, the report adds.

                           *     *     *

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 29,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' issue
rating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in two
tranches.  The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due in
2028.  The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in 2045.
The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that Jamaica
owes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's 2015/2016
budget.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Moving Closer to Deal With Some Bank Bondholders
-------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske and Alexander Lopez at Bloomberg News report that
Puerto Rico's Government Development Bank, operating under a state
of emergency to preserve cash, is about halfway toward reaching a
forbearance agreement with creditors, according to an official.

The GDB, which lent to the commonwealth and its municipalities,
owes $422 million on May 1 that officials have said the bank
cannot pay. Jesus Manuel Ortiz, spokesman for Governor Alejandro
Garcia Padilla, said while leaving a press conference in San Juan
that the government was about halfway there when asked by a
Bloomberg News reporter about how talks on a potential forbearance
pact were progressing, according to Bloomberg News.  Such an
agreement would allow the parties to negotiate out of court,
Bloomberg News notes.

In an e-mail later to Bloomberg News, Barbara Morgan, a
representative at SKDKnickerbocker in New York who represents the
GDB, said there is no agreement yet.

"While we are actively negotiating in good faith with our
creditors, no one on our team would ever suggest agreements have
been reached," Bloomberg News quoted Ms. Morgan as saying. "That
would be both premature and directly at odds with our commitment
to not negotiate this through the media," she added.

                             Taxable Debt

Bloomberg News says the bank has filed with regulators to sell
taxable debt that would mature in May 2017, according to the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's website.  Garcia Padilla
on April 9 declared a state of emergency for the bank.  That
decision limits withdrawals from the GDB only to fund health,
public safety and education services, Bloomberg News discloses.
The bank has $562 million of liquidity, according to a debt-
moratorium law passed two weeks ago, notes the report.

Puerto Rico and its agencies borrowed for years to fix budget
deficits, amassing $70 billion of debt, Bloomberg News notes.
Island officials are negotiating with bondholders to reduce those
obligations through a voluntary debt exchange, Bloomberg News
relays.

A U.S. House Natural Resources Committee is working on a bill that
would establish a federal control board to manage Puerto Rico's
budgets and oversee any restructurings, notes the report.

Puerto Rico needs Congress to address the island's finances in
order to protect its ability to maintain essential services for
its residents, Antonio Weiss, counselor to U.S. Treasury Secretary
Jacob J. Lew, told a packed audience in Manhattan during a panel
on the commonwealth's debt crisis at the Center for Puerto Rican
Studies at Hunter College, Bloomberg News relays.  For every
dollar the island collects in tax revenue, it must spend 33 cents
on debt services, compared to an average 5 or 6 cents for states,
Mr. Weiss said, according to Bloomberg News.

                          Cascading Defaults

"Without legislation by Congress, Puerto Rico will face a
cascading series of defaults, including on its constitutionally
protected debts and mounting litigation both against the
commonwealth and between the creditors," Mr. Weiss said, Bloomberg
News relays.

The cash-strapped commonwealth is expected to fall short of paying
the $422 million to holders of the GDB bonds, Moody's Investors
Service said in a report.  It may also default on debt from the
Employees Retirement System, Industrial Development Co. and
Highways and Transportation Authority, Moody's said.

Mr. Lew urged Congress to act on a restructuring for the
commonwealth to avoid a bailout, Bloomberg News notes.

"The goal should be that at the end of a restructuring, that
Puerto Rico will again have access to capital markets," Mr. Lew
said in an interview with the Spanish-language Univision
television network, Bloomberg News relates.  "With a
restructuring, it will actually be better for creditors as well,"
he added.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Dec.
28, 2015, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded $1.09 billion
of Puerto Rico appropriation bonds issued by the Public Finance
Corporation (PFC) to C from Ca, while maintaining other ratings
assigned to the US territory's debt.


===============
S U R I N A M E
===============


SURINAME: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Rating to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term sovereign
credit rating on the Republic of Suriname to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  At
the same time, Standard & Poor's lowered its transfer and
convertibility assessment on the republic to 'BB-' from 'BB'.
Standard & Poor's also affirmed its 'B' short-term rating on
Suriname.  The outlook is negative

                            RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects the weakening of Suriname's external
liquidity, fiscal flexibility, and debt burden, stemming from
rising recent fiscal and current account deficits.  Low commodity
prices led to falling export earnings, resulting in large trade
and current account deficits in 2015.  Foreign exchange reserves
also fell to SR$1.4 billion in December 2015 from SR$2.1 billion
at the beginning of 2015, weakening the country's external
position.  Higher government spending and sharply lower fiscal
revenues from the mining sector resulted in a fiscal deficit of
10% of GDP and boosted the net general government debt burden to
36% of GDP in 2015.

S&P believes that the prospects for recovery in key external,
fiscal, and debt metrics from 2016-2019 are modest.  The negative
outlook reflects S&P's belief that there is a one-in-three chance
that those key metrics could deteriorate further, absent decisive
and timely government policies.  The government recently announced
that it had reached a staff-level agreement with the IMF to enter
a two-year, standby agreement for US$478 million.  Successful
implementation of the agreement, along with likely added funding
from other multilateral development banks, could gradually enhance
investor confidence, stabilize public finances, and sustain
external liquidity.

The value of Suriname's exports fell for the third consecutive
year in 2015, weakening the country's current account balance and
external position.  Low prices, especially for the country's key
exports of gold and oil, have resulted in a decline in the value
of exports of close to 32% from 2012 to 2015, which led to a trade
deficit, the country's first in over a decade.  That deficit,
coupled with a relatively large deficit in services (related to
the construction of the oil refinery), led to a current account
deficit of about US$800 million or almost 16% of 2015 GDP, the
largest in more than a decade.  The central bank's foreign
exchange reserves have fallen to less than three months' worth of
current account payments.  S&P expects that the current account
deficit will narrow to about 8% of GDP in 2016 as exports grow and
imports compress.  S&P believes that improving commodity prices,
rising gold production at the new Merian mine, and slow import
growth could lead to the current account back to balance by 2017.

The average of Suriname's gross external financing requirements is
likely to remain at about 100% current account receipts (CAR) and
usable reserves in the next three years and its narrow net
external debt should average about 42% of CAR.  Suriname's
external accounts have reflected material data inconsistencies
historically.

S&P projects that general government debt could increase by an
average of 6.5% of GDP during 2016-2019.  The fiscal deficit
reached close to 10% of GDP for fiscal 2015, up from 5.7% in 2014.
Total revenues fell in 2015 to 18% of GDP from 22% a year earlier
due to low commodity prices and the closure of an aluminum mine.
Total fiscal revenues (income tax, royalties, and dividend
payments) from the mining sector (including oil and gold) fell to
2.0% of GDP in 2015 from 4.4% in 2014 and from a peak of 8.7% in
2012.  Spending, on the other hand, increased about 6% in 2015
(due to higher outlays on goods and services and subsidies) and,
because of all this, the fiscal deficit widened.

S&P expects the fiscal deficit to narrow in the next four years as
the government implements revenue and expenditure measures.  The
deficit should fall to close to 5% of GDP by fiscal 2019 from
close to 8% in fiscal 2016.  If oil or gold prices rise
substantially beyond S&P's expectations, fiscal deficits could be
smaller than expected.

Suriname's net general government debt rose to 36% of GDP in 2015
from 24% in the previous fiscal year.  S&P expects the net general
government debt to GDP ratio to average 38% for the 2016-2018
period.  Also, S&P expects that general government interest burden
will be below 10% of government revenues on average from 2016-
2019.  Both interest and debt burdens will rise in that time.

In fiscal 2015, the government borrowed from the central bank to
reduce the debt it owed to the commercial banks.  As a result, the
banks' exposure to the government (including the central bank) was
18% of their total assets, down from above 20% in the previous
year.  However, S&P expects that their exposure will rise back
over 20% in the next three years due to the government's high
domestic financing needs.  Furthermore, 49% of the government's
debt was in U.S. dollars in fiscal 2015.  The overwhelming
majority of external debt is owed to official bilateral and
multilateral creditors; only a small portion is owed to external
commercial creditors.

Despite a 45% devaluation of the Surinamese currency in April
2015, the country's foreign exchange reserves continued to fall,
contributing to a gap between the official and parallel exchange
rates.  The central bank has responded with periodic auctions of
foreign exchange, gradually introducing more flexibility into the
exchange rate (which has historically been fixed to the U.S.
dollar).  It has conducted five auctions to date.  The most recent
one set the exchange rate at 5.789 Surinamese dollars to one U.S.
dollar.  The auctions are weekly and relatively small in size, but
are slowly bringing the official exchange rate closer to the
parallel market rate.

The central bank has limited monetary policy tools; it primarily
uses reserve requirements on local and foreign currency deposits
to manage credit growth in the local banking system.  Financial
dollarization, however, remains high, limiting the potential
effectiveness of monetary policy.  About 58% of deposits and just
more than 30% of claims by resident commercial banks and credit
unions were foreign-currency denominated at the end of 2015.
Accordingly, S&P has equalized the local and foreign currency
ratings on the country.

S&P projects that Suriname's GDP per capita will be US$9,600 in
2016.  Despite slumping oil prices and low gold prices, real GDP
grew modestly in 2015 (less than 1%) owing to continuing
construction work at the Merian gold mine and steady domestic
demand.  S&P expects that per capita growth will be 0%-1% for the
2016-2019 period, depending on the path of commodity prices.  For
2016, S&P expects real GDP growth of less than 1% as construction
at the Merian mine ends and production begins in the last quarter
of the year.  Domestic demand in real terms, which loose fiscal
policy before the election had sustained, should be flat as the
government imposes spending restraint.  Because of low commodity
prices, Suriname's growth rates in the next four years will be
somewhat below those of other countries at the same level of
income, after having been higher in the recent past.  As a result,
S&P do not believe that the country's trend economic growth is
either consistently above or below the average of its peers.  The
country's medium-term growth prospects should be sustained by the
expansion of gold mining, which will partially compensate for the
decline in oil prices.

Suriname's government is stable and democratic.  The Nationale
Democratische Partij (NDP), led by President Desi Bourtese, won a
narrow majority (26 out of 51 seats) in the 2015 election.
Although the government has and will likely continue to enact
economic and financial reforms, some of them unpopular, S&P
expects broad continuity in economic and social policies.
Suriname's public sector institutions, however, remain weaker than
those of most countries at a similar level of per capita income.

                              OUTLOOK

S&P bases the negative outlook on the at least one-in-three
likelihood of a downgrade in the next two years due to continued
erosion of the country's external or debt profile.  The formal
agreement with the IMF will provide greater clarity about the
government's policy agenda and its medium-term economic targets,
potentially boosting investor confidence and reducing pressures on
the exchange rate.  S&P expects that the government will take
steps to boost revenues, curb spending, and move toward fiscal
balance in the outlook horizon.  S&P also expects that improving
commodity prices will eventually lead to modest but positive GDP
growth and stronger exports, reversing the recent deterioration in
the current account.

Delays in strengthening the government's revenue base, including
through the introduction of a proposed value added tax and curbing
spending, could result in persistent high fiscal deficits, further
increases in general government debt, and potentially weaken
external liquidity.  Loose fiscal policy, combined with persistent
current account deficits, could further reduce the central bank's
foreign exchange reserves, weaken external liquidity, and result
in a downgrade.

Successful stabilization of the economy, including steps to boost
confidence in the exchange rate, would contain the erosion of
public finances.  Enhanced access to external funding from
official sources would alleviate immediate liquidity pressures in
the domestic market and boost foreign exchange reserves.  These
steps, along with measures to improve business conditions to
attract more investment in noncommodity sectors of the economy,
would sustain long-term GDP growth and fiscal revenues.  S&P could
revise the outlook to stable as a result.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that "key rating factor" had
improved/deteriorated and that the "key rating factor" had
improved/deteriorated.  All other key rating factors were
unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded
                                        To          From
Suriname (The Republic of)
Sovereign credit rating                B+/Neg./B   BB-/Stable/B
Transfer and convertibility assessment
  Local currency                        BB-         BB


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *