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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, August 8, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 155



CHACO ARGENTINA: Fitch Assigns 'B' Longterm IDRs, Outlook Stable
PAN AMERICAN: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Issuer Default Rating


BANCO DO BRASIL: Said to Hire JPM to Sell Patagonia Stake
BRAZIL: Real Rises to One-Year High as Yields Lure Carry Trades
OI SA: Refers Investor Meeting Request to Bankruptcy Judge

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AQR OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
BILLION SUN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
FOCUS 825: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
KAIMASU LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 18
MOHICAN VCA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

MOHICAN VCA MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
MOOREA INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 1
PROFIT RISE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
RESOURCE ADD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
SINGULARIS HOLDINGS: Creditors to Hold Meeting on Aug. 18




ECUADOR: S&P Affirms 'B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable


BANCO NACIONAL: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating on Tier 2 Sub. Notes
CAMPOSOL SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC-', Off CreditWatch Developing

P U E R T O    R I C O

CYMA CLEANING: Unsecured Trade Claims to Get 3% Under Plan
SPORTS AUTHORITY: Denver Broncos to Assume Naming Rights Deal

S T.   K I T T S  &  N E V I S

UNITED AIRLINES: Boosts Service to Country

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: Under Scutiny Ahead of Release of Audits


CORPORACION ELECTRICA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Aug. 1 to Aug. 5, 2016

                            - - - - -


CHACO ARGENTINA: Fitch Assigns 'B' Longterm IDRs, Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B' rating to the Province of Chaco's
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer-Default Ratings.  The
Rating Outlook is Stable.  Fitch has also assigned an expected
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Rating of 'B(EXP)' to the Province of
Chaco's upcoming unsecured bond issuance.

The bond is rated at the same level as the province.  The bond
will be issued in USD for an amount of up to USD250 million, to
accrue a fixed interest rate to be determined at issuance and
payable on a semi-annual basis.  The estimated maturity of the
bond is around seven to eight years, with equal bullet payments in
the last years.  The notes will be a senior unsecured,
unsubordinated obligation of the Province of Chaco.

Provincial Law 7782 of 2016 authorized the issuance of this debt.
Half the proceeds will be used by the province to cancel
litigations and the rest to finance logistics and public
infrastructure projects.  The notes will be governed by the laws
of the State of New York.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has assigned an expected Long-Term Foreign-Currency Rating
of 'B(EXP)' to the new bond, which is in line with the issuer's
Long-Term rating ('B'/Outlook Stable).  Chaco's rating mainly
considers the province's low leverage ratios for the recent
period, and adequate operating margins in the period 2011 - 2015.
In contrast, the rating is limited by the constrained fiscal and
budgetary flexibility of the province as well as its weak
liquidity position.  In addition, a tepid economy that is
dependent on services is another limitation.

Chaco's long-term debt is manageable.  In 2015, direct debt
totaled ARS7.1 billion, representing 26% of current revenues and
5.4x operating balance.  Exposure to currency risk is moderate at
39%, but will increase around 60% at the end of 2016 with new debt
issue for USD250 million.  Compared to other Provinces, Chaco does
not have oil and gas assets, and therefore, no revenue denominated
in dollars.

Considering new debt for 2016, leverage ratios will arise to 35%
and the ratios of debt service will continue to be pressured given
the current macroeconomic context, limited operating balances, and
capital needs.

Liquidity has deteriorated but is still adequate for its rating
category.  Short-term debt has increased and may continue this
trend in 2016.  At year-end 2015, commercial debt rose to
ARS2.8 billion from ARS0.8 billion in 2011.  Cash deposits cover
only 40% of commercial debt.  However, this debt represents 33
days of primary expenditure, an adequate ratio.

Despite economic challenges in the local and national economy,
Chaco's budgetary performance has been improving but remains
limited.  In 2015, operating margin was 6%.  Fitch expects a
similar performance in subsequent years.

Going forward, capital revenues for Chaco may increase because of
the federal government's investment plan in the north of the
country.  Capex-to-total expenditure has also been significant and
steady, averaging 17% in the 2011-2015 period, financed with
federal resources and debt.

Fitch considers Chaco's economic profile weak.  The most
significant sector of the economy is services.  The local
government is one of the main employers.  GDP per head is around
USD 6,000 far below national GDP of USD14,400.  However, Chaco's
economy has grown more than national GDP and represents 1.3% of
the national economy.

Fitch views the forthcoming Federal Law for deficit compensation
in social security provincial schemes as a positive for the
Province's public finances.  Chaco did not transfer its pension
fund to the federal government, hence, pension payments are
covered from contributions from current employees; however, these
are insufficient and the province will need to transfer
extraordinary funds to the Social Security and Insurance
Institute.  The latent agreement may help to reduce future
deficits in Chaco's institutes.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

A recovery in fiscal and budgetary flexibility observed in
operating margins, as well as an improvement of liquidity could
lead to an upgrade in Chaco's rating.  A sudden increase in the
public debt burden and weak operating margins that significantly
affect debt sustainability ratios, could lead to a negative rating

The final rating of Chaco's new bond is contingent upon the
receipt of final documents conforming to information already

PAN AMERICAN: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on Pan
American Energy LLC (PAE):

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency (LT FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
    affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook Stable;

-- Long-Term Local Currency (LT LC) IDR upgraded to 'BB' from
    'B+'; Outlook Stable;

-- Pan American Energy LLC Sucursal Argentina's (PAME) senior
    unsecured notes due 2021 upgraded to 'BB-/RR3' from 'B+/RR4'.

The PAME notes' above-average Recovery Rating of 'RR3' reflects
good recovery prospects in the event of default given the
company's solid balance sheet and cash flow generation. Fitch
believes that a default, should it occur, would most likely be
driven by transfer and convertibility restrictions imposed upon
the payment of foreign debt, not by a material deterioration of
the company's business or financial profile.

The upgrade of the LC IDR reflects the company's protections
against sovereign turbulence, as historically a significant
portion of the company's revenues has been related to exports.
Fitch expects the company's export volumes will continue to
represent approximately 30% of the company's total oil production.
PAE's significant proportion of exports, strong foreign parent
ownership, robust liquidity position, coupled with the country's
capital investment needs in the sector support the company's LC

Fitch believes an exporter would likely do significantly better
than a company more dependent on the local economy in a scenario
of a sharp devaluation with both issuers having FC debt to
service. An exporter generally competes on a global basis and
usually benefits from a depreciating local currency, which could
lower its cost structure and reduce the burden of its LC debt

The FC IDR, one-notch-higher than the country ceiling of
Argentina, is supported by Pan American's reliable strong cash
flow generation, dollar-denominated export revenues relative to
total debt, ownership by a strong parent, and a good track record
of payment during stressed sovereign scenarios. Positively, Pan
American has ample liquidity and proven access to the financial


The primary factor negatively impacting PAE's ratings is its
exposure to political interference in Argentina. Companies face a
volatile domestic business environment and inflationary pressures
on their cost structures. In comparison with its Argentine peers,
PAE's ratings are supported by its stronger business position,
large reserves base, low leverage and strong operating

The Argentine government has a history of significant interference
in the oil and gas sector. Via Decree No. 1277, the government set
regulations related to investment levels in the oil and gas sector
and domestic price reference points. In 2012, via Law No. 26,741,
the government nationalized Argentina's largest energy company,
YPF S.A. Although in recent years, government regulations
maintained domestic crude oil prices significantly below world
prices, these same regulations have kept Argentine crude oil
prices above global prices, despite the global price decline seen
during the last year.

Given PAE/PAME's large oil export program, the global oil price
decline has had a negative impact on the company's export sales;
recent government moves have been positive in this regard. Under
the Crude Oil Production Stimulus Program implemented in February
2015, the Argentine government agreed to provide an export
stimulus of up to US$3/barrel of oil (bbl) exports for companies
participating in the program when the company's quarterly
production of crude oil is equal or greater than the base
production level under the program (December 2014 is the
baseline). If the beneficiary companies manage to satisfy all the
demand of all of the domestic refineries, then they can export
this petroleum and receive an additional payment equivalent to
US$2- US$3/bbl. During 2015, the company received US$71.3 million
under this program for sales in the first six months of that year.
In the past, when international prices were high, Argentine
producers were subject to an export price cap of US$70/bbl.

Additionally, during 2015 and as a response to the decline in
international oil prices, the government reduced the export taxes
to 1% from the 11% - 13% that was applied in the past.

Fitch believes the recent export stimulus plan approved in 2016 is
an effort by the Macri administration to compensate upstream
players for the windfall taken by the previous administration
during the high oil price environment. Res 21/2016 was further
implemented by the government in an attempt to protect upstream
producers from cutting jobs that could have hurt the national
economy as well as the provinces that rely on oil and gas
production. Under this stimulus plan, exporters would receive
US$7.5/bbl from the national government and US$2.5/bbl from the
province when Brent is below US$47.5/bbl or US$47.2/bbl,
respectively. As oil prices recover, this stimulus plan will have
a negligible positive impact on the company. Fitch believes more
flexible regulations removing export controls would benefit the
industry; these changes are not expected at least in the short

Pan American has a strong business position in the Argentine
market and its credit metrics are expected to remain strong.
Ownership by a strong parent, reliable cash flow generation, and
significant levels of exports support PAE's LT FC IDR, which is
rated one notch above Argentina's country ceiling. PAE is 60%
owned by BP (rated 'A'/Stable Outlook) and 40% owned by Bridas
Corporation (Bridas). Bridas is 50% owned by Bridas Energy
Holdings Ltd (BEH) and 50% by China National Offshore Oil
Corporation Limited (CNOOC, rated 'A+'). During 2015,
approximately 30% of PAME's oil volume was exported, representing
21% of the company's revenues. PAME's export revenues decreased to
US$0.8 billion from US$1.7 billion in 2014 as a result of
depressed international hydrocarbon prices.

Historically, PAME's exports have represented between 40%-55% of
the company's revenues. Fitch expects this trend to continue as
international prices recover. PAME's historical exports compare
favorably to its long-term debt maturities. In addition, the
company has a track record of meeting payments during stressed
sovereign scenarios.

PAE's gas production for 2015 represented 50% of its total
production. Fitch believes that due to a more favorable
environment for natural gas prices in Argentina, PAE's business
position will further strengthen.

As of December 2015, PAME was Argentina's largest proved reserves
holder, with oil and gas reserves of 1.55 billion barrels of oil
equivalent (boe), of which 66% is oil, equivalent to 16 years of
production (22 years for oil, 11 years for natural gas). PAME's
leverage is low at approximately US$1.85 of debt per barrel of
proved reserves as of December 2015. The company has historically
increased reserves and production volumes sustainably, despite
operating in a challenging environment.

As expected by Fitch, the company's production remained stable
despite a double-digit inflation rate and a difficult economic
climate in Argentina, with average production of 244,200 boe/d in
2015 (up 6% year-over-year). Approximately 50% of the company's
production and 70% of its revenues were related to oil. During
2015, the company increased its capex investments by 13% in dollar
terms, maintaining a reserve replacement ratio of 135% for the
year. Fitch expects 2016 production levels to remain flat with a
2%-3% increase in production for 2017-2019.

PAE's ratings reflect the company's robust metrics and Fitch's
expectations for low leverage during the next three years despite
increased capex needs. As of the last 12 months ended March 31,
2016, PAE's EBITDA remained relatively flat at US$1.9 billion
compared with 2014. EBITDA margin of 50.7% was up from 33.5% in
2012. Fitch is conservatively assuming annual capex to amount
US$1.5 billion - US$1.8 billion over the next three years, with
gross leverage to remain below 1.0x.


Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for PAE include:

-- Production growth in the low single-digits per year;
-- Long-term energy prices converge with world prices over the
    next five years;
-- EBITDA margins remain at an average of 50%;
-- Conservative annual capex US$1.5 billion- US$1.8 billion;
-- Gross leverage metrics below 1.0x in the short- to medium-


PAE's ratings could be negatively affected by a combination of the

-- Argentina's credit quality deterioration;
-- A material increase in the government's interference in the
-- Total Debt/EBITDA greater than 3.5x and EBITDA/interest
    coverage below 4.5x could be viewed negatively.

An upgrade of Argentina's ratings and country ceilings may result
in a positive rating action.


ADEQUATE LIQUIDITY: PAME's total cash and equivalents amounted to
approximately US$235 million as of March 31, 2016, which is
approximately 30% of short-term debt totalling US$571 million.
Given the company's strong operational track record along with
strong parent company support, Fitch does not anticipate any
difficulties for the company in tapping local debt markets in
order to refinance short-term debt.


Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

-- LT FC IDR affirmed at 'B+';
-- LT LC IDR upgraded to 'BB' from 'B+'.

-- International senior unsecured bond ratings upgraded to 'BB-

The Rating Outlook for the IDRs is Stable.


BANCO DO BRASIL: Said to Hire JPM to Sell Patagonia Stake
Cristiane Lucchesi and Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez at Bloomberg News
report that Banco do Brasil SA hired JPMorgan Chase & Co. to help
sell a stake in its Argentina unit, according to a person with
direct knowledge of the matter.

The Banco Patagonia SA stake would go to strategic investors or
shares would be sold in a public offering, the person said, asking
not to be named because the matter is private, according to
Bloomberg News.   The size of the stake wasn't known, the person

Brazilian lender Itau Unibanco Holding SA would consider bidding
for the stake if it's offered to strategic investors, another
person familiar with the matter said, Bloomberg News notes.
Shares of the Argentine bank plunged as much as 3.1 percent on the

"We don't know who the buyer will be, only that there's a need to
sell," Rafael di Giorno, director at Proficio Investment in Buenos
Aires, said by phone.  "And with uncertainty it often happens that
the market reacts negatively until they see how it's sold."

Bloomberg News relays that Banco do Brasil, with total assets of
BRL1.4 trillion ($430 billion), needs to raise capital as it faces
deepening losses from bad loans amid Brazil's recession.  The
lender holds about 58.6 percent of Banco Patagonia, which has
total equity of about $2.3 billion, according to Argentina's stock
exchange, Bloomberg News notes.

Patagonia is the 11th-biggest bank in the country with BRL55.8
billion in assets, according to the central bank.

Banco do Brasil shares rose as much as 2.3 percent in Sao Paulo,
leading advances among banks, Bloomberg News notes.  Shares of
Banco Patagonia closed 1 percent lower at 48 pesos and the volume
of shares changing hands on Thursday, Aug. 4 was 211 percent
higher than the three-month average.

Other banks including Banco Santander SA, Banco Macro SA, BBVA
Frances and Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires SA may find the Banco
do Brasil's stake most attractive, Juan Manuel Vasquez, a
corporate analyst at Buenos Aires-based brokerage Puente Hnos SA,
Bloomberg News says.

"Banco do Brasil SA is running out of options to weather the
impact on earnings of Brazil's economic crisis," wrote Jonathan
Tyce and Arjun Bowry, analysts at Bloomberg Intelligence.  If
capital concerns persist, asset sales may be necessary, they

JPMorgan, Banco do Brasil and Itau officials declined to comment.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July
7, 2016, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB/B' global scale
ratings on Banco do Brasil S.A., its 'BB' ratings on the bank's
senior unsecured debt, its 'B' ratings on the bank's subordinated
debt, and its 'B-' rating on the bank's junior subordinated debt.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'brAA-' national scale ratings
on its core subsidiary, Ativos S.A. Securitizadora de Creditos
Financeiros.  The outlook remains negative.

BRAZIL: Real Rises to One-Year High as Yields Lure Carry Trades
Paula Sambo and Marisa Castellani at Bloomberg News reports that
Brazil's real climbed to a one-year high after policy makers in
Latin America's largest economy sought to reassure investors and
as sought out securities paying some of the world's highest
interest rates.

The real gained 0.9 percent to 3.1655 per dollar on Friday, Aug.
5, extending the weekly advance to 2.6 percent, according to
Bloomberg News.  The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index, which tracks the
U.S. currency against a basket of its top peers, added 0.3
percent.  The real closed stronger for the fourth consecutive

Bond buyers seeking an alternative to negative yields on
government debt in Europe and Japan are heading to Brazil, where
the benchmark interest rate is 14.25 percent, Bloomberg News
relays.  Officials have signaled that's not likely to come down
anytime soon, and central bank chief Ilan Goldfajn reiterated that
stance in an interview published in O Estado de S. Paulo when he
said inflation risks persist, Bloomberg News notes.  Buying the
real with borrowed dollars in a so-called carry trade has returned
34 percent this year, the most in the world, Bloomberg News says.

"It's all about yield," said Win Thin, an emerging-market
strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. in New York, Bloomberg
News notes.  "Every central bank in the developed world, except
the Fed, is easing. With negative rates everywhere, investors are
piling into emerging markets," the report quoted Mr. Thin as

Local newspapers reported that Brazil's economic team is working
to convey a positive message to investors amid criticism in recent
days that it's backtracked on some fiscal adjustment measures,
Bloomberg News relays.

Finance Minister Henrique Meirelles said business and consumer
confidence has rebounded and forecast that if the economy grows
some 2 percent next year, it won't be necessary to increase taxes,
according to Valor Economico newspaper, Bloomberg News relays.  He
and Goldfajn met with several market players to try to boost
confidence, also according to Valor.

Swap rates on the contract maturing in January 2018, a gauge of
expectations for interest rates, dropped 0.07 percentage point to
12.71 percent, extending this week's decline to 0.12 percentage
point, Bloomberg News adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service.  The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.

OI SA: Refers Investor Meeting Request to Bankruptcy Judge
Ana Mano at Reuters reports that the board of Brazilian telephone
operator Oi SA has referred to a bankruptcy judge an activist
investor's request for legal action against company managers, its
second straight bid to thwart the investor's moves, according to a
securities filing.

In the filing, Oi SA's board referred a decision on activist
investor Societe Mondiale's late July request for a shareholders
meeting to approve an arbitration claim against controlling
shareholder Pharol to the Rio de Janeiro judge overseeing the
company's bankruptcy, according to Reuters.

Societe Mondiale, an investment vehicle for Brazilian businessman
Nelson Tanure, owns 7 percent of Oi's voting stock, the report
notes.  It also wants Oi to pursue a claim against Santander
Brasil, which advised Oi on its 2015 merger with Portugal Telecom,
as Pharol was previously known, the report relays.

This is the second time Oi's board has refrained from discussing
Societe Mondiale's proposals.  On July 22, the company asked the
court to rule on Societe Mondiale's request to call a shareholders
meeting to seek the replacement of five members of Oi's nine-
person board, the report relays.  That decision is pending.

Mr. Tanure, known for investing in financially distressed
companies, acquired a stake in Oi through Societe Mondiale after
Oi filed for bankruptcy protection in June, the report notes.

Societe Mondiale also is proposing the annulment of a shareholders
meeting held in March 2015 in which a share swap between Portugal
Telecom and Oi was approved as part of Oi's takeover by the
Portuguese company, the report discloses.

Pharol remains the largest individual shareholder of Oi, with
27.49 of its voting shares, the report says.

Both Pharol and Santander Brasil have declined to comment on
Societe Mondiale's proposal to commence legal action against them,
the report adds.

                                About Oi SA

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line data
transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and cable,
Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect

Ojas N. Shah filed a Chapter 15 petition for Oi S.A. (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Case No. 16-11791), Oi Movel S.A. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case
No. 16-11792), Telemar Norte Leste S.A. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
16-11793), and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Case No. 16-11794) on June 21, 2016.  The case is
assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.

The Chapter 15 Petitioner is represented by John K. Cunningham,
Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in New York;
and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq., and Laura L.
Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AQR OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
On July 20, 2016, the sole shareholder of AQR Offshore Multi-
Strategy Fund IX Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the
company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          AQR Capital Management, LLC
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877

BILLION SUN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
The creditors of Billion Sun International Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by Aug. 22, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 18, 2016.

The company's liquidators are:

          Stephen Liu Yiu Keung
          Koo Chi Sum
          Ernst & Young Transactions Limited
          One Island East, 62nd Floor
          18 Westlands Road, Island East
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 2629 3323
          Facsimile: +852 2827 0715

FOCUS 825: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
The creditors of Focus 825 Ltd. are required to file their proofs
of debt by Aug. 22, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 18, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902

KAIMASU LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 18
The creditors of Kaimasu Ltd. are required to file their proofs of
debt by Aug. 18, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 18, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands

MOHICAN VCA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
On July 20, 2016, the sole shareholder of Mohican VCA Offshore
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mohican Financial Management, LLC
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands

MOHICAN VCA MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
On July 20, 2016, the sole shareholder of Mohican VCA Master Fund,
Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mohican Financial Management, LLC
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands

MOOREA INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 1
The creditors of Moorea Investments Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Sept. 1, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 18, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zedra Directors (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Enola Reid
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914-5413
          First Caribbean House, 4th Floor
          P.O Box 487 George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands

PROFIT RISE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
The creditors of Profit Rise International Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by Aug. 22, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 18, 2016.

The company's liquidators are:

          Stephen Liu Yiu Keung
          Koo Chi Sum
          Ernst & Young Transactions Limited
          One Island East, 62nd Floor
          18 Westlands Road, Island East
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 2629-3323
          Facsimile: +852 2827-0715

RESOURCE ADD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
The creditors of Resource Add Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by Aug. 22, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 18, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stephen Liu Yiu Keung
          Koo Chi Sum
          Ernst & Young Transactions Limited
          One Island East, 62nd Floor
          18 Westlands Road, Island East
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 2629 3323
          Facsimile: +852 2827 0715

SINGULARIS HOLDINGS: Creditors to Hold Meeting on Aug. 18
The creditors of Singularis Holdings Limited will hold their
meeting on Aug. 18, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., at the offices of Grant
Thornton Specialist Services (Cayman) Limited, 48 Market Street,
2nd Floor, Suite 4290, Canella Court, in Camana Bay, Grand Cayman,
Cayman Islands.

The company's liquidator is:

          Grant Thornton Specialist Services (Cayman) Limited
          48 Market Street, 2nd Floor
          Suite 4290, Canella Court
          Camana Bay, Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands


S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Coltel to negative from
stable and affirmed its 'BB' corporate credit and issue-level
ratings on Colombia Telecomunicaciones S.A. E.S.P. (Coltel).  At
the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue-level rating on the
company's hybrid capital securities.

The outlook revision is a result of Coltel's weaker-than-expected
results.  Intensified competition, regulatory measures like the
reduction of termination rates, as well as dampened domestic
demand and the depreciation of the Colombian peso, weakened the
company's EBITDA generation.  Those factors ultimately increased
Coltel's debt to EBITDA to above 5.0x and hurt the company's cash
flow generation.

The negative outlook reflects the possibility of a downgrade by
more than one notch at year end if the company does not show a
clear plan to address its cash flow and liquidity position, which
have been largely drained by its high Parapat payments.  This
decrease could lead to a debt to EBITDA above 5.0x for a prolonged
time, in turn driving the company to scale back capex.  At that
juncture, its revenue and EBITDA growth could be hampered and, in
consequence, its competitive position.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the company successfully
strengthens its capital structure, keeping its debt to EBITDA
ratio below 5.0x.


ECUADOR: S&P Affirms 'B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Ecuador.  The
outlook on the long-term rating remains stable.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings.

In addition, S&P affirmed its transfer and convertibility
assessment at 'B'.


The ratings on the Republic of Ecuador reflect moderate per capita
income (projected to exceed US$6,000 in 2016), weak public
institutions, high reliance on oil exports, and vulnerability to
external shocks.  Ecuador's weak system of political checks and
balances, as well as its history of past defaults on sovereign
debt, influence S&P's assessment of the country's institutional
framework and governance.  Ecuador uses the U.S. dollar as its
legal currency, hence it lacks monetary and exchange rate
independence and flexibility.  The ratings also reflect a moderate
general government debt burden and recent efforts by the
government to staunch the deterioration of fiscal and external
balances, including through austerity measures and greater
pragmatism in its relationship with the private sector and
official creditors.

"The Ecuadorian economy grew only 0.3% in 2015, according to
official data, and we expect it to contract by more than 2% in
2016.  The recession has weakened public support for the
administration of President Rafael Correa, who has governed the
country since 2007.  President Correa has announced that he will
not seek reelection in February 2017.  We expect a stable
transition to a new administration after next year's national
elections.  The Correa Administration has undertaken a substantial
fiscal adjustment in the face of plummeting oil-related revenues
and has changed other policies to encourage private and foreign
investment.  Several recent developments indicate a greater
willingness by the government to improve its relationship with the
private sector.  In December of 2015, the sovereign repaid its
maturing $650 million external bond--the first time it has repaid
a commercial external bond in its history.  In addition, the
government recently paid nearly $1 billion to the oil and gas
company Occidental Petroleum to settle past claims against Ecuador
following international rulings.  The government has also been
active in signing service contracts with foreign firms to operate
in oil fields.  We expect that economic policy under the next
administration will continue being pragmatic, improving investor
confidence as the government continues to promote the fiscal and
external adjustments needed to maintain stability and return to
economic growth," S&P said.

"Low oil prices, fiscal adjustment, declining public-sector
investment, and a strong U.S. dollar underpin the recession in
2016. Real effective exchange rate appreciated by about 14% in
2015 and has been stable so far this year.  We expect Ecuador's
economy to modestly rebound in 2017-2019, based on higher oil
output as well as some recovery in global oil prices.  We now
estimate that Ecuador's per capita growth trajectory is below that
of its peers with a similar level of per capita GDP.  Recent
efforts to develop oil fields, including through policies that
have attracted private-sector investment, and to promote the non-
oil economy (especially through foreign investment in mining), as
well as the coming on stream of eight new hydroelectric plants,
should improve longer-term growth prospects," S&P noted.

Nearly a decade of booming commodity prices had provided the
government with extra resources to support an aggressive fiscal
policy based on high public-sector investment and social spending.
However, the downturn in oil prices since 2014 led the government
to impose austerity measures, cutting capital spending (by 4% of
GDP last year) and seeking new revenues.  S&P expects that the
general government deficit will be 4.8% of GDP this year, compared
with 5% in 2015.  Last year's deficit understates the extent of
fiscal imbalance as it excludes arrears (which S&P estimates could
have reached 2.5% of GDP earlier this year) on payments owed to
local governments and private companies.  The combination of
further fiscal adjustments, as well as gradual economic recovery,
is likely to result in a general government deficit of 3.5% of GDP
in 2017 and 2.5% in the following year.

"We project that the general government debt will increase by 4.2%
of GDP on average during 2016-2019, reflecting fiscal deficits and
payment of recent spending arrears.  We project net general
government debt, as calculated by S&P Global Ratings, at 39% of
GDP in 2016.  Given Ecuador's limited capacity to borrow locally
(relying essentially on central bank and Instituto Ecuatoriano de
Seguridad Social financing), we estimate the financing gap will be
largely covered by official external sources (bilateral loans from
China and loans from multilateral financial institutions), as well
by tapping into global capital markets, which the sovereign
recently did," S&P noted.

Adverse terms of trade, mainly from low oil prices, have weakened
Ecuador's external position.  In response to the fall in exports,
the government has been restricting imports by imposing tariffs.
S&P expects the current account deficit to narrow to 0.4% of GDP,
from 2.2% in 2015, reflecting a plunge in imports.  S&P expects
the current account deficit to slightly deteriorate to an average
0.7% of GDP in 2017-2018.

Over the next three years, the external position should improve,
sustained by recovery in oil output and moderate price increases,
some gains in non-oil exports, and lower imported diesel resulting
from the fall in the country's energy imports as new hydroelectric
plants come into production (and begin exporting power as well).
S&P estimates Ecuador's narrow net external debt at 101% of
current account receipts (CAR) in 2016, while gross external
funding needs will average 122% of CARs and usable reserves in

As a dollarized economy, the authorities have limited resources to
support the financial system in the event of serious problems as
the Central Bank has limited ability to act as a lender of last
resort.  The government has relied on central bank financing in
recent years, contributing to deterioration in the composition of
the central bank's assets and in the coverage of private banks'
deposits at the central bank.  The ratio of central bank net
currency position to bank reserves fell to 64% in June 2016 from
110% in January 2015.  Contingent liabilities are limited, in
S&P's view, to less than 10% of GDP, given the low levels of
domestic credit to GDP.


The stable outlook is based on S&P's assumption that Ecuador's
economic policies will continue to become more pragmatic following
the general elections in February 2017.  The country is likely to
maintain moderate fiscal and external deficits and low inflation
in the next two to three years.  S&P expects a stable transition
to a new administration, strengthening investor confidence amid
continued efforts to implement fiscal and external adjustment in
order to contain the government's debt burden and support higher,
sustainable economic growth.  S&P expects that Ecuador will
continue to use the U.S. dollar as its legal currency.

S&P could lower the ratings if the economy fails to stabilize and
to show signs of recovery next year, contrary to S&P's
expectations, likely resulting in worsening public finances
(because of worse fiscal performance and a rising debt burden).
Failure to stabilize the recent deterioration in public finances
and the rise in the general government debt burden could undermine
confidence in the financial system.  Similarly, unexpected
political developments or external shocks could raise doubts about
the continued use of the U.S. dollar as Ecuador's legal currency.
The resulting loss of liquidity in the financial system, as well
as potential capital flight, could lead to a lower rating.

In contrast, a successful stabilization program that reverses the
recent erosion of public finances and attracts more private and
foreign investment could contribute to better long-term growth
prospects.  Skillful political leadership and economic management
could result in a substantial improvement in investor confidence,
especially among the domestic private sector, auguring well for
long-term stability and better external liquidity.  S&P could
raise the ratings as a result.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that economic and external risks had
deteriorated and that fiscal and debt risks had improved.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating


Ratings Affirmed

Ecuador (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating                 B/Stable/B
  Senior Unsecured                       B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment    B


BANCO NACIONAL: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating on Tier 2 Sub. Notes
Moody's Investors Service assigned a (P)Ba1 (hyb) rating to the
proposed Tier 2 subordinated capital notes to be issued by Banco
Nacional de Comercio Exterior, Sociedad Nacional de Credito,
Institucion de Banca de Desarrollo (Bancomext, senior debt A3
negative, BCA/adjusted BCA ba3) through its Cayman Islands branch,
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, Sociedad Nacional de Credito

This rating was assigned to Bancomext's proposed Tier 2
subordinated capital notes for up to USD700 million with a
ten-year maturity:

  Long-term foreign currency debt rating of (P)Ba1 (hyb)

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The (P)Ba1 (hyb) rating for Bancomext's Tier 2 subordinated
preferred capital notes considers the incremental probability of
default of the notes absent extraordinary support from the Mexican
government, the bank's sole shareholder, relative to the bank's
other financial obligations, that results from interest deferral
provisions tied to high capitalization thresholds, as well as a
higher loss given default reflecting the subordination of the
notes to other claims on the bank.  The rating also incorporates
Moody's assessment of a high probability of support for the notes
from the Mexican government should the bank face financial stress.

The hybrid subordinated capital notes are (i) subordinated and
junior to all senior notes/creditors, (ii) pari passu with all
other unsecured subordinated preferred indebtedness, (iii) senior
to subordinated non-preferred, and (iv) senior to all classes of
capital stock.  Bancomext has the right to defer but not cancel
payment of interest or principal if capitalization ratios fall
below 10.5% for the total capital ratio, 8.5% for the Tier 1
ratio, and 7% for the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio.  These ratios
are each 250 basis points higher than the respective minimum
regulatory requirements.

The (P)Ba1 (hyb) rating for these notes benefits from Moody's
assessment of high government support related to (i) the bank's
full government ownership and the Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit's active involvement in the bank's management, (ii) its
important public policy role to promote the export sector and
those industries which are major magnets of foreign currency for
the country, and (iii) reputational risk to the government and the
likely negative consequences to the government's own cost of
funding and that of Mexico's other development banks and
government-related issuers should Bancomext default on the notes.
The government's ability to provide support is derived from its A3
bond rating, with a negative outlook.

While the principal of the notes is ultimately protected by the
government's statutory commitment to fulfill all of the bank's
financial obligations, which results in six notches of uplift to
the bank's senior debt, this commitment does not protect
noteholders from an interest deferral pursuant to the terms of the
notes.  Although the government asserts that it is committed to
supporting the notes and it is likely that it will inject
additional capital into the bank before any of the interest
deferral triggers are breached, it is not possible to say with
certainty that the government's commitment will remain if and when
the bank is actually in need of such support, particularly if the
government's own finances have deteriorated as well.  The rating
agency noted that as the notes are structured for regulatory
capital treatment, they provide loss absorption by design, which
the government and the bank may ultimately choose to take
advantage of should the bank's financial fundamentals deteriorate

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
notes, but these ratings only represent Moody's preliminary credit
opinion.  Upon a conclusive review of the transaction and
associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the hybrid subordinated notes.  A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.


Bancomext's BCA of ba3 reflects its narrow profitability and very
high loan growth levels in the last three years, which have led to
a deterioration of its once strong capital levels, as well as a
marked increase in its oil-related exposures in the last year,
which now equal about 80% of tangible common equity.  The bank's
net interest margin is a very narrow 1.5%, a reflection of its
public policy mandate.  In addition, Bancomext's profitability
will be periodically affected by extraordinary provisioning needs
related to its high industry and single borrower concentrations.
Asset risk has increased as a result of loan growth that has
averaged 32% over the past three years in response to various
government mandates, notwithstanding sound credit policies aimed
at mitigating the impacts of those mandates.  Although the bank's
tangible common equity fell to just 11.1% of adjusted risk-
weighted assets as of March 2016, from about 14.2% as of year-end
2013, as a result of rapid loan growth coupled with weak earnings
generation, core capitalization remains adequate.  Management
expects the capital ratio to remain stable going forward despite
continued high loan growth of 20% for 2016 based on an expectation
of continued capital support by the federal government.  The
current note issuance will increase the bank's total regulatory
capital ratio to about 18%.  While Moody's does not view the notes
as capital because they will not provide meaningful loss
absorption before the bank reaches the point of non-viability, the
bank will have a cushion of about 800 basis points between its
total capital ratio and the interest deferral trigger for total
capital; however, the cushion for Tier 1 capital is narrower at
about 400 basis points.


A downward change in the BCA of Bancomext would likely result in
changes to the (P)Ba1 (hyb) rating assigned to the securities.
Bancomext's BCA could be adjusted downwards if its already high
exposures to the oil sector continue to increase or if the
creditworthiness of the state-owned oil company or Bancomext's
core capitalization were to deteriorate further.  In addition, an
increase in the probability of a coupon suspension driven by a
decline in the bank's total capital ratio to below 13.5% or Tier 1
capital to below 11% would also lead Moody's to reconsider the
rating level.

Upward ratings pressure is limited at this time as a result of
Mexico's less favorable operating environment, which has shifted
the balance of risks and opportunities for Bancomext to the

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Bancomext ratings is between Jan. 1, 2011, and March 31,

CAMPOSOL SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC-', Off CreditWatch Developing
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating and issue-
level ratings on Camposol S.A. to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'.  S&P also
removed the ratings from CreditWatch with developing implications,
where S&P placed them on June 6, 2016.  The outlook is negative.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view of Camposol's higher refinancing
risk and the likelihood of default if the company is unable to
refinance its short-term debt maturities in the next six months.
Although Camposol completed the exchange of 73.75% of its senior
unsecured notes due Feb. 2, 2017, -- a transaction that S&P
considered as a distressed exchange--the company continues to
carry $85 million in short-term debt, including $52.5 million from
the 2017 notes.

S&P continues to view Camposol's liquidity as weak.  Absent the
refinancing of its upcoming debt maturities, S&P expects uses of
cash will exceed sources of cash, resulting in a considerable
deficit in the next six months.

P U E R T O    R I C O

CYMA CLEANING: Unsecured Trade Claims to Get 3% Under Plan
CYMA Cleaning Contractors, Inc., Innova Industrial Contractor,
Inc., Handy Man Services, Inc., and Ambitek Industrial
Contractors, Inc., filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico filed a supplement to their disclosure
statement including proposed payments under their plan of
reorganization and reorganization plan cash flow forecast for
years one to seven of the plan.

According to the supplement, the allowed unsecured priority claims
from employees (Class 7) will be paid in monthly cash payments, in
full, plus interest at 3.25% in a term not to exceed five years
from the entry of the order of relief.

The allowed unsecured claims of governmental units (Class 8) and
the allowed unsecured claims from banking institutions (Class 9)
will receive a 3% payment of the allowed amount in 84 monthly
installments.  The Debtors' allowed liability to Class 8 is
estimated in the amount of $210,744.  The Debtors' allowed
liability to Class 9 is estimated in the amount of $282,699.

The allowed unsecured trade claims (Class 10) will receive a 3%
payment of the allowed amount on effective date.  The Debtors'
allowed liability to Class 10 is estimated in the amount of

A full-text copy of the Supplement dated Aug. 1, 2016, is
available at

CYMA Cleaning Contractors, Inc. (Bankr. D.P.R., Case No. 15-
06582), Innova Industrial Contractor, Inc. (Bankr. D.P.R., Case
No. 15-06584), and Handy Man Services, Inc. (Bankr. D.P.R., Case
No. 15-06585), filed Chapter 11 Petitions on August 27, 2015.

The Debtors' counsel is Mary Ann Gandia-Fabian, Esq., at
Gandia-Fabian Law Office, in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

At the time of filing, CYMA Cleaning had $500,000 to $1.0 million
in estimated assets and $1.0 million to $10.0 million in estimated
liabilities; Innova Industrial had $100,000 to $500,000 in
estimated assets and $50,000 to $100,000 in estimated liabilities;
and Handy Man Services had $100,000 to $500,000 in estimated
assets and $1.0 million to $10.0 million in estimated liabilities.

The petition was signed by Ivelisse Gonzalez Rodriguez, president,
CYMA Cleaning Contractors.

SPORTS AUTHORITY: Denver Broncos to Assume Naming Rights Deal
Sports Authority Holdings, Inc., and its affiliated debtors ask
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for authority to:

     -- assume an Agreement for Naming Rights, dated as of June
        15, 2001, by and between INVESCO Funds Group, Inc., and
        Metropolitan Football Stadium District, which was assumed
        by Debtor TSA Stores, Inc. pursuant to an Assignment,
        Assumption and Consent Agreement, dated as of August 19,
        2011, and

     -- assign the Naming Rights Agreement to Stadium Management
        Company, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, and
        PDB Sports, LTD, a Colorado Limited Partnership doing
        business as the Denver Broncos Football Club.

Pursuant to the Naming Rights Contract, TSA received naming
rights, beginning Aug. 19, 2011, for the stadium located at 1701
Bryant Street in the City and County of Denver, which is the home
venue for the NFL football team known as the Denver Broncos, and
for other sports and entertainment events.

TSA and the Broncos are parties a Sponsorship Agreement dated as
of Aug. 1, 2011.  In consideration for the exclusive sponsorship
rights, TSA agreed to pay an annual sponsorship fee in quarterly

The Debtors sought authority to reject the Sponsorship Agreement,
among other executory contracts, effective as of June 3, 2016.  On
June 22, the Court entered an order granting the Rejection Motion.
Among other things, the Rejection Order authorized the Debtors to
reject the Sponsorship Agreement effective as of June 3, 2016.

On June 21, 2016, the Broncos filed a Motion seeking allowance and
immediate payment of an administrative expense claim in the amount
of $1,081,744.  The hearing on the Administrative Claim Motion is
scheduled for Aug. 31, 2016.

On July 12, 2016, the Debtors reached a Settlement Agreement with
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as the Term Loan Agent.  The
Debtors requested, among other things, the approval of (i) an
allowed superpriority adequate protection claim for the Term Loan
Lenders in the amount of $71,000,000, (ii) the approval of a
wind-down budget providing for the use of cash collateral to pay
certain administrative expense claims and wind-down the Debtors'
estates, and (iii) a waiver of the Bankruptcy Code Section 506(c)
surcharge in favor of the Term Loan Lenders.

The Broncos objected to the proposed settlement on the grounds
that the wind-down budget did not provide for payment of the
Broncos' alleged administrative expense claim that allegedly arose
as a result of the rejection of the Sponsorship Agreement.

The Debtors are currently in the process of liquidating their
assets and will not continue operations as a going concern. The
Debtors have sold substantially all of their inventory, furniture,
fixtures and equipment and conducted "going out of business" sales
at the Debtors' remaining locations. The final going out of
business sales concluded on or before July 29, 2016, and the
Debtors vacated their remaining store locations by July 31, 2016.

The Debtors extensively marketed their interests in the Naming
Rights Contract as part of an auction process.  The Debtors,
through their intellectual property marketing agent, Hilco IP
Services, LLC d/b/a Hilco Streambank, reached out to more than 200
potential buyers, 7 of which engaged in diligence using the
Debtors' online data room. Ultimately, however, the Debtors did
not receive a cash bid for the Naming Rights Contract.

However, the Debtors did receive an offer from the Broncos for the
Naming Rights Contract, which the Debtors determined was the
highest and best available bid for the Naming Rights Contract.

The pertinent terms of the Assumption and Assignment Agreement

     -- The Debtors will assume and assign the Naming Rights
        Contract to the Broncos, effective as of July 31, 2016;

     -- The Broncos will assume all obligations under the Naming
        Rights Contract, including the obligation to make a
        payment of $3,601,890 due on August 1, 2016;

     -- The Debtors will pay $50,000 to the Broncos;

     -- The Broncos will indemnify the Debtors for any
        administrative expense liability the Debtors' estates
        incur to the MFSD under the Naming Rights Contract between
        July 31, 2016 and August 31, 2016 if assumption and
        assignment of the Naming Rights Contract is not approved
        by the Court;

     -- The Broncos will release all claims they have against the
        Debtors, including, for the avoidance of doubt, any
        asserted administrative expense claims; and

     -- The Broncos will withdraw the Settlement Objection and the
        Administrative Claim Motion.

"The Debtors extensively marketed the Naming Rights Contract for
sale and did not locate a buyer that was willing to provide cash
consideration.  However, by reaching an agreement with the Broncos
related to the assumption and assignment of the Naming Rights
Contract, the Debtors were able to resolve the Broncos' pending
Administrative Claim Motion and Settlement Objection. In the
Administrative Claim Motion, the Broncos sought allowance and
immediate payment of an alleged administrative expense claim that
exceeds $1 million. Assumption and assignment of the Naming Rights
Contract allows the Debtors to settle that claim for only $50,000
in cash. Given that the Debtors had no other offers for the Naming
Rights Contract, the Debtors submit that this deal is imminently
reasonable," Andrew L. Magaziner, Esq., at Young Conaway Stargatt
& Taylor, said.

                 About Sports Authority Holdings

Sports Authority Holdings, et al., are sporting goods retailers
with roots dating back to 1928.  The Debtors currently operate 464
stores and five distribution centers across 40 U.S. states and
Puerto Rico.  The Debtors offer a broad selection of goods from a
wide array of household and specialty brands, including Adidas,
Asics, Brooks, Columbia, FitBit, Hanesbrands, Icon Health and
Fitness, Nike, The North Face, and Under Armour, in addition to
their own private label brands.  The Debtors employ 13,000 people.

Sports Authority and six of its affiliates filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10527 to
16-10533) on March 2, 2016.  The petitions were signed by Michael
E. Foss as chairman & chief executive officer.

The Debtors have engaged Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP as general
counsel, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as co-counsel,
Rothschild Inc. as investment banker, FTI Consulting, Inc., as
financial advisor and Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as notice,
claims, solicitation, balloting and tabulation agent.

Andrew Vara, Acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, appointed seven
creditors of Sports Authority Holdings Inc. to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors.  Lawyers at Pachulski
Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP represent the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors.

S T.   K I T T S  &  N E V I S

UNITED AIRLINES: Boosts Service to Country
------------------------------------------ reports that the United Airlines plans to expand
its Saturday service between the airline's New York/Newark gateway
airport, Liberty International Airport (EWR) and St Kitts (SKB).

It will recommence service on November 19, 2016, and will fly
throughout the winter, summer and fall in 2017, according to  "I am very pleased that we will be receiving
additional flights from United Airlines," said Lindsay Grant,
minister of tourism, international trade, industry and commerce.

"The extension of United's service will significantly increase
capacity into the Federation from the New York metro area, a
primary market for visitors to St Kitts," the report quoted Ms.
Grant as saying.

United will operate 50 percent more flights between EWR and SKB
and will begin its winter season early this year on November 19,
the report notes.

United will operate Saturday-only service between EWR and SKB:
United will continue to utilize a 737-800 aircraft with capacity
ranging from 154 to 166 seats for these flights, the report
relays.  Those flights will complement existing non-stop airlift
into St Kitts from North America, providing more convenient
options for travel to St Kitts, the report adds.

                         About UAL Corp.

Based in Chicago, Illinois, UAL Corporation (NASDAQ: UAUA) -- is the holding company for United
Airlines, Inc.  United Airlines is the world's second largest air
carrier.  The airline flies to Brazil, Korea and Germany.

The company filed for Chapter 11 protection on Dec. 9, 2002
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Case No. 02-48191).  James H.M. Sprayregen,
Esq., Marc Kieselstein, Esq., David R. Seligman, Esq., and Steven
R. Kotarba, Esq., at Kirkland & Ellis, represented the Debtors in
their restructuring efforts.  Fruman Jacobson, Esq., at
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP represented the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors before the Committee was
dissolved when the Debtors emerged from bankruptcy.

Judge Eugene R. Wedoff confirmed the Debtors' Second Amended Plan
on Jan. 20, 2006.  The company emerged from bankruptcy protection
on Feb. 1, 2006.

                           *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter, on Aug. 24, 2014, reported that
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'A- (sf)' rating
to United Airlines Inc.'s series 2014-2 class A pass-through
certificates (with an expected maturity of Sept. 3, 2026).  At the
same time, S&P assigned its 'BB+ (sf)' rating to the company's
series 2014-2 class B pass-through certificates (with an expected
maturity of Sept. 3, 2022).

The TCR, on July 30, 2014, reported that S&P assigned its
preliminary 'A-(sf)' rating to United Airlines Inc.'s series 2014-
2 class A pass-through certificates (with an expected maturity of
Sept. 3, 2026).  At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary
'BB+ (sf)' rating to the company's series 2014-2 class B pass-
through certificates (with an expected maturity of Sept. 3, 2022).

On the same date, the TCR reported that Fitch Ratings assigned the
following expected ratings to United Airlines' (UAL, rated 'B';
Outlook Positive by Fitch) proposed Pass Through Trusts Series
2014-2: (i) $823,071,000 Class A certificates due in September
2026 'A(EXP)'; and (ii) $238,418,000 Class B certificates due in
September 2022 'BB+(EXP)'.

The TCR, on July 29, 2014, reported that S&P assigned its 'BB-'
issue rating and '1' recovery rating to United Airlines Inc.'s new
$500 million senior secured term loan B due 2021.  The '1'
recovery rating indicates S&P's expectation for very high recovery
(90%-100%) in a payment default scenario.  At the same, the 'BB-'
issue level rating and '1' recovery rating on the upsized $1.35
billion revolving credit facility due 2019 remain unchanged.

On July 28, 2014, the TCR reported that Moody's Investors Service
assigned a Ba2 rating to the $500 million incremental term loan
facility due 2021 that United Airlines, Inc. ("United") announced
it plans to arrange. The Corporate Family rating of UAL is B2.

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: Under Scutiny Ahead of Release of Audits
RJR News reports that Caribbean Airlines Limited is under scrutiny
amid signs that it will be tardy in releasing another of  set of
audited results.

In e-mailed responses to the Trinidad Guardian newspaper, the
airline admitted that its 2015 financial statements have not been
produced on time, according to RJR News.

Caribbean Airlines said the field work for the financial year
which ended on December 31, will commence next month. It added
that the audit for the financial year ending December 31, 2014 is
in progress and is expected to be concluded by October this year,
the report notes.

A recent newspaper article in Trinidad criticized the airline, and
the three administrations since its establishment in September
2006, for failing to publish CAL's audited accounts, the report

The airline said some audited financial statements have been
adopted by the board of directors and the shareholders and
submitted to the Ministry of Finance, the report says.

Questions have also been raised about the delay in appointing a
chief executive, the report notes.

The post has been vacant since Michael DiLollo resigned last

Mr. DiLollo, who cited personal reasons for his departure, worked
at the airline for 17 months, the report notes.

Caribbean Airline's Chairman Philip Marshall subsequently
announced that Chief Financial Officer Tyrone Tang would act in
the position as chief executive.

Meanwhile, former Minister in Trinidad and Tobago's Ministry of
Finance, Vasant Bharath, has called for disclosure regarding
Caribbean Airlines' operations including its routes, the report

In an interview with the Guardian newspaper, Mr. Bharath said
neither CAL nor the government had provided details on the plan to
maintain certain routes, the report discloses.

Mr. Bharath called for the airline to disclose which routes it
intends to keep, which ones are making losses, and if they will be
maintained, the report relays.

The former Minister suggested there is no strategic direction when
it comes to the management of Caribbean Airlines, including the
strategy for generating additional revenues, the report adds.

                     About Caribbean Airlines

Caribbean Airlines Limited --
-- provides passenger airline services in the Caribbean, South
America, and North America.  The company also offers freighter
services for perishables, fish and seafood, live animals, human
remains, and dangerous goods.  In addition, it operates a duty
free store in Trinidad.  Caribbean Airlines Limited was founded in
2006 and is based in Piarco, Trinidad and Tobago.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
November 2, 2015, RJR News said that Michael DiLollo, Chief
Executive Officer of Caribbean Airlines Limited has quit after
just 17 months on the job. The 48-year-old Canadian national,
citing personal reasons, resigned with immediate effect.  His
resignation was accepted by the airline's board of directors. Mr.
DiLollo was appointed Caribbean Airlines CEO in May 2014,
following the sudden resignation of Robert Corbie in September

In early February 2015, Larry Howai, then Finance Minister, told
Parliament that unaudited accounts for 2014 showed the airline
made a loss of US$60 million, inclusive of its Air Jamaica
operations, and the airline planned to break even by 2017.
Mr. Howai told the Parliament that a five-year strategic plan had
been completed and was in the process of being approved for

In an interview with the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian in early
November 2015, Mr. DiLollo said CAL did not need a bailout just
yet. Mr. DiLollo said the airline had benefited from extremely
patient shareholders for years and he believed the airline was
strategically positioned to break even in three years.


CORPORACION ELECTRICA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Corporacion Electrica Nacional S.A.'s
(CORPOELEC) local and foreign currency Issuer Default Ratings at

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

CORPOELEC's ratings reflect the company's strong linkage to the
government of Venezuela (rated 'CCC' by Fitch), given its tight
integration into the public sector, evidenced by its 100% public
ownership and dependence on public funding to carry on day-to-day
operations, honor financial obligations and finance capital
expenditure needs.

The ratings also reflect the environment of weak administrative
control under which CORPOELEC conducts its operations.  The poor
quality of its financial and accounting information has prevented
the auditors from issuing an opinion on the company's financial
statements for the period 2009 - 2014.  Audited financial
statements were not available for FY 2015.  The company's
monopolistic condition as the sole provider of electricity
services in the country (generation, transmission, distribution
and retail) is also factored into the rating.

The ratings incorporate Venezuela's weakening policy framework,
which is the result of increased vulnerability to commodity price
shocks and deterioration in fiscal and external credit metrics.
The lack of sustained and coherent policy adjustments could lead
to further erosion in external buffers, macroeconomic and
financial instability, and exacerbate the risk of social unrest
given the high level of political polarization.

Ratings Linked to the Government

CORPOELEC's credit profile reflects its strong credit linkage with
the Republic of Venezuela as the latter is closely integrated
within the public sector.  The company's sole shareholder is the
Ministry of Popular Power for Electric Energy (MPPEE), which has a
public mandate to operate the nation's electricity sector
according to its planning directives, and heavily depends on
public sector transfers and subsidies for the sustainability of
its operations.  The company receives explicit support from both
the Central Government, through operational and capital
expenditure allocations contained in the nation's budget, and from
PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela, SA) in the form of subsidized fuel

Poor Quality of Information

CORPOELEC's most recent audited consolidated financial statements
are for the period 2014.  During the period 2011 - 2014 the
auditor, Ernst & Young, could not issue an opinion on the
reasonability of the statements given the weaknesses observed in
the administrative control environment and lack of accounting
support to establish an opinion on key components of the company's
financial statements.  At the time of publication the company did
not make available its audited financial statements for FY 2015.

Monopolistic Position

CORPOELEC is a vertically integrated public utility in charge of
the operation of the country's electricity assets and the
provision of electricity services in Venezuela.  The company
absorbed all generation assets and transmission, distribution and
retail infrastructure in the country during the period 2010 -
2011, affording it an installed capacity of 28,998 MW (52% Hydro,
48% Thermo) and a client base of 6.4 million users by December
2015.  CORPOELEC's monopolistic position conveys the company's
strategic relevance to the country given the essential nature of
the service provided and the sector's correlation with GDP growth.

Operational Results Impacted by Tariff Lag

The state's control of CORPOELEC exposes the company to political
interference in its day-to-day operations.  Tariffs are set by the
MPPEE and are expected to continue to be below the level necessary
to allow for cost recovery.  Tariffs had been frozen since 2002,
but the MPPEE implemented tariff adjustments during 2013 - 2014
resulting in an average tariff increase of 29.8% in 2015.  In
spite of these price adjustments, CORPOELEC continued to post a
large operational deficit before government's current transfers,
as evidenced by pro forma results for FY 2015 (negative EBITDA of
Bs. 123,452 million at Dec. 31, 2015).

As a result, Fitch expects CORPOELEC's dependence on public
funding to remain unchanged going forward (preserving the linkage
to the sovereign) and as its standalone credit profile
deteriorates over time due to low tariffs preventing the recovery
of operational costs.

Sovereign Support Needed to Fund CAPEX:

By the end of 2015, CORPOELEC executed USD 2,590 million in CAPEX
(USD 4.1 billion in 2014) of which 61.5% or USD 1.6 billion was
associated with progress of existing generation projects (USD 2.8
billion in 2014).  The low level of additional CAPEX and the
progress in on going CAPEX execution, allowed CORPOELEC to
incorporate 707 MW of new capacity and re-establish 2,485 MW to
the SEN in 2015.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

The key rating triggers that could lead to a negative rating
action include:

   -- A downgrade of the sovereign;
   -- Lack of financial support coming from the central government
      and its agencies in order to allow CORPOELEC to service its
      financial obligations on a timely basis, particularly the
      EDC bond maturing in October 2018 (USD650 million).

                        KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The continuation of the tariff lag impedes cost recovery of
operations, which strengthens CORPOELEC's rating linkage to the


Liquidity is determined by opportune access to government
transfers that allow CORPOELEC to meet operating costs, finance
its capex and meet its financial obligations.


Fitch has affirmed CORPOELEC's ratings as:

   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA(ven)';
   -- National Short-Term Rating at 'F1+(ven)';
   -- EDC's USD650 million senior unsecured bond issuances due
      2018 at 'CCC/RR4'.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Aug. 1 to Aug. 5, 2016

Issuer Name                  Cpn   Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------                  ---   -----   --------  -------   ---
Andino Investment Holding     11   70.85  11/13/2020   PE     USD
Andino Investment Holding     11   68.88  11/13/2020   PE     USD
Anton Oilfield Services G     7.5  69.03   11/6/2018   CN     USD
Anton Oilfield Services G     7.5     66   11/6/2018   CN     USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 Lt   0.719   38.5               KY     EUR
BA-CA Finance Cayman Ltd    0.749  38.93               KY     EUR
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman    6.25  62.84               KY     USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman    6.25  59.51               KY     USD
BPI Capital Finance Ltd      2.29     40               KY     EUR
CA La Electricidad de Car     8.5  43.75   4/10/2018   VE     USD
Chile Government Internat   3.625   15.7  10/30/2042   CL     USD
CSN Islands XI Corp         6.875  61.25   9/21/2019   KY     USD
CSN Islands XI Corp         6.875  61.13   9/21/2019   KY     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp            7   48.8               BR     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp            7  47.75               BR     USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso    4.54  59.75  10/25/2041   PA     USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso       6  71.38  10/25/2041   PA     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45   70.8    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.35   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  70.42    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.72   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.71   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.23   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  70.52   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    7.75  74.84  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.94   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.95   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.82    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.56    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  72.94   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    7.75  74.95   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.74   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.73   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  72.77   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Empresa de Telecomunicaci       7  71.24   1/17/2023   CO     COP
Empresa de Telecomunicaci       7  71.24   1/17/2023   CO     COP
ESFG International Ltd      5.753  0.883               KY     EUR
General Exploration Partn    11.5  36.75  11/13/2018   CA     USD
General Shopping Finance       10  60.55               KY     USD
General Shopping Finance       10  60.63               KY     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10  70.88    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10  71.88    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10   50.5    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10     54    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Glorious Property Holding   13.25  74.56    3/4/2018   HK     USD
Gol Finance Inc              9.25  47.35   7/20/2020   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              8.75  37.75               BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5     61    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5  59.38    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5  59.38    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              9.25  43.38   7/20/2020   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              8.75  36.88               BR     USD
Green Dragon Gas Ltd           10  63.75  11/20/2017   HK     USD
Greenfields Petroleum Cor       9  11.35   5/31/2017   US     CAD
Honghua Group Ltd            7.45  58.25   9/25/2019   CN     USD
Honghua Group Ltd            7.45     58   9/25/2019   CN     USD
Inversora Electrica de Bu     6.5   59.5   9/26/2017   AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp             7.5  67.25   4/25/2019   HK     USD
MIE Holdings Corp             7.5  68.58   4/25/2019   HK     USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman Isl    3.38  60.22    2/7/2035   KY     EUR
Newland International Pro     9.5  24.13    7/3/2017   PA     USD
Newland International Pro     9.5  25.13    7/3/2017   PA     USD
Noble Holding Internation     6.2  65.42    8/1/2040   KY     USD
Noble Holding Internation    6.05  66.38    3/1/2041   KY     USD
Noble Holding Internation    5.25  64.71   3/15/2042   KY     USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc            7.25  57.75    4/1/2019   CY     USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc            7.25     55    4/1/2019   CY     USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe     6.35     27   6/30/2021   KY     USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe     6.35   28.5   6/30/2021   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7.5     40               KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       4.375  37.23   4/25/2025   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       7.125   33.5   6/26/2042   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        5.25   34.5   6/27/2029   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       5.125     36   6/26/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        8.25     35   4/25/2018   KY     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           7   53.5   4/21/2020   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           6  41.51    4/5/2023   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        5.25     36   6/27/2029   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       4.375     36   4/25/2025   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       7.125  33.75   6/26/2042   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7.5   42.5               KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        8.25     35   4/25/2018   KY     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       5.125  35.38   6/26/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           6  38.88    4/5/2023   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           7     44   4/21/2020   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli    6.75     17   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli   6.625     17   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli    6.75  17.38   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli   6.625  17.38   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    5.25   67.5   4/12/2017   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   12.75   56.1   2/17/2022   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       9  49.38  11/17/2021   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    9.75  44.57   5/17/2035   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6   38.5   5/16/2024   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  36.75  11/15/2026   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   5.375     37   4/12/2027   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA     5.5  36.75   4/12/2037   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  32.13  10/28/2022   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6   36.4  11/15/2026   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  35.35   5/16/2024   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    9.75   41.7   5/17/2035   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       9  45.25  11/17/2021   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   12.75  46.15   2/17/2022   VE     USD
Polarcus Ltd                  5.6  44.93   3/30/2022   AE     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     1.6148     62    5/4/2024   AR     ARS
PSOS Finance Ltd            11.75  60.13   4/23/2018   KY     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.22   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.88  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7   73.6    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.99   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.22   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.77   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.39   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.75   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.39   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.81   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.78   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7   73.6    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.98   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.98   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.77   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.99   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.97   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.88  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.84    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.55   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.85    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.45    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.81   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.75   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.74   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.97   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.99   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.85    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.45    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.74   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.78   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.84    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.99   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.55   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        4.125  37.25   11/1/2022   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA         5.75   36.6  10/24/2023   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        5.375  35.38   9/26/2024   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        4.125  37.38   11/1/2022   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA         5.75  39.63  10/24/2023   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        5.375  37.25   9/26/2024   BR     USD
Siem Offshore Inc            5.69  52.25   1/30/2018   NO     NOK
Siem Offshore Inc            5.49  51.75   3/28/2019   NO     NOK
Transocean Inc               5.05  74.75  10/15/2022   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                6.8  63.66   3/15/2038   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                7.5  65.78   4/15/2031   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                9.1  70.41  12/15/2041   KY     USD
Transocean Inc               7.45   74.9   4/15/2027   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                  8  73.55   4/15/2027   KY     USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesoro     5.25  61.99  12/29/2021   UY     UYU
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305  43.92   12/1/2039   KY     USD
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305  43.92   12/1/2039   KY     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    9.25  49.03   9/15/2027   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   11.75   49.5  10/21/2026   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   11.95   49.5    8/5/2031   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    7.75  47.38  10/13/2019   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625  65.25   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   9.375  45.85   1/13/2034   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       7  52.85   12/1/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       7     42   3/31/2038   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       9   45.5    5/7/2023   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    9.25   45.5    5/7/2028   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    8.25  44.38  10/13/2024   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       6   43.5   12/9/2020   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625   56.5   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    7.65  43.25   4/21/2025   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625  59.69   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   12.75   53.5   8/23/2022   VE     USD
Venezuela Government TICC    5.25  53.23   3/21/2019   VE     USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        10.75  25.63   2/12/2023   BR     USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        10.75  25.63   2/12/2023   BR     USD
XLIT Ltd                      6.5     70               IE     USD


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding,
electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited
without prior written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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