TCRLA_Public/160623.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Thursday, June 23, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 123


                            Headlines



B E R M U D A

FLOATEL INTERNATIONAL: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Negative


B R A Z I L

AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to 'B-'
BRAZIL: Plans Budget Freeze for Up to 20 Years
COSAN S.A.: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Ratings
OI SA: Files Largest Bankruptcy Request in Brazil's History
OI SA: Brazilian Banks Solid After Bankruptcy Petition

OI SA: Moody's Lowers CFR to C/C.br. on Judicial Recovery Filing
OI SA: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'D'
OI S.A: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to 'D'
OI SA.: Moody's Lowers Rating on 5 Cl. of Notes to C
VIDROPORTO SA: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa2/Caa2.br; Outlook Stable


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ACMAN FUND: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 13
APOGEE FUND: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
EVERBRIGHT ASHMORE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 29
GC GLOBAL: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 27
HERRING CREEK: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 6

PURSUIT CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 28
SATELLITE OVERSEAS: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
SATELLITE OVERSEAS V: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
SATELLITE OVERSEAS VI: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
SATELLITE OVERSEAS IX: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11

SUCCESSOR X: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 6
UCGP (F) LTD: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 30
WILTSHIRE CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 30


C U B A

CUBA: Nickle Faces Tough Challenges in Its Need for Efficiency


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Economy to Grow 7%, Central Banker Says


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: IDB OKs US$5.75MM Loan to Support Water Adaptation
UC RUSAL: Could Reduce Output Capacity


M E X I C O

EMPRESAS ICA: Obtains Loan, Unveils Downsizing Plan
MBIA MEXICO: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'CCC'


P A R A G U A Y

PARAGUAY: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Issuer & Sr. Unsec. Bond Ratings


P U E R T O    R I C O

IVAN A RODRIGUEZ PAGAN: Combined Plan Hearing on July 12
KOMODIDAD DISTRIBUTORS: Taps Carrasquillo as Financial Consultant
LEGAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS: Hires Ortiz-Bey as DACO Counsel
LUAR CLEANERS: Taps Aida Escribano-Ramallo as Financial Consultant
SPORTS AUTHORITY: US Trustee Objects to Gordon Brothers' Hiring


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN AIR: Responds to Ultimatum by Guyana Airport Authorities
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Seeks to Raise Millions on International Market
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: IMF Says Real GDP Declined 2.1% in 2015


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Moody's Says Default "Highly Likely"


                            - - - - -


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B E R M U D A
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FLOATEL INTERNATIONAL: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has affirmed its 'B-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Bermuda-based accommodation rig owner
Floatel International Ltd.  The outlook is negative.

S&P also affirmed its issue rating on Floatel's $650 million term
loan at 'B-'.  The recovery rating on this loan is unchanged at
'3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery prospects
at the lower end of the 50%-70% range in the event of a payment
default.

All ratings were taken off CreditWatch with negative implications,
where they were originally placed on Nov. 26, 2015, due to
difficult market conditions.

"The affirmation reflects our forecast that Floatel's credit
measures will remain weak--with debt to EBITDA of close to 8x in
2016--but improve in 2017 under the assumption that its new
Floatel Triumph vessel will fully contribute to operating earnings
during that year.  Floatel's operating environment remains very
weak, in our view, because oil companies globally continue
delaying and cancelling projects in the oil and gas segment to
adjust to the lower oil price environment.  We therefore expect
demand for accommodation rigs to remain low, resulting in
increased supply and pressure on day rates and securing contracts,
thus weighing on profitability.  We also anticipate the low demand
will result in increasingly more rigs being unemployed and idled,
leading to poor profitability.  However, in the longer term, this
will balance the supply and demand situation as some assets will
be scrapped.  The timing of such recovery is however difficult to
anticipate at this point," S&P said.

S&P nevertheless assumes the company will be successful in
obtaining important new liquidity sources by year-end 2016 to pay
for the Floatel Triumph, now due for delivery in Q4 2016,
following a delay in the project the vessel is contracted to work
on.  The vessel is to be delivered by its 50% owner, Singapore-
based Keppel Shipyards.  Given the company's track record of
parental help, S&P thinks it is probable that Keppel would provide
at least part of the funding.

S&P continues to assess Floatel's business risk profile as weak,
reflecting S&P's view of the highly competitive and cyclical
offshore oilfield services industry in which the company operates.
Floatel has limited diversification due to its sole focus on
accommodation vessels for the oil industry and its relatively
limited asset base--it has three vessels in operation, one laid up
seeking employment, and an additional vessel on order.  The weak
market environment creates some uncertainty beyond contracted
periods.  Furthermore, the risk of laying-up additional rigs due
to lack of work may also weigh on the company's business risk
going forward.  At present, S&P understands that Floatel has
material contracted revenues up to early 2018, with firm contracts
of $528 million and options of $133 million.

Furthermore, Floatel's revenue forecasts over 2016-2018 depend on
the successful delivery of its new rig in Q4 2016, which would
contribute close to 40% of Floatel's EBITDA, according to S&P's
assumptions for 2017.  Geographic and customer diversification is
limited due to the low number of vessels.  However, customers are
largely blue-chip exploration and production companies, so S&P do
not view this as a major constraint.

"We assess Floatel's financial risk profile as highly leveraged,
owing to its overall weakening operating cash flow generation
capability given that the operating environment, especially the
oil price, has deteriorated materially in the last couple of
years.  Although the company retains a decent firm contract
backlog, we believe the weak prospects of a market recovery over
the next two-to-three years make it uncertain whether the company
will be able to secure sufficient work in 2018 and beyond.  This
could weigh on Floatel's financial risk profile over time,
potentially leading us to reassess our view of the sustainability
of its capital structure in relation to the market environment.
Positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) is anticipated after the
delivery of Triumph as the company has no committed capital
expenditure (capex) thereafter," S&P said.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Strong utilization for contracted rigs, in line with
      historical levels;

   -- About three-quarters of the 2016 year firmly contracted
      (including standby periods) on average across the fleet;

   -- The lay-up of the Reliance vessel for a lengthy period given
      that no contract has been agreed at present;

   -- Delivery of the new Triumph vessel in late 2016, coming into
      operation in the second quarter of 2017 (on paid standby
      before then).  If this assumption does not materialize, it
      could have a material impact on S&P's forecast, because it
      assumes Triumph will be the main EBITDA contributor in 2017
      (about 40%);

   -- An increase in leverage due to debt financing of the
      Triumph.  However, this will be affected by how the vessel
      is financed and therefore S&P will reassess its base case
      once the Triumph financing is finalized;

   -- EBITDA generation of about $130 million-$140 million in 2016
      and about $150 million-$170 million in 2017, compared to
      $188 million in 2015 and $126 million in 2014;

   -- No dividends, in line with the stated intentions of its
      private equity joint owner Oaktree.  Any change in this
      policy would represent a downside to S&P's forecasts;

   -- Total capex of about $250 million-$275 million in 2016,
      mainly related to the Triumph delivery, compared with
      $335 million in 2015 and $65 million in 2014; and

   -- Very low maintenance capex requirements, at less than
      $10 million per year in the next two years.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA close to 8x for the full year 2016
      and above 6x in 2017;

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 6%-8% in 2016
      and 2017; and

   -- Negative FOCF in 2016 of above $200 million, after reported
      negative FOCF of about $250 million in 2015.  FOCF should
      nevertheless turn slightly positive in 2017 because capex is
      anticipated to drop to low levels, with no new orders on the
      books apart from Triumph.

S&P could revise its assessment upward once Floatel successfully
secures financing for the new vessel.  Historically, the company
has been successful in financing new units.  S&P would still
expect the Keppel shipyard to come to a suitable agreement if
funding cannot be finalized.  S&P also notes that a default on
payment at the shipyard would not necessarily trigger a cross
default on Floatel's debt.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of the uncertainty around
the newbuild delivery and the difficult operating environment
Floatel is exposed to.  S&P anticipates debt to EBITDA to move
from about 8x in 2016 to closer to 6x in 2017.  At the same time,
S&P assumes delivery of Triumph and related financing to be closed
before year-end 2016.  The current rating takes into account FFO
to cash interests of above 2x in both 2016 and 2017.

S&P could lower the ratings on Floatel by at least one notch if
the Triumph vessel is not delivered or if any other contract was
to be amended or cancelled to such an extent that S&P would not
view cash flow generation as sufficient, leading to even higher
leverage than in S&P's base case and an unsustainable capital
structure.  A liquidity squeeze and covenant constraints could
also weigh on the rating, although S&P currently anticipates the
company to comply.

S&P would likely revise its outlook to stable if it saw
substantial improvement in the company's operations and cash
generation prospects, supported by new long-term contracts for its
units.  This would require improved visibility over 2018 earnings
and a stable or improving backlog trend.  The successful delivery
of the Triumph vessel and a reduction in debt over the course of
2017 could also lead to an outlook change.  This could happen if
S&P was to anticipate debt to EBITDA approaching 5x toward year-
end 2017.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Agencia de Fomento do Estado do Rio
de Janeiro S.A.'s (AgeRio) Long-Term Local and Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B-' from 'B+', Long-Term
National Ratings to 'BB-(bra)' from 'A-(bra)' and Support Rating
to '5' from '4'. Fitch also removed the Rating Watch Negative
assigned to Agerio's ratings on May 31, 2016, and assigned a
Stable Rating Outlook to the Long-Term IDRs and Long-Term National
Rating. A full list of rating actions follows at the end of the
release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATINGS

The rating action mirrors the recent action on Agerio's parent,
the State of Rio de Janeiro (ERio, Long-Term Foreign Currency and
Local Currency IDRs 'B-'/Outlook Stable). (See 'Fitch Downgrades
State of Rio de Janeiro to 'B-'; Resolves Negative Watch', dated
June 15, 2016 at 'www.fitchratings.com' for more details.)

AgeRio's ratings are driven by expected support from ERio and
aligned with those of its parent. Fitch does not assign a
Viability Rating to AgeRio, as it is a development agency and
therefore cannot be assessed on standalone basis.

Fitch views AgeRio as strategically important for ERio, as it acts
as the state's development arm and implements its economic
development policies. A track record of frequent capital
injections by ERio, most recently in the second half of 2015,
reinforces Fitch's view. ERio controls 99.99% of AgeRio.
Furthermore, by state law ERio's stake in AgeRio's voting shares
cannot fall below 51%, and it is the financial agent or
administrator of three state funds.

As of December 2015, AgeRio remained highly capitalized with a
total regulatory capital ratio of 75.30% (70.95% in December
2014). Fitch believes that, under a stress scenario, ERio might
need to withdraw part of the excess capital at AgeRio, which would
lead to a decline in the development agency's loss absorption
capacity.

In 2015, AgeRio's overall profitability fell but remained
adequate, as a solid increase in fee income broadly offset a large
increase in loan impairment charges. Average ROA stood at 1.07%
(1.49% in December 2014). In the same period, AgeRio's impaired
loans classified in the D-H range of the central bank's risk scale
rose to 6.54% of total loans (5.37% in December 2014), while
impaired loan coverage by reserves rose significantly to 223.9%
(89.67% in December 2014). Fitch expects loan impairment charges
to remain high throughout 2016 as a result of the continued
weakness in the operating environment in ERio that is undermining
the credit worthiness of AgeRio's borrowers.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATINGS
Changes in Parental Support: AgeRio's ratings are linked to those
of ERio. Any further changes in ERio's ratings would lead to a
review of AgeRio's ratings.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

-- Foreign and Local Currency long-term IDRs downgraded to 'B-'
    from 'B+', Outlook Stable;
-- Foreign and Local Currency short-term IDRs affirmed at 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating downgraded to 'BB-(bra)' from 'A-
    (bra)', Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating downgraded to 'B(bra)' from
    'F1(bra)';
-- Support Rating downgraded to '5' from '4'.


BRAZIL: Plans Budget Freeze for Up to 20 Years
----------------------------------------------
The Financial Times reports that an ambitious constitutional
amendment to freeze budget spending would cut the uncertainty over
public finances that is the root cause of Brazil's deep recession,
according to the country's new finance minister.

"With this kind . . . of tough fiscal policy . . . everyone will
be able to project the numbers," Henrique Meirelles said,
according to The FT.

The report notes that the plan to eliminate real increases in
budget spending for up to 20 years is the central plank of a
number of reforms -- from fiscal policy to rules on pensions and
the operation of state oil company Petrobras -- that the
government of interim president Michel Temer is rushing through
congress.

Elevated to power by an impeachment process against President
Dilma Rousseff for allegedly manipulating the budget, Mr. Temer is
staking his leadership on stabilizing the economy and stemming an
alarming rise in public debt, the report relays.

Once a fast-growing emerging market, Brazil's GDP shrank 3.8 per
cent last year and is expected to decline by the same amount this
year, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service.  The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.


COSAN S.A.: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cosan S.A. Industria e Comercio's
(Cosan) Long-Term (LT) Foreign Currency (FC) and Local Currency
(LC) Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+', and its National
Scale rating at 'AA+(bra)'. The Rating Outlook for the FC IDR is
Negative, and Stable for the LC IDR and National Scale rating. The
ratings on all related debts were affirmed at 'BB+', as they are
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by Cosan. A complete
list of rating actions follows at the end of this release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Cosan's ratings are supported by its strong and diversified asset
portfolio. Fitch expects this portfolio to provide a robust flow
of dividends to Cosan in order to cover its interest expenses
above 2x and pay a sufficient dividend to support its main
shareholder's (Cosan Ltd.) debt service. The company's portfolio
benefits from the resilience of activities such as distribution of
natural gas, and the sale of lubricants and fuels. The share of
the sugar and ethanol (S&E) business over Cosan's pro forma
consolidated EBITDA remained flat at 33% in 2015, as this business
presented a stable performance despite its inherent volatility.

The ratings incorporate Cosan's still-high leverage as of March
31, 2016, although some reduction has been noted, and the company
benefits from a comfortable debt maturity profile. Fitch's
analysis has also considered the subordination of this company's
debt to the obligations of its main investments, as access to
their cash is limited to dividends received.

Robust Asset Portfolio

Cosan's three main assets and source of dividends are companies
with robust credit quality. Raizen Combustiveis S.A. (Raizen
Combustiveis; FC and LC IDRs 'BBB', National Scale rating
'AAA(bra)') is the third largest fuel distributor in Brazil, with
predictable operational cash generation. Despite its more volatile
results, Raizen Energia S.A. (Raizen Energia; rated the same as
Raizen Combustiveis) is the largest S&E company in Brazil and as
such it benefits from its large business scale, which somewhat
mitigates the current challenging scenario for the sector.
Companhia de Gas de Sao Paulo (Comgas; FC IDR 'BB+', LC IDR 'BBB-
', National Scale rating 'AAA(bra)') is the largest natural gas
distributor in Brazil, with high growth potential and predictable
operational cash flow. Fitch's Rating Outlook on all of their FC
IDRs is Negative to reflect the Negative Outlook on Brazil's
sovereign rating.

All of Cosan's businesses reported improved performance in 2015
compared to the previous year. In 2015, Comgas reported net
revenues at BRL6.6 billion and stable EBITDA margin at 23%, while
Raizen Combustiveis reported net revenues of BRL63 billion in the
fiscal year ended March 31, 2016, comparing favorably to BRL56
billion in fiscal 2015. Raizen Energia reported a 22% increase in
revenues to BRL11.8 billion in fiscal 2016 and flat EBITDAR margin
at 29% compared to fiscal 2015. The other two assets that Cosan
invests are Cosan Lubrificantes S.A. and Radar Propriedades
Agricolas S.A., which add to business diversification.

High Interest Coverage Expected to Remain

Fitch expects Cosan's investees to pay robust dividend payments
over the next few years, with Cosan receiving around BRL1 billion
in 2016, up from BRL684 million in 2015. Raizen Combustiveis
should maintain its growing trend in revenues, with a stable
EBITDA margin, while Raizen Energia's operational cash flow
generation should benefit from expected higher S&E prices and
sales volumes. Comgas distributed BRL1.2 billion of dividends in
1Q16, which is expected to reach BRL1.4 billion at year-end.
Nevertheless, Fitch estimates Comgas' annual dividends
distribution will range between BRL300 million-BRL500 million from
2017 to 2019.

Cosan's interest coverage should be above 2x on a sustainable
basis, which is adequate for the rating category and allows the
company to gradually reduce its debt. In 2015, the ratio of
dividends received/interest expense was near 2x. Cosan's access to
its main investees is limited to dividends, as Raizen Combustiveis
and Raizen Energia are jointly controlled by Cosan and Shell.
Comgas is a regulated concession and any intercompany loan to
shareholders must be approved by regulators.

High Leverage for Cosan

Fitch said, "Cosan's leverage should remain high on a stand-alone
basis, in our view, despite the lower ratio presented at the end
of 1Q16. This decline was due to appreciation in the BRL and, more
important, a robust dividend inflow of BRL730 million in the
three-month period ended March 31, 2016. The company reported net
adjusted debt of BRL5.9 billion and total dividend inflow of
BRL1.4 billion in the last 12 months ended March 31, 2016,
bringing down the ratio of net adjusted debt-to-EBITDA plus
dividends received to 4.9x. This compares favorably with the net
adjusted debt of BRL7.6 billion and net adjusted leverage of 12.1x
reported in December 2015."

Debt consisted mostly of intercompany loans of BRL4.4 billion,
which represent past bond issuances by its fully owned
subsidiaries, and non-voting preferred shares of BRL2 billion.
Although issued by Cosan Luxembourg S.A. (Cosan Luxembourg) and
Cosan Overseas Ltd. (Cosan Overseas), the associated debt at both
entities is guaranteed by Cosan, which is ultimately responsible
for the payment.


KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for Cosan include:
-- An increased flow of dividends coming from Comgas, Raizen
    Combustiveis and Raizen Energia over the next two years,
    reaching over BRL1 billion per year.
-- Potential new issuances will only be used to refinance
    existing debt.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a negative rating action include deterioration of the credit
profiles of Raizen Combustiveis, Raizen Energia and/or Comgas, and
Cosan's interest coverage by dividends received falling below 2x
on a sustainable basis. A downgrade of the sovereign rating may
also trigger a downgrade of Cosan's FC IDR and ratings for the
associated bond issuances.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a positive rating action include more predictable cash flow
generation at Raizen Energia, and Cosan's interest coverage by
dividends received remaining above 3x on a sustainable basis.

LIQUIDITY
Cosan's debt maturity profile is well laddered and is not expected
to pressure the company's cash flows until 2018 when the BRL850
million notes are due. Part of the proceeds from the 2027 senior
unsecured notes recently issued by Cosan Luxembourg is estimated
to be used to prepay 60% of the 2018 notes and reduce liquidity
pressures in that year. As of March 31, 2016, the holding company
had BRL980 million of cash versus short-term debt of BRL535
million, yielding robust cash-to-short-term debt coverage of 1.8x.
Fitch expects Cosan to receive a robust inflow of dividends that
should provide adequate repayment capacity for upcoming interest.
Cosan's liquidity is reinforced by a fully available committed
Stand-by Facility of BRL750 million and the positive dividend
track record.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Cosan S.A Industria e Comercio:
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
-- National scale rating at 'AA+(bra)'; Outlook Stable

Cosan Overseas Limited:
-- Perpetual notes at 'BB+'.

Cosan Luxembourg S.A.:
-- Senior unsecured notes due in 2018, 2023 and 2027 at 'BB+'.


OI SA: Files Largest Bankruptcy Request in Brazil's History
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rogerio Jelmayer and Luciana Magalhae at The Wall Street Journal
reports that Brazil's troubled telephone company Oi SA filed the
largest bankruptcy protection request in the country's history
just days after debt restructuring talks with creditors collapsed.

The filing of Oi and six subsidiaries lists BRL65.4 billion
($19.26 billion) in debt.

In its filing, the company said it chose judicial reorganization
to preserve the value of its holdings and to continue providing
service to its customers, according to The Wall Street Journal.

A person familiar with the bankruptcy filing said it would be the
largest in Brazil's history if it is accepted by the court, notes
WSJ.

Oi Chief Executive Bayard Gontijo resigned from his post June 10.
Although Oi gave no reason for his departure, Mr. Bayard was under
severe pressure from company shareholders who had been resisting a
proposal by creditors to convert a total of BRL25 billion in debt
to equity, the report notes.

That plan would have significantly diluted the company's shares,
giving a 95% stake of the restructured business to its
bondholders, the report relays.  Shareholders balked at the
prospect, and the talks fell apart.

Fitch Ratings downgraded Oi by two notches to C from CCC, well
below investment grade, reports WSJ.

"Oi's current capital structure is unsustainable, and the company
faces an imminent default risk given sizable short-term debt
maturities," Fitch said, the report relays.

Since 2009, Brazil's fourth-largest telecom company has
accumulated a huge amount of debt to complete two mergers, first
with Brasil Telecom and later with Portuguese company Portugal
Telecom, the report notes.  Those deals failed to generate enough
cash flow to fund the company's investment needs.

Oi has low penetration in the mobile phone and broadband markets,
the most critical and profitable segments of the
telecommunications sector in Brazil, the report says.

As of March 31, Oi had reported gross debt of about BRL50 billion
($14.72 billion), about BRL38.9 billion of which was held by
international bondholders, the report relays.

The recent debt negotiation has involved Oi's main shareholder,
Bratel BV, which controls a 22.24% stake in the company, the
report discloses.  Bratel is an investment vehicle formed by
former shareholders of Portugal Telecom, using the official name
Pharol SGPS.

On the other side of the table, investment bank Moelis & Co. is
advising creditors with around 40% of outstanding bonds, including
big international players such as Pacific Investment Management
Co., Citadel LLC and Wellington Management Co, the report notes.

About a quarter of Oi's debt belongs to commercial banks, such as
Banco Itau SA, Banco Santander SA, Banco do Brasil SA and Caixa
Econìmica Federal. Another 5% is in the hands of development
banks, such as the Brazilian Development Bank and Banco do
Nordeste do Brasil SA, the report relays.

Other shareholders include the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan,
with a 4.77% stake; the equity arm of Brazil's development bank,
known as BNDESPar, with 4.63%; and investment firm BlackRock Inc.,
with 0.96%. Oi has a free float of 49.23%. The rest of the
company's capital is in its own treasury, the report discloses.

During Brazil's commodities boom, Oi was seen as a potential
national champion that could become a global player, the report
notes.  But the Rio de Janeiro-based company failed to compete
with international telecoms in the local arena, in part because it
didn't have the same financial resources, the report relates.

Brazil's market leader is Telefonica Brasil SA, also known as
Vivo, which is part of Spain's Telefonica SA; followed by TIM
Participacoes SA, a unit of Telecom Italia SpA; and Claro, the
local unit of Mexico's America M¢vil SAB de CV.


OI SA: Brazilian Banks Solid After Bankruptcy Petition
------------------------------------------------------
Alonso Soto at Reuters reports that the bankruptcy petition of
mobile phone carrier Oi SA, the biggest ever in Brazil, poses no
threat to the country's financial system, central bank director
Aldo Mendes said.

The company's petition to seek protection from creditors on
BRL65.4 billion ($19.2 billion) in liabilities, raised alarms
about the exposure of local lenders, according to Reuters.

Speaking at an event in Sao Paulo, Mr. Mendes, director of
monetary policy, also said the bank is waiting on international
economic events before deciding whether to intervene in the local
currency market, the report notes.

Mr. Mendes said those events include Britain's vote today on
whether to abandon the European Union and upcoming interest rate
decisions by the U.S. Federal Reserve, the report relays.


OI SA: Moody's Lowers CFR to C/C.br. on Judicial Recovery Filing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina downgraded Oi S.A.'s corporate family
ratings to C/C.br.  As part of this rating action, Moody's also
downgraded the ratings on unsecured debt at Oi to C/C.br.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Ratings downgraded:

Issuer: Oi S.A.

   -- Corporate Family Rating: to C/C.br from Caa1/Caa1.br
   -- BRL 2.350 mm BRAZILIAN DEBENTURES due 2018: to C/C.br from
      Caa2/Caa2.br
   -- BRL 246 mm BRAZILIAN BOND due 2020: to C/C.br from
      Caa2/Caa2.br

The downgrade follows Oi's filing for judicial recovery, the
closest equivalent to chapter 11 in Brazil.

The recovery filing contains BRL 65.4 billion (~USD 19 bil.) in
liabilities including BRL 51 billion in financial debt of which
BRL31.6 billion held by bondholders.  Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social - BNDES (Ba2 negative), Caixa
Economica Federal (Ba2 negative) and Banco do Brasil S.A. ((P) Ba2
negative) are creditors to around BRL 13 billion, BNDES loans are
secured with 60% of the company's receivables that totaled
BRL8.6 billion in the end of March 2016.  The voluntary bankruptcy
filing was triggered after no agreement was reached with
bondholders in a negotiation that involved haircuts of up to 75%
over the instruments' face value.

The judicial recovery request results from the company's
persistently increasing leverage and cash consumption, which has
reduced financial flexibility and has led to an untenable capital
structure.  There is no visibility of other options of
transforming events such as a merger or capital injection that
could lead to lower leverage, or a new debt issuance that would
result in a more comfortable maturity profile, and stronger
financial flexibility to avoid a default.  Oi had BRL 8.5 billion
in cash at the end of March 2016 and upcoming maturities in the
order of BRL 8.3 billion until the end of 2016, BRL 8.8 billion in
2017, and BRL 6.8 billion in 2018.  CAPEX is high at around
BRL 5.0 billion per year and the company is not expected to
generate positive free cash flow at least until 2018, reinforcing
its dependency on the capital markets, currently closed, to extend
debt maturities.

Subsequent to the actions, all Oi's ratings will be withdrawn
shortly following the filling for the restructuring proceeding.

The judicial recovery request needs to be ratified by shareholders
on an extraordinary shareholders' meeting on July 22 and then
approved by the court.  Following the court decision authorizing
the filing, the company has 60 days to present the recovery plan,
that, if approved by the general meeting of creditors, will bind
all of the company's creditors that are subject to the recovery
proceeding.  Some claims are not part of the recovery process,
including credits subject to fiduciary alienation, leases, taxes,
and Advances on Exchange Contracts (ACC).  The filing of a
recovery leads to an automatic stay period of 180 days, when all
enforcement actions and executions against the debtor are
automatically suspended.

For the purpose of voting in reorganizations, creditors will be
divided into three broad classes: (i) Labor credits; (ii) Secured
credits; and (iii) Privileged, unsecured and subordinated credits.
All three classes must approve the recovery plan.  In class (1)
the plan should be approved by the majority of members while in
classes (2) and (3), the plan may be approved by at least 50% of
total claim amount and simple majority of members.  Secured
creditors vote in class (2) up to the value of the collateral and
with class (3) for the deficient portion.

Oi's C corporate family rating reflects its untenable capital
structure, very limited financial flexibility given its large debt
burden and challenging momentum for funding through capital
markets.  In Moody's view the judicial recovery proceeding will
lead to severe losses to creditors, associated with a C rating.

On the operational side, despite the company's cost cutting and
efficiency efforts, its business will face further margin
deterioration from an unfavorable product mix shift to pay TV and
broadband and the price pressure inherent in its targeted value
segment, especially during the ongoing economic slowdown in
Brazil.  Further reductions in capital spending may result in
future operational and competitive challenges.

In Moody's view, it is also inevitable to expect some level of
business disruption following the filling for judicial recovery,
such as client losses, issues in the negotiation with suppliers,
and employee turnover.  All those factors will put additional
pressure on the company's operating performance.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.

While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of default
risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time.  For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons, please
see:
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
189530


OI SA: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'D'
------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit and issue-level
global scale ratings on Oi S.A. to 'D' from 'CCC-' and its
national scale ratings to 'D' from 'brCCC-'.

The recovery ratings on the company's rated debt remain unchanged
at '4', indicating S&P's expectation for average recovery (30%-
50%; in the lower half of the range) following a default.

The downgrade follows Oi's announcement that it had filed a
request for judicial reorganization in an effort to restructure
its debt obligations.  Once the judicial reorganization process is
finalized, S&P will evaluate the company under its updated capital
structure and strategic plan.

OI S.A: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Oi S.A.'s (Oi) Long-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'D' from 'C'. Fitch
has also downgraded the company's National Long-Term Rating and
local debentures rating to 'D(bra)' from 'C(bra)'. Fitch has
affirmed the existing ratings for Oi's senior notes. A full list
of rating actions follows at the end of this release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect Oi's filing for a request for judicial
reorganization with the Court of the State of Rio de Janeiro, as
disclosed by the company on June 20, 2016. The request also
includes Oi's subsidiaries, Oi Movel S.A., Telemar Norte Leste
S.A., Copart 4 Participacoes S.A., Copart 5 Participacoes S.A.,
Portgual Telecom International Finance BV, and Oi Brasil Holdings
Cooperatief U.A.

Oi, beset by its debt-laden precarious capital structure and
consistently negative FCF generation in recent years, was seeking
to reach an agreement with its creditors for potential debt
restructuring. However, the negotiation fell through and the
company decided to file for judicial reorganization as an
alternative for financial restructuring.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Oi include:

-- Fitch believes that the court will accept Oi's filings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The company's ratings have reached the lowest level on Fitch's
rating scale. An upgrade is unlikely at this time given the
group's judicial reorganization filing.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Oi S.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign-Currency and Local-Currency IDRs downgraded
    to 'D' from 'C';
-- National Long-Term Rating downgraded to 'D(bra)' from 'C
    (bra)';
-- Telemar Norte Leste, S.A.'s (Telemar) senior notes, originally
    due 2017, 2019, and 2020, affirmed at 'C/RR4';
-- All outstanding senior unsecured notes affirmed at 'C/RR5';
-- Local debentures downgraded to 'D(bra)' from 'C(bra)'.

Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. (Oi Netherlands)
-- EUR600 million senior notes due 2021 affirmed at 'C/RR5'.

Telemar notes, rated 'C/RR4', reflect average recovery prospects
in the event of default, given Telemar's position as the main cash
flow generator with operating assets. Securities rated 'RR4' have
characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering
31% - 50% of current principal and related interest. However,
despite structural seniority compared to Oi's other unsecured
notes, Fitch has low visibility as to whether these notes would be
entitled to seniority under Brazil's legal system upon judicial
reorganization. Oi's other senior unsecured notes, with Recovery
Ratings of 'RR5', represent average recovery prospects of 11% -
30% given default.


OI SA.: Moody's Lowers Rating on 5 Cl. of Notes to C
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on the notes
issued by Oi S.A. and guaranteed by Telemar Norte Leste S.A. and
the unsecured debt at Oi S.A. to C.

At the same time Moody's America Latina downgraded Oi's corporate
family ratings ("CFR") to C/C.br.  As part of this rating action,
Moody's also downgraded the ratings on unsecured debt at Oi to
C/C.br.

Moody's Investors Service also downgraded the unsecured debt at
Portugal Telecom International Finance, BV ("PTIF") and Oi Brasil
Holdings Cooperatief U.A. to C.  Moody's believes that these notes
are pari passu to unsecured debt at to the parent and guarantor,
Oi.

Moody's Investors Service also downgraded three specific note
issuances at Oi to which benefit from a subsidiary guarantee from
Telemar by two notches to C.  These three issuances, the 5.5% USD
notes due 2020, the 9.5% USD notes due 2019, and the 5.125%
EUR notes due 2017 were originally issued by Telemar but
transferred to Oi.  Moody's believes that the Telemar guarantee is
sufficient to differentiate the creditworthiness of these
issuances versus other unsecured obligations of Oi, but Moody's
estimates losses on these instruments to be also associated with a
C rating, preventing further differentiation on the ratings scale.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Ratings downgraded:

Issuer: Oi S.A.

   -- EUR601 mil. GLOBAL BONDS due 2017: to C from Caa1
   -- USD142 mil. GLOBAL BONDS due 2019: to C from Caa1
   -- USD1,787 mil. GLOBAL BONDS due 2020: to C from Caa1
   -- BRL 1,100 mil. GLOBAL BONDS due 2016: to C from Caa2
   -- USD 1,500 mil. GLOBAL NOTES due 2022: to C from Caa2

Issuer: Portugal Telecom International Finance B.V.

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN: to (P) C from (P) Caa2
   -- EUR 250 mil. GTD EURO MTNS due 2017: to C from Caa2
   -- EUR 382 mil. GTD GLOBAL MTNS due 2017: to C from Caa2
   -- EUR 750 mil. GTD EURO MTNS due 2018: to C from Caa2
   -- EUR 50 mil. GTD FLT RT EURO MTNS due 2019: to C from Caa2
   -- EUR 750 mil. GTD EURO MTNS due 2019: to C from Caa2
   -- EUR 1,000 mil. GTD EURO MTNS due 2020: to C from Caa2
   -- EUR 500 mil. GTD EURO MTNS due 2025: to C from Caa2

Issuer: Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A.

   -- EUR 600 mil. GTD GLOBAL BONDS due 2021: to C from Caa2

The downgrade follows Oi's filing for judicial recovery, the
closest equivalent to chapter 11 in Brazil.

The recovery filing contains BRL 65.4 billion (~USD 19 bn) in
liabilities including BRL 51 billion in financial debt of which
BRL 31.6 billion held by bondholders.  Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social - BNDES (Ba2 negative), Caixa
Economica Federal (Ba2 negative) and Banco do Brasil S.A. ((P) Ba2
negative) are creditors to around BRL 13 billion, BNDES loans are
secured with 60% of the company's receivables that totaled
BRL8.6 billion in the end of March 2016.  The voluntary bankruptcy
filing was triggered after no agreement was reached with
bondholders in a negotiation that involved haircuts of up to 75%
over the instruments' face value.

The judicial recovery request results from the company's
persistently increasing leverage and cash consumption, which has
reduced financial flexibility and has led to an untenable capital
structure.  There is no visibility of other options of
transforming events such as a merger or capital injection that
could lead to lower leverage, or a new debt issuance that would
result in a more comfortable maturity profile, and stronger
financial flexibility to avoid a default.  Oi had BRL 8.5 billion
in cash at the end of March 2016 and upcoming maturities in the
order of BRL8.3 billion until the end of 2016, BRL 8.8 billion in
2017, and BRL6.8 billion in 2018.  CAPEX is high at around
BRL5.0 billion per year and the company is not expected to
generate positive free cash flow at least until 2018, reinforcing
its dependency on the capital markets, currently closed, to extend
debt maturities.

Subsequent to today's actions, all Oi's ratings will be withdrawn
shortly following the filling for the restructuring proceeding.

The judicial recovery request needs to be ratified by shareholders
on an extraordinary shareholders' meeting on July 22 and then
approved by the court.  Following the court decision authorizing
the filing, the company has 60 days to present the recovery plan,
that, if approved by the general meeting of creditors, will bind
all of the company's creditors that are subject to the recovery
proceeding.  Some claims are not part of the recovery process,
including credits subject to fiduciary alienation, leases, taxes,
and Advances on Exchange Contracts (ACC).  The filing of a
recovery leads to an automatic stay period of 180 days, when all
enforcement actions and executions against the debtor are
automatically suspended.

For the purpose of voting in reorganizations, creditors will be
divided into three broad classes: (i) Labor credits; (ii) Secured
credits; and (iii) Privileged, unsecured and subordinated credits.
All three classes must approve the recovery plan.  In class (1)
the plan should be approved by the majority of members while in
classes (2) and (3), the plan may be approved by at least 50% of
total claim amount and simple majority of members.  Secured
creditors vote in class (2) up to the value of the collateral and
with class (3) for the deficient portion.

Oi's C corporate family rating reflects its untenable capital
structure, very limited financial flexibility given its large debt
burden and challenging momentum for funding through capital
markets.  In Moody's view the judicial recovery proceeding will
lead to severe losses to creditors, associated with a C rating.

On the operational side, despite the company's cost cutting and
efficiency efforts, its business will face further margin
deterioration from an unfavorable product mix shift to pay TV and
broadband and the price pressure inherent in its targeted value
segment, especially during the ongoing economic slowdown in
Brazil.  Further reductions in capital spending may result in
future operational and competitive challenges.

In our view, it is also inevitable to expect some level of
business disruption following the filling for judicial recovery,
such as client losses, issues in the negotiation with suppliers,
and employee turnover.  All those factors will put additional
pressure on the company's operating performance.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010.


VIDROPORTO SA: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa2/Caa2.br; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has downgraded the corporate family rating
of Vidroporto S.A. to Caa2/Caa2.br from B3/B2.br.  At the same
time, Moody's downgraded the rating of its BRL 134 million Secured
Debenture due 2021 to Caa2/Caa2.br from B3/B2.br.  The outlook for
the ratings is stable.

Ratings downgraded:

Issuer: Vidroporto S.A.

   -- Corporate Family Ratings: Caa2 (global scale) / Caa2.br
      (national scale)
   -- BRL 134 million senior secured debentures due 2021:
      Caa2/Caa2.br

The outlook for all ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade to Caa2/Caa2.br ratings reflects Vidroporto's
increased liquidity risk with a high short term debt burden and
reliance on receivables to equate its coverage of short-term debt.
The situation is aggravated by Brazil's severe economic downturn
which led to a drop in sales for the beer industry, more
challenging commercial conditions for the industry suppliers, and
made credit more restrict and expensive.  Under these conditions,
Moody's believes the likelihood of a debt restructuring is high.

Additional constraints are Vidroporto's (i) small size and scale
relative to global and local peers, (ii) its exposure to a
commoditized product offering, and (iii) the lack of geographic
and operational diversity, with operations concentrated in a
single site and focused on servicing mainly the Brazilian beverage
industry.

Counterbalancing these negative aspects are the company's track
record of strong operating margins compared to global peers,
arising from high capacity utilization rates and efficiency, its
enhanced position in the domestic market after the conclusion of
its investment plans (being the fourth largest producer in Brazil
with around 15% share) and a persisting deleveraging.  Following
the investment on a new kiln, concluded in 2014, leverage peaked
at 4.8x but ended 2015 at 3.0x, low for the rating level.  On the
other hand, with current macroeconomic conditions, Moody's expects
the ramp-up of production to the new capacity levels to be slower
than initially estimated.  Despite the existence of long-term
supply agreements and mutual reliance between glass container and
beverage producers, given the tight demand and supply balance
domestically, the concentration of sales with very large customers
with strong bargaining power increases the risks for Vidroporto to
place its volumes.

The stable outlook reflects our view that, in case of a debt
restructuring, losses for senior secured creditors will not be
greater than those associated with a Caa2 rating.  In addition,
the stable outlook incorporates our expectation that liquidity
will not deteriorate further.

The ratings could be downgraded if liquidity deteriorates further
or recovery prospects for creditors decline.

An upgrade of the ratings would require an improvement in
Vidroporto's liquidity.  Additionally, the company would need to
prove able to sustain margins and credit metrics close to current
levels.

Headquartered in Porto Ferreira, Brazil, and founded in 1977,
Vidroporto is a glass packaging manufacturer in Brazil supplying
the domestic food and beverage industries.  In 2015, the company
reported BRL 191 million in net revenues, mainly from the sale of
containers for beer (40%), spirits (30%), wine (20%) and other
alcoholic beverages (10%).  With the conclusion of its expansion
plans, the company has a production capacity of 192 thousand tons
of glass bottles per year, making it the fourth largest glass
packaging producer for the Brazilian beverage industry.  Even so,
the company is still small compared to Brazilian lead suppliers,
namely, Owens-Illinois ("O-I" rated Ba3/Stable) and Verallia (a
subsidiary of Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, rated Baa2/Stable).

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Packaging
Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containers published in
September 2015.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.

While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of default
risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time.  For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons, please
see:

https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
189530


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ACMAN FUND: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 13
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Acman Fund Limited will hear on July 13, 2016,
at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery Cathlin Rossiter
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          Elgin Court Elgin, 2nd Floor
          Avenue George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY1-1106
          Telephone: (345) 945 3466
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


APOGEE FUND: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
---------------------------------------------------
The members of The Apogee Fund, Ltd. will hold their final meeting
on July 11, 2016, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Sargison
          c/o Vijayabalan Murugesu
          Premier Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 414 31 Woodland Drive, Savannah
          Grand Cayman, KY1-1502
          Cayman Islands


EVERBRIGHT ASHMORE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 29
---------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Everbright Ashmore Investment Blue (Cayman)
Limited will hold their final meeting on June 29, 2016, at
9:30 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Antoine Bastian
          c/o Richard Bennett/Phoebe Chan
          Telephone:  +852 3656 6069/ +852 3656 6063
          Facsimile: +352 949-9877
          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          89 Nexus Way Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands


GC GLOBAL: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 27
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of GC Global Quant Fund will hear on June 27,
2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands


HERRING CREEK: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 6
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Herring Creek Offshore Fund, Ltd. will hear on
July 6, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Herring Creek Capital Management, LLC
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          Ogier, Attorneys
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


PURSUIT CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 28
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Pursuit Capital Partners (Cayman) Ltd. will
hold their final meeting on June 28, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

          Anthony Schepis
          Frank Canelas
          c/o Ashleigh Dixon
          Carey Olsen
          CO Services Cayman Limited
          P.O. Box 10008 Willow House, Cricket Square
          Grand Cayman, KY1-1001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 749 2023
          E-mail: ashleigh.dixon@careyolsen.com


SATELLITE OVERSEAS: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
----------------------------------------------------------
The members of Satellite Overseas Fund, Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on July 11, 2016, to receive the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Sargison
          c/o Vijayabalan Murugesu
          Premier Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 414 31 Woodland Drive, Savannah
          Grand Cayman, KY1-1502
          Cayman Islands


SATELLITE OVERSEAS V: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Satellite Overseas Fund V, Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on July 11, 2016, to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Sargison
          c/o Vijayabalan Murugesu
          Premier Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 414 31 Woodland Drive, Savannah
          Grand Cayman, KY1-1502
          Cayman Islands


SATELLITE OVERSEAS VI: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
-------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Satellite Overseas Fund VI, Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on July 11, 2016, to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Sargison
          c/o Vijayabalan Murugesu
          Premier Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 414 31 Woodland Drive, Savannah
          Grand Cayman, KY1-1502
          Cayman Islands


SATELLITE OVERSEAS IX: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 11
-------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Satellite Overseas Fund IX, Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on July 11, 2016, to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Sargison
          c/o Vijayabalan Murugesu
          Premier Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 414 31 Woodland Drive, Savannah
          Grand Cayman, KY1-1502
          Cayman Islands


SUCCESSOR X: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 6
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Successor X Ltd. will hear on July 6, 2016, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Johnson
          Circumference FS (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 32322, Grand Cayman, KY1-1209
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 640-670


UCGP (F) LTD: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 30
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of UCGP (F) Ltd. will hold their final meeting on
June 30, 2016, at 10:15 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


WILTSHIRE CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Wiltshire Capital Limited will hold their
final meeting on June 30, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


=======
C U B A
=======


CUBA: Nickle Faces Tough Challenges in Its Need for Efficiency
--------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Cuban nickel, one of the island's chief
sources of revenue, faces some tough challenges in its need for
efficiency and in its search for foreign partners to drive an
industry weakened by the mineral's ebbing international prices --
but has great hopes that the nation's new relations with the
United States will bring great opportunities.

Cuba is among the world's top producers of the mineral, with an
industry concentrated in the town of Moa, Holguin province, some
800 kilometers (500 miles) east of Havana, considered the "nickel
capital" of the island, according to EFE News.

Two extraction and processing factories operate there, one of them
the Pedro Sotto Alba plant built in 1957 by a U.S. company and
taken over by the Cuban government after the revolution. Since
1994 it has operated as a mixed company -- Moa Nickel S.A. -- a
50-50 split between the Cubaniquel monopoly and the Canadian firm
Sherrit International, the report notes.

With a work force of 1,936 employees, the Pedro Sotto Alba plant
currently produces 37,500 tons of nickel plus cobalt, its maximum
productive capacity, according to engineer Ricardo Quintana, who
noted the progressive increase in production since the mixed
company was set up in 1994, which planned to start out producing
24,000 tons a year, the report notes.

The raw material is obtained from open-pit nickel mines in Moa
municipality, where enough of the mineral exists for the next 18
to 20 years at the current rate of production, the report relays.

"That will depend on efficiency, which is why the priority of the
business has been focused on seeking metallurgical efficiency.
Making the most of the existing nickel and cobalt," Mr. Quintana
warned, the report notes.

The Pedro Sotto Alba plant doesn't plan to boost production, but
it does seek greater efficiency associated with cost reduction in
order to compensate for the decline in nickel prices on the
international market, which has dropped in recent years from
$14,000 a ton to $8,000, or 45 percent less, the report says.

New relations with the United States offer new hope for the
island's nickel industry, which would be, according to the head of
Cubaniquel, "one of the great benefits" if Washington raises the
embargo it imposes on the Caribbean island, the report discloses.

Nickel sales figure among the principal categories of the island's
exports, trailing only professional services and tourism, the
report adds.


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Economy to Grow 7%, Central Banker Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that central banker Hector Valdez Albizu
said Dominican Republic's economy grew 7.1% in the first four
months, propelled by a 10.1% growth in April.

Mr. Albizu said agro grew 6%, livestock 11.7%, construction 36.2%
and financial intermediation 3%, according to Dominican Today.

"The trend cycle indicates that growth in 2016 could close at
around 7%," the official in a meeting with Commercial Banks
Association (ABA) and Savings and Loans Association executives, to
review the economy's performance in the first quarter, the report
notes.

Mr. Albizu said the banks and S&Ls should make available the
RD$5.35 billion pending disbursement, from the RD$10.0 billion the
Monetary Board authorized to finance low-cost housing on March 26,
2015, the report relays.  "With this, we will continue working for
poor people to acquire decent housing," Mr. Albizu added.

                            Liquidity

Mr. Albizu also described the financial system's performance as
excellent, stressing the banks' current liquidity of more than
RD$21.0 billion, "showing solvency indicators of 15.46%, well
above the required by the Monetary and Financial Law," the report
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 3, 2015, Fitch Ratings affirmed the Dominican Republic's
long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B+'.  The Rating Outlooks on the long-term IDRs are revised to
Positive from Stable. The issue ratings on the Dominican
Republic's senior unsecured foreign and local currency bonds are
affirmed at 'B+'. The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'BB-' and the
short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: IDB OKs US$5.75MM Loan to Support Water Adaptation
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has approved an
operation to enable investments in efficient water technologies
and practices in newly built housing in Jamaica.

The project will promote related business opportunities and
entrepreneurship in climate resilience and improve the
conservation of water throughout the country. The project will use
a US$5.75 million loan funded by resources from the Pilot Program
for Climate Resilience (PPCR), one of three programs under the
Strategic Climate Fund -- a funding window under the Climate
Investment Funds, together with non-reimbursable financing for
technical assistance (US$1,139,400, including local counterpart
resources) from the Proadapt Program of the Multilateral
Investment Fund, a member of the IDB Group. Proadapt is co-
financed by the Nordic Development Fund (NDF).

Drought and shifting patterns of rainfall are affecting water
prices across Jamaica and aggravating the strain on the water
supply, which along with other constraints has led to periodic
water service interruptions. This project, by demonstrating the
market for greater water efficiency in Jamaica, will contribute to
greater conservation of this resource in housing.

The borrower of the loan is the Jamaican National Building Society
(JNBS), the largest mortgage granting institution in the Caribbean
Basin. The Jamaica National Foundation, a member of the JNBS Group
and a non-profit foundation that promotes social and sustainable
development, is the executing agency for this operation. JNBS will
on-lend PPCR resources to housing developers and construction
companies for water efficient products and measures. The
investments financed will improve water availability and reduce
the risk of water disruptions during increased periods of drought
that result from climate change. Investments will also yield
economic co-benefits by reducing household water bills.

The grant resources provided by the Multilateral Investment Fund
and the Proadapt program support technical assistance activities
aimed at complementing the loan interventions and will focus on

   -- providing the business and financial cases of water
      efficiency in companies and households;
   -- building local capacity in water adaptation measures;
      supporting a climate resilience entrepreneurship program;
      and
   -- raising awareness of the opportunities presented by water
      efficiency for local businesses, financial institutions,
      civil society and the Government of Jamaica.


UC RUSAL: Could Reduce Output Capacity
--------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Russian conglomerate UC Rusal, which has a
stake in Jamaica's mining sector, says it might reduce its output
capacity by 200,000 tons.

It says it will take action if aluminium prices fall below
US$1,500 per ton, according to RJR News.

UC Rusal's Chief Executive, Vladislav Soloviev, made the
disclosure during an interview with a Russian news agency, the
report notes.

The report relates that UC Rusal, which was overtaken last year by
China's Hongqiao as the world's top aluminum producer, has long
considered a plan to reduce capacity but has never pegged it to a
certain price for the metal.

The output cut could be carried out a smelter in northwestern
Russia and in Siberia, the report relays.

Soloviev says Rusal planned to keep its 2017 capital expenditure
at US$600 million, the report discloses.

In the meantime, aluminum prices on the London Metal Exchange are
up about 8 percent this year, the report says.

They are now trading at 1-thousand 622 dollars per ton, adds the
report.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 14, 2016, RJR News reports that UC Rusal has asked lenders
to refinance some of its US$8.4 billion debt pile.  The Russian
aluminum group disclosed the move in its full-year financial
statements, according to RJR News.  This comes less than two years
after its most recent debt restructuring, the report notes.

TCRLA reported on June 24, 2015, that RJR News said Jamaica Mining
Minister Phillip Paulwell, who returned to Jamaica from his trip
to Russia, has declared that all is well with the arrangements
that have been made for full restoration of operations at the
Alumina Partners of Jamaica (Alpart) bauxite/alumina plant at Nain
in St. Elizabeth.

After being closed for six years, work resumed at the plant
earlier this year, but only in respect of mining of the ore for
shipment to Russia, in the first instance, according to RJR News.
The phased resumption plan should see the resumption of alumina
refining towards the end of 2016, the report said.

TCRLA, citing RJR News, reported on April 30, 2015, that UC Rusal
has re-ignited its war of words with the London Metal Exchange,
saying it has allowed financial speculators to distort prices.
Vladislav Soloviev, Chief Executive Officer of the heavily
indebted Russian group, said the price of aluminum traded on the
LME has been depressed by as much as 30 per cent by the actions of
money-market players, according to RJR News.

UC Rusal has been involved in a bitter legal wrangle with the LME
over plans to reform the exchange's warehousing system and
introduce rules to tackle long queues that built up in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis, the report said.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


EMPRESAS ICA: Obtains Loan, Unveils Downsizing Plan
---------------------------------------------------
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that struggling
Mexican construction company Empresas ICA SAB said it has secured
a $215 million loan to fund current and future work as it outlined
a plan to become a much leaner company.

ICA, which has $1.35 billion in bonds, missed interest payments
late last year and early this year and is in the process of debt
restructuring, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The company ran into financial difficulties the past two years as
earnings fell at its construction division and the depreciation of
the Mexican peso led to problems meeting its dollar-denominated
debt obligations, the report notes.

ICA last year hired Rothschild & Co. and FTI Consulting to advise
it in its operational and financial restructuring, the report
says.  It had initially expected to have the plan ready by
February.

ICA said it signed a three-year convertible loan from Fintech
Europe, an investment vehicle of Mexican investor David Martinez,
the report says.  The loan carries interest of 16% and is backed
by ICA's airport and other assets.

In an outline of its five-year business plan, ICA said it plans to
wind down its housing construction and real-estate business and
its international division, while focusing on domestic
construction and limiting expansion of its infrastructure
concessions, the report discloses.

"The strategy going forward will be to get back to the basics,"
ICA said, adding that "profitability will be the main driver," the
report notes.

ICA said it would continue to own the controlling shares in
airports concern Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte, but will
stop consolidating those results, the report says.

The company expects its revenue to decline steadily from 14.5
billion pesos ($770 million) this year to just under 10 billion
pesos in 2019, and begin growing again in 2020, says the report.
About 57% of revenue over the period is expected to come from
domestic construction, the report relays.

The plan seeks to gradually increase its operating profit and
margins over the five-year period, with a return to net profit in
2017, the company said, the report discloses.

ICA didn't give details of its debt negotiations.  The company's
shares were up 19% on the Mexican stock exchange midsession, but
down 77% in the past year, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 5, 2016, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had
affirmed its 'D' global scale and national scale corporate credit
ratings and senior unsecured debt ratings on Empresas ICA, S.A.B.
de C.V.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its '5L' recovery rating
on the company's senior unsecured debt, indicating recovery
prospects between 10% and 30%.


MBIA MEXICO: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale counterparty credit
and financial strength ratings on MBIA Mexico S.A. de C.V. to
'CCC' from 'B' and its national scale financial strength rating to
'mxCCC' from 'mxBB+'.  The outlook is negative.

The ratings on MBIA Mexico are based on its core status to its
parent, MBIA Insurance Corp. (MBIA Corp; CCC/Negative/--),
according to S&P's group rating methodology.  S&P bases its
assessment of the group's status on the parent's support, which
consists of a reinsurance agreement calling for MBIA Mexico to
cede 100% of its net liability and other obligations to MBIA Corp.
S&P also takes into consideration a net worth maintenance
agreement (NWMA) in which MBIA Corp agreed to maintain MBIA
Mexico's capital equal to Mexican regulatory requirements or
$10 million, whichever is greater.  MBIA Mexico currently has only
two policies in its portfolio, which are due by 2036, and it is
not commercializing any products at this point.

S&P's rating action on MBIA Insurance Corp reflects S&P's view its
liquidity position is weak, in its view, and absent favorable
developments, the company is not likely to meet all of its
insurance policy obligations in the next 12 months.  The rating
also reflects MBIA Corp's run-off status and S&P's belief that
this status is unlikely to change.

The negative outlook on MBIA Mexico reflects that on MBIA
Insurance Corp, which in turn reflects S&P's view that the
company's liquidity position is weak and subject to risks that
directly affect its ability to pay claims.  S&P could lower the
ratings on MBIA Mexico if it becomes a virtual certainty that MBIA
Corp will not be able to meet its insurance policy obligations.
S&P do not expect to raise the ratings on MBIA Corp or MBIA Mexico
in the next 12 months


===============
P A R A G U A Y
===============


PARAGUAY: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Issuer & Sr. Unsec. Bond Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Paraguay's issuer and
senior unsecured bond ratings at Ba1 and maintained a stable
outlook.

Moody's decision to affirm Paraguay's Ba1 government bond ratings
reflects these drivers:

  1) Limited impact of the commodities price shock and regional
     slowdown on Paraguay's credit metrics, which remain in line
     with Ba-rated peers

  2) Prudent fiscal policy and progress in improving the fiscal
     framework and compliance with the Fiscal Responsibility Law

Paraguay's country ceilings are unchanged.  The foreign currency
bond ceiling remains at Baa3/P3, the foreign currency deposit
ceiling at Ba2/NP, and the long-term local currency bond and
deposit ceilings at Baa3.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE RATING

Moody's has reviewed Paraguay's rating in light of the fall in the
price of a range of commodities, including agricultural
commodities which play an important role in the growth of
Paraguay's economy.  The decision to affirm the rating at its
current level of Ba1, with a stable outlook, reflects the
following drivers.

FIRST DRIVER -- LIMITED IMPACT OF COMMODITIES PRICE SHOCK ON
PARAGUAY'S CREDIT METRICS

Paraguay's credit profile benefits from a strong fiscal position,
improving fiscal policy framework, and limited external
vulnerability.  These strengths are balanced against the economy's
longstanding dependence on agriculture, which leads to GDP growth
volatility; and overall weak governance indicators relative to
peers, despite a track-record of prudent macroeconomic policy.

The Paraguayan economy has shown resilience to adverse external
conditions.  Growth has remained strong despite the drop in
commodity prices, and the impact on fiscal metrics has been
limited, leaving the sovereign's credit profile in line with Ba
peers.  Moody's expects Paraguay's GDP growth rate to remain
around 3% in 2016, similar to last year; which was among the
highest in the region.  Despite agriculture-driven growth
volatility, Paraguay's GDP growth averaged 4.9% over the past five
years, compared to the 3.3% median for Ba-rated peers.

Moreover, even though government debt ratios have increased during
the last four years, they are expected to remain favorable
compared to Paraguay's Ba-rated peers.  Moody's expects government
debt to remain around 21% of GDP in 2017, below the Ba1 median of
36% and one of the lowest in the Ba category.  Interest payment to
revenue ratio will be around 3.6%, well-below the median of 8.9%
for Ba-rated peers.

SECOND DRIVER -- PRUDENT FISCAL POLICY AND IMPROVED COMPLIANCE
WITH THE FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW

The government continues to make progress towards implementing the
fiscal reforms approved in late 2013, which included the fiscal
responsibility law (FRL), income tax reforms, and the public-
private partnership (PPP) framework to boost infrastructure
investment.  Moreover, efforts to contain current spending have
been effective, creating more room for capital and infrastructure
spending.

The fiscal account for 2015 posted a deficit of 1.8% of GDP,
slightly above the ceiling of 1.5% mandated by the fiscal
responsibility law, largely as a result of revenue shortfall from
import duties and increased infrastructure expenditure financed by
international bond issuance (1.3% of GDP).  The government
nevertheless complied with the limits on current spending and
public sector wage increases.  The 2016 budget set the fiscal
deficit target at 1.5% of GDP, and includes a very slight increase
in the wage bill.  Going forward, we expect the authorities to
continue building policy credibility through strict compliance
with the FRL, as they contain current spending, create fiscal
space for growth-enhancing capital expenditure, and maintain low
debt ratios.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

Moody's decision to maintain a stable outlook on Paraguay's
government bond ratings was driven by our expectation that the
authorities will maintain prudent macroeconomic and fiscal
policies that will manage to strike an effective balance between
containing the rise in public debt, while continuing to borrow to
support investment in infrastructure.  The stable outlook reflects
a balance of risks facing Paraguay resulting from a weak external
environment and regional slowdown that could weigh on its growth
outlook, against the prospects of continued economic growth and
diversification, stable debt dynamics, and limited external
vulnerability.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

While a rating upgrade is not expected in the near future, upward
rating pressure could result from (1) track-record of strict
compliance with the fiscal responsibility law; (2) successful
completion of growth-enhancing infrastructure investments; and (3)
steady improvement in institutional and governance indicators.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

Downward rating pressure could result from (1) marked
deterioration in fiscal indicators and significant rise in
government debt; and/or (2) significant and prolonged
deterioration in external accounts and increase in external
vulnerability.

  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,708 (2015 Actual) (also known
   as Per Capita Income)
  Real GDP growth (% change): 3% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP
   Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 3.1% (2015 Actual)
  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.8% (2015 Actual) (also known
   as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.8% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: 58.1% (2015 Actual)
  Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
  Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
   loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On June 16, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Paraguay, Government of.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have not materially changed.  The
issuer's institutional strength/ framework, have not materially
changed.  The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its
debt profile, has not materially changed.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2015.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


IVAN A RODRIGUEZ PAGAN: Combined Plan Hearing on July 12
--------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico entered an order
conditionally approving the disclosure statement accompanying the
Chapter 11 plan of Ivan A. Rodriguez Pagan.

Pagan filed the Plan documents with the Court on May 26.

The Court set July 12 at 10:00 a.m. as the hearing on final
approval of the disclosure statement (if a written objection has
been timely filed) and for the hearing on confirmation of the
plan.

Written acceptances or rejections to the plan as well as written
objections to the disclosure statement must be filed on or before
three days prior to the hearing.

Ivan A Rodriguez Pagan filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-09507) on November 30, 2015.


KOMODIDAD DISTRIBUTORS: Taps Carrasquillo as Financial Consultant
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Komodidad Distributors, Inc., et al., ask the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ CPA Luis R.
Carrasquillo & Co., P.S.C., as financial consultant, to assist its
management in the financial restructuring of its affairs by
providing advice in strategic planning and the preparation of
Debtor's plan of reorganization, disclosure statement and business
plan, and participating in the Debtor's negotiations with the
Debtor's creditors.

The Firm's duties will consist of strategic counseling and advice,
pro forma modeling preparation, financial/business assistance,
preparation of documentation as requested for and during the
Debtor's Chapter 11, specifically as it is related to and has an
effect on the Debtor, as well as recommendations and
financial/business assessments regarding issues specifically
related to the Debtor.

The Debtor has retained the Firm on the basis of a $20,000 advance
retainer.  The Firm's professionals will be paid at these hourly
rates:

     CPA Luis R. Carrasquillo, All Areas Partner         $175

     CPA Marcelo Gutierrez, Financial Accounting
          Senior CPA                                     $125

     Other CPA's All Areas                             $90-$125

     Lionel Rodriguez Perez, Senior Accountant            $90

     Carmen Callejas Echevarria, Senior Accountant        $85

     Alfredo J. Segarra, Senior Accountant                $80

     Janet Marrero, Administrative and Support            $45

     Iris L. Franqui, Administrative and Support          $45

Luis R. Carrasquillo Ruiz, a principal at the Firm, assures the
Court that the Firm and the members of the Firm are disinterested
persons as defined in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(14).

The Firm can be reached at:

     CPA Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co., P.S.C.
     Luis R. Carrasquillo Ruiz
     28th Street, No. TI-26, Turabo Gardens Avenue
     Caguas, Puerto Rico 00725
     Tel: (787)746-4555
          (787)746-4556
     Fax: (787)746-4564
     E-mail: luis@cpacarrasquillo.com

                  About Komodidad Distributors

Komodidad Distributors, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-04161) on May 25, 2016.  The
petition was signed by Jorge Galliano, president.  The Hon.
Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan presides over the case.  The Debtor
estimated assets of $50 million to $100 million and estimated
debts of $10 million to $50 million.

Komodidad Distributors' Chapter 11 case is jointly administered
with those of G.A. Design & Sourcing, Inc., GMAXPORT, Inc., G.A.
Investors, S.E., and G.A. Property Development, Corp., under
(Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 16-04164).


LEGAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS: Hires Ortiz-Bey as DACO Counsel
-------------------------------------------------------
Legal Credit Solutions, Inc., seeks authority from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Pedro
M. Ortiz-Bey, Esq., as counsel to the Debtor.

Legal Credit Solutions requires Ortiz-Bey to:

   (a) perform any and all general corporate services that may be
       required from time to time in the ordinary course of
       debtor's business during the administration of the Estate;

   (b) process the Department of Consumer Affairs (DACO) matters;
       and

   (c) handle any DACO hearings, only when necessary.

Ortiz-Bey will be paid at these hourly rates:

   -- $75.00 for general corporate services;

   -- $500.00 a month fixed rate for processing of Department of
      Consumer Affairs (DACO) matters; and

   -- $300 fixed rate for handling of any DACO hearings (per
      hearing and only when necessary).

Ortiz-Bey will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

Pedro M. Ortiz-Bey, Esq., assured the Court that the firm is a
"disinterested person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14)
of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse
to the Debtors and their estates.

Ortiz-Bey can be reached at:

     Pedro M. Ortiz-Bey, Esq.
     1060 Ferrocarril St., Rio Piedras
     San Juan, PR 00925
     Tel: (787) 765-8191
     Fax: (787) 765-2600
     E-mail: pmoblaw@gmail.com

                       About Legal Credit Solutions

Headquartered in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, Legal Credit Solutions,
Inc., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D. P.R.
Case No. 16-03685) on May 6, 2016, estimating its assets at up to
$50,000 and its liabilities at between $1 million and $10 million.

The petition was signed by Mrs. Yahairie Tapia, president.

Judge Brian K. Tester presides over the case.

Paul James Hammer, Esq., at Estrella, LLC, serves as the Debtor's
bankruptcy counsel.


LUAR CLEANERS: Taps Aida Escribano-Ramallo as Financial Consultant
------------------------------------------------------------------
Luar Cleaners, Inc., seeks permission from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Aida
Escribano-Ramallo, CPA, CIRA, CFE from the firm BDO Puerto Rico,
PSC, as financial consultant.

The Firm will:

     a. prepare or review monthly operating reports;

     b. reconcile proof of claims;

     c. prepare or review the Debtor's projections;

     d. analyze profitability of the Debtor's operations;

     e. assist in the development or review of plan of
        reorganization or disclosure statements;

     f. provide consultation on strategic alternatives and
        developments of business plans; and

     g. provide any other consulting and expert witness services
        relating to various bankruptcy matters like insolvency,
        feasibility forensic accounting, etc., as necessary.

Aida Escribano-Ramallo, CPA, CIRA, CFE has required in this case a
retainer in the amount of $5,200 which was paid after the filing
of the case.  The Firm will be paid at these hourly rates:

        Partner    $175
        Managers & Supervisors                $150
        Seniors & Semi-Senior Consultants     $100
        Consultants                            $85
        Staff                                  $60

Ms. Escribano-Ramallo assures the Court that the Firm is a
disinterested person, as defined in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(14).

The Firm can be reached at:

        Aida Escribano-Ramallo CPA, CIRA, CFE
        BDO PUERTO RICO, PSC
        1302 Ponce De Leon Avenue, 1st Floor
        San Juan, Puerto Rico 00907
        Tel: (787) 754-3999

        Fax: (787) 754-3105
        Website: www.bdopr.com
        E-mail: aescribano@bdo.com.pr

Headquartered in Toa Baja, Puerto Rico, Luar Cleaners, Inc., filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No.
14-04974) on June 18, 2014, listing $1.03 million in total assets
and $2.15 million in total liabilities.  The petition was signed
by Raul Palacios Velez, president.  Jacqueline Hernandez Santiago,
Esq., at Jacqueline Hernandez Santiago serves as the Debtor's
bankruptcy counsel.


SPORTS AUTHORITY: US Trustee Objects to Gordon Brothers' Hiring
---------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew R. Vara, the Acting United States Trustee for Region 3,
objects to Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., et al.'s application
to employ Gordon Brothers Asset Advisors, LLC, doing business as
Gordon Brothers-AccuVal, as appraiser for the Debtors'
intellectual property, nunc pro tunc to April 8, 2016.

According to the Objection, AccuVal seeks to be paid "from the
Debtors' estates, subject to approval by the Court pursuant to
Sections 330 and 331 of the Bankruptcy Code, for any fees, costs
or expenses, arising out of the successful defense of any fee
application by the Firm in these bankruptcy cases in response to
any objection to its fees or expenses."

The Fee Defense Provisions violate the Bankruptcy Code and the
American Rule, ignore the express directives of the United States
Supreme Court, and are otherwise unreasonable, Mr. Vara contends.
The principle known as the American Rule provides that each
litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a
statute or contract provides otherwise.

The Supreme Court recently held that Section 330(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a court to approve a law firm's
fee for litigating its fee application, Mr. Vara argues, citing
Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2158
(2015).  He insists that for five separate and independent
reasons, AccuVal cannot circumvent ASARCO by having the same fees
approved as a term or condition of its employment under Section
328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Unless the Fee Defense Provisions are removed or stricken, the
Court should deny the Application, Mr. Vara says.  He adds, among
other things, that the Fee Defense Provisions cannot be approved
under Section 328(a) because they seek to pay professionals for
work not within the scope of their employment.

The Court will commence a hearing on June 28, 2016, at 11:00 a.m.,
to consider the Application.

The U.S. Trustee is represented by:

          Hannah Mufson McCollum, Esq.
          TRIAL ATTORNEY, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
          UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          J. Caleb Boggs Federal Building
          844 N. King Street, Room 2207
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 573-6491
          Facsimile: (302) 573-6497
          E-mail: hannah.mccollum@usdoj.gov

                     About Sports Authority

Sports Authority Holdings, et al., are sporting goods retailers
with roots dating back to 1928.  The Debtors currently operate 464
stores and five distribution centers across 40 U.S. states and
Puerto Rico.  The Debtors offer a broad selection of goods from a
wide array of household and specialty brands, including Adidas,
Asics, Brooks, Columbia, FitBit, Hanesbrands, Icon Health and
Fitness, Nike, The North Face, and Under Armour, in addition to
their own private label brands.  The Debtors employ 13,000 people.

Sports Authority and six of its affiliates filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10527 to
16-10533) on March 2, 2016.  The petitions were signed by Michael
E. Foss as chairman & chief executive officer.

The Debtors have engaged Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP as general
counsel, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as co-counsel,
Rothschild Inc. as investment banker, FTI Consulting, Inc., as
financial advisor and Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as notice,
claims, solicitation, balloting and tabulation agent.

Andrew Vara, Acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, appointed seven
creditors of Sports Authority Holdings Inc. to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors.  Lawyers at Pachulski
Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP represent the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


CARIBBEAN AIR: Responds to Ultimatum by Guyana Airport Authorities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Antigua Observer reports that the state-owned Caribbean Airlines
(CAL) says it must comply with all regulatory directives of the
sovereign states into which it operates as it sought to deal with
a deadline given by the Cheddi Jagan International Airport (CJIA)
in Guyana.

CJIA says it is prepared to cancel an agreement it has with the
Trinidad-based airline unless the carrier remedies a situation
involving passengers and duty free concessionaires about their
duty free items being dumped in Trinidad once bought in Guyana,
according to Antigua Observer.

In a letter to CAL, the CJIA has given the carrier 21 days to
"remedy the situation" with the CJIA warning that it "will be at
liberty to proceed to cancel the Air Carrier Agreement under
Article 9.3," the report notes.

Media reports in Guyana note that passengers and duty free
concessionaires have been complaining about their duty free items
being dumped in Trinidad once bought in Guyana, the report notes.

But in a statement, CAL said Guyana is an important destination
for it and remains "committed to our loyal Guyanese customers whom
we have consistently served with reliable service since our start
in 2007," the report relays.

But the airline said that while it has been designated the carrier
for Guyana for the Toronto and New York destinations, carrying
over 350,000 passengers to and from Guyana annually, "as an
international air carrier, Caribbean Airlines must comply with all
regulatory directives of the sovereign states into which we
operate, as do all other airlines," Antigua Observer notes.

"One such regulatory body is the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) which governs the security processes and
conducts audits for all carriers flying into the United States of
America," CAL said, the report notes.

CAL said that in light of screening rules which are in accordance
with TSA measures being applied at any Last Point of Departure
(LPD) to the United States, and a recent TSA audit, a restriction
on the entry of transit duty free into the sterile holding areas
of all transit airports has been imposed, the report relays.

"Consequently, customers departing from Guyana or any other
Caribbean destination with duty free items who are connecting on
flights to the United States on any airline cannot enter the
sterile holding area of any airport through which they transit en
route to the United States," CAL said, the report adds.

The airline said that it sought to balance its regulatory
obligations "with our customers' desire to make duty free
purchases.  Unfortunately, this proved to be challenging as it
resulted in damage to fragile items as well as items remaining
unclaimed at the final destination, the report relays.

"Customer comfort and convenience are top priorities of Caribbean
Airlines and we continue to collaborate with stakeholders,
including the Civil Aviation and Airport authorities to achieve a
workable solution to ensure we remain compliant with the TSA
regulations and provide quality service to our valued customers,"
CAL added, notes the report.

                         About Caribbean Airlines

Caribbean Airlines Limited -- http://www.caribbean-airlines.com/
-- provides passenger airline services in the Caribbean, South
America, and North America.  The company also offers freighter
services for perishables, fish and seafood, live animals, human
remains, and dangerous goods.  In addition, it operates a duty
free store in Trinidad.  Caribbean Airlines Limited was founded in
2006 and is based in Piarco, Trinidad and Tobago.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
November 2, 2015, RJR News said that Michael DiLollo, Chief
Executive Officer of Caribbean Airlines Limited has quit after
just 17 months on the job. The 48-year-old Canadian national,
citing personal reasons, resigned with immediate effect.  His
resignation was accepted by the airline's board of directors. Mr.
DiLollo was appointed Caribbean Airlines CEO in May 2014,
following the sudden resignation of Robert Corbie in September
2013.

In early February 2015, Larry Howai, then Finance Minister, told
Parliament that unaudited accounts for 2014 showed the airline
made a loss of US$60 million, inclusive of its Air Jamaica
operations, and the airline planned to break even by 2017.
Mr. Howai told the Parliament that a five-year strategic plan had
been completed and was in the process of being approved for
implementation.

In an interview with the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian in early
November 2015, Mr. DiLollo said CAL did not need a bailout just
yet. Mr. DiLollo said the airline had benefited from extremely
patient shareholders for years and he believed the airline was
strategically positioned to break even in three years.


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Seeks to Raise Millions on International Market
------------------------------------------------------------------
Antigua Observer reports that the Trinidad and Tobago is seeking
to borrow one billion US dollars on the international market,
Finance Minister Colm Imbert has said.

"The next set of financing that Government is going to do is we
are going to the international market," Minister Imbert told
reporters that he will be visiting several cities in the United
States including Los Angeles, Boston and Chicago next month to
raise the funds, notes the report.

According to Antigua Observer, Minister Imbert said the value of
going overseas, "is that you get US dollars which are added to our
foreign reserves when they come in and you will be paying back
over a period of years.

"One billion US dollars will go immediately to enhancing our
country's foreign reserves and then we may pay back US$80 million
. . . US$100 million over a period of 10 to 12 years." Minister
Imbert told reporters that a team from the Ministry of Finance and
the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago will make presentations to
US banks.

"I don't expect it will be a difficult 'sell', I'm confident in
the ability of myself and the Government to 'sell' Trinidad and
Tobago, "he said, the report notes.

The report says that Minister Imbert said the Keith Rowley
government has been successful in raising three billion TT dollars
(One TT dollar =US$0.16 cents) with financial institutions
yielding TT$1.88 billion, an indication that they "still have an
appetite for government debt".

The Finance Minister reiterated that the government, which came to
office last September, has no plans to seek funding from the
Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF), notes the
report.

"We don't borrow from the IMF. You borrow from the IMF when you
gone through. Trinidad and Tobago has not gone through," Minister
Imbert said, the report adds.


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: IMF Says Real GDP Declined 2.1% in 2015
----------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
concluded the Article IV Consultation with Trinidad and Tobago.
Trinidad and Tobago's output has continued to shrink while
declines in global energy prices are leading to surging fiscal
deficits and are pushing the external current account into
deficit.

Energy output is sharply lower due to supply-side constraints.
Combined with weak non-energy growth, real GDP is estimated to
have declined 2.1 percent in 2015 and is expected to fall another
2.7 percent in 2016.

The lower energy prices and weaker growth have contributed to a
steep fall in fiscal revenues, raising the FY 2014/15 (October to
September) deficit to 4.7 percent of GDP, and once the full-year
impact is felt, to a projected 10.9 percent of GDP in FY 2015/16.2
In addition, lower energy prices reversed Trinidad and Tobago's
usual current account surplus, with the current account estimated
at a deficit of 5.4 percent in 2015, while gross official reserves
fell from US$11.3 billion to US$9.8 billion during 2015. Core
inflation remained anchored at 2.0 percent yoy in 2015, while
headline inflation fell to 1.5 percent (yoy).

Unemployment remained low (3.6 percent in September 2015), in part
as make-work programs continue to facilitate employment, though
layoffs are picking up.

The new government has undertaken fiscal adjustments intended to
bring the economy back into balance. It introduced new revenue
measures with the FY 2015/16 budget, and made further adjustment
measures mid-year when it became clear that even the seemingly
conservative energy price assumptions in the budget were
overoptimistic, due to the subsequent continued decline in energy
prices.

The Central Bank began tightening monetary policy to mitigate
capital outflows beginning in late 2014, before pausing in January
2016. Although the currency has been allowed to depreciate
modestly against the U.S. dollar, external balance models suggest
the currency remains substantially overvalued (although the degree
of overvaluation is subject to uncertainty due to historical
shortcomings in domestic data), while foreign exchange shortages
persist.

Banks remain strong, while there has been some progress on
structural reforms, notably with respect to a significant start on
efforts to remedy statistical shortcomings.

                      Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors noted that the recent sharp decline in energy
prices is posing major challenges to Trinidad and Tobago's
economy.  Directors welcomed the efforts taken by the new
government and encouraged further policy actions, including
additional fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, to
preserve macroeconomic stability, diversify the economy, and
enhance medium-term growth prospects.

Directors concurred that a strong medium-term fiscal plan is
needed to re-establish a sustainable fiscal path and ensure debt
sustainability. They commended the authorities for the important
steps taken thus far and encouraged them to put in place a
comprehensive fiscal framework to guide their multi-year
adjustment efforts. Directors agreed that priority should be given
to broadening the revenue base with a comprehensive VAT reform,
improving tax administration, phasing out fuel subsidies, while
improving targeted social protection. In this context, they also
welcomed the authorities' intention to pursue a comprehensive
expenditure review.

Directors supported the current pause in monetary policy
tightening given the challenges to growth. They noted that while
the immediate policy priority is to focus on maintaining external
balance, addressing foreign exchange shortages on current
transactions would be important. Directors noted that a well-
communicated move to greater exchange rate flexibility, as part of
a comprehensive demand-management package, would help strengthen
the foreign exchange market and support the needed macroeconomic
adjustment. Some Directors highlighted the importance of
mitigating volatility in the foreign exchange market, and
recommended a careful adjustment strategy.

Directors noted that strong comprehensive structural reforms are
needed to achieve sustained and inclusive growth over the medium
term. They emphasized the importance of pushing ahead with energy
sector taxation reforms, addressing inefficiencies in the public
service, and strengthening financial sector supervision and
regulation, particularly the non-bank financial regulatory
framework. They also welcomed ongoing efforts to further
strengthen the AML/CFT framework.

Directors encouraged continued efforts to reform the labor market,
improve the business climate, and make further progress on the
establishment of a tax policy unit and the National Statistical
Institute to address the remaining shortcomings.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Moody's Says Default "Highly Likely"
-----------------------------------------------
Venezuela's external funding gap implies it is highly unlikely
there will be sufficient hard currency available to fully redeem
debt service obligations this year, said Moody's Investors
Service.  Still, the ratings agency noted that a default could be
avoided.

In a new report, Moody's examined the relationship between the
government of Venezuela (Caa3 Negative) and Petroleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA, Caa3 negative), analyzing how a potential credit event
could play out in the near future with a focus on PDVSA's role as
a possible trigger of a credit event involving the sovereign.  The
relationship between the two is complex and intertwined, with the
sovereign's indirect ownership of oil assets -- the main source of
hard currency inflows into Venezuela -- via PDVSA.

"Of the two debt issuers, PDVSA and Venezuela, the oil company is
more likely to default first given that it owes significantly more
than the sovereign in debt service in 2016-2017, with large
payments due this year," said Moody's Vice President Jaime
Reusche.

PDVSA's hefty payment calendar through 2017 includes almost $4
billion in debt service in Q4 2016 when $3 billion in principle
payments come due: $1 billion in October and another $2 billion in
November.  By contrast, the sovereign has only interest payments
due on its global bonds from now through the end of 2017.

The report acknowledges that a default by the PDVSA would very
likely be followed by a default of the sovereign as well.

In the event of a credit event, Moody's expects losses to be in
the vicinity of 35% in net present value terms, which is
consistent with the sovereign's and PDVSA's Caa3 rating.  The
rating agency noted its negative outlook on both ratings
acknowledges the degree of uncertainty involving potential losses
in the event of default.

While less likely than a default in its view, Moody's said there
is a non-negligible probability that a credit event related to
both Venezuela and PDVSA could be avoided altogether.  The
sovereign could avoid being caught in a debt restructuring of
PDVSA if the latter's maturities are restructured under relatively
favorable terms for bondholders.  For both issuers to avoid
default, Moody's analysts said several factors would need to
converge.

"For both the sovereign and PDVSA to avoid default, the external
funding gap would need to narrow materially either as a result of
additional financing and/or debt relief from China, and/or higher
oil prices," said Reusche.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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