TCRLA_Public/160701.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, July 1, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 129


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ALBANESI SA: Moody's Assigns B3/Baa2.Ar Ratings to $250MM Notes
ARGENTINA: Holds First International Business & Investment Forum
COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: Reveals Cash Tender Offer for 2019 Notes
COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Stable
COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: Fitch Rates USD300MM Proposed Bonds B-

IRSA INVERSIONES: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Remains Stable
QUICKFOOD SA: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to B3/Baa2.ar


B O L I V I A

BANCO FIE: Moody's Assigns Ba3 GS Rating to Bs200MM Debt Issuance


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Unemployment Rises to 11.2% in March-May Period
KLABIN SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB+'; Outlook Stable


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BDCC INVESTMENT: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 12
DENJOY CAYMAN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 29
DOWGATE EUROPE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 15
FR PLASCO: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 12
MB ASSET: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 29

PACIFIC ALLIANCE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
TRYALL MANAGEMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 15
WINDY SAILS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 20
ZEDRA HOLDINGS: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 4


C O L O M B I A

BANCO DE BOGOTA: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Subordinated Debt Rating
EMPRESA NACIONAL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR; Outlook Negative


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Launches US$500 Million Tap of 2026 Bond
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Moody's Affirms B1 Issuer and Debt Ratings


J A M A I C A

NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK: Discloses Management Changes


M E X I C O

BANCO MERCANTIL: Moody's Cuts MTN Debt Pogram Rating to Ba1(hyb)
BANCO MERCANTIL: Moody's Cuts Jr. Sub. Debt Rating to Ba1(hyb)


P U E R T O    R I C O

JEM REST CORP: Court Junks Bid to Enjoin Treasury Dept.
LLAC INC: Taps Berrios & Longo as Legal Counsel
SPORTS AUTHORITY: Objects to Ward Gateway's Motion to Compel


                            - - - - -



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ALBANESI SA: Moody's Assigns B3/Baa2.Ar Ratings to $250MM Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo ("Moody's)
assigned a B3/Baa2.ar ratings to the proposed USD 250 senior
unsecured notes due 2023 guaranteed by Albanesi S.A. In addition
to the guarantee of the parent company, the group's following
subsidiaries: Generacion Mediterranea S.A., Generacion Frias S.A.
("Frias") and Central Termica Roca S.A ("Roca") will be joint and
several obligors under the notes.

Proceeds from the notes will be used by the issuers to prepay most
of their outstanding secured debt (approximately USD 120 million
of GEMSA and Roca's secured bank loans) while USD 105 million will
be applied to the companies' investment program (USD 50 million
for Roca's plant conversion to combined cycle; USD 55 million to
expand GEMSA's installed capacity by adding additional 150 MW to
its current 442 MW). The remaining USD 25 million will be used for
the repayment of other bank loans and general corporate purposes.
Moody's has reviewed the preliminary draft legal documentation
provided to date related to the debt issuance and the assigned
ratings assume that there will be no material variation from the
drafts reviewed and that all agreements will be legally valid,
binding and enforceable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B3/Baa2.ar ratings reflects the predictable and stable cash
flows originated by the long-term capacity payments power purchase
agreements (PPAs) that Albanesi companies operate. PPA contracts
are dollar-denominated and payments are not subject to realized
energy dispatch. In addition, fuel costs (gas or fuel oil) are
passed-through to the off-takers under the PPA's and therefore
there is no exposure to changes in fuel prices.

The ratings also factor-in the companies' and the parent proven
track record of developing and operating generation projects over
the past decade. Since the Albanesi group acquired its first
generation plant in 2007, its total installed capacity expanded to
the current 900 MW. Albanesi's investment program includes
expansions of 460 MW in additional capacity over the next 2 years,
including some PPAs recently awarded to Albanesi by the Argentine
Ministry of Energy.

The ratings are tempered by the companies' small scale, with total
assets that even after the planned expansion will represent less
than USD 1.0 billion and are largely concentrated in Argentina,
under predominantly an unique regulatory regime that still faces
some degree of uncertainty.

In addition, most of the co-issuers' EBITDA and cash flows rely on
contracts with the government's agency that manages the wholesale
electricity market in Argentina "Cammesa". The electricity price
controls in place in Argentina translate in Cammesa posting
structural operating deficits that need to be covered by the
federal government. This leaves the electricity market in
Argentina with a high degree of exposure to Argentine government
(B3, stable) credit risk that is captured in both the rating level
as well as its outlook.

Rating Outlook

The stable outlook is in line with the outlook of the sovereign
and reflects and Moody's view that the creditworthiness of the
company cannot be de-linked from the credit quality of the
government. The stable outlook also considers that combined
leverage will decline steadily after peaking in 2017 and once the
new capacity becomes operative.

What Could Change the Rating -- Up/Down

The B3 rating is constrained by Argentina's foreign currency bond
ceiling; therefore the rating could be upgraded if Argentina's
foreign currency bond ceiling is upgraded.

An upgrade of the ratings will also require that the co-issuers
continue to generate stable cash flows under their respective PPAs
and that the planned expansions are finalized on time to allow the
expected debt decline as increased revenues are applied to debt
repayment. Quantitatively, an upgrade of the national scale rating
would require a combined ratio of interest coverage (CFO pre WC
plus interest to interest) above 3.5 times, CFO (pre WC) to debt
in the range of 25 to 30% and positive levels of FCF on a
sustainable basis. A material reduction of leverage, such as a
combined debt to EBITDA ratio below 2.5 times could also be
beneficial for an upgrade consideration.

A rating downgrade of the sovereign would likely result in
negative rating actions for the notes. The ratings could also come
under downward pressure if payments from Cammesa under the signed
PPAs experience significant delays.

Moody's said, "Quantitatively, negative pressure on the ratings
could occur if the group's financial policy became more aggressive
than expected. Specifically, we would become concerned should
combined debt to EBITDA exceed 5.0x times beyond 2017; combined
interest coverage (CFO pre WC + Interest/Interest) were to fall
below 1.5x or FCF to Debt stayed lower than 15%.

Issuer's Profile

"The co-issuers under the notes are three different Argentine
corporations or S.A.'s: (1) Generacion Mediterranea, 442 MW of
installed capacity and annualized revenues of ARS 2.0 billion (USD
130 million), operates four power plants located in four different
Argentine provinces. Gemsa is the surviving entity after the merge
of 3 smaller companies (Independencia, Riojana and La Banda) into
Gemsa. Gemsa's revenues are a combination of sales to the spot
market, Energ°a Plus and Resolution 220 PPAs, the last two
explaining close to 80% of its revenues and cash flows. (2) Frias,
60 MW power plant located in Santiago del Estero is a different
S.A. that initiated commercial operations in December 2015. Frias'
2016 annualized revenues are estimated at ARS 200 million (USD 15
million), mostly arising from its Resolution 220 PPA. We expect
that Frias will merge into Gemsa early next year. Finally, (3)
Central TÇrmica Roca S.A., 130MW power plant located in Rio Negro,
with annualized revenues of approximately ARS 550 million (USD 40
million), generates 60% of its cash flows under the Res. 220
framework. While Gemsa and Frias are Albanesi's fully owned
subsidiaries, Roca is only 75% owned by Albanesi Inversora S.A.
The 25% remaining shareholding interest belongs to an Argentine
group of private investors. Nevertheless, the three companies are
jointly and severally liable for all obligations under the notes
that in addition will be fully and unconditionally guaranteed by
Albanesi S.A."

Albanesi S.A. (the parent guarantor), is an Argentine holding
company that owns and operates through several plants and
subsidiary companies approximately 760 MW of power capacity within
the country. In 2015, Albanesi's consolidated revenues in the
electricity market reached approximately USD 200 million.


ARGENTINA: Holds First International Business & Investment Forum
----------------------------------------------------------------
From September 12-15, Argentina's capital Buenos Aires will host
over 1500 global businessmen, investors and political leaders for
the first Argentina Business & Investment Forum.

"Argentina is back on the global investment map, offering some of
the most exciting investment opportunities for the coming decade",
declared Argentine President Mauricio Macri.

"It is important for Argentina that we re-establish a strong and
mutually-beneficial relationship with the international business
community", he added. "Attracting foreign direct investment this
year will be a catalyst to economic growth and to creating jobs
and opportunities for the people of Argentina."

Organized by the Argentina Investment & Trade Promotion Agency,
the Forum will consist of plenary sessions, thematic conferences,
bilateral meetings and networking opportunities that will give
participants the chance to interact with senior government
officials, state governors and local business leaders to explore
new investment opportunities underpinned for strategic growth in
every sector of the economy.

"We are looking for international investors to review first-hand
the investment opportunities that our country presents across
almost all industrial and service sectors, such as conventional
and renewable energy, agribusiness, technology and
infrastructure", declared Juan Procaccini, President of the
Argentina Investment & Trade Promotion Agency. "The Agency will
prioritize investments that promote inclusive growth in the
different regions of our country".

Procaccini revealed that, since the assumption of President Macri
in December 2015, foreign companies have already announced
investments of over US$ 16bn, three times as many as in the same
period last year.

Key to attracting these investments are the ongoing macroeconomic
and institutional reforms that will underpin national growth and
stability in the coming years. "Other measures in the agenda, such
as the new legal framework for public-private partnerships, will
facilitate investment in key areas such as infrastructure", stated
Procaccini.

President Macri added that the Forum will show the global business
community that "in Argentina they can count on the best tools, the
best supplies and raw materials, the best energy potential, and
above all else, the enormous talent of our people."

                           *     *     *

On April 19, 2016, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Moody's Investors Service upgraded on April 15,
2016, Argentina's government bond rating to B3 from Caa1, with the
outlook changed to stable from positive.  The key drivers for the
upgrade are (i) Moody's expectation that Argentina will settle
holdout creditor claims which will result in a lifting of court
injunctions and clear the way for Argentina to access
international capital markets, as well as the likelihood that
Argentina will make payments to restructured bondholders increased
significantly following an April 13, US circuit court ruling in
favor of Argentina, and (ii) the economic policy improvements
since Mauricio Macri's administration took office last December.
The new government lifted capital controls and allowed the peso to
float more freely, reduced energy and transportation subsidies and
has begun to address longstanding macroeconomic imbalances.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.

On March 24, 2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Argentina's Long-
term local-currency Issuer Default Rating (LT LC IDR) to 'B' from
'CCC', with a Stable Outlook. Fitch has affirmed Argentina's Long-
term foreign-currency (FC) IDR at 'RD' and the short-term FC IDR
at 'RD'. In addition, Fitch has upgraded the Country Ceiling to
'B' from 'CCC'.


COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: Reveals Cash Tender Offer for 2019 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Compania Latinoamericana de Infraestructura & Servicios S.A. said
that it is commencing a tender offer for cash (the "Tender Offer")
for any and all of the outstanding U.S.$87,106,000 11.50% Series 4
Notes due 2019 issued by CLISA and guaranteed by Cliba Ingenieria
Ambiental S.A. and Benito Roggio e Hijos S.A. In conjunction with
the Tender Offer, CLISA is commencing a consent solicitation (the
"Consent Solicitation") according to which it will solicit from
holders of Notes (the "Holders") consents (the "Consents") to
certain proposed amendments (the "Proposed Amendments") to the
terms and conditions of the Notes (the "Conditions"), which, if
adopted by Holders, are expected to make the covenants of the
Notes substantially consistent with the covenants proposed for the
Proposed Offering (as defined below).  The Consent Solicitation,
together with the Tender Offer, is referred to as the "Offer".

The principal purpose of the Offer is to acquire the Notes for
liability management purposes and to obtain the Requisite Consents
(as defined below) to the Proposed Amendments (as defined below).
The Offer will expire at 04:59 hours, Central European Time, on 28
July, 2016, unless extended or earlier terminated by the Purchaser
(the "Expiration Time").

A full text copy of the press release is available free at:

                       https://is.gd/qLJf4y


COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' corporate credit and issue-
level ratings on CLISA-Compania Latinoamericana de Infrastructura
& Servicios S.A.  At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B-' rating
to the company's proposed seven-year senior unsecured notes for up
to $300 million.  The outlook is stable.

On June 29, 2016, CLISA announced that it intends to issue long-
term dollar denominated senior unsecured notes for refinancing
purposes.  The use of proceeds includes the tender of its existing
bullet $87.1 million due in 2019.  S&P views the tender offer as
opportunistic, with proposed prices to repurchase the securities
above par value, and because S&P believes a failure to carry out
the transaction won't increase the likelihood of conventional
default over the near to medium term.  Clisa's subsidiaries,
Benito Roggio e Hijos S.A. and Cliba Ingenieria Urbana S.A. (not
rated) jointly account for approximately 80% of the group's
consolidated assets and EBITDA), and will unconditionally and
irrevocably guarantee the notes.

Given that the company plans to use the new issuance for
refinancing purposes, S&P expects CLISA will maintain relative
stable debt levels and credit metrics.  Moreover, S&P believes
that a successful transaction will improve CLISA's financial
flexibility as it will reduce the concentration of its short-term
debt, which accounted for 49% of total debt as of March 31, 2016.
On the other hand, in S&P's view, the transaction might exacerbate
CLISA's currency mismatch risk, as the company will replace debt
denominated in local currency with the new bond, while its cash
flow generation is predominately in Argentine pesos.  S&P
estimates that, pro forma of the bond issuance, approximately 85%-
90% of the total debt will be denominated in foreign currency.

The stable outlook on CLISA incorporates S&P's expectations that
the company will maintain its debt to EBITDA at levels below 5x.

S&P could lower the ratings on CLISA in the next 12 months if it
perceives that the company's capital structure is unsustainable,
which could happen if its debt to EBITDA persistently exceeds 5x,
for example.  At the same time, a downward revision of the
country's T&C assessment would result in a downgrade of the
company.

In the next 12 months, any upside scenario would depend on both an
upward revision of the ratings on Argentina to 'B' (because CLISA
cannot be rated above Argentina due to its high exposure to the
country) as well as an improvement in the company's financial risk
profile.  That might occur if the company starts generating
sustained operating cash flows -- for example, if its OCF to debt
ratio were to exceed 25%.


COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: Fitch Rates USD300MM Proposed Bonds B-
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned CLISA-Compania Latinoamericana de
Infraestructura y Servicios S.A.'s (CLISA) proposed bond offering
of up to USD300 million a rating of 'B-(EXP)/RR4'.  Proceeds of
the bond issuance will be used to refinance existing debt.  The
issuance will improve CLISA's debt maturity profile as well as
lower its overall cost of debt.

The bonds will be guaranteed by Benito Roggio e Hijos S.A. and
Cliba Ingenieria Urbana S.A and rank pari passu in priority of
payment with CLISA's other senior unsecured debt.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

CLISA's ratings reflect the company's strong market position as
one of the largest privately-owned conglomerates supported by its
businesses in various public infrastructure works.  The company is
exposed to cyclicality in its construction business, leading to
increased importance of its waste management business.  CLISA's
main activities depend on contractual agreements and Argentine
government regulations at the national, provincial and municipal
levels. The ratings are constrained by Argentina's country ceiling
rating.

STRONG MARKET POSITION
CLISA operates in four main businesses: construction and toll road
concessions (through Benito Roggio e Hijos [BRH]), water
treatment, waste management (CLIBA), and transportation.  The
waste management division is the largest contributor to sales and
EBITDA at around 42% and 53%, respectively, as of December 2015.
During the first quarter of 2016 waste management operations
contributed 47% to sales and 58% to EBITDA.  This resulted from
improved performance in the waste management business partially
offsetting the slowdown in the construction segment.  Construction
and toll road concessions now contribute 30% to sales and 24% to
EBITDA as of the first quarter 2016, down from 40% and 44% in
2013.

EXPOSURE TO REGULATORY RISK
CLISA's main business activities depend on contractual agreements
and government regulations at the national, provincial and
municipal levels.  Past actions include the previous
administration's interference in the concession of Metrovias'
(CLISA's mass transport subsidiary) operation of the subway
concession in 2013 and rescinding of CLISA's contract for the
operation of the San Martin and Mitre commuter railroad services
in 2015.  An agreement was reached for Metrovias to exclusively
operate and maintain the subway, and the contract was renewed and
amended in February 2016.  Exposure to regulatory risk also
derives from the delay in the renegotiations of public service
contracts.

EXPOSURE TO CYCLICALITY IN CONSTRUCTION
While the waste management business contributes the majority of
sales and EBITDA, CLISA's construction and toll road concessions
continue to be important to its overall operation at 30% of sales
and 25% of EBITDA.  The company's cash flow from this business is
exposed to the cycles of the construction industry and public
works in Argentina.  The construction segment decelerated during
the last three years due to the macroeconomic slowdown in
Argentina and the Presidential elections in October 2015.  The
slowdown is one reason for the increased importance of CLISA's
waste management business.  Fitch expects activity to pick up in
the medium term after the Macri administration has reviewed its
priorities for infrastructure development.

CLISA's consolidated construction backlog continued to be strong
at around ARS7 billion allowing the company to maintain an
important cash generation source for approximately three years.
The company is also exposed to collection risk derived from having
the government as its main counterparty.

RESULTS IMPROVING IN LOCAL CURRENCY
On a peso basis, the company's revenues and EBITDA grew by 25% and
12% respectively in 2015.  CLISA reported sales and EBITDA of ARS9
billion (USD917 million) and ARS1.2 billion (USD127 million),
respectively as of December 2015.  This compares with revenues of
ARS7 billion (USD851 million) and EBITDA of ARS1.1 billion (USD132
million) reported in 2014.  The increase was mainly driven by new
contracts and adjustments to existing contracts in the waste
management and construction and toll road concessions segments.

LEVERAGE AND LIQUIDITY WEAKENING DUE TO DEPRECIATION
Depreciation of the peso in the fourth quarter of 2015 was the
main reason for the significant increase in the level of reported
debt.  At Dec. 31, 2015 CLISA reported ARS4.5 billion in total
debt up from ARS2.8 billion in 2014.  On a dollar basis, the
company's total debt increased to USD341 million from USD332
million over the same period.  As a result of the depreciation, in
local currency terms gross and net leverage ratios jumped to 3.8x
and 3.1x, respectively, as of year-end 2015.  The company reported
ARS779 million (USD60 million) in cash and equivalents in 2015.
ARS163 million of reported cash and equivalents are tied for use
to specific government projects.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

The company's ratings reflect the close relationship between CLISA
and the Argentine government, which has a 'B' country ceiling.  A
positive rating action in the short to medium term is unlikely
without an upgrade of Argentina's country ceiling.

CLISA's ratings could be negatively affected by a combination of
the following: economic deterioration and a downgrade of
Argentina's sovereign ratings; a significant deterioration of
credit metrics; and/or the adoption of adverse public policies
that can affect the company's business performance in any of its
business segments.


IRSA INVERSIONES: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Remains Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' corporate credit and issue-
level ratings on IRSA Inversiones y Representaciones and on its
subsidiary, IRSA Propiedades Comerciales (IRCP).  The outlook
remains stable.

The ratings on IRSA and IRCP reflect that operations are mostly
concentrated in the shopping mall and office sectors in the city
of Buenos Aires, where IRSA generates the bulk of its EBITDA,
although it has minor investments in other countries.  As a
result, the ratings on IRSA and IRCP are capped at the 'B-'
transfer and convertibility (T&C) on Argentina, reflecting S&P's
view that high inflation and uncertainty about future economic
trends undermine IRSA's long-term strategy and financial
flexibility.  Also, despite recent debt refinancing, short-term
debt still accounts for the bulk of the company' debt and its
funding costs are higher than those of its real estate peers in
other countries.

The ratings affirmation reflects S&P's view of IRSA's resilient
business, due to high quality and strategic location of assets,
which should allow it to maintain occupancy rates around 98%.
Additionally, the long-term nature of its contracts with
commercial and office property tenants, which include renewal
rates typically passing through inflation (shopping malls) and
foreign-exchange movements (offices) generates fairly stable cash
flows.

IRSA's exposure to currency mismatch risk, because about 75% of
its debt is denominated in dollars while it generates revenue in
Argentine pesos, could drag down cash generation amid higher
interest costs if the peso further depreciates.  S&P also believes
that continued exchange-rate fluctuation can pressure company's
ability to pass through changes in its debt cost to its tenants.
The mitigating factors are the company's high-quality real estate
assets and investments in the U.S. that could provide some
financial flexibility in case they are monetized, as seen in the
past.  However, these are difficult to project, so their current
impact on S&P's analysis is very limited.

"In our base-case assumptions, we treat Israel-based IDB
Development Corp.'s operations as separate from IRSA's core real
estate business.  We believe IRSA's investment in Israel is
noncore and separable, because IDB Development's debt is non-
recourse to IRSA and it's not guaranteed or secured by IRSA's
assets.  We understand that the Israeli court would have no
jurisdiction on IRSA's assets to solve any claims that could come
from IDB Development bondholders and suppliers in the event of
bankruptcy.  However, any potential loss of value and the risk of
further capital injections that can hurt IRSA's credit quality are
factored in our analysis of the company's financial policy," S&P
said.

S&P's base-case scenario excludes any contingent liability to
address potentially adverse litigation outcomes, resulting from
the current class action lawsuits that have been filed against
IRSA.  The lawsuits contend that the company may have issued
misleading information to the market in October 2015 regarding the
consolidation of its Israeli subsidiary.  In S&P's view, it
remains uncertain to what extent the lawsuits can affect IRSA's
credit quality in the next two years.


QUICKFOOD SA: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to B3/Baa2.ar
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo ("Moody's")
has upgraded Quickfood S.A.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to B3
from Caa1 in the global scale and to Baa2.ar from Ba1.ar in the
national scale of Argentina. The outlook remains stable.

The ratings of Quickfood's outstanding notes guaranteed by BRF
S.A. remain unchanged at Ba1/Aaa.ar, with negative outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's said, "Quickfood's CFR upgrade to B3/Baa2.ar reflects our
reassessment of the support provided by its parent company, BRF
S.A. (Ba1 negative), who owns 90.05% of the company. Since the
acquisition of Quickfood in 2012, BRF has shown both explicit and
implicit support to the company. BRF fully and unconditionally
guarantees all of Quickfood's outstanding notes ($61 million as of
March 2016), currently representing 89% of its total debt, which
would cause an acceleration of most of the parent's debt in the
event of a default. The rating also incorporates the ongoing
support, both in terms of quality and technical affairs, provided
by BRF. More recently, in October 2015, BRF supported Quickfood in
the acquisition of five recognized brands in Argentina
(Vienissima, Hamond, Tres Cruces, Good Mark and Wilson)."

The stable outlook for Quickfood's CFR reflects Moody's view that
BRF will continue to support Quickfood as one of its key platforms
to expand its presence in Argentina, in line with the group's
expansion plan within Latin America. In addition, the company will
continue to profit from the group's solid business model and
position as one of the largest food conglomerates in the world.

Quickfood's B3/Baa2.ar rating incorporates an uplift from its
standalone credit profile provided by the support from BRF.
Quickfood's credit metrics and liquidity profile are weak. Despite
significant improvements in its operating performance up until the
third-quarter of 2015 as a result of the company's restructuring
plan and very positive evolution in revenue generation, in the
fourth-quarter of 2015 and first-quarter of 2016 the company's
margins were affected by a devaluation of the Argentine peso,
which increased the cost of raw materials, and the increase in
public tariffs of utilities, which added to the continuous
increase in the cost of livestock. In addition, there has been a
significant increase in marketing expenses as a result of a
significant marketing campaign for the company's products since
the fourth-quarter 2015.

Moody's said, "We expect Quickfood's operating performance to
gradually improve over the next several quarters, driven by its in
natura meat exports (benefited by the elimination of the export
tax on beef since December 2015), its cold-cuts meat segment and
new launches in the hamburger segment. In addition, Quickfood will
benefit from the increased competitive position after the brands
acquired in October 2015, reinforced by its investment plan to
increase production capacity in several of its plants."

The company's B3/Baa2.ar ratings also reflect Quickfood's position
as one of the main meat processor companies in Argentina,
supported by the quality of its products and its well-recognized
brands. The ratings are mainly constrained by Quickfood's
historical weak credit and financial profiles, the company's
modest scale and its concentration in Argentina, with a consequent
strong correlation with the country's macroeconomic environment.

The Ba1/Aaa.ar ratings of Quickfood's outstanding guaranteed notes
mirror the Ba1 rating of its guarantor, BRF. The negative outlook
mirrors the negative outlook of BRF's rating. BRF fully and
unconditionally guarantees the instruments, which would cause an
acceleration of most of the parent's debt in the event of a
default.

A rating downgrade on the company's CFR could be prompted in case
of a weakening credit profile of Quickfood's sponsor, BRF, or in
case of a significant deterioration in Quickfood's operating
performance. Indications of a weakening market share in the
domestic protein market could also place pressure on the ratings,
especially if Quickfood is unable to remain among the leading
protein players in Argentina. Finally, the guaranteed notes could
experience downward pressure if BRF's ratings were to be
downgraded.

An upgrade could result from a continued strengthening of
Quickfood's revenues and profitability, along with a continued
improvement on leverage metrics. Additionally, a more predictable
outlook for economic activity in Argentina would be important for
a ratings upgrade. Finally, the guaranteed notes could be upgraded
if BRF's ratings were to be upgraded.

Founded in 1960 and headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
Quickfood is dedicated to the manufacturing and commercialization
of processed, refrigerated and frozen food under specific brands
(burgers, sausages, processed meat and frozen vegetables) and 'In
Natura' bovine meats and sub products. It has several recognized
brands, such as "Paty", the hamburger brand used as a general
expression of "hamburger" in Argentina. Revenues for the last
twelve months ended in March 2016 amounted to ARS 4.1 billion (USD
403 million).

BRF is one of largest food conglomerates globally, with
consolidated net revenues of BRL33.3 billion as of the last twelve
months ended March 2016. At the end of 2015, the company operated
44 plants and 40 distribution centers, and exported to more than
120 countries, with a leading position in poultry exports.



=============
B O L I V I A
=============


BANCO FIE: Moody's Assigns Ba3 GS Rating to Bs200MM Debt Issuance
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned a Ba3 global scale debt rating and a Aa2.bo national
scale debt rating to Banco Fie's second takedown under its senior
debt program of Bs600 million (Programa de Emisiones de Bonos
Banco Fie 2).

The issuance, for up to Bs200 million, will be split into two
different classes due in 1,620 days (Class A) and 2,340 days
(Class B). The outlook for the global scale rating is negative, in
line with the negative outlook on Bolivia's government bond
rating, while the national scale rating carries a stable outlook.

The following ratings were assigned to Banco Fie S.A.:

Expected issuance of Bs100 million - Class A:

Global Local-Currency Debt Rating: Ba3

Bolivian National Scale Local-Currency Debt Rating: Aa2.bo

Expected issuance of Bs100 million - Class B:

Global Local-Currency Debt Rating: Ba3

Bolivian National Scale Local-Currency Debt Rating: Aa2.bo

RATINGS RATIONALE

Fie's ratings reflect its well-established position among Bolivian
microfinancers, which supports its historically robust interest
margins. However, Fie has sought to diversify its business model
by continuing to bank its customers as they move up the income
ladder and graduate to small and medium-sized companies (SMEs).
The ratings also consider Fie's manageable asset risk indicators,
healthy reserve coverage and capital levels. These strengths more
than offset its modest total liquidity and pressures on
profitability.

Profitability remains sound, but government-imposed lending rate
caps on mandated loans and deposit rate floors will increasingly
weigh on Fie's profitability metrics. In order to maintain
profitability, the bank has been seeking to diversify its income
sources towards fees and commissions and to reduce its cost
structure. Fie's asset quality remains sound and the bank
maintains a robust reserve coverage which should enable it to
absorb potential losses in adverse circumstances. The bank's
capital ratios remain adequate as it continues to reinvest a high
proportion of earnings to support its expansion plans.

What could move the rating up or down

The bank's negative outlook is in line with the negative outlook
on the Bolivian government's rating and reflects credit inter-
linkages between the two. The bank's ratings would likely be
downgraded as well if the sovereign rating were lowered. The
ratings could face downward pressure if the entity's asset quality
and profitability were to suffer as a result of adverse market
conditions or additional government regulations. While there is no
upward ratings pressure at this time given the bank's negative
outlook, the outlook would likely be stabilized if and when the
sovereign outlook stabilizes.

Banco Fie is headquartered in La Paz, with assets of Bs10.36
billion and equity of Bs782 million as of March 2016.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: Unemployment Rises to 11.2% in March-May Period
-------------------------------------------------------
Rogerio Jelmayer at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's
unemployment rate increased between March and May, while wages
continued to decline, as Latin America's largest economy faces a
deep and prolonged recession.

Joblessness rose to 11.2% from 10.2% in the previous three-month
period and 8.1% compared with a year earlier, the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics, or IBGE, said, according to
The Wall Street Journal.  Average monthly wages fell to BRL1,982
($582), adjusted for inflation, from BRL2,037 in the year-earlier
period.

The drop in jobs and wages comes as the country's recession
lingers, the report notes.  After contracting 3.8% last year,
Brazil's economy is expected to shrink 3.44% this year, according
to a weekly central-bank survey of 100 economists.

The data were from a recently created, nationwide unemployment
survey, known as PNAD, that the IBGE is phasing in. The survey
that it replaced collected data only from six major metropolitan
areas, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service.  The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.


KLABIN SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit
rating on Klabin S.A. to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and its national scale
corporate credit rating to 'brAA' from 'brAA'.  S&P also lowered
its issue-level rating on the financing vehicle Klabin Finance
S.A.'s $500 million senior unsecured notes, which Klabin
guarantees, to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The outlook is stable.  S&P
also assigned a '3' recovery rating on Klabin Finance's notes,
indicating S&P's expectation for meaningful recovery (50%-70%, in
the higher range of the band) of the notes in the hypothetical
default scenario.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that Klabin's debt reduction
will be slower amid softer-than-expected operating results.  Even
though Klabin implemented its R$8.5 billion investment on time and
on budget, the softer pulp prices and the recently appreciated
Brazilian real had raised the company's adjusted debt to EBITDA to
the 4.5x-5.0x range in 2016, in comparison with S&P's previous
forecast of 3.5x-4.0x.

Although weaker, S&P still considers Klabin's financial risk
profile to be significant, due to S&P's expectations of improving
leverage profile by 2017, once the new plant becomes fully
operational and investment needs decrease.  However, in S&P's
view, Klabin's leverage tolerance and commitment to reducing debt
in line with a higher rating after Puma's completion were
insufficient, in S&P's view.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BDCC INVESTMENT: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 12
-------------------------------------------------------
The members of BDCC Investment Company will hold their final
meeting on July 12, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


DENJOY CAYMAN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 29
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Denjoy Cayman Limited will hear on July 29,
2016, at 10:30 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman, KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Kim Charaman
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


DOWGATE EUROPE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 15
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of The Dowgate Europe Fund Limited will hold
their final meeting on July 15, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Avalon Ltd.
          Landmark Square, 1st Floor
          64 Earth Close
          P.O. Box 715 Grand Cayman KY1-1107
          Cayman Islands
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 769-9351


FR PLASCO: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 12
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of FR Plasco Coinvest Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on July 12, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alan Schwartz
          c/o Matt Bernardo
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 4268


MB ASSET: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 29
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of MB Asset Management Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on July 29, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ken Stewart
          c/o Apex Fund Services (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 10085 161a Artillery Court
          Grand Cayman, KY1 1001
          Cayman Islands


PACIFIC ALLIANCE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund Limited
received on June 28, 2016, the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Saville
          c/o Peter Bigwood
          10 Market Street
          P.O. Box 765 Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9006
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 7100
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 7120
          e-mail: peter.bigwood@uk.gt.com


TRYALL MANAGEMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 15
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Tryall Management Company will hold their
final meeting on July 15, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Keith Blake
          c/o Giji Alex
          Telephone: 345-914-4350
          Facsimile: 345-949-7164
          Century Yard, 2nd Floor
          Cricket Square, Elgin Avenue
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-949-4800
          Facsimile: 345-949-7164


WINDY SAILS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 20
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Windy Sails Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 20, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on May 27, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zedra Holdings (Cayman) Limited
          FirstCaribbean House, 4th Floor
          George Town, Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


ZEDRA HOLDINGS: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 4
-----------------------------------------------------
The members of Zedra Holdings (Cayman) Limited will hold their
final meeting on Aug. 4, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Nicola Cowan
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


BANCO DE BOGOTA: Moody's Confirms Ba2 Subordinated Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed all of Banco de Bogota
S.A.'s ratings, including its ba1 standalone baseline credit
assessment (BCA); the Baa2 long-term senior unsecured debt rating
and the Baa2/Prime-2 long- and short-term deposit ratings.
Moody's assigned a negative outlook on these ratings.  The Ba2
subordinated debt rating was also confirmed as well as the long-
and short-term counterparty risk assessments (CR Assessments) of
Baa1(cr) and Prime-2(cr).

At the same time, Moody's confirmed the Ba2 local and foreign
currency long-term issuer ratings of Grupo Aval Acciones y
Valores, S.A., and assigned a negative outlook.  Moody's also
confirmed Grupo Aval Limited's Ba2 senior unsecured foreign
currency debt rating, with a negative outlook.

These rating actions conclude the rating reviews initiated on 9
March 9, 2016.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

BANCO DE BOGOTA
CONFIRMATION OF STANDALONE BASELINE CREDIT ASSESSMENT
In confirming its ratings for Banco de Bogota, Moody's took into
account the corporate restructuring announced by management on 14
June, which is intended to strengthen the bank's capitalization
ratios.  The measures include the deconsolidation of its merchant
bank, Corporacion Financiera Colombiana S.A. (Corficolombiana,
unrated), and the merger of Leasing Bogota Panama (LBP, unrated),
the holding company of, BAC International Bank (BAC, Baa3 stable),
with Banco de Bogota S.A. Colombia.  While the proposed
restructurings are yet to be reflected in Bogota's capitalization
ratios, Moody's estimates that the bank's resulting tangible
common equity (TCE) capital ratio will be consistent with a ba1
BCA.  David Olivares, a Moody's Senior Credit Officer noted that
"Banco de Bogota's capital management initiatives will primarily
have an accounting effect and fall short of bringing substantial
fresh core capital to the bank, leaving it still weakly positioned
relative to regional and global peers."

Moody's noted that the proposed deconsolidation of Corficolombiana
will significantly reduce volatility in Banco de Bogota's balance
sheet, as Bogota's investment in the merchant bank, in the form of
a 38.2% shareholding, will now be carried as an equity investment.
The volatility has been essentially derived from Corficolombiana's
investments in the real sector, namely in concessions of toll
roads and oil and gas pipelines, which under IFRS are treated as
intangible assets.  According to its methodology, Moody's deducts
a large portion of intangible assets from its calculation of Banco
de Bogota's TCE.

In addition, the proposed merger of LBP will help mitigate the
effect currency swings have on Banco de Bogota's financial
statements stemming from the bank's foreign currency-denominated
assets that are booked at its Central American subsidiaries.  By
merging LBP into Banco de Bogota, the sizable goodwill originated
from regional acquisitions, including BAC, will be recognized in
Colombia, in pesos, rather than in Panama where LBP is based,
potentially reducing the balance sheet exposure to currency
volatility.  In its calculation of capital ratios, Moody's also
deducts goodwill from TCE metrics.  Banco de Bogota's goodwill
represented a hefty 40% of TCE as of March 2016 as a result of the
depreciation of the Colombian peso.  Moody's notes that goodwill
will continue to weigh on Banco de Bogota's TCE, but the effect of
currency swings will be lower following the regulatory approval
for the merger.

According to Moody's estimates based on Banco de Bogota's
preliminary unaudited figures as of March 2016, the capitalization
initiatives will increase the bank's TCE/RWA ratio to nearly 6.2%
from 4.7% taking solely into account the proposed operation of
Corficolombiana before the potential increase in the bank's
consolidated book value derived from carrying Corficolombiana at
fair value.  While the improvement is significant, the resulting
TCE ratio is still low in absolute terms and relative to peers,
and provides limited capacity to support loan growth and absorb
higher than expected losses in the event of stress.  Moreover, the
bank's sizable single borrower and sector concentrations relative
to capital, continue to expose the balance sheet to asset risk and
earnings volatility, particularly under current uncertain market
conditions.  While Banco de Bogota's unaudited estimates point to
higher capitalization ratios nearing 8.25% derived from potential
increases in equity resulting from the deconsolidation of
Corficolombiana, Moody's final calculation of the bank's TCE/RWA
ratio is subject to the publication of financial statements and
crystallization of changes in capitalization levels, and thus are
subject to change.

                          NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The Baa2 deposit and senior debt ratings reflect Moody's continued
assessment that there is a high probability that Banco de Bogota
will benefit from government support in the event of financial
stress.  However, these ratings carry a negative outlook to
reflect negative pressure on the bank's BCA.  Moody's finds the
bank's prospective TCE ratio to be sensitive to small deviations
in earnings or asset quality performance, and therefore notes that
the BCA would be downgraded, and thus the bank's deposit and
senior and subordinated debt ratings, if: (i) the bank fails to
execute its proposed corporate reorganization plans, or (ii) the
TCE/RWA ratio does not improve sustainably, or conversely, falls
below 6%, or (iii) higher than expected deterioration in asset
risk materializes and leads to delinquency ratios (measured as
non-performing loans as a percentage of gross loans) consistently
higher than the levels reported to date, and/or if sub-par
earnings performance leads to return on assets ratios lower than
1.5% (measured as net income as a percentage of tangible assets).

     GRUPO AVAL AND GRUPO AVAL LIMITED WITH NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The confirmation of Grupo Aval's and Grupo Aval Limited's issuer
and senior unsecured ratings reflects the confirmation of Banco de
Bogota's BCA. G rupo Aval's ratings incorporate the structural
subordination of the bank holding company's liabilities versus the
liabilities of its operating entity, and are notched off the
bank's BCA.  In turn, Grupo Aval Limited's debt ratings are based
on Grupo Aval's irrevocable and unconditional guarantee of Grupo
Aval Limited's liabilities under the indentures.  The negative
outlook on Grupo Aval ratings mirrors the outlook on Banco de
Bogota.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Banco de Bogota S.A.

These ratings were confirmed:
   -- Standalone baseline credit assessment at ba1
   -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment at ba1
   -- Long term local currency deposits at Baa2, negative outlook
   -- Short term local currency deposits at Prime-2
   -- Long term foreign currency deposits at Baa2, negative
      outlook
   -- Short term foreign currency deposits at Prime-2
   -- Long term foreign currency senior unsecured debt at Baa2,
      negative outlook
   -- Long term foreign currency subordinated debt rating at Ba2
   -- Long and short term counterparty risk assessments at
      Baa1(cr)/Prime-2(cr)
   -- Overall rating outlook: Negative

Grupo Acciones y Valores S.A.

These ratings were confirmed:
   -- Long term local currency issuer at Ba2
   -- Long term foreign currency issuer at Ba2
   -- Overall rating outlook: Negative

Grupo Aval Limited

These ratings were confirmed:
   -- Long term foreign currency backed senior unsecured at Ba2
   -- Overall rating outlook: Negative

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


EMPRESA NACIONAL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo SA, changed
the outlook on Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones S.A. (ENTEL
S.A.) to negative from stable and affirmed the global and national
scale corporate family ratings of Ba3 and Aaa.bo, respectively.
The rating action follows Moody's Investors Service's decision on
June 10th to change the outlook on Bolivia's Ba3 government bond
rating to negative from stable.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The negative outlook on ENTEL S.A.'s ratings reflects the outlook
on the ratings of the Government of Bolivia (Ba3 negative), which
owns 97.5% of ENTEL S.A.'s shares through the Ministry of Public
Works, Utilities and Housing.  The change of the sovereign outlook
to negative from stable incorporates persistent fiscal and
balance-of-payment pressures as a result of Bolivia's widening
fiscal and current account deficits coupled with the lack of
fiscal adjustment measures to compensate for lower hydrocarbon
revenues.

The affirmation of ENTEL S.A.'s global and national scale
corporate family ratings of Ba3/Aaa.bo considers the company's
operating strength among peers and strong liquidity. ENTEL S.A.'s
ratings are furthermore supported by its leading market position
in the mobile business and steady cash generation.  Despite
operating in a capital intensive industry, ENTEL S.A. has only
minimal debt-like obligations while maintaining sufficient cash on
hand.  ENTEL S.A.'s rating is restrained by its modest scale when
compared to global peers, a product portfolio largely limited to
the prepaid mobile business, and revenue growth pressured by
Bolivia's highly competitive operating environment as well as
macroeconomic limitations.  Through at least 2017, ENTEL S.A. will
continue to carry out significant capital investments which will
generate sustained negative free cash flow.

ENTEL S.A.'s ratings also reflect the application of Moody's joint
default rating methodology for government-related issuers (GRIs).
ENTEL S.A.'s rating combines: (i) ENTEL S.A.'s underlying baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of ba3, and (ii) the willingness and
ability of the government of Bolivia to provide credit support to
ENTEL S.A. in a distress scenario.  The Bolivian government's
ability to provide support to ENTEL S.A. is measured by its Ba3
rating and negative outlook, weakened somewhat by the moderate
dependence of the government and the company on credit factors
that could cause stress on both simultaneously.  Moody's considers
the government's willingness to support the company in the event
of financial distress as high.

The ratings could be downgraded if the Government of Bolivia's
rating is downgraded.  ENTEL S.A.'s ratings could also experience
downward pressure if overall credit metrics significantly
deteriorate, such that adjusted debt/EBITDA is sustained above 2.3
times or adjusted EBITDA margin falls below 35% on a sustained
basis.  In addition, ENTEL S.A.'s ratings could fall under
pressure in case of negative regulatory developments, or a loss of
government support.  A large debt-funded acquisition would also
put negative pressure on the rating.

Given the majority participation of the Government of Bolivia in
ENTEL S.A., a rating upgrade would be dependent on a positive
rating action on the sovereign rating.

ENTEL S.A. is Bolivia's incumbent telecommunications service
provider.  Initially, the company was a public entity under the
Ministry of Civil Transportation, Communications and Aeronautics
until it became a subsidiary of Telecom Italia (Ba1 negative) in
1995.  In 2008, the Government of Bolivia (Ba3 negative) carried
out the nationalization of ENTEL S.A. and now holds 97.5% of the
company's shares through the Ministry of Public Works, Utilities
and Housing.  The remaining 2.5% is held by a group of minority
shareholders.  The company derives over 80% of its revenue from
the mobile voice and internet segment, where it has approximately
44% of market share with full national coverage through 2G and 4G
networks.  In addition, the company offers fixed landline and
broadband, wireless data, corporate and satellite television
services.  During the last twelve months as of March 31, 2016,
ENTEL S.A. reported revenues totaling close to USD612 million.


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Launches US$500 Million Tap of 2026 Bond
------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Kilby at Reuters reports that the Dominican Republic has
launched a US$500 million tap of its 6.875% 2026 bond at 5.60%
after order books swelled to around US$3bn, a buyside source told
IFR.

The final yield comes at the tight end of guidance of 5.60%-5.65%
and inside initial price thoughts of 5.875% area, according to
Reuter.

The bonds closed at 109.20 or a 5.6% yield on June 28 and were
trading earlier on June 28 at 110.25 or at a yield of 5.40%, the
investor said.

The Caribbean nation is expected to price the deal later on
through leads Citigroup and JP Morgan. Ratings are B1/BB-/B+.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Moody's Affirms B1 Issuer and Debt Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the Dominican
Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to positive from
stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.

The change of the Dominican Republic's rating outlook to positive
is driven by the following credit considerations:

(1) Moody's expectation that the country's debt burden will
continue to fall over the next two years, supported by a reduced
fiscal deficit.

(2) The Dominican Republic's robust growth outlook, which compares
favorably to rating peers, and which leads to a rise in the
country's income levels.

The Dominican Republic's long-term local currency country risk
ceilings remain unchanged at Ba1. The foreign currency bond
ceiling and the foreign currency bank deposit ceiling also remain
unchanged at Ba2/NP and B2/NP, respectively.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR MOVING THE OUTLOOK TO POSITIVE

FIRST DRIVER: FALLING DEBT BURDEN SUPPORTED BY A REDUCED FISCAL
DEFICIT

Moody's said, "The first driver for the outlook change relates to
the Dominican Republic's improving debt profile. The country's
debt burden has fallen every year since 2013, when it peaked at
38.9% of GDP, and we expect the country's debt will end at 35.4%
next year, compared to an average of 58% of GDP for B1-rated
sovereigns."

A reduced fiscal deficit has been key in reducing the debt
metrics. The Medina administration, which assumed power in 2012
and was reelected this past May, has been able to maintain a
trajectory of gradual fiscal consolidation, reducing the deficit
to 2.9% of GDP last year, from a peak of 6.4% during the 2012
election year. The lower deficits will continue this year and next
with the fiscal deficit dropping to 2.5% next year.

SECOND DRIVER: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S ROBUST ECONOMIC GROWTH

The second driver for the outlook change is the Dominican
Republic's robust growth outlook. Real GDP rose 6.9% in 2015, the
highest growth rate in Latin America and in the Caribbean, and
Moody's expects strong economic growth this year and next, albeit
at a somewhat lower rate. Data from the first four months support
our view of at least 6% growth for 2016, driven by construction
and mining. Next year growth should be closer to the 5% long-term
trend, still higher than rating peers. In particular, economic
growth compares very favorably to other Caribbean islands. The
Dominican economy grew an average 5.6% annually from 2006 to 2015
compared to a median of 1.0% in the Caribbean.

As a result of the fast growth the country has become
progressively richer and its GDP per-capita of $14,984 (2015 data,
PPP) is almost double the B-category median, and higher than the
Ba median. The economy is strongly linked to that of the US, which
accounts for around 50% of exports, 41% of tourist arrivals and
71% of remittances to the island. The tourism industry in the
Dominican Republic currently contributes around 16% of GDP, 15% of
total employment and 25% of its foreign exchange earnings.

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S B1 RATING

The Dominican Republic's B1 rating balances a comparatively fast
growing economy with a weak institutional framework and an
improving, but still weak fiscal position. As in most Caribbean
economies, the service sector dominates the Dominican Republic's
economic structure. Although it is more diversified than other
Caribbean peers, the Dominican Republic remains dependent on
tourism, which accounts for 25% of its foreign exchange earnings.

Moody's said, "The rating is constrained by a weak institutional
framework, as evidenced by the country's low scores on the
Worldwide Governance Indicators and a mixed track record of
macroeconomic stability. Monetary and fiscal policies have in the
past been prone to boom-bust cycles, and we believe that there is
still a high degree of discretion and lack of a rules-based
approach to fiscal policymaking."

Despite recent improvements to fiscal metrics the Dominican
Republic continues to face significant fiscal challenges,
including a high exposure to foreign exchange risks, as more than
70% of central government is denominated in foreign currencies,
higher than the B1 rating median. Furthermore, the Dominican
Republic's interest payments represent 18.5% of government
revenues, a ratio that is also higher than rating peers.

The rating is further constrained by a sovereign's small and
volatile revenue base, which contributes to the sovereign's low
debt tolerance. Fiscal outcomes are heavily influenced by
electoral cycles and lead to stop-and-go policies that undermine
fiscal sustainability. Absent material structural reforms,
electricity sector transfers and subsidies remain a burden on
public finances.

Weak external finances are an important vulnerability given levels
of foreign exchange reserves, leaving the country exposed to
terms-of-trade shocks and price volatility for imported energy. In
addition, the government balance sheet faces exchange-rate risk
related to a high share of foreign currency-denominated financial
obligations despite efforts by the authorities to develop the
domestic government bond market.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN/UP

The sovereign's rating could face upward pressure if
vulnerabilities to external shocks decline, and if the debt burden
falls significantly. Continued consolidation of government
finances and fiscal restraint, supported by a continuation of the
robust growth, could lead to an improvement in credit quality.

A weakening of external finances that results in a substantial
decrease of foreign exchange reserves or an abrupt depreciation of
the currency could put downward pressure on the rating. Material
fiscal slippage that reverses progress on consolidation and leads
to continued increases in debt levels or funding costs could also
lead to a lower rating.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 14,984 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 6.9% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 2.3% (2015 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.9% (2015 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -2% (2015 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 43.6% (2015 Actual)

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On 28 June 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Dominican Republic, Government of. The main points
raised during the discussion were: The issuer's economic
fundamentals, including its economic strength, have not materially
changed. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its
debt profile, has materially increased.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK: Discloses Management Changes
------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Lalu Vaswani has been appointed a Director
of NCB Capital Markets Barbados, effective June 14.

Meanwhile, Lennox Channer, who is the Assistant General Manager
for Investor Relation, Performance Monitoring and Planning, has
resigned. His resignation takes effect on August 19, according to
RJR News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 1, 2016, Fitch Ratings upgraded National Commercial Bank
Jamaica Limited's (NCBJ) long-term foreign currency and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) to 'B' from 'B-', its Viability Rating (VR) to 'b' from 'b-'
and its Support Rating (SR) to '4' from '5'. Short-term foreign
and local currency IDRs were affirmed at 'B.'


===========
M E X I C O
===========


BANCO MERCANTIL: Moody's Cuts MTN Debt Pogram Rating to Ba1(hyb)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico has confirmed Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A.'s
(Banorte) long-term global local and foreign currency A3 deposit
ratings and Aaa.mx long-term Mexican National Scale deposit
ratings.  The global scale ratings carry a negative outlook.  At
the same time, Moody's downgraded Banorte's standalone baseline
credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to baa2 from baa1,
downgraded the bank's long-term subordinated MTN debt program
rating one notch to (P)Baa3, and the junior subordinated debt and
MTN debt program ratings to Ba1 (hyb) and (P)Ba1, respectively.

Moody's also downgraded the subordinated and junior subordinated
Mexican National Scale debt ratings to Aa3.mx and A1.mx (hyb),
respectively.  The bank's long and short-term A2(cr)/Prime-1(cr)
counterparty risk (CR) assessments were confirmed.

In addition, Moody's downgraded Arrendadora y Factor Banorte,
S.A.'s (AyF Banorte) issuer and senior debt ratings to Baa2 from
Baa1 and (P)Baa2 from (P)Baa1, respectively, as well as its
National Scale Ratings to Aa2.mx from Aa1.mx.  The outlook on AyF
Banorte's ratings is stable.

These actions conclude the ratings reviews initiated on April 4,
2016.

RATINGS RATIONALE
CONFIRMATION OF DEPOSIT RATINGS WITH A NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The confirmation of Banorte's deposit ratings reflects Moody's
continued assessment of a very high likelihood that the Mexican
government would support this systemically important institution
should it face severe financial stress.  Moody's continues to
regard the government as having a high willingness to support the
country's banks to assure banking system stability and investor
confidence.  Moody's assessment incorporates the government's
track record of support, the system's reliance on domestic deposit
funding, and the absence in Mexico of an operational bank
resolution regime based on the principle of bailing-in bank
creditors.

Moody's assessment of government support results in two notches of
uplift from the bank's baa2 adjusted BCA, leading to an A3 deposit
rating that is aligned to the government's own bond rating.  As a
result of the negative outlook on Mexico's rating, the outlook on
Banorte's deposit rating is also negative.

LOWERING OF BANORTE'S STANDALONE BASELINE CREDIT ASSESSMENT
Banorte, along with other Mexican banks, faces increased medium
term tail risks stemming from the country's less favorable
environment predicated on a combination of the oil price shock and
the lower than expected economic growth.  The structural reforms
adopted in 2013-14, which were expected to deliver a boost to
economic activity, have not provided the anticipated benefit.
Moody's does not project an economic deceleration, but together
these factors have undermined expectations for improved economic
performance and shifted the balance of risks and opportunities for
the country's banking sector to the downside.

Although Banorte's recent performance has remained solid and the
bank exhibits one of the strongest core capitalization among the
largest banks in Mexico, just behind Banco Nacional de Mexico,
S.A. (Banamex, A3 negative, BCA baa2), its high single borrower
loan concentrations leave it exposed to the potential for a sharp
and sudden deterioration in asset quality.  To a great extent,
Banorte's high capital adequacy reflects its large exposure to low
capital-consuming assets.  These include exposures to Mexican
states and municipalities, many of which currently have a negative
outlook due to slowing growth of transfers from the federal
government and resulting expectations of increased indebtedness,
as well as the national oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex,
senior unsecured Baa3 negative, BCA b3).  Pemex's creditworthiness
has deteriorated significantly even when considering the very high
likelihood that it will benefit from sovereign support.  Banorte's
exposure to Pemex and its related risks continue to account for a
hefty amount of the bank's tangible common equity.

However, these credit challenges are balanced by important credit
strengths, including the bank's stable and diversified core
earnings and ample access to retail deposit funding, that continue
to underpin the baa2 BCA.  The bank has relatively limited
exposure to the higher risk consumer and SME market segments,
focusing instead on lower risk but lower margin, corporate lending
in addition to government lending.  Lending concentrations aside,
Banorte's target markets support the bank's relatively strong
asset quality, with a delinquency ratio of just 2.1% as of 1Q2016,
one of the strongest among its peers.  Lastly, as the fourth
largest deposit taker in Mexico, Banorte benefits from a very
stable and low-cost funding structure.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN
The bank's negative outlook reflects the negative outlook on the
Mexican government's bond rating.  The deposit ratings would be
lowered if Mexico's government bond ratings are downgraded.
Banorte's BCA could face downward pressure if a slowdown in or
further shock to the Mexican economy causes its profitability
and/or asset quality to deteriorate.

However, the bank's deposit ratings would not be affected by a
change in the BCA provided that the government continues to
demonstrate a very high willingness to support the bank.  While
there is no upwards ratings pressure at this point, the outlook on
the bank's ratings will likely stabilize if and when the
government's outlook returns to stable.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A.

These ratings were confirmed:
   -- Long-term global local currency deposit rating of A3;
      negative outlook
   -- Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of A3; negative
      outlook
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of Aaa.mx
   -- Long-term counterparty risk assessment of A2(cr)
   -- Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime-1(cr)
   -- Overall rating outlook: Negative

These ratings were downgraded:
   -- Long-term global local currency subordinated debt rating
      (BANORTE 08, BANORTE 08-2, BANORTE 09, BANORTE 12) to Baa3,
      from Baa2
   -- Long-term global local currency subordinated MTN debt
      program rating to (P)Baa3, from (P)Baa2
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale subordinated debt rating
      (BANORTE 08, BANORTE 08-2, BANORTE 09, BANORTE 12) to
      Aa3.mx, from Aa2.mx
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale subordinated MTN debt
      program rating to Aa3.mx, from Aa2.mx
   -- Long-term global local currency junior subordinated debt
      rating (BANORTE 08U) to Ba1 (hyb), from Baa3 (hyb)
   -- Long-term global local currency junior subordinated MTN debt
      program rating to (P)Ba1, from (P)Baa3
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale junior subordinated debt
      rating (hyb) (BANORTE 08U) to A1.mx (hyb), from Aa3.mx (hyb)
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale junior subordinated MTN
      debt program rating to A1.mx, from Aa3.mx
   -- Baseline credit assessment to baa2, from baa1
   -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment to baa2, from baa1

Arrendadora y Factor Banorte, S.A. de C.V.

These ratings were downgraded:
   -- Long-term global local currency issuer rating to Baa2, from
      Baa1; stable outlook
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating to Aa2.mx,
      from Aa1.mx
   -- Long-term global local currency senior unsecured MTN debt
      program rating to (P)Baa2, from (P)Baa1
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale senior unsecured MTN debt
      program rating to Aa2.mx, from Aa1.mx
   -- Overall rating outlook: Stable

The principal methodology used in rating Banco Mercantil del
Norte, S.A. was Banks published in January 2016.  The principal
methodology used in rating Arrendadora y Factor Banorte, S.A. de
C.V. was Finance Companies published in October 2015.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A., ratings is between 1
January 2011 and March 31, 2016.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.

While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of default
risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time.  For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons, please
see:
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
189530


BANCO MERCANTIL: Moody's Cuts Jr. Sub. Debt Rating to Ba1(hyb)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed Banco Mercantil del Norte,
S.A. (Cayman I)'s (Banorte Cayman) long-term A2(cr) and short-term
Prime-1(cr) counterparty risk (CR) Assessments. at the same time,
Moody's downgraded Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A.'s (Banorte)
foreign currency junior subordinated debt ratings to Ba1 (hyb),
from Baa3 (hyb).  This action concludes the review initiated on 4
April 2016, and follows the rating action taken by Moody's de
Mexico (MDM) on Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A. (Banorte, A3
negative, BCA baa2).

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

These ratings were confirmed:

Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A. (Cayman I)
   -- Long-term counterparty risk assessment of A2(cr)
   -- Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Prime-1(cr)
   -- Overall outlook: Negative

This rating was downgraded:

Banco Mercantil del Norte, S.A.
   -- Long-term foreign currency debt rating to Ba1 (hyb), from
      Baa3 (hyb)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The confirmation of Banorte Cayman's CR Assessments follows a
similar action on Banorte.  Banorte Cayman is a branch and thus
its CR Assessment reflects that of Banorte.  Banorte's ratings
currently carry a negative outlook.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN

Banorte's negative outlook reflects the negative outlook on the
Mexican government's bond rating.  The deposit ratings would be
lowered if Mexico's government bond ratings are downgraded.
Banorte's BCA could face downward pressure if a slowdown in or
further shock to the Mexican economy causes its profitability
and/or asset quality to deteriorate.

However, the bank's deposit and senior debt ratings would not be
affected by a change in the BCA provided that the government
continues to demonstrate a very high willingness to support the
bank.  While there is no upwards ratings pressure at this point,
the outlook on the bank's ratings will likely stabilize if and
when the government's outlook returns to stable.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


JEM REST CORP: Court Junks Bid to Enjoin Treasury Dept.
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Brian K. Tester of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico denied Plaintiff/Debtor JEM Restaurant
Corporation's request for an injunction as it has failed to meet
the first of the four-prong injunction standard that "there be a
likelihood of success on the merits of the claim," in the
adversary case captioned as JEM REST CORP, Plaintiff, v. HON. JUAN
ZARAGOZA PUERTO RICO TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Defendant(s), Adversary
No. 16-00095 (Bankr. D.P.R.).

Before the court is Plaintiff/Debtor JEM Restaurant Corporation's
Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Protection and accompanying Memorandum of Law and
Defendant, Puerto Rico Department of Treasury's Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary Injunction.
The court entered an Order denying JEM's request for a temporary
restraining order due to JEM's failure to carry its burden on the
issue of "irreparable harm to the debtor or the estate" and
scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing for May 27, 2016.

A full-text copy of the Opinion and Order dated June 10, 2016 is
available at https://is.gd/WgUEwc from Leagle.com.

The bankruptcy case is IN RE: JEM REST CORP, Chapter 11,
Debtor(s)Case No. 16-00152 (Bankr. D.P.R.).

JEM REST CORP, Plaintiff, is represented by ALEXIS FUENTES
HERNANDEZ, Esq. -- FUENTES LAW OFFICES, LLC.

HON. JUAN ZARAGOZA PUERTO RICO TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Defendant, is
represented by MARTHA L. ACEVEDO PENUELA.


LLAC INC: Taps Berrios & Longo as Legal Counsel
-----------------------------------------------
L.L.A.C. Inc. seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico to hire Berrios & Longo, P.S.C. as its
legal counsel.

The firm will provide these services in connection with the
Debtor's Chapter 11 case:

     (a) advise and consult with the Debtor concerning the filing
         of schedules, appearance at first meeting of creditors,
         identifying and evaluating legal issues, and the filing
         of objections to claims;

     (b) appear for, prosecute, defend and represent the Debtor's
         interest in suits arising in or related to its bankruptcy

         case;

     (c) investigate preferences and other actions arising under
         the trustee's avoiding powers.

     (d) assist in the preparation of pleadings, motions, notices

         and orders required for the orderly administration of the

         Debtor's estate.

The firm's professionals and their hourly rates are:

     Edilberto Berrios Perez     $350
     Fernando Longo Quinones     $275
     Junior Attorneys            $175
     Legal Assistants            $100

In a court filing, Mr. Quinones disclosed that he and the members
of the firm do not hold any interests adverse to the Debtor's
estate.

Berrios & Longo can be reached through:

     Fernando Longo Quinones
     Berrios & Longo, P.S.C.
     Capital Center Building
     239 Arterial Hostos Avenue, Suite 701
     Hato Rey, Puerto Rico 00918
     Tel: 753-0884
     Fax: 753-4821

                        About L.L.A.C. Inc.

L.L.A.C. Inc., dba Tula Bay Dinner, sought protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 16-
05004) on June 23, 2016.


SPORTS AUTHORITY: Objects to Ward Gateway's Motion to Compel
------------------------------------------------------------
Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., and its affiliated debtors
submitted to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware an objection to landlord Ward Gateway-Industrial-Village,
LLC's motion to compel the Debtors to consummate and close a
proposed transaction between the Debtors and Ward Gateway.

"The Debtors are currently engaged in advanced discussions with a
potential strategic buyer . . . interested in acquiring the
Debtors' leasehold interests in over one hundred (and perhaps
upwards of two hundred) nonresidential real property leases and
offering jobs to a significant number of the Debtors' employees,
which may number in the thousands . . . the Debtors' advisors did
not market the Honolulu Lease to the Bulk Buyer but, in
conjunction with crafting its Bulk Bid and during subsequent
negotiations with the Debtors, the Bulk Buyer has repeatedly "and
very recently" advised the Debtors that the Honolulu Lease is a
critical component of its bid, and a central lynchpin to its
proposed acquisition . . . Accordingly, upon an informed
interpretation of the Main Auction Bid Procedures, the Debtors
have both the opportunity and fiduciary obligation to consider the
Bulk Buyer's potential bid, notwithstanding the Landlord's
Successful Bid, and pursue -- and certainly not foreclose or
inhibit -- an enterprise-wide transaction that holds significant
potential value for the Debtors' estates, their employees, and
other interested parties . . . despite the Landlord's accounts of
the Debtors' purported bad faith, the Debtors have complied with
the Main Auction Bid Procedures throughout the sale process with
respect to the disposition of the Honolulu Lease and the
fulfillment of their fiduciary duty to maximize value for the
estates and stakeholders . . .  the Debtors submit that the Motion
to Compel is a misplaced effort to force the Debtors to consummate
a transaction that contravenes the authority and guidelines that
the Court approved to govern the Debtors' sale process and
disposition of the Debtors' fiduciary duties to maximize value for
all," the Debtors aver.

Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., and its affiliated debtors are
represented by:

          Michael R. Nestor, Esq.
          Kenneth J. Enos, Esq.
          Andrew L. Magaziner, Esq.
          YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP
          Rodney Square
          1000 North King Street
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302)571-6600
          Facsimile: (302)571-1253
          E-mail: mnestor@ycst.com
                  kenos@ycst.com
                  amagaziner@ycst.com

                      About Sports Authority

Sports Authority Holdings, et al., are sporting goods retailers
with roots dating back to 1928.  The Debtors currently operate 464
stores and five distribution centers across 40 U.S. states and
Puerto Rico.  The Debtors offer a broad selection of goods from a
wide array of household and specialty brands, including Adidas,
Asics, Brooks, Columbia, FitBit, Hanesbrands, Icon Health and
Fitness, Nike, The North Face, and Under Armour, in addition to
their own private label brands.  The Debtors employ 13,000 people.

Sports Authority and six of its affiliates filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10527 to
16-10533) on March 2, 2016.  The petitions were signed by Michael
E. Foss as chairman & chief executive officer.

The Debtors have engaged Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP as general
counsel, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as co-counsel,
Rothschild Inc. as investment banker, FTI Consulting, Inc., as
financial advisor and Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as notice,
claims, solicitation, balloting and tabulation agent.

Andrew Vara, Acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, appointed seven
creditors of Sports Authority Holdings Inc. to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors.  Lawyers at Pachulski
Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP represent the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding,
electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited
without prior written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *