TCRLA_Public/160513.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, May 13, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 94


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

CAMUZZI GAS: Moody's Baa1.ar National Scale CFR Confirmed
CHUBUT REGALIAS: Moody's Ups Class A Debt Sec. Rating to Ba3(sf)
DEUTSCHE BANK (ARGENTINA): Moody's Puts 'B1' Global LC Dep. Rating
PROVINCE OF MENDOZA: Moody's Rates $500MM Sr. Notes Issue 'B3'

* Moody's Repositions NSRs of 40 Argentine Finance Transactions
* Moody's Repositions NSRs of 6 Argentine Firms


B O L I V I A

* Moody's Repositions YPFB Transierra S.A.'s National Scale Rating


B R A Z I L

BANCO BTG: Moody's Reposition NSR, and that of 27 Other Banks
BRAZIL: Recession Puts Focus on Smaller Banks-Deposit Fund Head
CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Admits to Possible New York Delisting
HYPERMARCAS SA: Moody's Repositions NSRs to Ba2/Aa2.br
LOCALIZA RENT: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative

USJ ACUCAR: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'

* Moody's Repositions 17 Tranches of Brazilian Transactions' NSRs


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ADAPTIVE ALPHA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 9
ADAPTIVE ALPHA MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 9
BLACKSTONE ALTERNATIVE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CAIS BALESTRA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CAIS HIGHBRIDGE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

CAIS JAT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CAIS PAULSON: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CAIS PERELLA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
DCMF LIQUIDATING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 8
FMCP AFRICA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 16

FPP BALKAN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LOREN LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 21
ODEBRECHT DRILLING: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Notes to Caa3
ZHG SAVEOPPORTUNITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 8


C H I L E

CHILE: To Boost Productive Financing for MSMEs with $120M IDB Loan


M E X I C O

ARENDAL S DE RL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CC' & Puts on Watch Negative
MAXCOM TELECOMUNICACIONES: Moody's Lowers CFR to Ca; Outlook Neg.

* MEXICO: To Re-Award 6 Oil Blocks on Lack of Financial Guarantees


P U E R T O    R I C O

CHILDREN'S TRUST: Moody's Cuts Term Bond 1 Rating to Ba1(sf)


V E N E Z U E L A

EMPRESAS POLAR: Running Out of Their Favorite Beer


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


CAMUZZI GAS: Moody's Baa1.ar National Scale CFR Confirmed
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (Moody's)
has repositioned the national scale ratings (NSRs) of 12 Argentine
infrastructure issuers in conjunction with the recalibration of
the Argentine national rating scale. As a result the NSRs of 9
issuers have been confirmed while 3 have been repositioned. This
concludes the reviews on these ratings that were initiated on 21
April 2016.

NSRs, which provide a measure of relative creditworthiness within
a single country, are derived from global scale ratings (GSRs)
using country-specific maps. The adoption of a revised
correspondence between Moody's GSRs and the Argentine national
scale follows the publication of Moody's updated methodology
"Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale Ratings"
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189032. For
more information, please see "Moody's publishes updated
methodology for national scale ratings"
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-publishes-updated-
methodology-for-national-scale-ratings--PR_348579 .

With nearly 100 rated fundamental issuers in Argentina, the new
map has been designed using the modified approach, whereby the map
design is adjusted to reflect the distribution of fundamental
ratings in the country in order to ensure adequate opportunity for
differentiation where ratings are most highly concentrated.
Structured finance ratings are not taken into consideration in the
determination of the map design. Because more than 10% of
fundamental issuers are rated above Argentina's B3 sovereign
rating, as well as the previous anchor point of B1, the anchor
point, or the lowest GSR that can map to a Aaa.ar, has been raised
to Ba3, the level of the local currency country ceiling. All GSRs
from B1 to Caa3 now map to three NSRs each. This provides adequate
opportunity for differentiation on the national scale among the
more than 50% of Argentine fundamental issuers rated B3 on the
global scale.

As a result of these changes, GSRs will generally correspond to
lower NSRs on the Argentine national scale than they did
previously. Consequently, the majority of Argentine NSRs that are
currently under review direction uncertain are being confirmed at
their current levels notwithstanding the recent upgrades of their
corresponding GSRs. However, a small number of fundamental
issuers' primary local currency NSRs are being raised, while the
NSRs of those issuers whose GSRs were not upgraded following the
recent sovereign upgrade are in most cases being lowered,
reflecting their relatively weaker creditworthiness compared to
the majority of domestic peers, whose GSRs were raised. in total,
slightly more than 10% of Argentine fundamental issuers' primary
NSRs are being repositioned an average of 1.3 notches higher,
while almost 20% are being repositioned an average of 2.3 notches
lower. Other NSRs are also being raised or lowered for these and
other issuers. The repositioned NSRs of individual issuers do not
signify a change in credit risk, since the GSRs for these issuers
remain unchanged.

As a result of the recalibration, the level of risk associated
with a particular Argentine NSR level (e.g. Baa2.ar) has changed
in many cases. NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss; they are ordinal rankings of
creditworthiness relative to other domestic issuers within a given
country. A historical probability of default and/or expected loss
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. However, both the
probability of default and the expected loss of an NSR may change
if and when a country's national scale is remapped.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

1) Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 S.A. (AA2000)

National Scale Corporate Family Rating, $US 300 million 2020
Senior Unsecured Notes and Class "A" and Class "C" Senior
Unsecured Local Notes

Baa1.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

2) Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad de Salta S.A. (EDESA)

$US 63.00M Senior Unsecured Amortizing Notes:

NSR repositioned to Baa2.ar from Baa3.ar. Stable Outlook.

3) Camuzzi Gas Pampeana S.A.

National Scale Corporate Family rating:

Baa1.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

4) Gas Natural Ban S.A.

National Scale Corporate Family rating:

Baa1.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

5) Transportadora de Gas del Sur S.A. (TGS):

2017 and 2020 Senior Unsecured Notes:

Baa1.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

6) HidroelÇctrica El Chocon S.A.

National Scale Corporate Family rating:

Baa2.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

7) Genneia S.A.

National Scale Corporate Family rating and Senior secured Class 2,
3 and Senior Unsecured Class13 Notes National Scale ratings:

Baa2.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

8) Generacion Independencia S.A.

National Scale Corporate Family rating and Senior Unsecured Class
3 Notes

Baa2.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

9) Empresa Provincial de Energ°a de Cordoba (EPEC):

National Scale Corporate Family rating and $US 565 million Senior
Secured Notes:

NSR repositioned to Baa3.ar from Ba1.ar. Stable Outlook

10) Empresa Distribuidora Norte S.A. (EDENOR)

National Scale Corporate Family Rating; 2017 and 2022 Senior
Unsecured Notes:

NSR repositioned to Baa3.ar from Ba2.ar. The rating outlook is
stable

11) Metrogas S.A.

National Scale Corporate Family rating and Debt program for up to
US 600 million

Baa3.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

12) Distribuidora de Gas Cuyana S.A. (DGCU)

National Scale Corporate Family rating:

Baa1.ar NSR confirmed. Stable Outlook

RATING RATIONALE

NSRs are assigned by applying the published correspondence from
GSRs. Where a single GSR maps to multiple NSRs, rating committees
assigned higher or lower NSRs to individual issuers and debts
depending on their relative credit position within the same GSR
category, using the same methodologies as were used to determine
the GSRs themselves.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS -- UP AND DOWN

The NSRs would face upward or downward pressure if their
corresponding GSRs are upgraded or downgraded, unless this is in
conjunction with a sovereign rating action that results in another
recalibration of the Argentine national scale with an offsetting
impact on NSRs. In addition, the NSRs may be repositioned upwards
(downwards) if Argentina's sovereign is downgraded (upgraded) and
the map is revised accordingly, but the corresponding GSRs have
not changed as a result of the sovereign action. Because of the
higher granularity of national scales, NSRs may also face pressure
due to changes in creditworthiness that are not sufficient to
cause a change in the corresponding GSR, measured using the same
methodologies used to determine the GSR.


CHUBUT REGALIAS: Moody's Ups Class A Debt Sec. Rating to Ba3(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) upgraded the global scale
rating of Class A (VDF A) debt securities issued by Fideicomiso
Financiero Chubut Regalias Hidrocarburiferas I to Ba3 (sf) from B2
(sf) and the national scale rating to Aaa.ar (sf) from Aa3.ar
(sf). The action follows the upgrade of some counterparties of the
transaction as well as the upgrade of Argentina's foreign currency
bond ceiling to B2 from Caa1.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's upgraded the global scale rating of Class A (VDF A) debt
securities issued by Fideicomiso Financiero Chubut Regalias
Hidrocarburiferas I to Ba3 (sf) from B2 (sf) and the national
scale rating to Aaa.ar (sf) from Aa3.ar (sf). The upgrade follows
the upgrade of Argentina's foreign currency bond ceiling to B2
from Caa1. Class A debt securities are denominated in US dollars.
Moody's notes that the Class A ratings continue to pierce the
Argentine foreign currency bond ceiling by two notches based on
structural protections, including: (i) an offshore reserve account
with Bank of New York Mellon (Aa1) for the benefit of investors
that covers five quarterly interest payments on the Class A notes,
(ii) provisions that allow Banco de Valores as the Argentine
trustee, in case of a convertibility or transferability event, to
purchase an amount of Argentine government or corporate bonds
denominated in US dollars to be sold in the New York, Zurich or
Montevideo market, so that the amount in US dollars resulting from
the bond sale, net of expenses and taxes, equals the debt service
to be paid to note holders, and (iii) payment-in-kind provisions.

Additionally, the deal's credit profile was also strengthened by
the fact that the ratings of key counterparties in the transaction
have been upgraded following the upgrade of the sovereign rating.
The rating of the Province of Chubut, the seller of the
receivables in the transaction, was upgraded to B3 from Caa1,
while the rating of Pan American Energy LLC, Argentine branch (the
operator of the concession generating the cash flows) was upgraded
to B1 from B2.

Factors that would lead an upgrade of downgrade of the ratings:

Further changes to Argentina's country ceilings may have an impact
on the ratings of Fideicomiso Financiero Chubut Regal°as
Hidrocarbur°feras I.

Moreover, changes in the credit profile of key counterparties in
the transaction could also have a rating impact.


DEUTSCHE BANK (ARGENTINA): Moody's Puts 'B1' Global LC Dep. Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. (MLA)
has confirmed national scale local currency deposit and corporate
family ratings of 18 Argentine banks and financial institutions
and repositioned the ratings of four of them. In addition, Moody's
has repositioned at a higher level the national scale foreign
currency deposit and issuer ratings of 25 banks and financial
institutions, including 18 whose local currency ratings were
confirmed or repositioned, and taken action on the national scale
senior unsecured and/or subordinate debt ratings of 14 financial
institutions. This concludes the reviews on these ratings that
were initiated on 21 April 2016. At the same time, Moody's has
publically assigned Deutsche Bank S.A. (Argentina) a B1 global
local currency deposit rating.

National Scale Ratings (NSRs), which provide a measure of relative
creditworthiness within a single country, are derived from global
scale ratings (GSRs) using country-specific maps. The adoption of
a revised correspondence between Moody's GSRs and the Argentine
national scale follows the publication of Moody's Investors
Service updated methodology "Mapping National Scale Ratings from
Global Scale Ratings"
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189032. For
more information, please see "Moody's publishes updated
methodology for national scale ratings"
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-publishes-updated-
methodology-for-national-scale-ratings--PR_348579 .

With nearly 100 rated fundamental issuers in Argentina, the new
map has been designed using the modified approach, whereby the map
design is adjusted to reflect the distribution of fundamental
ratings in the country in order to ensure adequate opportunity for
differentiation where ratings are most highly concentrated.
Structured finance ratings are not taken into consideration in the
determination of the map design. Because more than 10% of
fundamental issuers are rated above Argentina's B3 sovereign
rating, as well as the previous anchor point of B1, the anchor
point, or the lowest GSR that can map to a Aaa.ar, has been raised
to Ba3, the level of the local currency country ceiling. All GSRs
from B1 to Caa3 now map to three NSRs each. This provides adequate
opportunity for differentiation on the national scale among the
more than 50% of Argentine fundamental issuers rated B3 on the
global scale.

As a result of these changes, GSRs will generally correspond to
lower NSRs on the Argentine national scale than they did
previously. Consequently, the majority of Argentine NSRs that are
currently under review direction uncertain are being confirmed at
their current levels notwithstanding the recent upgrades of their
corresponding GSRs. However, a number of fundamental issuers'
primary local currency NSRs are being raised, while the NSRs of
those issuers whose GSRs were not upgraded following the recent
sovereign upgrade are in most cases being lowered, reflecting
their relatively weaker creditworthiness compared to the majority
of domestic peers, whose GSRs were raised. In total, slightly more
than 10% of Argentine fundamental issuers' primary NSRs are being
repositioned an average of 1.3 notches higher, while almost 20%
are being repositioned an average of 2.3 notches lower. Other NSRs
are also being raised or lowered for these and other issuers. The
repositioned NSRs of individual issuers do not signify a change in
credit risk, since the GSRs for these issuers remain unchanged.

As a result of the recalibration, the level of risk associated
with a particular Argentine NSR level (e.g. Baa2.ar) has changed
in many cases. NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss; they are ordinal rankings of
creditworthiness relative to other domestic issuers within a given
country. A historical probability of default and/or expected loss
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. However, both the
probability of default and the expected loss of an NSR may change
if and when a country's national scale is remapped.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

Please click on this link
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189810for
the list of affected credit ratings. This list is an integral part
of this press release and identifies each affected issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

POSITIONING OF NATIONAL SCALE RATINGS

NSRs are assigned by applying the published correspondence from
GSRs. Where a single GSR maps to multiple NSRs, rating committees
assigned higher or lower NSRs to individual issuers and debts
depending on their relative credit position within the same GSR
category, using the same methodologies as were used to determine
the GSRs themselves.

FIRST TIME GLOBAL SCALE RATINGS ASSIGNED TO DEUTSCHE BANK S.A.
(ARGENTINA)

"Deutsche Bank S.A. (Argentina)'s B1 global local currency deposit
rating captures the entity's role as the leading investment bank
in the country, offering corporate and global markets related
products and services. The deposit rating also reflects the
relatively strong financial fundamentals of the bank, particularly
its profitability and capital ratios, as well as our assessment of
the high probability that its parent, Deutsche Bank A.G. (baa3
BCA, under review for possible downgrade), would extend financial
support to its subsidiary in Argentina if it faces financial
stress, notwithstanding the parent's announced intention to exit
from Argentina. However, these credit strengths are offset by the
operating environment in Argentina, which remains challenging
despite the country's recent return to global capital markets and
various other market-friendly policy reforms implemented in recent
months by the new administration."

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS -- UP AND DOWN

The NSRs would face upward or downward pressure if their
corresponding GSRs are upgraded or downgraded, unless this is in
conjunction with a sovereign rating action that results in another
recalibration of the Argentine national scale with an offsetting
impact on NSRs. In addition, the NSRs may be repositioned upwards
(downwards) if Argentina's sovereign is downgraded (upgraded) and
the map is revised accordingly, but the corresponding GSRs have
not changed as a result of the sovereign action. Because of the
higher granularity of national scales, NSRs may also face pressure
due to changes in creditworthiness that are not sufficient to
cause a change in the corresponding GSR, measured using the same
methodologies used to determine the GSR.

Deutsche Bank (Argentina)'s GSR could face upward pressure if
Argentina's bond rating is upgraded and/or if Argentina's
operating environment continues to improve. On the other hand, the
rating could go down if the probability of affiliate support
declines further. However, the rating would not be affected by a
downgrade of the parent.

The principal methodology used in rating Banco Cetelem Argentina
S.A., Banco Comafi S.A., Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires S.A.,
Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Banco de la Provincia de
Cordoba S.A., Banco de Santiago del Estero S.A., Banco de
Servicios y Transacciones S.A., Banco de Valores S.A., Banco del
Chubut S.A., Banco Finansur S.A., Banco Hipotecario S.A., Banco
Itau Argentina S.A., Banco Macro S.A., Banco del Tucuman S.A.,
Banco Patagonia S.A., Banco Piano S.A., Banco Santander Rio S.A.,
Banco Supervielle S.A., Grupo Supervielle S.A., BNP Paribas
(Argentina), Deutsche Bank S.A. (Argentina), HSBC Bank Argentina
S.A., ICBC (Argentina) S.A., Nuevo Banco de La Rioja S.A., PSA
Finance Argentina Comp.Fin.S.A., and Toyota Compania Financiera de
Argentina S.A. was Banks published in January 2016.

The principal methodology used in rating John Deere Credit
Compania Financiera S.A., GPAT Compania Financiera S.A, and Rombo
Compania Financiera S.A. was Finance Companies published in
October 2015.

The principal methodology used in rating Mercado a Termino de
Buenos Aires S.A. was Global Securities Industry Methodology
published in May 2013. Please see the Ratings Methodologies page
on www.moodys.com.ar for a copy of these methodologies.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons, please
see
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
189530.


PROVINCE OF MENDOZA: Moody's Rates $500MM Sr. Notes Issue 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) has assigned a B3 debt rating
to the Senior Unsecured Notes to be issued by the Province of
Mendoza for up to $US500 million. The rating is in line with the
province's long term foreign currency issuer rating, which carry a
stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The bond issuance has been authorized by the Provincial Law N
8.838 and by Governor's Decree Nß344 of 2016. Moody's expects the
final authorization of these Notes by the National Secretary of
Finance after the pricing of the Notes planned by the end of this
week. The Province of Mendoza will use the proceeds to fund
infrastructure and/or social projects, to make payments on some of
its financial obligations during this year and to improve its debt
maturity profile. The assigned debt rating reflect Moody's view
that the willingness and capacity of the Province of Mendoza to
honor these Notes is in line with the provincial's long-term
credit quality as reflected in the B3 issuer rating in foreign
currency in Global Scale.

The rated bonds, which constitute direct, general, unconditional
and unsubordinated obligations of the province, will be
denominated and payable in US dollars with a maturity of eight
years. The bonds will amortize in three annual installments
equivalent the first two of them to 33.33% of the outstanding
principal at the sixth and seventh years; and equivalent to 33.34%
at the eighth year. They will pay fixed annual interest rate on a
semi-annual basis, and will be subject to the State of New York
Law.

After the issuance of these Notes and together with the current
fiscal deficit expected for the end of this fiscal year, Moody's
anticipates that the ratio of total debt to total revenues of the
Province of Mendoza will rise to 47% approximately from 39% at the
end of last fiscal year.

The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
nor anticipates changes in the main conditions that the Notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
these Notes deviate from the original ones submitted and reviewed
by the rating agency, Moody's will assess the impact that these
differences may have on the ratings and act accordingly.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns economic and
financial profiles and ratings, an upgrade of Argentina's
sovereign bonds ratings and/or the improvement of the country'
operating environment could lead to an upgrade of the Province of
Mendoza's ratings. Conversely, a downgrade in Argentina's bond
ratings and/or further systemic deterioration or idiosyncratic
risks arising in this Province --such as an additional
deterioration of its financial results or significantly higher
debt levels- could exert downward pressure on the ratings assigned
and could translate in to a downgrade in the near to medium term.


* Moody's Repositions NSRs of 40 Argentine Finance Transactions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (Moody's)
has repositioned the national scale ratings of 40 Argentine
structured transactions in conjunction with the recalibration of
the Argentine national rating scale. At the same time, Moody's has
taken selective rating actions on the global scale based on
updated performance data.

With nearly 100 rated fundamental issuers in Argentina, the new
map has been designed using the modified approach, whereby the map
design is adjusted to reflect the distribution of fundamental
ratings in the country in order to ensure adequate opportunity for
differentiation where ratings are most highly concentrated.
Because more than 10% of fundamental issuers are rated above
Argentina's B3 sovereign rating, as well as the previous anchor
point of B1, the anchor point, or the lowest global scale rating
that can map to a Aaa.ar, has been raised to Ba3, the level of the
local currency country ceiling. All GSRs from B1 to Caa3 now map
to three NSRs each. This provides adequate opportunity for
differentiation on the national scale among the more than 50% of
Argentine fundamental issuers rated B3 on the global scale.

As a result of these changes, GSRs will generally correspond to
lower NSRs on the Argentine national scale than they did
previously. Consequently, the majority of Argentine NSRs that are
currently under review direction uncertain are being confirmed at
their current levels notwithstanding the recent upgrades of their
corresponding GSRs. However, a number of fundamental issuers'
primary local currency NSRs are being raised, while the NSRs of
those issuers whose GSRs were not upgraded following the recent
sovereign upgrade are in most cases being lowered, reflecting
their relatively weaker creditworthiness compared to the majority
of domestic peers, whose GSRs were raised. In total, slightly more
than 10% of Argentine fundamental issuers' primary NSRs are being
repositioned an average of 1,3 notches higher, while 20% are being
repositioned 2,3 notches lower. Other NSRs may be raised or
lowered for some additional issuers. In addition, approximately
20% of the NSRs assigned to Argentine structured finance
transactions are being repositioned an average of 1.8 notches
lower. The repositioned national scale ratings of individual
issuers do not signify a change in credit risk, since the global
scale ratings (GSRs) for these issuers remain unchanged.

In addition, the level of risk associated with particular
Argentine NSRs has changed in many cases. NSRs have no inherent
absolute meaning in terms of default risk or expected loss; they
are ordinal rankings of creditworthiness relative to other
domestic issuers within a given country. A historical probability
of default and/or expected loss consistent with a given NSR can be
inferred from the GSR to which it maps back at that particular
point in time. However, both the probability of default and the
expected loss of an NSR may change if and when a country's
national scale is remapped.

Moody's also took selective rating actions on global scale for
some transactions based on updated performance data and cash flow
analysis. Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in
each transaction through the subordination levels over the current
pool of assets (less than 30 days of delinquency) and ran
simulations with original assumptions regarding prepayment and
losses rates, as well as specific factors related to the Argentine
market.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

Please click on this link
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF432227for
the List of Affected Credit Ratings. This list is an integral part
of this Press Release and identifies each affected issuer

RATING RATIONALE

Please click on this link
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF432227for
the List of Affected Credit Ratings.


* Moody's Repositions NSRs of 6 Argentine Firms
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
repositioned the national scale ratings (NSRs) of six Argentine
non-financial non-utilities companies in conjunction with the
recalibration of the Argentine national rating scale. The NSRs of
another nine companies have been confirmed. This concludes the
reviews on these ratings that were initiated on 21 April 2016.

NSRs, which provide a measure of relative creditworthiness within
a single country, are derived from global scale ratings (GSRs)
using country-specific maps. The adoption of a revised
correspondence between Moody's GSRs and the Argentine national
scale follows the publication of Moody's Investors Service updated
methodology "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings"
[https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC
_189032]. For more information, please see "Moody's publishes
updated methodology for national scale ratings"
(https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-publishes-updated-
methodology-for-national-scale-ratings--PR_348579 ).

With nearly 100 rated fundamental issuers in Argentina, the new
map has been designed using the modified approach, whereby the map
design is adjusted to reflect the distribution of fundamental
ratings in the country in order to ensure adequate opportunity for
differentiation where ratings are most highly concentrated.
Structured finance ratings are not taken into consideration in the
determination of the map design. Because more than 10% of
fundamental issuers are rated above Argentina's B3 sovereign
rating, as well as the previous anchor point of B1, the anchor
point, or the lowest GSR that can map to a Aaa.ar, has been raised
to Ba3, the level of the local currency country ceiling. All GSRs
from B1 to Caa3 now map to three NSRs each. This provides adequate
opportunity for differentiation on the national scale among the
more than 50% of Argentine fundamental issuers rated B3 on the
global scale.

As a result of these changes, GSRs will generally correspond to
lower NSRs on the Argentine national scale than they did
previously. Consequently, the large majority of Argentine NSRs
that are currently under review direction uncertain are being
confirmed at their current levels notwithstanding the recent
upgrades of their corresponding GSRs. However, a number of
fundamental issuers' primary local currency NSRs are being raised,
while the NSRs of those issuers whose GSRs were not upgraded
following the recent sovereign upgrade are in most cases being
lowered, reflecting their relatively weaker creditworthiness
compared to the majority of domestic peers, whose GSRs were
raised. In total, slightly more than 10% of Argentine fundamental
issuers' primary NSRs are being repositioned an average of 1.3
notches higher, while almost 20% are being repositioned an average
of 2.3 notches lower. Other NSRs are also being raised or lowered
for these and other issuers. The repositioned NSRs of individual
issuers do not signify a change in credit risk, since the GSRs for
these issuers remain unchanged.

As a result of the recalibration, the level of risk associated
with a particular Argentine NSR level (e.g. Baa2.ar) has changed
in many cases. NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss; they are ordinal rankings of
creditworthiness relative to other domestic issuers within a given
country. A historical probability of default and/or expected loss
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. However, both the
probability of default and the expected loss of an NSR may change
if and when a country's national scale is remapped.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

Please click on this link
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189784for
the List of Affected Credit Ratings. This list is an integral part
of this Press Release and identifies each affected issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

NSRs are assigned by applying the published correspondence from
GSRs. Where a single GSR maps to multiple NSRs, rating committees
assigned higher or lower NSRs to individual issuers and debts
depending on their relative credit position within the same GSR
category, using the same methodologies as were used to determine
the GSRs themselves.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS -- UP AND DOWN

The NSRs would face upward or downward pressure if their
corresponding GSRs are upgraded or downgraded, unless this is in
conjunction with a sovereign rating action that results in another
recalibration of the Argentine national scale with an offsetting
impact on NSRs. In addition, the NSRs may be repositioned upwards
(downwards) pressure if Argentina's sovereign is downgraded
(upgraded) and the map is revised accordingly, but the
corresponding GSRs have not changed as a result of the sovereign
action. Because of the higher granularity of national scales, NSRs
may also face pressure due to changes in creditworthiness that are
not sufficient to cause a change in the corresponding GSR,
measured using the same methodologies used to determine the GSR.


=============
B O L I V I A
=============


* Moody's Repositions YPFB Transierra S.A.'s National Scale Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. has
repositioned the national scale ratings (NSRs) of Bolivian issuers
in conjunction with the recalibration of the Bolivian national
rating scale. As a result, national scale ratings for YPFB
Transierra S.A. have been repositioned to Aa2.bo from Aa1.bo. The
rating outlook is stable.

NSRs, which provide a measure of relative creditworthiness within
a single country, are derived from global scale ratings (GSRs)
using country-specific maps. The adoption of a revised
correspondence between Moody's GSRs and the Bolivian national
scale follows the publication of Moody's updated methodology
"Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale Ratings"
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189032. For
more information, please see "Moody's publishes updated
methodology for national scale ratings"
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-publishes-updated-
methodology-for-national-scale-ratings--PR_348579 .

With approximately 40 rated fundamental issuers in Bolivia, the
new map has been designed using the standard approach, whereby the
map design is selected from a set of standard maps based upon the
anchor point, or the lowest GSR that can map to a Aaa.bo. Per the
standard approach, Bolivia's anchor point is unchanged at Ba3,
which is equal to the sovereign bond rating. However, the rest of
the map design has been significantly altered. The revised map
provides significantly more opportunities for credit
differentiation on the national scale where GSRs concentration is
highest -- specifically at the anchor point as well as at the B1
and B2 GSR levels -- than the previous map did. As a result of
these changes, GSRs will generally correspond to lower NSRs on the
Bolivian national scale than they did previously, in some cases
considerably so.

Consequently, slightly more than half of Bolivian issuers' primary
long-term NSRs are being repositioned an average of 3 notches
lower. Certain short-term and other NSRs may be affected for these
and other issuers as well. While many ratings will decline by just
one or two notches, some ratings will be lowered by as many as 6
or 7 notches. The repositioned NSRs of individual issuers do not
signify a change in credit risk, since the GSRs for these issuers
remain unchanged.

As a result of the recalibration, the level of risk associated
with a particular Bolivian NSR level (e.g. Baa2.bo) has changed in
many cases. NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss; they are ordinal rankings of
creditworthiness relative to other domestic issuers within a given
country. A historical probability of default and/or expected loss
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. However, both the
probability of default and the expected loss of an NSR may change
if and when a country's national scale is remapped.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

Issuer: YPFB Transierra S.A.

Corporate Family Rating, Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture
2020 and Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture 2024: National
scale ratings repositioned to Aa2.bo from Aa1.bo. Stable Outlook


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO BTG: Moody's Reposition NSR, and that of 27 Other Banks
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has repositioned the national scale
ratings (NSRs) of 28 Brazilian banks and other financial
institutions issuers in conjunction with the recalibration of the
Brazilian national rating scale.

National scale ratings (NSRs), which provide a measure of relative
creditworthiness within a single country, are derived from global
scale ratings (GSRs) using country-specific maps. The adoption of
a revised correspondence between Moody's global scale ratings and
the Brazilian national scale follows the publication of Moody's
updated methodology "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global
Scale Ratings"
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189032. For
more information, please see "Moody's publishes updated
methodology for national scale ratings"
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-publishes-updated-
methodology-for-national-scale-ratings--PR_348579 .

With approximately 170 rated fundamental issuers in Brazil, the
new map has been designed using the modified approach, whereby the
map design is adjusted to reflect the distribution of fundamental
ratings in the country in order to ensure adequate opportunity for
differentiation where ratings are most highly concentrated.
Structured finance ratings are not taken into consideration in the
determination of the map design. Because fewer than 5% of
fundamental issuers are rated at or above the previous anchor
point, or the lowest global scale rating that can map to a Aaa.br,
the anchor point has been lowered to Ba1 from Baa3 under the new
map. As nearly 15% of fundamental issuers are rated above Brazil's
sovereign bond rating of Ba2, however, the anchor point remains a
notch higher than the sovereign. Because nearly 40% of fundamental
issuers are rated Ba2 on the global scale, Ba2 corresponds to
three ratings on the national scale, Aa1.br, Aa2.br, and Aa3.br,
to allow for adequate opportunity for credit differentiation
amongst these issuers. The global scale rating of Ba3, which is
assigned to another 20% of fundamental issuers, also corresponds
to three national scale ratings. In addition, in order to clarify
the meaning of NSRs, overlap -- where two GSRs can correspond to
the same NSR -- has been eliminated from the Brazilian national
scale map, so every NSR maps back to just one GSR. As a result of
these changes, GSRs of B1 and above will in some cases correspond
to higher NSRs on the Brazilian national scale than they did
previously, GSRs of B2 and below may correspond to lower NSRs.

Consequently, approximately 35% of Brazilian fundamental issuer's
primary long-term national ratings are being repositioned upwards,
and roughly 20% are being repositioned lower. Certain short-term
and other NSRs may be affected for these and other issuers as
well. In addition, approximately one-third of the NSR assigned to
Brazilian structured finance transactions are being repositioned
higher, while roughly 15% are being repositioned lower. The
average change is just over one notch. The repositioned national
scale ratings of individual issuers do not signify a change in
credit risk, since the global scale ratings (GSRs) for these
issuers remain unchanged.

As a result of the recalibration, the level of risk associated
with a particular Brazilian national scale rating level (e.g.
Aa2.br) has changed in many cases. NSRs have no inherent absolute
meaning in terms of default risk or expected loss; they are
ordinal rankings of creditworthiness relative to other domestic
issuers within a given country. A historical probability of
default and/or expected loss consistent with a given NSR can be
inferred from the GSR to which it maps back at that particular
point in time. However, both the probability of default and the
expected loss of an NSR may change if and when a country's
national scale is remapped.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

Please click on this link
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189783for
the list of affected credit ratings. This list is an integral part
of this press release and identifies each affected issuer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

National scale ratings are assigned by applying the published
correspondence from global scale ratings. Where a single global
scale rating maps to multiple national scale ratings, rating
committees assigned higher or lower national scale ratings to
individual issuers and debts depending on their relative credit
position within the same global scale rating category, using the
same methodologies as were used to determine the GSRs themselves.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS -- UP AND DOWN

The NSRs would face upward or downward pressure if their
corresponding GSRs are upgraded or downgraded, unless this is in
conjunction with a sovereign rating action that results in another
recalibration of the Brazilian national scale with an offsetting
impact on NSRs. In addition, the NSRs may be repositioned upwards
(downwards) if Brazil's sovereign is downgraded (upgraded) and the
map is revised accordingly, but the corresponding GSRs have not
changed as a result of the sovereign action. Because of the higher
granularity of national scales, NSRs may also face pressure due to
changes in creditworthiness that are not sufficient to cause a
change in the corresponding GSR, measured using the same
methodologies used to determine the GSR.

The principal methodology used in rating Banco Alfa de
Investimento S.A., Banco Bradesco S.A., Banco BTG Pactual S.A.,
Banco Cetelem S.A., Banco do Brasil S.A, Banco do Estado de
Sergipe S.A., Banco do Estado do Para S.A., Banco do Estado do Rio
Grande do Sul S.A., Banco Fibra S.A., Banco Ford S.A., Banco GMAC
S.A., Banco Industrial do Brasil S.A., Banco Mercantil do Brasil
S.A., Banco Pan S.A., Banco Paulista S.A., Banco Pine S.A., Banco
PSA Finance Brasil S.A., Banco Safra S.A., Banco Santander
(Brasil) S.A., Banco RCI Brasil S.A., Banco Votorantim S.A., BRB-
Banco de Brasilia S.A., Caixa Economica Federal (CAIXA), China
Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A., HSBC Bank Brasil S.A. - Banco
Multiplo, Itau Unibanco Holding S.A. and Itau Unibanco S.A. was
Banks published in January 2016.

The principal methodology used in rating Banco Nac. Desenv.
Economico e Social -- BNDES was Government-Related Issuers
published in October 2014. Please see the Ratings Methodologies
page on www.moodys.com.br for a copy of these methodologies.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons, please
see
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
189530.


LAST RATING ACTIONS

The last rating action on Banco Alfa de Investimento S.A. (Alfa)
was on 25 February 2016, when Moody's downgraded the bank's
baseline credit assessment to ba2, from baa3, as well as the long
and short-term local currency deposit ratings to Ba2/Not Prime,
from Baa3/Prime-3, following the downgrade of Brazil's government
bond rating to Ba2, from Baa3. Alfa's foreign currency deposit
rating was downgraded to Ba3, following the downgrade of Brazil's
foreign currency deposit ceiling to Ba3, from Baa3. The bank's
Brazilian national scale deposit rating was downgraded to Aa2.br,
from Aa1.br. The counterparty risk assessments assigned to Alfa
were also downgraded to Ba1(cr)/NP(cr). The outlook of the bank's
global scale ratings was changed to negative in line with the
negative outlook on the sovereign bond rating.

The last rating action on Banco Bradesco S.A. was on 25 February
2016, when Moody's downgraded the bank's baseline credit
assessment to ba2, from baa3, as well as the long and short-term
local currency deposit ratings to Ba2/Not Prime, from Baa3/Prime-
3, and the foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2
from Baa3, following the downgrade of Brazil's government bond
rating to Ba2, from Baa3. Bradesco's foreign currency deposit
rating was downgraded to Ba3, following the downgrade of Brazil's
foreign currency deposit ceiling to Ba3, from Baa3. The bank's
Brazilian national scale deposit rating was downgraded to Aa2.br,
from Aaa.br. The counterparty risk assessments assigned to
Bradesco were also downgraded to Ba1(cr)/NP(cr). The outlook of
the bank's global scale ratings was changed to negative in line
with the negative outlook on the sovereign bond rating.

The last rating action on Banco BTG Pactual S.A. was on 11 March
2016 when Moody's downgraded its baseline credit assessment (BCA)
to ba3 from ba2, and its ratings, including the long-term global
local-currency deposit rating to Ba3 from Ba2; the senior
unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating to (P)Ba3
from(P)Ba2; and the long-term Brazilian national scale deposit
rating to A2.br. The foreign currency deposit rating of Ba3 as
well as the short-term deposit and debt ratings of Not Prime
remained unchanged. The counterparty risk assessment for long-term
assigned to BTG Pactual was also downgraded to Ba2(cr), and short-
term remained unchanged at NP(cr). The outlook on the rating was
changed to negative.

The last rating action on Banco Cetelem S.A. was on 25 February
2016, when Moody's downgraded the bank's foreign currency deposit
rating was downgraded to Ba3, following the downgrade of Brazil's
foreign currency deposit ceiling to Ba3, from Baa3. All other
ratings were affirmed. The outlook of this rating was change to
negative in line with the negative outlook on the sovereign bond
rating. All other ratings remained unchanged with stable outlook.

The last rating action on Banco do Brasil S.A. (BB) was on 25
February 2016, when Moody's downgraded the bank's baseline credit
assessment to ba2, from ba1, as well as the long and short-term
local currency deposit ratings to Ba2/Not Prime, from Baa3/Prime-
3, and the foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating assigned
to the program to (P)Ba2 from (P)Baa3, following the downgrade of
Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2, from Baa3. BB's foreign
currency deposit rating was downgraded to Ba3, following the
downgrade of Brazil's foreign currency deposit ceiling to Ba3,
from Baa3. The bank's Brazilian national scale deposit rating was
downgraded to Aa2.br, from Aaa.br. The counterparty risk
assessments assigned to BB were also downgraded to Ba1(cr)/NP(cr).
The outlook of the bank's global scale ratings was changed to
negative in line with the negative outlook on the sovereign bond
rating.

The last rating action on Banco do Estado de Sergipe S.A. (Banese)
was on 25 February 2016, when Moody's downgraded the bank's
foreign currency deposit rating was downgraded to Ba3, following
the downgrade of Brazil's foreign currency deposit ceiling to Ba3,
from Baa3. All other ratings remained unchanged. The outlook of
the bank's global scale rating was changed to negative in line
with the negative outlook on the sovereign bond rating.

The last rating action on Banco do Estado do Para S.A. (Banpara)
was on 25 February 2016, when Moody's changed the outlook on the
bank's foreign currency deposit rating of Ba3 to negative, from
stable, in line with the negative outlook on the sovereign bond
rating.

The last rating action on Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul
S.A. (Banrisul) was on 25 February 2016, when Moody's downgraded
the bank's baseline credit assessment to ba2, from ba1, as well as
the long-term local currency deposit ratings to Ba2, from Ba1, and
the foreign currency subordinated debt rating to Ba3, following
the downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2, from
Baa3. Banrisul's foreign currency deposit rating was downgraded to
Ba3, following the downgrade of Brazil's foreign currency deposit
ceiling to Ba3, from Baa3. The bank's long-term Brazilian national
scale deposit rating was downgraded to Aa2.br, from Aaa.br. The
long-term counterparty risk assessment assigned to Banrisul was
also downgraded to Ba1(cr). All other short-term ratings remained
unchanged. The outlook of the bank's global scale ratings remained
negative.

The last rating action on Banco Fibra S.A. (Fibra) was on 21
September 2015 when Moody's downgraded Fibra's BCA to b3 from b1;
long-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to B3
from B1; the senior unsecured medium term note (MTN) program
(foreign currency) rating to (P)B3 from (P)B1; the long-term
foreign-currency subordinated debt rating to Caa1 from B2; the
long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to B1.br from
Baa2.br; and the short-term Brazilian national scale deposit
rating to BR-4 from BR-2. The outlook for its ratings remained
negative.

The last rating action on Banco Ford S.A. was on 25 February 2016,
when Moody's downgraded the bank's foreign currency deposit rating
was downgraded to Ba3, following the downgrade of Brazil's foreign
currency deposit ceiling to Ba3, from Baa3. The outlook of this
rating was changed to negative in line with the negative outlook
on the sovereign bond rating. All other ratings were affirmed with
stable outlook.

The last rating action on Banco GMAC S.A. was on 25 February 2016,
when Moody's affirmed all credit assessments and ratings assigned
to the bank, including its BCA of ba3, and local currency deposits
of Ba2/Not Prime, for long and short-term respectively. At the
same time, Moody's downgraded the bank's long-term foreign
currency deposit rating to Ba3, following the downgrade of
Brazil's foreign currency deposit ceiling to Ba3, from Baa3. The
outlook of this rating was changed to negative in line with the
negative outlook on the sovereign bond rating. All other ratings
were affirmed with stable outlook.

The last rating action on Banco Industrial do Brasil S.A. (BIB)
was on 25 February 2016, when Moody's changed the outlook on the
bank's local currency deposit rating of Ba2, and downgraded its
long-term foreign currency deposit rating to Ba3, following the
downgrade of Brazil's foreign currency deposit ceiling to Ba3,
from Baa3. The outlook of these ratings was changed to negative in
line with the negative outlook on the sovereign bond rating. All
other ratings remained unchanged.

The last rating action on Banco Nac. Desenv. Economico e Social -
BNDES was on 25 February 2016, Moody's downgraded to Ba2 and Not
Prime from Baa3 and Prime-3, long and short-term, respectively,
the global local currency issuer ratings assigned to BNDES. At the
same time, BNDES's foreign currency deposit ratings were
downgraded to Ba3 and Not-Prime from Baa3 and Prime-3, long-term
senior unsecured bond rating to Ba2 from Baa3, and Brazilian
national scale deposit rating to Aa2.br from Aaa.br. Moody's also
downgraded BNDES's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ba2 from
ba1. The rating action followed the downgrade of Brazil's bond
rating to Ba2, with a negative outlook, announced 24 February
2016. The outlook on the ratings was changed to negative, in line
with the negative outlook of the sovereign bond rating.

The last rating action on Banco Mercanitl do Brasil S.A. (BMB) was
on 5 February 2016, when Moody's downgraded its long-term local-
and foreign-currency deposit ratings to B3 from B2; as well as its
long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to B1.br from
Ba2.br, the long-term foreign currency senior unsecured medium
term note program to (P)B3 from (P)B2, and the long-term foreign
currency subordinated debt rating to Caa1 from B3. At the same
time, Moody's downgraded BMB's baseline credit assessment (BCA)
and adjusted BCA to b3 from b2, and its long-term Counterparty
Risk Assessment (CRA) to B2(cr) from B1(cr). The short-term
ratings and assessment were affirmed and the outlook on the
ratings remained negative.

The last rating action on Banco Pan S.A. was on 10 December 2015,
when Moody's downgraded Pan's long-term global local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings to B1 from Ba2; the senior unsecured MTN
program (foreign currency) rating to (P)B1 from(P)Ba2; the foreign
currency subordinate debt rating to B2 from Ba3; the long-term
Brazilian national scale deposit rating to Baa2.br from A1.br; and
the short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to BR-2
from BR-1. At the same time, Pan's BCA was lowered to b2 from b1.
The short-term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings
of Not Prime were affirmed. The outlook on all ratings remained
stable.

The last rating action on Banco Paulista S.A. was on 24 October
2013, when Moody's downgraded the bank's BCA to b2, as well as the
long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings to B2, from
B1, and the long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to
Baa3.br, from Baa2.br. The outlook on all ratings remained stable.

The last rating action on Banco Pine S.A. was on 25 February 2016,
Moody's downgraded Pine's long-term local and foreign currency
deposit ratings to B1 from Ba3 and the BCA to b1 from ba3. At the
same time, Pine's long-term Brazilian national scale rating was
also downgraded to Baa1.br , as well as the foreign currency
subordinated debt rating to B2 and the long-term counterparty risk
assessment to Ba3(cr). This rating action followed the downgrade
of Brazil's bond rating to Ba2, with negative outlook, on 24
February 2016, and the resulting change of Brazil's macro profile
to Moderate from Moderate+, on 25 February 2016. The short-term
ratings remained unchanged. The outlook changed to stable.

The last rating action on Banco PSA Finance Brasil S.A. was on 25
February 2016, Moody's downgraded the foreign currency deposit
rating assigned to Banco PSA to Ba3, from Ba2, and changed to
negative the outlook on the rating. This rating action followed
the downgrade of Brazil's bond rating to Ba2, with negative
outlook, on 24 February 2016. All other ratings and assessments
were affirmed. The local currency deposit rating has a positive
outlook by the effect of the outlook at the parent's rating.

The last rating action on Banco Safra S.A. (Safra) was on 25
February 2016, Moody's downgraded all ratings assigned to Safra,
including the baseline credit assessment to ba2 from baa3, the
long and short-term local currency deposit ratings to Ba2/Not
Prime, from Baa3/Prime-3, as well as the Brazilian long-term
national scale deposit rating to Aa2.br. The short-term national
scale deposit rating remained at BR-1. The foreign currency
deposit ratings were also downgraded to Ba3 and Not Prime, for
long and short-term respectively. This rating action followed the
downgrade on Brazil's bond rating to Ba2, from Baa3, which was
placed on negative outlook.

The last rating action on Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A. was on 25
February 2016, Moody's downgraded the bank's baseline credit
assessments (BCAs) and bank deposit and debt ratings that were
either constrained by Brazil's sovereign bond rating or were
capped by the country ceilings. This rating action followed the
downgrade of Brazil's bond rating and the changes in the country
ceilings on 24 February 2016.

The last rating action on Banco Votorantim S.A. (BV) was on 25
February 2016, Moody's downgraded BV's baseline credit assessment
(BCA) to ba3 from ba2, and also the local currency deposit and
senior debt ratings to Ba2 from Ba1.The foreign currency deposit
ratings was downgraded to Ba3, from Ba1, in line with the
downgrade of the ceiling for foreign currency deposits. The
outlook on the ratings is negative.

The last rating action on BRB - Banco Regional de Brasilia S.A.
(BRB) was on 25 February 2016 Moody's downgraded BRB's baseline
credit assessment (BCA) to b1 and its global scale long-term local
and foreign currency deposit ratings to B1 from Ba3.The short-term
ratings remained unchanged. The outlook on the ratings is stable.

The last rating action on Caixa Economica Federal (Caixa) was on
25 February 2016, Moody's downgraded all supported ratings
assigned to Caixa following the downgrade of Brazil's bond rating
to Ba2/Negative. The long and short-term local currency deposit
ratings were downgraded to Ba2/Not Prime, from Baa3/Prime-3, and
the long-term senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2, from Baa3. The
foreign currency deposit rating was downgraded to Ba3/Not Prime,
long and short-term, respectively, to the foreign currency deposit
ceiling of Ba3. The Brazilian long-term national scale deposit
rating was also downgraded to Aa2.br, from Aaa.br, while the
short-term were confirmed at BR-1. The ratings were placed on
negative outlook in line with the outlook on the sovereign bond
rating. At the same time, Caixa's baseline credit assessment of
ba3 remained unchanged, as well as the rating assigned to its Tier
2 Basel III notes.

The last rating action on China Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A.
(CCB Brasil) was on 25 February 2016, Moody's downgraded CCB
Brasil's foreign currency bank deposit and senior debt ratings
that were capped by the country ceiling. This rating action
followed the downgrade of Brazil's bond rating and the changes in
the country ceilings on 24 February 2016. All other ratings
remained unchanged and have a negative outlook.

The last rating action on Banco RCI Brasil S.A. (RCI Brasil) was
on March 31, 2016, when Moody's assigned ratings to the new bank-
entity created following the conversion of the group's leasing
company Companhia de Arrendamento Mercantil RCI Brasil S.A into
Banco RCI Brazil which incorporated the assets and liabilities of
the finance company Companhia de Credito, Financ. e Investimento
RCI Brasil S.A --  Moody's assigned long and short-term global
local currency deposit ratings of Ba1 and Not-Prime, respectively,
to Banco RCI, long and short-term foreign currency deposit ratings
of Ba3 and Not-Prime, as well as long- and short-term Brazilian
national scale deposit ratings of Aa1.br and BR-1. Moody's also
assigned a standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba3, an
adjusted BCA of ba1, to the bank, and counterparty risk
assessments of Baa3(cr) and Prime-3(cr), long and short-term
respectively. The outlook on the ratings is stable, expect on the
long-term foreign currency deposit Ba3, which has a negative
outlook.

The last rating action on HSBC Bank Brasil S.A. - Banco Multiplo's
(HSBC Brasil) was on 25 February 2016, Moody's downgraded HSBC
Brazil's deposit and debt ratings, as well as its baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to ba2, from baa3. The downgrade of HSBC Brazil's
ratings followed the downgrade of Brazil's bond rating to Ba2,
from Baa3, announced 24 February 2016. HSBC Brazil's ratings are
constrained by the sovereign rating and/or are capped by the
country's ceilings which moved in tandem with the sovereign
rating. Moody's maintained the review for downgrade on all
ratings.

The last rating action on Itau Unibanco S.A. (IU) was on 25
February 2016, Moody's downgraded all ratings and assessments
assigned to IU, including the BCA to ba2, the local currency
deposit rating to Ba2/Not Prime and the foreign currency deposit
rating to Ba3/Not Prime, for long and short-term respectively.
This rating action followed the downgrade of Brazil's bond rating
to Ba2, from Baa3 and the downgrade of the country's foreign
currency deposit ceiling to Ba3, from Baa3. All ratings have
negative outlook in line with the negative outlook of Brazil's
bond rating.

The last rating action on Itau Unibanco Holding S.A. (IUH) was on
25 February 2016, Moody's downgraded all ratings assigned to IUH,
including the local currency issuer rating to Ba3/Not Prime, long
and short-term respectively, which remained one notch below the
deposit rating of its main operating bank IU. The holding
company's senior unsecured and subordinated program ratings were
also downgraded to (P)Ba3. This rating action followed the
downgrade of Brazil's bond rating to Ba2, from Baa3. All ratings
have negative outlook in line with the negative outlook of
Brazil's bond rating.


BRAZIL: Recession Puts Focus on Smaller Banks-Deposit Fund Head
---------------------------------------------------------------
Aluisio Alves at Reuters reports that smaller corporate lenders
are better positioned to weather Brazil's worst recession in
decades, but need to be monitored closely as clients grapple with
soaring defaults and bankruptcy filings, the head of the nation's
deposit guarantee fund said.

Banks in the so-called middle-market segment have tightened loan
disbursement standards and scaled down the use of borrowed money
to boost lending, although they are struggling to predict
defaults, which recently hit a six-year high, according to
Reuters.

"Differently from prior crises, small- and mid-sized banks were
not caught by surprise, they are less leveraged," Andre Loes,
president of Sao Paulo-based FGC, told Reuters in an interview
earlier, the report notes.

Mr. Loes added that both the central bank, which oversees the
banking industry, and FGC, which has BRL48 billion ($13.9 billion)
in assets through compulsory contributions from banks, are better
equipped now to deal with problems, the report notes.

But rising defaults among small factories and retailers have yet
to "ring warning bells," said Mr. Loes, a former chief Brazil
economist for HSBC Holdings Plc and Banco Santander Brasil SA, the
report relays.

Brazil's central bank said in a recent report that banks,
especially those that lack access to fundraising and a stable
stream of fee-based revenues, were struggling to gain visibility
on default trends in Latin America's largest economy, the report
says.

FGC, which helped rescue more than two dozen banks during the
2007-2009 global financial crisis, has sped up changes to its
governance rules in the past three years in a bid to broaden its
role from solely that of a guarantor for deposits in failed banks,
the report discloses.

The FGC's new responsibilities include taking a more pro-active
role in trying to avert bank failures by providing cash-strapped
lenders quick financing, the report adds.


CENTRAIS ELETRICAS: Admits to Possible New York Delisting
---------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A.
(Eletrobras) could see its American Depository Receipts delisted
as a result of delayed regulatory filings, the latest consequence
of a vast corruption investigation rattling the South American
country.

Eletrobras said delivery of its 20-F form, required of foreign
issuers listed in the United States, had been delayed by an
internal investigation that is analyzing potential financial
losses from a graft scheme involving local construction firms,
according to Reuters.

Eletrobras, known formally as Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras SA,
said it was in contact with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission and the New York Stock Exchange over the forms for 2014
and 2015 to try to avoid a delisting, Reuters notes.

The company had planned to turn in the forms by May 18, after
exhausting extensions, the report relays.  Brazil's official
gazette reported last week that Eletrobras executives were in New
York meeting with members of the SEC and the New York Stock
Exchange, the report notes.

The internal investigation led by law firms Hogan Lovells and
WFaria Advogados is not "sufficiently complete" to allow the
company to determine financial impacts, the Eletrobras filing
said, the report discloses.  It has been delayed by problems
investigating massive hydroelectric dams in which Eletrobras has a
minority stake, the report relays.

Brazilian federal prosecutors say construction firms that bribed
politicians and executives at state-run oil firm Petroleo
Brasileiro SA in return for bloated contracts likely repeated the
scheme at Eletrobras, the report says.

Brazilian prosecutors charged Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, the
former chief executive of Eletrobras subsidiary Eletronuclear,
with corruption and money laundering, the report relays.  Mr.
Pinheiro da Silva is accused of taking BRL4.5 million ($1.3
million) in bribes related to the Angra 3 plant near Rio de
Janeiro, the report notes.

The investigation has jailed dozens of engineering executives and
fueled the campaign to impeach President Dilma Rousseff, the
report relays.  President Rousseff is expected to be suspended
after a Senate vote later for allegedly manipulating public
accounts.  She denies any wrongdoing.

Challenges facing the internal investigation at Eletrobras stem
from limitations in Brazil's corporate laws as well as limited
access to plea bargain testimony from the federal corruption
probe, the company said, the report notes.

The law firms started investigating possible bribery at three
Amazonian dam projects worth billions of dollars and a nuclear
power plant, the report relays.  They later expanded to nine
projects, sources have told Reuters.


HYPERMARCAS SA: Moody's Repositions NSRs to Ba2/Aa2.br
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has, in conjunction with the
recalibration of the Brazilian NSRs, repositioned the national
scale ratings of Hypermarcas S.A. to Ba2/Aa2.br from Ba2/A1.br.
Currently, the company has no rated debt outstanding that requires
a National Scale Rating (NSR), therefore these ratings will be
withdrawn.  Hypermarcas' Ba2 Global Scale Ratings (GSRs) and
negative outlook are unaffected.

National scale ratings (NSRs), which provide a measure of relative
creditworthiness within a single country, are derived from global
scale ratings (GSRs) using country-specific maps.  The adoption of
a revised correspondence between Moody's global scale ratings and
the Brazilian national scale follows the publication of Moody's
updated methodology "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global
Scale Ratings"

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_189032

With approximately 170 rated fundamental issuers in Brazil, the
new map has been designed using the modified approach, whereby the
map design is adjusted to reflect the distribution of fundamental
ratings in the country in order to ensure adequate opportunity for
differentiation where ratings are most highly concentrated.
Structured finance ratings are not taken into consideration in the
determination of the map design.  Because fewer than 5% of
fundamental issuers are rated at or above the previous anchor
point, or the lowest global scale rating that can map to a Aaa.br,
the anchor point has been lowered to Ba1 from Baa3 under the new
map.  As nearly 15% of fundamental issuers are rated above
Brazil's sovereign bond rating of Ba2, however, the anchor point
remains a notch higher than the sovereign.  Because nearly 40% of
fundamental issuers are rated Ba2 on the global scale, Ba2
corresponds to three ratings on the national scale, Aa1.br,
Aa2.br, and Aa3.br, to allow for adequate opportunity for credit
differentiation amongst these issuers.  The global scale rating of
Ba3, which is assigned to another 20% of fundamental issuers, also
corresponds to three national scale ratings.  In addition, in
order to clarify the meaning of NSRs, overlap -- where two GSRs
can correspond to the same NSR -- has been eliminated from the
Brazilian national scale map, so every NSR maps back to just one
GSR.  As a result of these changes, GSRs of B1 and above will in
some cases correspond to higher NSRs on the Brazilian national
scale than they did previously, GSRs of B2 and below may
correspond to lower NSRs.

Consequently, approximately 35% of Brazilian fundamental issuer's
primary long-term national ratings are being repositioned upwards,
and roughly 20% are being repositioned lower.  Certain short-term
and other NSRs may be affected for these and other issuers as
well.  In addition, approximately one-third of the NSR assigned to
Brazilian structured finance transactions are being repositioned
higher, while roughly 15% are being repositioned lower.  The
average change is just over one notch.  The repositioned national
scale ratings of individual issuers do not signify a change in
credit risk, since the global scale ratings (GSRs) for these
issuers remain unchanged.

As a result of the recalibration, the level of risk associated
with a particular Brazilian national scale rating level (e.g.
Aa2.br) has changed in many cases.  NSRs have no inherent absolute
meaning in terms of default risk or expected loss; they are
ordinal rankings of creditworthiness relative to other domestic
issuers within a given country.  A historical probability of
default and/or expected loss consistent with a given NSR can be
inferred from the GSR to which it maps back at that particular
point in time.  However, both the probability of default and the
expected loss of an NSR may change if and when a country's
national scale is remapped.

RATINGS RATIONALE

National scale ratings are assigned by applying the published
correspondence from global scale ratings.  Where a single global
scale rating maps to multiple national scale ratings, rating
committees assigned higher or lower national scale ratings to
individual issuers and debts depending on their relative credit
position within the same global scale rating category, using the
same methodologies as were used to determine the GSRs themselves.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS -- UP AND DOWN

The NSRs would face upward or downward pressure if their
corresponding GSRs are upgraded or downgraded, unless this is in
conjunction with a sovereign rating action that results in another
recalibration of the Brazilian national scale with an offsetting
impact on NSRs.  In addition, the NSRs may be repositioned upwards
(downwards) if Brazil's sovereign is downgraded (upgraded) and the
map is revised accordingly, but the corresponding GSRs have not
changed as a result of the sovereign action.  Because of the
higher granularity of national scales, NSRs may also face pressure
due to changes in creditworthiness that are not sufficient to
cause a change in the corresponding GSR, measured using the same
methodologies used to determine the GSR.


LOCALIZA RENT: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' global scale and 'brAA+'
national scale corporate credit ratings on Localiza Rent-a-Car
S.A.  S&P also affirmed its 'brAA+' issue-level ratings on
Localiza's senior unsecured debentures and removed ratings from
CreditWatch with developing implications, where S&P placed them on
Feb. 17, 2016.  The outlook on the corporate ratings remains
negative.

S&P has assigned a '3' recovery rating on Localiza's senior
unsecured debts because S&P expects a meaningful recovery (70%-
90%; in the higher end of the range).

The ratings affirmation reflects Localiza's solid operating
performance and fairly stable credit metrics despite Brazil's
recession.  The company's market leadership, large scale, and
nationwide footprint in the Brazilian market will continue to
support Localiza's competitive advantages such as bargaining power
with automakers, while its low debt should support stable credit
metrics and favorable access to debt refinancing.  Nonetheless,
S&P continues to limit Localiza's ratings to one notch above that
of Brazil (foreign and local currency: BB/Negative/B; national
scale: brAA-/Negative/--), given S&P's view of the business' tight
correlation with economic activity, consumer purchasing power,
inflation, and credit availability.

Localiza's financial metrics are likely to remain fairly stable in
2016 because the higher interest expenses--reflecting the
country's higher average base interest rates--will mostly be
offset by the likely positive free cash generation, given the
slower expansion rate of its fleet, and higher average used-car
prices.

S&P continues to view Localiza's liquidity as sufficient to deal
with short-term obligations.  Also, S&P expects Localiza to reduce
the pace of its fleet expansion in 2016 amid weak economic
forecasts, likely resulting in positive free cash generation,
while it funds capex for new vehicle purchases through proceeds
from the used-vehicle sales.


USJ ACUCAR: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit
rating on USJ Acucar e Alcool S/A to 'SD' from 'CC' and S&P's
Brazil national scale corporate credit rating to 'SD' from 'brCC'.
At the same time S&P lowered the issue-level ratings to 'D' from
'CC'.  S&P's recovery rating of '4', which indicates an average
recovery prospects (30%-50%, in the low range of the band),
remains unchanged.

The downgrade follows the company's missed interest payment on
May 9, 2016, on its unsecured bond due 2019, which is now under
the grace period of 30 days to amend the payments.

S&P considers the missed interest payment to be tantamount to a
default at the issue level because S&P views the payment of
interest during the grace period as highly unlikely under USJ's
current capital structure.  At the same time, S&P would consider
the recommended exchange offer, if accepted, to be a distressed
restructuring, also equivalent to a default on its obligations
because the amount and conditions of payment differ from its
original amount.

S&P lowered its corporate credit ratings to 'SD' because the
company is still current on its other obligations such as bank
loans, taxes, and debt to suppliers.  At the same time, S&P
lowered its issue-level rating on senior unsecured notes to 'D'
from 'CC'.

S&P will reassess its ratings on USJ within the next few weeks,
after the negotiations on the exchange offers are completed, with
potential improvements on its capital structure and cash flow
generation amid its option to accrue interest payments.

S&P's recovery rating of '4' remains unchanged.


* Moody's Repositions 17 Tranches of Brazilian Transactions' NSRs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has repositioned the national scale ratings
(NSRs) of 17 tranches of Brazilian structured finance transactions
in conjunction with the recalibration of the Brazilian national
rating scale.

NSRs, which provide a measure of relative creditworthiness within
a single country, are derived from global scale ratings (GSRs)
using country-specific maps. The adoption of a revised
correspondence between Moody's GSRs and the Brazilian national
scale follows the publication of Moody's updated methodology
"Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale Ratings"
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
189032 For more information, please see "Moody's publishes updated
methodology for national scale ratings"
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-publishes-updated-
methodology-for-national-scale-ratings--PR_348579

With approximately 170 rated fundamental issuers in Brazil, the
new map has been designed using the modified approach, whereby the
map design is adjusted to reflect the distribution of fundamental
ratings in the country in order to ensure adequate opportunity for
differentiation where ratings are most highly concentrated.
Structured finance ratings are not taken into consideration in the
determination of the map design. Because fewer than 5% of
fundamental issuers are rated at or above the previous anchor
point, or the lowest GSR that can map to a Aaa.br, the anchor
point has been lowered to Ba1 from Baa3 under the new map. As
nearly 15% of fundamental issuers are rated above Brazil's
sovereign bond rating of Ba2, however, the anchor point remains a
notch higher than the sovereign. Because nearly 40% of fundamental
issuers are rated Ba2 on the global scale, Ba2 corresponds to
three ratings on the national scale, Aa1.br, Aa2.br, and Aa3.br,
to allow for adequate opportunity for credit differentiation
amongst these issuers. The GSR of Ba3, which is assigned to
another 20% of fundamental issuers, also corresponds to three
national scale ratings. In addition, in order to clarify the
meaning of NSRs, overlap -- where two GSRs can correspond to the
same NSR -- has been eliminated from the Brazilian national scale
map, so every NSR maps back to just one GSR. As a result of these
changes, GSRs of B1 and above will in some cases correspond to
higher NSRs on the Brazilian national scale than they did
previously, GSRs of B2 and below may correspond to lower NSRs.

Consequently, approximately 35% of Brazilian fundamental issuer's
primary long-term NSRs are being repositioned upwards, and roughly
20% are being repositioned lower. Certain short-term and other
NSRs may be affected for these and other issuers as well. In
addition, approximately one-third of the NSRs assigned to
Brazilian structured finance transactions are being repositioned
higher, while roughly 15% are being repositioned lower. The
average change is just over one notch. The repositioned NSRs of
individual issuers do not signify a change in credit risk, since
the GSRs for these issuers remain unchanged.

As a result of the recalibration, the level of risk associated
with a particular Brazilian NSR level (e.g. Aa2.br) has changed in
many cases. NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss; they are ordinal rankings of
creditworthiness relative to other domestic issuers within a given
country. A historical probability of default and/or expected loss
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. However, both the
probability of default and the expected loss of an NSR may change
if and when a country's national scale is remapped.

ISSUERS AND RATINGS AFFECTED

Please click on this link
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF432102for
the list of affected credit ratings. This list is an integral part
of this press release and identifies each affected issuer.

RATING RATIONALE

NSRs are assigned by applying the published correspondence from
GSRs. Where a single GSR maps to multiple NSRs, rating committees
assigned higher or lower NSRs to individual issuers and debts
depending on their relative credit position within the same GSRs
category, using the same methodologies as were used to determine
the GSRs themselves.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

The NSRs would face upward or downward pressure if their
corresponding GSRs are upgraded or downgraded, unless this is in
conjunction with a sovereign rating action that results in another
recalibration of the Brazilian national scale with an offsetting
impact on NSRs. In addition, the NSRs may be repositioned upwards
(downwards) if Brazil's sovereign is downgraded (upgraded) and the
map is revised accordingly, but the corresponding GSRs have not
changed as a result of the sovereign action. Because of the higher
granularity of national scales, NSRs may also face pressure due to
changes in creditworthiness that are not sufficient to cause a
change in the corresponding GSR, measured using the same
methodologies used to determine the GSR.

METHODOLOGIES USED

Please refer to the following Excel file for further references
regarding the applicable rating methodology for each transaction:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF432102

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons, please
see
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
189530.

LAST RATING ACTIONS

Please refer to the following Excel file for further references
regarding the last rating action for each transaction:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF432102



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ADAPTIVE ALPHA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 9
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Adaptive Alpha Fund, Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by June 9, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 15, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Matthew Wright
          c/o Omar Grant
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295


ADAPTIVE ALPHA MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 9
-----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Adaptive Alpha Master Fund, Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by June 9, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 14, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Matthew Wright
          c/o Omar Grant
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295


BLACKSTONE ALTERNATIVE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
On April 18, 2016, the sole shareholder of Blackstone Alternative
Multi-Manager Sub Fund II Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate
the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Sean Flynn
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 914 6365


CAIS BALESTRA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On April 14, 2016, the sole shareholder of Cais Balestra Global
Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Capital Integration Systems LLC
          598 Madison Avenue, 11th Floor
          New York, New York 10022
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 202 2972


CAIS HIGHBRIDGE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On April 14, 2016, the sole shareholder of Cais Highbridge Capital
Institutional Fund Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Capital Integration Systems LLC
          598 Madison Avenue, 11th Floor
          New York, New York 10022
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 202 2972


CAIS JAT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------
On April 14, 2016, the sole shareholder of Cais Jat Capital
Offshore Fund Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Capital Integration Systems LLC
          598 Madison Avenue, 11th Floor
          New York, New York 10022
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 202 2972


CAIS PAULSON: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
On April 14, 2016, the sole shareholder of Cais Paulson
International Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Capital Integration Systems LLC
          598 Madison Avenue, 11th Floor
          New York, New York 10022
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 202 2972


CAIS PERELLA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
On April 14, 2016, the sole shareholder of Cais Perella Weinberg
Partners Xerion Offshore Fund Ltd. resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Capital Integration Systems LLC
          598 Madison Avenue, 11th Floor
          New York, New York 10022
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 202 2972
          e-mail: legal@caisgroup.com


DCMF LIQUIDATING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 8
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of DCMF Liquidating Company Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by June 8, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 25, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


FMCP AFRICA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 16
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of FMCP Africa Liquid Strategies Fund Limited are
required to file their proofs of debt by June 16, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 14, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Christopher Smith
          Krys Global VL Services Limited
          KRyS Global, Governors Square
          Building 6, 2nd Floor, 23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
          P.O. Box 31237 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Telephone: (345) 947 4700


FPP BALKAN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on April 22, 2016, the
shareholders of FPP Balkan Limited resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Casey McDonald
          Krys Global VL Services Limited
          KRyS Global, Governors Square
          Building 6, 2nd Floor, 23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
          P.O. Box 31237 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 947 4700


LOREN LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 21
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Loren Limited are required to file their proofs
of debt by June 21, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 26, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town Tortola VG 1110
          British Virgin Islands
          c/o Philip C. Pedro
          HSBC International Trustee Limited
          Compass Point, 9 Bermudiana Road
          Hamilton HM 11
          Bermuda
          Telephone: (441) 299-6482
          Facsimile: (441) 299-6526


ODEBRECHT DRILLING: Moody's Lowers Rating on Sr. Notes to Caa3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the senior
secured notes of these issuers:

Odebrecht Drilling Norbe VIII/IX Ltd. (Norbe VIII/IX)
  Senior secured global notes due June 2021 downgraded to Caa3
   from Caa2
  Approximately US$ 1,177,500,000 of debt affected

Odebrecht Offshore Drilling Finance Limited (OODFL)
  6.75% and 6.625% senior secured global notes due in October 2022
   downgraded to Ca from Caa3
  Approximately US$ 2,009,578,000 of debt affected

At the same time, Moody's has affirmed the Caa1 rating of this
issuer:

QGOG Atlantic / Alaskan Rigs Limited (QGOG Atlantic/Alaskan)
  Senior secured global notes due July 2018
  Approximately US$ 260,190,000 of debt affected

All ratings remain with a negative outlook.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating actions on the OODFL's and Norbe VIII/IX's notes
reflect primarily the significant deterioration of the liquidity
of the operator, Odebrecht Oil and Gas S.A. (OOG; unrated), as
reflected by the non-payment of scheduled interest on its 7.00%
unsecured perpetual notes that was due on April 17.  In addition,
the downgrade of OODFL reflects the increasing liquidity pressure
that has resulted from the early termination by Petroleo
Brasileiro S.A. -- Petrobras (B3 negative) of the charter and
services contracts of one of its four project vessels (ODN Tay
IV), and the lack of replacement contracts since September 2015.

OOG's weakening liquidity could negatively affect the quality of
the operation of the project vessels, rendering OOG unable to
fulfill its obligations under the OODFL's and Norbe VIII/IX's
charter and services contracts signed with Petrobras, such as
meeting required uptime performance contractual standards, which,
in Moody's opinion, could lead Petrobras to terminate these
contracts.  Petrobras is the sole contractual off-taker and
revenue source to service the outstanding debt issued by the above
referenced project entities.

OOG's liquidity pressure results in part from the fact that the
company has been unable to secure replacement charter and services
contracts for ODN Tay IV given the current extremely challenging
environment for oil prices.  Given that OOG is highly dependent on
cash flow generated by its subsidiaries, the lack of replacement
contracts since September 2015 has also exerted significant
pressure on OOG's liquidity, which could negatively impact the
quality and level of maintenance activities that these vessels
require.

Moody's rating actions also take into account, on a relative
basis, the projects' vessels recent operating performance in 2014
and 2015 as measured by average uptime, the age and value of the
vessels, the level of charter day rates as compared to current
market day rates, the amount of outstanding debt at maturity, re-
contracting risk, liquidity arrangements as measured by the
sufficiency of reserve accounts, and the potential impact on the
issuers of the ongoing corruption investigations at Petrobras.

The negative outlook reflects the fact that, in light of the
ongoing cost-reduction and fleet optimization efforts, Petrobras
has requested OOG (together with its subsidiaries and affiliates)
and Queiroz Galvao Oleo e Gas S.A. (the operator of the QGOG
Atlantic/Alaskan vessels) to re-negotiate key terms of charter and
services contracts pursuant to which these operators provide
services to Petrobras.  Although there is still no clarity which
assets will be affected by a potential re-negotiation, new terms
could have a material negative impact on the issuers' level of
revenues and cash flows for debt service, a credit negative.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's do not anticipate upward pressure of the ratings in the
near to medium term.

The ratings could be further downgraded if the charter and
services contracts of the underlying vessels are re-negotiated at
worse terms or even terminated, or upon the deterioration in the
quality or sufficiency of the liquidity arrangements, or the
occurrence of any payment acceleration, or, in the case of OODFL
and Norbe VIII/IX, a negative outcome for Notes' holders from the
current and ongoing debt restructuring negotiations.  A downgrade
could also occur if there were a deterioration in: (i) the credit
profile of the operators of the assets; or (ii) the operating
performance of the project vessels relative to the standards set
out in the charter and services agreements with Petrobras; or
(iii) the re-contracting market for offshore vessels; or (iv)
Petrobras' ratings.

Odebrecht Drilling Norbe VIII/IX Ltd.

Odebrecht Drilling Norbe VIII/IX Limited is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of OOG, organized as a limited liability company under
the laws of the Cayman Islands.  The activities of Odebrecht
Drilling Norbe VIII/IX Limited are limited to the issuance of the
Notes and making the corresponding loan to each of the project
companies, Odebrecht Drilling Norbe Eight Gmbh and Odebrecht
Drilling Norbe Nine Gmbh, domiciled in Austria which own,
respectively, the vessels Norbe VIII and Norbe IX.  Each of the
project companies has a 10-year Charter Agreement with Petrobras,
which began at the start of operation of each drilling vessel
(2011) under which Petrobras pays a contracted day rate for the
use of each vessel.  Both the Charter and the Services Agreements
signed with Petrobras are extendable, upon mutual agreement
between OOG and Petrobras, for additional 10 years at the end of
the original expiration.

Odebrecht Offshore Drilling Finance Limited

OODFL is an exempted company organized under the laws of the
Cayman Islands, indirectly owned by OOG.

The transaction consists of the securitization of future flows of
the Charter and Services Agreements between Petrobras and ODN I
GmbH and ODN Six GmbH, which solely own OODFL, associated with a
state-of--the-art, brand new 3-asset portfolio: two drillships ODN
I and ODN II, and one semisubmersible rig, Norbe VI.

On Feb. 14, 2014, OODFL completed a $580 million note offering,
which added ODN Tay IV, a semisubmersible rig to the collateral
package.  ODN Tay IV is a fifth generation ultra-deepwater,
purchased by OOG in 2011, at which time it was operating in
Nigeria for Total SA by Stena Drilling.

QGOG Atlantic / Alaskan Rigs Limited

QGOG A/A is a special purpose vehicle organized under the laws of
the British Virgin Islands.  The issuer is jointly owned in equal
parts by Alaskan Star Ltd (BVI) and Star International Drilling
Ltd (Cayman Islands), both of which are wholly owned by Hopelake
Services Limited (BVI).

The Alaskan Star and the Atlantic Star are mid-water drilling
moored rigs.  Both rigs are currently operating in Brazil under
charter with Petrobras, with the charter agreement for the Alaskan
Star ending November 2016, while the charter agreement for the
Atlantic Star will end in July 2018.  The US$700 million senior
secured notes were issued by QGOG A/A in July 2011, and are due in
July 2018, with a relatively small gross balloon payment of
US$49.3 million, which we expect that at maturity will be fully
covered with funds captured through the retention mechanisms and
letters of credit.


ZHG SAVEOPPORTUNITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due June 8
---------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of ZHG Saveopportunity Fund Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by June 8, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 20, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands






=========
C H I L E
=========


CHILE: To Boost Productive Financing for MSMEs with $120M IDB Loan
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank has approved a $120 million
loan to help Chile improve and increase its supply of productive
financing instruments for Micro, Small, and Medium-sized
Enterprises (MSMEs).  The lending is part of a package of measures
recently announced by the Finance and Economy ministries aimed at
boosting firm productivity.

To this end, the Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) will
channel resources to MSMEs through Non-Banking Financial
Intermediaries such as factoring companies and savings, lending
and leasing cooperatives.

"The project seeks to boost both supply and competition in Chile's
financial market with a blend of financial instruments focused on
MSMEs needs in order to improve their productivity," said IDB's
project team leader Diego Herrera.

The operation was launched in collaboration with the Inter-
American Investment Corporation and the Multilateral Investment
Fund and has three components -- a factoring element, a MSMEs
lending element, and a leasing element.

The factoring component ($50 million) will be assigned by CORFO to
fund eligible entities that neither belong to nor are associated
with banks, which will use it to finance MSMEs working capital.

The lending component ($50 million) will finance eligible Savings
and Lending Cooperatives, which will use these resources to supply
medium and long term financing to MSMEs' investment and eventually
productive reconversion plans. Part of the resources will also go
to finance the operations of microfinance institutions and of
productive or service cooperatives engaged in the financial
intermediation business.

The third component ($20 million) will fund eligible leasing
companies that neither belong to nor are associated with a bank to
help them finance MSMEs medium and long term assets and
investments.

The amount of each component can be changed by CORFO during the
project's execution depending on demand and could also be used to
supplement the agency's efforts in other current or future
programs aimed at fostering MSMEs innovation, certification and
training, or in any other initiative or intervention seeking to
boost up corporate productivity.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


ARENDAL S DE RL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CC' & Puts on Watch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on Mexico-
based engineering and construction company Arendal, S. de R.L. de
C.V. to 'CC' from 'CCC-'.  S&P also lowered its issue-level rating
on the company's $100 million senior unsecured notes due May 23,
2016 to 'CC' from 'CCC-'.  At the same time, S&P placed the
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications.  The '4'
recovery rating on the senior unsecured notes is unchanged,
reflecting S&P's expectation of average (lower end of the 30% to
50% range) recovery for lenders in the event of a payment default.

The downgrade reflects S&P's opinion that a default or debt
restructuring appears to be a virtual certainty even under the
most optimistic circumstances.  As of May 9, the company has not
been able to reach an agreement with any financial entity to
refinance its notes.  Consequently, S&P considers that a debt
exchange or restructuring of the notes is highly likely.

The negative CreditWatch listing reflects the possibility that S&P
will lower ratings to 'D' if the company doesn't make the
principal payment on its notes due May 23, 2016.  An announcement
of a debt exchange that S&P deems to be distressed would also lead
to a downgrade.


MAXCOM TELECOMUNICACIONES: Moody's Lowers CFR to Ca; Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Maxcom Telecomunicaciones,
S.A.B. de C.V.'s corporate family and senior secured debt ratings
to Ca from Caa1.  At the same time, Moody's changed the rating
outlook to negative from stable.

These ratings were affected:

   -- Maxcom Telecomunicaciones, S.A.B. de C.V. Corporate Family
      Rating: downgraded to Ca from Caa1

   -- Senior Secured Global Notes due 2020: downgraded to Ca from
      Caa1

   -- Rating Outlook: changed to negative from stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings downgrade was prompted by weaker than anticipated
credit metrics despite the company's efforts to improve its
capital structure and increase its financial flexibility.  "A
weaker than anticipated credit profile reflects the challenges
faced by Maxcom to turnaround an operation that has been under
significant business risk for several years" said Sandra Beltr†n,
an Assistant Vice President -- Analyst at Moody's.

Maxcom completed a debt restructure in 2014.  The plan included a
change of control, a capitalization from new investors and the
exchange of its US$200 million notes due 2014 into US$175 million
notes due 2020.  After the restructure, Maxcom reduced debt in USD
24 million and materially improved its liquidity position.
Moody's expected that upon completion, the restructure would allow
Maxcom to turn around its operations.  Quantitatively Moody's were
expecting the company to end 2015 with EBITDA margin and debt to
EBITDA ratio, as adjusted by Moody's, at around 25% and 3.7 times,
respectively.  However, Maxcom ended 2015 with a 11.9% drop in its
revenue base, adjusted EBITDA margin at 20.6% and Debt to EBITDA
at 5.5 times.  As of March 2016, Maxcom revenues further drop
14.2% on a last twelve months basis.

The weaker than anticipated operating performance is partly due to
Maxcom's efforts to scale back its operation, in order to
rationalize its products offering, focusing in more profitable
services and in regions where it has significant market share.
Specific measures include the divestiture of the public telephony
business and the cancellation of inactive prepaid cell phone
contracts and low-margin accounts from the residential segment.
Also part of the strategy are investments made to improve quality
service and that in 2014 and 2015 amounted MXN 880 million and MXN
788 million, respectively.

Although the investments should help Maxcom improve its
competitive position, the transitioning business model entails
significant execution risk, particularly when considering the
intense competitive environment.  Additionally, the investment
plan has also resulted in a significant cash burn that has
deteriorated Maxcom's liquidity profile despite continued equity
injections since 2015.

Currently Maxcom has adequate liquidity to meet obligations over
the next 12 months; however liquidity will weaken through 2017.
As of March 2016, the company had MXN636 million (USD36 million)
cash on hand with short term debt maturities of MXN 30 million.
Cash position is supported by recent capital injections that
helped Maxcom offset weak cash generation due to high capital
expenditures and poor operating performance in recent quarters.
Since December 2015, capital injections have amounted
MXN545 million.

Liquidity is also supported by a comfortable debt maturity profile
that includes amortizations of MXN30 million annually through
2020, when its USD 136 million outstanding notes will also come
due.  Additionally, Maxcom has fully hedged USD coupon payments
through 2017, providing protection against any increased foreign
exchange volatility.  Going forward, Maxcom could still receive
additional equity injections up to MXN 150 million, according to
the amount approved by the board by the end of 2015.  Moody's
anticipates that, absent further capitalization from shareholders,
liquidity could become precarious by the end of 2017.

The Ca ratings not only reflect a high probability of default, but
a recovery for bondholders below 65% under a default scenario.
This expectation is based in the company's current liabilities and
asset base after haircuts assumed by Moody's.  Moreover, Moody's
expectation is in line with recovery for bondholders under recent
distressed exchanges.  Since 2015, the company carried out a
series of repurchases (and subsequent cancellations) of its 2020
secured notes.  Moody's previously determined that the repurchases
totaling USD 39.7 million were distressed exchanges given the loss
incurred by investors relative to the original promise of payments
and that the majority of the repurchase took place under
tightening liquidity conditions.  The bonds were repurchased with
prices ranging from US$55 to US$75, reducing the original total
debt obligation by almost 23%.

The negative outlook is based on the high execution risk that
Maxcom's current business strategy entails and the its ability to
deal with the difficult operating environment and restore its
credit quality.  In addition, the negative outlook incorporates
the fact that Maxcom's liquidity situation is currently dependent
on further equity injections and reduced levels of capex, which,
in turn, could impair Maxcom's competitive position and ability to
generate cash.

Further ratings downgrade would be likely if Maxcom is not able to
improve operating performance resulting in a continued cash burn,
specifically, if the cash balance falls below US$20 million.

An upgrade is unlikely at the moment but would be considered if
Maxcom's revenues were to return to a growth mode, with EBITDA
margin and debt to EBITDA, including Moody's standard adjustments,
being close to 25% and 4.5 times, respectively.

The last rating action on Maxcom was on April 3, 2014 when Moody's
upgraded the company's ratings to Caa1 from Ca and changed the
outlook to stable from negative.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010.

Maxcom Telecomunicaciones, S.A.B. de C.V., headquartered in Mexico
City, Mexico, is a facilities-based telecommunications provider.
It delivers last-mile connectivity to micro, small and medium-
sized businesses and residential customers in Mexico.  The company
provides local and long-distance voice, data, high speed,
dedicated Internet access, paid TV, public telephony and Voice
over Internet Protocol telephony, as well as service bundles.
After filing for bankruptcy in October 2013, the company's control
was transferred to shareholders advised by Ventura Capital
Privado, S.A. de C.V., which currently retains approximately 70%
of its shares.  Revenues during the last twelve months ended in
March 2016 amounted MXN 2.3 billion (US$130 million).


* MEXICO: To Re-Award 6 Oil Blocks on Lack of Financial Guarantees
------------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that six of 25 oil and natural gas contracts that
Mexico awarded last December went unsigned after the winning
bidders failed to provide the required financial guarantees and
will be assigned to other auction participants.

Juan Carlos Zepeda, president of the National Hydrocarbons
Commission, or CNH, Mexico's oil regulator, said those license
contracts for onshore oil blocks would be awarded to the second-
place bidders, according to EFE News.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


CHILDREN'S TRUST: Moody's Cuts Term Bond 1 Rating to Ba1(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the class
of Children's Trust Tobacco Settlement Asset-Backed Bonds, Series
2002, maturing on May 15, 2033. The bonds are backed by payments
that tobacco companies owe to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
pursuant to the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (the MSA).

The complete rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Children's Trust, Series 2002

Term Bond 1, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 20, 2014
Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the uncertainty surrounding future
actions of the Puerto Rican government with respect to payments
due on the bonds in this transaction.

On April 6, 2016, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Emergency
Moratorium and Financial Rehabilitation Act (the Moratorium). The
Moratorium allows the governor to issue an executive order to
temporarily suspend certain debt payments, including payments on
the tobacco settlement bonds issued by Children's Trust. The
current moratorium will expire on January 31, 2017 but the
governor can potentially extend it up to two months.

The MSA payment due to Puerto Rico for the 2015 cigarette sales
year has already been deposited to an account at the indenture
trustee, US Bank Trust National Association. The Trust currently
has approximately $71 million available for debt payments, and $84
million held in the Liquidity Reserve Account. We expect these
funds to be used to make the payments due to the bondholders this
month.

Although the indenture trustee holds funds in an amount sufficient
to make the May 2016 payment to bondholders, the rating action
reflects the increased risk associated with the possibility for
Puerto Rico to take other actions that could impede the payments
due on the bonds in the future.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


EMPRESAS POLAR: Running Out of Their Favorite Beer
--------------------------------------------------
The Latin American Herald Tribune reports that employees of
Empresas Polar, the conglomerate that controls 80 percent of the
Venezuelan beer market, are standing guard at the company's four
breweries to ward off a feared government takeover.

While Polar spars with the government of President Nicolas Maduro,
bars and restaurants scramble to secure a supply of Venezuela's
favored brew, as production has been suspended since April 29,
according to The Latin American Herald Tribune.

The report notes that Geovar Reyes, chief of operations at Polar's
Los Cortijos brewery in Caracas, said employees are on guard
round-the-clock "to prevent (authorities) from entering and
creating a disaster."

The Maduro administration, which accuses Empresas Polar of
engineering food shortages, has undertaken a nationwide audit of
the firm, sending inspectors into 83 facilities, the report
relays.

The Ocumare plant, in central Venezuela, "was looted" in the audit
process by officials who "damaged the equipment," according to
Reyes, the report notes.

"They have taken batteries, they take computers.  What are they
doing with all that? What kind of audit is that?" he said, though
acknowledging that the officials who visited Los Cortijos were
cordial and "respectful," the report discloses

The audits have confirmed that Polar is not producing because of a
lack of raw materials, Mr. Reyes told EFE News, the report relays.

"We have nothing left, we have nothing to produce with," Mr. Reyes
said.

Labor Ministry Oswaldo Vera says the Venezuelan Central Bank has
provided Polar with the hard currency the conglomerate requested
to acquire materials, but that the company "has invested in other
countries," the report notes.

The Maduro administration has threatened to take over companies
that are not producing, the report discloses.

Mr. Reyes, however, said the government has failed to pay
suppliers, the report relays.

With production halted, some bars and liquor stores have turned to
re-sellers to keep patrons happy, though some consumers have made
the switch to another beer, Regional, the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or
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The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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                   * * * End of Transmission * * *