TCRLA_Public/160719.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Tuesday, July 19, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 141


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Judge Orders Cash Seized From Fernandez's Daughter
BUENOS AIRES: S&P Affirms 'B-' Ratings, Outlook Stable
TOYOTA COMPANIA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 LC Global Sr. Debt Rating


B R A Z I L

BANRISUL: Moody's Puts Ba2 Rating on Review for Downgrade
INVEPAR: Moody's Lowers CFR to B2, Outlook Remains Negative
SAMARCO MINERACAO: Brazil Prosecutors Open Criminal Probe Into CEO
SAMARCO MINERACAO: Fitch Cuts Senior Unsecured Debt Ratings to 'C'
* S&P Takes Multiple Rating Actions on 7 Brazilian Insurers


C U B A

CUBA: Economy Minister Removed From Post


P U E R T O    R I C O

EIA TROPICAL: Taps Hector Eduardo Pedrosa-Luna as Legal Counsel
FARMACIA SAN JUSTO: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
GALLERY MOTORS: Disclosures Okayed, Plan Hearing on Nov. 15
MAGNO TIRE: Plan Outline Okayed, Plan Hearing on August 24
WILLIAM CONTRACTOR: Zalduondo, Machicote's Bid to Dismiss Denied

WILLIAM CONTRACTOR: Suit vs. Mercado, et al., Dismissed


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CL FIN'L: Prime Minister Must Act on Clico, Claimant Group Says


U R U G U A Y

HDI SEGUROS: Moody's Gives Ba2 Insurance Financial Strength Rating


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Reopens Colombian Border to Allow Shoppers to Cross


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Judge Orders Cash Seized From Fernandez's Daughter
-------------------------------------------------------------
Associated Press reports that a judge ordered the seizure of more
than $4.6 million from a bank safe deposit box belonging to former
Argentinian President Cristina Fernandez's daughter as part of an
investigation into alleged money laundering.

Ms. Fernandez called the probe "a media stunt" and said the money
belongs to her family, according to Associated Press.  She said it
came from changing savings in pesos to dollars and that she
recently declared the sum to authorities, the report notes.

Argentine authorities had opened the box belonging to Ms.
Fernandez's daughter, Florencia Kirchner, at the request of the
daughter in an effort to clear her name, the report relays.

The ruling by Judge Julian Ercolini included two other bank
accounts and came after a request by a local prosecutor, the
report relays.  Ms. Ercolini said in a statement that the seizure
was needed "to preserve the state of things" and to ensure that
the money "cannot be altered or modified," the report notes

"That the funds in question have been duly declared is irrelevant
because in the maneuvers being investigated, what is being
discussed is its origin," said Ms. Ercolini, who is also
investigating construction businessmen with close ties to
Fernandez's family as part of a widening probe into allegations of
money laundering, the report relays.

The judge is trying to determine whether Fernandez's family
received payments through hotels it owns in southern Argentina
from businessmen who benefited from the granting of public works
contracts, the report discloses.  Prosecutors say the alleged
scheme would have allowed the money to be laundered, the report
relays.

Local lawmaker Margarita Stolbizer recently asked authorities to
look into "suspicious movements" in the accounts and safe box
belonging to the former president's daughter, the report notes.

Argentine media showed images of blocks of cash from the box,
which has stirred criticism of Fernandez's 26-year-old daughter,
the report says.

Ms. Kirchner said that the money is partly from the inheritance
left by her father, former President Nestor Kirchner, who died in
2010, the report notes.

"I asked them to open them because I have nothing to hide," she
said on social media.

She added that all the cash had been previously stated in sworn
declarations as well as before Argentina's anti-corruption office,
the report relays. "The legal proceedings against my family breach
all the laws," she added.

Corruption allegations swirled around Fernandez during her eight
years in the presidency. Since leaving office in December, she has
also been included in investigations involving allegations of
state fraud and possible illegal enrichment, the report adds.

                          *     *     *

On April 19, 2016, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Moody's Investors Service upgraded on April 15,
2016, Argentina's government bond rating to B3 from Caa1, with the
outlook changed to stable from positive.  The key drivers for the
upgrade are (i) Moody's expectation that Argentina will settle
holdout creditor claims which will result in a lifting of court
injunctions and clear the way for Argentina to access
international capital markets, as well as the likelihood that
Argentina will make payments to restructured bondholders increased
significantly following an April 13, US circuit court ruling in
favor of Argentina, and (ii) the economic policy improvements
since Mauricio Macri's administration took office last December.
The new government lifted capital controls and allowed the peso to
float more freely, reduced energy and transportation subsidies and
has begun to address longstanding macroeconomic imbalances.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.

On March 24, 2016, Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina's Long-
term local-currency Issuer Default Rating (LT LC IDR) to 'B' from
'CCC', with a Stable Outlook. Fitch has affirmed Argentina's Long-
term foreign-currency (FC) IDR at 'RD' and the short-term FC IDR
at 'RD'. In addition, Fitch has upgraded the Country Ceiling to
'B' from 'CCC'.


BUENOS AIRES: S&P Affirms 'B-' Ratings, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' foreign and local currency
ratings on the province of Buenos Aires (PBA).  The outlook
remains stable.

                            RATIONALE

PBA's 'B-' ratings and 'b-' stand-along credit profile (SACP;
which is a means of assessing the intrinsic creditworthiness of
PBA under the assumption that there is no rating cap) reflect its
individual credit profile and the institutional framework in which
it operates.  PBA, like all local and regional governments (LRGs)
in Argentina, operates under a very volatile and underfunded
institutional framework.  At the same time, PBA's very weak
budgetary performance and flexibility, and its weak economy,
financial management, and liquidity are rating constraints.  On
the other hand, the province's moderate contingent liabilities and
debt burden support its creditworthiness.

Governor Maria Eugenia Vidal of the Cambiemos political coalition
took office in December 2015.  Cambiemos' victory marks an
important political shift, given that this is the party's first
time holding this office after 28 years under the Partido
Justicialista (PJ) party.  However, Cambiemos lacks a majority in
PBA's legislative branch, which requires the administration to
rely on political negotiations with other political parties to
advance its agenda.  Ms. Vidal previously served as vice mayor of
the city of Buenos Aires under the Mauricio Macri, who was elected
as a president in late 2015.  S&P expects the relationship between
the provincial and national governments to be strong over the next
four years.  As a demonstration of this support, since December
2015, the national government has provided financial assistance to
the province, advanced coparticipation funds, and helped PBA close
a deal with the teacher unions in February 2016 by financing part
of a salary increase to start the school year on time.

Although S&P views the renewed relationship between the PBA and
national governments positively, it highlights the province's
fiscal dependency on the latter and the lack of policies that
guarantee this support as part of PBA's financial framework.  Part
of the structural gap originates from the outdated structure of
Argentina's tax-sharing coparticipation scheme and nominal caps on
other funds, such as transfers from the Fondo Conurbano.
Nevertheless, S&P expects that these gaps will be politically
difficult to resolve given that changes to the coparticipation
scheme require unanimous approval by all provinces and changes to
the Fondo Conurbano that benefit PBA would likely require other
provinces to forsake part of their share.  In addition, although
the province has recently implemented spending efficiency
measures, high inflation and choppy economic performance hinder
its long-term financial planning, budgeting process, and
predictability of revenue and expenditures.

PBA has a weak economy, in S&P's opinion.  S&P estimates that the
province's GDP per capita will reach close to $9,600 in 2016,
which S&P expects will be lower than the national $12,940 GDP per
capita.  Although PBA has a diversified economic structure, it
hasn't insulated the province from economic slowdown over the past
couple of years.  And S&P expects this to be the case during this
year's slight economic contraction of around 1% stemming from the
regional and global soft economy.  The national government's
fiscal and monetary tightening will also likely contribute to the
weak national and provincial economy in 2016.  S&P expects
economic recovery-a 3.1% growth-in 2017.  PBA's economy is
vulnerable to regional and global risks, given that the province's
exports represent around 14% of its economy.  In particular,
exports to Brazil represent 35% of the province's total exports,
while exports to China represent 8%.  Also, PBA will continue to
contend with high inflation over the next several years.  S&P
expects the latter at 42% in 2016 as a result of the nominal
depreciation of the Argentine peso and the impact of tariff
increases.

In S&P's opinion, PBA's budgetary flexibility is very weak.  The
province's capital spending dropped over the past several years
because the previous administration prioritized the operating
spending needs amid uncertain access to external financing.  Over
the past two years, capital spending averaged 3.7% of total
spending, low by both national and global standards.  While S&P
expects public-works spending to pick up in the next three years,
given that the province has greater access to external financing
and the new administration is focusing on investment, S&P expects
it will take some time for this spending to recover.  S&P expects
capex to reach just above 5% of total spending by 2018.  However,
PBA is pressured to raise its operating spending due to high
inflation and ongoing demands for public-sector wage increases to
cope with inflation.  S&P expects PBA's own-source revenue to
average 70% of total operating revenue until 2018.  S&P believes
that the province's ability to increase its own revenue is limited
owing to the economic slump and tax modifications over the past
several years.

Budgetary performance weakened sharply in 2015 as operating
spending significantly outpaced operating revenue.  The province
posted an operating deficit of 5.9% of operating revenue, compared
with a 1.7% surplus in 2014 as operating revenue rose 36% in
nominal terms while operating expenditures by 46%, following a 50%
increase in the provincial government's payroll.  At the same
time, PBA posted a deficit after capital revenue and expenditures
of 7.8% of total revenue in 2015, compared with a 0.4% surplus in
2014.  Although S&P expects the province's budgetary performance
to remain very weak, it will likely to improve over the next three
years as growth picks up and as the administration is likely to
restrain the growth of operating spending.  S&P expects the
province's operating deficit will be 1.2% and deficit after
capital revenue and spending of 4.3% by 2018.  S&P also expects
PBA's budgetary performance to be volatile over the next three
years because S&P expects the annual growth in prices to remain in
the double digits through 2018.

S&P assesses the province's debt burden as moderate, representing
45.4% of operating revenue at the end of 2015.  At the same time,
we believe that PBA's contingent liabilities are moderate.
Although debt level have been declining in relative terms over the
past six years as operating revenue has risen sharply due to high
inflation, S&P expects debt to begin to rise in both nominal and
relative terms in 2016 as the province begins to issue higher
levels of debt in both the international and domestic capital
markets, as well as increasingly tap financing from multilateral
organizations.  Partly due to the $2.25 billion international bond
issuances in the first half of 2016, S&P expects PBA's debt level
to increase slightly to 47.6% of operating revenue for the year
and to continue rising through 2018, although remain at moderate
levels.  As of the end of March 2016, the province's debt totaled
ARP153.3 billion, of which around 64% was denominated in foreign
currency.  Adverse exchange rate movements could continue to raise
total debt as S&P expects continued depreciation of the Argentine
peso over the next couple of years.

Liquidity

PBA's liquidity is weak, in S&P's opinion.  The province's recent
debt issuances improved its liquidity in the short term and
relieved the province's near-term liquidity needs.  However, S&P
believes that PBA's free cash (cash that's not required to meet
daily operating needs or planned capital costs) and its internal
cash flow generation capability are limited due to a deficit after
capital accounts of 7.4% of total revenue.  S&P also expects the
province's debt service cost to be ARP27 billion in 2016.  Despite
the province's obtainment of significant levels of financing in
early 2016 from national and international sources, S&P believes
that PBA's access to external liquidity is uncertain because of
S&P's evaluation of the ongoing development of domestic capital
markets as well as S&P's assessment of the domestic banking
system.  For the latter, S&P's Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA) is at group '9'.  S&P's BICRAs, which evaluate
and compare global banking systems, are grouped on a scale from
'1' to '10', ranging from what S&P views as the lowest-risk
banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').

The province doesn't face any large capital amortization payments
over the next 12 months because its next bullet amortization of
its $475 million bond is due 2018, followed by a $500 million bond
amortization in 2019.  Additionally, since 2012, PBA has faced
semi-annual interest and capital payments of its discount bond due
April 2017.

                              OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on PBA mirrors the one on the sovereign.  The
outlook reflects renewed dialogue between LRGs and the federal
government about tackling fiscal and economic challenges in the
short to medium term.  Given that S&P don't believe that PBA could
meet the conditions to have a higher rating than the sovereign,
S&P would only consider raising its ratings on the province in the
next 12 months if S&P was to raise Argentina's foreign and local
currency ratings, along with the transfer and convertibility
assessment (T&C).  Such an upgrade would have to be accompanied by
a growing track record of the province's satisfactory long-term
capital and financial planning, as well as improved budgetary
flexibility or consistently stronger budgetary performance in the
form of operating surpluses.  At the same time, structural
improvements in the institutional framework, in which the province
operates, could help improve its creditworthiness.  On the other
hand, S&P could lower the ratings on PBA during the same period if
Argentina's T&C assessment weakens, if S&P was to lower the
sovereign local or foreign currency ratings, or if S&P perceives
that the province's financial commitments are unsustainable or
that PBA faces a near-term payment crisis.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Buenos Aires (Province of)
Issuer Credit Rating                   B-/Stable/--
Senior Unsecured                       B-


TOYOTA COMPANIA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 LC Global Sr. Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A.
assigned a Ba3 local currency global senior debt rating and a
Aaa.ar national scale debt rating to Toyota Compania Financiera de
Argentina S.A.(TCFA)'s expected issuance up to ARS100 million of
senior notes.  The issuance, which will be due in one year, is
under Toyota's ARS200 million short-term senior unsecured program.
All the ratings have stable outlook.

These ratings were assigned to Toyota Compa┬žia Financiera de
Argentina:

  ARS100 million Senior Unsecured Debt Issuance:
  Ba3 Global Local Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating
  Aaa.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Senior Unsecured
   Debt Rating

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba3 global local currency senior debt and deposit ratings are
constrained by Argentina's local currency country ceiling of Ba3,
and reflect the very high probability that Toyota's ultimate
parent, Toyota Motor Corporation (Japan) (Aa3 stable), will
support the issuer, whose standalone credit quality is reflected
by its b3 BCA.  Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
parental support considers TCFA's key role as the financial agent
for Toyota Corporation in Argentina and its strong commercial and
strategic importance to the corporation.  Thanks to parental
support, the company remains one of the strongest credits in
Argentina despite significant credit challenges that constrain
TCFA's BCA and its debt ratings relative to global peers.

The BCA considers the considers the still challenging operating
environment in Argentina together with TCFA's monoline business
model and the increasing level of competition within the car-
financing industry in Argentina. Argentina's operating environment
has improved since the new administration took office in December
2015 and softened or eliminated various burdensome government
controls on the financial system which should help support
earnings.  Nevertheless, the country continues to face significant
economic challenges, including high inflation and weak economic
activity.  While non-performing loans remain low given the
company's focus on middle and high-income individuals, delinquency
levels in the market may rise given the current economic
situation.  However, the company's loans are well collateralized
due to generally conservative underwriting standards as well as
the impact of the high rate of inflation, as a consequence of
which cars hold their value in nominal terms.  The ratings also
include the company's strong capitalization levels together with
the risk associated with a liability structure mainly reliant on
market funds, as is the case of other automobile finance
companies.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The entity's rating could face upward pressure if Argentina's bond
rating is upgraded or if Argentina's operating environment
continues to improve.  On the other hand, the rating could go down
if the probability of affiliate support declines, or if the
operating environment deteriorates, affecting TCFA's business
prospects.

Toyota Compania Financiera de Argentina S.A. is headquartered in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, with assets of ARS2.37 billion and equity
of ARS237 million as of March 2016.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANRISUL: Moody's Puts Ba2 Rating on Review for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for downgrade Banco do
Estado do Rio Grande Do Sul S.A. (Banrisul's) long-term global and
national scale local- currency deposit rating of Ba2 and Aa3.br
and foreign currency subordinate debt rating of Ba3, as well as
the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba2 and its long-
term counterparty risk assessment of Ba1(cr).  The bank's other
ratings were not affected by this action.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings were placed under review to consider the precise
impact that the bank's recent acquisition of the right to provide
payroll services for state employees for BRL 1,251 million will
have on the bank's capitalization levels and recurring
profitability in the context of its increasing asset risk.  The
review will also consider the probability that the bank will be
able to replenish at least some portion of this reduction in
capital over the coming quarters, together with the prospects for
its asset quality.

As the right to provide these services is an intangible asset,
Moody's deducts it from its tangible common equity (TCE) measure
of capitalization.  Based on first quarter 2016 results, this
would lead to a substantial fall in the bank's ratio of TCE to
risk weighted assets (RWA), bringing this ratio to approximately
7.9% down from 10.4%.

The acquisition will also lead to lower net income as the Banrisul
will no longer earn interest income on the cash used for payment,
while the purchase price will be amortized over 10 years.  The
transaction comes at a time when the bank's asset quality has
continued to show signs of deterioration, with the bank's problem
loan to gross loans ratio rising by 60 basis points in the first
three months of the year alone.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

The review could result in a downgrade if the bank's TCE/RWA falls
below 8% as a result of the transaction, taking into consideration
its second quarter results, and it does not appear likely to
recover to that level over the next 12-18 months.  Continued
increases in asset risk could also put downward pressure on the
rating.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

While upward pressures on Banrisul's ratings is unlikely as they
are on review for downgrade, the ratings could be confirmed at
current levels if Moody's concludes that the bank will generate
and retain sufficient earnings that would lead to have adjusted
capital levels of at least 8% within 12-18 months and asset risk
is not likely to continue rising.

These ratings for Banco do Estado do Rio Grande Do Sul S.A. were
placed on review for downgrade:

   -- Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba2
   -- Subordinate debt rating of Ba3
   -- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aa3.br
   -- Baseline credit assessment of ba2
   -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba2
   -- Long-term counterparty Risk Assessment, of Ba1(cr)

Outlook Actions:

  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

The last rating action on Banco do Estado do Rio Grande Do Sul
S.A. was on May 11, 2016, when Moody's repositioned the bank's
long-term Brazilian national scale rating at Aa3.br, in view of
the recalibration of the national rating scale methodology.  All
other ratings remained unchanged.

Banco do Estado do Rio Grande Do Sul is headquartered in Porto
Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul.  The bank reported total assets of
BRL66 billion ($19.6 billion) and equity of BRL6.3 billion
($1.8 billion) as of March 31, 2016.


INVEPAR: Moody's Lowers CFR to B2, Outlook Remains Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina downgraded the corporate family ratings of
Invepar - Investimentos e Participacoes em Infraestrutura S.A. to
B2 from B1 on the global scale, and to Ba2.br from Baa2.br on the
national scale.  The outlook remains negative.

                         RATING RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects Moody's expectation that Invepar's credit
metrics will continue to deteriorate over the next 6-12 months,
driven by the negative effects that Brazil's economic recession
exerts on Invepar's concessions and in particular on its single
largest concession the Guarulhos Airport ("GRU", unrated).

Declines in domestic air passenger volumes and in sales at the
airport retail shops has led the GRU concession to perform below
Invepar's initial expectations set out at the time of the 2012
auction, leading the company to announce it will not make the full
concession rights payment under the contract, scheduled on 11 July
2016.  Moody's understands that the granting authority, the
government of Brazil (Ba2 negative) has recently authorized all
Brazilian airport concessions - including GRU - to delay the
concession fee payment by six months until December, in exchange
for the payment of a 2% penalty under the concession contract.
Moody's expects that the federal government, a 49% stakeholder in
the GRU concession, will continue to support Invepar regarding its
concession fee obligations.

However the agency views the concession fee payment delay as a
further indication of GRU's on-going deterioration in operating
performance.  While some of Invepar's other businesses, in
particular the mature concessions such as Metro Rio (Ba2/Aa1.br,
negative) and LAMSA (Ba2/Aa2.br, negative) have continued to
contribute positively to Invepar's cash flow generation despite
weak traffic trends, the negative outlook reflects Moody's
expectations that the company's credit metrics will deteriorate
further going forward, in line with the drop in FFO to Debt to -
0.1% in the last twelve months ended 30 March 2016 from 1.9%
during 2015; and in cash interest coverage to 1.0x from 1.4x.

Moody's views Invepar's liquidity position as weak.  As of
March 30, 2016, the company had around BRL 1.9 billion in
financial debt to repay within the 12 next months (including BRL
0.6 billion of debt paid during Q2).  This compares to a negative
free cash flow generation of BRL 1.1 billion in the LTM to March
2016.  In this context Moody's expects that Invepar's ability to
repay debt, and make the upcoming concession fee payment in
December will primarily depend on its ability to refinance debt
and/or to find alternative sources of funding.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

In light of the most recent rating action and the negative
outlook, an upgrade of the rating is unlikely in the near term.  A
ratings downgrade could result from a further deterioration in
Invepar's operating performance such that FFO to Debt is expected
to remain negative or interest coverage is expected to remain
below 1x on a sustainable basis.  Negative pressure could also
arise should Invepar face challenges in covering its upcoming debt
maturities and concession fees payments on a timely basis, either
with internally generated cash flows or via alternative sources of
funding.  Evidence that government support has weakened would also
exert negative pressure on the assigned ratings.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Invepar is a holding company
controlled by the three largest Brazilian pension funds (PREVI,
FUNCEF and PETROS) and by the creditors of Group OAS (not rated)
which is current under judicial reorganization.  Invepar's current
portfolio of concessions consists of (i) urban mobility projects
(MetroRio (Ba2/ Aa1.br, negative), VLT (tramway in the city of
Rio), (ii) regional toll roads (LAMSA Ba2/Aa2.br, negative),
CART(B1/Baa3.br, negative), CBN (B1, Baa2.br negative),CLN, CRT,
and CRA (all unrated) ; and (iii) the GRU airport concession.

In the last twelve months ended on March 31, 2016, using Moody's
standard adjustments Invepar reported consolidated net revenues
(excluding construction revenues) of BRL3,5 billion, EBITDA
(including interest income) of BRL1,9 billion and Total Debt of
BRL23,9 billion (including the GRU concession payments).


SAMARCO MINERACAO: Brazil Prosecutors Open Criminal Probe Into CEO
------------------------------------------------------------------
Marta Nogueira at Reuters reports that Brazilian federal
prosecutors said they opened an investigation into alleged
environmental crimes by Roberto Carvalho, chief executive of iron-
ore mining company Samarco Mineracao SA, over a deadly damburst
last year.

According to a statement released by prosecutors, Samarco, a 50-50
joint venture between Brazil's Vale SA and Australia's BHP
Billiton Ltd, has failed to fully implement emergency
precautionary measures ordered by Brazil's environmental
protection agency Ibama in the wake of the October 2015 tailings
dam burst, Reuters notes.

In what has been billed the worst environmental disaster in
Brazil's history, the flood of iron-rich mud killed 19 people,
wiped out several towns and polluted hundreds of kilometers
(miles) of rivers in Brazil's Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo
states, according to Reuters.

The opening of an investigation is the latest set back for plans
to re-open Samarco, restore lost jobs in the region and help it
raise cash for an estimated BRL20 billion ($6.13 million) clean-up
plan, Reuters says.

Brazilian prosecutors have attacked the plan, agreed to with the
federal government in March, as too small and lacking specifics.
Samarco's mine is not expected to reopen before mid 2017, Reuters
discloses.

"The omissive acts of the chief executive could be categorized as
environmental crimes," the prosecutors said in the statement
obtained by the news agency.

According to Ibama and the prosecutors, Samarco has failed to
properly contain 24.8 million cubic meters (875.8 million cubic
feet) of mine tailings -- enough to fill 10,000 Olympic swimming
pools -- that remain spread over the disaster area and have not
been flushed away by rains or floods, Reuters notes.

The amount represents more than three quarters of the total amount
of muddy mine tailings that spilled out of the broken dam, the
report discloses.

The containment structures built by Samarco are insufficient, the
prosecutors said and will allow 2.8 million cubic meters (98.9
million cubic feet) of muddy tailings to be swept into rivers
downstream by as early as March 2017, the report relays.

Of the 11 measures ordered on Samarco by Ibama, four were
partially implemented and the rest were totally ignored,
prosecutors said, the report notes.

They added that Vale and BHP are considered co-responsible for the
disaster as owners of the company, the report adds.


SAMARCO MINERACAO: Fitch Cuts Senior Unsecured Debt Ratings to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT
FC) and Local Currency (LT LC) Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and
senior unsecured debt ratings of Samarco Mineracao S.A. (Samarco)
to 'C' from 'CCC'. Fitch has also downgraded Samarco's National
Long-Term Ratings to 'C(bra)' from 'CCC(bra)' and senior unsecured
notes to 'CC/RR3' from 'CCC/RR4'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade is due to a change in Fitch's view of the timing
regarding the restart of Samarco's operations. Given the political
climate surrounding the company and an inability to gain traction
in obtaining the necessary licenses to restart its business, Fitch
now believes that the company will not restart operations until
the second half of 2017. Previously, Fitch assumed that Samarco's
operations would be able to restart during the first half of 2017.

The 'C' rating reflects Fitch's view that Samarco will be forced
to request a standstill or restructure its debt within the next
couple of months, as the company seeks to preserve cash for
expenses related to obtaining operating permits. It is not likely
that government officials will release cash that is trapped by
authorities, which would mitigate some of the cash flow pressure
the company faces.

Fitch's RR3 recovery rating for the company's bonds reflect above
average recovery prospects. For this to occur, the company will
need to be able to restart operations at the level of 50% or more
of current capacity. If Samarco is not able to restart its
operations, which remains a distinct possibility, recovery
prospects would likely be less than 10% and the notes would be
downgraded to C/RR6.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's main concern remains the ability for Samarco to restart
operations - for the company to be able to comply with its various
reparation agreements to date alongside its financial obligations;
it requires the ability to generate income.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch would downgrade Samarco's rating to 'RD' upon completion of
a Distressed Debt Exchange, and/or the company has experienced an
uncured payment default.

An upgrade is unlikely in the near term absent significant
shareholder equity to support debt service payments coming due.

LIQUIDITY

Fitch assumes that the ongoing delay for Samarco to regain its
operating licenses will result in the company likely running out
of cash at some point during the third quarter or fourth quarter
of 2016.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Samarco Mineracao S.A.

-- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR to 'C' from 'CCC';
-- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR to 'C' from 'CCC;
-- National Long-Term Rating to 'C(bra)' from 'CCC(bra)';
-- Senior unsecured debt rating to 'CC/RR3' from 'CCC/RR4'.


* S&P Takes Multiple Rating Actions on 7 Brazilian Insurers
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its ratings on seven Brazilian insurers
and reinsurers, incorporating the impact of the sovereign
downgrade on Feb. 17, 2016 and the subsequent revision of Brazil's
P&C IICRA to moderate risk from intermediate risk.

S&P downgraded its national scale rating on Austral Seguradora
S.A. and Austral Resseguradora S.A. to 'brA+' from 'brAA-', with a
negative outlook, and on Terra Brasis to 'brA' from 'brA+', with a
stable outlook; S&P resolved the CreditWatch negative listings.
Finally, S&P affirmed the ratings on J. Malucelli Seguradora S.A.,
J. Malucelli Resseguradora S.A., Sul America Cia.  Nacional de
Seguros, and Sul America S.A., with negative outlooks.

                            RATIONALE

The downgrades of Austral Seguradora and Austral Resseguradora
reflect the deterioration in Brazil's economy and the companies'
weaker credit profiles relative to peers rated 'brAA-'.
Furthermore, S&P lowered Austral Seguradora's and Austral
Resseguradora's financial risk profiles to less than adequate from
lower adequate to reflect their investment portfolio concentration
in non-investment grade securities -- mainly Brazil's sovereign
bonds (downgraded to 'BB' in Feburary 2016).  On the other hand,
S&P raised Austral Seguradora's and Austral Resseguradora's
business risk profiles to fair from vulnerable and revised S&P's
assessment of their competitive positions to adequate from less
than adequate.  The companies have left the volatile start-up
phase, and Austral group has presented adequate profitability
relative to its peers over the last four years.  Its return on
revenue (ROR) and return on equity (ROE) reached 13% and 19% in
December 2015, respectively, both of which are stronger than the
average for the P&C industry in Brazil (9% ROR and 13.5% ROE),
while Austral Resseguradora also presents stronger profitability
than most of its peers in the Brazilian reinsurance market.  Also,
the group has consistently maintained a net combined ratio below
100% over the last four years, averaging 85%, which is evidence of
adequate operating performance.

"We have removed the adjustment we were applying to Austral's
business risk profile because the moderate IICRA score
sufficiently incorporates the risks of the reinsurance industry.
In the past, this adjustment reflected higher industry risk in the
P&C reinsurance market compared to our overall IICRA assessment;
however, in our view, the recent improvements in profitability and
the adequate market growth prospects for the reinsurance industry
counterbalance weaknesses related to industry risk.  Although we
believe the challenging economy in Brazil could hurt Brazilian
reinsurers' results, these issuers have been able to sustain
positive growth and profitability by expanding operations into
other Latin American countries while focusing locally on products
with greater demand, such as surety (particularly in judicial
bonds) and life reinsurance.  In addition, premium growth in the
reinsurance industry -- which is young in Brazil -- has been
stronger than in the P&C insurance industry because of
opportunities for growth and regulation that supports local
business volumes," S&P said.

"The rating action on Terra Brasis Resseguros reflects the
revision of its financial risk profile to less than adequate from
lower adequate because its investment portfolio is concentrated in
government bonds, which recently became non-investment grade
securities.  Terra Brasis' business risk profile remained
vulnerable after we removed its negative adjustment because, like
Austral, we believe that the recent improvements in profitability
and adequate market growth prospects for the reinsurance industry
counterbalance lower barriers to entry and higher product risk.
These characteristics are relative to the P&C insurance sector,
which has shown that its profitability and premium growth are in
general more strongly tied to the country's economic conditions.
Also, as with other Brazilian reinsurers, Terra Brasis has been
expanding its operations in Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, which
already represent around 10% of the company's originations, thus
mitigating the effects of Brazil's economic environment.

In addition, S&P has affirmed its ratings on J. Malucelli
Seguradora and J. Malucelli Resseguradora because S&P maintained
its fair business risk profile assessment of those companies,
removing the negative adjustment of that rating component. J.
Malucelli group has also been able to sustain positive growth
through its focus on the surety business, upholding its leadership
in this segment in Brazil.  In S&P's view, J. Malucelli has
adequate risk management of its exposures, presenting no losses
within judicial bonds, a product that it's offered for over 10
years. At the same time, the companies' financial risk profiles,
which S&P revised to less than adequate in its last review,
already reflect the sovereign downgrade.  Nevertheless, the
ratings on both companies remain limited by those on Parana Banco,
their ultimate parent company.

S&P has also affirmed its ratings on Sul America Cia Nacional de
Seguros and Sul America S.A.  The P&C IICRA revision didn't affect
these companies because Sul America is a multiline insurer.  Its
overall IICRA score is a weighted average of health, P&C, and life
IICRA scores based on the premiums in each segment.  The Brazilian
health sector carries a heavier weight in Sul America's business,
comprising around 70% of Sul America's premiums.  So, since S&P
maintained its moderate risk IICRA score for the health insurance
industry in S&P's last review, the company's weighted IICRA is
still moderate risk, leading to S&P to maintain its satisfactory
business risk profile.

                                OUTLOOK

The negative outlooks on Austral Seguradora S.A. and Austral
Resseguradora reflect the one-in-three chance that the group could
be downgraded over the next 12 months, which could happen if S&P
downgrade the sovereign below 'brA+', limiting the ratings on
Austral.  S&P anticipates that within the next year it could lower
the sovereign ratings, and consequently those on Austral, if
potential key policy reversals take place, given the fluid
political dynamics in Brazil, including lack of cohesion within
the cabinet, inconsistent policy initiatives, and uncertainties
during or following the impeachment process.

S&P could downgrade the ratings on Austral group if S&P lowered
the national scale ratings on Brazil, given that S&P don't believe
that the group will be able to meet its financial obligations amid
a sovereign default.  S&P could also downgrade the ratings on the
group if the companies' operating performance weakens or if the
group is unable to sustain positive technical results.  S&P could
revise the outlook on Austral group to stable if it was to revise
the outlook on Brazil to stable.

The outlook on Terra Brasis Resseguros is stable because S&P
expects the company will continue to present volatile results over
the next 12 months, given its short track record, which underlies
its vulnerable business risk profile.  On the other hand, S&P
expects its financial risk profile to remain less than adequate
because of its non-investment grade portfolio, which is
concentrated in sovereign bonds.  In S&P's view, a downgrade of
the sovereign would not necessarily impact the ratings on this
company.

S&P can lower its ratings on Terra Brasis over the next 12 months
if the macroeconomic environment deteriorates further, leading the
insurer to present significant losses or impairing its ability to
write new business.  S&P believes an upside for the ratings on
Terra Brasis is unlikely over the next 12 months due to Brazil's
economic situation.  However, if the country recovers, S&P could
raise the ratings on Terra Brasis if the company is able to
present adequate operating performance and positive technical
results.

The outlooks on J. Malucelli Seguradora, J. Malucelli
Resseguradora, Sul America Cia. Nacional de Seguros, and Sul
America are negative.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Lowered
                          To                  From
Austral Resseguradora S.A.
Issuer Credit Rating
  Brazil National Scale   brA+/Negative/--    brAA-/Watch Neg/--

Austral Seguradora S.A.
Issuer Credit Rating
  Brazil National Scale    brA+/Negative/--   brAA-/Watch Neg/--

Terra Brasis Resseguros S.A.
Issuer Credit Rating
  Brazil National Scale    brA/Stable/--      brA+/Watch Neg/ --

Ratings Affirmed

J. Malucelli Resseguradora S.A.
Issuer Credit Rating
  Brazil National Scale   brA/Negative/--

J. Malucelli Seguradora S.A.
Issuer Credit Rating
  Brazil National Scale   brA/Negative/--

Sul America Cia Nacional de Seguros
Issuer Credit Rating
  Global Scale            BB/Negative/--
  Brazil National Scale   brAA-/Negative / --

Sul America S.A.
Issuer Credit Rating
  Global Scale            B+/Negative/ --
  Brazil National Scale   brBBB+/Negative/ --
Senior Unsecured         brBBB+



=======
C U B A
=======


CUBA: Economy Minister Removed From Post
----------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Cuban economy minister has been removed
from his post following President Raul Castro's warning last week
that people would have to tighten their belts amid the continuing
economic crisis in Venezuela.

The government says Marino Murillo will now have responsibility
for spearheading market reforms, according to RJR News.

Cuba's economy is closely tied to that of its socialist ally,
Venezuela, the report notes. But Venezuela has been hit by oil
prices remaining comparatively low, the report adds.

As of July 18, 2016, Cuba continues to carry Moody's Investors
Service Caa2 foreign currency issuer rating.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


EIA TROPICAL: Taps Hector Eduardo Pedrosa-Luna as Legal Counsel
---------------------------------------------------------------
EIA Tropical LLC seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico to hire The Law Offices of Hector
Eduardo Pedrosa-Luna as its legal counsel.

The firm will provide these services in connection with the
Debtor's Chapter 11 case:

     (a) prepare bankruptcy schedules, pleadings and applications,
         and conduct examinations incidental to the administration
         of the bankruptcy case;

     (b) develop the relationship of the status of the Debtor to
         the claims of creditors;

     (c) advise the Debtor with respect to its rights and duties;
         and

     (d) advise and assist the Debtor in the formulation of a
         Chapter 11 plan and the disclosure statement.

The firm will be paid $150 per hour for its services.

In a court filing, Hector Eduardo Pedrosa-Luna, Esq., disclosed
that the members of his firm are "disinterested persons" as
defined in section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The firm can be reached through:

     Hector Eduardo Pedrosa-Luna, Esq.
     The Law Offices of Hector Eduardo Pedrosa-Luna
     P.O. Box 9023963
     San Juan, PR 00902-3963
     Tel: 787-920-7983
     Fax: 787-754-1109
     Email: hectorpedrosa@gmail.com

                        About EIA Tropical

EIA Tropical LLC sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 16-05552) on July 12,
2016.


FARMACIA SAN JUSTO: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Farmacia San Justo, Inc.
        PO Box 1347
        Saint Just, PR 00978

Case No.: 16-05624

Chapter 11 Petition Date: July 14, 2016

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Judge: Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan

Debtor's Counsel: Charles Alfred Cuprill, Esq.
                  CHARLES A CUPRILL, PSC LAW OFFICE
                  356 Calle Fortaleza, Second Floor
                  San Juan, PR 00901
                  Tel: 787 977-0515
                  E-mail: cacuprill@cuprill.com

Total Assets: $0

Total Liabilities: $1.30 million

The petition was signed by Hector O. Rodriguez, president.

A list of the Debtor's 20 largest unsecured creditors is available
for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb16-05624.pdf


GALLERY MOTORS: Disclosures Okayed, Plan Hearing on Nov. 15
-----------------------------------------------------------
Gallery Motors Sport Inc. is now a step closer to emerging from
Chapter 11 protection after a bankruptcy court approved the
outline of its plan of reorganization.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico on July
12 approved the company's disclosure statement after determining
that the document contains "adequate information."

The bankruptcy court also gave Gallery Motors the green light
To begin soliciting votes from creditors who are required to cast
their ballots 14 days prior to the hearing on confirmation of the
plan scheduled for November 15, at 10:00 a.m.

Objections to confirmation of the plan must be filed 21 days
before the November 15 hearing.  The hearing will take place at
Jose V. Toledo Federal Building & U.S. Courthouse, Courtroom 2,
300 Recinto Sur Street, Old San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Gallery Motors can be reached through its counsel:

     Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq.
     Lugo Mender Group LLC
     Centro International De Mercadeo
     100 Carr 165 Suite 501
     Guaynabo, PR 00968-8052
     Tel: 787 707-0404
     Email: wlugo@lugomender.com

                        About Gallery Motors

Gallery Motors Sport Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 15-07013) on
September 11, 2015.  The petition was signed by Noelia Gomez-
Montalvo, president.

The case is assigned to Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor disclosed $350,000 in assets
and $562,857 in liabilities.


MAGNO TIRE: Plan Outline Okayed, Plan Hearing on August 24
----------------------------------------------------------
Magno Tire Center, Inc., is now a step closer to emerging from
Chapter 11 protection after a bankruptcy court approved the
outline of its plan of reorganization.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico on July
12 conditionally approved Magno Tire's disclosure statement,
allowing the company to begin soliciting votes from creditors for
its plan.

The bankruptcy court also gave Magno Tire the green light to begin
soliciting votes from creditors who are required to cast their
ballots 14 days prior to the hearing on confirmation of the plan
scheduled for August 24, at 9:00 a.m.

Objections to final approval of the disclosure statement and
confirmation of the plan must be filed 14 days before the August
24 hearing.

The hearing will take place at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Jose V.
Toledo U.S. Post Office and Courthouse Building, 300 Recinto Sur
Street, Courtroom 3, Third Floor, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

                        About Magno Tire

Magno Tire Center, Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-00074) on January 11,
2016.

The case is assigned to Judge Mildred Caban Flores.  The Debtor is
represented by Eduardo J Mayoral Garcia, Esq. --
emayoral@gmail.com --


WILLIAM CONTRACTOR: Zalduondo, Machicote's Bid to Dismiss Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Brian K. Tester of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico denied the motion to dismiss filed by
defendants Juan R. Zalduondo and Magdalena Machicote in the
adversary proceeding captioned WILLIAM CONTRACTOR, INC. Plaintiff,
v. JUAN R. ZALDUONDO, et al. Defendants, Adversary No. 15-00263
BKT (Bankr. D.P.R.).

Judge Tester held, "As the "party asserting the res judicata
defense, [D]efendants bear the burden of demonstrating that
[Plaintiff's] claims were raised or could have been raised in the
state proceedings."  While Defendants allege that a judgment was
entered against Multiplaza de Puerto Rico, Inc. in state court,
they failed to provide evidence of said judgment for this Court's
consideration. Therefore, because the Defendants fail to meet the
first requirement of the res judicata affirmative defense, the
Court need not consider the latter requirements, and denies the
Defendant's request for dismissal for failure to state a claim."

A full-text copy of Judge Tester's June 30, 2016 opinion and order
is available at https://is.gd/TBEMDx from Leagle.com.

The bankruptcy case is IN RE: WILLIAM CONTRACTOR, INC., Chapter
11, Debtor, Case No. 15-06311 BKT (Bankr. D.P.R.).

WILLIAM CONTRACTOR INC is represented by:

          Damaris Quinones Vargas, Esq.
          BUFETE QUINONES VARGAS & ASOC.
          P.O. Box 429
          Cabo Rojo, PR 00623
          Tel: (787)851-7866
          Fax: (787)851-1717
          Email: damarisqv@bufetequinones.com

BANCO POPULAR is represented by:

          Luis C. Marini Biaggi, Esq.
          Carolina Velaz-Rivero, Esq.
          O'NEILL & BORGES
          250 Munoz Rivera Avenue, Suite 800
          San Juan, PR 00918-1813
          Tel: (787)764-8181
          Fax: (787)753-8944
          Email: luis.marini@oneillborges.com
                 carolina.velaz@oneillborges.com


WILLIAM CONTRACTOR: Suit vs. Mercado, et al., Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Brian K. Tester of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico granted the motion filed by Jose
Mercado and Sonia Ortiz to dismiss the adversary proceeding
captioned WILLIAM CONTRACTOR, INC., Plaintiff, v. JOSE MERCADO, et
al., Defendants, Adversary No. 15-00263 BKT (Bankr. D.P.R.).

The bankruptcy case is IN RE: WILLIAM CONTRACTOR, INC., Chapter
11, Debtor, Case No. 15-06311 BKT (Bankr. D.P.R.).

A full-text copy of Judge Tester's June 22, 2016 opinion and order
is available at https://is.gd/dqwP8E from Leagle.com.

WILLIAM CONTRACTOR INC is represented by:

          Damaris Quinones Vargas, Esq.
          BUFETE QUINONES VARGAS & ASOC.
          P.O. Box 429
          Cabo Rojo, PR 00623
          Tel: (787)851-7866
          Fax: (787)851-1717
          Email: damarisqv@bufetequinones.com

BANCO POPULAR is represented by:

          Luis C. Marini Biaggi, Esq.
          Carolina Velaz-Rivero, Esq.
          O'NEILL & BORGES
          250 Munoz Rivera Avenue, Suite 800
          San Juan, PR 00918-1813
          Tel: (787)764-8181
          Fax: (787)753-8944
          Email: luis.marini@oneillborges.com
                 carolina.velaz@oneillborges.com

JOSE MERCADO is represented by:

          Luisa S. Valle Castro, Esq.
          C CONDE & ASSOCIATES
          254 San Jose Street, 5th Floor
          Old San Juan, PR 00901
          Tel: (787)729-2900
          Fax: (787)729-2203
          Email: ls.valle@condelaw.com



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


CL FIN'L: Prime Minister Must Act on Clico, Claimant Group Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that claimant group, Clico
Stakeholders Alliance (CSA), is urging Prime Minister Dr Keith
Rowley to get directly involved in the Clico affair, as they
questioned recent statements by Finance Minister, Colm Imbert.

In a statement titled, 'Not so fast Mr Imbert', the group accused
the Minister of "passing the buck", by his recent remarks that
queries about a missing $6 billion must be directed to the Central
Bank of TT (CBTT) which managed Clico since 2009, according to
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.

The CSA said this sum represents a transfer of wealth from
policyholders and shareholders to State agencies that hold Clico
Investment Bank (CIB) deposits, the report notes.

"Imbert is right to question the Central Bank, but it did not
confiscate the $6 billion," said the CSA, which also criticized
the bank for this loss under the nose of an actuary, the report
relays.  "It then added its own $4 billion deficit by writing down
asset values and writing up liability values at Jan 30, 2009,
which it then used in its propaganda campaign as a 'ballooning $10
Billion deficit'."

The CSA accused the bank of losing its way as it amended the
Insurance Act to minimize policyholder and shareholder rights, and
surrendered to the Government its stewardship powers to preserve
rights of policyholders, creditors and shareholders, the report
notes.

"Central Bank's self-interest in hanging on to control of Clico
was misaligned with policyholders and shareholders, while the
Government had no business touching Clico assets or undertakings,
yet despite his passing the buck, Imbert by letter of Oct 2, 2015
clearly demonstrated his power over Central Bank by using his
power to direct Central Bank to dispose of Clico's assets," the
report discloses.

The CSA said the CBTT's overarching stewardship duty was to
maximize the Clico shareholder value in plain sight, as the first
line of protection for policyholders, the report says.

"Shareholders must lose everything before policyholders lose
anything. Alas, Central Bank lazed around, destroyed Clico
franchise value and drove it into the ground, with the last nail
in the coffin being the sale of the traditional business to leave
the Clico infrastructure worthless."

The CSA vowed to publicly reveal Clico- CIB documents, and said
Imbert will ultimately be judged by the public, the report
discloses.

"CSA calls on the Honorable Prime Minister to intervene and set
the record straight on the missing $6 billion from Clico.  The
Honorable Prime Minister must note that the credibility of his
government is on center stage and world is watching. Over to you,
Mr. Prime Minister," the report adds.

                             *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.
6, 2015, Trinidad Express reports that the Constitution Reform
Forum (CRF) has called on Finance Minister Larry Howai to refrain
from embarking on an "unnecessary drain on the Treasury" by
appealing the decision of a High Court judge, who ordered that the
Minister fulfil a request by president of the Joint Consultative
Council (JCC) Afra Raymond for financial details relating to the
bailout of CL Financial Limited.  The CRF issued a release stating
that if the decision is appealed, not only will it be a waste of
finance but such a course of action will also demonstrate a "lack
of commitment by the Government to the spirit and intent of the
Freedom of Information Act FOIA", under which the request was
made, according to Trinidad Express.

On July 7, 2014, Trinidad Express said that the Central Bank has
placed the responsibility of voluntary separation package (VSEP)
negotiations for workers at insurance giant Colonial Life
Insurance Company Ltd. (CLICO) with the company's board, after
which it will review accordingly, the bank said in a statement.
The bank's statement follows protest action by CLICO workers,
supported by their union, the Banking, Insurance and General
Workers' Union (BIGWU), outside the Central Bank in Port of Spain,
according to Trinidad Express.

In a separate TCRLA report on June 26, 2014, Caribbean360.com said
that the Trinidad and Tobago government has welcomed an Appeal
Court ruling that the Attorney General Anand Ramlogan said saves
the country from paying out more than TT$1 billion (TT$1 = US$0.16
cents) to policyholders of the cash-strapped CLICO.  The Appeal
Court overturned the ruling of a High Court that ruled members of
the United Policyholders Group (UPG) were entitled to be paid the
full sums of their polices. CLICO financially caved in on itself
at the end of 2008 after the investment instruments of major
policyholders matured and they wanted hundreds of millions of
dollars they were owed.

On Aug. 6, 2013, the TCR-LA, citing Caribbean360.com, said that
over TT$8 billion worth of CLICO's profitable business will be
transferred to Atruis, a new company that will be owned by the
state.  The Trinidad Express said that the Cabinet approved the
transfer as the Finance and General Purposes Committee continues
to discuss a letter of intent hammered out by the Ministry of
Finance and CL Financial's 400 shareholders, which envisions
taxpayers will recover the more than TT$20 billion Government has
injected since 2009 to keep CL subsidiary CLICO and other
companies afloat.

At its annual general meeting in Sept. 2013, CL Financial
shareholders voted to extend the agreement with Government until
August 25, 2014, while Cabinet decides on a new framework accord
to recover the debt owed to Government through divestment of CL
subsidiaries, including Methanol Holdings, Republic Bank,
Angostura Holdings, CL World Brands and Home Construction Ltd.,
Caribbean360.com related.  Proceeds from the divestment of these
assets will go toward Government's recovery of the billions it
pumped into CLICO.

TCRLA reported on Sep 22, 2011, Caribbean News Now, citing
Reuters, said that the cost of the Trinidad and Tobago
government bailout of CL Financial Limited is likely to rise to
more than TT$3 billion.



=============
U R U G U A Y
=============


HDI SEGUROS: Moody's Gives Ba2 Insurance Financial Strength Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba2 global local-currency
(GLC) insurance financial strength (IFS) rating and an A3.uy
Uruguayan national scale IFS rating to HDI Seguros S.A. (Uruguay)
("HDI/UY").  The ratings carry a stable outlook

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, HDI/UY's ratings are based primarily on its
good product diversification through a balanced book of business
of commercial and personal line products, adequate asset quality,
and implicit and explicit support provided by its German-based
ultimate parent company, Talanx Group, through brand name sharing
-HDI- and risk transfer arrangements, achieved through intra-
group reinsurance agreements.  The rating agency went on to say
that although HDI/UY paid dividends for the first time in 1Q2016,
its capitalization is still expected to be adequate, although less
robust than in previous years, but above market average.

These positive credit considerations are offset partly by the
company's modest market presence in the Uruguayan property and
casualty insurance market, its weak underwriting results in some
business lines, high exposure to Uruguayan sovereign bonds and
bank deposits -- which is common for all Uruguayan insurers -- and
generally lower profitability track record than industry peers
over the last 5 years, a fact that is partly explained by the
company's solid capitalization.

Commenting on factors that could result in an upgrade for HDI/UY's
ratings, Moody's cited the following: 1) a significant improvement
in the company's market presence; 2) better profitability track
record (e.g. return on capital consistently above 15%); and 3)
improved underwriting results.  Conversely, HDI/UY's ratings could
be downgraded for the following reasons: 1) a significant
deterioration in its capitalization (e.g. gross underwriting
leverage above 6x); 2) sustained underwriting losses; 3) decline
in profitability trend; 4) a reduction of Talanx Group's strategic
interest in HDI/UY; or 5) a substantial reduction in market share.

HDI/UY is a Uruguayan insurer that distributes property and
casualty insurance coverages to individuals, as well as to
corporations.  The company is a subsidiary of Talanx Group, a
German-based holding company that comprises a wide range of
weeksubsidiaries, including leading insurance and reinsurance
operations such as HDI Gerling and Hannover Re., respectively.

HDI/UY is headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay, and it reported a
net loss of UYU 3 million, with gross premiums written of
UYU29 billion for the three-month period ended March 31, 2016.  As
of that date, the company reported total assets of UYU 717 million
and shareholders' equity of UYU219 million.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Property and Casualty Insurers published in June 2016.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Reopens Colombian Border to Allow Shoppers to Cross
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Venezuela has opened its borders with
Colombia for the second time this month to allow people to cross
over to shop for basic foods and medicines.
Last week, about 35,000 people crossed over for the first time
since the border was closed a year ago by President Nicolas Maduro
to fight cross-border crime, according to BBC News.

Officials said at least 100,000 entered Colombia over the weekend.
Many basic goods are in short supply in Venezuela because of a
severe economic crisis in the country, the report notes.

The border across a pedestrian bridge connecting Tachira in
Venezuela and Cucuta in Colombia opened on Saturday, July 16, a
day earlier than authorities from both countries had previously
announced. Officials said they wanted to avoid the build-up of too
many people, the report notes.

It stayed open through Sunday, July 18.

Venezuela has suffered severe shortages for months as a result of
the falling price of oil, which is the country's prime source of
income, the report discloses.

Many supermarket have empty shelves and Venezuelans spend days in
queues to buy basic goods, the report notes.

The opposition blames the government for the economic crisis,
saying its policies have left businesses unable to import raw
materials and essential parts, the report relays.

The president of Congress, Henry Ramos Allup, said President
Maduro had ignored "the human sea" which had crossed the frontier
searching for food, the report says.

The report discloses that Congresswoman Adriana Pichardo said
"Venezuelans are looking for basic food that the government can't
supply."

President Maduro has said his government is the victim of an
economic war.

President Maduro ordered the border to be closed in August 2015
after former Colombian paramilitaries attacked a Venezuelan
military patrol and wounded three soldiers, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2016, Fitch Ratings affirmed Venezuela's Long-Term
Foreign-and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (LT FC/LC IDR)
at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed the sovereign's Short-Term
Foreign Currency (ST FC) IDR at 'C' and country ceiling at 'CCC'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding,
electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited
without prior written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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