/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/160902.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, September 2, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 174


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: IMF Meets to Consider Progress in Improving GDP Quality
GPAT COMPANIA: Moody's Puts B1 GSR to ARS200MM Loan Issuance
TOYOTA COMPANIA: Moody's Rates ARS170MM Sr. Debt Issuance 'Ba3'


B E R M U D A

POLARIS HOLDING: Returns to Profit After Years of Restructuring


B O L I V I A

PLANIFICA FONDO: Moody's Puts B-bf Global Scale Bond Fund Rating
PREVISOR FONDO: Moody's Puts B-bf Global Scale Bond Fund Rating


B R A Z I L

BTG PACTUAL: Profits Fall as Expenses Rise


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: Moody's Lowers Deposit Ratings to B3


J A M A I C A

* JAMAICA: Local Sugar Industry Performs Poorly in April to June


M E X I C O

MEXICALI MUNICIPALITY: Moody's Confirms Caa1/B3.mx Issuer Rating
VERACRUZ STATE: Moody's Cuts Issuer Ratings to B3/B1.mx


P U E R T O    R I C O

AEROPOSTALE INC: Hires Hilco Streambank as IP Sales Advisor
MAGNO TIRE: Disclosures Conditionally OK'd; Sept. 27 Plan Hearing
SAMUEL BURGOS: Court OKs Disclosures, Confirms Chapter 11 Plan


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Prepares For Huge Opposition March in Caracas


                            - - - - -



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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: IMF Meets to Consider Progress in Improving GDP Quality
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) met
to consider the Managing Director's report on Argentina's progress
in improving the quality of the official data reported to the Fund
for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).

At the meeting, the Executive Board noted the authorities'
extraordinary efforts and important progress made in strengthening
the accuracy of Argentina's statistics. A revised series for GDP
has been produced that is broadly in line with international
standards, and a new CPI series has been launched that aims to
address the inaccuracies in the previous index. Directors
commended the transparency with which national statistics agency
(INDEC) officials have undertaken the process.

Beyond the advances regarding the quality of the data, the
Executive Board also commended the authorities' intention to
strengthen the national statistics agency, including by rebuilding
the agency's human capital, reviewing its methodological
practices, and engaging with users constructively by providing
information in a transparent manner.

The Executive Board judged that more information was needed to
fully assess how the new CPI index will perform in practice and
that more time was necessary for capacity building and to
strengthen methodological foundations. In this context, the Board
instructed staff to continue the collaboration with the
authorities to address the remaining methodological issues, and
welcomed the opportunity to provide technical advice and
assistance to INDEC over the next few months. As a result, IMF
staff will remain engaged with the authorities on this issue
including during the upcoming mission for the Article IV
consultation in September.

The Managing Director is expected to report to the Board on this
matter by November 15, 2016. In light of the positive steps taken
by the Argentine authorities, with continued progress and with a
positive report to the Board by the Managing Director, the
Executive Board would be in a position to lift the Declaration of
Censure at that time.

                           *     *     *

On April 19, 2016, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Moody's Investors Service upgraded on April 15,
2016, Argentina's government bond rating to B3 from Caa1, with the
outlook changed to stable from positive.  The key drivers for the
upgrade are (i) Moody's expectation that Argentina will settle
holdout creditor claims which will result in a lifting of court
injunctions and clear the way for Argentina to access
international capital markets, as well as the likelihood that
Argentina will make payments to restructured bondholders increased
significantly following an April 13, US circuit court ruling in
favor of Argentina, and (ii) the economic policy improvements
since Mauricio Macri's administration took office last December.
The new government lifted capital controls and allowed the peso to
float more freely, reduced energy and transportation subsidies and
has begun to address longstanding macroeconomic imbalances.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.

On March 24, 2016, Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina's Long-
term local-currency Issuer Default Rating (LT LC IDR) to 'B' from
'CCC', with a Stable Outlook. Fitch has affirmed Argentina's Long-
term foreign-currency (FC) IDR at 'RD' and the short-term FC IDR
at 'RD'. In addition, Fitch has upgraded the Country Ceiling to
'B' from 'CCC'.


GPAT COMPANIA: Moody's Puts B1 GSR to ARS200MM Loan Issuance
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned a B1 global scale rating (GSR) and a Aa3.ar national
scale rating (NSR) to GPAT Compania Financiera (GPAT)'s XXIV
series issuance up to ARS 200 million, under its senior debt
program of ARS 1500 million. The rating was placed under review
for downgrade, in line with the review on the other ratings
assigned to GPAT.

The following ratings were assigned to GPAT Compania Financiera
S.A.'s series XXIV senior unsecured debt issuance up to ARS 200
million each:

   -- B1 Global Local Currency Debt Rating

   -- Aa3.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Debt Rating

RATINGS RATIONALE

GPAT is a finance company mainly focused on the financing of
General Motors vehicle purchases by individuals through car
dealers. The company offers its products through its parent Banco
Patagonia's (Ba3 review for downgrade, b3 BCA) branch network and
the wholesale funding for dealers is currently offered by
Patagonia, while GPAT provides all the back office services for
this financing.

The rating reflects the assessment of a high probability of
support from the parent Banco Patagonia in the event of stress.

The rating also considers Argentina's ongoing macroeconomic and
institutional challenges together with GPAT's monoline business
model dedicated to the financing of General Motors vehicles and
the increasing level of competition within the car-financing
industry in Argentina. Despite significant improvements since the
new administration took office in December 2015 and softened or
eliminated various burdensome government controls on the financial
system which should help support earnings, Argentina continues to
face significant economic and institutional challenges, including
high inflation and recession. Although the company posted good
profitability in 2015, this was distorted by the high rate of
inflation. While non-performing loans remain low thanks to the
company's focus on middle and high-income individuals, delinquency
levels are likely to rise given the current economic situation.
These risks are balanced in part by the GPAT's strong commercial
and strategic importance to the group, as well as its good capital
metrics. The ratings also include risks associated with a
liability structure mainly reliant on senior debt issuances, as is
the case of other automobile finance companies.

The review for downgrade of GPAT's ratings is in line with the
review of its parent Banco Patagonia's ratings, and considers the
strong linkages between the operations of the bank and this
subsidiary.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The ratings could face downward pressure if GPAT's parent Banco
Patagonia is downgraded. As the ratings are under review for
downgrade, upward rating pressure is unlikely at this time.
However, the ratings would likely be confirmed at their current
level if and when Banco Patagonia's ratings are confirmed.

METHODOLOGIES USED

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Companies published in October 2015

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time.

GPAT CompaNIa Financiera S.A. is headquartered in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, and reported Ar$2,923 million of total assets and
Ar$889 million of shareholders' equity as of June 2016.


TOYOTA COMPANIA: Moody's Rates ARS170MM Sr. Debt Issuance 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. (MLA)
assigned a Ba3 senior unsecured local currency global debt rating
and a Aaa.ar national scale local currency debt rating to Toyota
Compania Financiera de Argentina S.A.(TCFA)'s Class 20 expected
issuance up to ARS170 million. The issuance, which will be due in
24 months, is under Toyota's ARS1.4 billion senior unsecured note
program.

All the ratings have stable outlook.

The following ratings were assigned to Toyota Compania Financiera
de Argentina:

-- ARS170 million Senior Unsecured Debt Issuance:

   -- Ba3 Global Local Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating

   -- Aaa.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Senior
      Unsecured Debt Rating

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba3 global local currency senior debt rating is constrained by
Argentina's local currency country ceiling of Ba3, and reflect the
very high probability that Toyota's ultimate parent, Toyota Motor
Corporation (Japan) (Aa3 stable), will support the issuer, whose
standalone credit quality is reflected by its b3 BCA. Moody's
assessment of a very high probability of parental support
considers TCFA's key role as the financial agent for Toyota
Corporation in Argentina and its strong commercial and strategic
importance to the corporation. Thanks to parental support, the
company remains one of the strongest credits in Argentina despite
significant credit challenges that constrain TCFA's BCA and its
debt ratings relative to global peers.

The BCA considers Argentina's ongoing macroeconomic and
institutional challenges together with TCFA's monoline business
model dedicated to the financing of Toyota vehicles and the
increasing level of competition within the car-financing industry
in Argentina. Despite significant improvements since the new
administration took office in December 2015 and softened or
eliminated various burdensome government controls on the financial
system which should help support earnings, Argentina continues to
face significant economic and institutional challenges, including
high inflation and weak growth. Although the company posted very
strong profitability in 2015, this was distorted by the high rate
of inflation. While non-performing loans remain low thanks to the
company's focus on middle and high-income individuals, delinquency
levels are likely to rise given the current economic situation.
These risks are balanced in part by the TCFA's satisfactory risk
management practices that are aligned to those of its parent
companies as well as its adequate capitalization. The ratings also
include risks associated with a liability structure mainly reliant
on market funds, as is the case of other automobile finance
companies.

The stable outlook on the company's ratings is in line with the
stable outlook B3 rating for Argentina's government bond rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The entity's rating could face upward pressure if Argentina's bond
rating is upgraded or if Argentina's operating environment
continues to improve. On the other hand, the rating could go down
if the operating environment deteriorates, affecting TCFA's
business prospects.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time.

Toyota Compa§ia Financiera de Argentina S.A. is headquartered in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, with assets of ARS2.84 billion and equity
of ARS240 million as of June 2016.


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B E R M U D A
=============


POLARIS HOLDING: Returns to Profit After Years of Restructuring
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Kent at The Royal Gazette reports that the dock services
firm Polaris Holding Company Ltd has returned to profit after
three years of restructuring.

Polaris, the parent company of Stevedoring Services Ltd, announced
profits of BM$1.38 million, or BM$1.16 per share, for the year
ended March 31, 2016, according to The Royal Gazette.

It marks a strong turnaround after three years of losses totaling
nearly BM$2.5 million for the company headed by chief executive
officer Warren Jones, the report notes.

The bulk of Polaris' income came from Stevedoring Services, which
generated BM$10.57 million in revenue, up by BM$1.35 million, or
14.6 per cent on the previous year, the report relays.  The
company moved 34,901 20ft equivalent containers, up 5.4 per cent
on the previous year and the highest number since 2011, the report
relays.  The company attributed the increase to the island's
improving economic situation, the report notes.

In the Bermuda Stock Exchange-listed company's first formal annual
report, Mr. Jones, a former civil servant who was appointed in
January 2014, said: "It has been a bumpy few years, but in fiscal
2016 Polaris emerged focused, stable and profitable after an
extended period of malaise," the report says.

Cheryl Hayward-Chew, who was appointed chairman in 2013 as part of
a major overhaul for the company, described how the success story
was the product of significant changes, the report notes.

"While it is tempting to conclude that the company's success was
simply the result of a more buoyant economy, and while that is
part of the story, Polaris' dramatic turnaround and positive
position runs far deeper," Ms. Hayward-Chew said, the report says.

"Polaris' financial success has been primarily built around its
staff and a three-year administrative clean-up and operational
reorganisation which saw headcount reduced, pay rates frozen,
improved training, enhanced relations with the Corporation of
Hamilton, Bermuda Industrial Union, the company's customers and
key stakeholders and a material investment in equipment,
maintenance and infrastructure," the report notes.

The chairwoman added that during the past year Polaris had
produced a strategic action plan, in which the stated missions
include consistently achieving net income equal to a 12 per cent
return on equity by 2020, the report relays.  Last year's ROE was
12.5 per cent.

Polaris highlighted improved labor relations as a key factor in
the firm's successful turnaround, based on an agreement struck
with the Bermuda Industrial Union in June 2014, the report notes.

"The positive nature of these negotiations and the transparency on
both sides of the table represented the beginning of a new
relationship between management and its unionized staff," Mr.
Jones said in the report, The Royal Gazette discloses.

Mr. Jones added that Polaris had managed to cut staffing costs in
2015, through early retirement, reducing overtime rates and a
salary freeze, the report notes.  In April this year, Polaris
struck a deal with the BIU, part of which stipulated that wage
increases would be earned only if the company achieved "a minimum
level of profitability," the report relays.

Last year, the improvements were recognised when Stevedoring
Services placed eighth in The Bottom Line's Top Ten Employers in
Bermuda awards, which are based primarily on surveys of employees,
the report recalls.

The report relays that Polaris highlighted its good relations with
the Portworkers Division of the BIU in the annual report, adding:
"Our success would not have been possible if we together did not
create a framework based on trust, transparency and frank
discussion."

The company spent BM$4.69 million on salaries, wages and
employment benefits in the past fiscal year, up from BM$4.45
million the previous year, the report notes.

In January 2016, the company signed a five-year terminal
operator's deal with the Corporation of Hamilton, cementing its
future until 2021, the report discloses.

Mr. Jones said Stevedoring's major goal was to put itself in the
best possible position to renew the operating licence and with
this in mind, the company had undergone an independent operational
review, the report relays.  The results are being analysed and
discussed now, Mr. Jones added.

In fiscal 2016, the company initiated a stock repurchase tender
and offered to buy back shares for BM$4 apiece at a time when they
were trading for the BM$3.11 on the BSX, the report notes.  A
total of 25 shareholders offered up 61,068 shares for repurchase
and cancellation, representing nearly 5 per cent of shares
outstanding, the report adds.


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B O L I V I A
=============


PLANIFICA FONDO: Moody's Puts B-bf Global Scale Bond Fund Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned bond fund ratings to Planifica Fondo de Inversion Abierto
Largo Plazo (FIA LP), a newly launched Bolivian fund that will be
managed by local asset manager BISA SAFI.

The ratings assigned are:

   -- Global scale bond fund rating: B-bf
   -- National scale bond fund rating: A-bf.bo

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The fund ratings are based on Moody's expectation that Planifica
will maintain above 40% of invested assets in Bolivian local
currency corporate bonds and Treasury bonds issued by the Bolivian
Central Bank with an average rating of B/Aa.bo- A.bo.  The
remainder of the fund's assets will be allocated to similarly
rated time deposits and other liquid securities.  The ratings also
incorporate Moody's expectation the fund manager will maintain a
long term portfolio duration above five years.

"The rating agency noted that the fund will target a return on par
with the average interest rate of 1,080 day TDs and redemptions
within the first three years of fund life will be penalized with a
10% NAV yield during this period.  Additionally, the fund will
have a once a month redemption period." said Moody's lead analyst
Carlos de Nevares.

The new fund expects key shareholders to be individual, mainly
young families, investors which are seeking protection against
local inflation and expecting a higher yield than a short term
bond fund.

BISA SAFI, is the asset management arm of the BNB Bolivian
financial group, hand historically among the leaders in the local
mutual fund industry.  As of May 2016, BISA SAFI managed
approximately UD$273.8 million, commanding a 11.3% market share
making it the fourth largest manager in the local open ended fund
market.


PREVISOR FONDO: Moody's Puts B-bf Global Scale Bond Fund Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned bond fund ratings to Previsor Fondo Mutuo de Largo Plazo
(FM LP), a newly launched Bolivian fund that will be managed by
local asset manager SAFI MERCANTIL SANTA CRUZ.

The ratings assigned are:

   -- Global scale bond fund rating: B-bf
   -- National scale bond fund rating: A-bf.bo

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

"The fund ratings are based on Moody's expectation that Previsor
will maintain above 40% of invested assets in Bolivian local
currency corporate bonds and Treasury bonds issued by the Bolivian
Central Bank with an average rating of B/Aa.bo- A.bo.  This fund
will invest up to 30% in foreign securities.  The remainder of the
fund's assets will be allocated to similar rated time deposits and
liquidity.  The ratings are further supported by Moody's
expectation that the fund manager will maintain a long term
portfolio duration above 5 years.

"The rating agency noted that the fund will target a return on par
with the average interest rate of 1,080 days TDs, while
redemptions within the first three years of fund life will be
penalized with a 10% of NAV.  Additionally, fund redemptions wiill
be permitted only once a month." said Moody's Lead Analyst Carlos
de Nevares.
The new fun
d expects key shareholders to be individual, mainly young
families, investors which are seeking protection against local
inflation and expecting a higher yield than a short term bond
fund.

SAFI MERCANTIL SANTA CRUZ is the asset management arm of the
MERCANTIL financial group, a leading local asset manger in
Bolivia.  As of May 2016, SAFI MERCANTIL SANTA CRUZ managed
approximately UD$281 million, commanding a 11.6% market share and
occupying the third position within the local open ended fund
market.


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B R A Z I L
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BTG PACTUAL: Profits Fall as Expenses Rise
------------------------------------------
Rogerio Jelmayer at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazilian
investment bank Banco BTG Pactual SA saw an 8% decline in its net
profit in the second quarter, as its expenses increased more than
its revenues and as its corporate-lending portfolio shrank.

The bank reported a profit of BRL940 million ($302 million), down
from BRL1.02 billion in the year-ago period, according to The Wall
Street Journal.

BTG's total revenue reached BRL2.59 billion, up 26.7% from BRL2.05
billion in the year-ago period, the report notes.  The bank's
operating expenses increased 55% in the quarter to BRL1.58
billion, the report says.

The bank's corporate-lending portfolio ended the second quarter
with BRL21.7 billion, down drastically from BRL41.68 billion in
the year-ago period, the report notes.

Its return on equity ended at 16.1% in the second quarter, down
from 21% a year earlier, the report says.

At the end of last year, the Brazilian bank started selling
certain assets to generate cash and restore investors' confidence
since the arrest of its former CEO and founder Andre Esteves, the
report relays.

Mr. Esteves was arrested in November on charges of obstructing a
federal investigation into corruption at state-run oil company
Petroleo Brasileiro SA, or Petrobras, the report says.  Mr.
Esteves was released from jail in December.

In May, Mr. Esteves rejoined BTG as "a senior partner focused on
partnership matters advising Banco BTG Pactual on strategy and
supporting the development of its activities and operations," the
report discloses.

Mr. Esteves, who remains a major shareholder of the bank,
previously denied wrongdoing, the report relays.

At the end of July, Brazilian federal court has accepted charges
against Mr. Esteves for alleged obstruction of justice.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.
24, 2016, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco BTG Pactual S.A. (BTG
Pactual) and its related entities' ratings and removed them from
Rating Watch Negative.

The following ratings were affirmed and have been removed from
Rating Watch Negative and where applicable the respective Outlooks
assigned:

   Banco BTG Pactual S.A.

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BB-', Negative
      Outlook;

   -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';


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G U A T E M A L A
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BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES: Moody's Lowers Deposit Ratings to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the long-term local and
foreign currency deposit ratings of Guatemala's Banco de los
Trabajadores (Bantrab) to B3 from B1.  The rating agency also
downgraded the foreign currency senior debt rating of Bantrab
Senior Trust (BST) to Caa1 from B1.  BST is a Cayman-Island based
trust guaranteed by Bantrab.  At the same time, the rating agency
downgraded Bantrab's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA)
and adjusted BCA to caa1 from b2 and its long-term counterparty
risk assessment to B2(cr) from Ba3(cr).

All of the long term ratings and assessments remain on review for
further downgrade.

These ratings and assessments were downgraded:

Banco de los Trabajadores:
  Long term local and foreign currency deposit ratings to B3 from
   B1, on review for downgrade
  Baseline credit assessment and adjusted baseline credit
   assessment, to caa1 from b2, on review for downgrade
  Long term, counterparty risk assessment to B2(cr) from Ba3(cr),
  on review for downgrade.

Bantrab Senior Trust:
  Backed Long term foreign currency senior debt rating to Caa1
   from B1, on review for downgrade

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Bantrab's baseline credit assessment to caa1 from
b2 reflects increased payment risks for the bank's external
obligations given its inability to secure an adequate number of
alternative correspondent banking lines following the loss of all
of its previous facilities in May.  If the sole current facility,
which has not yet been tested, does not function correctly, the
bank may effectively be prevented from paying the November 2016
coupon related to BST's global bond.  The review for further
downgrade will focus on Bantrab's ability to pay the November 2016
coupon on a timely manner.

While the bank managed to obtain a new correspondent banking line
this month, the facility appears to be primarily intended to
settle international balances with a credit card issuer as well as
to facilitate international wires for Bantrab's customers, and
makes no explicit reference to the processing of coupon payments.
The ambiguity of the terms and conditions creates uncertainty as
to whether the facility will function as intended to ensure a
timely payment to BST's bondholders.  Even if the November coupon
payment is made, the lack of redundant correspondent facilities
means that if the facility is subsequently canceled, the bank will
once again be left without any means to pay bondholders.  Its
difficulty in securing even this one facility suggests that it
might not be able to arrange any alternatives in such a
circumstance on a timely manner.

According to Moody's bank analyst Georges Hatcherian, "Bantrab's
ability to secure new lines has been challenged by increased
headline and reputational risks for the bank following the seizure
by Guatemala's Public Ministry in April 2016 of the bank's non-
voting preferred shares that had been held by Panama-based DHK
Finance Inc".  The share seizure was in response to allegations by
Guatemala's Superintendency of Banks that the funds used to
purchase these shares were obtained illegally and that potential
wrongdoing might have occurred during the sale of those shares to
DHK.  This incident came on top of a generalized increase in risk
aversion of international banks towards Central America due to
rising apprehensions about weaknesses in regional banks' and
regulators' anti-money laundering controls.

The downgrade of BST's foreign currency senior debt rating to Caa1
from B1 reflects the downgrade of Bantrab's BCA.  In addition, it
considers a reduction in Moody's assessment of the probability of
public support to the bank to avoid a default on the bond, if
needed, to "low" from "moderate" given the absence of any
indication of public support for the bank following the loss of
its correspondent lines.

Nevertheless, Moody's believes that the Superintendency of Banks
and central bank remain more willing and able to support Bantrab's
domestic deposits should that prove necessary, and the rating
agency continues to assess a moderate probability of public
support for these.  This assessment considers the fact that
Bantrab was established by the Guatemalan government in 1965, as
well as its large base of public sector deposits and significant
overall deposit market share of about 7% as of June 2016.
Consequently, Bantrab's B3 deposit ratings continue to benefit
from one notch of lift from the caa1 BCA.

Furthermore, Moody's notes that the aforementioned developments
have not led to a material deterioration of the bank's other
financial fundamentals thus far.  That said, the B3 deposit
ratings reflect the risk of contagion if BST's bond is eventually
not paid.

                   WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS

Bantrab's ratings could be confirmed if the bank pays the next
coupon payment in a timely manner.  If the bank is not able to
avoid a default on the bond, the rating will likely be lowered,
possibly by multiple notches, depending upon the prospects for
full repayment in the future and the expected timing of such
payment.

The last rating action on Bantrab and on Bantrab Senior Trust was
on June 24, 2016.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Based in Guatemala City, Banco de los Trabajadores reported total
consolidated assets of about USD2.2 billion (GTQ 17.5 billion) and
shareholders' equity of around USD220 million (GTQ 1.7 billion),
as of June 2016.


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J A M A I C A
=============


* JAMAICA: Local Sugar Industry Performs Poorly in April to June
----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the local sugar industry performed
negatively during the April to June quarter.

According to the Bank of Jamaica's Quarterly Monetary Policy
Report, there was a fall in sugar and molasses production during
the period, the report notes.

The decline followed the late start to the 2016 crop season as
well as operational issues at some plants, the report relays.

The Central Bank said the industry is expected to recover over the
near-to medium-term due to increased investment and production
initiatives undertaken through public-private partnerships, the
report says.

                            *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Jamaica's Long-term
foreign and local currency IDRs to 'B' from 'B-' and revised the
Rating Outlooks to Stable from Positive.  In addition, Fitch
upgraded Jamaica's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-Currency
bonds to 'B' from 'B-'.  The Country Ceiling has been affirmed at
'B' and the Short- Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


MEXICALI MUNICIPALITY: Moody's Confirms Caa1/B3.mx Issuer Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico confirmed the Municipality of Mexicali's issuer
ratings at Caa1/B3.mx, and revised the outlook on the ratings to
negative from ratings under review for a downgrade.  At the same
time, Moody's confirmed the ratings for a MXN 814 million enhanced
loan (original amount) with Banobras at B1/Baa3.mx.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE RATING CONFIRMATION AT Caa1/B3.mx

This action closes the review for downgrade after Mexicali missed
payments on two short-term unsecured loans on June 30.  The
default event was cured in July without losses to creditors.

Mexicali's Caa1/B3.mx ratings reflect the municipality's very
tight liquidity position and a structural reliance on short-term
debt.  Between 2011 and 2015, the municipality's net working
capital (measured as current assets minus current liabilities)
averaged -20.2% of total expenditures, one of the lowest levels
among Mexican rated municipalities.  The municipality's cash
position is also extremely low, covering 0.1 times its current
liabilities at the end of 2015.

At the end of the first quarter of 2016, the total outstanding
amount of Mexicali's short-term debt stood at MXN 48.847 million
with Banco del Bajio and MXN 193.125 with Banco Interacciones.
These loans are equivalent to 24% of total direct debt, in line
with its historical average.

The ratings also take into account negative gross operating
balances and high total debt levels.  Mexicali's gross operating
balance averaged -12.5% of operating revenues between 2011 and
2015 and stood at -7.8% at the end of last year.  Mexicali's long-
term debt stood at MXN 1,498.5 million at the end of 2015,
representing 68.7% of operating revenues, one of the highest debt
levels among Mexican rated municipalities.  Moody's do not expect
Mexicali to contract long-term debt before the end of the current
administration's term in office concluding on December 1.

However, Moody's expects Mexicali to continue accumulating arrears
with suppliers while it keeps its short-term debt to operating
revenue ratio constant at the end of 2016.

The ratings confirmation of the MXN 814 million enhanced loan
reflects the confirmation of Mexicali's issuer ratings.  The loan
ratings are directly linked to the credit quality of the issuer,
which ensures that underlying contract enforcement risks, economic
risks and credit culture risks (for which the issuer rating acts
as a proxy) are embedded in the enhanced loans ratings.

                 RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects our expectations that Mexicali will
continue experiencing pressures to fund its recurrent deficit and
will continue relying on short-term financial debt.  The negative
outlook also reflects the uncertainty regarding the financial
policies to be implemented by the incoming administration.

              WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP OR DOWN

Given the negative outlook, a rating upgrade is unlikely in the
medium-term.  However, the rating could be stabilized if Mexicali
improves its gross operating and reduces deficits.  The ratings
could also be stabilized if Mexicali improves its liquidity
position through a reduction in short-term debt, an increase in
cash holdings, or a combination of the two.  Finally, the ratings
could be stabilized if the new administration has credible fiscal
consolidation plan.  Conversely, an increase in debt levels, or a
deterioration of arrears with suppliers would exert downward
pressure on Mexicali's issuer ratings.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Mexicali, Municipality of rating is between 01/01/2011
and 31/12/2015 (source: issuer).

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.


VERACRUZ STATE: Moody's Cuts Issuer Ratings to B3/B1.mx
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico concluded the rating review of the state of
Veracruz and downgraded its issuer ratings to B3/B1.mx from
B1/Baa3.mx. The outlook is negative. At the same time, Moody's
downgraded the debt ratings of the following 12 enhanced loans:

   -- Banco del Baj°o for MXN1500 million (original amount) to
      Ba1/A1.mx from Baa3/Aa3.mx

   -- Banobras for MXN1220 million (original amount) to Ba1/A1.mx
      from Baa3/Aa3.mx

   -- Inbursa for MXN5500 million (original amount) to Ba2/A2.mx
      from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Banobras for MXN4600 million (original amount) to Ba2/A2.mx
      from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Banorte for MXN4500 million (original amount) to Ba2/A2.mx
      from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Banobras (FAIS) for MXN1730 million (original amount) to
      Ba2/A2.mx from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Interacciones for MXN1500 million (original amount) to
      Ba2/A2.mx from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Multiva for MXN1500 million (original amount) to Ba2/A2.mx
      from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Multiva for MXN1300 million (original amount) to Ba2/A2.mx
      from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Santander for MXN750 million (original amount) to Ba2/A2.mx
      from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Interacciones for MXN695 million (original amount) to
      Ba2/A2.mx from Ba1/A1.mx

   -- Banamex for MXN500 million (original amount) to Ba2/A2.mx
      from Ba1/A1.mx

Today's action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on 11
July 2016.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

The downgrade reflects Veracruz's deteriorating financial position
reflected by weaker than expected 2015 financial results and a
drastic deterioration in Veracruz's liquidity metrics.

In contrast to Moody's expectations of a budget deficit in the
order of 4% of total revenues, Veracruz posted a deficit of 6.5%
of total revenues in 2015. This includes MXN 6.6 billion
expenditures reported in the notes to the state's financial
statements as spent outside the regular budget execution process.
Veracruz has also seen a severe depletion of its cash reserves
which fell to MXN 576 million at the end of 2015 from MXN 6.8
billion in 2014. This was accompanied by an increase of current
liabilities, which passed from to MXN 12 billion from MXN 3
billion between 2014 and 2015, and have further increased to MXN
17 billion as of the second quarter of 2016. These results have
pushed Veracruz's cash-to-current liabilities ratio to 0.05 from
1.9, the lowest among Mexican states rated by Moody's.

The downgrade also reflects negative pressure resulting from two
recently approved local laws. The first saw the status of more
than 5,000 workers change to permanent from temporary. This is
expected to increase expenses by MXN108 million as well as
increase future pension contributions. The second committed
directing all payroll taxes collected by the State towards
repayment of current liabilities. While this is expected to clear
arrears, it is expected this will require 3 years' worth of
payroll taxes, which will limit the revenues available to the
State for ongoing expenditures.

Finally, the downgrade reflects the breaching of the current
liabilities' covenants in Veracruz bonds (VERACB 12, VERACB 12B,
and VERACB 12U), which could result in the state receiving less
participaciones transfers for at least one year. Overall, these
three situations will reduce Veracruz's flexibility in the short-
and medium-term.

Also included in the review for downgrade was the lack of
transparency on the state's short-term debt. Moody's notes that
the release of the 2015 financial statements indicated that
Veracruz did not have any short-term debt. This was also
reinforced with the financial results for the second quarter of
2016.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectations that the state
will have limited financial flexibility to address its financial
deterioration, improve liquidity and deter debt increases, thereby
increasing the risk of further financial deterioration in the near
future.

RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE OF THE ENHANCED LOANS' RATINGS

The rating downgrades of the enhanced loans reflects the downgrade
of Veracruz's issuer ratings. According to Moody's projections,
the loan enhancements provide three- to four-notches uplifts from
the global scale issuer ratings. However, given the strong
positive track record of the existing enhanced loans, as well as
the solid trust framework in which these loans are embedded, it is
Moody's opinion that these loans have demonstrated increased
security to the lenders. As such, Moody's considers that the
ratings for the enhanced loans do not need to move in conformity
with the issuer rating at Veracruz's current rating level. Per
Moody's methodology on rating enhanced loans, the loan ratings are
still linked to the credit quality of the issuer, which ensures
that underlying contract enforcement risks, economic risks and
credit culture risks (for which the issuer rating acts as a proxy)
are embedded in the ratings of the enhanced loans.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook, a rating upgrade is unlikely. However,
the ratings could be stabilized if Veracruz registers significant
improvement in its cash financing results and current liabilities.
Conversely, the ratings could be downgraded if Veracruz's
consolidated results deteriorate further, joined by a further
deterioration in liquidity or an increase in debt levels.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Rating Methodology
for Enhanced Municipal and State Loans in Mexico published in June
2014 and Regional and Local Governments published in January 2013.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Mexicali, Municipality of rating is between 01/01/2011
and 31/12/2015 (source: State of Veracruz).

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


AEROPOSTALE INC: Hires Hilco Streambank as IP Sales Advisor
-----------------------------------------------------------
Aeropostale, Inc., et al., seek authorization from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York to employ
Hilco IP Services, LLC dba Hilco Streambank as intellectual
property sale advisor to the Debtors, nunc pro tunc to August 9,
2016.

The Debtors require Hilco Streambank to:

   (a) collect and secure all of the available information and
       data concerning the Debtors' IP Assets;

   (b) prepare marketing materials designed to inform potential
       purchasers of the availability of the Debtors' IP Assets
       for sale, assignment, license, or other disposition;

   (c) develop and execute a sales and marketing program designed
       to elicit proposals to acquire the Debtors' IP Assets from
       qualified acquirers with a view toward completing one or
       more sales, assignments, licenses, or other dispositions of

       the Debtors' IP Assets;

   (d) assist the Debtors in connection with the transfer of the
       Debtors' IP Assets to the acquirers who offer the highest
       or otherwise best consideration for the Debtors' IP Assets;
       and

   (e) assist with any depositions or expert testimony in support
       of the transfer of the Debtors' IP Assets.

The Debtors have agreed to pay Hilco Streambank the following Fee
Structure:

    -- Engagement Fee. Hilco Streambank shall be paid a one-time
       engagement fee of $150,000 upon approval of the Engagement
       Agreement by the Court.

    -- Commission. Hilco Streambank shall be paid a commission
       based on the aggregate proceeds generated from the sale,
       assignment, license, or other dispositions of the Debtor's
       IP Assets as:

       - "Stalking Horse Fee". If a New Bidder is signed up as a

         "Stalking Horse" bidder for the Debtor's IP Assets alone
         or in combination with other assets, the Stalking Horse
         Fee shall be 0.5% of the Stalking Horse bid. If a New
         Bidder is the Stalking Horse and there are no other
         bidders, the Stalking Horse Fee shall be 1.5% of the
         Stalking Horse bid.

       - "Incremental Value Fee". If a New Bidder participates in
         an auction for the Debtors' IP Assets by making a bid or
         bids in excess of the Stalking Horse bid, either
         individually or in a joint venture or combination with an

         Existing Bidder, Hilco Streambank shall be paid 5% of
         the difference between the Stalking Horse bid and the
         highest bid made by any New Bidder.

    -- Expenses. The Debtors have agreed to reimburse Hilco
       Streambank's reasonable and verified out-of-pocket expenses

       incurred in connection with this engagement up to an
       aggregate of $50,000.

David Peress, executive vice president of Hilco, assured the Court
that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined
in
Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any
interest adverse to the Debtors and their estates.

Hilco can be reached at:

       David Peress
       HILCO STREAMBANK
       980 Washington St., Suite 330
       Dedham, MA 02026
       Tel: (781) 471-1239
       E-mail: dperess@hilcoglobal.com

                       About Aeropostale Inc.

Aeropostale, Inc. (OTC Pink: AROPQ) is a specialty retailer of
casual apparel and accessories, principally serving young women
and men through its Aeropostale(R) and Aeropostale Factory(TM)
stores and website and 4 to 12 year-olds through its P.S. from
Aeropostale stores and website.  The Company provides customers
with a focused selection of high quality fashion and fashion basic
merchandise at compelling values in an exciting and customer
friendly store environment.  Aeropostale maintains control over
its proprietary brands by designing, sourcing, marketing and
selling all of its own merchandise.  As of May 1, 2016 the Company
operated 739 Aeropostale(R) stores in 50 states and Puerto Rico,
41 Aeropostale stores in Canada and 25 P.S. from Aeropostale(R)
stores in 12 states.  In addition, pursuant to various licensing
agreements, the Company's licensees currently operate 322
Aeropostale(R) and P.S. from Aeropostale(R) locations in the
Middle East, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.  Since November
2012, Aeropostale, Inc. has operated GoJane.com, an online women's
fashion footwear and apparel retailer.

Aeropostale, Inc., and 10 of its affiliates each filed a voluntary
petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Lead Case No. 16-11275) on May 4, 2016.  The petitions were signed
by Marc G. Schuback as senior vice president, general counsel and
secretary.

The Debtors listed total assets of $354.38 million and total debts
of $390.02 million as of Jan. 30, 2016.

The Debtors have hired Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP as counsel; FTI
Consulting, Inc., as restructuring advisor; Stifel, Nicolaus &
Company, Inc., and Miller Buckfire & Company LLC as investment
bankers; RCS Real Estate Advisors as real estate advisors; Prime
Clerk LLC as claims and noticing agent; Stikeman Elliot LLP as
Canadian counsel; and Togut, Segal & Segal LLP as conflicts
counsel.

Judge Sean H. Lane is assigned to the cases.

The U.S. trustee for Region 2 on May 11, 2016, appointed seven
creditors of Aeropostale Inc. to serve on the official committee
of unsecured creditors.  The Committee hired Pachulski Stang Ziehl
& Jones LLP as counsel.

                           *     *     *

The Bankruptcy Court entered an order establishing (i) July 25,
2016 at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) as the deadline for each person
Or entity, not including governmental units to file proofs of
claim in respect of any prepetition claims against any of the
Debtors, and (ii) Oct. 31, 2016, at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) as
the deadline for governmental units to file proofs of claim in
respect of any prepetition claims against any of the Debtors.


MAGNO TIRE: Disclosures Conditionally OK'd; Sept. 27 Plan Hearing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Mildred Caban Flores of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico has conditionally approved Magno Tire
Center Inc.'s disclosure statement filed on Aug. 5, 2016.

A hearing for the consideration of the final approval of the
Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Plan will be held
on Sept. 27, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.

Any objection to the final approval of the Disclosure Statement
and
the confirmation of the Plan must be filed 14 days prior to the
date of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.  Acceptances or
rejections of the Plan may also be filed in writing by the holders
of all claims 14 days prior to the date of the hearing on
confirmation of the Plan.

As previously reported by The Troubled Company Reporter, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico on July 12
conditionally approved Magno Tire's disclosure statement, allowing
the company to begin soliciting votes from creditors for its plan.

Magno Tire Center, Inc., sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-00074) on Jan. 11,
2016.


The case is assigned to Judge Mildred Caban Flores.  The Debtor is
represented by Eduardo J. Mayoral Garcia, Esq.


SAMUEL BURGOS: Court OKs Disclosures, Confirms Chapter 11 Plan
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Puerto Rico has approved Samuel Burgos
Rodriguez and Blanca Vivas Valentin's disclosure statement and has
confirmed their Chapter 11 plan.

The Debtors filed the Disclosure Statement and the Plan on April
23, 2016.  The Court conditionally approved the Disclosure
Statement on April 29, 2016.

Samuel Burgos Rodriguez and Blanca Vivas Valentin filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-06055)
on Aug. 7, 2015.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Prepares For Huge Opposition March in Caracas
--------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Venezuelan opposition leaders have called on
their supporters to gather in the capital for what they have
dubbed the "Takeover of Caracas".

Their goal is to put pressure on the electoral authorities to
allow a recall referendum this year, aimed at ousting President
Nicolas Maduro, according to BBC News.

The country is in a deep economic crisis which the opposition
blames on government mismanagement, the report notes.

The government accuses the opposition of trying to mount a coup.

President Maduro said his administration was well prepared: "If
they're coming with coups, ambushes and political violence, the
revolutionary [government] will provide an uncommon and
overwhelming response," the report notes.

The president's supporters said they would hold counter-rallies.
Five hundred police officers will be deployed in the Chacao area
of Caracas alone to police the marches, the report relays.

In the run-up to the march, a number of opposition politicians
were detained, the report discloses.

Daniel Ceballos of the opposition Popular Will party was returned
to prison after having spent a year under house arrest awaiting
trial on charges of rebellion, the report relays.

The Interior Ministry said he was planning on escaping from house
arrest to carry out acts of violence during the rally.

Mr. Ceballos was one of the politicians arrested in 2014 over
violent anti-government protests that swept through Venezuela at
the time, the report relays.

Forty-three people on both sides of the political divide where
killed during those protests.

Popular Will party activists Carlos Melo and Yon Goicoechea have
also been arrested over the past few days, the first suspected of
carrying a "detonator cord" and the latter of carrying explosives.
Many shops and businesses said they would not open out of fear the
protests could turn violent.

                            'Come Out Peacefully'

Opposition leader Henrique Capriles said he hoped that they could
fill the main avenues of Caracas with people protesting
peacefully, the report relays.

"All of those who want change, come out onto the streets
peacefully, the recall referendum will put an end to this
disastrous government," Mr. Capriles said, the report notes.

But government politician Diosdado Cabello said he hoped that the
opposition would understand that "Nicolas Maduro is president, and
we're telling you Nicolas is not going, we're telling you Nicolas
will continue being president," the report relays.

The opposition hopes the march will pressure the electoral
authorities into allowing them to launch the second petition
needed to trigger the recall referendum as soon as possible, the
report says.

Timing is key as the date when the referendum is held will
determine what happens next, the report notes.

If a referendum should go against the president before 10 January,
new elections will be held, which the opposition hopes to win.
But if it is held after that date and Mr. Maduro is recalled, his
loyal vice-president will serve out the end of his term until
2019, the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *