TCRLA_Public/160713.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, July 13, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 137


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ALBANESI SA: Fitch Assigns First Time 'B'/'BB-' IDRs


B R A Z I L

GENERAL SHOPPING: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to 'C'


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

36KR INC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 3
ALTERNATIVE FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 26
ARDON MAROON: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 5
EJF GREATER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
KING INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 4

LP GLOBAL FZ-LLC: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
LP GLOBAL HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
MONEDA ABSOLUTE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
OHA AVAERO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PIONERO CHILE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

PIONERO CHILE MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SJK CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SJK CAPITAL MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
STAR HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 4
TRIMAX MASTER: Creditors' Meeting Set for Aug. 3


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Minister Vows to Address Issue of Imported Refined Sugar


M E X I C O

MEXICALI: Moody's Cuts Issuer Ratings to Caa1/B3.mx
VERACRUZ STATE: Moody's Lowers Issuer Ratings to B1/Baa3.mx


P E R U

PACIFIC ANDES: Citing Stalled Peru Sale, Opposition to Ch. 11 Ups
PERU: IDB OKs $40MM Loan to Promote MSMEs' Innovation and Capacity


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Fresh From Record Default, Plots Bond-Market Return
SAN JUAN PROPERTIES: Case Summary & 4 Unsecured Creditors
SPORTS AUTHORITY: Elise Frejka Appointed as Fee Examiner


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Seizes and Re-opens Kimberly-Clark Factory


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ALBANESI SA: Fitch Assigns First Time 'B'/'BB-' IDRs
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned first time Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'B' and 'BB-',
respectively, to Albanesi S.A. (Albanesi). The Rating Outlook is
Stable.

Fitch has simultaneously assigned an expected rating of
'B+(EXP)/RR3' to the up to $US250 million proposed senior
unsecured notes issued by Central Termica Roca (CTR), Generacion
Mediterranea SA (GEMSA) and Generacion Frias(GFSA). GFSA and GEMSA
are subsidiaries of Albanesi S.A. The notes are guaranteed by
Albanesi S.A. Each of the issuers and Albanesi S.A. will be
jointly and severally liable for any payment obligations under the
notes.

The company expects to use the proceeds from the issuance to
refinance existing debt at its subsidiaries, funding capital
expenditures and for general corporate purposes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Albanesi's ratings reflect the industry's improving regulatory
risk; counterparty risk to Compania Administradora de Mercado
Mayorista Electrico S.A. (CAMMESA) as main offtaker; the company's
sound metrics supported by its relatively stable and predictable
cashflow generation; and Albanesi's debt partial structural
subordination to OpCo debt. Finally, the company's ratings also
reflect the macro-economic environment, including high inflation
and steep currency devaluation and implicit support and synergies
with natural gas trader sister company, Rafael G. Albanesi (RGA).

Albanesi's ratings are constrained by the 'B' country ceiling of
the Republic of Argentina. Fitch has assigned a country ceiling of
'B' to the Republic of Argentina, which limits the foreign
currency rating of most Argentine corporates. Country ceilings are
designed to reflect the risks associated with sovereigns placing
restrictions upon private sector corporates, which may prevent
them from converting local currency to any foreign currency under
a stress scenario, and/or may not allow the transfer of foreign
currency abroad to service foreign currency debt obligations.
Since taking power in December 2015, the Mauricio Macri
administration removed FX controls introduced in 2011 and
increased the flexibility of the Argentine peso, which should
contribute towards improving the capacity of the economy to absorb
external shocks and relieve pressure on international reserves.

Factors such as the high capital investment needs in the sector to
reduce the energy deficit in the country, coupled with the
company's conservative financial structure allows the company's
local currency IDR to be above the sovereign's local currency IDR
by two notches, in line with Fitch's criteria for rating non-
financial corporates above the country ceiling.

The rating of the notes considers the combined operating assets of
Albanesi and CTR which jointly and severally guarantee the
proposed notes due 2023. Fitch expects to assign an 'RR3' Recovery
Rating to Albanesi's proposed issuance, which reflects good
recovery prospects in the event of default given the company's
solid balance sheet and cash flow generation. Fitch believes that
the company's default, should it occur, would be most likely
driven by transfer and convertibility restrictions imposed upon
the payment of foreign debt, not a material deterioration of the
company's business or financial profile.

Improving Regulatory Risk:
Fitch believes the recent resolutions implemented by the new
government reflect a trend of less government interference and
discretion in the power generation sector. Albanesi operates in a
highly strategic sector in which the government has historically
had a role as the price/tariff regulator and had full control over
the subsidies for industry players. Since 2013, the Secretariat of
Energy introduced material changes to the structure and operation
of the wholesale electricity market (WEM). Since 2013, the tariffs
have almost doubled. Additionally, the Ministry of Mining and
Energy, under Resolution 22/2016 adjusted the spot price tariffs
for energy sales under the Energia Base framework.

Counterparty Exposure:
Albanesi depends on payments from CAMMESA, which can be volatile
given that the agency depends on the national government for funds
to make payments. Electric companies in Argentina are not only
exposed to delays in the payment of CAMMESA, but also to risks in
fuel supply, as the government's agency centralizes the country's
fuel imports. During the past couple of years, CAMMESA's
increasing obligations relative to its revenues significantly
increased discretionary payments to suppliers. The new resolutions
intend to reduce CAMMESA's deficit to support the industry
sustainability in order to balance the supply/demand dynamics. The
company's exposure to a shortage in fuel is partially mitigated by
the role of sister company RGA as the main natural gas trader of
the country, supplying the gas if needed to the companies within
the Albanesi group.

Sound Credit Metrics:
Albanesi's cash flow generation is relatively stable and
predictable. As of December 2015, 65% of the company's EBITDA was
related to long term take or pay contracts with CAMMESA
denominated in U.S. dollars under the Resolution 220/07 regulatory
framework. Additionally, approximately 84% of the revenues of
Albanesi and CTR were denominated in U.S. dollars. Albanesi is a
HoldCo concentrating all the power generation assets, except for
CTR. The Albanesi group, including CTR, operates eight power
plants located in multiple provinces of Argentina, benefitting
from geographical diversification and good access to fuel and the
Sistema Argentino de Interconexion (SADI).

As of December 2015, Albanesi's total debt/EBITDA ratio, including
debt with CAMMESA, stood at 2.0x (significantly improving from the
4.2x observed in 2011), while net of debt with CAMMESA stood at
1.7x. Fitch expects leverage to peak at 4.6x in $US (5.4x in ARS)
after the issuance of the notes and to decrease below 3.0x in 2018
when the additional projects start operations.

Gross leverage for the co-guarantors (including CTR) as of
December 2015 was 2.31x in $US (3.25x in ARS) and it is expected
to be below 3.0x by 2018/2019 once the additional capacity is
fully operational.

Partial Structural Subordination:
The potential retention of cash after debt service at the OpCo's
level makes cash flow to the HoldCo less stable and less
predictable than the cash flows from operations (CFFO) of the
subsidiaries. The repayment of Albanesi's debt relies on the
dividends being paid by the OpCos, mainly GEMSA. As of December
2015, GEMSA paid approximately ARS50 million in dividends. Fitch
believes that with the proceeds of the notes, a significant
portion of the existing debt will be repaid reducing the
structural subordination.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS
-- Installed capacity for Albanesi S.A. and the guarantors of
    812MW and 942MW respectively for 2016, increasing by 350MW for
    Albanesi S.A and by 410MW for the Guarantors compared with
    2016. Main increased in installed capacity due to Ezeiza
    (150MW), Independencia 1 & 2 (100MW), Rio Negro CC (60MW) and
    La Rioja (50MW).
-- Additional 250 MW of installed capacity expected to be
    contracted under Res-21/2016 (which is similar to Res-220).
    The remaining contracted under Res-220.
-- Approximately 60% of the installed capacity contracted under
    Res-220 in 2016 increasing to 72% by 2019 (considering the co-
    issuers).
-- Base energy prices will increase by 30% in 2017, 25% in 2018
    and 20% in 2019.
-- Res 220 prices and Energia plus prices remaining flat.
-- Peak capex of $US150 million-$US220 million per year for 2016-
    2017, reducing to an average $US35 million per year for the
    following years.
-- No additional revenues associated to Solalban are included.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Albanesi's ratings could be negatively affected by a combination
of the following:
-- A change in the company's contractual mix and/or deterioration
    on the regulatory framework that could affect the company's
    ability to generate revenues under the Energia plus and Res
    220/07 frameworks.
-- A significant deterioration of credit metrics and/or
    significant payment delays from CAMMESA.

Finally, a downgrade of Argentina's ratings would result in a
downgrade of Albanesi's ratings, given that the company's ratings
are constrained by the sovereign's credit quality.

An upgrade to the ratings of Argentina could result in a positive
rating action.

LIQUIDITY

As of year-end 2015, total cash and equivalents amounted to
approximately $US2.4 million compared with approximately $US45
million of short-term debt due during 2016. This is a common
practice among Argentine companies. The company's successful
record of accessing the local markets and the available credit
lines with local banks should mitigate the liquidity risk exposure
during 2016.

The proceeds from the issuance of the bond will be used to
refinance most of the company's financial debt, improving
liquidity and extending the company's maturity profile.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

Albanesi S.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'B',
    Stable Outlook;
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB-', Stable Outlook;
-- $250 million senior unsecured notes due 2023 issued by CT
    Roca, GEMSA and GFSA and co-guaranteed by Albanesi SA and CTR
    'B+(EXP)'/'RR3'.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


GENERAL SHOPPING: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded General Shopping Brasil S.A.'s (GSB)
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'C' from 'CC', and its $US250
million perpetual notes to 'C/RR4' from 'CCC/RR2'. Fitch has also
affirmed GSB's $US150 million subordinated perpetual notes at
'C/RR5'. See the full list of rating actions at the end of this
release.

The rating downgrade follows GSB's proposed debt exchange offering
of its $US150 million subordinated perpetual notes announced on
July 5, 2016. According to Fitch's rating distressed debt exchange
criteria, the proposed offering imposes a material reduction in
the original terms and conditions of the subordinated perpetual
notes to creditors. The completion of the exchange offering would
result in the IDRs being downgraded to Restricted Default ('RD').
Shortly after the distressed debt exchange is completed, the IDRs
would be re-rated, typically, somewhere still in the highly
speculative grade rating category.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Proposed Debt Exchange:

GSB has announced that its subsidiary, General Shopping
Investments Limited (the issuer), has commenced a private exchange
offer in respect of any and all of its outstanding $US150 million
principal amount of 12% perpetual subordinated notes (the existing
notes). The issuer is offering to exchange any and all of their
existing notes for (i) $US30 million newly issued U.S. dollar-
denominated 10%/12% Senior Secured PIK Toggle Notes due 2026 (the
new notes) to be issued by the issuer and unconditionally and
irrevocably guaranteed by GSB and (ii) global depositary shares,
each global depositary share representing 55 common shares of GSB,
valued at approximately $US30 million in total at current market
values.

The new notes will also be secured by a second mortgage ('hipoteca
de segundo grau') on 50.1% of GBS' interest in Parque Shopping
Maia; collateral coverage is estimated at about 2.0 to 1.0. The
new notes will be senior to the GSB' $US250 million of existing
perpetual notes, which are unsecured and would become subordinated
obligations to the new notes as well as all other secured debt
obligations. The debt exchange offer will expire on Aug. 1, 2016.


High Leverage, Weakening Liquidity:

GSB's capital structure is viewed by Fitch as unsustainable due to
excessive financial leverage. GSB's last 12-month period ended
March 31, 2016 (LTM March 2016) saw EBITDA of BRL178 million and
total debt of BRL2 billion, with net total debt-to-EBITDA of 9.4x.
All of the company's cash flow, measured as EBITDA, is generated
in the local currency, Brazilian reais, while approximately 60% of
its total debt is U.S. dollar-denominated.

GSB's FCF is expected to remain negative due to excessive cash
interest payments during 2016. The company's high leverage and
interest rates on its debt has led to high cash interest payments
and declining interest coverage. GSB has a cash position and
short-term debt of BRL47 million and BRL118 million, respectively,
and approximately BRL466 million ($US130 million) in unencumbered
assets as of March 31, 2016. On Sept. 8, 2015, the company
exercised its right to defer the payment of interest under its
$US150 million 10% perpetual subordinated notes. The interest
payment deferral does not constitute an event of default under the
indenture.

Quality Assets and Subordination Incorporated in Debt Recovery:

As of LTM March 2016, GSB's total assets were valued at an
estimated BRL2.9 billion (approximately $US803 million using the
FX rate of 3.59x), with encumbered and unencumbered assets
representing approximately 84% and 16%, respectively, of the total
assets value. The Recovery Rating (RR) of 'RR4' for the $US250
million perpetual notes reflects the average recovery prospects -
in the 31% to 50% range - in an event of default.

Fitch has revised its initial expectations on the recovery
prospects for the $US250 million perpetual notes from 'RR2' to
'RR4'considering GSB's current level of unencumbered assets and
the recent terms offered in the $150 million proposed distressed
debt exchange offering. The 'RR5' for the $US150 million
subordinated perpetual notes reflects below average recovery
prospects of approximately 11-30%; excluding any consideration for
equity value.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The exchange offer launched on July 5, 2016, constitutes a
distressed debt exchange under Fitch's criteria, because investors
face a reduction in terms and conditions, and the restructuring is
being conducted in order to avoid a traditional payment default.
Fitch considers alternative options to be limited.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The completion of the proposed exchange offer will lead to a
downgrade of the Long-Term IDRs to 'RD'. A positive rating action
may follow the implementation of an alternative capital structure
that arises out of the restructuring process.

LIQUIDITY

Fitch views GSB's liquidity as unsustainable due to its high
financial leverage. The company's total cash flow from operations
for 2016 is estimated to be negative at around BRL125 million.
Without a material change in the company's capital structure,
GSB's limited capacity to cover interest expenses and taxes with
its operational cash flow is expected to result in continued
deterioration of its liquidity position during 2016.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has taken the following rating actions GSB's ratings:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
    downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
-- Long-Term Local currency IDR downgraded to 'C' from 'CC';
-- National Scale rating downgraded to 'C(bra)' from 'CC(bra)'.

General Shopping Finance Limited (GSF):
-- $US250 million perpetual notes downgraded to 'C/RR4' from
    'CCC/RR2'.

General Shopping Investment Limited (GSI):
-- $US150 million subordinated perpetual notes affirmed at
    'C/RR5'.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


36KR INC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 3
----------------------------------------------
The creditors of 36KR Inc. are required to file their proofs of
debt by Aug. 3, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company will hold a meeting for its shareholders on Aug. 8,
2016.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 10, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Maricorp Services Ltd.
          c/o Roger L. Nelson
          P.O. Box 2075 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-9710


ALTERNATIVE FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 26
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Alternative Fund LDC are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 26, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on June 22, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7463
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


ARDON MAROON: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 5
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ardon Maroon Asia Dragon Feeder Fund are required
to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 5, 2016, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David A.K. Walker
          c/o Kadie Prospere
          PwC Corporate Finance & Recovery (Cayman) Limited
          18 Forum Lane
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 914 8745
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237


EJF GREATER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
On June 23, 2016, the shareholders of EJF Greater China Fund, Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road
          George Town Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


KING INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 4
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of King Investments GP, Inc are required to file
their proofs of debt by Aug. 4, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 23, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Susan Craig
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman, KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


LP GLOBAL FZ-LLC: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------------
On June 20, 2016, the sole shareholder of LP Global Solutions FZ-
LLC resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Palmer Law Firm, CHTD
          Daniella Skotnicki
          c/o Ogier 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


LP GLOBAL HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
On June 20, 2016, the sole shareholder of LP Global Holdings Co.
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Palmer Law Firm, CHTD
          Daniella Skotnicki
          c/o Ogier 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


MONEDA ABSOLUTE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
On June 23, 2016, the sole shareholder of Moneda Absolute Return
Master Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Padraig Hoare
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 815 1415
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 945-6265


OHA AVAERO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On June 13, 2016, the sole shareholder of OHA Avaero Holdings,
Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


PIONERO CHILE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------
On June 23, 2016, the sole shareholder of Pionero Chile Small Cap
Fund resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          Padraig Hoare
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 815 1415
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 945-6265


PIONERO CHILE MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------
On June 23, 2016, the sole shareholder of Pionero Chile Small Cap
Master Fund resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          Padraig Hoare
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 815 1415
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 945-6265


SJK CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
On June 24, 2016, the sole shareholder of SJK Capital Offshore
Fund Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          SJK Capital Management LLC
          Madeleine Welham
          c/o Ogier 89 Nexus Way
          Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


SJK CAPITAL MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
On June 24, 2016, the sole shareholder of SJK Capital Master Fund
Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          SJK Capital Management LLC
          Madeleine Welham
          c/o Ogier 89 Nexus Way
          Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


STAR HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 4
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Star Holdings Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Aug. 4, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 1, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          SCL Limited
          Smeets Law (Cayman)
          Reference: JAPF
          Telephone: (+1) 345 815 2800
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 947 4728
          Suite 2206, Cassia Court
          72 Market Street Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 32302 Grand Cayman KY1-1209
          Cayman Islands


TRIMAX MASTER: Creditors' Meeting Set for Aug. 3
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Trimax Master Fund Limited will have a meeting on
Aug. 3, 2016. The meeting will be held at the offices of Deloitte
& Touche, 4th Floor of Citrus Grove Building, in Goring Avenue,
George Town, KY11109, Cayman Islands.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Minister Vows to Address Issue of Imported Refined Sugar
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Minister of Industry, Commerce and
Agriculture, Karl Samuda said he will be moving to tackle the
problem of imported refined sugar for manufacturing ending up in
the retail trade.

Mr. Samuda who made the commitment while on tour of the Long Pond
Sugar Factory said --  "You cannot have sugar being produced . . .
. brought back having been refined and then to have manufacturers,
who use that refined sugar as raw material, and get duty
concession, selling it in the retail trade at enormous profit,"
according to RJR News.

Mr. Samuda said the practice undermines those who are engaged in
the sugar industry and the government is going to put a stop to
it, the report notes.

The Agriculture Minister said the Bureau of Standards will play a
role in ensuring that breaches are dealt with and within the next
two months, will start seizing sugar found on the shelves without
its seal, the report relays.

Mr. Samuda also urged local sugar producers to get into refining
the product instead of selling raw sugar which is then refined and
sold back to Jamaica, the report notes.

Meanwhile, President of the Jamaica Manufacturers Association
(JMA) Metry Seaga has welcomed the move, but disputes the view
that manufacturers are the ones selling refined sugar into the
retail trade, the report says.

Mr. Seaga said if anyone is found breaching the rules pertaining
to the importation of refined sugar then that person must be
prosecuted.  However, he believes the issue could be solved
permanently by making it cheaper and easier to import refined
sugar, the report adds.

                        *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Feb.
15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Jamaica's Long-term foreign
and local currency IDRs to 'B' from 'B-' and revised the Rating
Outlooks to Stable from Positive.  In addition, Fitch upgraded
Jamaica's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-Currency bonds to
'B' from 'B-'.  The Country Ceiling has been affirmed at 'B' and
the Short- Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


MEXICALI: Moody's Cuts Issuer Ratings to Caa1/B3.mx
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico downgraded the Municipality of Mexicali's issuer
ratings to Caa1/B3.mx from B3/Ba3.mx following the missed payments
for two short-term unsecured loans, scheduled for June 30, 2016.
A MXN 814 mllion (original amount) enhanced loan with Banobras was
also downgraded to B1/Baa3.mx from Ba3/Baa1.mx.

At the same time, Moody's placed the ratings under review for
further downgrade.  Moody's review of the ratings, which is
expected to be completed by September 1st, will focus on the
immediate plans of Mexicali to address its missed payments, as
well as its overall liquidity profile within the context of
ensuring future payments of short-term loans as per Mexico's
legislation on financial discipline for states and municipalities.

RATINGS RATIONALE
RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE OF THE ISSUER RATING TO Caa1/B3.mx
from B3/Ba3.mx

The downgrade of the issuer ratings to Caa1/B3.mx from B3/Ba3.mx
reflects Mexicali's default on two short-term unsecured loans on
June 30, with Banco del Bajio and Banco Interacciones.  At the end
of the first quarter of 2016, the total outstanding amount of
Mexicali's short-term amortizable obligations stood at MXN48.847
million with Banco del Bajio and MXN 193.125 with Banco
Interacciones.  The municipality has forwarded its intention to
repay both banks.  The Caa1 global scale rating (GSR) assigned to
Mexicali's rating incorporates the expectation of a 90 to 95%
recovery rate.

The downgrade also reflects Mexicali's very tight liquidity
position.  Between 2011 and 2015, the municipality's net working
capital (measured as current assets minus current liabilities)
averaged -20.2% of total expenditures, one of the lowest levels
among Mexican municipalities rated by Moody's.  Moody's expects
liquidity pressures to have increased this year and to remain
tight over the short-term.  According to its published financial
statements, as of the end of the first quarter of this year,
Mexicali's cash position was MXN344.67 million, compared with
MXN460.84 registered last year.  As a result, and according to
Moody's estimates of Mexicali's currently outstanding short-term
debt, Moody's expects Mexicali to experience increased
difficulties to repay its short-term creditors in full and on time
by August 31, the original maturity of the two loans.

Mexicali's long-term debt stood at MXN 1,498.5 million pesos at
the end of 2015, representing 68.7% of operating revenues, one of
the highest levels of debt among Mexican-rated municipalities.
Similarly, its net working capital stood at -21.8% of total
expenditures, one of the lowest levels for Mexican municipalities.

The rating downgrade of the enhanced loan reflects the downgrade
of Mexicali's issuer ratings.  While the loan enhancements
continue to provide a three-notches uplift from the global scale
issuer ratings, per Moody's methodology on rating enhanced loans,
the loan ratings are directly linked to the credit quality of the
issuer, which ensures that underlying contract enforcement risks,
economic risks and credit culture risks (for which the issuer
rating acts as a proxy) are embedded in the ratings of the
enhanced loans.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP OR DOWN

Given the review for further downgrade, and its recurrent and
structural expenditure pressures, a rating upgrade is highly
unlikely in the short- and medium-term.  Evidence that Mexicali
has failed to cover its debt payments by the end of August could
result in an additional downgrade.

Positive pressure on the ratings could develop if Mexicali
successfully makes the remaining debt payments on time.  In the
medium term, the ratings could also improve if liquidity improves,
reliance on short-term financing decreases, and the municipality
registers moderately negative or equilibrated gross operating
balances.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Regional and Local
Governments published in January 2013, and Rating Methodology for
Enhanced Municipal and State Loans in Mexico published in June
2014.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Municipality of Mexicali rating is between 01/01/2011
and 12/31/2015.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.


VERACRUZ STATE: Moody's Lowers Issuer Ratings to B1/Baa3.mx
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico downgraded the State of Veracruz's issuer
ratings to B1/Baa3.mx from Ba3/A3.mx and placed the ratings under
review for further downgrade.  At the same time, Moody's
downgraded the debt ratings of these 12 enhanced loans and placed
the ratings under review for further downgrade:

  Banco del Bajio for MXN1500 million (original amount) from
   Baa2/Aa2.mx to Baa3/Aa3.mx
  Banobras for MXN1220 million (original amount) from Baa2/Aa2.mx
   to Baa3/Aa3.mx
  Inbursa for MXN5500 million (original amount) from Baa3/Aa3.mx
   to Ba1/A1.mx
  Banobras for MXN4600 million (original amount) from Baa3/Aa3.mx
   to Ba1/A1.mx
  Banorte for MXN4500 million (original amount) from Baa3/Aa3.mx
   to Ba1/A1.mx
  Banobras (FAIS) for MXN1730 million (original amount) from
   Baa3/Aa3.mx to Ba1/A1.mx
  Interacciones for MXN1500 million (original amount) from
   Baa3/Aa3.mx to Ba1/A1.mx
  Multiva for MXN1500 million (original amount) from Baa3/Aa3.mx
   to Ba1/A1.mx
  Multiva for MXN1300 million (original amount) from Baa3/Aa3.mx
   to Ba1/A1.mx
  Santander for MXN750 million (original amount) from Baa3/Aa3.mx
   to Ba1/A1.mx
  Interacciones for MXN695 million (original amount) from
   Baa3/Aa3.mx to Ba1/A1.mx
  Banamex for MXN500 million (original amount) from Baa3/Aa3.mx to
   Ba1/A1.mx

The review for further downgrade of the state's issuer ratings
reflects the lack of visibility around Veracruz's current
financial position and level of unsecured short-term debt.  During
the review period, Moody's will seek additional information on
both of these elements, including plans to repay outstanding
short-term debt by the Sept. 1, 2016, deadline as per MÇxico's
legislation on regional and local governments' financial
discipline.  Moody's expects to have this information and review
completed shortly prior to September 1.

RATINGS RATIONALE
RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Veracruz's debt covenants require it to present financial
statements.  Contrary to these obligations, Veracruz has failed to
publicly disclose financial statements for the fiscal year 2015
and the first two quarters of 2016.  Crucially, the state has
failed to provide information about its short-term unsecured debt,
increasing the uncertainty around Veracruz's financial position.

Moody's notes that failure to present financial statements could
prompt debt acceleration events, which could in turn impair the
finances of the state.  Moreover, the lack of transparency,
combined with a protracted political transition (a new
administration will take office on Dec. 1, 2016) could result in a
material deterioration of the state's financial results over the
short-term.

In addition to transparency practices that are inferior to Mexican
peers, we expect Veracruz's metrics to be no longer compatible
with Ba3 peers.  Between 2010 and 2014, Veracruz's total debt
increased from 27.3% to 38.2% of total revenues.  As a baseline,
Moody's estimates the state to have registered a deficit
equivalent to -2.4% of total revenues in 2015, taking its debt to
levels closer to 40.4% of total revenues; contrastingly, Ba3
states registered median debt levels of 26.2%and consolidated
surpluses of 1.4% of total revenues in 2015.  Under our baseline
assumption, we expect the state's total debt to increase to 41%
and 43% by 2016 and 2017, respectively, in light of high
expenditure rigidities.  Moody's notes that these forecasts could
be revised substantially once 2015 financial results are turned
in.

The rating downgrade of the enhanced loans reflects the downgrade
of Veracruz's issuer ratings.  While the loan enhancements
continue to provide three- to four-notches uplifts from the global
scale issuer ratings, per Moody's methodology on rating enhanced
loans, the loan ratings are directly linked to the credit quality
of the issuer, which ensures that underlying contract enforcement
risks, economic risks and credit culture risks (for which the
issuer rating acts as a proxy) are embedded in the ratings of the
enhanced loans.

RATIONALE TO PUT THE RATING UNDER REVIEW FOR FURTHER DOWNGRADE

The review for further downgrade reflects the lack of visibility
around Veracruz's unsecured short-term debt.  In particular, we
expect to have visibility on the state's short-term debt shortly
prior September 1, before the deadline for the current
administration to repay short-term loans according to Mexico's
legislation on regional and local governments financial
discipline.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the review for further downgrade, an issuer rating upgrade
is unlikely.  Additionally, we note that the state's ratings could
be further downgraded if we continue to fail to have visibility of
the state's financial position or if the state's financial
position continues to deteriorate further, including worsening net
working capital and increase in debt levels.

In the medium-term, the rating could face positive pressure if the
state improves significantly its accounting practices and if it
registers balanced or positive consolidated results.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Regional and Local
Governments published in January 2013, and Rating Methodology for
Enhanced Municipal and State Loans in Mexico published in June
2014.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine State of Veracruz's rating is between 01/01/2011 and
12/31/2014.



=======
P E R U
=======


PACIFIC ANDES: Citing Stalled Peru Sale, Opposition to Ch. 11 Ups
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Smith at UnderCurrent News reports that several of Pacific
Andes' major lenders believe that the fishing conglomerate is
improperly using US and Peruvian bankruptcy laws to "derail" a
planned sale of its Peruvian assets.

In court filings on July 8, several creditor banks of the 16
Pacific Andes entities that declared bankruptcy in the US on June
30 questioned directors' motivations to have three Peruvian
subsidiaries of the group file for bankruptcy under that country's
laws rather than in the US, according to UnderCurrent News.  The
bankruptcy filings effectively halted a sale of the Peruvian
assets, which was designed to repay Pacific Andes' creditors, the
report notes.

The subsidiaries -- CFG Investment, Corporacion Pesquera Inca
(Copeinca), and Sustainable Fishing Resources -- legally hold the
Pacific Andes group's lucrative fishmeal producing assets and are
owned by Pacific Andes International Holding (PAIH) subsidiary
China Fishery, the report relays.

The Peru subsidiaries, which include the proceeds of the 2013
purchase of Peru's Copeinca, annually produce 300,000 metric tons
of fishmeal and 50,000t of fish oil annually generating $580
million in revenues, Francisco Paniagua, CFG Investment's general
manager said in a filing, the report notes.

But instead of filing under chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code,
the three Peruvian subsidiaries filed for "involuntary" bankruptcy
proceedings in Peru, prompted by Peruvian creditors who are owed
about $1.1 million, or about .01% of the companies' total debt,
four large banks opposed to the US bankruptcy argue, the report
says.

The three Peruvian subsidiaries instead filed under chapter 15 of
the US Bankruptcy Code, which would prompt a court to recognize
the authority of the foreign court. That strikes a consortium of
four Pacific Andes lenders -- Rabobank, Standard Chartered Bank,
CITIC Bank International and DBS Bank -- as improper, the report
relays.

"In his declaration, Mr. Paniagua offered no explanation why the
Peruvian opcos (the three subsidiaries) decided not to join their
affiliates in filing Chapter 11 petitions, thus subjecting the
Peruvian business to this court's jurisdiction along with the
Bankruptcy Code's disclosure requirements and independent
fiduciary oversight," the banks stated in a filing, the report
discloses.

Last year, after a series of defaults on Pacific Andes' debts and
facing petitions from lender HSBC to have liquidators appointed in
Hong Kong and the Cayman Islands to wind up China Fishery, the
group agreed to reforms, the report relays.

The liquidation attempts would stand down as a chief restructuring
officer, Paul Brough -- the former CEO of scandal hit forestry
company Sino Forest and a longtime KPMG executive -- was appointed
to China Fishery. The firm Grant Thornton was hired to review the
company's books, and a sale process for the Peruvian assets would
start, the report notes.

If the sale wasn't complete by July 15, HSBC would regain the
right to have the Caymanian liquidators reappointed, the report
discloses.  The US bankruptcy filings on June 30 aim to forestall
that process, several creditors assert, the report notes.

Additionally, the banks, which have alleged that investigators
have detected over $1 billion in "questionable transactions" and
"substantial" fabrications of revenue and payments in Pacific
Andes' records, believe that Pacific Andes' management "have taken
steps to eliminate independent fiduciary oversight" at the
Peruvian subsidiaries, the report relays.

Mr. Brough wasn't told in advance of the US bankruptcy filings and
quit as he was unable to complete the sale process while Grant
Thonton was terminated, the banks' filing stated, the report
notes.

"The debtors have not indicated, nor is it credible to believe,
that there will be any effective independent fiduciary oversight
with respect to the Peruvian business which is run by the Peruvian
opcos.  Given the lack of transparency and unexplained past
intercompany transfers, the debtors' affirmative steps to
eliminate this oversight is alarming," the filing stated, the
report relays.

Representatives of Pacific Andes did not immediately return a
request seeking comment for this article.

Separate to the four banks' filing, Bank of America, which says it
is owed $27.8 million by subsidiary China Fishery International,
also objected to the group's use of the US bankruptcy courts, the
report says.

The companies' filings give "no indication whatsoever of what they
intend to accomplish, or how -- or even how they will survive the
first 30 days of the case without falling into administrative
insolvency," Bank of America claimed, the report notes.

"Full disclosure is key to the bankruptcy process and to the
debtors' being able to obtain the benefits of the automatic stay,
and thus far they have demonstrated no intention of giving
anything approaching full disclosure," it added, the report
relays.


PERU: IDB OKs $40MM Loan to Promote MSMEs' Innovation and Capacity
------------------------------------------------------------------
Peru will promote micro, small and medium-sized enterprises'
(MSMEs) innovation, technical development and capacity building
with a $40 million loan approved by the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB).

The project will help consolidate recent gains in Peru's policy
and institutional framework as well as the implementation of new
measures to tackle challenges that hamper MSMEs' ability to
innovate, such as lack of financing or qualified personnel,
insufficient access to technological or market information, and
difficulty in finding investment partners.

Over the past decade Peru has posted one of the highest economic
growth rates in Latin America, although research has shown that
some long-term productivity gaps still remain. For example, its
total factor productivity is only 49 percent that of the United
States and 76 percent that of Chile.

With support from the Bank, the country has made major strides
toward establishing a national innovation system through public-
sector capacity building to promote science, technology and
innovation and through a gradual deployment of incentives to boost
investment and innovation. Yet, these processes take time to
consolidate and yield results, so Peru's aggregated investment
levels on innovation are still lagging -- it invests 0.15 percent
of its gross domestic product in research and development (R+D)
activities, compared with 0.78 in Latin America as a whole and 2.4
percent in OECD countries.

Additionally, recent research on perceptions regarding in the
ability of Peruvian companies to innovate has revealed an
underappreciation of the effects of adopting initiatives in
science and technology. Consequently, the project includes actions
aimed at improving the social perception of these key features
throughout the country.

"Increasing human capital is vital to develop the innovation
system. This program will fund courses leading to bachelor's and
master's degrees to support entrepreneurs', innovation managers'
and other key players' capacity building," IDB project team leader
Claudia Suazn†bar said.

The IDB's $40 million loan is for an 11-year term, with an 11-year
grace period, at a LIBOR-based interest rate and will be disbursed
over seven years. The executing agency will be the Production
Ministry (PRODUCE) through the National Innovation Program for
Competitiveness and Productivity (PNICP). The project includes $60
million in local counterpart funding.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 11, 2016 Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its
'B+' issue-level rating and recovery rating of '3H' to CEMEX
S.A.B. de C.V's (global scale: B+/Positive/--; national scale:
mxBBB/Positive/mxA-2) $500 million dollar-denominated senior
secured notes due 2026.  The recovery rating of '3H' indicates
that bondholders can expect a meaningful (50% to 70%; the higher
band of the range) recovery in the event of a payment default.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Fresh From Record Default, Plots Bond-Market Return
----------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske at Bloomberg News writes that Puerto Rico just
defaulted on about $1 billion due to bondholders, has declared its
debts too crushing to pay and is about to undergo an unprecedented
financial takeover by the U.S. government.  So what's next on the
agenda? Finding investors willing to lend it $900 million.

The Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority wants to issue the debt
through a new agency to finance construction work delayed by the
government's fiscal crisis, according to Bloomberg News.  As an
inducement to skeptics, the agency would give investors first
claim on revenue it collects from water and sewer bills, according
to Efrain Acosta, the director of finance for the utility,
Bloomberg News notes.  It may also exchange an additional $1.1
billion of securities for its outstanding bonds to investors
willing to accept less than they're owed, Bloomberg News relays.

"The market is tough at this moment," Mr. Acosta said in an
interview.  "But we have to go forward with our plan and see if we
can get new money to pay our contractors and try to restart our
construction plan," he added.

Bloomberg News notes that Puerto Rico faces considerable
obstacles, even in a market where rock-bottom yields have left
buyers willing to take on more risk for bigger returns.  The U.S.
territory hasn't sold bonds since it borrowed $3.5 billion in
March 2014, a deal that was supposed to give it time to arrest the
financial decline, and a planned $750 million offering by the
water utility last year was subsequently shelved, Bloomberg News
says.

Moreover, it's unclear how a federal oversight board, which hasn't
been appointed yet, will treat bondholders as the island seeks to
cut its debt, Bloomberg News notes.

"The whole situation's kind of confusing," said Daniel Solender,
who oversees $19 billion, including Puerto Rico securities, as
head of municipals at Lord Abbett & Co. in Jersey City, New
Jersey.  "On the one hand, they're defaulting on bonds and they're
declaring moratoriums and then they want to have market access for
a new issue," he added.

Bloomberg News relates that with an economy mired in recession,
Puerto Rico has been defaulting on a growing share of its $70
billion debt, which Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla says can't
be paid without draconian budget cuts that would fall heavily on
the island's 3.5 million residents.

After Puerto Rico made little progress in talks with creditors,
President Barack Obama on June 30 enacted a law that will give a
seven-member board power to review budgets and any debt
restructuring, Bloomberg News notes.  The next day, the island
defaulted on nearly half of $2 billion of principal and interest
that was due, marking the biggest payment failure ever in the U.S.
municipal-bond market, Bloomberg News says.  The water utility,
known as Prasa, negotiated with creditors to delay $12.7 million
that it was supposed to pay, Bloomberg News discloses.

Other distressed borrowers, such as Detroit and Jefferson County,
Alabama, have been able to return to the bond market, but only
after going through bankruptcy to wipe out some of their debts.
Puerto Rico doesn't have recourse to Chapter 9 and its crisis is
far from resolved, Bloomberg News relays.  The federal board will
help the commonwealth end chronic budget deficits, monitor any
borrowings and will be able to force reluctant creditors to accept
a deal in court. Obama has until Sept. 15 to form the panel.

The move to help rescue Puerto Rico has been welcomed by most
bondholders because it promises to resolve the crisis.  Prasa debt
maturing July 2042, the utility's most actively traded, changed
hands July 11 at an average price of about 67 cents on the dollar,
up from 62.7 cents at the start of 2016, data compiled by
Bloomberg show.  The yield was about 8.4 percent.

The bill passed by the legislature that would allow Prasa to issue
debt has yet to be sent to Garcia Padilla for his signature,
Bloomberg News notes.  Any deal would probably happen after the
board is in place, Prasa's Acosta said, notes the report.  To get
cash in the meantime, the utility may try to sell notes that would
be repaid after the bonds are sold, Bloomberg News relays.

In addition to selling new debt, the utility would offer investors
a chance to exchange their securities at a 15 percent loss, Mr.
Acosta said, Bloomberg News notes.  The new bonds would be backed
by a pledge of as much as 20 percent of the utility's revenue, he
added.  Prasa has about $4.7 billion of debt.

The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority in December reached a
similar agreement, with creditors accepting a loss in exchange for
securities with stronger legal protections, Bloomberg News
recalls.   It may be possible for Prasa to do the same, said Matt
Dalton, chief executive officer of Rye Brook, New York-based Belle
Haven Investments, which oversees $5 billion of municipal bonds,
including insured Puerto Rico debt, Bloomberg News notes.

"If it's iron clad, it's locked up and it's attractive, at the
right price you can pull people out of the shadows," the report
quoted Mr. Dalton as saying.

Whether that's possible may depend largely on the oversight board,
Bloomberg New notes.

Investors will probably want to know how it's going to treat
bondholders first, said Molly Shellhorn, a senior research analyst
in Chicago at Nuveen Asset Management, which holds $120 billion of
municipal debt, including insured Puerto Rico securities,
Bloomberg News discloses.  "I just have a hard time seeing that go
forward outside the oversight board," Mr. Shellhorn added.

                         *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on June 15,
2016, that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Puerto Rico law
that would have let its public utilities restructure their debt
over the objection of creditors leaving it to Congress to help the
island resolve its fiscal crisis.  Siding with bondholders
challenging the law, the court ruled 5-2 that the measure was
barred under federal bankruptcy law.

Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority in the 5-to-2
decision, said the law was at odds with the federal bankruptcy
code, which bars states and lower units of government from
enacting their own versions of bankruptcy law.

Puerto Rico is struggling with $72 billion in debt and has argued
that it needs to restructure at least some of it under Chapter 9,
the part of the bankruptcy code for insolvent local governments.
But Puerto Rico is not permitted to do so, because Chapter 9
specifically excludes it.

The federal law, Justice Thomas wrote, "bars Puerto Rico from
enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure the
debt of its insolvent public utilities." Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer and
Elena Kagan joined him.

Consequently, Puerto Rico opted to default on $911 million in
constitutionally guaranteed debt, or roughly half of the $2
billion in principal and interest that came due July 1, EFE News
reported.

The reported further noted that Puerto Rico enacted a debt
moratorium due to liquidity restraints -- a move that coincided
with a new U.S. law signed by President Obama that installs a
financial control board to restructure the island's debt and
provides a retroactive stay on lawsuits by bondholders.

On July 11, 2016, the TCR-LA reported that S&P Global Ratings has
downgraded the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's general obligation
secured debt to 'D' (default) from 'CC' following the
commonwealth's default.

On July 7, 2016, Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from
'C' and general obligation (GO) bond rating to 'D' from 'C'
following the payment default on certain GO bonds on July 1, 2016.
Both ratings are removed from Rating Watch. Ratings on securities
that have not defaulted will remain at 'C' until the point of
default. The ratings on non-defaulted bonds remain on Rating Watch
Negative.


SAN JUAN PROPERTIES: Case Summary & 4 Unsecured Creditors
---------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: San Juan Properties Inc.
         PO Box 365066
         San Juan, PR 00936
         Tel: 787 759-8090

Case No.: 16-05397

Nature of Business: Single Asset Real Estate

Chapter 11 Petition Date: July 7, 2016

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Judge: Hon. Mildred Caban Flores

Debtor's Counsel: Emily Darice Davila Rivera, Esq.
                  EMILY D DAVILA LAW FIRM
                  420 Ponce Leon Midtown Suite 311
                  San Juan, PR 00918
                  Tel: 787 753-2368
                  Fax: 787 759-9620
                  E-mail: davilalawe@prtc.net

Estimated Assets: $1 million to $10 million

Estimated Liabilities: $1 million to $10 million
The petition was signed by Rolando Avila, president.
A list of the Debtor's 20 largest unsecured creditors --
containing 4 entries -- is available for free at:

                 http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb16-05397.pdf


SPORTS AUTHORITY: Elise Frejka Appointed as Fee Examiner
--------------------------------------------------------
A federal judge appointed an official to review fee applications
filed by attorneys and other bankruptcy professionals retained in
the Chapter 11 case of Sports Authority Holdings Inc.
Judge Mary Walrath of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware
appointed Elise Frejka of Frejka PLLC as fee examiner in Sports
Authority's bankruptcy case.

The bankruptcy judge also approved the proposed procedures for
reviewing fee requests, according to a court filing.

A fee examiner serves to aid the bankruptcy court in reviewing fee
requests by attorneys, financial advisors, and others whose
services have been retained to resolve questions involved in a
bankruptcy case.

                  About Sports Authority Holdings

Sports Authority Holdings, et al., are sporting goods retailers
with roots dating back to 1928. The Debtors currently operate 464
stores and five distribution centers across 40 U.S. states and
Puerto Rico. The Debtors offer a broad selection of goods from a
wide array of household and specialty brands, including Adidas,
Asics, Brooks, Columbia, FitBit, Hanesbrands, Icon Health and
Fitness, Nike, The North Face, and Under Armour, in addition to
their own private label brands. The Debtors employ 13,000 people.

Sports Authority and six of its affiliates filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10527 to
16-10533) on March 2, 2016. The petitions were signed by Michael
E. Foss as chairman & chief executive officer.

The Debtors have engaged Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP as general
counsel, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as co-counsel,
Rothschild Inc. as investment banker, FTI Consulting, Inc., as
financial advisor and Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as notice,
claims, solicitation, balloting and tabulation agent.

Andrew Vara, Acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, appointed seven
creditors of Sports Authority Holdings Inc. to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors. Lawyers at Pachulski
Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP represent the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Seizes and Re-opens Kimberly-Clark Factory
-----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the government of Venezuela has said it has
seized a factory owned by the US firm Kimberly-Clark.

The firm had said it was halting operations in Venezuela as it was
unable to obtain raw materials, according to BBC News.

But the labor minister said that the factory closure was illegal
and it had re-opened "in the hands of the workers".  Kimberly-
Clark, which makes hygiene products including tissues and nappies,
said it had acted appropriately, BBC News notes.

The report relays that over the weekend it became the latest
multinational to close or scale back operations in the country,
citing strict currency controls, a lack of raw materials and
soaring inflation.

General Mills, Procter & Gamble and other corporations have
reduced operations in Venezuela as the country is gripped by
economic crisis and widespread shortages of basic household goods,
the report discloses.

                   What Has Gone Wrong in Venezuela?

Labor Minister Oswaldo Vera, from the ruling Socialist Party
(PSUV), visited the factory in Maracay and said it was illegal.
Almost 1,000 workers had asked him to re-start production, he
said, the report notes.

The report relays that Mr. Vera said: "Kimberly-Clark will
continue producing, now in the hands of the workers.  "We've just
turned on the first engine."

The Texas-based company said in a statement: "If the Venezuelan
government takes control of Kimberly-Clark facilities and
operations, it will be responsible for the well-being of the
workers and the physical asset, equipment and machinery in the
facilities going forward," the report notes.

              Venezuelans Cross in to Colombia to Buy Food

There are daily protests against shortages at the moment in
Venezuela, the report relays.

A growing opposition blames President Nicolas Maduro of wrecking
the oil-rich economy and is seeking a referendum to remove him,
the report notes.

Mr. Maduro has previously threatened to jail the owners of
factories that have stopped production, the report discloses.

A private supermarket chain and an electronic goods shop have been
seized in recent years after Mr. Maduro accused many businessmen
of conducting an economic war in collusion with the country's
opposition, the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding,
electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited
without prior written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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