TCRLA_Public/160523.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, May 23, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 100


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BUENOS AIRES: S&P Rates Up to US$890MM Sr. Unsec. Notes 'B-'
BUENOS AIRES: Fitch Puts B(exp) Rating to Prop. US$890MM Bond
BUENOS AIRES: Moody's Rates Up to US$890MM Sr. Unsec. Notes 'B3'
PVCRED SERIE XXVII: Moody's Rates ARS31,943,000 Cert. Caa1.ar (sf)


B O L I V I A

BOLIVIA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Sovereign Credit Ratings


B R A Z I L

ELETROBRAS-CENTRAIS: S&P Affirms 'BB' Currency Ratings
NEUQUEN: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 30.38% Sec. Amortizing Notes
USJ-ACUCAR: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Rating to 'RD'


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ANTHRACITE BALANCED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 31
CA PARTNERS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 9
CONTINENTAL TRUSTEES: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Jr. Sub. Notes
EVENING STAR: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 13
GLG EMERGING: Members' Final Meeting Set for June 2

MASTER INTERNATIONAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 8


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Manufacturing Declines Slightly in April


G R E N A D A

GRENADA ELECTRICITY: Warns of Threat to Electricity Reliability


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Budget Devoid of Strategies to Reduce Debt, Phillips Says
JAMAICA: Urged to Review CET Charged on Imported Oil


P E R U

BANCO DE CREDITO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Jr. Sub. Debt
BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Jr. Sub. Debt


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: New Bill Makes Changes to Creditor Prioritization


S T.  V I N C E N T  &  G R E N A D I N E S

ST. VINCENT: Moody's Changes Outlook on B3 Gov't. Rating to Stable


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From May 16 to May 21, 2016


                            - - - - -



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


BUENOS AIRES: S&P Rates Up to US$890MM Sr. Unsec. Notes 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' issue-level rating on the
City of Buenos Aires' (CABA: B-/Stable/--) senior unsecured notes
for up to $890 million.  The amortizing notes will be denominated
in dollars, and the city will use the proceeds for its ambitious
infrastructure plans and for the refinancing of its debt,
including the offer to purchase up to $390 million of the
outstanding 9.95% notes due 2017 (Bono Tango Series 10).  S&P
expects that CABA will pay any remaining outstanding Series 10
notes in accordance to their original terms and conditions.

S&P don't view this new debt as harmful to the city's financial
profile.  S&P expects that CABA's low debt, despite significant
exposure to the exchange rate risk, will continue to support the
city's credit profile.  Including the $890 million issuance, S&P
expects CABA's debt to reach ARP44.5 billion by the end of 2016,
or nearly 34% of its operating revenues.  Although the city's debt
will increase in nominal terms from ARP31.4 billion as of the end
of 2015, debt--relative to operating revenues--will fall from 39%.
This stems from S&P's expectations that higher inflation will
compensate for the impact of new net borrowings and currency
depreciation, which S&P expects to be less than in 2015, on CABA's
operating revenues.

Additionally, as per S&P's criteria "Rating Implications of
Exchange Offers and Similar Restructurings, Update," published
May 12, 2009, S&P don't consider the offer to purchase the Series
10 notes as tantamount to default because S&P believes it doesn't
meet the conditions to be considered as such.  Given that the city
is offering a cash premium of $1,055 for every $1,000 to purchase
the notes, plus accrued and unpaid interest, the offer introduces
an incentive to compensate investors for their loss of future cash
flows.

The 'B-' foreign currency rating on CABA is one notch below its
'b' stand-alone credit profile (SACP).  The SACP isn't a rating
but a means of assessing the intrinsic creditworthiness of a local
and regional government (LRG) under the assumption that there is
no sovereign rating cap.  The SACP reflects the combination of
S&P's assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the
institutional framework in which it operates.  All Argentinean
LRGs operate under the institutional framework that S&P views as
very volatile and unbalanced.  However, S&P considers that the
city's credit profile is stronger than those of its domestic
peers.  According to the latest data, CABA's GDP per capita is
3.2x greater than that of Argentina.  In addition, the city has
consistently posted operating surpluses above 8% of operating
revenues, which it's likely to do so again in 2016.  Such high
operating surpluses have allowed CABA to maintain higher capital
expenditures (capex) than those of its domestic peers.  High
capex, budgetary flexibility thanks to own-source revenues that
will likely account for more than 75% of total revenues in 2016,
and a strong credit culture support the city's creditworthiness.
In addition, the strong political ties between the city government
under mayor Horacio Larreta, and the national government led by a
former mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri, bolster CABA's
credit quality, in S&P's opinion.

The stable outlook on the city mirrors the stable outlook on the
sovereign's local currency rating.  The outlook reflects renewed
dialogue between the city--as well as other Argentinean LRGs--and
the federal government about tackling fiscal and economic
challenges in the short to medium term.  If S&P was to raise
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment and local currency
rating on the sovereign, an upgrade of the city is possible within
the next 12 months.  On the other hand, S&P could downgrade CABA
if the T&C assessment deteriorates or if S&P was to lower the
sovereign local currency rating.  However, according to S&P's
base-case for 2016, such a scenario is unlikely.

RATINGS LIST

City of Buenos Aires
  Issuer credit rating    B-/Stable/--

Rating Assigned

City of Buenos Aires
  Sr. unsec. notes        B-


BUENOS AIRES: Fitch Puts B(exp) Rating to Prop. US$890MM Bond
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned an expected long-term rating of
'B(exp)' to the City of Buenos Aires's (the CBA) proposed bond.

The bond will be issued up to USD890 million under a USD2.3
billion EMTN Program.  This note is denominated in USD, to accrue
a fixed interest rate to be determined at issuance and payable on
a semi-annual basis.  The maturity of the bond is estimated to be
of 10 years, with equal annual payments of USD296.7 million in the
last three years.  The bond will be a senior unsecured obligation
of the CBA.

The city intends to use the net proceeds of the new issue under
the Series 12 Notes for infrastructure investments and for the
refinancing of Series 10 Notes in up to USD390 million, out of the
USD415 million due on March 1, 2017.

                            KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has assigned a long-term rating of 'B(exp)' in line with the
issuer's long-term rating ('B'/Stable Outlook).  The rating of the
CBA considers its adequate fiscal and budgetary performance,
generating good operating margins that averaged 12.9% of its
current revenues over the last five years despite the pressures on
operating expenditures.  The CBA maintains manageable debt and
sustainability ratios and it is Argentina's primary political and
economic center.  The main constraints of the rating are the
sovereign rating and the CBA's unfavorable debt structure, having
92.1% in unhedged foreign currency.

At year-end 2015, debt grew by 71.7% compared to 2014, due to
higher debt on government securities and the effect of currency
devaluation.  According to preliminary information, outstanding
direct debt totalled ARS31,432.3 million, which represented 38.9%
of current revenues and 3.6x of the current balance.  In Fitch's
opinion, even though the growth was significant, debt levels are
still appropriate.  Also, considering the use of authorized debt
for 2016, debt will represent 32% of budgeted operating revenues.

The city's direct debt has been increasing since 2009, largely
associated with the execution of investment on public works in a
macroeconomic context of limited capital sources.  Nonetheless,
the CBA's debt profile is still in line with its current rating
level. On average, during the last five years, CBA's capital
expenditure represented 14.7% of its total expenses.  The new
issuance will alleviate debt service pressure in the short term
and extend 2017 maturities towards a longer and more manageable
term, according to the CBA's projections.


BUENOS AIRES: Moody's Rates Up to US$890MM Sr. Unsec. Notes 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 (Global Scale foreign
currency) rating to the Senior Unsecured Notes to be issued by the
City of Buenos Aires for up to $US890 million under its Medium-
Term Note Program. The ratings are in line with the City's long
term foreign currency debt rating, which carry a stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The proposed Notes issuance (will be Series 12 Notes) has been
authorized by the City's Laws Nß 5.014, 5.236 and 5.492. The City
of Buenos Aires will use the proceeds of the Notes for two
objectives. Firstly, it will offer to purchase up to $US390
million of outstanding principal of 9.95% Series 10 Notes due 2017
and if there were some remaining funds within that amount, they
will be used to fund infrastructure works for the Ministries of
Education and Health and to the acquisition of medical equipment.
Secondly, the City will use an amount up to $US500 million to
execute its general infrastructure plan for the current year.

The Notes, which constitute direct, general, unconditional and
unsubordinated obligations of the City. They will be denominated
and payable in US dollars with an expected maturity of 10 years,
amortization in three annual installments and will pay fixed
interest rate on a semi-annual basis. The Notes will be subject to
the English Law.

The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
nor anticipates changes in the main conditions that the Notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
these Notes deviate from the original ones submitted and reviewed
by the rating agency, Moody's will assess the impact that these
differences may have on the ratings and act accordingly.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns economic and
financial ratings, and upgrade of Argentina's sovereign bonds
ratings and/or the improvement of the country' operating
environment could lead to an upgrade of the City of Buenos Aires
ratings. Conversely, a downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings
and/or further systemic deterioration or idiosyncratic risks
arising in the City of Buenos Aires --such as a rapid increase in
the debt to total revenues ratio of the City-- could exert
downward pressure on the ratings assigned and could translate in
to a downgrade in the near to medium term.


PVCRED SERIE XXVII: Moody's Rates ARS31,943,000 Cert. Caa1.ar (sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (Moody's)
has rated Fideicomiso Financiero Pvcred Serie XXVII. This
transaction will be issued by TMF Trust Company (Argentina) S.A.-
acting solely in its capacity as issuer and trustee.

The securities for this transaction have not yet been placed in
the market. The transaction is pending approval from the Comision
Nacional de Valores, if any assumption or factor Moody's considers
when assigning the ratings change before closing, the ratings may
also change.

-- ARS 67,879,000 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities (VRDA
    TV) of "Fideicomiso Financiero Pvcred Serie XXVII", rated
    Aaa.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Ba3 (sf) (Global
    Scale, Local Currency)

-- ARS 31,943,000 in Certificates (CP) of "Fideicomiso Financiero
    Pvcred Serie XXVII", rated Caa1.ar (sf) (Argentine National
    Scale) and Caa3 (sf) (Global Scale, Local Currency).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rated securities are payable from the cash flow coming from
the assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of
approximately 5,490 eligible personal loans denominated in
Argentine pesos, bearing fixed interest rate, originated by
Pvcred, a financial company owned by Comafi's Group in Argentina.
Only the installments due after July 31, 2016 will be assigned to
the trust.

The VRDA TV will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus
400bps). The VRDA TV's interest rate will never be higher than 40%
or lower than 24%.

Overall credit enhancement is comprised of subordination, various
reserve funds and excess spread.

The transaction has initial subordination level of 32.0% for the
VRDA TV, calculated over the pool's principal balance as of July
31, 2016. The subordination level will increase overtime due to
the turbo sequential payment structure. The transaction will have
a grace period for principal and interest payment until September
2016.

The transaction also benefits from an estimated 44.1% annual
excess spread, before considering losses, taxes or prepayments and
calculated at the caps of 40% for the VRDA TV.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed
when rating this transaction. Although Moody's analyzed the
historical performance data of previous transactions and similar
receivables originated by Pvcred, the actual performance of the
securitized pool may be affected, among others, by the economic
activity, high inflation rates compared with nominal salaries
increases and the unemployment rate in Argentina.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo
sequential payment structure, when compared with the level of
projected losses in the securitized pool.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this
transaction through the initial subordination levels for each
rated class, as well as the historical performance of Pvcred
portfolio. In addition, Moody's considered factors common to
consumer loans securitizations such as delinquencies, prepayments
and losses; as well as specific factors related to the Argentine
market, such as the probability of an increase in losses if there
are changes in the macroeconomic scenario in Argentina.

These factors were incorporated in a cash flow model that takes
into account all the relevant features of the transaction's assets
and liabilities. Monte Carlo simulations were run, which
determines the expected loss for the rated securities.

Moody's analyzed the historical performance data of previous
transactions and similar receivables originated by Pvcred, ranging
from July 2014 to April 2016. Moody's has observed a weaker
performance of Refis loans compared to Unregulated Pvcred Loans.
In addition, Moody's has observed a weaker performance of Open
Market Loans compared to Existing Loans.

Moody's notes that there is significant uncertainty around key
macroeconomic variables in Argentina, including inflation rates,
salary increases compared to inflation, and economic activity,
which have an impact on future performance of this transaction.

In assigning the rating to this deal, Moody's assumed a lognormal
distribution of losses for each one of the different securitized
subpools: for the loans of Existing Clients, a mean of 18%; for
loans of Open Market, a mean of 35% and for the "Refinanciados"
loans, a mean of 41% with a coefficient of variation of 60% for
each of the three subpools. Also, Moody's assumed a lognormal
distribution for prepayments with a mean of 35% and a coefficient
of variation of 70%.

Servicer default was modeled by simulating the default of Banco
Comafi as the servicer consistent with its current rating of
B3/Baa1.ar. In the scenarios where the servicer defaults, Moody's
assumed that the defaults on the pool would increase by 20
percentage points.

The model results showed 1.2% expected loss for Class A Floating
Rate Debt Securities and 26.0% for the Certificates.

Moody's also evaluated the back-up servicing arrangements in the
transaction. If Pvcred is removed as collection agent, Banco
Comafi will be appointed as the back-up collection agent.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's ran several stress scenarios, including increases in the
default rate assumptions. If default rates were increased by 4%
from the base case scenario, the ratings of the Class A Floating
Rate Securities would likely be downgraded to B1 (sf), while that
of the Certificates would remain unchanged


=============
B O L I V I A
=============


BOLIVIA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Sovereign Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on the Plurinational State of
Bolivia.  The outlook remains stable.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed the 'B' short-term foreign and local currency sovereign
credit ratings on Bolivia.  In addition, S&P affirmed its transfer
and convertibility assessment at 'BB'.

                             RATIONALE

The ratings on Bolivia reflect its strong external balance sheet,
low debt burden, and favorable debt profile.  They also reflect
Bolivia's weak public institutions, low per capita income
(projected to exceed US$3,500 in 2016), weakening fiscal profile,
and fiscal and export dependence on commodities, which can be
subject to volatile prices. Hydrocarbons (mainly natural gas) and
minerals account for the bulk of the country's exports.

The Administration of President Evo Morales has made dramatic
political and economic changes in recent years, shifting political
power toward Bolivia's large indigenous population and economic
power to its public sector.  However, Bolivia's public
institutions remain comparatively weak and susceptible to
politicization, and economic policymaking is highly centralized.
Morales' political party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), holds a
two-thirds majority in Congress, which helps the government to
implement its policy agenda.  However, MAS includes many well-
organized social groups, potentially making it difficult for the
government to adjust fiscal and other policies in the event of a
prolonged period of low commodity prices.

In contrast with some commodity-producing countries, Bolivia has
chosen to use aggressive countercyclical fiscal and monetary
policies to sustain economic growth during the downturn in prices,
drawing upon its ample public-sector liquid assets (which it had
accumulated during the commodity boom years).  As a result, GDP
grew 4.8% in 2015 and is likely to grow more than 4% this year (or
just above 2.4% in per capita terms), just below the country's
average GDP growth rate of 5% since 2006.  Bolivia's per capita
income has more than doubled since 2007.

GDP could grow around 3% or more in the next three years
(equivalent to 1.3% in per capita terms), reflecting the
government's plans to boost public-sector investment in strategic
sectors of the economy (especially petrochemicals, energy, and
infrastructure) while running fiscal and current account deficits.
Uncertainty about energy prices, coupled with the government's
ability to adjust the level of public-sector investment, adds
volatility to S&P's GDP growth forecast for the country in the
next three years.

A potentially prolonged period of low energy prices could create a
difficult trade-off between the need to contain the rise in public
debt and maintain an adequate level of foreign exchange reserves
on the one hand and the political goal of sustaining GDP growth
through continued high public-sector spending on the other.  The
success of the government's strategy depends on continued
pragmatism in encouraging private-sector investment in energy
exploration and production, and on avoiding substantial erosion in
its external balance sheet and currently low debt burden.

S&P expects that Bolivia's natural gas reserves will likely
increase in the next two to three years because of continued
exploration and development.  Production from existing fields may
peak in 2019 before declining gradually, highlighting the
importance of advancing rapidly with exploration and development
of new reserves.  S&P expects that Bolivia will continue to export
stable to moderately higher volumes of natural gas to Argentina
and Brazil while expanding the use of natural gas for domestic
residential consumption and power generation, and for new
petrochemical plants.  Otherwise, the prospect of declining gas
exports and lower long-term GDP growth could lead to a lower
rating.

Bolivia will likely have substantial current account deficits
(CADs) in 2016 and next year, eroding the strong external position
that it had acquired as a result of current account surpluses
during 2003-2014.  However, S&P expects the country's external
position to remain relatively robust thanks to ample external
assets and low external debt.  A sharp drop in exports drove the
trade balance into a deficit of around 4% of GDP in 2015,
resulting in a CAD exceeding 6% of GDP.  The combination of low
energy prices and the government's policy of sustaining GDP growth
via public-sector investment is likely to contribute to another
CAD approaching 6% of GDP in 2016.  Both the trade and current
account deficits are likely to narrow over the next two to three
years, with the CAD likely approaching 3%-4% of GDP, based on a
modest increase in gas export volumes and prices, along with some
moderation in import demand resulting from less expansionary
fiscal policy.

Despite these negative trends, S&P expects Bolivia's external
position will remain relatively strong.  S&P projects net public-
sector external debt to be -60% of current account receipts (CAR)
in 2016 and net banking sector external debt to be -22% of CAR.
S&P expects gross external financing requirements to be 59% of CAR
and usable reserves in 2016 and remain around 60%-70% in the next
three years.  The country's narrow net external debt is projected
to be -64% of CAR in 2016 and may decline below -50% in 2017.

Bolivia is subject to volatility in its terms of trade (the prices
of exports compared with prices of imports).  The country's stable
exchange rate vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar since 2011 has anchored
inflation expectations and underpinned confidence in the local
currency, a significant achievement in a country historically
plagued with monetary instability and a high level of dollar-
denominated assets and liabilities in its financial system.
However, a potentially prolonged period of currency appreciation,
combined with fiscal policies that contribute to a trade deficit,
could gradually erode the country's external assets.  S&P expects
that the government will make timely adjustments to policies to
avoid large and persistent imbalances that substantially weaken
its external profile.

S&P expects an erosion of Bolivia's fiscal profile in the coming
couple of years.  Bolivia had its first nonfinancial public-sector
deficit (of 3.4% of GDP) in 2014 after eight years of surpluses.
The nonfinancial public-sector deficit increased to around 7% of
GDP last year and may reach 6%-7% of GDP in 2016-2017.  As a
result, general government debt could increase by over 4% of GDP,
on average, during 2016-2019, more than S&P had previously
assumed.  S&P projects net general government debt could approach
20% of GDP in 2016 and continue climbing toward 28% in 2018.
Interest costs will likely rise to 3.6% of general government
revenue in 2016 and exceed 4% in the next two years.

Greater economic stability, as well as regulatory measures and
higher reserve requirements, has contributed to declining dollar-
denominated assets and liabilities in the financial system in
recent years, improving the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Dollar-denominated deposits fell below 17% of total deposits by
the end of 2015 from 94% in 2002, and dollar-denominated loans
fell below 5% of total loans from 97% during the same period.  The
reported capital adequacy ratio of the banks exceeds 12%, and
deposits fully fund the loan book.  Nonperforming loans are around
1.5% of total loans and are fully covered by loan loss provisions.
The financial system is likely to remain a net external creditor
in the coming three years.

Bolivia's financial services law gives the government powers to
set interest rates and to direct bank lending to specific sectors,
including a minimum of 60% of loans to "social housing" and to
"productive sectors" of the economy.  The long-term health of the
financial system depends in large part on the government's
pragmatism in prudently encouraging lending to targeted sectors,
avoiding excessive credit growth and risk-taking, and maintaining
bank profitability.

S&P believes that the banking system, as well as the small nonbank
financial sector, poses a limited contingent liability to the
sovereign.  Bolivia has several large nonfinancial public-sector
enterprises, but much of their funding comes from government funds
that had been set aside in earlier years of surpluses.

                              OUTLOOK

The stable outlook is based on S&P's assumption that the
government will seek to sustain GDP growth in the next two to
three years, in large part through investment funded by public-
sector savings and by both official and commercial debt.  S&P also
assumes that continued efforts to boost reserves of natural gas to
ensure the long-term sustainability of energy exports, as well as
domestic industrialization, will slowly begin to show results.
S&P expects that the government will manage the financial sector
under the 2013 financial services law in a manner that avoids
excessive credit growth, containing the risk of future contingent
liabilities.

The availability of ample public-sector savings, plus a low debt
burden, provides scope for the government to use countercyclical
fiscal and monetary policies to promote economic growth.  S&P
assumes that the government will be pragmatic in pursuing its
growth strategy so that it does not result in general government
debt and external metrics worse than S&P currently forecasts.

Prolonged low international oil prices (which are linked by a
formula to the price of Bolivia's natural gas exports), combined
with failure to boost output of natural gas, could worsen the
country's long-term export prospects.  Under such a scenario,
Bolivia's debt burden and external deficits could deteriorate
beyond our expectations, unless the government makes adjustments
to fiscal and other policies.  A weaker external profile or higher
debt burden could result in a downgrade.

Successful implementation of the government's growth strategy
could generate greater-than-expected fiscal revenue and net
exports.  Higher hydrocarbon production and a gradual
diversification of the economy would strengthen Bolivia's ability
to withstand volatility in commodity prices.  Over time, a better
fiscal performance could reverse the recent decline in fiscal
flexibility.  That, combined with potentially greater monetary
flexibility, could lead to a higher credit rating.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that "fiscal risk" had deteriorated.  All
other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Sovereign Credit Rating                       BB/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment          BB
Senior Unsecured                              BB


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


ELETROBRAS-CENTRAIS: S&P Affirms 'BB' Currency Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' global scale foreign and
local currency ratings and 'brA-1' short term national scale
ratings on Brazil-based power company Eletrobras-Centrais
Eletricas Brasileiras.

S&P also lowered the SACP to 'b+' from 'bb-'.  The outlook remains
negative.

The SACP revision reflects S&P's view that Eletrobras has lesser
ability to identify and effectively control critical strategic
risks, as seen in the corruption investigations and delays in
releasing its financial statements.  S&P then lowered its
management and governance assessment on the company to weak from
fair.  Eletrobras failed to release its 20-F filing for 2014 as
required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on-or-
before the already-extended date of May 18, 2016, given the
ongoing requests from independent auditors concerning issues
related to the corruption investigations.  As a result, the
negotiation of its American depository receipts (ADRs) listed in
NYSE was suspended in the trading, and the process of delisting
was initiated.  The company already announced that it will appeal
the decision.

The negative outlook on the company mirrors that on the sovereign
and reflects S&P's expectation that Eletrobras will continue to
play an essential role in Brazil's electricity sector, and will
therefore continue to receive government support.  Consequently,
any rating action on the company will continue to mirror actions
taken on the sovereign.

The negative outlook on the Federative Republic of Brazil reflects
S&P's view that there is a greater than one-in-three likelihood
that S&P could lower its ratings in the next year.


NEUQUEN: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on 30.38% Sec. Amortizing Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' global scale, issue-level
rating on the province of Neuquen's 30.38% secured amortizing
notes originally for $260 million, backed by oil royalties, due
2021 (TICAP), following the $110.4 million debt exchange of these
notes.

                              RATIONALE

The province completed the voluntary debt exchange of the
outstanding balance of its TICAP notes for new secured amortizing
notes backed by gas and cannon royalties due 2028 (TICADE).  The
province exchanged the outstanding amount of $110.4 million of the
TICAP notes for the new notes, the equivalent of 69.62% of the
TICAP notes' outstanding balance.  In addition to the exchange,
the province issued $235 million in new TICADE notes.  It will use
the proceeds of the new and exchanged notes for debt repayment.

As per S&P's criteria, "Rating Implications Of Exchange Offers And
Similar Restructurings, Update," published May 12, 2009, it don't
consider this exchange offer as tantamount to default because S&P
believes it doesn't meet the conditions to be considered as such.
Neuquen is offering higher interests for the new notes than the
existing ones (8.625% versus 7.875%), an exchange ratio of 1.03
per $1,000 tendered notes, plus accrued and unpaid interest with
respect to the 2021 notes.  In addition, S&P believes the province
is taking advantage of market conditions to refinance its
outstanding debt, following Argentina's curing of the July 2014
default on its foreign currency bonds.

Neuquen's TICAP notes are secured by certain oil royalties that
several oil producers pay to the province.  These royalties
represent 12% of the oil production value at the wellhead of the
dedicated concessionaries.  As part of the exchange, a share of
the underlying oil royalties previously committed to TICAP will be
transferred to TICADE.  The secured amortizing notes are Neuquen's
direct, general, unconditional and unsubordinated obligations.

S&P expects the province to repay the non-tendered part of the
eligible notes in accordance with the original terms and
conditions and the risks associated with Neuquen's weak credit
quality due to substantial economic imbalances in Argentina,
including high inflation; the risks associated with the
vulnerability of the hydrocarbon industry in the province as well
as the evolution and performance of the royalties or oil
production; and credit-enhancement protection that includes
overcollateralization and a debt service reserve account
equivalent to the next scheduled debt service payment.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Neuquen (Province of)
Senior Secured                         B-


USJ-ACUCAR: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Rating to 'RD'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Ratings of U.S.J. - Acucar e Alcool S.A. (USJ) to 'RD'
from 'C' and the National Scale Rating to 'RD(bra)' from 'C(bra)'.
Fitch has also upgraded USJ's USD275 million senior unsecured
notes due 2019 to 'CCC/RR2' from 'C/RR4'.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade follows the conclusion of a debt exchange offer for
the USD275 million senior unsecured notes due 2019, with
approximately 90% adhesion.  According to Fitch's methodology,
this offer is viewed as a distressed debt exchange (DDE).  The
rating upgrade on the unsecured notes reflects the implicit 75%
recovery that followed the 25% haircut taken by the bondholders.

According to the terms of the new notes, the company will have the
option to defer coupon payments in 2016 and 2017 and pay accrued
interest at maturity, which has been extended to 2021 from 2019.
If USJ defers coupon payments in 2016 and 2017, the coupon rate
will increase to 12% for these two years and return to the
original 9.875% in the following years.  New notes will be secured
by a fiduciary lien on USJ's Araras mill, lien on land and pledge
of sugar cane.

                         KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Crushed sugar cane volumes of 3.2 million tons in 2015/2016
      and gradual increases of 5% thereafter;

   -- Mix relatively unchanged at 66% sugar and 34% ethanol for
      the projected period;

   -- Average sugar prices at USD13 cents/pound in 2015/2016,
      USD15 cents/pound in 2016/2017 and USD16 cents/pound onward;

   -- Domestic ethanol prices keep their historical correlation
      with international sugar prices;

   -- No dividends coming from SJC Bioenergia (SJC) in 2015/2016;

   -- Up to BRL60 million in land sales in the State of Goias have
      been forecast for 2015/2016.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

USJ's IDRs and National Scale ratings will be downgraded to 'D'
and 'D(bra)', respectively, if the company formally files for
bankruptcy protection.  An upgrade to the 'C' to 'CCC' range is
plausible over the short-term, following the conclusion of the
Debt Exchange Offer and the consequent improvements in company's
liquidity and capital structure.  Upgrades to higher categories
are not expected given the maintenance of above-average leverage
indicators and the operational and financial challenges
surrounding the sugar and ethanol sector

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

U.S.J. - Acucar e Alcool S.A:

   -- Foreign and local currency long-term IDRs downgraded to 'RD'
      from 'C';
   -- Long-term National Scale rating downgraded to 'RD(bra)' from
      'C(bra)';
   -- USD275 million senior unsecured notes due 2019 upgraded to
      'CCC/RR2' from 'C/RR4'.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ANTHRACITE BALANCED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Anthracite Balanced Company (Discoverer I)
Limited will hold their final meeting on May 31, 2016, at
9:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Simon Conway
          c/o Gabby Whitter
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 914 8730
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237


CA PARTNERS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 9
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of CA Partners Offshore Fund SPC will hold their
final meeting on June 9, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Scott M. Kleberg
          Telephone: + 817 332 1600
          c/o CA Partners, LLC, 301 Commerce Street
          Suite 1300, Fort Worth
          TX 76102


CONTINENTAL TRUSTEES: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Jr. Sub. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed BBVA Banco Continental's (BC) Viability
Rating (VR) and Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'a-' and 'A-',
respectively.  The Rating Outlook is Stable.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

BC's local currency IDR remains one notch above Peru's sovereign
due to its very strong credit profile.  BC's VR reflects its
robust franchise, solid asset quality and ample reserves, solid
and consistent performance, diversified funding and adequate
capital. BC's cautious approach to business and track record of
adequate risk management underpin its credit metrics and provide
stability amid a less benign operating environment projected
during 2016 for Peruvian economy.

BC's moderate risk appetite, adequate credit policies, and risk
management tools contribute to maintain its historic asset quality
among the best in the region.  Although Fitch notes a slightly
deterioration trend in the last two years given the less favorable
operating environment that affected the loan growth, BC's 90-day
past due loan (PDL) stood below 2% at year-end 2015 (YE15) and
were covered by ample reserves (2.4x to PDL).  Some of these
ratios could continue to deteriorate slightly but Fitch expects
that it will remain sound and still adequately comparable with
regional peers.

In addition, the bank's efficiency and adroit credit risk
management that minimizes credit cost have contributed to an
operating profit/risk weighted assets (RWA) of 4% for the past
five years, although with a clear declining trend.  Fitch
estimates this ratio should remain strong and above 2% in the
medium term considering its robust franchise and diversified
business model even under moderate growth.

Good profitability and earnings retention underpin BC's capital,
which have declined from its peak in 2011 due to BC's solid
growth, with a Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio of 10.1% at YE15,
below the direct regional peers median (near to 11%) and lags from
those of its international peers rated (median of 14.6% for banks
with VR level of 'a-' at Dec. 31, 2015).  A strong internal
capital generation (11.9% in average for the last five years) will
continue to be the main source to maintain its capitalization
ratios in line with the past levels, altough Fitch considers that
recent RWA growth can put some pressure with respect to VR 'a-'
rated banks.

In addition, BC's still strong loan loss reserves (LLR) create an
additional cushion as LLR exceed 90-day PDLs in an amount
equivalent to about 20.5% of FCC.  Under the assumption of 100%
reserves coverage over 90-day PDLs, the FCC ratio will be around
12%.

Funding is wide based, stable, diversified with a growing share of
capital markets and adequate matching in currency and tenure.
Capital markets funding provides the bank with lower funding costs
and long-term funding, which improves asset/liability matching.
In addition, the core Fitch's metric of loans/deposits ratio is
above than regional peers (107.1% compared to 98.4% for the region
sector median at YE15).

                           SUPPORT RATING

The Support Rating of '2' reflects Fitch's view that there is high
probability of support to BC from its parent BBVA (rated
'A-' /Outlook Stable), if needed, as BC is considered a strategic
subsidiary of BBVA.

                          SUBORDINATED DEBT

As per Fitch's criteria, the subordinated note are rated one notch
below BC's VR, reflecting one notch for loss severity, but no
notches for incremental non-performance risk relative to the
bank's VR.  In Fitch's opinion, losses for the bondholders would
only arise when and if the bank reaches the point of non-
viability, which is why these securities receive no equity credit
under the agency's criteria.

              CONTINENTAL TRUSTEES (CAYMAN) LTD (CTCL)

Fitch has affirmed the rating of the loan participation notes
issued by CTCL at 'BB+'.  The notes are secured by the rights to a
junior subordinated loan extended to BC.  CTLC's notes, rated four
notches below the bank's VR, have strong equity-like features
including the non-cumulative deferral of the coupons and a deeper
subordination.  This notching reflects the incremental non-
performance risk relative to that captured by the VR and the loss
severity (two notches) given its deeper subordination.

          CONTINENTAL SENIOR TRUSTEES (CAYMAN) LTD (CSTC)

Fitch has affirmed the rating of the loan participation notes
issued by CSTC at 'A-'.  The notes are secured by the rights to a
senior loan extended to BC, hence, are equalized with the Long-
Term Foreign Currency IDR of BC.

          CONTINENTAL SENIOR TRUSTEES (CAYMAN) II LTD (CSTCII)

Fitch has affirmed the rating of the loan participation notes
issued by CSTCII at 'A-'.  The notes are secured by the rights to
a senior loan extended to BC, hence, are equalized with the Long-
Term Foreign Currency IDR of BC.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, VR, AND SENIOR DEBT

Over the medium term, BC's VR and IDR are highly correlated with
the strength of the operating environment.  A positive rating
action on the bank Foreign Currency IDR is not Fitch base case
considering current ratings are one notche above the sovereign and
due to lag of its FCC according to Fitch benchmark ratios.

On the other hand, BC's Local Currency IDRs could benefit from a
significant improvement of its parent's ability to provide
support, as evidenced by BBVA's IDR.

Significant Deterioration of its Performance: BC's VR and IDRs
would be pressured, individually or collectively, by a sharp
deterioration of the bank's performance or a larger than expected
decline in asset quality that would erode the capital/reserves
cushion (operating profit/RWA below 2%, 90-day PDLs above 3%, and
FCC below 9.5%).

                          SUPPORT RATING

The support rating of BC could be revised upward if the parent
rating is materially further upgraded (at least two notched from
current BBVA Spain 'A-' IDR).

                         SUBORDINATED DEBT

The subordinated notes' rating is sensitive to any changes in BC's
VR and will typically be rated one notched below BC's VR.

CONTINENTAL TRUSTEES (CAYMAN) LTD, CONTINENTAL SENIOR TRUSTEES
(CAYMAN) LTD AND CONTINENTAL SENIOR TRUSTEES (CAYMAN) II LTD

The ratings of the securities issued by these three SPVs would
move in line with those of BC.

Fitch has affirmed BC's ratings as:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'A-', Stable Outlook;
   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'F1';
   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'A-', Stable Outlook;
   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR at 'F1';
   -- Viability Rating at 'a-';
   -- Support Rating at '2';
   -- Senior unsecured debt at 'A-';
   -- Subordinated debt at 'BBB+'.

Continental Trustees (Cayman) Ltd.

   -- Junior subordinated loan participation notes at 'BB+'.

Continental Senior Trustees (Cayman) Ltd

   -- Senior secured loan participation notes at 'A-'.

Continental Senior Trustees II (Cayman) Ltd.

   -- Senior secured loan participation notes at 'A-'.


EVENING STAR: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 13
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Evening Star PTC Limited will hear on June 13,
2016, at 11:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
          Clifton House, 75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


GLG EMERGING: Members' Final Meeting Set for June 2
---------------------------------------------------
The members of GLG Emerging Currency and Fixed Income Fund will
hold their final meeting on June 2, 2016, at 11:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ms. Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Ernst & Young Ltd.
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060


MASTER INTERNATIONAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 8
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Master International Co., Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on June 8, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Chen, Li-Chen
          No.19
          Ln. 207 Huakang St.
          Bade Dist.
          Taoyuan City 334
          Taiwan (R.O.C.)
          Telephone: 886-3-3625206


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Manufacturing Declines Slightly in April
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the monthly manufacturing index
(IMAM) prepared by the Dominican Republic Industries Association
(AIRD) declined slightly from 59.9 in March to 58.9 in April.

The activity rose from March 2016 to April 2016 on production
volume and suppliers delivery time, while a turnover, employment
and inventory of raw materials slightly decreased, according to
Dominican Today.

Production volume posted the highest increase compared with the
previous month, from 63.5 in March to 66.4 in April, the report
notes.

The index also reveals that the segment of major industries posted
the highest increase in manufacturing activity, from 59.5 to 66.8,
while the micro and small industries slightly decline in the index
over the previous month, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 3, 2015, Fitch Ratings affirmed the Dominican Republic's
long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B+'.  The Rating Outlooks on the long-term IDRs are revised to
Positive from Stable. The issue ratings on the Dominican
Republic's senior unsecured foreign and local currency bonds are
affirmed at 'B+'. The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'BB-' and the
short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.


=============
G R E N A D A
=============


GRENADA ELECTRICITY: Warns of Threat to Electricity Reliability
---------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that Grenada Electricity Services Ltd.
(GRENLEC,) the sole provider of electricity in Grenada, Carriacou
and Petit Martinique, has claimed that the country's new energy
legislation will threaten the electricity sector's reliability and
costs.

It has also claimed the Electricity Supply Bill and Public
Utilities Regulatory Commission Bill are politically motivated,
according to Caribbean360.com.

But government says both claims are far from the truth, notes
Caribbean360.com.

In a statement, GRENLEC said the Bills unilaterally scrap the
current legislative and regulatory framework that has successfully
allowed Grenada to enjoy more than 20 years of world-class
electricity service and growth, the report relays.

But Minister for Health and Social Security issued a statement,
saying he was appalled at GRENLEC's comments.

"I take issue with that.  In fact, I take offence to that. This is
being motivated in the best interest of our people of Grenada.
Unlike the members of GRENLEC who have framed this, we have a
responsibility to the people, not to shareholders," the minister
said, the report notes.  "It is not an acceptable international
norm to have a legislated monopoly," he added.

Mr. Steele said that, for years, Grenada has not been able to
access any of the benefits of being a member of the International
Renewable Authority, because of the legislative monopoly of
GRENLEC, which has been preventing government from providing
electricity to less fortunate people, or to itself, without first
seeking the permission of the private entity, the report notes.

The minister says, with the new legislation, the aim of government
is not to terminate the operations of GRENLEC, but to bring
greater competition into electricity market for the benefit of the
people, the report relays.

"It has nothing to do with whether the private entity is welcomed
or continues to be welcomed. What we seek to do is create an
environment . . . . it should not be as a result of a legislation.
It should be as a result of fair competition and fair play," he
said, the report notes.  "As a responsible government we not only
have a right to provide that type of environment, we have an
obligation to provide that type of environment," he added.

The Lower House of Parliament on May 11 approved the measures that
the Government said will lead to a comprehensive reform of the
electricity sector by opening the door for other investors to
generate electricity using renewable energy resources, the report
relays.

The Upper House will make a final decision on the Bills in an
upcoming sitting, the report adds.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Budget Devoid of Strategies to Reduce Debt, Phillips Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the opposition People's National Party's
(PNP) spokesperson on Finance, Dr. Peter Phillips, said the
2016/2017 Budget was devoid of strategies to reduce Jamaica's
debt.

Mr. Phillips says debt reduction is a key element of the economic
program and based on the new fiscal policy paper, there are no
explicit plans to address the issue, according to RJR News.

"We had projected that we would reach a debt reduction target of
120 per cent debt to GDP by the end of this fiscal year.  The
Government in its fiscal policy paper has said we will not reach
that, and that the debt will remain constant this year. . . .
Over the course of the next three to four years, there will be a
slippage of about eight per cent debt to GDP on this debt
reduction target," Mr. Phillips said, the report notes.

At a press conference the former Finance Minister said this is a
cause for concern, the report relays.  "There may be reasons for
it but the Minister of Finance said nothing about it and so we are
left to feel that this might be just an attempt to ignore these
hard realities. We need to have a better statement of purpose from
the government in this regard," he added.


                              *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 29, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B'
issue rating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in
two tranches.  The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due
in 2028.  The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in
2045.  The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that
Jamaica owes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's
2015/2016 budget.


JAMAICA: Urged to Review CET Charged on Imported Oil
----------------------------------------------------
RJR news reports that Dennis Chung, CEO of the Private Sector
Organisation of Jamaica (PSOJ), is calling for the government to
review the Common External Tariff (CET) charged on oil imported
from outside the region.

Mr. Chung said the government must either remove the tariff or
introduce the CET on oil from Trinidad and Tobago, according to
RJR News.

                            *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 29, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B'
issue rating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in
two tranches.  The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due
in 2028.  The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in
2045.  The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that
Jamaica owes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's
2015/2016 budget.


=======
P E R U
=======


BANCO DE CREDITO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Jr. Sub. Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco de Credito del Peru's (BCP)
Viability Rating (VR) and Issuer Default Ratings at 'a-' and 'A-',
respectively.  The Rating Outlook is Stable.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

BCP's local currency IDR remains one notch above Peru's sovereign
due to its very strong credit profile.  Its VR reflect the bank's
adequate loss absorption capacity, given a dominant franchise,
high and sustained profitability and sound credit risk management,
together with a strong liquidity and stable and diversified
funding.  Fitch believes the entity will be able to withstand any
occasional deterioration in the operating environment.

Sound risk management policies and diversification allowed BCP to
maintain a strong asset quality - 90-day past due loan (PDL) below
2% for more than five years, altough with a slight increasing
trend - and were covered by ample reserves (2.4x to PDL) at year-
end (YE) 2015, one of the best among peers in the region.  At the
same time, the bank's diversified business model and resilient
margins, improving efficiency and moderate credit cost resulted in
a consistent operating profit to risk weighted assets (RWA) at
3.5% in the last five years.

BCP's Fitch core capital (FCC) at 11.1% at YE 2015 compares
adequately with that of its regional peers but still lags those of
its international peers rated (median of 14.6% for banks with VR
level of 'a-' at Dec. 31, 2015).  Ample and sustained
profitability and earnings retention underpin BCP's capital which
should be viewed in the light of its ample reserve coverage
(excess reserves attained about 20% of FCC).

Fitch notes that the structural dollarization of the Peruvian
banking system creates challenges for banks as the dollar
strengthens and expectations for the depreciation of local
currency persist.  The challenge for banks has mainly come in the
form of asymmetric liquidity (ample in dollars, tight in local
currency) and some pressures on capital.  The bank's funding is
ample, well diversified and low cost but the core Fitch's metric
of loans / deposits ratio is been increasing the latest two years
and above than regional peers (104.9% compared to 98.8% for the
region sector median at YE 2015).

While the bank's strength allows it to face these challenges
confidently, the structural currency mismatch will take some time
to improve.  Fitch will continue to monitor the evolution of the
de-dollarization efforts and the eventual introduction of
structural, long term solutions.

                SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

BCP's 34% market share in deposits and its outsize presence in all
business segments make it a crucial part of Peru's financial
sector.  Support from the government should be forthcoming in case
of need; Peru's ability to provide such support is reflected in
its Sovereign Rating ('BBB+/A-') and underpins BCP's Support and
Support Rating Floor ratings.

           SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

BCP's subordinated bonds are plain vanilla and lack the features
that would earn them equity credit following Fitch's criteria.
Their probability of non-performance is equivalent to that of
BCP's senior bonds, but they would entail a higher loss severity
in case of default due to their subordinated nature.  Hence, they
are rated only one notch below the bank's VR.

BCP's junior subordinated bonds, rated five notches below the
bank's VR, have very strong equity-like features including the
non-cumulative deferral of the coupons and a deeper subordination.
This notching reflects the incremental non-performance risk
relative to that captured by the VR and the loss severity (two
notches) given its deeper subordination.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, VR, AND SENIOR DEBT

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's belief that the bank's strong
balance sheet and performance are resilient to eventual downturns
and even though some credit metrics may see a slight
deterioration, they are likely to remain compatible with its
current rating.

Over the medium term, BCP's VR and IDRs are highly correlated with
the operating environment.  A positive rating action on the bank
IDRs is not Fitch base case considering current ratings are one
notche above the sovereign and due to lag of its FCC according to
Fitch benchmark ratios.

Significantly Weaker Performance: BCP's VR and IDRs could suffer
if the bank's asset quality deteriorates significantly causing and
erosion of the bank's reserve and capital cushions (FCC below 9.5%
and or operating profit to RWA below 2%).

             SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

BCP's SR and SRF could be affected if Fitch changes its view of
Peru's ability or willingness to support the bank.

            SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The subordinated and junior subordinated debt ratings would move
in line with BCP's VR.

Fitch has affirmed BCP's ratings as:

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR at 'A-', Stable
      Outlook;
   -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR at 'F1';
   -- Viability Rating at 'a-';
   -- Support Rating at '2';
   -- Support Rating Floor at 'BBB';
   -- Senior unsecured debt at 'A-';
   -- Subordinated debt at 'BBB+';
   -- Junior subordinated debt at 'BB'.


BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Jr. Sub. Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Internacional del Peru S.A.A.'s
(Interbank) Viability Rating (VR) and Issuer Default Ratings at
'bbb+' and 'BBB+', respectively.  The Rating Outlook remains
Stable.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's IDRs are driven by its VR and standalone strength.
They reflect the bank's information-intensive risk management
framework, strong underwriting and effective collections efforts.

Interbank's loan quality indicators showed modest deterioration
over the course of 2015, primarily in its credit card and payroll
loan portfolio affected by slower economic growth.  Interbank's
loan quality indicators continued to compare favourably with the
financial system as a whole, despite the bank's relatively greater
retail orientation.  Past due loans greater than 90 days (90-day
PDLs) rose to 2.2% at year-end (YE) 2015 from 1.9% the year prior,
mitigated by relatively low borrower concentration levels and
reserve coverage of 209%.  In addition, the bank reported
substantial gains in reducing loan dollarization to 29.2% from
37.4% of net loans during 2015.

Ratings also reflect Interbank's consistently strong
profitability, benefitting from stronger growth in higher-margin
products, a larger contribution from fee income, and better
operational efficiency.  Notwithstanding a disproportionate growth
in cash and other non-earning assets, operational profitability
increased to 3.2% in 2015 from 3.1% the year prior.  In addition,
Interbank's operating expenses have consistently trended downwards
to 3.7% of average assets in 2015 compared to a rate of 6.4% in
2008 due in part to increased focus on digital service channels.

Interbank's capital is adequate but was slightly pressured in 2015
due to the appreciation of U.S. dollar denominated assets. Fitch
core capital remained stable at 9.6% of risk weighted assets at YE
2015 and its regulatory capital of 15.5% compared favourably with
the banking system average (14.2%).  Fitch sees the bank's cushion
against unexpected losses also considering its large loan loss
reserves (2.8% of total assets) as well as USD200 million in Tier
I compliant junior subordinated debt and USD518.7 million in Tier
2 compliant subordinated debt equivalent.

The bank's funding and liquidity profile marks a key strength.
Interbank has made significant gains in attracting a stable,
retail deposit base, ranking fourth in customer deposits with a
market share of 12%.  Like the financial system as a whole,
Interbank's loan de-dollarization has outpaced its deposit de-
dollarization.  The central bank has encouraged banks to de-
dollarize by facilitating long-term currency swaps.  In Fitch's
opinion, the central bank has the capacity and propensity to
continue providing these facilities over the longer term, given
Peru's strong external liquidity and large FX reserves, as well as
the moderate size of private credit (44.8% of GDP at March 2016).
In terms of liquidity, Interbank manages to conservative liquidity
limits in both currencies, comparing favourably to the system as a
whole.

               SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Interbank's Support Rating and Support Rating Floor reflect
Interbank's sizeable market share in deposits, its presence in all
business segments, as well as the Republic of Peru's capacity to
provide support should it be required.

           SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Interbank's subordinated bonds are plain vanilla and are not
assigned equity credit under Fitch's criteria.  In Fitch's
opinion, their probability of non-performance is equivalent to
that of Interbank's senior bonds but, they would entail a higher
loss in case of default due to their subordinated nature.  Hence,
they are rated only one notch below the bank's VR.

Interbank's junior subordinated bonds, rated four notches below
the bank's VR, have non-cumulative deferral of the coupons and a
deeper subordination.  This notching reflects the incremental non-
performance risk relative to that captured by the VR and the loss
severity (two notches) given its deeper subordination.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

VRs, IDRS, AND SENIOR DEBT

Given its current rating, there is little upside potential for
Interbank's VR and IDRs.  Interbank's ratings could be downgraded
if a severe decline in asset quality (PDLs above 4%) or weak
profitability erode its capital (FCC below 9%) and reserve
cushion.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Interbank's Support Rating (SR) and Support Rating Floor (SRF)
could be affected if Fitch changes its view of Peru's ability or
willingness to support the bank.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The subordinated and junior subordinated debt ratings would move
in line with Interbank's VR.

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

Banco Internacional del Peru S.A.A. (Interbank)

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BBB+', Stable Outlook;
   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'F2';
   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BBB+', Stable Outlook;
   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR at 'F2';
   -- Viability Rating at 'bbb+';
   -- Support Rating at '2';
   -- Support Rating Floor at 'BBB';
   -- Senior unsecured debt at 'BBB+';
   -- Subordinated debt at 'BBB';
   -- Junior subordinated debt at 'BB'.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================

PUERTO RICO: New Bill Makes Changes to Creditor Prioritization
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Rainey at Morning Consult reports that Republicans on the
House Natural Resources Committee introduced a new measure aimed
at giving Puerto Rico the tools to restructure about $70 billion
in debt.

The legislation -- H.R. 5278, sponsored by Rep. Sean Duffy (R-
Wis.) -- includes several "minor" changes to the previous measure,
H.R. 4900, according to Committee Chairman Rob Bishop (R-Utah),
the report notes.

"Tonight we introduced legislation to responsibly address the
crisis in Puerto Rico," Mr. Bishop said in a statement, according
to Morning Consult.  "The revised bill incorporates technical
refinements and input from all stakeholders.  Any future changes
will be done in public committee meetings," Mr. Bishop added.

Some stakeholders may consider the revisions to be significant.
According to a Natural Resources Committee summary, the new
measure would block a new Labor Department overtime rule from
applying to Puerto Rico, the report notes.

The changes also include language that clarifies the fiscal
oversight board's authority to protect prioritized payments to
bondholders, the report relays.  Those payments are required by
the commonwealth's constitution, the report notes.

"PROMESA creates a firewall between the constitutionally protected
creditor hierarchy and pensions in the development of Fiscal
Plans," the committee summary stated, referring to the bill by its
acronym, the report discloses.

The legislation also bars Puerto Rico's governor "from executive
any budgetary adjustment" between the enactment of the bill and
the establishment of its oversight board, and has language to
"reiterate the promotion of voluntary restructuring agreements and
explicitly honor voluntary agreements that are already in place,"
the summary said, the report says.

Talks between House lawmakers and the Obama administration lasted
more than a week, largely due to hangups over language concerning
the oversight board's composition and the prioritization of
creditors that had to be hashed out between the White House, the
Treasury Department and Speaker Paul Ryan's office, the report
notes.

The Treasury Department has called for language that would
prioritize pensioners over creditors, but Republicans' rejection
of that language was non-negotiable, the report relays.

The report says that the new bill retains provisions, with some
alterations, that some opponents have called a form of "Super
Chapter 9" bankruptcy.  That language, which gives the federal
district court in Puerto Rico "personal jurisdiction over any
person or entity," remains in section 306 (c) of the new
legislation, the report notes.

Daniel Hanson, an analyst for the Washington-based broker-dealer
Height Securities LLC, said a provision that separates
constitutionally guaranteed debts from other claims like pensions
in restructuring votes would help the bill gain more support,
notes the report.

"This version will pass," he said in an email to Morning Consult.

The Natural Resources summary addresses the Chapter 9 accusations,
as well as concerns that the bill has implications of "contagion"
to other debt-strapped jurisdictions beyond Puerto Rico, whose
relationship with Congress is formed under the Territorial Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, the report notes.

"PROMESA ensures that Puerto Rico is unable to repudiate its
debts," the summary said. "Instead it institutes fiscal and
economic reforms to guarantee the island regains access to capital
markets."

The new measure omits controversial provisions that would have
allowed the transfer of federal land on the island of Vieques, and
it makes complex alterations to a previous provision that would
have allowed Puerto Rico's governor to lower the minimum wage to
$4.25 an hour, the report discloses.

Pedro Pierluisi, Puerto Rico's non-voting representative in the
U.S. House, said the new bill is closer to earning his support,
which would be important to attract Democratic support for the
measure, the report relays.

"Like any product of bipartisan compromise, it contains provisions
I oppose or view as unnecessary, and it is my hope these
provisions can be modified or removed as the legislative process
moves forward," he said in a statement, the report notes.
"However, the heart of the bill -- the debt restructuring section
and the oversight board section -- now comes far closer to meeting
the stringent criteria I established in order for the legislation
to earn my support."

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Dec.
28, 2015, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded $1.09 billion
of Puerto Rico appropriation bonds issued by the Public Finance
Corporation (PFC) to C from Ca, while maintaining other ratings
assigned to the US territory's debt.


===========================================
S T.  V I N C E N T  &  G R E N A D I N E S
===========================================


ST. VINCENT: Moody's Changes Outlook on B3 Gov't. Rating to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on the Government of
St Vincent and the Grenadines' B3/NP issuer and B3 government bond
ratings to stable from negative and affirmed the ratings.

Moody's says, "the rating action reflects our expectation that
faster growth and lower fiscal deficits will keep St Vincent's
debt metrics consistent with B-rated peers. Real GDP will likely
increase closer to 2% this year and next, after averaging only
0.5% per year from 2010 to 2015. We forecast debt will end at 260%
of revenues in 2016, similar to the 234% median for ratings peers.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that while debt will likely
continue to rise in the next two years, the increase will be
moderate and debt affordability will continue to be supported by
low interest funding from multilateral and bilateral creditors."

The local currency ceiling remains unchanged at Ba3. The foreign
currency bond and bank deposit ceilings also remain unchanged at
Ba3/NP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATION OF ST VINCENT'S B3 RATING

After years of weak economic growth St Vincent is poised for a
modest recovery, with real GDP forecast to grow 2% on average
until 2018. St Vincent, like most other Caribbean nations, is
highly dependent on tourism, which represents almost 25% of
economic activity, either directly or indirectly. Most tourism is
from the US and with the recent economic recovery in the US,
growth has also picked up in St Vincent. Last year stay-over
tourist arrivals rose 6.6% relative to 2014, compared with an
average increase of only 0.1% since 2010.

Moody's says, "further growth may result from the opening of a new
international airport. In construction since 2008, lack of
necessary funding has delayed the start of operations of Argyle
international Airport. Since currently there are no direct flights
to the capital city of Kingstown from North America or Europe, the
new airport will likely lead to an increased flow of tourists, a
development we anticipate will have a multiplier effect on the
economy.

"Economic growth should help limit the increase in the debt
burden, which remains on par with peers but has been rising in
recent years. Debt to GDP will end at 72% this year, compared to
60% in 2012. Low interest funding from developments banks has
helped keep interest payments stable, despite the increase in
debt. We estimate interest payments will represent 9% of revenues
in 2016, a similar percentage as in 2012, and lower than the B-
rated median of 10%."

St Vincent's B3 rating remains constrained by its small and
undiversified economy. The country is highly susceptible to
weather-related shocks and it relies heavily on grants and
multilateral lending for its funding needs. Fiscal flexibility is
limited as well as overall policy effectiveness reflecting a weak
institutional framework and lack of timely and adequate
macroeconomic data.

RATIONALE FOR ASSIGNING A STABLE OUTLOOK

Moody's says, "the stable outlook reflects our expectation that
the fiscal deficit will remain moderate over the next two years
limiting the increase in the debt burden. Fiscal deficits averaged
3.5% of GDP since 2011 but that should fall to 2.5% in 2016, on
the heels of increased tax compliance efforts and faster growth.
The government aims to reach fiscal results close to balance by
2018, an ambitious target which we anticipate will be extremely
hard to reach given historical performance."

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's says, "we see limited potential for upward rating changes
in the immediate future. Faster growth driven by the completion of
Argyle International Airport and the expected associated increase
in FDI in the tourism sector would be credit positive and
supportive of the rating. A significant strengthening of the
government's balance sheet through a marked reduction in debt
metrics or diversification of funding sources would place upward
pressure on the sovereign's rating. A significant reduction in
external vulnerabilities, particularly a drop of the current
account deficit which reached almost 30% of GDP last year, would
also create upward pressure."

A further deterioration of the government balance sheet, the
assumption of contingent liabilities coming from state owned
companies, or increased commercial borrowing to finance potential
cost overruns related to the Argyle airport would be credit
negative. Downward pressure on the rating would also arise if
access to grants and concessional finance were to deteriorate, or
if a large external shock - such as a major hurricane - were to
jeopardize balance of payments sustainability.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 11,009 (2014 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 1.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 0.5% (2015 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.8% (2015 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -29.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 46.8% (2015 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On 17 May 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Gov-t of. The main
points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's economic
fundamentals, including its economic strength, have materially
increased. The issuer's governance and/or management, have
decreased. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including
its debt profile, has not materially changed.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From May 16 to May 21, 2016
--------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn    Price   Maturity   Country  Curr
-----------               ---    -----   --------   -------  ----
Alpha Star Holding II Lt   8.45   66.477  3/19/2034     EC  USD
Andino Investment Holdin   5.36   74.336  11/25/2020    EC  USD
Andino Investment Holdin    8.5     37.1  4/10/2018     VE  USD
Anton Oilfield Services   11.75       41  10/21/2026    VE  USD
Anton Oilfield Services   8.875     19.5  3/29/2017     MN  USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 L      8    6.625  12/31/2018    CL  USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman Ltd   5.75   69.812  12/1/2034     KY  USD
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Arg  4.375    46.75  4/25/2025     KY  USD
Banco BPI SA/Cayman Isla    7.5    61.25   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma    7.5    45.88                KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma    7.5     44.2                KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma     10  128.271  12/31/2020    KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma  4.625   69.075   3/1/2021     KY  USD
Banco Santander Puerto R    7.5       45  4/25/2019     HK  USD
BCP Singapore VI Cayman   8.625     68.5  11/1/2018     AE  USD
BCP Singapore VI Cayman  0.9551    42.75  12/1/2039     KY  USD
CA La Electricidad de Ca   5.93   73.652  11/1/2021     EC  USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos    9.5    29.75  4/23/2019     BR  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr  7.375   69.875  1/31/2020     PE  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr    6.5   69.989  12/1/2023     EC  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr      7    47.25  4/21/2020     KY  USD
CSN Islands XI Corp        5.93   73.051   1/1/2022     EC  USD
CSN Islands XI Corp       10.75   34.639  2/12/2023     BR  USD
CSN Islands XII Corp          7    73.33  1/17/2023     CO  COP
CSN Islands XII Corp       3.95   61.977  3/15/2022     KY  USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomis  6.375   73.875  5/15/2043     CR  USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomis    7.7   68.067   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Delta Investment Horizon   5.36   75.108  12/30/2020    EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.389  4/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.389  4/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.5   65.375   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      6   43.875   4/5/2023     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.25   73.089   4/6/2017     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  6.375   73.835  5/15/2043     CR  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      6       31  5/16/2024     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   9.75    36.95  5/17/2035     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  4.625     69.5  5/21/2023     CN  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    8.5    75.01  5/25/2016     CN  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      3   74.109  5/26/2020     ID  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.784  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   9.25       35   5/7/2028     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  4.875   75.819   6/1/2027     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.75   74.625  6/11/2025     DO  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.75   74.625  6/11/2025     DO  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.164  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.201  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.201  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.975  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.415  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.415  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.158  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.195  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.408  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.408  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   70.121  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.073  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.073  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  5.125    43.35  6/26/2022     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  5.125   44.625  6/26/2022     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  7.125     43.5  6/26/2042     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  7.125       42  6/26/2042     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.25       43  6/27/2029     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.35    31.25  6/30/2021     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.35     31.5  6/30/2021     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.032   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.067   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.291   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.863   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.291   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625       62  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625       45  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625   49.881  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Empresa de Telecomunicac   5.64   71.931  12/30/2021    EC  USD
Empresa de Telecomunicac   5.42       50  3/28/2019     NO  NOK
Empresa Generadora de El   8.25    45.75  4/25/2018     KY  BRL
Empresa Generadora de El  4.625   72.512  5/21/2023     CN  USD
ESFG International Ltd     5.25       52  4/12/2017     VE  USD
General Exploration Part  5.125    34.75  12/15/2017    BR  EUR
General Shopping Finance   6.21   71.552  11/25/2023    EC  USD
General Shopping Finance  11.75    70.75  4/23/2018     KY  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   7.75   69.333  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   5.93   73.359  12/1/2021     EC  USD
Global A&T Electronics L     10    62.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   8.45   66.646   2/6/2034     EC  USD
Gol Finance Inc            6.75    23.75  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Gol Finance Inc           8.625    67.75  11/1/2018     AE  USD
Gol Finance Inc            4.15     71.5  11/14/2035    KY  EUR
Gol Finance Inc            5.25    47.25  3/15/2042     KY  USD
Gol Finance Inc           5.375    31.45  4/12/2027     VE  USD
Gol Finance Inc             5.5    32.64  4/12/2037     VE  USD
Gol Finance Inc            8.25    45.75  4/25/2018     KY  BRL
Golden Eagle Retail Grou      6    70.25  10/25/2041    PA  USD
Golden Eagle Retail Grou   6.95       65   4/1/2025     KY  USD
Greenfields Petroleum Co  12.75     42.4  2/17/2022     VE  USD
Honghua Group Ltd           6.5    67.24  11/15/2020    KY  USD
Honghua Group Ltd          8.45   66.414   4/2/2034     EC  USD
Instituto Costarricense    7.75   69.149  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Instituto Costarricense     7.5   51.602  4/15/2031     KY  USD
Inversiones Alsacia SA      7.5   46.274  11/6/2018     CN  USD
Inversiones Alsacia SA       10    62.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Inversora Electrica de B    7.5       34  4/25/2019     HK  USD
Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd   5.64   70.192  11/25/2021    EC  USD
Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd   5.61   68.567  12/1/2022     EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.75   70.495  10/23/2028    EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp          6.21   71.691  11/1/2022     EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp             8    57.65  4/15/2021     KY  USD
Mongolian Mining Corp       5.5     36.5  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Mongolian Mining Corp     8.875       16  3/29/2017     MN  USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman Is   7.75   69.111  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Newland International Pr  12.75    44.25  2/17/2022     VE  USD
Newland International Pr      7   46.125  4/21/2020     KY  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  6.625       22  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   5.75    61.11  10/24/2023    BR  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  4.125    61.46  11/1/2022     BR  USD
Noble Holding Internatio      6    30.75  11/15/2026    VE  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   5.93   71.815  11/25/2022    EC  USD
Noble Holding Internatio    7.5     46.5  11/6/2018     CN  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   7.75   69.371  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  9.875    31.05  11/9/2019     BR  USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe   7.25   53.375  1/18/2018     KY  USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe   7.75   69.102  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7    38.55                BR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7     39.5                BR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.753        1                KY  EUR
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.75    37.25  10/13/2019    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      8.25    35.75  10/13/2024    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         9    35.75  11/17/2021    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         4   70.666  11/4/2023     AR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd    0.9551    42.75  12/1/2039     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.75   69.102  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         8     74.5  12/20/2049    CN  CNY
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         6    33.25  12/9/2020     VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      3.38   63.175   2/7/2035     KY  EUR
Odebrecht Finance Ltd    3.8734       98  3/21/2017     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7       36  3/31/2038     VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.45    53.07  4/15/2027     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6.875   73.411  4/22/2016     CN  CNY
Odebrecht Offshore Drill  9.375    37.75  1/13/2034     VE  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill      6   29.125  10/28/2022    VE  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill  7.125    65.73  12/15/2021    KY  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill   7.75   69.066  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Oi SA                         7    73.33  1/17/2023     CO  COP
Oi SA                         8        6  12/31/2018    CL  USD
Pesquera Exalmar SAA     2.8791   73.715  11/30/2032    CL  USD
Pesquera Exalmar SAA       7.65     35.5  4/21/2025     VE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   6.25    54.25                KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   8.75    28.25                BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   0.99   43.333                KY  EUR
Petroleos de Venezuela S   5.95    50.25  1/30/2018     NO  NOK
Petroleos de Venezuela S  7.375     73.5  1/31/2020     PE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   5.93   73.967  10/1/2021     EC  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  6.625   22.375  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S    5.5    35.59  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  4.125       62  11/1/2022     BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S     11   70.125  11/13/2020    PE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S     10    63.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  10.75   34.125  2/12/2023     BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   6.05       49   3/1/2041     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S    6.8       50  3/15/2038     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   7.95    55.25   4/1/2045     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S      8    66.25  4/15/2021     KY  USD
Polarcus Ltd               7.75   69.371  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Provincia del Chaco           6       45   4/5/2023     KY  USD
PSOS Finance Ltd              7     41.5  12/1/2018     VE  USD
Rabobank Chile             5.25    41.55  6/27/2029     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.752  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini      9    37.25   5/7/2023     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.465  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.563  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.563  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45    65.97  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   67.196  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.789  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   67.196  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25     36.1  7/20/2020     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25       38  7/20/2020     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.949  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.932  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.932  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    9.5   23.375   7/3/2017     PA  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    9.5   23.375   7/3/2017     PA  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    4.9   73.401   8/1/2020     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.885   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.899   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.899   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.2   50.923   8/1/2040     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  12.75       43  8/23/2022     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  11.95     40.5   8/5/2031     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7    67.63  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.663  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.663  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.552  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.897  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.897  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.687  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.719  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.719  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.625    72.25  9/11/2042     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.75   33.382  9/15/2016     BR  BRL
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.75   33.625  9/15/2016     BR  BRL
Republic of Ecuador Mini  9.125   67.887  9/15/2017     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25       40  9/15/2027     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  6.875    55.25  9/21/2019     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  6.875       57  9/21/2019     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.45   45.015  9/25/2019     CN  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.45   45.125  9/25/2019     CN  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.5     58.5  9/26/2017     AR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.375    61.25  9/26/2024     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.375    53.75  9/26/2024     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.506  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   68.779  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   68.779  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.454  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.784  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.784  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA      0.719       43                KY  EUR
Samarco Mineracao SA       7.75   69.436  10/23/2028    EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA       11.5   35.375  11/13/2018    CA  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA      1.353   73.375  12/17/2017    KY  EUR
Samarco Mineracao SA       6.21   68.503  12/30/2023    EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA       8.45   66.646   2/6/2034     EC  USD
Seagate HDD Cayman         7.75   70.495  10/23/2028    EC  USD
Seagate HDD Cayman          6.5   69.477  11/25/2024    EC  USD
Shelf Drilling Holdings   5.125   34.584  12/15/2017    BR  EUR
Shelf Drilling Holdings       8    52.15  4/15/2027     KY  USD
Siem Offshore Inc            10    67.99   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Siem Offshore Inc           7.5     79.5  3/10/2020     CN  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA        9       68                KY  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     6.25    50.25                KY  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     5.75    61.25  10/24/2023    BR  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     7.75   69.149  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA    6.875       49   2/6/2018     HK  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     5.25   43.273  3/21/2019     VE  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA      5.6       45  3/30/2022     AE  USD
Transocean Inc               10       55                KY  USD
Transocean Inc                9    69.75                KY  USD
Transocean Inc             7.25       54  1/18/2018     KY  USD
Transocean Inc             4.54   58.625  10/25/2041    PA  USD
Transocean Inc               11       70  11/13/2020    PE  USD
Transocean Inc             6.75  104.4036 11/5/2021     PY  USD
Transocean Inc              7.5   75.375  12/10/2028    PR  USD
Transocean Inc             8.45   66.618   2/6/2034     EC  USD
US Capital Funding IV Lt   7.75   70.502  4/25/2028     EC  USD
US Capital Funding IV Lt   9.75    37.65  5/17/2035     VE  USD
Usiminas Commercial Ltd      10       55                KY  USD
Usiminas Commercial Ltd    8.45   66.451  3/19/2034     EC  USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA      6.5   69.901   1/1/2024     EC  USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     5.93   73.323  12/30/2022    EC  USD
Vale SA                    6.21   71.086   1/1/2023     EC  USD
Vantage Drilling Interna  9.875    33.25  11/9/2019     BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int    6.5   69.654                IE  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.75   30.125                BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int   6.75    24.01  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Venezuela Government Int    4.3   54.766  10/15/2022    KY  USD
Venezuela Government Int    5.5     35.5  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int    6.5   70.288  11/1/2023     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int      6    31.21  11/15/2026    VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int      9     33.9  11/17/2021    VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int    8.5    53.55  11/2/2017     VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.45   66.477  3/19/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int    7.5   68.052   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int      6    30.25  5/16/2024     VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int    8.5    75.01  5/25/2016     CN  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.45   65.784  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int      9     12.5  5/31/2017     US  CAD
Venezuela Government Int    7.7   68.195  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Venezuela Government TIC   8.45   66.414   4/2/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government TIC    9.5    30.05  4/23/2019     BR  USD
Venezuela Government TIC  4.375       41  4/25/2025     KY  USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        8.1   53.131  12/15/2041    KY  USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA       8.45   66.386   4/2/2034     EC  USD
XLIT Ltd                    8.5       53  11/2/2017     VE  USD


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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