TCRLA_Public/160704.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, July 4, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 130


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

PROVINCE OF SANTA FE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Issuer Default Rating
YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Rates $750MM Floating Rate Notes 'B3'


B E R M U D A

BANK OF NT BUTTERFIELD: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Preference Stock
BERMUDA COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB+'


B O L I V I A

SEGUROS Y REASEGUROS: Moody's Assigns B1 GLC IFS Rating


B R A Z I L

BR MALLS: Fitch Keeps 'BB+' LC Issuer Default Rating
MINAS GERAIS: Moody's Cuts Global Scale Issuer Rating to B1
ODEBRECHT ENGENHARIA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Issuer-Default Ratings
RB CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns Ba2 GS LC Rating to Certificates
STATE OF BAHIA: Moody's Cuts GS Issuer Rating to 'Ba3'

STATE OF MARANHAO: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ALPHADYNE INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 15
ARC (EURO): Contributories to Hold First Meeting on July 11
ARC (USD): Contributories to Hold First Meeting on July 11
ARGYLE FUNDS: Contributories and Creditors to Hold Meetings
CAPITAL GROWTH: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 12

CONDOR ALTERNATIVE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 14
EMERGING STRATEGIES: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 12
F&C LONGSTONE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 13
FINEX FUNDS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 14
FORTISSIMO LIQUIDATING: Shareholders' Meeting Set for Aug. 4

HIGHLAND CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 14
SAAD INVESTMENTS: Creditors Hold Meeting


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: British Chamber on Brexit: Not to Worry
DOMINICAN REP: Another Business Chamber Warns About Legal Security


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Fitch Says Banks Needs Protective Measures
BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: Fitch Places 'BB-' IDR on Watch Neg
GUATEMALA: Moody's Foreign-Currency Deposit Ceiling Remains at Ba2


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Suffers Dip in Earnings


M E X I C O

BANCO NACIONAL: Moody's Cuts Baseline Credit Assessment to ba3
GRUPO POSADAS: Fitch Affirms 'B' Issuer Default Ratings
HSBC MEXICO: Moody's Downgraded Standalone BCA to 'ba3'


P E R U

CORPORACION AZUCARERA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR; Outlook Negative


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Lowers Rating on $8.3BB Bonds to 'D'
PUERTO RICO: Moody's Says PROMESA Provides Orderly PR Debt Revamp


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

NATIONAL FLOURS: Jamaica Refusing Products


V I R G I N   I S L A N D S

VIRGIN ISLANDS: Moody's Cuts Senior Lien Bond Rating to 'B1'


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From June 27 to July 1, 2016


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A R G E N T I N A
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PROVINCE OF SANTA FE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to the Province
of Santa Fe, Argentina (Santa Fe):

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR of 'B'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Santa Fe's rating reflects strong sustainability and leverage
ratios, despite future plans that will significantly increase
them. The rating also takes into consideration low refinancing
risk relative to its annual budget, as well as positive, though
limited, operating balances, underpinned by a solid and stable
revenue system. Finally the rating considers Santa Fe's robust
socioeconomic profile, as the third largest province in Argentina,
in terms of Gross Geographic Product (GGP) and population.

In contrast, the rating is limited by the constrained fiscal and
budgetary flexibility of the Province as well as its relatively
weak liquidity position, which is mitigated by quite diverse
liquidity sources. In addition, Santa Fe faces contingent
liabilities related to unfunded pension and retirement
obligations. On this matter, the Supreme Court recently ruled to
cease the withholding of 15% of federal shared tax revenue to
finance the National Social Security Administration (ANSES:
Administracion Nacional de la Seguridad Social) and the devolution
of all amounts improperly withheld since 2006, which will
strengthen the Province's budgetary flexibility.

Considering the features of Argentina's institutional framework,
Fitch does not believe any subnational entity to be rated higher
than the sovereign, as the regional government's access to foreign
currency is not deemed stronger than the central government's.
Therefore, Santa Fe is rated at the same level as the sovereign.

Santa Fe is reliant on federal shared tax revenue (co-
participation regime), a common feature in Argentinian provinces.
Despite that, tax revenue (including federal taxes)-to operating
revenue averaged 84.7% from 2011 to 2015, modifiable tax revenue
represented a relatively low 36.3% of total tax revenue in the
same period. This limits the province's fiscal flexibility and
ability to control its own revenue sources, but at the same time
endows the revenue system with stability and predictability
through a foundation of broad-based national taxes. Santa Fe's
dependence on discretionary transfers is also low, as current
transfers received-to-operating revenue averaged 6% in the last
five years. The province's operating revenue recorded a compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 31.8% from 2011 to 2015.

Santa Fe's expenditure flexibility is low, as it has significant
responsibilities that are operational in nature, such as the
provision of health care and education. Salary and price
adjustments and the deficit in Social Security have pressured
operating expenditure in recent years. Moreover, due to the
incorporation of all the employees into the provincial union,
Santa Fe faces substantial obstacles in cutting the public labor
force to reduce operating costs. Staff expenditure-to-operating
expenditure averaged 57.4% from 2011 to 2015, constraining Santa
Fe's ability to meet capital needs with its own resources.

While the high inflation environment presents a challenge to
healthy fiscal performance, the Province reported positive but
limited and declining operating balances during the period of
analysis. Santa Fe's operating margin (operating balance/operating
revenues) has been relatively stable, since expenditure growth
(2011-2015 CAGR of 30.8%) has matched revenue growth. The
operating margin closed 2015 at 4%, versus 5.3% in 2014 and 5.6%
in 2013. Despite this decline, Santa Fe kept up an adequate
budgetary performance in an election year (2015), when the
dynamics of operating expenditure usually exceed operating revenue
performance.

Capex-to-total expenditure has also been relatively low, averaging
8.5% from 2013 to 2015, although it improved to 9.8% in 2015, from
5.8% in 2012. This improvement was accompanied by the lowest
deficit before net financing of ARS2.5 billion, or 3.7% of total
revenue, which was funded by delaying payments to trade creditors,
as Santa Fe does not have accumulated reserves. Floating debt
reached 43.3 days of primary expenditure and 12.6% of operating
revenue in 2015, after averaging around 34 and 9.6% from 2011 to
2014.

To finance major capital projects and tackle infrastructure lag,
Santa Fe plans to issue notes for up to $US1 billion (or its
equivalent in other currencies). The authorization bill, currently
under discussion by the provincial legislature, states that the
notes will accrue a fixed or floating interest rate in concordance
with market conditions, while the maturity is expected to be
between 5 and 12 years. Even though final terms are still pending,
preliminary information suggests that principal may be paid in a
single final bullet payment.

According to Fitch calculations, direct debt-to-current revenue
will close 2016 at 17.2%, and will remain under 12.5% in 2017 and
2018, while direct debt servicing-to-operating balance will be
around 35% between 2016 and 2018. Therefore, even though future
capital projects will significantly increase debt burden ratios,
Fitch believes Santa Fe's future debt profile will not be weakened
for the next 2 to 3 years, as current debt levels are very low.
Direct debt-to-current revenue has consistently declined over the
last five years, closing 2015 at 3.15%, while payback (direct
debt-to-current balance) was 0.8 years.

Regarding the composition of debt, almost 100% of the provincial
debt will be denominated in foreign currency (tentatively $US).
Nevertheless, if conditions for additional debt are favorable,
Fitch believes that the currency risk faced by Santa Fe is
manageable, due to the low leverage of the Province and to the
relatively long maturity and low interest rates of its outstanding
and expected debt.

Santa Fe has a relatively weak liquidity position, as cash
represented less than 4.5% of total revenue in the last five years
(2.6% in 2015). The Province can cover temporary deficits of the
provincial treasury through the use of the fund balances of all
jurisdictions and entities of the province's non-financial public
sector without financial cost (Unified Fund of Official Accounts
or FUCO, ARS3.7 billion in 2015). As another liquidity source,
Santa Fe is authorized to issue short-term treasury notes for up
to ARS2 billion or its equivalent in other currencies. Fitch
considers the refinancing risk of Santa Fe as low, as the share of
this financial tool in the annual budget is less than 3%.

Santa Fe did not transfer the pension and retirement fund to the
national government, which is obliged to cover the underfunding of
those pension funds that were not transferred to its coverage. The
national government has not fulfilled the commitment of such
financing since the homogenization of the pension funds that took
place in 2006, so the Province has been obliged to handle the
pension deficit through contributions. This deficit reached ARS1.9
billion in 2015, with a CAGR of 42.6% from 2011 to 2015.

In November 2015, the Supreme Court ruled to stop the withholding
of 15% of the federal shared tax revenue to finance the National
Social Security Administration. Santa Fe expects higher revenues
of approximately ARS500 million per month. The ruling established
a period of 120 days in which implement the terms and conditions
of the devolution of all amounts improperly withheld since 2006,
plus interest that may apply.

Fitch considers this situation as a credit positive for Santa Fe,
as it will benefit its operating balance. According to Fitch
calculations, the operating margin may improve to 6.9% in 2016,
and then decline to 5.1% in 2017 and 3.2% in 2018.

Santa Fe is located in the Central Region of Argentina. The
contribution of the Province's GGP in the national Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) was 8.1% in 2013, the third largest nationally,
while the GGP per capita represented 1.1x of the national GDP.
According to the 2010 census, Santa Fe recorded 3.2 million
residents, the third most populous Argentinian province,
representing 8% of the country's population and reporting a CAGR
of 0.7% versus the 2001 census, below the national population CAGR
of 1.1%.

Even though Santa Fe's economy is strongly linked to the external
sector and is dominated mainly by the servicing sector, Fitch
considers it as relatively broad, diverse and stable, making it
resilient to most external economic shocks, such as weaker
commodity prices and continued underperformance in Brazil. The
Province's exports represented 21.3% of national exports, emerging
as the second Argentinian province in terms of export values.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
The IDR of Santa Fe should move in tandem with Argentina's
sovereign ratings. An upgrade of the sovereign IDR, accompanied by
an improvement in liquidity, fiscal and budgetary flexibility,
could lead to an upgrade in Santa Fe's rating. A downgrade of
Argentina's IDR, coupled with a sudden increase in the public debt
burden and weak operating margins that significantly affect
sustainability ratios, could lead to a negative rating action.


YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Rates $750MM Floating Rate Notes 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) has assigned a B3 global
foreign currency rating to YPF Sociedad Anonima's (YPF)'s proposed
$US 750 million Argentine Peso-Linked Floating Rate Notes due
2020. The proceeds of the notes will be used for capital
expenditure and working capital purposes. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Since YPF is majority owned and controlled by the Argentine
government, its B3 ratings reflect the application of Moody's
joint default rating methodology for government-related issuers
(GRIs). YPF's rating combines its underlying b3 BCA, which
expresses a company's intrinsic credit risk; the B3 local currency
rating and stable outlook of the Argentine government; and Moody's
view of moderate support from and high dependence on the
sovereign. While YPF is expected to account for only a small part
of the government's revenue base, the high default dependence
reflects the high correlation between YPF's credit profile and
Argentine economic trends. YPF derives the majority of its
revenues domestically; also, the company and the government both
share common exposure to foreign exchange rate risk and inflation,
to name a few. Moody's assumes a moderate support probability by
the government to YPF given the close relationship between the two
since the company is majority owned and controlled by the first.
However, the government's ability to provide support to YPF in
case of need is weak, evidenced by its B3 local currency rating
and stable outlook.

YPF's b3 BCA is based on the company's status as the largest
industrial corporation and energy company in Argentina with
sizeable oil and gas reserves, including large shale resources.
YPF's ratings also incorporate Moody's belief that although credit
metrics will deteriorate during 2016, given the adverse operating
environment, they will remain strong for the rating category.
However, Moody's will closely monitor the company's ability to
adapt to the new environment, following the 12% decrease in local
oil prices in Argentina earlier this year and still uncertain
policies for the energy sector, on top of a rigid cost structure
due to the Argentine labor dynamics that impact YPF's cash flow
generation.

Moody's considers YPF's liquidity profile as weak. YPF's cash
balances as of March 31, 2016 were $US 1.6 billion, which compares
to its close to $US 2 billion debt coming due in the remainder of
the year. Much of this amount is owed to local market participants
and Moody's believes that a large portion of it could be rolled
over relatively easily. Most of the company's cash is held in US
dollars in bank accounts in Argentina. The company has
demonstrated successful access to both local and international
markets to conduct liability managements; so far in 2016, YPF
would have raised close to $US 2.5 billion in debt, including the
proposed issuance. Moody's expects the company to raise additional
$US 1.5 billion in incremental debt in 2017 and refinance $US 740
million and fund negative free cash flow, despite reducing its
important capex program by 25% in 2016. It is yet to be seen how
additional capex cuts could impact YPF's production; however,
Moody's believes that past investments in technology and reserve
replacement could somewhat mitigate the negative impact in the
short term.

YPF's internal, publicly-stated net leverage target is 1.5x,
although this ratio will be higher during 2016 to reach about
2.2x, as per Moody's estimates, given lower local prices and
delays by the government to pay subsidies. YPF believes it can
reverse this trend by cashing in government subsidies as scheduled
and passing through inflation and foreign exchange devaluation to
final prices, but current economic conditions may post resistance
to elevated price increases. For these reasons, Moody's believes
that YPF's leverage will remain above management's target until at
least 2017.

YPF has a weak export profile, as it exports only around 10% of
revenues per year. The company's foreign currency risk is
currently high as 79% of its debt, 40% of its capital spending 40%
of its operating costs are linked to the US dollar, which compares
to the 40% of the company's revenue generated in US currency. The
proposed issuance, since linked to the Argentine peso, would help
reduce the company's exposure to foreign currency debt. YPF
usually holds $US 1 billion in cash but it can easily operate with
half of that.

YPF's stable outlook assumes that the Argentine government has
incentives to maintain prices of crude and oil products at a level
that makes it economically attractive for oil companies to invest
to increase production and reduce the country's dependence on
imports of oil products and natural gas.

Continued growth in total production while maintaining strong
margins and relatively low leverage could lead to an upgrade of
YPF's BCA. Over the medium term, an improvement in Argentina's B3
rating and continued demonstration of a strong financial track
record could result in a ratings upgrade. However, a rating
upgrade will depend on a clearer view of the new government's
energy policies for the next several years and how that could
affect YPF.

Conversely, YPF's ratings could be downgraded if it is unable to
maintain sufficient liquidity and access to foreign currency in
order to meet its debt service obligations. The ratings could also
be downgraded if the government of Argentina's B3 rating were to
be downgraded.

YPF is 51% owned by the Argentine government and had revenues of
$US 16.4 billion and total assets of $US 28.8 billion for the
twelve months ending March 31, 2016. During 2015, the company
generated 96% of its revenues in Argentina; its operations outside
of the country include the United States, Brazil and Chile.


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B E R M U D A
=============


BANK OF NT BUTTERFIELD: S&P Affirms BB+ Rating on Preference Stock
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it revised its outlook on Bank of N.T.
Butterfield & Son Ltd. (BNTB) to positive from stable.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed the 'BBB/A-2' issuer credit ratings on
BNTB.

S&P also affirmed its 'A-/A-2' issuer credit ratings on HSBC Bank
Bermuda Ltd. (HBBM).  The outlook is negative.

   -- The outlook revision on BNTB reflects S&P's view of
      improving economic conditions in Bermuda and S&P's
      expectation that the bank will maintain adequate capital and
      superior credit metrics relative to those of peers.  The
      negative outlook on HBBM primarily reflects S&P's belief
      that there is a possibility the bank may significantly
      reduce its capital levels, which more than offsets the
      likelihood of an improvement stemming from a potential
      strengthening in the Bermuda anchor.

S&P has reviewed the banking sector of Bermuda (A+/Stable/A-1)
under S&P's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA)
methodology, and as a result, S&P continues to rank Bermuda in
BICRA group '5'.  S&P Global Ratings' criteria define the BICRA
framework as one "designed to evaluate and compare global banking
systems."

"We believe economic risks in Bermuda's banking industry may be
declining, and we view the trend as positive.  Our base case is
for credit losses to continue to stay higher than normalized
levels through the 2016-2018 period, as prior credit impairment is
resolved, and given macroeconomic performance that remains weak,
some new impairment is added.  On the other hand, the Bermudian
economy has recently shown signs of gradual turnaround, with 2015
registering the first real GDP increase since 2008, and
unemployment declining to 7%, from its 2014 peak of 9%.  This
improvement, combined with a potentially stronger boost to
economic activity than we currently expect from Bermuda's
preparation for the 2017 America's Cup, means we may revise our
assessment of economic imbalances to high impact, from very high
impact if credit losses continue to outperform our expectations.
If it were to occur, this improvement would lead, other factors
unchanged, to our improving our overall score for economic risk to
'5', from '6', and improving our overall BICRA on Bermuda to '4',
from '5'.  We continue to view the trend for industry risk as
stable," S&P said.

"Consistent with our positive trend in the economic risks in
Bermuda's banking industry, BNTB's nonperforming loans have
trended downwards over the past few years and continue to be
significantly lower than HBBM's.  As of March 31, 2016, BNTB's S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted nonperforming assets were 3.3% of customer
loans + other real estate owned, down from 4.4% as of March 31,
2015.  BNTB recorded net charge-offs of 9 basis points in 2015
(compared with 118 basis points for HBBM), as it continues to
benefit from a balance-sheet cleanup it undertook in 2010.  In
mid-February, the bank announced that it has commenced an orderly
wind-down of the deposit-taking and investment management
businesses of its wholly owned London subsidiary, Butterfield Bank
(UK) Limited.  While BNTB expects to maintain a mortgage lending
business in the U.K., its growth strategy is focused on markets
where it has a substantial presence and can achieve economies of
scale, as evidenced by recent acquisitions in Guernsey, the Cayman
Islands and Bermuda, which we view positively.  In 2015, core
earnings improved by 7.1% from 2014 (to $113.9 million) through
acquisitions, organic growth, and cost initiatives.  BNTB incurred
on-core charges of $36.2 million, primarily in the fourth quarter,
which were largely connected to the wind-down of the London bank,
U.S. tax compliance remediation, and severance associated with
senior management restructuring.  First-quarter 2016 core earnings
were $36.0 million (up $7.0 million from first-quarter 2015) after
excluding expenses attributed to the wind-down of its deposit
taking and investment management business in the U.K.  Partly as a
result of these initiatives, we see a significant likelihood of
further improvements in the bank's future performance," S&P noted.

The negative outlook on HBBM primarily reflects S&P's belief that
there is a possibility the bank may significantly reduce its
capital levels in an effort to boost its return on equity, which
more than offsets the likelihood of a positive ratings impact from
a potential strengthening in the Bermuda anchor.

HBBM's parent company, U.K.-incorporated bank holding company HSBC
Holdings PLC, has set return on equity targets for its
subsidiaries worldwide, which S&P regards as ambitious for
Bermuda.  In order for HBBM to meet these hurdles, S&P believes
there is a possibility that HBBM may significantly adjust its
capital levels.  S&P notes that dividend payouts have in several
recent years exceeded net income, but capital remains well above
minimum regulatory requirements, and S&P expects this to remain
the case.  While the bank's loan quality metrics largely improved
in 2015, they remain very poor relative to peers' and its adjusted
nonperforming assets to customer loans have even ticked up since
2014 (20.6% in 2015 versus 18.8% in 2014).  In October 2015, HBBM
entered into an agreement to sell Bermuda Trust Company Ltd and
its Private Banking Investment management operations in Bermuda to
BNTB.  S&P acknowledges management's re-focus on the bank's core,
and better performing businesses in Bermuda, including Retail
Banking Wealth Management, Commercial Banking, and Global Banking
and Markets.

The outlook on BNTB is positive.  Within two years, S&P expects
that an improvement in the economic risk score for Bermuda, if it
occurs, would raise the Bermuda anchor to 'bbb' (from 'bbb-'),
which would in turn raise the issuer credit rating on BNTB by one
notch, other things unchanged.  S&P could also raise its ratings
if the bank were to retain sufficient capital to preserve a S&P
Global Ratings risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio meaningfully
above 10%, and were S&P to become convinced that this would be
sustained.  However, S&P could revise the outlook to stable if
BNTB's asset quality metrics were to become less distinguishable
from those of peers or if the potential upside to Bermuda's
economic risk does not materialize.

The negative outlook on HBBM primarily reflects S&P's belief that
there is a possibility the bank may significantly reduce its
capital levels, which more than offsets the likelihood of an
improvement stemming from a potential strengthening in the Bermuda
anchor.  S&P might lower the stand-alone credit profile, and
therefore, the rating, if a capital decline were to drive S&P's
Global risk-adjusted capital ratio below 10% on a sustained basis.
On the other hand, S&P could revise the outlook to stable, within
two years, if it was to become convinced that any potential
capital withdrawal, by the parent, will be fully offset by
improving operating conditions in Bermuda.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                              To                 From
Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating   BBB/Pos./A-2   BBB/Stable/A-2

Ratings Affirmed

Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son Ltd.
Subordinated                 BBB-
Preference Stock             BB+

Ratings Affirmed

HSBC Bank Bermuda Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating             A-/Negative/A-2


BERMUDA COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long- and Short-Term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of Bermuda Commercial Bank (BCB) to 'BB+/B'
from 'BBB-/F3'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. See the full list of
rating actions at the end of this release.

The downgrade of BCB's IDRs and Viability Rating (VR) reflects the
company's increased risk profile and weakened capital position.
Prior to the downgrade, Fitch saw BCB's liquid balance sheet and
strong capital position as a buffer in support of the relatively
high risk tolerance of BCB's investment portfolio.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs AND VR
BCB's IDRs and VR have been downgraded following a shift in the
business mix and risk profile of the bank, along with a reduction
in risk-based capital (RBC) ratios.

In September 2015, BCB obtained a majority shareholding (75.5%) in
Private and Commercial Finance Group Plc (PCFG), a U.K.-based and
AIM-listed finance house that specializes in providing auto and
other asset-based financing to consumers and small businesses
within the U.K. Fitch views the diversification of BCB's business
model and the relatively stable income stream provided by PCFG as
positive. However, these factors are more than offset by the
capital dilution (as a percentage of risk-weighted assets) and the
riskier overall BCB asset mix that resulted from the acquisition.

PCFG has a solid operating history of over 20 years and
specializes in the near-prime and prime customer segments, focused
primarily on used vehicle finance and with an average loan size of
approximately GBP12,500 as at Sept. 30, 2015. At around the same
time that it acquired PCFG, BCB divested its holding in West
Hamilton Holdings Ltd (WHH), a Bermuda-based property investment
company. While the WHH divestment reduced illiquid property
holdings by US$19.4 million, the PCFG acquisition added US$163
million of consumer and business finance loans to the balance
sheet that comprised 21% of the BCB's total assets at FYE2015.
Fitch views the addition of these loans as an increase in BCB's
overall risk profile and risk tolerance.

Fitch considers BCB's RBC levels to have fallen below a level
adequate to support its prior rating within the context of the
relatively unconventional and high risk investment portfolio. As
at FYE September 2015, BCB had a Tier 1 Capital Ratio of 21%
calculated according to the Basel III regulatory rules set forth
by the Bermudan Monetary Authority (BMA). This compares to a 25%
ratio a year prior. Fitch calculates a Core Capital (FCC) ratio of
19.8% for FYE 2015 relative to 27.4% a year prior. The FCC ratio
incorporates the impact of an unrealized loss in the investment
portfolio which amounted to US$6.6 million at FYE 2015. However,
management has indicated plans to reduce some of the higher risk-
weighted security positions in the investment portfolio, which is
expected to bode well for the Basel III RBC ratios.

Fitch said, "we note that BCB's RBC ratios remain comparatively
high relative to other equally rated institutions in our rated
universe. Nevertheless, Fitch views it as a necessary buffer to
offset BCB's relatively high risk appetite."

Liquidity remains a rating strength for BCB. More than half of
BCB's deposits are maintained in cash and high quality liquid
assets (HQLA) and this ratio has remained stable notwithstanding
the PCFG acquisition. However, Fitch expects limited deployment of
BCB liquidity into the PCFG business. Over recent years, Fitch has
noted an upward trend in the proportion of BCB's non-HQLA
securities classified as Level 1 in the fair value hierarchy,
which adds another source of liquidity. BCB reported a Liquidity
Coverage Ratio of 111% for December 2015, which is above the fully
phased-in Basel 3 minimums. In the absence of a lender of last
resort, Fitch expects Bermudan banks to maintain conservative
liquidity profiles.

Fitch anticipates earnings headwinds for BCB as a result of
volatility within its investment portfolio. While BCB continued to
perform well in 2015, reporting net income of $8 million (7.2%
return on equity [ROE]), Fitch notes that over the last few years
BCB's earnings profile has relied on capital gains from the
investment portfolio to bolster earnings. Recent market volatility
and a slump in the oil price are expected to strain the values of
some of the securities in the BCB investment portfolio.

While the overall quality of management remains good, Fitch notes
that BCB has experienced significant turnover of the CEO role in
recent years that also constrains the rating. Despite management's
efforts to restore profitability of the core banking, trust and
corporate services segments, performance remains lackluster.
Notably, the PCFG acquisition should be a positive contributor to
earnings.

Fitch said, "PCFG is currently reliant on a wholesale funding
model, which Fitch views as a relatively costly source of funds.
Furthermore, the acquisition weakens BCB's overall liquidity
position in the near term. Nonetheless, Fitch notes that PCFG is
in the process of pursuing a banking license that, if granted,
will diversify its funding sources and provide the company access
to relatively inexpensive deposit funding. However, the impact of
a PCFG banking license is not factored into the rating, since
Fitch believes it to be unlikely that the benefits from such
approval would be realized within our rating horizon."

Asset quality at PCFG continues to improve in a benign credit
environment with impaired loans as a percentage of gross loans
dropping to below 10% of total loans in FY2015. Fitch notes that
these impaired loans are well-reserved. BCB's securities portfolio
remains relatively high risk and is concentrated in short-duration
high yield corporate bonds. Although the credit ratings of these
bonds are, on average, investment grade, many of the bonds are not
rated or are rated below investment grade. Nevertheless, about a
third of the balance consists of cash and HQLA that still provides
some offset to the higher overall risk profile.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING
Fitch said, "BCB's Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating Floor
of 'NF' reflect our view that BCB is not systemically important in
the local Bermuda market and, therefore, Fitch believes the
probability of support is unlikely. IDRs and VRs do not
incorporate any support for BCB."

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs AND VR
Fitch believes the rating is comfortably situated at current
levels. However, downward ratings momentum could develop if
average on-balance-sheet liquidity, defined as cash-to-total
assets were to be managed to below 20%, either as a result of
deposit outflow or deployment of liquidity into risky assets. If
Fitch Core Capital were to fall to below 15%, Fitch would consider
a downgrade. Additionally, a material increase in market or credit
risk from current levels could further strain the rating.

Conversely, positive ratings momentum could develop if BCB were to
increase and maintain its capital to historical levels while
maintaining a stable deposit base and on-balance-sheet liquidity
of above 35%. However, Fitch would also expect BCB to demonstrate
effective governance, risk management and integration of PCFG into
the broader BCB group operations.

Fitch said, "the rating incorporates the possibility of short-term
deterioration in earnings as a result of volatility in the
investment portfolio. However, should capital losses in the
securities portfolio drive BCB into an overall loss position,
negative ratings pressure could develop. While Fitch anticipates
modest improvement to PCFG's asset quality metrics over the near
term, the rating incorporates the potential for some credit
deterioration to normalized levels over the long term. However,
should the credit performance of this portfolio significantly
underperform our expectations negative ratings momentum could
develop."

The impact of a banking license approval is not currently factored
into the rating. However, a significant improvement in the funding
and liquidity position of PCFG such that it substantially
eliminates the potential dependence on BCB as a secondary source
of liquidity could be viewed as positive for the rating. However,
an upgrade would only be considered if there is a reduction in the
credit risk profile of the loan portfolio without a significant
earnings impact on a risk-adjusted basis.

Fitch downgrades the following ratings:

Bermuda Commercial Bank
-- Long-term IDR to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term IDR to 'B' from 'F3';
-- Viability Rating to 'bb+' from 'bbb-'.

In addition, Fitch affirms the following:

-- Support Rating at '5';
-- Support Floor at 'NF.


=============
B O L I V I A
=============


SEGUROS Y REASEGUROS: Moody's Assigns B1 GLC IFS Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo ("Moody's")
has assigned a B1 global local-currency (GLC) insurance financial
strength (IFS) rating and a Aa3.bo Bolivian national scale IFS
rating to Seguros y Reaseguros Personales Univida S.A.
("Univida"). The ratings carry a stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, Univida's ratings benefit from ownership by
and support from state-owned Banco Uni¢n, the largest bank in
Bolivia, with significant resources to support Univida's
operations and future growth. The high degree of operational
integration with Banco Uni¢n (rated Ba3/Aaa.bo for local currency
deposits) as its main distribution channel and revenue source
provides Univida with the potential to expand its business volume,
representing a competitive advantage for the company. The rating
agency also noted that the high granularity of the credit-life
coverage that Univida grants to Banco Uni¢n's client base is also
a positive credit consideration.

Moody's pointed out, however, that these strengths are tempered by
several credit concerns and challenges for the company including
the following: 1) Univida's lack of operating history and
consequent uncertain future performance (the company began
operations in February 2016); 2) investment risk associated with
its concentration in Bolivian sovereign bonds as well as local
bank deposits, common for all Bolivian insurers; and 3) challenges
and uncertainties related to the company's expansion plans in
several business lines, including mandatory automobile, and group
life and disability coverages for participants in local pension
funds.

Commenting on factors that could result in an upgrade for
Univida's ratings, Moody's cited the following: 1) a significant
and sustained growth of the company's market share; 2) a good
track record of profitability, with sustained return on capital
metrics of at least 20% and combined ratios below 90%; and 4) a
significant improvement in Bolivia's government bond rating.
Conversely, Univida's ratings could be downgraded for the
following reasons: 1) a downgrade of Banco Uni¢n's ratings; 2) a
consistent negative return on capital; 3) a deterioration in its
capital adequacy (e.g. adjusted shareholders' equity being less
than 20% of total assets); and/or 4) a significant deterioration
in Bolivia's government bond rating and/or the country's insurance
operating environment.

Headquartered in La Paz, Bolivia, Univida reported total assets
and shareholders' equity of BOB 43 million and BOB 39 million,
respectively,as of March 31, 2016. As of that date, the company
posted a net loss of BOB 1 million.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BR MALLS: Fitch Keeps 'BB+' LC Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the expected rating for BR Malls
Participacoes S.A.'s (BRMALLS) BRL200 million proposed debentures.
Fitch is withdrawing this specific security rating as the
transaction was not executed. The issuer is not considering
pursuing this transaction.

Fitch currently rates BRMALLS as follows:

-- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB+';
-- Local Currency IDR 'BB+';
-- Long-term national scale rating 'AA+(bra)';
-- BRL400 million local debentures, first and second tranches due
    in 2017 and 2019 'AA+ (bra)';
-- BRL270 million local debentures due in 2016 'AA+(bra)'.

Fitch currently rates BR Malls International Finance Limited
(Finco)'s perpetual notes as follows:
-- $US405 million perpetual notes 'BB+'.

The Rating Outlook for BRMALLS' Long-Term IDR is Negative.

The Rating Outlook for BRMALLS' Local Currency Long-Term and
National Long-Term Rating is Positive.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

BRMALLS' ratings incorporate its business position as the largest
Brazilian shopping center operator, stable and predictable cash
flow generation, geographical and property revenue base
diversification, and low working capital requirements with renters
responsible for most maintenance expenses. The ratings also factor
in BRMALLS' growth strategy, stable capital structure, a large
pool of unencumbered assets, and successful track record in
growing the business. The company's consistent use of a balance of
equity and debt to fund its organic and inorganic growth during
the past five years has kept leverage levels low relative to the
value of its assets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative Rating Actions: The foreign currency ratings of BRMALLS
could be negatively impacted by a negative rating action on the
sovereign rating of Brazil and/or a downgrade of its country
ceiling. The Outlook for Brazil's foreign currency rating is
currently Negative.

Positive Rating Actions: BRMALLS' Local Currency IDR and National
Scale ratings currently have a Positive Rating Outlook. The
Outlook reflects Fitch's expectations of continued consistent
operational performance despite Brazil's current business
environment.


MINAS GERAIS: Moody's Cuts Global Scale Issuer Rating to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the global scale issuer
rating of the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais to B1 from Ba3, the
outlook is negative.

RATING RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects the rapid and ongoing deterioration of the
state's fiscal position. Continuing revenue decline and a rigid
cost structure has translated into weak credit metrics that no
longer compare favorably with rated peers.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that under
Brazil's current economic environment, the state's credit metrics
and poor liquidity position will deteriorate further. By year end
2015, the state had accumulated payment arrears equivalent to 8%
of total revenues compared with 5% a year earlier. Moody's expects
Minas liquidity position will remain strained over the next 12 to
18 months.

Minas total deficit reached 14% of total revenues in 2015 from 3%
in 2014. The deficit has further widened in the four months to
April 2016 as expenditure growth materially outpaced revenue
growth. The state of Minas Gerais faces a very rigid cost
structure whereby it devotes around 63% of total expenses to
personnel costs, including pension-related payments. Minas' fiscal
position will rely increasingly on a return to tax revenues growth
which Moody's does not expect to recover before year-end 2017.

The state of Minas Gerais has the highest debt levels for rated
Brazilian states with net debt to operating revenues of 188% as of
30 April 2016. Moody's notes that the state will receive some
liquidity relief coming from a recent measure to support states
announced by Brazil's federal government. Debt owed to the federal
government (69% of total sub-sovereign debt in Brazil and 73% in
the case of Minas Gerais) will have an extended maturity profile.
In addition, Brazilian states are allowed a 6 month debt servicing
pause under those obligations. Moody's expects that those measures
will save Minas around BRL 1.8 billion (i.e 2% of 2015 total
expenses) in debt service payments until January 2017 when debt
will progressively resume its amortization schedule.

Moody's understands that Brazil's federal government, the state's
primary creditor and guarantor of all state foreign debt
obligations, remains committed to supporting states under severe
liquidity strains through a number of policy measures such as the
one described above.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook a rating upgrade is unlikely in the
near term. A stable outlook could result from marked improvements
in Minas' fiscal position. A downgrade of Brazil's sovereign bond
rating could result in a downgrade. Further deterioration of the
state's credit metrics and/or evidence of any weakening of the
willingness of Brazil's federal government to continue supporting
the states would also lead to a further downgrade of the state of
Minas Gerais.


ODEBRECHT ENGENHARIA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Issuer-Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Odebrecht Engenharia e Construcao
S.A.'s (OEC) Long- Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer-Default
Ratings (IDRs) and National Long-Term Ratings at 'B+' and 'A-
(bra)', respectively and removed the ratings from Negative Watch.

The Rating Outlook for the corporate ratings is Negative.

The ratings decision affects approximately $US3 billion worth in
issuances from Odebrecht Finance Ltd (OFL), which are fully and
irrevocably guaranteed by OEC and two other subsidiaries. A
complete list of ratings follows at the end of this press release.


KEY RATING DRIVERS

The resolution of the Negative Watch status for OEC's corporate
ratings and OFL's issuances is due to the publication of OEC's
2015 results, which reduces potential liquidity pressures from
creditors. The company was not able to release 2015 financial
statements up to April 30th, and triggered a clause that would
have allowed OFL's bondholders to declare an event of default..
The delay was due to discussions between the company and the
independent auditor, who requested more information on the latest
phases of the Lava-Jato investigation.

The Negative Rating Outlook stems from a myriad of medium-term
challenges and risks that require more clarity before the ratings
can stabilize. Operationally, OEC would need to be more efficient
in replacing its backlog without compromising margins. The
Brazilian adverse scenario and maintenance of low oil prices
affects approximately 60% of the company's backlog as important
clients, namely Venezuela and Angola, depend on oil exports to
execute their infrastructure agendas.

Financially, potential fines from Lava-Jato and other countries,
as well as potential contamination from liquidity issues of the
Odebrecht group are the main risks. According to the Brazilian
press, OEC is in the process of signing a lenience agreement -- a
sort of plea agreement for corporates -- with Brazilian
authorities. This agreement should result in a fine that the
agency estimates to be material, but that can be paid in several
instalments. In addition, Fitch still has concerns related to
potential fines from countries where OEC operates in and that have
more restrictive anti-corruption policies.

Fitch sees an increasing risk of contamination from the Odebrecht
group. OEC has advanced $US300 million to its ultimate parent,
Odebrecht S.A., in the form of intercompany loans that are
expected to be repaid to the construction company over the next
few months. The sugar and ethanol segments of the Odebrecht group
could also face financial constraints. The delay in selling assets
and in finding a solution for the oil and gas unit also erodes
franchising; reducing the odds that OEC will remain immune to the
group's problems.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

OEC's and OFL's ratings could be further downgraded if one or a
combination of the following risks materializes:
-- Decreasing backlog due to maintenance of low oil prices and
    the Brazilian adverse economic scenario;
-- Harsh payment conditions for any fines as part of a leniency
    agreement;
-- A public investigation or fine from other countries; and
-- Direct support to affiliates.

A positive rating action is unlikely in the short term.


FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Odebrecht Engenharia e Construcao S.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B+';
-- National Scale Rating at 'A-(bra)'.

Odebrecht Finance Limited (OFL)
-- BRL500 million senior unsecured notes due 2018 at 'B+/RR4';
-- $US500 million senior unsecured notes due 2020 at 'B+/RR4';
-- $US600 million senior unsecured noted due 2022 at 'B+/RR4;
-- $US800 million senior unsecured notes due 2023 at 'B+/RR4';
-- $US550 million senior unsecured notes due 2025 at 'B+/RR4';
-- $US500 million senior unsecured notes due 2029 at 'B+/RR4';
-- $US850 million senior unsecured notes due 2042 at 'B+/RR4';
-- $US750 million perpetual bonds at 'B+/RR4'.

The Negative Watch was removed, and the Outlook for the corporate
ratings is Negative.


RB CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns Ba2 GS LC Rating to Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has assigned definitive ratings of Ba2
(Global Scale, Local Currency) and Aa2.br (National Scale) to the
138th, 139th and 140th Series of the first issuance of real estate
certificates ("certificados de recebiveis imobiliarios" or CRI)
issued by RB Capital Companhia de Securitizacao (RB Capital, the
Issuer or the Securitizadora) and backed by three series of
debentures issued by BR Malls Participacoes S.A. (BR Malls,
Ba2/Aa2.br Corporate Family Ratings).

Issuer / Securitizadora: RB Capital Companhia de Securitizacao

138th, 139th and 140th Series of the first issuance of CRI rated
Ba2 / Aa2.br

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and Aa2.br (National Scale)
ratings assigned to the CRI are primarily based on the willingness
and ability of BR Malls (as debtor) to honor the payments defined
in transaction documents, reflecting the Ba2/Aa2.br ratings of the
underlying debenture backing the transaction. Any changes in the
ratings of the debentures will lead to a change in the ratings of
the CRI.

Each series of CRI issued by RB Capital are backed by a real
estate credit note ("cedula de credito imobiliario" or CCI), which
in turn represents a series of debentures issued by BR Malls. The
underlying debentures are rated Ba2 on the global scale and Aa2.br
on the national scale. BR Malls will also cover the transaction
expenses.

The definitive ratings on the CRI are based on a number of
factors, among them the following:

-- The willingness and ability of BR Malls (as debtor) to make
    payments on each series of the underlying debentures, rated
    Ba2/Aa2.br. BR Malls is therefore ultimately responsible for
    making timely principal and interest payments on the
    debentures backing the CRI.

-- Pass through structure; mitigated interest risk: The payment
    schedule of each series of CRI replicates the scheduled cash
    flow of the underlying debentures, with a two-day lag, which
    allows adequate timing to make payments on the CRI. The CRI
    will make payments that match the payments to be made by the
    underlying debentures. The floating rate of CDI (interbank
    deposit rate) to be paid under each series of CRI will be
    determined using the same CDI period under each series of the
    debenture. In addition, to mitigate the risk of the additional
    2 day of interest in the CRI during first interest rate
    period, the debentures will incorporate two extra days of
    interest accrual, mitigating any potential interest rate
    mismatch.

-- BR Malls will pay the CRI expenses: BR Malls is responsible,
    under the transaction documents, for all the CRI expenses.

-- Segregated assets: The CRI benefit from a fiduciary regime
    ("regime fiduciario") whereby the assets backing each series
    of CRI are segregated. These segregated assets are destined
    exclusively for payments on the CRI as well as certain fees
    and expenses, and will be segregated from all of the other
    assets on the issuer's balance sheet. However, the transaction
    is subject to residual legal risk because RB Capital's real
    estate credits can be affected by the securitization company's
    tax, labor and pension creditors.

-- As an additional collateral, each series of CRI benefit from
    (i) a pledge ("alienacao fiduciaria") of an ideal fraction of
    a shopping mall (Shopping Villa Lobos) located in Sao Paulo,
    (ii) a pledge ("cessao fiduciaria") of a portion of the future
    receivables related to the commercial exploration and
    management of Shopping Villa Lobos, and (iii) a pledge
    ("cessao fiduciaria") of a portion of the future receivables
    related to the equity rights, including dividends, interest on
    capital e other distributions from Christaltur Empreendimentos
    e Participacoes S.A. In assigning the ratings, Moody's has not
    given credit to the pledged real estate in benefit of the
    issuer, or the pledged receivables.

-- Legal opinion: Moody's received a copy of a legal opinion that
    was directed to transaction arrangers, which content addresses
    the true sale of the debentures, as described in assignment
    agreement and that the transaction documents are lawful,
    enforceable, valid and effective, conditioned upon the
    registry in the appropriate public notary offices.

BR Malls Participacoes S.A. is based in Rio de Janeiro and is the
largest owner and manager of shopping centers in Brazil. The
company owns interests in a portfolio of 45 malls, totaling 1.64
million square meters of gross leasable area, located across 15
states. BR Malls will use the proceeds from issuance exclusively
to refund expenses or new expenditures related to two shopping
malls.

The ratings of the debentures that backs the 138th, 139th and
140th Series of CRI reflect BR Mall's dominant position as the
largest owner and manager of shopping centers in Brazil with a low
leveraged balance sheet and a substantial unencumbered asset pool.
The company's high-quality and resilient portfolio has
consistently generated strong EBITDA margins and has maintained
occupancy levels above 95% for multiple, consecutive years. In
addition, management continues to efficiently operate the
portfolio and keep its late payments, occupancy costs and tenant
turnover low.

RB Capital Companhia de Securitizacao was incorporated in 1998 as
a securitization company (companhia securitizadora de creditos
imobiliarios) authorized to issue real estate certificates (CRI)
as per Brazilian law nß 9,514/97.

To date, RB Capital has issued circa 130 transactions, totaling
approximately BRL 19.3 billion, with an outstanding amount of CRI
of BRL15.7 billion. RB Capital financial auditor is Grant Thornton
Auditores Independentes

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Any changes in the ratings of the underlying debentures will lead
to a change in the ratings on the CRI.


STATE OF BAHIA: Moody's Cuts GS Issuer Rating to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina downgraded the issuer ratings of the
Brazilian state of Bahia ("Bahia") to Ba3 from Ba2 on a global
scale and to A2.br from Aa3.br on a national scale, with a
negative outlook on the ratings. At the same time the agency
affirmed the issuer ratings of the state of Parana (Ba3/A1.br) and
changed the outlook to negative from stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Bahia's ratings to Ba3/A2.br from Ba2/Aa3.br
reflects the recent marked deterioration in the state's fiscal
position which resulted in weaker credit metrics relative to Ba2-
rated peers.

In the four months ended 30 April 2016 total revenues grew by a
modest 3% largely outpaced by a 18% increase in total expenses.
Decline in revenues has been resulting both by the impact of the
economic recession on tax revenues, and by the progressive
reduction of federal transfers (responsible for over 30% of
Bahia's revenues). The state has been unable to constrain
personnel expenses, which have been growing at 16% in the first
four months of the year compared to 15% and 11% during 2015 and
2014 respectively, demonstrating limited expenditure flexibility.
The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that under
Brazil's current economic environment, Bahia's credit metrics will
continue to deteriorate in the next 12 to 18 months.

The Ba3/A1.br issuer ratings for the state of Parana has been
affirmed, based on Moody's view that the state's credit metrics
which includes a positive cash financing surplus over the 2010-
2015 period and low debt burden remain strong for the rating
category. The change of outlook to negative reflects the agency's
expectations that the building up of operating expenses since the
beginning of the year will leave the state's fiscal position
exposed to the negative effects of Brazil's on-going economic
recession.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook a rating upgrade is unlikely in the
near term. A stable outlook could result from marked improvements
in the fiscal position of those states. A downgrade of Brazil's
sovereign bond rating and/or further deterioration of the states
credit metrics could result in a downgrade.



STATE OF MARANHAO: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Brazilian state of Maranhao's
national long-term rating at 'A+(bra)' with a Stable Outlook.
Fitch has also affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
at 'BB-' with a Negative Outlook. The Outlook reflects the
Negative Outlook assigned to Brazil on May 9, 2016.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the state of Maranhao's ratings reflects its
adequate fiscal performance as expressed by operating margins
higher than 10% over the last five years. In 2015, it reached 7.9%
slightly lower than Fitch's expectations as a result of the
challenging economic environment. The ratings are also based on
Maranhao's modest economic base and low economic diversification.

The state remains very much dependent on federal transfers, which
accounted for 54.5% of Maranhao's operating revenues in 2015,
despite the state's efforts to increase tax revenues. In Fitch's
opinion, this will limit the gains derived from the local economic
activities. Moreover, any general downward trend in the national
economy translates into a decline in revenue.

Urbanization and sanitation rates remain very poor, especially in
comparison to other states in Brazil, demanding high and continued
investments. The state has launched a program, Mais IDH, with
total investments of BRL500 million in 2015 and 2016 mostly in
education and law enforcement. Maranhao's GDP corresponds to less
than 2% of Brazil's GDP, despite faster growth than Brazil also
propelled by increased activities associated with the Itaqui Port
and investments in energy and mining.

Maranhao holds a moderate debt burden. Direct debt was 5.5 years
of the current balance in 2015. The recent $US appreciation
negatively affected debt service requirements of the state. $US-
denominated debt was 48% of total debt and fully guaranteed by the
federal government. The state has decided not to prepay foreign
debt, despite the weakening of the Brazilian real.

Pension payments have been compromising some 15% of the state's
personnel expenditures, with some increase projected for 2017 and
2018. The estimated actuarial deficit of BRL22 billion in 2015
corresponded to 1.6x of the state's operating revenues, which is
better than 'BB' rated entities. The state contributes with 15% of
the consolidated payroll, which is higher than other states in
Brazil.

Maranhao has not yet fully adopted the international accounting
standards but constituted provisions for the unrecoverable tax in
arrears in late 2015. Moreover, the state has not implemented
tools to measure fiscal risks nor economic benefits derived from
the application of tax incentives. Maranhao has not significantly
suffered from liquidity squeezes in 2015, with no reported delays
in commercial and personnel payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Any rating action affecting the Federative Republic of Brazil may
exert a direct effect over Maranhao. Moreover, a downgrade will be
warranted if operating margins consistently fall below 5%. Fitch
no longer expects Maranhao to being structurally able to generate
operating margins higher than 10%.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS
The ratings and Outlooks are sensitive to these assumptions:

--Fitch assumes a moderate level of sovereign support for Maranhao
given that the state's most relevant creditor is the Federal
Government.

-- Fitch assumes that any political transition to a new
    government during the impeachment process will be smooth and
    peaceful but with some delays in progress on the government's
    legislative agenda specially the ones affecting subnationals
    such as pension reform.

Located in the northeast region of Brazil, Maranhao posted an
estimated Gross Domestic Product of BRL61.5 billion, ranking as
the 16th largest state in Brazil with a privileged geographic
position for exports.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

State of Maranhao:

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB-'; Negative Outlook;
-- Foreign Currency Short-Term IDR at 'B';
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB-'; Negative Outlook;
-- Local Currency Short-Term IDR at 'B';
-- National Long-Term at 'A+(bra)'; Stable Outlook;
-- National Short-Term rating at 'F1(bra)'.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ALPHADYNE INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 15
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Alphadyne Investment Strategies Master Fund
SPC, Ltd. will hold their final meeting on Aug. 15, 2016, at
9:30 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Simon Conway
          c/o Sarah Moxam
          PO Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 914 8634
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237


ARC (EURO): Contributories to Hold First Meeting on July 11
-----------------------------------------------------------
The contributories of ARC (EURO) Fund, which is under official
liquidation, will hold their first meeting on July 11, 2016, at
8:00 a.m.

During the meeting, the contributories will be:

a. given an update regarding the conduct of the official
liquidation;

b. asked to elect members to establish a liquidation committee for
each portfolio; and

c. to deal with such other matters or resolution as the
liquidators think fit or which the court directs.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Morrison
          c/o Kelsey Hedgecock
          FTI Consulting (Cayman) Limited
          Suite 3212, 53 Market Street, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KYI-1203 P.O. Box 30613
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 6840


ARC (USD): Contributories to Hold First Meeting on July 11
----------------------------------------------------------
The contributories of ARC (USD) Fund, which is under official
liquidation, will hold their first meeting on July 11, 2016, at
10:00 a.m.

During the meeting, the contributories will be:

a. given an update regarding the conduct of the official
liquidation;
b. asked to elect members to establish a liquidation committee for
each portfolio; and
c. to deal with such other matters or resolution as the
liquidators think fit or which the court directs.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Morrison
          c/o Kelsey Hedgecock
          FTI Consulting (Cayman) Limited
          Suite 3212, 53 Market Street, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KYI-1203 P.O. Box 30613
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 6840


ARGYLE FUNDS: Contributories and Creditors to Hold Meetings
-----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors and contributories of Argyle Funds SPC Inc., which
wound up its operations through the order of the Court of Cayman
Islands, will hold its first meeting for its contributories and
creditors for different portfolios including:


  Portfolio           Date               Time(Cayman Islands Time)
  ---------           ----               -------------------------
  Class R             July 6, 2016           8:00 a.m.
  Class X             July 6, 2016           10:00 a.m.
  Class J             July 6, 2016           12:00 noon
  Class IV            July 6, 2016           2:00 p.m.
  Class O             July 7, 2016           8:00  a.m.
  Class V             July 7, 2016           10:00 a.m.
  Class K             July 7, 2016           12:00 noon
  Class VI            July 7, 2016           2:00 p.m.
  Class II            July 8, 2016           8:00 a.m.
  Class Q             July 8, 2016           10:00 a.m.
  Class N             July 11, 2016          12:00 noon
  Class VIII         July 11, 2016           2:00 p.m.
  EUR Workout
   Class              July 12, 2016           8:00 a.m.
  Class III          July 12, 2016           10:00 a.m.
  Class P             July 12, 2016           12:00 noon
  Class IX            July 12, 2016           2:00 p.m.
  Class T             July 13, 2016           8:00 a.m.
  Class S             July 13, 2016           10:00 a.m.
  Class M             July 13, 2016           12:00 noon

  Class VIII         July 13, 2016            2:00 p.m.
  USD Workout        July 14, 2016           8:00 a.m.
    Class
  Class L             July 14, 2016           10:00 a.m.
  Class U             July 14, 2016           12:00 noon

During the meeting, the creditors and contributories will be:

a. given an update regarding the conduct of the official
liquidation;

b. asked to elect members to establish a liquidation committee for
each portfolio; and

c. to deal with such other matters or resolution as the
liquidators think fit or which the court directs.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kelsey Hedgecock
          FTI Consulting (Cayman) Limited
          Suite 3212, 53 Market Street, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 30613 Grand Cayman KYI-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 6840


CAPITAL GROWTH: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 12
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Capital Growth Russia Fund will hold their
final meeting on July 12, 2016, at 10:30 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Doran + Minehane
          59/60 O' Connell Street
          Limerick
          Ireland
          Telephone: 00353 61 430000
          Facsimile: 00353 61 408613
          e-mail Stephen.doran@doranandminehane.com


CONDOR ALTERNATIVE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 14
---------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Condor Alternative Fund Limited will hold
their final meeting on July 14, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Arnaud Cayla
          30 Place de Madeleine 75008
          Paris
          France
          Telephone: +33 1 53 43 20 43


EMERGING STRATEGIES: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 12
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Emerging Strategies Limited will hold their
final meeting on July 12, 2016, to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jane Fleming
          c/o Jean Ebanks
          Telephone: (345) 945-2187/ (345) 945-2197
          P.O. Box 30464 Grand Cayman KY1-1202
          Cayman Islands


F&C LONGSTONE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 13
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of F&C Longstone Fund Limited will hold their
final meeting on July 13, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David A.K. Walker
          c/o Sarah Moxam
          Telephone: (345) 914 8634
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


FINEX FUNDS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 14
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Finex Funds SPC will hold their final meeting
on July 14, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Oleg Yankelev
          Managing Partner FinEx Capital Management LLP
          39 Dover Street
          London W1S 4NN
          United Kingdom
          Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7663 3311


FORTISSIMO LIQUIDATING: Shareholders' Meeting Set for Aug. 4
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Fortissimo Liquidating Fund will hold their
final meeting on Aug. 4, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 1344
          Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


HIGHLAND CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 14
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Highland Capital Healthcare Partners, Ltd.
will hold their final meeting on July 14, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Highland Capital Healthcare Advisors, L.P.
          300 Crescent Court Suite
          700 Dallas Texas 75201
          United States of America
          Tel: +1 (972) 628 4100


SAAD INVESTMENTS: Creditors Hold Meeting
----------------------------------------
The creditors of Saad Investments Company Limited held a meeting
on June 28, 2016.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
June 24, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michal Segal
          c/o Grant Thornton Specialist Services (Cayman) Limited
          10 Market Street
          P.O. Box #765 Camana Bay
          Telephone: +1 (345) 769 7217


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: British Chamber on Brexit: Not to Worry
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the British Chamber of Commerce in
the Dominican Republic (BRITCHAM) announced a seminar in the heels
of his country's recent referendum and decision to pull out of the
European Union, 'Brexit.'

It said the move could open opportunities for bilateral trade by
negotiating new bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom,

In an emailed statement, BRITCHAM said the UK's demand for
Dominican products and services will continue regardless of recent
results, "so it's important to achieve preferential bilateral
agreements to strengthen relations, bilateral trade and British
investment in the country," according to Dominican Today.

"The result of Brexit poses new scenarios for all involved. These
new scenarios offer potential opportunities to further strengthen
the already important role that Dominican products and services
play in the UK. That's why we look at this outcome closely, and we
reiterate our commitment to continue to promote, facilitate and
increase the exchange between the two countries," said BRITCHAM
president Jose A. Rodriguez, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.


DOMINICAN REP: Another Business Chamber Warns About Legal Security
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican-Mexican Chamber of Commerce
(CADOMEX) executive director Marco Antonio Sanchez warned that
legal security is key to sustain and increase investment in
Dominican Republic, and rebuked the attempt by individuals who
through vandalism placed at risk the life of workers of the
bottling company Bepensa Dominicana, which was forced to halt
production.

CADOMEX's concern over legal security for investment has also been
stated recently by the bilateral chambers of commerce from Italy,
Great Britain and the United States, according to Dominican Today.

Mr. Sanchez said the aggression against a CADOMEX-member company,
located in the National District occurred recently when a group of
people tried to enter its facilities by force, the report notes.

"As a Chamber, we join those who've made the important call to
preserve legal security for local and foreign investors in the
country relying on security, tranquility and a favorable business
environment that the Dominican Republic has always offered
investors," Mr. Sanchez said in an emailed statement, the report
notes.

The director of CADOMEX said the country has mechanisms to
establish claims, but the repeated aggressions of which that
Mexico-based company has been the victim of is reason for concern,
the report relays.

The report discloses that Mr. Sanchez also thanked the Dominican
authorities for their prompt action in the incident, which
safeguarded the safety of the company's workers and prevented
damage to the plant, and requested follow up in the case to
enforce the law against those responsible.

"Bepensa currently offers 2,700 direct jobs, generates about
15,000 indirect jobs and demonstrates an ongoing commitment to
competitiveness and growth of the communities where it operates,"
the report quoted Mr. Sanchez as saying.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.


=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Fitch Says Banks Needs Protective Measures
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings notes that recent allegations of illicit acts
committed by three senior managers and directors of Banco de
Desarrollo Rural and one senior manager of Banco G&T Continental
have required the banks to take immediate protective measures to
maintain their financial and business profile.

Specifics of the alleged wrongdoing have not been fully disclosed
by the authorities, but appear related to accusations of money
laundering and illicit payments to the political party, Partido
Patriota. These allegations became known on June 2, 2016, when the
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, as
it is known in Spanish) presented the findings of this ongoing
investigation which resulted in arrest warrants for multiple
individuals.

Guatemalan authorities have to date limited their proceedings to
named individuals and have not implicated the banks; however, in
Fitch's opinion both institutions are taking the necessary steps
to prevent any negative impact on their reputations as a result of
these accusations. In the agency's view, the potential impact of
these events has been effectively contained by the actions taken
by the banks, which include rapidly relieving these named
executives of their duties and appointing replacements.

Fitch believes the financial profiles of both banks are unlikely
to see a significant impact on corporate governance and risk
management, or changes in funding conditions, as long as these
allegations do not reflect on the banks. Up to this point both
entities are running normally. During the following months, Fitch
will continue to monitor the information available on these cases
and the extent of the potential impact, if any. These events would
only have rating implications if they materially affect the banks'
financial and business profiles, which is not Fitch's baseline
scenario.

Fitch currently has the following ratings:

Banco de Desarrollo Rural:
-- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term IDR 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Local Currency IDR 'B';
-- Viability Rating 'bb';
-- Support Rating '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';
-- Long-Term National rating 'AA+(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term National rating 'F1+(gtm)'.

Banco G&T Continental:
-- Long-Term Foreign currency IDR 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Local Currency IDR 'B';
-- Viability Rating 'bb';
-- Support '3';
-- Support Rating Floor 'BB-';
-- Long-Term National rating 'AA-(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term National rating 'F1+(gtm)'.


BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: Fitch Places 'BB-' IDR on Watch Neg
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Banco de los Trabajadores' (Bantrab)
ratings on Rating Watch Negative. A full list of rating actions is
at the end of this rating action commentary.

The IDRs, VR, national ratings and senior debt ratings have been
placed on Rating Watch Negative due to the potential risks
following recent news releases of an ongoing investigation by the
Guatemalan authorities of three members of the Board of Directors
for an alleged fraud attempt on the bank's shareholders.

In Fitch's opinion, the level of development and effectiveness of
its corporate governance has been tested. This is because
Bantrab's government bodies did not take corrective and mitigating
measures. To date, these executives remain in their positions on
Bantrab's Board of Directors and the financial performance and
funding profile of the bank have not been affected materially.

The Rating Watch Negative reflects that ratings could be
downgraded if the bank's business and financial profile is
affected materially and corrective measures regarding corporate
governance are not set in place.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS, VR, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT
Bantrab is characterized by its high risk appetite, focusing on
segments of middle and low income, particularly in the Guatemalan
public sector. The bank is characterised by good loan portfolio
quality, sound capital position and a business model focused on
the riskier segments of Guatemalan retail banking.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
The bank's Support Rating and Support Rating Floor are unaffected.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, VR, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT
A ratings downgrade could occur if the bank fails to address the
weaknesses that have arisen from the current investigation of its
executives and if its business activities and financial profile
were to be affected in a material way.

On the other hand, the ratings could be affirmed and the Watch
Negative removed if its business and financial profiles remain
unaffected and its corporate governance is strengthened.

Fitch has placed the following ratings on Rating Watch Negative:

Banco de los Trabajadores
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'BB-';
-- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB-';
-- Short-Term Local Currency IDR 'B';
-- Viability Rating 'bb-';
-- Long-term national rating of 'A(gtm)';
-- Short-term national rating at 'F1(gtm)'.

Financiera de los Trabajadores, S.A.
-- Long-term national rating 'A(gtm)';
-- Short-term national rating 'F1(gtm)'.

Bantrab Senior Trust
-- Long-term foreign currency loan participation notes 'BB-'.

The following ratings are unaffected:

Banco de los Trabajadores
-- Support '5';
-- Support Rating Floor 'NF'


GUATEMALA: Moody's Foreign-Currency Deposit Ceiling Remains at Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on Guatemala's
ratings to stable from negative and affirmed the Ba1 government
bond and issuer ratings.

Today's rating action reflects the following key drivers:

1. Guatemala's credit profile proved resilient to the political
crisis of 2015, posting robust growth, a lower fiscal deficit and
stable debt metrics.

2. The government's fight against corruption and its effort to
improve transparency and accountability will continue to
strengthen the country's weak institutions, particularly in tax
administration and rule of law.

Guatemala's long-term foreign currency bond ceiling remains
unchanged at Baa3. The foreign-currency deposit ceiling remains at
Ba2, while the local-currency bond and deposit ceilings remain at
Baa1. The short-term foreign-currency bond ceiling remains at P-3,
while the short-term foreign currency deposit ceiling remains
unchanged at NP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

FIRST DRIVER -- MACROECONOMIC AND FISCAL RESILIENCE TO POLITICAL
CRISIS

In 2015, the escalation of political risks triggered by corruption
scandals led to widespread street demonstrations and eventually to
the ousting of President Otto Perez Molina. The uncertainty
surrounding the outcome of the political crisis posed a risk to
macroeconomic stability and government financial strength.
However, government channels were used to pursue corruption
allegations and street protests did not lead to violent incidents.
President Jimmy Morales, who took office in January 2016, has been
responsive to the Guatemalan people's demand to fight corruption.
As a result, social and political pressures towards instability
have eased, as well as questions surrounding the government's
commitment to maintain Guatemala's track record of conservative
macroeconomic and fiscal policies.

To date, there has been no evidence of economic or fiscal
deterioration as a result of the political crisis. GDP grew 4.1%
in 2015 and the central bank expects GDP growth to be in the 3.1%
- 3.9% range this year. The economy has benefited from lower oil
prices, which has translated into a smaller current account
deficit and higher disposable incomes, while stronger remittances
have also boosted domestic consumption. Additionally, the exchange
rate and foreign exchange reserves have experienced only modest
fluctuations. We expect these external forces will continue to
positively impact economic growth in 2016-17.

Moody's said, "A fiscal deficit of 1.4% of GDP was reported in
2015, down from 1.9% of GDP in 2014, while the central government
debt amounted to 24.2% of GDP at the end of 2015. The deficit
reduction was the result of an expenditure containment plan that
began in October 2014, as a response to the expectation that
revenues would be lower than budgeted. At the end, expenditure
cuts of 1.1% of GDP in 2015 more than offset a fall in government
revenues of 0.7% of GDP, which were due to both corruption in the
customs tax administration and lower taxes collected from oil
derivatives imports, given the drop in oil prices. For 2016 and
2017, we expect the fiscal deficit to increase slightly, reaching
levels closer to its historical average of 2% of GDP."

SECOND DRIVER -- WEAK INSTITUTIONS EXPECTED TO STRENGTHEN IN TAX
ADMINISTRATION AND RULE OF LAW

The CICIG (International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala,
a UN-run entity) in tandem with the Public Ministry, have led a
fight against corruption, uncovering entrenched criminal networks
working within the State. As of June 2016, around 300 people had
been arrested, with 53 apprehended on a single day last month. The
arrests include not only top and middle-management government
officials but also members of Congress, the military and two
prominent bankers.

The discovery of these corruption networks has shed light on the
magnitude of the rule of law challenges in Guatemala. However,
there is optimism about the effect the intervention of the CICIG
would have on Guatemalan institutions, identifying the permanent
criminal structures (not only the temporary ones) and increasing
the judicial system's independence and ability to enforce the law.
It has already begun to do so by helping Guatemalan authorities
follow due process in the most recent cases. The CICIG's mandate
has been renewed by President Morales for two more years,
scheduled to end September 2019.

Moody's said, "Corruption, particularly in the customs agency,
affected revenue collection in 2015. Government revenues amounted
to only 10.8% of GDP last year, down from 11.5% of GDP in 2014,
making Guatemala the sovereign with the third lowest revenue-to-
GDP ratio in our rated universe of 131 countries. The President
Morales administration has begun to take measures such as renewing
the top leadership of the tax administration department (the SAT),
which has a new director as of March 9. As of June, two-thirds of
the employees in the SAT were new, as well as 70% of the managers.
Despite running with a limited staff, the department has been able
to stabilize revenue collections. The SAT expects to increase
total government revenues by 0.5% of GDP in 2016 compared to
2015."

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATION OF GUATEMALA'S Ba1 RATINGS

The Ba1 ratings reflect, on the one hand, moderate medium-term
growth prospects and the government's long-standing commitment to
prudent fiscal and monetary policies, and, on the other, high
poverty levels and relatively weak institutional strength. Strict
expenditure controls have led to moderate budget deficits and low
debt ratios, despite low government revenues. Alternatively, poor
human development indicators, substantial social needs and the
weak quality of infrastructure hinder competitiveness, limiting
Guatemala's economic strength.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE

The ratings could experience upward pressure if there is (a)
substantial improvement in government revenue collection, (b)
sustained improvement in factors impacting economic strength,
including GDP per capita and the growth outlook for the economy,
and (c) stronger institutions, particularly rule of law and
control of corruption.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO A DOWNGRADE

The ratings could experience downward pressure if (a) there is an
erosion of the authorities' longstanding commitment to
conservative fiscal management, (b) there is a deterioration in
economic performance that leads to persistently higher debt
ratios, or (c) weak economic and social development indicators and
domestic security challenges begin to pose a threat to political
stability.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 7,738 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 4.1% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 3.1% (2015 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.4% (2015 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -0.3% (2015 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 27% (2015 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On 28 June 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Guatemala, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have not materially changed. The
issuer's institutional strength has increased. The issuer's fiscal
or financial strength, including its debt profile, has not
materially changed. The issuer has become less susceptible to
event risks.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


DIGICEL GROUP: Suffers Dip in Earnings
--------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the UK Times newspaper is reporting that the
Digicel Group has suffered a dip in earnings caused by the
strength of the US dollar against the currencies it trades in.

The mobile phone, broadband and cable TV company, which operates
across the Caribbean, Central America and the South Pacific, saw
earnings drop by one per cent to a little over EUR1 billion in the
last financial year, according to RJR News.

The report notes that Digicel Group reported that if the same
average exchange rates were in place for 2015-16 as for the
previous year, its earnings would have increased by 9 per cent.

And Colm Delves, Digicel's Group Chief Executive Officer, is
quoted in the Irish Independent newspaper as saying that the
company is not under pressure to undertake a stock market
flotation after postponing plans last year, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 27, 2016, Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Digicel
Group Limited (DGL) and its subsidiaries Digicel Limited (DL) and
Digicel International Finance Limited (DIFL), collectively
referred to as 'Digicel' as follows.

DGL
-- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'; Stable Outlook;
-- $US 2.0 billion 8.25% senior subordinated notes due 2020 at
    'B-/RR5';
-- $US 1 billion 7.125% senior unsecured notes due 2022 at
    'B-/RR5'.

DL
-- Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Stable Outlook;
-- $US 250 million 7% senior notes due 2020 at 'B/RR4';
-- $US 1.3 billion 6% senior notes due 2021 at 'B/RR4';
-- $US 925 million 6.75% senior notes due 2023 at 'B/RR4';

DIFL
-- Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Stable Outlook;
-- Senior secured credit facility at 'B+/RR3'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


BANCO NACIONAL: Moody's Cuts Baseline Credit Assessment to ba3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico affirmed Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior,
Sociedad Nacional de Credito, Institucion de Banca de Desarrollo's
(Bancomext) long- and short-term global local and foreign currency
issuer ratings of A3/Prime-2, and long-term global local currency
senior unsecured debt ratings of A3 in the global scale and Aaa.mx
in the Mexican National Scale. Moody's also affirmed Bancomext's
long- and short-term Mexican National Scale issuer ratings of
Aaa.mx/MX-1. Moody's nevertheless downgraded the bank's baseline
credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to ba3, from ba2. The
outlook is negative in line with the negative outlook on Mexico's
A3 rating.

This action concludes the rating review on Bancomext initiated on
4 April 2016.

A detailed list of affected ratings is provided below.

RATINGS RATIONALE

AFFIRMATION OF BANCOMEXT'S ISSUER RATINGS WITH A NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The affirmation of Bancomext's issuer and debt ratings reflects
the very high likelihood that the Mexican government will provide
extraordinary financial support in case of financial stress. The
rating agency's assessment takes into account statutory support
from the Mexican government that commits it to fulfil the banks'
financial obligations. This statutory support reflects Bancomext's
status as an arm of the government with a specific public policy
role to promote exports and attract foreign currency within
specific industries, including industrial complexes, tourism,
energy, transport, car and autoparts, mining, and
telecommunications.

The negative outlook on the issuer and debt ratings of Bancomext
reflects the negative outlook on Mexico's sovereign bond rating.

DOWNGRADE OF BCA TO ba3

Moody's lowered Bancomext's BCA to ba3 to reflect the higher asset
risks that the entity faces within a less favorable operating
environment stemming from a combination of the oil price shock and
the slower than expected economic growth for Mexico.

Moody's believes that Bancomext will be especially challenged
within the Mexican financial system as a result of its very high
loan growth, and markedly increased exposures to the troubled
state-owned oil company and related risks. In the last three
years, Bancomext's expansion has averaged a very high 32%,
compared to the banking system growth of 12%, while its oil and
oil-related exposures increased almost three times in the last 12
months.

The rating agency notes that it views positively that Bancomext
has traditionally maintained a good balance between its government
mandate and adequate risk management policies, reporting a low
level of nonperforming loans at 0.5% of gross loans, supported by
ample loan loss reserves at 1.6% of gross loans and adequate
capitalization. Moody's adjusted tangible common equity (TCE) to
risk-weighted assets ratio has averaged 11% in the last three
years, and reflects capitalizations by the federal government and
full earnings retention. However, the bank's very high growth and
exposures to the troubled oil industry could lead to higher than
expected deterioration in asset quality and consequently, in
capitalization over the next 12 to 18 months.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

While there is no upward ratings pressure at this point,
Bancomext's issuer and senior debt outlooks will likely be
stabilized if and when the Mexican government's ratings outlook
returns to stable. The development bank's government ownership and
important policy mandate would likely continue to align its
supported issuer and debt ratings to those of the government. That
said, Bancomext's issuer ratings would be downgraded if Mexico's
government bond rating, which currently carries a negative
outlook, is downgraded.

If Bancomext's already high exposures to the state-owned oil
company and related risks increase or if the standalone financial
strength of the state-owned oil company were to deteriorate,
Bancomext's standalone BCA would be adjusted downwards.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

The following assessments were downgraded:

Baseline credit assessment to ba3, from ba2

Adjusted baseline credit assessment to ba3, from ba2

The following ratings were affirmed:

Long-term global local currency issuer rating of A3, negative
outlook

Short-term global local currency issuer rating of Prime-2

Long-term foreign currency issuer rating of A3, negative outlook

Short-term foreign currency issuer rating of Prime-2

Long-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of Aaa.mx

Short-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of MX-1

Long-term global local currency senior unsecured debt rating of
A3, negative outlook

Long-term global Mexican National Scale senior unsecured debt
rating of Aaa.mx


GRUPO POSADAS: Fitch Affirms 'B' Issuer Default Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms Grupo Posadas, S.A.B. de C.V.'s (Posadas)
ratings as follows:

-- Local and Foreign Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
    (IDRs) at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- National scale rating at 'BB+(mex)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Outstanding $US38 million senior notes due in 2017 at
    'B+/RR3';
-- $US400 million senior notes due 2022 at 'B+/RR3'.

Posadas' ratings are supported by the company's solid business
position as a leading hotel chain in Mexico, strong brand equity
and operating performance, as well as its multiple hotel formats.
Conversely, the ratings are tempered by high leverage, as well as
industry cyclicality. Posadas' presence in all major urban and
coastal locations in Mexico, consistent product offering and brand
image have resulted in occupancy levels that are above the
industry average in Mexico. The use of multiple hotel formats
allows the company to target domestic and international business
travellers of different income levels as well as tourists,
diversifying its revenue base.

The 'RR3' Recovery Rating assigned to the issuances indicates good
recovery prospects given default. 'RR3' rated securities have
characteristics consistent with security historically recovering
51%-70% of current principal and related interest.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Solid Business Position
Posadas' ratings are supported by the company's solid business
position, strong brand name and multiple hotel formats.
Conversely, the ratings are tempered by high leverage, as well as
industry cyclicality. Posadas' presence in all major urban and
coastal locations in Mexico, consistent product offering and
quality brand image have resulted in occupancy levels that are
above the industry average in Mexico.

Strengthening Operations
Posadas operating performance continue to improve since the last
two years. Revenue per available room (RevPAR) has increased,
particularly in owned and leased hotels; driven by higher average
daily rate (ADR) and to a lesser extent higher occupancy. System
wide occupancy has remained stable, above 65%, although coastal
locations have outperformed urban ones, both for managed, as well
as owned and leased properties. Furthermore, vacation club sales
have improved, as increased occupancy in coastal locations has
increased cross-selling opportunities.

Correlation to Economic Cycles
The ratings incorporate the industry's high correlation to
economic cycles, which negatively affects operating trends in
downturns and increases volatility of operating results. The use
of multiple hotel formats allows the company to target domestic
and international business travellers of different income levels,
in addition to tourists, thus diversifying its revenue base.
Geographic diversification is limited as Posadas' operations are
primarily located in Mexico.

Capex Funded with Cash Flow
Fitch expects higher capex levels reaching up to MXN1 billion for
the next few years mainly related to Club Vacation projects in Los
Cabos and Acapulco as well as the remodeling of rooms. These
investments are expected to be funded with on hand resources,
which will result in no additional debt for the company. Fitch
incorporates Posadas' growth strategy of mainly managing hotels,
as opposed to owning the properties. New openings should continue
for all brands, mainly Fiesta Inn, Fiesta Americana and One, which
are mostly under managed and leased formats.

Leverage Still High
Fitch expects Posadas to maintain its total adjusted debt to -
EBITDA close to 5.0x in the short term and then gradually decline
toward 4.5x. Leverage improvement is expected to come from higher
EBITDA generation, as total debt should remain stable as the
before mentioned capex will be funded with internally generated
cash flow. As of March 31, 2016, Posadas' total debt was
unsecured; however, the company has a MXN200 million undrawn
secured facility.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Posadas
include:

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDAR around 4.5x in the medium term;
-- Consolidated EBITDA above MXN1 billion;
-- Broadly stable KPIs in the short to medium term;
-- Capex funded with internally generated cash flow;
-- Payment of the outstanding senior notes due in 2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Negative Trigger: Negative factors for credit quality could
include any weakening of operating trends or decreases in RevPAR
that could lead to lower EBITDA and cash flow levels, as well as
cash outflows or incurring debt that results in adjusted
debt/EBITDAR consistently higher than 5.0x.

Positive Trigger: Positive factors of the company's
creditworthiness include stable EBITDA generation, consolidating
gains in operating indicators and a proven track record of
stronger and stable credit metrics, such as adjusted debt/EBITDAR
consistently below 4.5x.

LIQUIDITY
Liquidity is sound. Assuming the repayment of the $US38 million
senior notes, the only maturity will be the senior notes due in
2022. Cash balances as of March 31, 2016 were $US92 million. The
additional $US12 million will be used for general corporate
purposes. As of March 31, 2016, Posadas has no committed credit
facilities and has a secured committed revolver facility for
MXN200 million.


HSBC MEXICO: Moody's Downgraded Standalone BCA to 'ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico lowered HSBC Mexico, S.A.'s standalone baseline
credit assessment (BCA) to ba3, from baa3, and downgraded the
long- and short-term local currency deposit and senior debt
ratings to Baa2/Prime-2 from A2/Prime-1. The long-term foreign
currency deposit rating was downgraded two notches to Baa2. The
outlook on these ratings is stable.

Moody's also lowered the adjusted BCA to baa3 from a2, and as a
result downgraded the subordinated debt rating to Ba1 from A3, and
the junior subordinated program debt rating to (P) Ba2 from (P)
Baa1. The long-term Mexican National Scale deposit and senior
unsecured debt ratings were downgraded two notches to Aa2.mx, and
the subordinated and junior subordinated National Scale ratings
were downgraded to A1.mx and A2.mx, respectively.

Moody's lowered the bank's long- and short-term counterparty risk
assessment (CR Assessment) to Baa1(cr)/Prime-2(cr), from
A1(cr)/Prime-1(cr).

At the same time, Moody's downgraded HSBC Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de
C.V.'s issuer ratings to Baa3/Prime-3 from A2/Prime-1, and the
long-term Mexican National Scale rating by one notch to Aa3.mx.
The outlook is stable.

These actions conclude the review initiated on 4 April 2016.

A detailed list of affected ratings is provided below.

RATINGS RATIONALE

LOWERING OF BASELINE CREDIT ASSESSMENT

In lowering HSBC Mexico's BCA to ba3 from baa3, Moody's considered
the heightened transition and execution risks stemming from
management's ambitious growth strategy coupled with the bank's
slow progress in improving its sluggish profitability. Though
profitability returned to positive net income in 1Q2016, earnings
remain weak and will continue to constrain the bank's capacity to
bolster its relatively limited capital levels organically, while
they provide a thin cushion to credit losses stemming from
nonperforming loans higher than the system.

Moody's notes that HSBC Mexico has been challenged to restore
profitability metrics to levels reported before the bank embarked
on a risk contention period between 2012-2014. During that period,
management tightened underwriting standards and shed relationships
with riskier customers. That strategy led to significant declines
in revenues and market share, especially in retail lending, and
contributed to a loss of competitive edge, which the bank has not
overcome.

Weak profitability is also the result of increasing loan loss
provisions, which have soared to nearly 90% of the bank's pre-
provision income as of 1Q2016, a figure that is twice as high the
peers' average. This performance in part relates to legacy sizable
problem corporate exposures to the construction segment, and more
recently to deterioration of consumer loans.

Moody's also notes management's goal to expand the loan portfolio
at seemingly above market trends in response to parent HSBC
Holdings plc's (HSBC, A1 negative) aggressive goals for revenue
and earnings growth laid on the Mexican subsidiary. The ambitious
growth goals, which combined with efforts to potentially expand
the customer base by attracting new customers, will challenge the
bank's underwriting standards, in Moody's view. These dynamics
will likely lead to setbacks in asset quality and additional
provisioning needs, further pressuring earnings.

Though asset quality metrics improved in recent quarters, the bank
continues to exhibit the weakest asset risk metrics among the
largest banks in the country, with a delinquency ratio of 5.1% as
of 1Q2016 versus peers' 2.1%, in average. While this ratio
incorporates arrears that have been already fully provisioned for,
Moody's sees limited room for improvement as the bank expands in
riskier, yet more profitable, consumer loans and lends to small
and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, asset quality remains
pressured by the highest borrower concentrations among the large
Mexican banks when measured against tangible common equity.

Lastly, capitalization ratios will continue under pressure due to
loan expansion and the bank's weak capacity to replenish capital
organically derived from currently poor profitability.

DOWNGRADE OF DEPOSIT AND SENIOR DEBT RATINGS

Moody's continues to regard HSBC Mexico as important to its parent
and assesses a very high likelihood of parent support in case of
need, which results in three notches of uplift from its BCA.
However, the lackluster performance of the Mexican bank to date,
if not improved substantially, could lead to shifts in likelihood
of parental support. HSBC Mexico's deposit rating was downgraded
to Baa2 reflecting Moody's reassessment of the Mexican
government's willingness to provide support to the bank to high
from very high. That said, Moody's continues to regard HSBC Mexico
as a systemically important bank in light of its 7.1% market share
of the system's deposits.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

Moody's said, "The BCA could be further lowered if profitability
and asset quality metrics continue to deteriorate. But even if the
BCA were downgraded, the deposit ratings would not be affected as
long as our assessment of the likelihood of affiliate and
government support remain unchanged."

There is no upward pressure on HSBC Mexico's ratings at this
juncture, but the ratings could benefit from substantial and
sustainable improvements in profitability and asset quality
metrics.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

-- HSBC Mexico, S.A.

The following ratings were downgraded:

Long-term global local currency deposit rating to Baa2, from A2,
stable outlook

Short-term global local currency deposit rating to Prime-2, from
Prime-1

Long-term foreign currency deposit rating to Baa2, from A3, stable
outlook

Long-term global local currency senior unsecured debt rating to
Baa2, from A2, stable outlook

Long-term global local currency provisional senior unsecured MTN
debt program rating to (P)Baa2, from (P)A2

Short-term global local currency provisional senior unsecured MTN
debt program rating to (P)Prime2, from (P)Prime-1

Long-term global local currency subordinated debt rating to Ba1,
from A3

Long-term global local currency provisional subordinated MTN debt
program rating to (P)Ba1, from (P)A3

Long-term global local currency provisional junior subordinated
MTN debt program rating to (P)Ba2, from (P)Baa1

Long-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating to Aa2.mx, from
Aaa.mx

Long-term Mexican National Scale senior unsecured debt rating to
Aa2.mx, from Aaa.mx

Long-term Mexican National Scale senior unsecured MTN debt program
rating to Aa2.mx, from Aaa.mx

Long-term Mexican National Scale subordinated debt rating to
A1.mx, from Aaa.mx

Long-term Mexican National Scale subordinated MTN debt program
rating to A1.mx, from Aaa.mx

Long-term Mexican National Scale junior subordinated MTN debt
program rating to A2.mx, from Aa1.mx

Standalone baseline credit assessment to ba3, from baa3

Adjusted baseline credit assessment to baa3, from a2

Long-term counterparty risk assessment to Baa1(cr), from A1(cr)

Short-term counterparty risk assessment to Prime-2(cr), from
Prime-1(cr)

Overall rating outlook: Stable

-- HSBC Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V.

The following ratings were downgraded:

Long-term global local currency issuer rating to Baa3, from A2,
stable outlook

Short-term global local currency issuer rating to Prime-3, from
Prime-1

Long-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating to Aa3.mx, from
Aaa.mx



=======
P E R U
=======


CORPORACION AZUCARERA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR; Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' long-term global scale
corporate credit and debt ratings on Corporacion Azucarera del
Peru SA (Coazucar).  The outlook on the corporate credit rating
remains negative.

The ratings affirmation reflects Coazucar's favorable growth
prospects for the next two years amid a recovery in global sugar
reference prices.  Also, S&P expects the company to increase its
production volumes following the completion of the Olmos project,
which will result in a production capacity expansion of
approximately 130,000 metric tons by 2017, improving its operating
efficiency and profitability.  However, Coazucar still faces
challenges in the next few quarters, given the significant
investments that the Olmos project still requires in 2016 and the
upcoming debt maturities, including its bridge loan due August
2017, which could further deteriorate the company's liquidity.

Coazucar's business risk profile incorporates its inherent
exposure to commodity price volatility and the company's still
lower profitability than those of its global, rated industry
peers, despite S&P's expectation of an improvement in the next two
years.  The assessment also incorporates Coazucar's geographic and
product concentration, which is tempered by the favorable weather
conditions at its fields, which allow for harvesting throughout
the entire year.  S&P believes that Coazucar's business risk
profile also benefits from sustainable, vertically integrated
operations, high-yield sugar cane harvests, well-developed
irrigation systems, the proximity of its plantations to its mills,
and limited dependence on third-party sugarcane suppliers.
Furthermore, S&P believes that the company benefits from strong
brand recognition in the Peruvian market, which typically has a
sugar supply deficit.

Depressed sugar prices and Coazucar's expansion initiatives have
taken a toll on its profitability metrics in the past two years.
However, S&P expects stronger EBITDA generation, stemming from
higher sales volumes, cost-saving initiatives, the completion of
the Olmos project, and rising sugar prices.

S&P's financial risk profile assessment incorporates its
expectation that Coazucar's leverage should improve in the next
two years as a result of higher cash flow generation amid stable
debt levels.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Lowers Rating on $8.3BB Bonds to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has lowered its ratings on the Puerto Rico
Electric Power Authority's (PREPA) approximately $8.3 billion to
'D' from 'CC'.

S&P understands that on June 30, 2016, PREPA made its regularly
scheduled $417.5 million principal and interest payment due July
1, 2016 from available funds.  However, S&P further understands
that on June 30, 2016, certain of PREPA's forbearing creditors and
monoline insurers loaned PREPA approximately $263.8 million at
8.46% interest, with repayment due in three tranches at an average
maturity of 3.5 years.

In S&P's opinion, were it not for the loan, PREPA would not have
made the payment, and that the creditor loans were a necessary
condition for PREPA to make the debt service payment.
Furthermore, S&P believes that this this "payment/re-lending"
constitutes a distressed exchange restructuring, tantamount to
default under S&P's criteria, whereby creditors are receiving less
value than originally promised--full and timely payment of
principal and interest when due--and that creditors are accepting
less than originally promised due to the risk that PREPA wouldn't
fulfill its obligations.


PUERTO RICO: Moody's Says PROMESA Provides Orderly PR Debt Revamp
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The enactment of a federal fiscal oversight board for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Caa3 negative) is credit positive for
bondholders because the legislation will prevent protracted
litigation and improve bondholder recoveries, Moody's Investors
Service says in "Puerto Rico (Commonwealth of): PROMESA Will
Impose Legal Order, Improve Recovery Prospects."

Moody's said, "However, Moody's notes that PROMESA (or the Puerto
Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act) will not
prevent Puerto Rico from defaulting on additional debt July 1.
Approximately $2.3 billion of payments are due Friday, including
$1.1 billion of general obligation debt. Moody's expects Puerto
Rico to default on the GO payment, and we expect additional
defaults to occur. We eventually believe Puerto Rico will default
on all of its rated debt."

Puerto Rico has already missed $562 million of debt service
payments, and has stated its current debt burden is unsustainable.
The legislation provides a path for the commonwealth and its
creditors to achieve an orderly restructuring.

"Without a federally approved course of action, protracted and
disorderly litigation was the most likely scenario," Ted Hampton,
Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer, says.

Moody's says PROMESA will also seek to honor the legal hierarchy
of Puerto Rico's debt structure, which indicates better recovery
rates for legally stronger bonds, such as the general obligation
and senior COFINA (Caa3 negative) securities. It will also allow
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA Caa3 negative) to
continue its ongoing restructuring with its creditors.

Additionally, PROMESA will require the oversight board to improve
Puerto Rico's financial reporting,

balance its budget under multi-year fiscal plans, and adopt
management practices to establish a more sustainable governance
framework in Puerto Rico for the long term.

The board would have oversight to determine whether the
restructuring has made good faith efforts to reach consensual
agreements, taken steps to provide timely and audited financial
reports, and mandate fiscal plans incorporate capital funding
needed to support economic recovery.

"In these respects, PROMESA lays out a blueprint for an oversight
board that behaves in a manner similar to the District of Columbia
(Aa1 stable) control board, which was established in 1995 and
oversaw substantial improvements in the district's financial
management," says Hampton.



=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================


NATIONAL FLOURS: Jamaica Refusing Products
------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that local producer National Flours Mills
said it has been finding it difficult to get some of its products
into Jamaica because of ongoing tension between that country and
Trinidad and Tobago.

NFM Chief Executive Officer Kelvin Mahabir told shareholders at
the company's annual general meeting at the Radisson Hotel, Port
of Spain, that there were instances where products have been
refused in Jamaica "simply because it is a Trinidad product and
nothing else," according to Trinidad Express.





===========================
V I R G I N   I S L A N D S
===========================


VIRGIN ISLANDS: Moody's Cuts Senior Lien Bond Rating to 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings on the US
Virgin Islands' four liens of Matching Fund Revenue Bonds, issued
through the Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority, as follows:
Senior Lien Bonds to B1 from Baa2; Subordinate Lien Bonds to B1
from Baa2; Subordinated Indenture (Diageo) Bonds to B2 from Baa3;
and Subordinated Indenture (Cruzan) Bonds to B2 from Baa3. The
bonds are secured by "matching fund" revenues which are
remittances paid by the federal government to the Virgin Islands
government of a portion of federal excise taxes collected on rum
produced in the territory and shipped to the US mainland. The
rating action affects approximately $1.24 billion in outstanding
debt.

The rating downgrades primarily reflect a closer alignment of
these special tax ratings with the Virgin Islands government's
general credit position, which has continued to erode and reached
a severely weak condition. The government's challenged financial
position increases the possibility that it will use the matching
fund revenue credit for new deficit financings, as it has in the
past. Additionally, while the legal structure of the matching fund
bonds is stronger than the government's unsecured general credit
quality (see Legal Security, below) this has not been tested in a
stress scenario, and warrants a closer alignment of the matching
fund bonds with the government's credit as its finances weaken.
Key characteristics of the government's general credit profile
include: persistent general fund deficits addressed primarily with
repeated deficit financings; very high and rising debt levels;
declining gross domestic product and population; high
unemployment; and a large unfunded pension liability. A further
challenge is the government's need to access the capital markets
to balance its budget and to bolster its liquidity, and the severe
stress that could result without this access.

To a lesser extent, the downgrades also reflect a decline in
pledged matching fund revenues and debt service coverage in 2015
primarily attributable to a reduction in shipments by one of the
territory's two rum distilleries. Future coverage could decline
further if the territory is successful in its plans for debt
refinancing and new money issuances.

Moody's said, "The ratings recognize that the bonds possess a
number of structural features that provide bondholder protections
and stronger credit quality than unsecured general obligation
bonds, most notably the direct payment of pledged revenues to the
US Treasury to the special escrow agent/trustee. The government
has pledged and assigned matching fund revenues to the trustee for
the benefit of bondholders, establishing a security interest in
the revenues. The statutes are written to create a statutory lien
on the revenues. But we note the instruction to the US Treasury to
make the direct payment must be renewed annually by the Virgin
Islands government, and these structures have not been tested in a
stress scenario where the government faces a severe lack of funds
to provide basic services."

Rating Outlook

The outlook on the ratings is negative, reflecting the severe
fiscal challenges facing the government, its need to access the
capital markets to balance its budget, and the possibility that
its liquidity and general credit profile could continue to
deteriorate.

Factors that Could Lead to an Upgrade

Restoration and maintenance of structural budget balance by the
primary government.

Factors that Could Lead to a Downgrade

Failure of the government to access capital market for planned
financings.

Further erosion of government's liquidity.

Decline in matching fund revenues and debt service coverage due to
further reduction in rum shipments by the two distilleries.

Legal Security

Bond security is established by the trust indenture, the loan
agreement, the special escrow agreement, and Virgin Islands
statutes. The government has pledged and assigned matching fund
revenues to the trustee for the benefit of bondholders,
establishing a security interest in the revenues. The statutes are
written to create a statutory lien on the revenues. In the loan
agreement the government covenants to direct the US Treasury to
pay the pledged matching fund revenues directly to the trustee.
This structure provides apparent bondholder protections and
stronger credit quality than unsecured general obligation bonds,
but it has not been tested in a severe stress scenario.

Use of Proceeds

Not applicable.

Obligor Profile

With the closure of the Hovensa oil refinery in 2012, the
territory's economy is primarily concentrated in tourism. While
there have been some positive trends in visitor counts since the
recession, GDP continues to decline, dropping at a compounded
annual rate of 2.7% from 2009 to 2014. Population fell from
115,852 in 2008 to 103,961 in 2014, while non-agricultural
employment fell from 45,488 to 38,144 over the same period.
Unemployment at 11.9% in 2015 was more than twice the US levels.
Per capita personal income is 47.9% of the US level.

Government finances have been severely strained. Revenues fell
abruptly in fiscal 2008 and 2009 as a result of the recession and
operating losses at the Hovensa refinery. The government addressed
the resulting deficits primarily with deficit financings. Revenues
have recovered somewhat in recent years. The Hovensa refinery was
recently sold generating a $220 million one-time payment which
will benefit government finances and liquidity in fiscal 2016.
Nevertheless, the general fund still has a structural deficit. For
fiscal 2017, the government estimates a structural imbalance of
$110 million and has proposed to address it with $55 million in
debt service savings from a debt refinancing and $50 million from
a new deficit financing.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From June 27 to July 1, 2016
---------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn    Price   Maturity   Country  Curr
-----------               ---    -----   --------   -------  ----
Alpha Star Holding II Lt   8.45   66.477  3/19/2034     EC  USD
Andino Investment Holdin   5.36   74.336  11/25/2020    EC  USD
Andino Investment Holdin    8.5     37.1  4/10/2018     VE  USD
Anton Oilfield Services   11.75       41  10/21/2026    VE  USD
Anton Oilfield Services   8.875     19.5  3/29/2017     MN  USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 L      8    6.625  12/31/2018    CL  USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman Ltd   5.75   69.812  12/1/2034     KY  USD
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Arg  4.375    46.75  4/25/2025     KY  USD
Banco BPI SA/Cayman Isla    7.5    61.25   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma    7.5    45.88                KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma    7.5     44.2                KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma     10  128.271  12/31/2020    KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma  4.625   69.075   3/1/2021     KY  USD
Banco Santander Puerto R    7.5       45  4/25/2019     HK  USD
BCP Singapore VI Cayman   8.625     68.5  11/1/2018     AE  USD
BCP Singapore VI Cayman  0.9551    42.75  12/1/2039     KY  USD
CA La Electricidad de Ca   5.93   73.652  11/1/2021     EC  USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos    9.5    29.75  4/23/2019     BR  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr  7.375   69.875  1/31/2020     PE  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr    6.5   69.989  12/1/2023     EC  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr      7    47.25  4/21/2020     KY  USD
CSN Islands XI Corp        5.93   73.051   1/1/2022     EC  USD
CSN Islands XI Corp       10.75   34.639  2/12/2023     BR  USD
CSN Islands XII Corp          7    73.33  1/17/2023     CO  COP
CSN Islands XII Corp       3.95   61.977  3/15/2022     KY  USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomis  6.375   73.875  5/15/2043     CR  USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomis    7.7   68.067   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Delta Investment Horizon   5.36   75.108  12/30/2020    EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.389  4/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.389  4/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.5   65.375   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      6   43.875   4/5/2023     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.25   73.089   4/6/2017     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  6.375   73.835  5/15/2043     CR  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      6       31  5/16/2024     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   9.75    36.95  5/17/2035     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  4.625     69.5  5/21/2023     CN  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    8.5    75.01  5/25/2016     CN  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      3   74.109  5/26/2020     ID  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.784  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   9.25       35   5/7/2028     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  4.875   75.819   6/1/2027     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.75   74.625  6/11/2025     DO  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.75   74.625  6/11/2025     DO  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.164  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.201  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.201  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.975  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.415  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.415  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.158  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.195  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.408  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.408  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   70.121  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.073  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.073  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  5.125    43.35  6/26/2022     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  5.125   44.625  6/26/2022     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  7.125     43.5  6/26/2042     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  7.125       42  6/26/2042     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.25       43  6/27/2029     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.35    31.25  6/30/2021     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.35     31.5  6/30/2021     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.032   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.067   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.291   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.863   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.291   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625       62  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625       45  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625   49.881  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Empresa de Telecomunicac   5.64   71.931  12/30/2021    EC  USD
Empresa de Telecomunicac   5.42       50  3/28/2019     NO  NOK
Empresa Generadora de El   8.25    45.75  4/25/2018     KY  BRL
Empresa Generadora de El  4.625   72.512  5/21/2023     CN  USD
ESFG International Ltd     5.25       52  4/12/2017     VE  USD
General Exploration Part  5.125    34.75  12/15/2017    BR  EUR
General Shopping Finance   6.21   71.552  11/25/2023    EC  USD
General Shopping Finance  11.75    70.75  4/23/2018     KY  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   7.75   69.333  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   5.93   73.359  12/1/2021     EC  USD
Global A&T Electronics L     10    62.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   8.45   66.646   2/6/2034     EC  USD
Gol Finance Inc            6.75    23.75  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Gol Finance Inc           8.625    67.75  11/1/2018     AE  USD
Gol Finance Inc            4.15     71.5  11/14/2035    KY  EUR
Gol Finance Inc            5.25    47.25  3/15/2042     KY  USD
Gol Finance Inc           5.375    31.45  4/12/2027     VE  USD
Gol Finance Inc             5.5    32.64  4/12/2037     VE  USD
Gol Finance Inc            8.25    45.75  4/25/2018     KY  BRL
Golden Eagle Retail Grou      6    70.25  10/25/2041    PA  USD
Golden Eagle Retail Grou   6.95       65   4/1/2025     KY  USD
Greenfields Petroleum Co  12.75     42.4  2/17/2022     VE  USD
Honghua Group Ltd           6.5    67.24  11/15/2020    KY  USD
Honghua Group Ltd          8.45   66.414   4/2/2034     EC  USD
Instituto Costarricense    7.75   69.149  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Instituto Costarricense     7.5   51.602  4/15/2031     KY  USD
Inversiones Alsacia SA      7.5   46.274  11/6/2018     CN  USD
Inversiones Alsacia SA       10    62.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Inversora Electrica de B    7.5       34  4/25/2019     HK  USD
Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd   5.64   70.192  11/25/2021    EC  USD
Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd   5.61   68.567  12/1/2022     EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.75   70.495  10/23/2028    EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp          6.21   71.691  11/1/2022     EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp             8    57.65  4/15/2021     KY  USD
Mongolian Mining Corp       5.5     36.5  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Mongolian Mining Corp     8.875       16  3/29/2017     MN  USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman Is   7.75   69.111  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Newland International Pr  12.75    44.25  2/17/2022     VE  USD
Newland International Pr      7   46.125  4/21/2020     KY  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  6.625       22  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   5.75    61.11  10/24/2023    BR  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  4.125    61.46  11/1/2022     BR  USD
Noble Holding Internatio      6    30.75  11/15/2026    VE  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   5.93   71.815  11/25/2022    EC  USD
Noble Holding Internatio    7.5     46.5  11/6/2018     CN  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   7.75   69.371  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  9.875    31.05  11/9/2019     BR  USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe   7.25   53.375  1/18/2018     KY  USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe   7.75   69.102  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7    38.55                BR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7     39.5                BR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.753        1                KY  EUR
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.75    37.25  10/13/2019    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      8.25    35.75  10/13/2024    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         9    35.75  11/17/2021    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         4   70.666  11/4/2023     AR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd    0.9551    42.75  12/1/2039     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.75   69.102  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         8     74.5  12/20/2049    CN  CNY
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         6    33.25  12/9/2020     VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      3.38   63.175   2/7/2035     KY  EUR
Odebrecht Finance Ltd    3.8734       98  3/21/2017     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7       36  3/31/2038     VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.45    53.07  4/15/2027     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6.875   73.411  4/22/2016     CN  CNY
Odebrecht Offshore Drill  9.375    37.75  1/13/2034     VE  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill      6   29.125  10/28/2022    VE  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill  7.125    65.73  12/15/2021    KY  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill   7.75   69.066  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Oi SA                         7    73.33  1/17/2023     CO  COP
Oi SA                         8        6  12/31/2018    CL  USD
Pesquera Exalmar SAA     2.8791   73.715  11/30/2032    CL  USD
Pesquera Exalmar SAA       7.65     35.5  4/21/2025     VE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   6.25    54.25                KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   8.75    28.25                BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   0.99   43.333                KY  EUR
Petroleos de Venezuela S   5.95    50.25  1/30/2018     NO  NOK
Petroleos de Venezuela S  7.375     73.5  1/31/2020     PE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   5.93   73.967  10/1/2021     EC  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  6.625   22.375  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S    5.5    35.59  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  4.125       62  11/1/2022     BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S     11   70.125  11/13/2020    PE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S     10    63.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  10.75   34.125  2/12/2023     BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   6.05       49   3/1/2041     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S    6.8       50  3/15/2038     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   7.95    55.25   4/1/2045     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S      8    66.25  4/15/2021     KY  USD
Polarcus Ltd               7.75   69.371  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Provincia del Chaco           6       45   4/5/2023     KY  USD
PSOS Finance Ltd              7     41.5  12/1/2018     VE  USD
Rabobank Chile             5.25    41.55  6/27/2029     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.752  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini      9    37.25   5/7/2023     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.465  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.563  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.563  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45    65.97  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   67.196  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.789  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   67.196  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25     36.1  7/20/2020     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25       38  7/20/2020     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.949  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.932  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.932  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    9.5   23.375   7/3/2017     PA  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    9.5   23.375   7/3/2017     PA  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    4.9   73.401   8/1/2020     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.885   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.899   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.899   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.2   50.923   8/1/2040     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  12.75       43  8/23/2022     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  11.95     40.5   8/5/2031     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7    67.63  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.663  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.663  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.552  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.897  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.897  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.687  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.719  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.719  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.625    72.25  9/11/2042     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.75   33.382  9/15/2016     BR  BRL
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.75   33.625  9/15/2016     BR  BRL
Republic of Ecuador Mini  9.125   67.887  9/15/2017     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25       40  9/15/2027     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  6.875    55.25  9/21/2019     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  6.875       57  9/21/2019     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.45   45.015  9/25/2019     CN  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.45   45.125  9/25/2019     CN  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.5     58.5  9/26/2017     AR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.375    61.25  9/26/2024     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.375    53.75  9/26/2024     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.506  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   68.779  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   68.779  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.454  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.784  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.784  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA      0.719       43                KY  EUR
Samarco Mineracao SA       7.75   69.436  10/23/2028    EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA       11.5   35.375  11/13/2018    CA  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA      1.353   73.375  12/17/2017    KY  EUR
Samarco Mineracao SA       6.21   68.503  12/30/2023    EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA       8.45   66.646   2/6/2034     EC  USD
Seagate HDD Cayman         7.75   70.495  10/23/2028    EC  USD
Seagate HDD Cayman          6.5   69.477  11/25/2024    EC  USD
Shelf Drilling Holdings   5.125   34.584  12/15/2017    BR  EUR
Shelf Drilling Holdings       8    52.15  4/15/2027     KY  USD
Siem Offshore Inc            10    67.99   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Siem Offshore Inc           7.5     79.5  3/10/2020     CN  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA        9       68                KY  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     6.25    50.25                KY  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     5.75    61.25  10/24/2023    BR  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     7.75   69.149  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA    6.875       49   2/6/2018     HK  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     5.25   43.273  3/21/2019     VE  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA      5.6       45  3/30/2022     AE  USD
Transocean Inc               10       55                KY  USD
Transocean Inc                9    69.75                KY  USD
Transocean Inc             7.25       54  1/18/2018     KY  USD
Transocean Inc             4.54   58.625  10/25/2041    PA  USD
Transocean Inc               11       70  11/13/2020    PE  USD
Transocean Inc             6.75  104.4036 11/5/2021     PY  USD
Transocean Inc              7.5   75.375  12/10/2028    PR  USD
Transocean Inc             8.45   66.618   2/6/2034     EC  USD
US Capital Funding IV Lt   7.75   70.502  4/25/2028     EC  USD
US Capital Funding IV Lt   9.75    37.65  5/17/2035     VE  USD
Usiminas Commercial Ltd      10       55                KY  USD
Usiminas Commercial Ltd    8.45   66.451  3/19/2034     EC  USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA      6.5   69.901   1/1/2024     EC  USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     5.93   73.323  12/30/2022    EC  USD
Vale SA                    6.21   71.086   1/1/2023     EC  USD
Vantage Drilling Interna  9.875    33.25  11/9/2019     BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int    6.5   69.654                IE  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.75   30.125                BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int   6.75    24.01  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Venezuela Government Int    4.3   54.766  10/15/2022    KY  USD
Venezuela Government Int    5.5     35.5  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int    6.5   70.288  11/1/2023     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int      6    31.21  11/15/2026    VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int      9     33.9  11/17/2021    VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int    8.5    53.55  11/2/2017     VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.45   66.477  3/19/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int    7.5   68.052   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int      6    30.25  5/16/2024     VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int    8.5    75.01  5/25/2016     CN  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.45   65.784  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int      9     12.5  5/31/2017     US  CAD
Venezuela Government Int    7.7   68.195  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Venezuela Government TIC   8.45   66.414   4/2/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government TIC    9.5    30.05  4/23/2019     BR  USD
Venezuela Government TIC  4.375       41  4/25/2025     KY  USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        8.1   53.131  12/15/2041    KY  USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA       8.45   66.386   4/2/2034     EC  USD
XLIT Ltd                    8.5       53  11/2/2017     VE  USD


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding,
electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited
without prior written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *