/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/160815.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Monday, August 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 160
Headlines
A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A
LIAT: Faces Customer Complaints Over Luggage Mishandling
LIAT: PAWA to Collaborate With Winair
A R G E N T I N A
INKIA ENERGY: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR, Outlook Remains Stable
B R A Z I L
AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB', Outlook Negative
BANCO DO BRASIL: Profit Misses Estimates on Higher Provisions
BRAZIL: Real Weakens as Central Bank Steps Up Intervention Effort
BRAZIL: DBRS Lowers Foreign Currency Issuer Rating to 'BB'
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
ASSADAFA INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 25
BOSSA CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 31
GLOBALCOM: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Sept. 14
JUNIPER NETWORKS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 2
MAGAVIE LIMITED: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 5
NEZU KT: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 2
NEZU KUMA: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 2
PPE HOLDINGS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Sept. 15
SANITAS GLOBAL: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 26
TAF MERCURY: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 9
TAF VENUS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 9
TITAN I G: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Sept. 14
TREMONT MARKET: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 2
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Unresolved Issues Hold Back Electricity Pact
E L S A L V A D O R
EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Issuer & Debt Ratings to B1, On Review
M E X I C O
OFFICE DEPOT: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR, Outlook Negative
P U E R T O R I C O
CYMA CLEANING: Court Confirms Plan & Approves Disclosure Statement
PUERTO RICO: Treasury Didn't Tell Island to Default, Lawyer Says
X X X X X X X X X
[*] LATAM: IMF Concludes Discussion on Common Policies With ECCU
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Aug. 8 to Aug. 12, 2016
- - - - -
===============================
A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A
===============================
LIAT: Faces Customer Complaints Over Luggage Mishandling
--------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that a group of citizens who returned to
Trinidad and Tobago from St. Vincent have not received their
luggage from regional carrier LIAT (Leeward Islands Air
Transport).
Indra Balkaran, a passenger on Flight 771 that left the ET Joshua
Airport, said one of the passengers who suffers from seizures was
in need of her medication which was in her luggage, according to
Trinidad Express.
* * *
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
8, 2015, the Daily Observer reports that LIAT, operating as
Leeward Islands Air Transport, is attempting to lose excess
baggage as part of measures to make the carrier "a smaller airline
in 2015." In a document signed by Director of Human Resources
Ilean Ramsey, eligible employees were asked to opt to apply for
voluntary separation or early retirement packages to avoid being
made redundant, according to The Daily Observer.
TCRLA reported on Dec. 2, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, that
chairman of the shareholder governments of the financially
troubled regional airline LIAT, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, said that
while he is unaware of the details regarding any possible
retrenchment of employees, the airline needs to deal with its high
cost of operations.
The TCR-LA on March 10, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, reported
that LIAT said it will take "decisive action" to deal with
unprofitable routes as the Antigua-based airline seeks to make its
operations financially viable.
On Sept. 23, 2013, the TCRLA, citing Trinidad and Tobago Newsday,
reported that there's much upheaval at the highest levels of LIAT
-- the Board and the Executive. Following the sudden resignation
of Chief Executive Officer Captain Ian Brunton, David Evans
replaced Mr. Brunton as chief executive officer.
LIAT: PAWA to Collaborate With Winair
-------------------------------------
The Daily Observer reports that regional air carriers LIAT,
operating as Leeward Islands Air Transport, and Winair have been
called to the table by the Chairman of Pan Am World Airways
Dominicana (PAWA Dominicana) Luis David Ramirez who proposes that
they co-operate to "feed" each other's routes.
The PAWA Dominicano chairman has also indicated that the airline,
which has operated in Antigua & Barbuda for a year, will not
compete directly with the government-owned LIAT, according to The
Daily Observer.
The report quoted Mr. Ramirez as saying, "This is our idea of our
operation -- we do not compete against anybody. We come to the
market, we offer a product and we want to work with everybody. We
will work on setting up inter-airline agreements so that they can
feed our routes and feed our hub.
"We are actually already having conversations with LIAT [and]
Winair to setup those agreements, to have them act as feeders
mutually feeding each other."
PAWA Dominicano, headquartered in the Dominican Republic (which
receives the most tourists of any Caribbean country), is the
international flag carrier of that country and operates widely
across the region.
Mr. Ramirez admitted that there may be some "side effects".
"We have a product, and sometimes our product just let's people
know that their product is not as good as ours and people start
preferring our product," the report related that Mr. Ramirez
stated. "We do not compete on price and we're not starting any
type of price war. We are competing with the quality of our
product," he added.
The "quality" of PAWA Dominicano's airline service includes their
commitment to timely flights, the report says. The chairman added
that over the year of operation in Antigua & Barbuda, the airline
has never cancelled a flight, the report adds.
* * *
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
8, 2015, the Daily Observer reports that LIAT, operating as
Leeward Islands Air Transport, is attempting to lose excess
baggage as part of measures to make the carrier "a smaller airline
in 2015." In a document, signed by Director of Human Resources
Ilean Ramsey, eligible employees were asked to opt to apply for
voluntary separation or early retirement packages to avoid being
made redundant, according to The Daily Observer.
TCRLA reported on Dec. 2, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, that
chairman of the shareholder governments of the financially
troubled regional airline LIAT, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves said while he
is unaware of the details regarding any possible retrenchment of
employees, the airline needs to deal with its high cost of
operations.
The TCR-LA on March 10, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, reported
that LIAT said it will take "decisive action" to deal with
unprofitable routes as the Antigua-based airline seeks to make its
operations financially viable.
On Sept. 23, 2013, the TCRLA, citing Trinidad and Tobago Newsday,
reported that there's much upheaval at the highest levels of LIAT
-- the Board and the Executive. Following the sudden resignation
of Chief Executive Officer Captain Ian Brunton, David Evans
replaced Mr. Brunton as chief executive officer
=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================
INKIA ENERGY: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR, Outlook Remains Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' corporate credit rating on
Inkia Energy Ltd. S&P also affirmed its 'BB' rating on the
company's senior unsecured notes due 2021. The outlook remains
stable.
The ratings affirmation reflects S&P's view that Inkia will
continue to strengthen its EBITDA generation in the next 12-24
months as a result of the consolidation of its latest acquisitions
and the commencement of operations of projects that were under
construction. The affirmation also reflects S&P's expectation
that due the stable and predictable cash flow generation, backed
by medium- to long-term contracts, and a shrinking capital
expenditure program, the company will continue to deleverage, as
seen in a projected adjusted debt to EBITDA in the 3.0x-3.5x and
FFO to debt above the 20% in the next several years.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectations that Inkia will
generate a relatively stable annual EBITDA of at least
$370 million in the 12-24 months thanks to its contractual
structure, as most of its generation business is contracted under
medium- to long-term PPAs and the distribution business receives
highly predictable availability payments. S&P's base-case
scenario assumes an adjusted debt to EBITDA of 3.0x-3.5x and FFO
to debt above 15%, excluding the non-recourse debt at the Cerro
del Aguila and Samay projects.
S&P could lower the ratings if the company's financial performance
deteriorates, for example due to a lower EBITDA stemming from
lower efficiency levels at major power plants (such as Kallpa) or
due to a higher exposure to the spot market that in the countries
were Inkia operates is experiencing relative lower prices than in
the past four years, or if S&P sees higher-than-projected debt,
resulting in permanent recourse adjusted debt to EBITDA of more
than 5x. S&P could also lower the ratings if Inkia were to
financially support its nonrecourse debt-financed projects. Under
such a scenario, S&P would consolidate its debt or if it perceives
a more aggressive acquisition policy that deviate the financial
metrics significantly from S&P's base-case projections.
An upgrade would depend mainly on an improvement in main credit
metrics, for example if adjusted debt to EBITDA were to drop to
3.0x in the upcoming years or if FFO to debt surpasses the 25%
threshold.
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB', Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-Term National Rating of
Agencia de Fomento do Estado de Sao Paulo - Desenvolve SP
(Desenvolve SP) to 'AA(bra)' from 'AA+(bra)' and revised the
Rating Outlook to Stable from Negative. In addition, Fitch has
affirmed the institution's Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency
Issuer Default Ratings at 'BB'. The Outlook for the IDRs remains
Negative, reflecting the Negative Outlook assigned to the State of
Sao Paulo.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
The rating actions on Desenvolve SP follow those taken by Fitch on
Sao Paulo, its main controlling shareholder, on July 27, 2016.
The downgrading of the state's Long-Term National Rating follows
the successive downgrades of the Brazilian sovereign in the last
six months. On the other hand, the affirmation of Sao Paulo's
IDRs reflects its strong economy, which accounts for approximately
one third of the Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The
ratings are based on the state's adequate budget performance, when
compared to its peers in the same rating category, and greater
fiscal autonomy, when compared to other Brazilian states. The
ratings also factor in that the Federal Government is Sao Paulo's
main creditor.
Desenvolve SP's IDRs and National Ratings are aligned with those
of Sao Paulo. The Support Rating (SR) of '3' reflects the
moderate probability of Sao Paulo providing support to Desenvolve
SP, if necessary. Fitch does not assign a Viability Rating to
Desenvolve SP, since it is a development agency.
Fitch views Desenvolve SP as strategically important for Sao
Paulo, with which it is strongly integrated and where it operates
mainly as a financing agent to the private sector, always with a
development bias, and to the state's municipalities. Desenvolve
SP also operates as a service provider/administrator of
development funds, which are important to the state. The modest
size of the development agency relative to GDP and Sao Paulo's
budget reduce the cost of potential support from the government
and increase the state's capacity to support the company, in
Fitch's opinion.
Desenvolve SP has been showing deterioration in its credit quality
indicators. In March 2016, 'D-H' credits were 12.3% (9.7% in
2015, 5.4% in 2014 and 6.8% in 2013), a ratio compatible with its
operating profile. The company has concentrated its efforts on
its control and collection policies. Credit concentration was
acceptable, with the 20 largest clients accounting for 32% of the
total in 2015 (37% in 2014).
As a development agency, Desenvolve SP has encountered constraints
in diversifying its funding base historically The credit portfolio
has been financed, in its majority, with the company's own capital
or with on lendings from official entities such as the National
Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and Finep - Studies
and Projects Financier. The agency intends to diversify its
funding with loans/onlendings from international development
institutions.
Desenvolve SP is highly capitalized, and has historically
distributed a large part of its dividends; Fitch does not expect
changes to this strategy. Due to the characteristics of the
development agency, the interest rates charged in its credit
operations are lower than those offered by institutions in the
banking sector.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Any changes to the state of Sao Paulo's ratings, or to its
capacity or willingness to provide support to Desenvolve SP can
lead to a revision of the institution's ratings. Desenvolve SP's
IDRs carry the Negative Outlook of Sao Paulo.
Fitch has taken these rating actions:
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB';
Outlook Negative;
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';
-- Supporting Rating affirmed at '3';
-- Long-Term National Rating downgraded to 'AA(bra)', from
'AA+(bra)'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative;
-- Short-Term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+ (bra)'.
BANCO DO BRASIL: Profit Misses Estimates on Higher Provisions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Francisco Marcelino at Bloomberg News reports that Banco do Brasil
SA, Latin America's largest bank by assets, said profit dropped 41
percent in the second quarter, missing analysts' estimates, as it
set aside more money for soured loans. The bank cut its forecast
for lending growth, according to Bloomberg News.
Bloomberg News notes that adjusted net income declined to BRL1.8
billion (US$576 million) from BRL3.04 billion a year earlier, the
Brasilia-based lender said in a regulatory filing. That was below
the 1.91 billion-real estimate of six analysts surveyed by
Bloomberg News. Net income dropped 18 percent to BRL2.47 billion.
Profit was hurt mostly by provisions related to "a specific case
of the business segment of oil and gas," the bank said in the
filing, without naming the company involved, Bloomberg News
relays.
Brazilian banks have been struggling through the worst recession
in more than a century, which is fueling bankruptcies and boosting
bad-loan provisions, Bloomberg News says. In April, oil-rig
supplier Sete Brasil Participacoes SA sought protection from
creditors on about BRL18 billion in liabilities, then the nation's
biggest bankruptcy case. Two months later, telecommunication
company Oi SA took the top position with a protection request for
BRL65 billion in debt, Bloomberg News notes.
Banco do Brasil set aside BRL8.28 billion to cover souring loans
in the second quarter, down from BRL9.15 billion in the previous
three months and up from BRL5.19 billion a year earlier, Bloomberg
News says. The company said debt overdue more than 90 days
climbed to 3.27 percent from 1.89 percent a year earlier, hurt by
exposure to the oil and gas industry, Bloomberg News says.
Corporate lending will decline 6 percent to 10 percent this year,
compared with a previous forecast for growth of 1 percent to 4
percent, Bloomberg News says. The 2016 forecast for the bank's
total domestic loan portfolio was a range between a 2 percent
contraction and a 1 percent expansion, Bloomberg News notes.
Banco do Brasil is seeking to sell assets to boost capital. Last
week, it said it's studying with other shareholders the sale of
their stakes in Buenos Aires-based Banco Patagonia SA in a public
offering, Bloomberg News relays. The firm hired JPMorgan Chase &
Co. to help sell the stake, according to a person with direct
knowledge of the matter.
Earlier this month, Itau Unibanco Holding SA's second-quarter
profit beat analysts' estimates on higher revenue from fees and
commissions, Bloomberg News discloses. Last month, Banco Bradesco
SA, Brazil's second-biggest bank by market value, missed earnings
estimates on bad-loan provisions, Bloomberg News adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.
BRAZIL: Real Weakens as Central Bank Steps Up Intervention Effort
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Paula Sambo at Bloomberg News reports that Brazil's real slipped
the most in Latin America as the central bank escalated efforts to
weaken the currency, counteracting optimism after lawmakers voted
to move forward with the impeachment of suspended President Dilma
Rousseff.
The monetary authority increased the amount of reverse foreign-
exchange swaps it is offering from 10,000 to 15,000, a move
equivalent to buying $750 million in the futures market, according
to Bloomberg News.
The Brazilian currency fell 0.5 percent to 3.1444 per dollar in
Aug. 11 in Sao Paulo, after closing at the strongest level in more
than a year on Aug. 10 as the Senate voted in favor of opening the
final phase of the impeachment process, Bloomberg News says.
Bloomberg News notes that policy makers revived the intervention
program in March as the real headed toward the world's biggest
gains this year, dimming the outlook for exports, and have since
sold $56.3 billion of the contracts. The currency has
strengthened amid optimism that the government of Acting President
Michel Temer can trim the country's budget deficit, end credit-
rating downgrades and restore confidence in its ailing economy,
Bloomberg News relays.
"The increase in swap auctions may have caught the market off-
guard this morning, leading to some lightening in positions after
a good run in the BRL this month," said Mike Moran, the head of
economic research for the Americas at Standard Chartered Plc.
"I suspect the market will test the CB's tolerance for currency
strength again in coming weeks," he added, Bloomberg News relays.
"Still, the central bank intervention may not be enough to prevent
the real from strengthening in the short term, said Joao Paulo de
Gracia Correa, the head of foreign currency at brokerage SLW in
Curitiba, Bloomberg News discloses. The favorable international
scenario for emerging-market assets and the expected inflow of
foreign funds to Brazil amid optimism about the government's
efforts to curb spending will offset the intervention," Mr. Moran
said, Bloomberg News notes.
Swap rates on the contract maturing in January 2021, a gauge of
expectations for interest-rate moves, rose 0.03 percentage point
to 11.89 percent, Bloomberg News adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2, negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.
BRAZIL: DBRS Lowers Foreign Currency Issuer Rating to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc., on Aug. 1, 2016, downgraded the Federative Republic of
Brazil's long-term foreign currency issuer rating to BB and the
long-term local currency issuer rating to BB (high). The trend on
both long-term ratings is Negative. DBRS has also downgraded the
short-term foreign currency issuer rating to R-4 with a Stable
trend and the short-term local currency issuer rating to R-3 with
a Negative trend.
The one-notch downgrade reflects the scale of Brazil's fiscal
challenge. The primary deficit is projected to widen to 2.6% of
GDP in 2016, materially larger than expectations during DBRS's
last review in March 2016. Due to the high share of mandatory and
indexed spending, reversing the fiscal trajectory will require
fundamental budgetary reforms. The interim government is designing
a gradual expenditure-based consolidation plan, which includes a
constitutional amendment to cap spending growth to the rate of
inflation. Based on this proposal, DBRS estimates that the primary
fiscal position will balance in 2020 and reach a surplus of 2.0%
of GDP in 2025.
Given the gradual pace of fiscal consolidation, public debt
dynamics could take a decade to stabilize. General government
debt-to-GDP is expected to increase to 88% by 2020 and continue
rising through 2025, although the upward trajectory will moderate
as the fiscal adjustment proceeds. This highlights the extent of
the challenge ahead for Brazil: fiscal policy will need to be
defined by expenditure control and tax increases for the next two
and a half presidential terms. Moreover, the high stock of public
debt leaves little room to maneuver in the event of adverse
shocks.
Risks to the ratings remain skewed to the downside. The level of
political uncertainty is still elevated despite improved
visibility in recent months. It is DBRS's baseline assumption that
the Senate will vote in favor of President Rousseff's impeachment
and the interim government will fulfill the term through 2018.
Nevertheless, fallout from the Car Wash investigations and a
potential ruling by the Electoral Court to annul the 2014
elections pose downside risks. In addition, the Temer
administration could have difficulty navigating major budgetary
reforms through Brazil's fragmented Congress, particularly as
attention turns to social security reform.
The BB ratings reflect DBRS's assessment that Brazil's medium-term
growth prospects are weak. The IMF projects that Brazil will
expand on average 1.8% per year from 2018-2021, well below most
emerging market peers. The poor outlook reflects interlinking
structural constraints of low investment, high business costs and
weak competitive forces. Over the last decade, investment averaged
just 20.6% of GDP per year even as the rapid growth of earmarked
lending contributed to capital misallocation. Underinvestment is
evident in Brazil's large infrastructure gap. High business costs
also stem from a distortionary tax system, which undermines
productivity and weakens incentives to invest.
Potential productivity gains are also held back by the closed
nature of the Brazilian economy. Trade penetration in Brazil is
among the lowest in the world. This partly reflects tariff
barriers, high compliance costs and inward-looking trade policy.
Consequently, Brazil is not fully benefiting from potential
efficiency gains derived from specialization and global
integration.
Notwithstanding these political and economic challenges, the
ratings are underpinned by several credit strengths. Brazil is a
large and diversified economy with abundant natural resources. The
external accounts are sound from a flow and stock perspective: the
current account deficit has narrowed to modest levels, external
liabilities are moderate, and a flexible exchange rate has
facilitated an adjustment amid weaker terms of trade. Furthermore,
the banking system appears sufficiently capitalized to digest
higher credit losses without posing systemic concerns.
In DBRS's view, recent policy actions to address macroeconomic
imbalances could stabilize the ratings in the near term. Though
gradual, the deficit-reduction strategy should anchor expectations
and put the fiscal trajectory on a more sustainable path. At the
same time, tight monetary policy is guiding inflation toward the
central bank's target and helping re-anchor inflation
expectations. A credible political commitment to sound
macroeconomic policy should reduce downside risks to the growth
outlook and support the recovery.
The Temer administration is also shifting economic policy toward a
more market-based approach. The shift includes reinvigorating
infrastructure concessions through regulatory changes, reducing
distortions in credit markets, easing restrictions on foreign
investment in the oil and gas sector, and showing a renewed
interest in global integration. However, given the immediate
concern of restoring fiscal sustainability, implementation of a
broader structural reform agenda will likely depend on the next
administration.
There are some early signs that Brazil's deep recession is
starting to moderate. In the last three months, business and
consumer confidence marginally improved, industrial production
stabilized, and export volumes continued to expand at a strong
pace. However, the pace of recovery will likely be slow, as
contractionary fiscal and monetary policy, private sector
deleveraging, and worsening labor market conditions impede a more
rapid rebound. The IMF estimates that GDP will contract 3.3% in
2016 and return to growth of 0.5% in 2017.
RATING DRIVERS
If unanticipated political developments derail the interim
government's fiscal policy agenda, the ratings could be
downgraded. However, if political risks subside and the government
advances measures underpinning the fiscal adjustment plan, the
trend could be changed to Stable.
RATINGS
Issuer Debt Rated Rating Rating
Action
Brazil, Federative Long-Term Foreign Downgraded BB
Republic of Currency - Issuer
Rating
Brazil, Federative Long-Term Local Downgraded BB
Republic of Currency - Issuer (high)
Rating
Brazil, Federative Short-Term Foreign Downgraded R-4
Republic of Currency - Issuer
Rating
Brazil, Federative Short-Term Foreign Downgraded R-3
Republic of Currency - Issuer
Rating
Other Securities Rated
Also on Aug. 1, 2016, DBRS specifically entered ratings for these
securities types:
Current Rating Last Rating
-------------- -----------
Brazil Letras do Tesouro Nacional (LTN)
(National Treasury Bills)
-- Local Currency LT Debt BBH BBBL
-- Foreign Currency LT Debt BB BBH
Brazil Letras Financeiras do Tesouro
(Financial National Treasury Bills)
-- Local Currency LT Debt BBH BBBL
-- Foreign Currency LT Debt BB BBH
Brazil Notas do Tesouro Nacional Serie B
-- Local Currency LT Debt BBH BBBL
-- Foreign Currency LT Debt BB BBH
Brazil Notas do Tesouro Nacional Serie C
-- Local Currency LT Debt BBH BBBL
-- Foreign Currency LT Debt BB BBH
Brazil Notas do Tesouro Nacional Serie F
-- Foreign Currency LT Debt BB BBH
-- Local Currency LT Debt BBH BBBL
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
ASSADAFA INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 25
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Assadafa Investment Company Limited will hold
their final meeting on Aug. 25, 2016, at 11:00 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Maricorp Services Ltd.
c/o Steven J. Barrie
Telephone: 345-949-9710
P.O. Box 2075 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
Cayman Islands
BOSSA CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 31
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Bossa Capital Management will hold their final
meeting on Aug. 31, 2016, at 9:15 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Ken Stewart
c/o Apex Fund Services (Cayman) Limited
161a Artillery Court
P.O. Box 10085 Grand Cayman KY1 1001
Cayman Islands
GLOBALCOM: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Sept. 14
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Globalcom will hold their final meeting on
Sept. 14, 2016, at 10:30 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Paget-Brown Trust Company Ltd.
c/o Dominique Massias
P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345)-949-5122
Facsimile: (345)-949-7920
JUNIPER NETWORKS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 2
---------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Juniper Networks Holdings (Ireland) will
hear on Sept. 2, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
90 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Susan Craig
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
MAGAVIE LIMITED: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 5
--------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Magavie Limited will hear on Sept. 5,
2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Commerce Corporate Services Limited
P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman
Cayman Islands
Telephone: 949 8666
Facsimile: 949 0626
NEZU KT: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 2
------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Nezu KT Fund Ltd. will hear on Sept. 2,
2016, at 3:00 p.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-
up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Richard Kincaid
c/o Richard Bennett
Telephone: +852 3656 6069
Facsimile: +852 3656 6001
NEZU KUMA: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 2
--------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Nezu Kuma Fund Ltd. will hear on Sept. 2,
2016, at 3:10 p.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-
up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Richard Kincaid
c/o Richard Bennett
Telephone: +852 3656 6069
Facsimile: +852 3656 6001
PPE HOLDINGS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Sept. 15
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of PPE Holdings Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on Sept. 15, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Norman Chan
DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
Telephone: (345) 946 7665
Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
P.O. Box 1344 dms House
20 Genesis Close, George Town KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
SANITAS GLOBAL: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 26
-------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Sanitas Global Opportunity Fund, Ltd. will
hear on Aug. 26, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Crestone Asset Management LLC
c/o Ridhiima Kapoor
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877
TAF MERCURY: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 9
----------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Taf Mercury Lease Limited will hear on
Sept. 9, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
90 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Susan Craig
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
TAF VENUS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 9
--------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Taf Venus Lease Limited will hear on
Sept. 9, 2016, at 9:15 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
90 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Susan Craig
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
TITAN I G: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Sept. 14
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Titan I G will hold their final meeting on
Sept. 14, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Paget-Brown Trust Company Ltd.
c/o Dominique Massias
P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345)-949-5122
Facsimile: (345)-949-7920
TREMONT MARKET: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 2
-------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Tremont Market Neutral Fund Limited will
hear on Sept. 2, 2016, at 9:30 a.m., the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
90 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Susan Craig
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Unresolved Issues Hold Back Electricity Pact
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that long speeches in preliminary meetings
and the various interests are holding back the necessary consensus
on the various issues leading to the Electricity Pact in the
Dominican Republic.
At a meeting, the long debates over issues such as the electricity
meters made impossible to start the talks on the technical fee and
other aspects of the call for tenders to sell and buy energy,
according to Dominican Today.
Power companies association (ADIE) vice president Milton Morrison
said the electric pact has "many issues that waste much time and
are totally sterile and without foundation," the report notes.
Economic and Social Council (CES) President Monsignor Agripino
Nunez agrees, again complaining that the talks are taking too much
time. "The work has been done at a pace that makes it possible to
work on such a complex issue and the diversity of participants and
also, why not, the very interests wrapped in a problem such as
this," the report quoted Mr. Nunez.
Mr. Nunez said the preliminary meetings should be suspended until
Aug. 18, to give the draft committee enough time to advance, the
report relays.
"But again, the work is at a pace that is possible where there are
so many heads talking, there is a group that agrees and another
states something, but you have to understand, is part of the
democratic systems," the prelate said, the report notes.
Some social sector representatives yesterday denounced that
business leaders are proposing a 100 percent jump in the light
bill, on which Nunez said there are two proposals, for which the
draft committee will work to unify the points in common, the
report adds.
* * *
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 8, 2015, the Daily Observer reports that LIAT, operating as
Leeward Islands Air Transport, is attempting to lose excess
baggage as part of measures to make the carrier "a smaller airline
in 2015." In a document, signed by Director of Human Resources
Ilean Ramsey, eligible employees were asked to opt to apply for
voluntary separation or early retirement packages to avoid being
made redundant, according to The Daily Observer.
TCRLA reported on Dec. 2, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, that
chairman of the shareholder governments of the financially
troubled regional airline LIAT, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves said while he
is unaware of the details regarding any possible retrenchment of
employees, the airline needs to deal with its high cost of
operations.
The TCR-LA on March 10, 2014, citing Caribbean360.com, reported
that LIAT said it will take "decisive action" to deal with
unprofitable routes as the Antigua-based airline seeks to make its
operations financially viable.
On Sept. 23, 2013, the TCRLA, citing Trinidad and Tobago Newsday,
reported that there's much upheaval at the highest levels of LIAT
-- the Board and the Executive. Following the sudden resignation
of Chief Executive Officer Captain Ian Brunton, David Evans
replaced Mr. Brunton as chief executive officer.
=====================
E L S A L V A D O R
=====================
EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Issuer & Debt Ratings to B1, On Review
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded El Salvador's issuer and debt
ratings to B1 from Ba3 and placed the ratings on review for
further downgrade.
The key driver for the downgrade to B1 is the continued inability
of the authorities to arrest the upward trend in government debt
amid persistently high fiscal deficits and low economic growth.
Moody's review for further downgrade will assess the rising
government liquidity risks derived from persistently high and
rising short-term debt in a relatively shallow domestic market,
and the legislative impasse that has so far this year prevented
the approval of long-term debt issuance to retire short-term
paper. The review for further downgrade will allow Moody's to
better assess rising liquidity risks in El Salvador's credit
profile and explore possible scenarios that could materialize,
depending on the government's policy response and the outcome of
negotiations between the main political parties in the Legislative
Assembly to normalize the funding situation and, ultimately, avoid
a credit event.
Moody's would downgrade El Salvador's B1 ratings if the review
were to conclude that measures are only sufficient to temporarily
curb the increase in liquidity risks. In this case, the most
likely rating outcome is a one-notch downgrade. However, if
government liquidity risks continue to rise unabated and an
agreement to approve long-term debt issuance to retire short-term
debt remains unlikely, a downgrade of more than one notch would be
possible.
El Salvador's long-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings
were lowered to Ba2 from Ba1. Short-term foreign-currency bond and
deposit ceiling remain unchanged at NP.
Ratings Rationale
Rationale for Downgrading to B1 From Ba3
Government Efforts Have Fallen Short in Addressing the Rising Debt
Trend
Moody's decision to downgrade El Salvador to B1 was driven by the
continued inability of the country's authorities to arrest the
upward trend in government debt amid persistently high fiscal
deficits and low economic growth.
El Salvador's government debt ratios have reported an upward trend
since 2009 driven by fiscal deficits of around 3.6% of GDP, which,
in addition to pension-related expenditures, have been due to an
expanding wage bill and untargeted subsidies. Moody's expects
debt-to-GDP to surpass 60% by year-end 2016. GDP growth of only 2%
implies that a stabilization of debt ratios requires the
authorities to implement aggressive fiscal consolidation measures
involving both revenues and expenditures. Political gridlock in
the Legislative Assembly and a lack of a majority by the ruling
party make this task particularly challenging.
As a result of a slow but steady rise in debt metrics, government
finances are weaker than those of other sovereigns in the Ba
category. El Salvador's debt-to-GDP ratio is 15 percentage points
higher than the Ba median projected to be 47% in 2016. The
government's interest burden (interest payments-to-government
revenues) is 4 percentage points higher than the Ba median (12.7%
vs. 8.7%). Low GDP growth complicates the government's fiscal
consolidation efforts given average annual growth of 1.7% over the
past decade, which compares to 3.7% of the median for Ba-rated
peers over the same period.
"If current fiscal and economic trends continue, without a fiscal
or pension reform, we project the gradual rise in the debt-to-GDP
ratio to continue and to approach 70% by 2020," Moody's said.
The affirmation of the Ba3 ratings last November incorporated
Moody's expectation that the government would take steps to reduce
fiscal deficits and stabilize rising debt ratios. The rating
agency expected this would be supported by approval of a pension
reform. Since then, the government has been unable to reach an
agreement with the opposition, and its efforts were sidetracked
because the ruling party (FMLN) lost support from its main ally
GANA, the third largest party in the Legislative Assembly. Without
GANA's votes, it is unlikely the FMLN will obtain the necessary
votes to approve a pension reform given strong opposition from
ARENA, the opposition party with the most seats in the Assembly.
El Salvador's pension system was privatized in 1998 and moved to a
defined-contributions system. However, the system partly operates
as a pay-as-you-go system with a portion of current pension
obligations financed by the government's budget, while most of the
contributions accrue to the private pension funds for future
pension payments. Moreover, legislative decisions over the past
decade to increase benefits under the private system, to make it
match the old system, have increased the financial costs of the
transition period. According to government estimates, pension-
related government expenditures have hovered at around 1.8% of GDP
during 2005-15 and are expected to remain roughly the same during
the next decade. The accumulation of these annual pension outlays
has led to a steady increase in debt issued to fund pensions,
which now amounts for 13.8% of GDP.
Pension expenditures represent roughly half of the fiscal deficit.
Without addressing pension-related fiscal costs, any single fiscal
effort will have only a limited effect in arresting the debt
trend.
RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW FOR FURTHER DOWNGRADE
Moody's decision to initiate a review for further downgrade of El
Salvador's B1 rating is intended to allow the rating agency to
better assess rising liquidity risks in the country's credit
profile. The review also offers Moody's the opportunity to explore
possible scenarios that could materialize depending on the
government's policy response and the outcome of negotiations
between the main political parties in the Legislative Assembly
that could ease funding pressures and, ultimately, avoid a credit
event.
The government of El Salvador faces increased liquidity risks,
given the continued rise of short-term government paper (LETES)
which currently stands above historical thresholds, challenging
local banks' capacity and willingness to absorb additional
amounts. As the government has been unable to secure approval from
the Legislative Assembly to issue long-term debt, it has been
forced to increasingly finance itself with short-term debt. As a
two-thirds majority vote in the Legislative Assembly is required
to approve long-term debt issuance, the ruling party (FMLN) needs
support from the main opposition party (ARENA) to get approval.
Previous administrations had always been able to broker an
agreement with the opposition to issue long-term debt and retire
LETES when the outstanding amount reached $800 million. Since
January 2016, LETES surpassed the $800 million mark, a level at
which refinancing conditions began to deteriorate. In March, LETES
reached a record high of $937 million and then declined to $857
million in May as the government restrained spending and benefited
from strong revenue collection.
To date, there are no indications that an agreement between the
two main parties will be reached soon.
WHAT COULD RESULT IN A FURTHER DOWNGRADE
Moody's would downgrade El Salvador's B1 rating if the review were
to conclude that an agreement between the political parties, or
other government measures, are only sufficient to temporarily curb
the increase in liquidity risks, provide temporary breathing room
to government finances, and therefore delay a comprehensive
agreement on fiscal and pension reforms. The most likely rating
outcome in that instance would be a one-notch downgrade. However,
if government liquidity risks continue to rise unabated and an
agreement to approve long-term debt issuance to retire short-term
debt is unlikely before the end of the year, a downgrade of more
than one notch is possible.
WHAT COULD CONFIRM THE RATING AT THE CURRENT LEVEL
Given Moody's decision to initiate a review for downgrade, an
upward movement in the rating is unlikely at this point in time.
El Salvador's rating could be confirmed at B1 if the government is
able to materially reduce government liquidity risks and/or if it
is granted Legislative Assembly's approval for issuance of long-
term government debt to retire LETEs. In addition, a credible and
detailed plan for addressing the government's persistent budget
deficits and rising debt ratio, agreed between the main political
parties or under an IMF program, would support a rating
confirmation.
GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,303 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): 2.5% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1% (2015 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.3% (2015 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 59.9% (2015 Actual)
Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.
On August 09, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the El Salvador, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's institutional
strength/framework, have materially decreased. The issuer's fiscal
or financial strength, including its debt profile, has materially
decreased. The issuer has become increasingly susceptible to event
risks.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2015.
The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.
===========
M E X I C O
===========
OFFICE DEPOT: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR, Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Office Depot de Mexico S.A. de C.V.'s
(ODM) Long- Term Local Currency (LC) and Foreign Currency (FC)
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB+'. The Rating Outlook has
been revised to Negative from Stable.
The revision of the Rating Outlook to Negative reflects the
adverse impact of currency depreciation in ODM's leverage. As of
June 2016, adjusted debt to EBITDAR ratio was 4.5x, above Fitch's
expectations for the company's current rating. Failure to reduce
adjusted debt to EBITDAR to 3.5x over the next 12 - 24 months
should result in a downgrade. If ODM's consolidated operating
results meet Fitch's EBITDA expectations and there is no further
foreign exchange depreciation within the next 12 - 24 months, the
Outlook could be revised to Stable as it would positively impact
leverage ratios.
ODM's credit quality continues to reflect its leadership position
in the office products super-store segment, diversified
geographical footprint and consistent cash flow generation. The
ratings also consider ODM's sound liquidity position and the
expectation that the company will successfully integrate and align
the recent acquisitions into its operations and financial results.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Leverage Above Expectations
ODM's leverage ratios are high for the current rating level. For
the latest-12-months (LTM) ended June 2016, Adjusted Debt to
EBITDAR was 4.5x and Debt to EBITDA was 3.5x, above Fitch
expectations of 3.5x and 2.5x, respectively. The reason for the
company's current leverage is due to the effect of the
depreciation of the Mexican peso versus USD. ODM's debt is mainly
denominated in USD and the principal is not hedged while cash flow
is generated in local currency. Fitch expects ODM's leverage to
improve as synergies and margin improvements from the recent
acquisitions materialize.
Strong Business Profile
ODM's operating profile is supported by its national retail
presence in Mexico, operations in Central and South America, mix
of large corporate customers, small businesses and consumers. It
has a leading position among Mexican office supply super stores
and non-Mexican sales represent about 26.4% of total revenues. In
addition, its wide distribution network, preponderance of cash
sales and mostly local sourcing of inventory, further supports
ODM's business profile.
Stable Cash Flow Generation
The company has shown consistent growth over the past 13 years,
with solid EBITDA generation even during economic downturns. Same
store sales (SSS) recovered during 2015 (6.3%) and the first
semester of 2016 (6.8%) due to improved consumer confidence, low
inflation rates and increasing real wages, while total sales
increased by 29.5% and 29.4%, respectively, due to the
consolidation of Grupo Prisa and RadioShack de Mexico (RSM).
During the LTM ended June 2016, EBITDA margins declined by nearly
240 basis points (bps) to 8.0% compared to full year 2014 (10.4%),
a result of the acquired companies' lower margins. Fitch expects
ODM's EBITDA margin to be around 9.5% in the medium term.
Growth Through Targeted Acquisitions
During 2015, ODM acquired Grupo Prisa (Prisa), a Chilean office
supply company, as well as RadioShack de Mexico (RSM). These
acquisitions have increased revenues by about 30%. Fitch believes
Prisa adds geographical diversification to ODM, while RSM could
see improved margins and market share under ODM's stewardship.
The Mexican office supply and small electronics retail industry is
very fragmented, with the potential for consolidation by big
players such as ODM. Going forward, ODM will also pursue a robust
growth strategy, with an estimated 40 store openings per year on
average. Fitch expects these openings and any upcoming
acquisitions to be funded with internally generated cash flow, as
the company has done in the past.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for the issuer
include:
-- Average revenues growth of 8.3% per year during 2016 - 2019;
-- EBITDA margins close to 9.2% on average during 2016 - 2019;
-- Senior notes amount affected by exchange rate fluctuations;
-- Exchange rate of MXN18.7 per USD for 2016, MXN18.17 for 2017
and MXN18.0 for 2018 - 2019;
-- CFO generation above MXN1.0 billion per year;
-- Average annual capex of MXN798 million during 2016 - 2019;
-- Cash dividend payments of 50% of net income.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that could be detrimental to credit quality include:
-- EBITDA margin trend below Fitch's expectations;
-- Sustained negative SSS over time;
-- Debt-financed acquisitions;
-- Further devaluation of the Mexican peso vs. the U.S. dollar;
-- Other factors that drive adjusted debt to EBITDAR above
3.5x; debt to EBITDA above 2.5x and FFO adjusted leverage
(Debt adjusted by leases / Funds from Operations) above 4.5x
within the next 12 - 24 months.
No positive rating actions are currently contemplated over the
near term. A revision of the Rating Outlook to Stable can be
contemplated if ODM manages to improve its adjusted leverage ratio
at or under 3.5x and continues showing positive SSS while
maintains its leadership in the office supply market.
LIQUIDITY
ODM's liquidity position is sound. As of June 2016, ODM had a
cash and marketable securities balance of MXN654 million and
short-term debt of MXN19 million (incurred by Prisa before the
acquisition). No material debt maturities are due until 2020.
Free cash flow (FCF) has been positive over the past five years,
and Fitch expects it to remain positive going forward. Estimated
capex in the medium term is around MXN800 million per year and
dividend payments should be up to 50% of net income according to
covenants.
FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS
Fitch has affirmed these ratings:
Office Depot de Mexico S.A. de C.V.
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB+';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB+';
-- USD350 million senior notes due 2020 at 'BB+'.
The Rating Outlook is Negative.
======================
P U E R T O R I C O
======================
CYMA CLEANING: Court Confirms Plan & Approves Disclosure Statement
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico inks final approval of the Disclosure
Statement and confirmation of the Plan filed by CYMA Cleaning
Contractors, Inc., Innova Industrial Contractor, Inc., Handy Man
Services, Inc., and Ambitek Industrial Contractors, Inc.
As previously reported by The Troubled Company Reporter, according
to the Debtors' Plan supplement, the allowed unsecured priority
claims from employees (Class 7) will be paid in monthly cash
payments, in full, plus interest at 3.25% in a term not to exceed
five years from the entry of the order of relief.
The allowed unsecured claims of governmental units (Class 8) and
the allowed unsecured claims from banking institutions (Class 9)
will receive a 3% payment of the allowed amount in 84 monthly
installments. The Debtors' allowed liability to Class 8 is
estimated in the amount of $210,744. The Debtors' allowed
liability to Class 9 is estimated in the amount of $282,699.
The allowed unsecured trade claims (Class 10) will receive a 3%
payment of the allowed amount on effective date. The Debtors'
allowed liability to Class 10 is estimated in the amount of
$99,359.
A full-text copy of the Supplement dated Aug. 1, 2016, is
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-06582-142.pdf
About CYMA Cleaning
CYMA Cleaning Contractors, Inc. (Bankr. D.P.R., Case No. 15-
06582), Innova Industrial Contractor, Inc. (Bankr. D.P.R., Case
No. 15-06584), and Handy Man Services, Inc. (Bankr. D.P.R., Case
No. 15-06585), filed Chapter 11 Petitions on August 27, 2015.
The Debtors' counsel is Mary Ann Gandia-Fabian, Esq., at
Gandia-Fabian Law Office, in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
At the time of filing, CYMA Cleaning had $500,000 to $1.0 million
in estimated assets and $1.0 million to $10.0 million in estimated
liabilities; Innova Industrial had $100,000 to $500,000 in
estimated assets and $50,000 to $100,000 in estimated liabilities;
and Handy Man Services had $100,000 to $500,000 in estimated
assets
and $1.0 million to $10.0 million in estimated liabilities.
The petition was signed by Ivelisse Gonzalez Rodriguez, president,
CYMA Cleaning Contractors.
PUERTO RICO: Treasury Didn't Tell Island to Default, Lawyer Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske, writing for Bloomberg News, reported that U.S.
Treasury officials didn't tell Puerto Rico to default on general-
obligationbond payments, according to a lawyer representing the
island in its $70 billion debt restructuring.
"At least in my experience, U.S. Treasury doesn't say to the
commonwealth 'do x or y,'" Richard Cooper, Esq. --
racooper@cgsh.com -- a partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
LLP, said during a Puerto Rico conference at the CUNY Graduate
School of Journalism in New York. "That is ultimately, I think
fueled, by creditors speculating for their own purposes."
The report related that Puerto Rico skipped paying nearly $1
billion to bondholders on July 1, including $780 million of
principal and interest on general obligations. It was the largest
default in the $3.7 trillion municipal-bond market and the first
time a state-level borrower failed to pay on its direct debt since
the 1930s, the report said.
Cleary Gottlieb is Puerto Rico's legal adviser as it seeks to
reduce a $70 billion debt load, the report further related. The
firm has been in discussions with U.S. Treasury staff,
commonwealth officials and creditors as the parties negotiate on a
how to restructure the island's debt, the report added.
=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================
[*] LATAM: IMF Concludes Discussion on Common Policies With ECCU
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, on July
13, 2016, concluded the consideration of the 2016 discussion on
the common policies of member countries of the Eastern Caribbean
Currency Union.
The regional recovery is gaining ground, supported by continued
low oil prices, strong tourism arrivals, and robust citizenship-
by-investment receipts. Three failed banks have been resolved with
no spillovers to the rest of the region and fiscal management has
improved.
Executive Board Assessment
Executive Directors welcomed the authorities' progress in
addressing key challenges and the regional economic recovery,
which is gradually gaining ground supported by strong external
demand, low oil prices, and buoyant citizenship by investment
receipts. Risks to the near term outlook are balanced, but growth
in the ECCU continues to be hindered by weak competitiveness,
banking sector fragilities, susceptibility to natural disasters,
and large public debt. In this context, Directors encouraged the
authorities to press ahead with sound macroeconomic policies and
structural reforms to decisively address these issues and
strengthen the conditions for robust long term growth.
Directors commended the decisive actions taken to strengthen the
resilience of the banking system. In particular, they welcomed the
passing of key banking legislation, and the successful resolution
of three insolvent banks. With non-performing loans still elevated
and credit continuing to decline, Directors stressed the
importance of swift action to help banks clean up their balance
sheets and resume lending. Specifically, they recommended quickly
operationalizing the regional asset management company and moving
ahead with regional foreclosure legislation. While Directors
generally supported eliminating the minimum saving deposit rate, a
few stressed the importance of accompanying this reform with
measures to enhance the financial safety net and to avoid
discouraging saving and reducing financial inclusion. Directors
encouraged the authorities to promote consolidation within the
regional indigenous banking system to strengthen its long run
viability and help lower the risk of further withdrawal of
correspondent banking relationships (CBRs) from the region. They
agreed that efforts to strengthen frameworks for international tax
cooperation and for anti-money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism should be complemented by continued
engagement with international partners in order to mitigate the
risk of further loss of CBRs. Directors supported further work in
this area by the Fund to assist its members, and encouraged
increased global cooperation to address this issue.
Directors welcomed the improvements in fiscal discipline, and
emphasized that stronger action is needed to achieve the regional
debt target of 60 percent of GDP by 2030. In particular, they
recommended formulating detailed medium term fiscal adjustment
plans and underpinning them with fiscal rules as well as continued
enhancements to public finance management frameworks. Given the
region's vulnerability to natural disasters, Directors generally
underscored the importance of internalizing those costs in the
fiscal policy frameworks. They also encouraged the authorities to
develop a strong, regionally accepted set of principles and
guidelines for citizenship by investment programs in order to
enhance their sustainability.
Directors noted that the quasi currency board arrangement
continues to serve the ECCU well by fostering price stability, and
that international reserve levels exceed most of the Fund's
reserve adequacy benchmarks. To improve international
competitiveness, they encouraged the authorities to pursue
structural reforms that reduce the costs of doing business. In
this context, Directors commended the initiatives to reduce energy
costs -- particularly investments in renewable energy sources --
and recommended policies to moderate labor costs, improve
resilience to natural disasters, and deepen regional
collaboration.
Directors recommended improving statistics and data provision in
order to enhance economic analysis and better support policy
making.
Directors agreed that the views they expressed today will form
part of their discussions in the context of the Article IV
consultations with individual ECCU members that will take place
until the next Board discussion of ECCU common policies.
A copy of the table is available free at https://is.gd/aHBo0A
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Aug. 8 to Aug. 12, 2016
---------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Country Curr
----------- --- ----- -------- ------- ---
Andino Investment Holding 11 70.85 11/13/2020 PE USD
Andino Investment Holding 11 68.88 11/13/2020 PE USD
Anton Oilfield Services G 7.5 69.03 11/6/2018 CN USD
Anton Oilfield Services G 7.5 66 11/6/2018 CN USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 Lt 0.719 38.5 KY EUR
BA-CA Finance Cayman Ltd 0.749 38.93 KY EUR
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman 6.25 62.84 KY USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman 6.25 59.51 KY USD
BPI Capital Finance Ltd 2.29 40 KY EUR
CA La Electricidad de Car 8.5 43.75 4/10/2018 VE USD
Chile Government Internat 3.625 15.7 10/30/2042 CL USD
CSN Islands XI Corp 6.875 61.25 9/21/2019 KY USD
CSN Islands XI Corp 6.875 61.13 9/21/2019 KY USD
CSN Islands XII Corp 7 48.8 BR USD
CSN Islands XII Corp 7 47.75 BR USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 4.54 59.75 10/25/2041 PA USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6 71.38 10/25/2041 PA USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 70.8 2/6/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.35 9/10/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 70.42 4/2/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.72 7/17/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.71 5/30/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.23 9/30/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 70.52 3/19/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.75 74.84 12/19/2028 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.94 6/12/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.95 6/11/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.82 7/1/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 73.56 7/1/2029 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 72.94 9/10/2029 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.75 74.95 11/8/2028 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 73.74 6/11/2029 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 73.73 6/12/2029 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 72.77 9/30/2029 EC USD
Empresa de Telecomunicaci 7 71.24 1/17/2023 CO COP
Empresa de Telecomunicaci 7 71.24 1/17/2023 CO COP
ESFG International Ltd 5.753 0.883 KY EUR
General Exploration Partn 11.5 36.75 11/13/2018 CA USD
General Shopping Finance 10 60.55 KY USD
General Shopping Finance 10 60.63 KY USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt 10 70.88 2/1/2019 SG USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt 10 71.88 2/1/2019 SG USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt 10 50.5 2/1/2019 SG USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt 10 54 2/1/2019 SG USD
Glorious Property Holding 13.25 74.56 3/4/2018 HK USD
Gol Finance Inc 9.25 47.35 7/20/2020 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 8.75 37.75 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 7.5 61 4/3/2017 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 7.5 59.38 4/3/2017 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 7.5 59.38 4/3/2017 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 9.25 43.38 7/20/2020 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 8.75 36.88 BR USD
Green Dragon Gas Ltd 10 63.75 11/20/2017 HK USD
Greenfields Petroleum Cor 9 11.35 5/31/2017 US CAD
Honghua Group Ltd 7.45 58.25 9/25/2019 CN USD
Honghua Group Ltd 7.45 58 9/25/2019 CN USD
Inversora Electrica de Bu 6.5 59.5 9/26/2017 AR USD
MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 67.25 4/25/2019 HK USD
MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 68.58 4/25/2019 HK USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman Isl 3.38 60.22 2/7/2035 KY EUR
Newland International Pro 9.5 24.13 7/3/2017 PA USD
Newland International Pro 9.5 25.13 7/3/2017 PA USD
Noble Holding Internation 6.2 65.42 8/1/2040 KY USD
Noble Holding Internation 6.05 66.38 3/1/2041 KY USD
Noble Holding Internation 5.25 64.71 3/15/2042 KY USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc 7.25 57.75 4/1/2019 CY USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc 7.25 55 4/1/2019 CY USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe 6.35 27 6/30/2021 KY USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe 6.35 28.5 6/30/2021 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 40 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 37.23 4/25/2025 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 33.5 6/26/2042 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 34.5 6/27/2029 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 36 6/26/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 8.25 35 4/25/2018 KY BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 53.5 4/21/2020 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 41.51 4/5/2023 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 36 6/27/2029 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 36 4/25/2025 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 33.75 6/26/2042 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.5 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 8.25 35 4/25/2018 KY BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 35.38 6/26/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 38.88 4/5/2023 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 44 4/21/2020 KY USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli 6.75 17 10/1/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli 6.625 17 10/1/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli 6.75 17.38 10/1/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli 6.625 17.38 10/1/2022 KY USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 5.25 67.5 4/12/2017 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 12.75 56.1 2/17/2022 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 9 49.38 11/17/2021 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 9.75 44.57 5/17/2035 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 38.5 5/16/2024 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 36.75 11/15/2026 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 5.375 37 4/12/2027 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 5.5 36.75 4/12/2037 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 32.13 10/28/2022 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 36.4 11/15/2026 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 35.35 5/16/2024 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 9.75 41.7 5/17/2035 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 9 45.25 11/17/2021 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 12.75 46.15 2/17/2022 VE USD
Polarcus Ltd 5.6 44.93 3/30/2022 AE USD
Provincia de Rio Negro 1.6148 62 5/4/2024 AR ARS
PSOS Finance Ltd 11.75 60.13 4/23/2018 KY USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.22 9/30/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.75 74.88 12/19/2028 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.6 7/1/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.75 74.99 11/8/2028 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.22 9/30/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.77 6/12/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.39 9/10/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.75 7/17/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.39 9/10/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 72.81 9/30/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.78 6/11/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.6 7/1/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.98 6/11/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.98 6/11/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.77 6/12/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 72.99 9/10/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.97 6/12/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.75 74.88 12/19/2028 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.84 2/6/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.55 3/19/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.85 7/1/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.45 4/2/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 72.81 9/30/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.75 7/17/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.74 5/30/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.97 6/12/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.75 74.99 11/8/2028 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.85 7/1/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.45 4/2/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.74 5/30/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.78 6/11/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.84 2/6/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 72.99 9/10/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.55 3/19/2034 EC USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 4.125 37.25 11/1/2022 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 5.75 36.6 10/24/2023 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 5.375 35.38 9/26/2024 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 4.125 37.38 11/1/2022 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 5.75 39.63 10/24/2023 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 5.375 37.25 9/26/2024 BR USD
Siem Offshore Inc 5.69 52.25 1/30/2018 NO NOK
Siem Offshore Inc 5.49 51.75 3/28/2019 NO NOK
Transocean Inc 5.05 74.75 10/15/2022 KY USD
Transocean Inc 6.8 63.66 3/15/2038 KY USD
Transocean Inc 7.5 65.78 4/15/2031 KY USD
Transocean Inc 9.1 70.41 12/15/2041 KY USD
Transocean Inc 7.45 74.9 4/15/2027 KY USD
Transocean Inc 8 73.55 4/15/2027 KY USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesoro 5.25 61.99 12/29/2021 UY UYU
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305 43.92 12/1/2039 KY USD
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305 43.92 12/1/2039 KY USD
Venezuela Government Inte 9.25 49.03 9/15/2027 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 11.75 49.5 10/21/2026 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 11.95 49.5 8/5/2031 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 7.75 47.38 10/13/2019 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 13.625 65.25 8/15/2018 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 9.375 45.85 1/13/2034 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 7 52.85 12/1/2018 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 7 42 3/31/2038 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 9 45.5 5/7/2023 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 9.25 45.5 5/7/2028 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 8.25 44.38 10/13/2024 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 6 43.5 12/9/2020 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 13.625 56.5 8/15/2018 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 7.65 43.25 4/21/2025 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 13.625 59.69 8/15/2018 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 12.75 53.5 8/23/2022 VE USD
Venezuela Government TICC 5.25 53.23 3/21/2019 VE USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 25.63 2/12/2023 BR USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 25.63 2/12/2023 BR USD
XLIT Ltd 6.5 70 IE USD
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2016. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding,
electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited
without prior written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.
* * * End of Transmission * * *