TCRLA_Public/160921.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, September 21, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 187


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Proposed CHF300MM Notes


B R A Z I L

ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B-'
JBS SA: Replaces Two Executives While Police Probes J&F for Fraud
JBS SA: Brazilian Judge Permits Executives to Return to Work
GRUPO OAS: Brazil Court Delays Ruling on Debt Plan for Two Weeks
STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Lowers Global Scale Rating to SD


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ASCLETIS (CAYMAN): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3
CHINA BRANDING: Court Enters Wind-Up Order
CINDA ASIA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LEKO GROUP: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3
LYNX ASIA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 12

MKP CREDIT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3
PROFESSIONAL CONSULTING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 17
Q-BLK YUKON: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 7
SEDACO INC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 17
SEDONA HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

VINA LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 12
WING LUNG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Ban on Dollar-Only Charges Surprises Big Firms


J A M A I C A

* JAMAICA: IMF Approves US$39.6MM Disbursement


P U E R T O    R I C O

EUROMODAS INC: Unsecured Creditors to Get 5% Under Exit Plan
SECURITY GLOBAL: Hires Cordero as Attorney
THAMAR LI: Hires Santiago & Gonzalez as Attorney
VERNUS GROUP: Unsecureds to Recover 95% Under Plan


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CC'; Outlook Negative
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Expects to Rate USD1.7BB Notes 'CCC'


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A R G E N T I N A
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YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Proposed CHF300MM Notes
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Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 global foreign
currency rating to YPF Sociedad Anonima's (YPF)'s proposed up to
CHF300 million notes due 2019.  The proceeds of the notes will be
used for capital expenditure and working capital purposes.  The
outlook on the ratings is stable.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

YPF's B3 rating is based on the company's status as the largest
industrial corporation and energy company in Argentina with
sizeable oil and gas reserves, including large shale resources.
YPF's ratings also incorporate Moody's belief that although credit
metrics will deteriorate during 2016, given the adverse operating
environment, they will remain strong for the rating category.
Moody's will closely monitor the company's ability to adapt to the
new environment, following the 12% decrease in local oil prices in
Argentina earlier this year and still uncertain policies for the
energy sector, on top of a rigid cost structure due to the
Argentine labor dynamics that impact YPF's cash flow generation.

Since YPF is majority owned and controlled by the Argentine
government, its B3 ratings reflect the application of Moody's
joint default rating methodology for government-related issuers
(GRIs).  YPF's rating combines its underlying b3 Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA), which expresses a company's intrinsic credit
risk; the B3 local currency rating and stable outlook of the
Argentine government; and Moody's view of moderate support from
and high dependence on the sovereign.  While YPF is expected to
account for only a small part of the government's revenue base,
the high default dependence reflects the high correlation between
YPF's credit profile and Argentine economic trends.  YPF derives
the majority of its revenues domestically; also, the company and
the government both share common exposure to foreign exchange rate
risk and inflation, to name a few.  Moody's assumes a moderate
support probability by the government to YPF given the close
relationship between the two since the company is majority owned
and controlled by the first.  However, the government's ability to
provide support to YPF in case of need is weak, evidenced by its
B3 local currency rating and stable outlook.

Moody's considers YPF's liquidity profile as weak.  YPF's cash
balances as of June 30, 2016, were USD 1.0 billion.  In July, YPF
collected USD 630 in sovereign bonds related to 2015 subsidies and
issued USD 750 million notes.  Both events will provide cushion to
the company's liquidity for the remainder of the year vis-a-vis
the USD 2.2 billion debt coming due from June 2016 to the end of
2017.  Much of this amount is owed to local market participants
and Moody's believes that a large portion of it could be rolled
over relatively easily.  Most of the company's cash is held in US
dollars in bank accounts in Argentina.  The company has
demonstrated successful access to both local and international
markets to conduct liability managements; so far in 2016, YPF
would have raised close to USD 2.8 billion in debt, including the
proposed issuance.  Moody's expects the company to raise
USD1.5 billion in debt in 2017 in order to finance debt maturities
and to fund negative free cash flow, despite reducing its
important capex program by 25% in 2016.  It is yet to be seen how
additional capex cuts could impact YPF's production; however,
Moody's believes that past investments in technology and reserve
replacement could somewhat mitigate the negative impact in the
short term.

YPF's internal, publicly-stated net leverage target is 1.5x,
although this ratio will be higher during 2016 to reach about
2.2x, as per Moody's estimates, given lower local oil prices and
delays by the government to pay subsidies.  YPF believes it can
reverse this trend by cashing in government subsidies as scheduled
and passing through inflation and foreign exchange devaluation to
final prices, but current economic conditions may post resistance
to elevated price increases.  For these reasons, Moody's believes
that YPF's leverage will remain above management's target until at
least 2017.

YPF has a weak export profile, as it exports only around 10% of
revenues per year.  The company's foreign currency risk is
currently high as 77% of its debt, 40% of its capital spending 40%
of its operating costs are linked to the US dollar, which compares
to the 40% of the company's revenue generated in US currency.  YPF
usually holds USD 1 billion in cash but it can easily operate with
half of that.

YPF's stable outlook assumes that the Argentine government has
incentives to maintain prices of crude and oil products at a level
that makes it economically attractive for oil companies to invest
to increase production and reduce the country's dependence on
imports of oil products and natural gas.

Continued growth in total production while maintaining strong
margins and relatively low leverage could lead to an upgrade of
YPF's BCA.  Over the medium term, an improvement in Argentina's B3
rating and continued demonstration of a strong financial track
record could result in a ratings upgrade.  However, a rating
upgrade will depend on a clearer view of the new government's
energy policies for the next several years and how that could
affect YPF.

Conversely, YPF's ratings could be downgraded if it is unable to
maintain sufficient liquidity and access to foreign currency in
order to meet its debt service obligations.  The ratings could
also be downgraded if the government of Argentina's B3 rating were
to be downgraded.

YPF is 51% owned by the Argentine government and had revenues of
USD 15.1 billion and total assets of USD28.2 billion for the
twelve months ending June 30, 2016.  During 2015, the company
generated 96% of its revenues in Argentina; its operations outside
of the country include the United States, Brazil and Chile.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Integrated Oil & Gas Industry published in April 2014.


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B R A Z I L
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ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B-'
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Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Andrade Gutierrez
Engenharia S.A. (AGE) to 'B-' from 'B+', as well as its long-term
National Scale rating to 'BB-(bra)' from 'A-(bra)'. These actions
affect approximately USD500 million of issued debt by Andrade
Gutierrez International S.A. (AGI) due April 2018, which AGE
unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees. The Rating Outlook
remains Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating downgrades reflect AGE's liquidity deterioration due to
difficulties the company has faced in monetizing its receivables,
combined with a continued challenging business environment. In
Brazil, the adverse macroeconomic scenario, lack of new projects,
and more scarce and costly credit lines continue to affect AGE's
operations and credit profile. Abroad, the backlog renewal is
impaired by moderate oil prices, as a large part of the company's
clients are countries that depend on the commodity exports to
support their infrastructure agenda. In order to protect its
liquidity, AGE has reduced activities on projects that are facing
delays in payments or not progressing as expected due to clients'
financial issues.

AGE's ratings are supported by its scale as one of the largest
contractors in Latin America with 34% of revenues generated
abroad. The market value of the AG group investments in Companhia
Energetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig; 'A(bra)'/Outlook Negative) and
CCR S.A. ('AA(bra)'/Outlook Stable) are also positive
considerations, and are estimated at around BRL6.4 billion. The
signing of the lenience agreement related to the Lava-Jato
scandal, determination of the BRL1 billion fine and the extended
time to pay it of 12 years were considered as positive, as they
remove uncertainties linked to this process, and potentially allow
the company to participate in more bids for new works.

The Negative Outlook is due to the uncertainties regarding AGE's
capacity to manage its working capital needs that have been
consuming its liquidity cash rapidly. It also considers the
challenging performance of the Brazilian economy in 2016 and 2017,
along with the recovery of oil prices that may continue to limit
backlog renewal. Fitch also expects the more limited and expensive
access to debt markets to continue.

Pressured and Concentrated Backlog

Fitch projects that AGE's total backlog will decline 21% in 2016
and grow 4% in 2017 in BRL terms. The anemic operating environment
has resulted in backlog consumption and poses uncertainties as to
backlog replacement capacity. AGE's backlog decreased to BRL22.1
billion in March 2016 from BRL25.2 billion in December 2015 and
BRL30 billion in December 2014. The adverse macroeconomic
conditions and the political crisis have blocked the
infrastructure agenda in Brazil. International backlog renewal
remains affected by the moderate oil prices, as a large part of
AGE's international backlog derives from countries that depend on
oil exports, such as Venezuela. As for 2017, the scenario may
improve with the Federal Government agenda for new concessions in
Brazil.

AGE's backlog is concentrated in several ways, which pressures its
credit quality. The contract portfolio is exposed to a small
number of projects, to public clients, and to countries that
depend on oil exports. In March 2016, AGE's 10 largest projects
represent 73% of its backlog. At the same time, public clients,
which tend to have erratic payment behavior, were 89%. Projects in
countries known for their oil export dependency, such as
Venezuela, Angola, Guinea Equatorial, among others surpasses 60%.
Venezuela, which is going through an economic crisis, represents
42% of AGE's backlog.

Lenience Agreement Signed

Fitch believes signing the lenience agreement was an important
step for the group. The deal came at the expense of a BRL1 billion
fine to be paid over the next 12 years as well as the application
of very restricted compliance measures going forward. The company
has been entitled to participate in public bids and applying to
access public funding. The agency also expects AGE to resume its
condition to provide services to Petrobras in the short term,
which could add projects to its backlog. The lenience agreement
partially mitigates concerns about the company's refinancing
capacity.

Cash Flow Still Pressured

Fitch forecasts that AGE's cash flow from operations (CFFO) will
decline to BRL87 million in 2016, due to negative working capital
of BRL161 million, with negative free cash flow (FCF) of BRL97
million in the same year. In the last 12 months (LTM) ended March
31, 2016, CFFO of BRL42 million was heavily reduced by BRL667
million of working capital needs, while FCF was negative at BRL362
million.

"We also expect AGE to have adjusted net leverage of 3.3x in 2016
and 1.5x in 2017, the result of BRL290 million and BRL346 million
EBITDA generation, respectively, in the same period." Fitch said.
As of the LTM ended March 31, 2016, AGE's adjusted net leverage
reached 5.3x. AGE's EBITDA continues to be affected by the weak
operating environment. In March 2016, total adjusted debt reached
BRL2.5 billion, mostly composed of AGI's BRL1.6 billion in
outstanding bonds and working capital lines of BRL685 million.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Backlog falls 20% in Brazil and 6% abroad in USD terms in
      2016. It declines 5% domestically and stays flat in foreign
      markets in 2017 in USD;

   -- Net revenues decline 15% in 2016 and 12% in 2017 due to the
      lack of new contracts;

   -- EBITDA margins of 1.5% in Brazil and 10% abroad in 2016,
      leading to a consolidated margin of 5.7%. As of 2017,
      domestic margins increase to 2.5% and the international
      margins returns to historical levels of 12%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a negative rating action include:

   -- Continued deterioration of the company's liquidity and CFFO
      generation capacity;

   -- Difficulties in replacing backlog domestically and abroad;

   -- Material problems collecting receivables, which can affect
      working capital needs.

An upgrade is unlikely in the short term. However, future
developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action include:

   -- Recovery in its business profile on a sustainable basis with
      strengthened backlog replacement capacity;

   -- Lower debt service challenges for AGE, which can occur
      through capital injections, debt refinancing, or asset sale.

LIQUIDITY

Fitch believes AGE's liquidity is under pressure. The company has
not been able to monetize receivables as expected due to the
financial deterioration of its clients and prolonged delays to
receive invoices from banks and multilateral agencies. AGE is
considering selling part of its concessions in order to reinforce
its liquidity which has not been considered on Fitch's base case.
Access to funding has been restricted by higher cost and shorter
tenors than before. The main repayment is AGI's USD500 million
bond maturing in April 2018 that has been serviced by AGE.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia S.A. (AGE)

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs to 'B-' from 'B+';

   -- National long-term rating to 'BB-(bra)' from 'A-(bra)'.

Andrade Gutierrez International S.A. (AGI)

   -- USD500 million senior unsecured bonds due April 2018 to 'B-
      /RR4' from 'B+/RR4'.


JBS SA: Replaces Two Executives While Police Probes J&F for Fraud
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Luciana Magalhaes and Jeffrey T. Lewis at The Wall Street Journal
report that JBS SA replaced its top two executives as it scrambles
to reassure investors that a fraud investigation at a related
company won't disrupt the world's largest protein producer.

JBS said in a note to the market that Jose Batista Junior will
take over as interim chief executive, substituting for his brother
Wesley Batista, according to The Wall Street Journal.  The company
appointed their father, Jose Batista Sobrinho, who is also the
founder of JBS as chairman to replace his other son, Joesley
Batista, the report relays.

The meat and poultry giant, whose U.S. holdings include poultry
producer Pilgrim's Pride and meat processor Swift & Company, has
been under pressure to name new leadership, the report notes.  On
Sept. 5, Wesley and Joesley Batista were forced to step aside
while police investigate alleged fraud at a paper-pulp producer
owned by the Batista family's investment company, J&F
Investimentos SA, the report discloses.

But analysts said the change has done little to satisfy investors'
questions about the extent of the Batista's legal woes or the
potential consequences for JBS at a time of upheaval in Brazil,
where political scandals have ensnared some of the country's
biggest corporate names, said Joao Pedro Brugger, an analyst at
Leme Investimentos in Florianopolis, the report relays.

"The main problem is that the investigation could have new
developments," Mr. Brugger said.

The two Batista brothers' legal troubles stem from a massive
police operation launched targeting more than 100 individuals and
businesses across Brazil, the report relays.  Dubbed Operation
Greenfield, the probe is aimed at uncovering alleged malfeasance
at four state pension funds that allegedly overpaid for stakes in
Brazilian-owned companies, including pulp maker Eldorado Brasil
Celulose SA, which is controlled by the Batista's holding company,
notes the report.

JBS SA isn't a target of the probe.  But Wesley and Joesley
Batista were among more than three dozen Brazilian executives
barred by a judge from managing any business while police
investigate the alleged scam, the report relays.

JBS said that Joesley and Wesley Batista will appeal the court
order.  A J&F spokesman has denied any wrongdoing by the brothers
or by Eldorado.

Recent investigations in Brazil into alleged overbilling linked to
government contracting, including the blockbuster probe centered
on state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro S.A or Petrobras,
have turned up evidence that some of the funds were used to pay
bribes and kickbacks to politicians, the report notes.

The Petrobras scandal has soured some investors on firms in
Brazil, including JBS, which has cultivated close ties to the
government, the report says.  Shares of JBS are down nearly 32%
over the past year.  Brazilian government entities own more than
one-quarter of JBS shares, part of a state strategy that turned
the meatpacker into a globally competitive player, the report
discloses.

According to WSJ, J&F and JBS both face legal issues of their own.
Brazil's accounting watchdog, known as the TCU, recently opened an
investigation into potential "irregularities" regarding a loan
from state-owned lender Caixa Economica Federal that J&F used to
buy Alpargatas SA, maker of the popular Havaianas brand of flip-
flops.

The probe is still in preliminary stages, according to a TCU
spokeswoman, who decline to provide more details on the alleged
irregularities, the report notes.

J&F declined to comment on the investigation. Caixa in an email
said J&F met all its risk-analysis requirements and that it will
fully collaborate with the investigation, says The Journal.

Prosecutors are also looking at whether or not JBS received
preferential treatment from state development bank BNDES, which
helped finance a string of acquisitions by the meatpacker that
turned it into the world's biggest producer of animal protein, the
report discloses.  BNDES owns 20.4% of JBS's shares, while state-
owned lender Caixa Economica Federal owns another 6.5% of JBS
shares.

Marcos Peixoto, a Sao Paulo-based money manager at investment firm
XP Gestao de Recursos, said JBS's close ties to the Brazilian
government have kept his firm away from the meatpacker, the report
says.  Now, he fears that JBS may have difficulties rolling over
debt and implementing its reorganization plan.

JBS has some BRL18 billion in short term debt to be rolled over in
the next 12 months, according to a report by Banco Bradesco BBI,
notes WSJ. The firm has said it is also moving ahead with a big
reorganization plan, to spin off its international business into
an Ireland-based company with shares traded at the NYSE, WSJ
relays.

Analysts and investors believe JBS may have difficulty concluding
the restructuring by the end of the year, as expected, says the
report.

JBS's share price dropped 10% on Sept. 5, the day police raided
Eldorado's offices and brought in Wesley Batista for questioning.
Joesley Batista, who is CEO of J&F, was out of the country the day
of the raid and is scheduled to be questioned by police, the
report notes.

Other firms controlled by J&F are being forced by the court order
to make changes as well, the report says.  Eldorado is temporarily
replacing Joesley and Wesley Batista from their positions as
chairman and vice chairman, the report adds.  Footwear company
Alpargatas said in a note to the market that two board members
will take over for the two brothers temporarily, notes the report.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.
16, 2016, S&P Global Ratings downgraded JBS S.A. and JBS USA LLC
to 'BB' from 'BB+' on the global scale.  S&P also downgraded JBS
to 'brAA-' from 'brAA+' on the national scale.  In addition, S&P
lowered all its issue-level ratings to 'BB' from 'BB+' on both
companies.  A recovery rating of '3' for the senior secured
debts--indicating a recovery expectation of 70%-90%, in the higher
band of the range--and a '4' recovery rating for the unsecured
debts--indicating a recovery expectation of 30%-50%, the higher
band of the range--remain unchanged.


JBS SA: Brazilian Judge Permits Executives to Return to Work
-------------------------------------------------------------
Luciana Magalhaes and Jeffrey T. Lewis at The Wall Street Journal
report that JBS SA's two top executives can return to work as soon
as Wednesday, Sept. 14, a judge said, more than a week after the
two men were suspended from their jobs by a court order.

The judge agreed to let Wesley and Joesley Batista return to work
in return for J&F either making a bank deposit of BRL1.5 billion
($452 million), or providing other guarantees for the same amount,
to pay any potential restitution from the investigation in the
event either or both of the men are charged and found guilty, the
report notes.

J&F has until Oct. 21 to make the deposit or provide those
guarantees, according to the agreement between J&F and
prosecutors, which a judge accepted. If the payment isn't made by
then, Wesley and Joesley Batista's suspensions from their
positions will be reinstated, the agreement said, the report
relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.
16, 2016, S&P Global Ratings downgraded JBS S.A. and JBS USA LLC
to 'BB' from 'BB+' on the global scale.  S&P also downgraded JBS
to 'brAA-' from 'brAA+' on the national scale.  In addition, S&P
lowered all its issue-level ratings to 'BB' from 'BB+' on both
companies.  A recovery rating of '3' for the senior secured
debts--indicating a recovery expectation of 70%-90%, in the higher
band of the range--and a '4' recovery rating for the unsecured
debts--indicating a recovery expectation of 30%-50%, the higher
band of the range--remain unchanged.


GRUPO OAS: Brazil Court Delays Ruling on Debt Plan for Two Weeks
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ana Mano at Reuters reports that a Brazilian state appeals court
postponed a vote on the legality of several aspects of Grupo OAS
SA's restructuring plan for at least a couple of weeks, adding
uncertainty to efforts by the debt-laden engineering conglomerate
to emerge from bankruptcy protection.

The appeals court in Sao Paulo agreed to reconvene as early as
Oct. 3 to discuss the 19 challenges put forward by a number of
local and foreign creditors, according to Reuters.  Some of the
challenges include lengthy repayment timetables and Grupo OAS's
use of asset sales to favor some creditors, court documents
showed, the report notes.

The delay adds to uncertainty over Grupo OAS's emergence from a
painful restructuring triggered by a harsh recession and the
group's involvement in a sweeping corruption scandal, the report
relays.  The ongoing delay in the plan has halted the surrender of
OAS's stake in Invepar Investimentos e Participacoes em
Infraestrutura SA to creditors, slowing the builder's recovery,
the report says.

Some creditors allege they were treated unfairly under terms of a
restructuring plan approved late last year by a majority of
lenders and the court overseeing Grupo OAS's bankruptcy protection
proceedings, the documents showed, the report discloses.

Under the original plan, OAS gave some lenders a 24.5 percent
stake it owned in Invepar in lieu for some debts, the report
relays.

Sao Paulo-based Grupo OAS filed for bankruptcy protection in March
last year to restructure about BRL8 billion ($2.4 billion) in
debt, the report recalls.

One key challenge to the plan came from a group of local unsecured
creditors led by Pentagono SA DTVM, which said the repayment terms
they obtained from OAS in the restructuring plan were worse than
those for foreign creditors such as U.S.-based Aurelius
Investments LLC, the report notes.

One of the judges in the three-justice panel asked for a pause to
the ruling, citing the need to further analyze evidence against
the legality of the plan, the report relays.

Eduardo Munhoz, Grupo OAS's attorney, said the company remains
optimistic that the panel will drop all the challenges -- which
might automatically trigger approval of the company's financial
reorganization, the report adds.


STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Lowers Global Scale Rating to SD
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it lowered its global scale 'CCC-'
and national scale 'brCCC-' ratings on the state of Rio de Janeiro
(Rio) to SD.  At the same time, S&P removed both ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where it placed them on
Sept. 12, 2016.

On Sept. 9, 2016, the state of Rio de Janeiro missed a $46 million
debt service payment to the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB).  The IADB loan is guaranteed by the sovereign, and S&P
expects it to fulfill the debt service payment in the following
weeks.  However, since the contract of IADB and Rio doesn't
incorporate a stated grace period, according to S&P's criteria,
when the contract doesn't incorporate a stated grace period,
timely payment means no later than five business days after the
due date for payment (either by the state or by the federal
government as guarantor).  As the payment wasn't made within five
business days after the due date, S&P considers this to be a
default.

S&P defines selective default ('SD') when an obligor has failed to
pay one or more of its financial obligations (rated or unrated)
when it came due.  An 'SD' rating is assigned when S&P believes
that the obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific issue or
class of obligations, but it will continue to meet its payment
obligations on other issues or classes of obligations in a timely
manner.

In addition to IADB, the state of Rio de Janeiro has payments
coming due in September to other multilateral lending agencies and
to Credit Suisse.  The state would cure its selective default once
the missed debt service is paid and if it is current to other
creditors.  If the payment is made to the IADB, but Rio has
outstanding past-due debt service payments, as per S&P's criteria
defines, to other creditors, then the ratings on the state would
remain at 'SD'.  The rating that the state would receive upon
emerging from default will depend on S&P's assessment of its
willingness and capacity to continue repaying debt and of its
overall credit profile.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.


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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
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ASCLETIS (CAYMAN): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ascletis (Cayman) Inc. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Oct. 3, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Aug. 29, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Powertree (Investment (BVI) Ltd.
          Vanterpool Plaza, 2nd Floor, Wickhams Cay 1
          Road Town, Tortola
          British Virgin Islands
          Telephone: + 86 571 8589 0915
          Facsimile: + 86 571 8538 9730


CHINA BRANDING: Court Enters Wind-Up Order
------------------------------------------
On Aug. 18, 2016, the Grand Court of Cayman Islands entered an
order to wind up the operations of China Branding Group Limited.

The company's liquidator is:

          Hugh Dickson
          c/o Phillip Tyrrell
          c/o Grant Thornton Specialist Services (Cayman) Limited
          10 Market Street #765, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1 9006
          Cayman Islands


CINDA ASIA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On Aug. 12, 2016, the sole shareholder of Cinda Asia Investments
Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

Zhou Lu is the company's liquidator.


LEKO GROUP: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Leko Group Holdings Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Oct. 3, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 1, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Li Li
          c/o Michelle R. Bodden-Moxam
          Portcullis TrustNet (Cayman) Ltd.
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          Oleander Way, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 32052 Grand Cayman KY1-1208
          Cayman Islands


LYNX ASIA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 12
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Lynx Asia Capital Resources Ltd are required to
file their proofs of debt by Oct. 12, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 22, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Susan Craig/Jennifer Chailler
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


MKP CREDIT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of MKP Credit Offshore (Plan Assets), Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 3, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 19, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Matthew Wright
          c/o Omar Grant
          P.O. Box 897 Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295


PROFESSIONAL CONSULTING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 17
--------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Professional Consulting International Limited are
required to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 17, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Aug. 22, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


Q-BLK YUKON: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 7
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Q-BLK Yukon Fund, Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Oct. 7, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Aug. 25, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jane Fleming
          c/o Jean Ebanks
          P.O. Box 30464 Grand Cayman KY1-1202
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 945-2187
          Facsimile: (345) 945-2197


SEDACO INC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 17
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Sedaco Inc are required to file their proofs of
debt by Oct. 17, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Aug. 22, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


SEDONA HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Aug. 22, 2016, the sole shareholder of Sedona Holdings Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Cayman Fiduciary Limited
          c/o Robin Garnham
          Telephone: (345) 746 3100
          Landmark Square, Third Floor, 64 Earth Close
          P.O. Box 707CB Grand Cayman KY1-9006
          Cayman Islands


VINA LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 12
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Vina Limited are required to file their proofs of
debt by Oct. 12, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 19, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Susan Craig/Jennifer Chailler
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


WING LUNG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 3
-----------------------------------------------
The creditors of Wing Lung Special Opportunities Fund Limited are
required to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 3, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 18, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Iain Gow
          Zolfo Cooper, 38 Market Street
          Canella Court, 2nd Floor, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY1-9006
          c/o Cassandra Ronaldson
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 4038
          e-mail: cassandra.ronaldson@zolfocooper.ky


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Ban on Dollar-Only Charges Surprises Big Firms
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that business leader Rafael Blanco said
the Central Bank's announced ban on the use of very-phones which
charge only in dollars or other foreign currency surprised the
business community, because in his view the issue wasn't
previously addressed.

Mr. Blanco, who said he was speaking as a hotelier and not as
president of the National Business Council (CONEP), said prices
throughout Dominican Republic's hotel industry are "normally"
expressed in dollars, according to Dominican Today.  "Then the
custom to charge the customer in the currency in which their
service was quoted was established to avoid confusion with the
exchange rate's movements."

In that regard, economist Ernesto Selman, quoted by
diariolibre.com.do, said the Central Bank's decision to restrict
somewhat the use of foreign currencies in the country is of great
concern, since thus far it's been used freely in transactions and
in businesses for consumption, savings or investment in local and
foreign currency, the report notes.

The Central Bank reported that in recent years has been to
increase the use of sales terminals designated for foreign
currency to pay a variety of suppliers of goods and services, the
report notes.

"In the interest of protecting the right to free choice by
cardholders and avoid unwanted pressures on the exchange rate, the
Central Bank instructed Acquirer Companies to remove of exclusive
TPOS in foreign currency within no later than 90 days," the
Central Bank says on its website, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


* JAMAICA: IMF Approves US$39.6MM Disbursement
----------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
completed on September 16, 2016 the thirteenth review of Jamaica's
economic performance under the program supported by a four-year,
SDR 615.38 million (about US$932.3 million at the time of
approval) arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF)1. The
completion of the review enables an immediate disbursement of an
amount equivalent to SDR 28.32 million (about US$39.6 million).
The Board made the decision based on lapse-of-time procedures,
without a formal meeting.2 The EFF arrangement was approved on May
1, 2013.

Program implementation is on track. The authorities' continued
commitment to the demanding reform program even in the fourth year
of the IMF-supported program is commendable. All quantitative
performance criteria for end-June 2016, as well as the continuous
quantitative program targets and structural benchmarks, were met.
Domestic confidence indicators are at an all-time high, and there
are improving signs of economic activity, including agricultural
recovery, strong performance in tourism and manufacturing,
increased FDI inflow, and stronger private sector credit growth.
Real GDP growth is estimated at 1 percent for FY15/16, and is
projected to reach 1.7 percent in FY16/17. Nevertheless, important
risks to the program remain.

Higher growth dividends, more job creation, and improved living
standards will be essential to maintain social support for the
reform agenda. Safeguarding growth-enhancing capital spending is
essential for employment and job-creation. Assessing banking
sector competition, improving land titling, as well as developing
mobile money and agency banking services will help alleviate
constraints to financial inclusion and investment. The rebalancing
from direct to indirect taxes provides an opportunity to improve
compliance and increase incentives for production and effort. At
the same time, protecting the poor and vulnerable is a high
priority, which requires developing and implementing a well-
designed plan to enhance Jamaica's social protection framework to
ensure inclusive and equitable growth. Controlling the wage bill
and reprioritizing public spending to areas where the need is
highest, including by delivering public services cost-effectively
and efficiently, are vital to support a dynamic private sector.

                         *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Jamaica's Long-term
foreign and local currency IDRs to 'B' from 'B-' and revised the
Rating Outlooks to Stable from Positive.  In addition, Fitch
upgraded Jamaica's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-Currency
bonds to 'B' from 'B-'.  The Country Ceiling has been affirmed at
'B' and the Short- Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


EUROMODAS INC: Unsecured Creditors to Get 5% Under Exit Plan
------------------------------------------------------------
General unsecured creditors of Euromodas, Inc., will get 5% of
their claims under the company's proposed plan to exit Chapter 11
protection.

Under the restructuring plan, holders of general unsecured claims
of $50,000 or less, will be paid 5% of their claims on the
effective date of the plan.  These creditors will receive cash
payments.

Meanwhile, general unsecured creditors with claims over $50,000,
will be paid 5% of their claims through 60 equal consecutive
monthly installments of $467, commencing on the effective date of
the plan and continuing on the 30th day of the subsequent 59
months.

General unsecured creditors assert a total of $1.28 million.

The Debtor will pay creditors from the cash resulting from its
operations, according to the disclosure statement filed with the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico.

A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at
https://is.gd/b0fCkK

The Debtor is represented by:

     Enrique M. Almeida-Bernal
     Almeida & Davila, PSC
     P.O. Box 191757
     San Juan, PR 00919-1757
     Tel : 787-722-2500
     Fax: 787-777-1376
     Email: info@almeidadavila.com

                        About Euromodas Inc.

Euromodas, Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 15-09174) on November 19,
2015.  The petition was signed by Juan Carlos Castiel Diaz,
president.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated its assets at
$100,000 to $500,000 and debts at $1 million to $10 million.


SECURITY GLOBAL: Hires Cordero as Attorney
------------------------------------------
Security Global Solutions, Inc., seeks authority from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Nilda
M. Gonzalez Cordero, Esq. as attorney to the Debtor.

Security Global requires Cordero to represent and assist the
Debtor in carrying out its duties in the bankruptcy case under the
bankruptcy code.

Cordero will be paid at these hourly rates:

     Nilda M. Gonzalez Cordero          $200
     Paralegal                          $75

Cordero will be paid a retainer in the amount of $5,000.

Cordero will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

To the best of the Debtor's knowledge the firm is a "disinterested
person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the
Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to the
Debtor and its estates.

Cordero can be reached at:

     Nilda M. Gonzalez Cordero, Esq.
     PO Box 3389
     Guaynabo, PR 00970
     Tel: (787) 721-3437
     Fax: (787) 724-2480
     E-mail: ngonzalezc@ngclawpr.com

                       About Security Global

Security Global Solutions, Inc., sought the Chapter 11 protection
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-06970) on August 31, 2016. The petition
was signed by Sharon Marie Rodriguez Crespo, president.

No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in
the case.


THAMAR LI: Hires Santiago & Gonzalez as Attorney
------------------------------------------------
Thamar Li Construction and Rental, Corp., seeks authorization from
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to
employ The Law Offices of Santiago & Gonzalez Law, LLC as attorney
for the Debtor.

The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for reorganization pursuant
to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor is not
sufficiently familiar with the law to able to plan and conduct the
proceedings without competent legal counsel.

The Debtor requires Santiago & Gonzalez Law, LLC to represent the
Debtor in these proceeding.

Santiago & Gonzalez Law will be paid at these hourly rates:

     Nydia Gonzalez Ortiz, Esq.         $200
     Associates                         $150
     Paralegal                          $50

Nydia Gonzalez Ortiz, Esq., partner in the law firm of The Law
Offices of Santiago & Gonzalez Law, LLC, assured the Court that
the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in
Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any
interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

Santiago & Gonzalez Law may be reached at:

       Nydia Gonzalez Ortiz, Esq.
       The Law Offices of Santiago & Gonzalez Law, LLC
       11 Balances Street
       Yauco, PR 00698
       Tel: (787)267-2205/267-2252
       Fax: (787)873-0206
       E-mail: bufetesg@gmail.com

Thamar Li Construction & Rental Corp. filed a Chapter 11 petition
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-05930), on July 27, 2016, listing under
$1 million in both assets and liabilities.  Nydia Gonzalez Ortiz,
Esq., at SANTIAGO & GONZALEZ, serves as counsel to the Debtor.


VERNUS GROUP: Unsecureds to Recover 95% Under Plan
--------------------------------------------------
Vernus Group Corp. filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico a disclosure statement describing the
Debtor's Chapter 11 plan.

Class 1 Non-Insider General Unsecured Claims, estimated at
$423,449.55, are impaired under the Plan.  The Holders will be
paid in full satisfaction of their claims, as the claims may be
reduced and negotiated, or as finally determined by the Bankruptcy
Court, 95% of their allowed claims on a pro-rata basis, as
follows: 1) $19,485, representing 5% of Class 1's allowed claims,
to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of assets on the
Effective Date of the Plan; 2) $120,000, representing 28% of Class
1 allowed claims, to be paid from the proceeds of the Sale of
Inventory on the later of the Effective Date of the Plan or the
closing on the Sale of Inventory; and 3) $260,000, representing
62% of Class 1 allowed claims, to be paid from the proceeds of the
avoidance actions on the later of the Effective Date of the Plan
or the date of collection of the avoidance actions.

Any remaining funds after paying Class 1 allowed claims will also
be distributed to the General Non-Insider Unsecured Creditors, up
to the full satisfaction of their allowed claims on a pro-rata
basis.

The proceeds from the sale of inventory and the avoidance actions
are contingent events whose success affects the estimated recovery
for Class 1 allowed claims.  Moreover, the final dividend to Class
1 may be affected by the costs of pursuing the avoidance actions
or by additional post-petition accounts payable.

The Debtor will effect payments of pending administrative expense
claims on the Effective Date from the proceeds of the sale of
assets.  Priority tax claims and other priority claims will be
paid on the Effective Date from the proceeds of the sale of
assets.

Class 1 claims will be paid in full satisfaction of their claims,
as the claims may be reduced and negotiated, or as finally
determined by the Court, 95% of their allowed claims on a pro-rata
basis, as follows: 1) $19,485, representing 5% of Class 1 allowed
claims, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of assets on the
Effective Date of the Plan; 2) $120,000, representing 28% of Class
1 allowed claims, to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of
inventory on the later of the Effective Date of the Plan or the
closing on the sale of inventory; and 3) $260,000, representing
62% of Class 1 allowed claims, to be paid from the proceeds of the
avoidance actions on the later of the Effective Date of the Plan
or the date of collection of the avoidance actions.  The exact
amount of payments to holders of Class 1 claims is contingent on
the successful prosecution of the avoidance actions and the sale
of inventory.  Moreover, the final dividend to Class 1 may be
affected by the costs of pursuing the avoidance actions or
additional postpetition accounts payable.

The Disclosure Statement is available at:

           http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-09339-164.pdf

The Plan was filed by the Debtor's counsel:

     Charles A. Cuprill-Hernandez, Esq.
     CHARLES A. CUPRILL, P.S.C. LAW OFFICES
     356 Fortaleza Street
     Second Floor
     San Juan, PR 00901
     Tel: (787) 977-0515
     Fax: (787) 977-0518
     E-mail: ccuprill@cuprill.com

                     About Vernus Group Corp.

Vernus Group Corp. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 15-09339) on November 25,
2015. The petition was signed by Jose Rafael Hernandez, chairman
and president.

The case is assigned to Judge Brian K. Tester.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor disclosed $3.69 million in
assets and $225,686 in liabilities.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CC'; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on
Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) to 'CC' from 'CCC'.  At the
same time, S&P lowered its issue-level ratings on the company's
$3.0 billion 5.25% senior unsecured notes due April 2017 and on
its $4.1 billion 8.5% senior unsecured notes due November 2017 to
'CC' from 'CCC'.  The outlook remains negative.

The downgrade follows PDVSA's announcement to exchange its
existing $3.0 billion senior unsecured notes due April 2017 and
its $4.1 billion senior unsecured notes due November 2017.  Under
the offer, PDVSA will exchange both 2017 senior unsecured notes at
par, for approximately $7.1 billion 8.5% senior secured notes due
2020.  The new notes will be guaranteed by 50.1% of equity shares
in PDVSA's refining unit, Citgo Holding Inc.

S&P views the transaction as a distressed exchange.  While the
exchange would be made at par value, the timing of payments will
be delayed with the extension of the maturity date of the new
notes.  Also, S&P views the offer as distressed rather than purely
opportunistic, given the current challenging operating conditions
and the significant upcoming debt maturities that PDVSA faces,
which would very likely lead to a conventional default when the
existing notes come due.


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Expects to Rate USD1.7BB Notes 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to assign a 'CCC/RR4(exp)' rating to
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.'s (PDVSA) up to USD7.1 billion of
proposed senior secured notes. The company expects to issue the
notes under a voluntary exchange for two bonds with final maturity
in 2017: the 8.5% coupon sinking bond with a USD2.05 billion
principal payment due in November 2016 and November 2017 and the
USD3 billion 5.25% coupon bond due 2017. The new notes will mature
in four equal annual instalments between 2017 and 2020, carry an
8.5% coupon and will receive a pledge consisting of 50.1% of Citgo
Holding, Inc. (Issuer Default Rating [IDR] 'B-'/Outlook Stable), a
wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA. Citgo Holdings in turn owns 100%
of Citgo Petroleum Corp (IDR 'B'/Outlook Stable). Debt at these
two subsidiaries amounted to approximately USD4 billion as of
year-end 2015.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

PDVSA's credit quality reflects the company's linkage to the
government of Venezuela as a state-owned entity, combined with
increased government control over business strategies and internal
resources. This underscores the close link between the company's
credit profile and that of the sovereign. PDVSA's cash flow
generation has historically been significantly affected by the
large amount of funds transferred to the central government each
year.

LINKAGE TO SOVEREIGN

PDVSA's credit quality is inextricably linked to that of the
Venezuelan government. Venezuela's ratings (IDR 'CCC') reflect the
sovereign's weakened external reserves, high commodity dependence,
rising macroeconomic distortions, limited reduced transparency in
official data, and continued policy and political uncertainty. The
sovereign's strong repayment record and relatively low debt
amortization profile mitigate imminent risks to debt service.
PDVSA is fully owned by the government and its transfers have
historically represented around 45% of the government's revenues.
It is of strategic importance to the economic and social policies
of the country, as oil accounts for around 95% of total exports.

LIMITED TRANSPARENCY

The Venezuelan government displays limited transparency in the
administration and use of government-managed funds, as well as in
fiscal operations, which poses challenges to accurately assessing
its fiscal state and the full financial strength of the sovereign.
PDVSA also displays similar characteristics, which reinforces the
linkage of its ratings to the sovereign.

UNCERTAIN LEVEL OF TRANSFERS TO GOVERNMENT

Although the excess hydrocarbon prices law eliminates transfers to
the FONDEN national development fund when oil prices are below
USD55/barrel (bbl), the low level of central government reserves
will require the government to either reduce social expenditures
or disregard the law and maintain historical levels of transfers
from PDVSA. Fitch believes these transfers will continue to take
place either in the form of royalties, social contributions,
dividends or investments. The high level of transfers to the
central government effectively renders PDVSA's cash flow from
operations negative.

FOCUS SHIFTS TO RECOVERY

PDVSA's 'CCC' rating suggests a real possibility of default. If a
restructuring occurs, Fitch anticipates average recovery for
PDVSA's bondholders of 31%-50%, and likely closer to the lower end
of the range. While Fitch's recovery analysis yields a high
recovery, the willingness of Venezuela's government to extend
concessions to investors will likely move actual recovery closer
to the lower end of the 31% to 50% range. In addition, should oil
prices remain depressed, an average recovery may lead to
additional future defaults in order to further reduce obligations
and allow for necessary transfers to the government. The proposed
senior secured notes have also been assigned an 'RR4' average
Recovery Rating as the collateral provided may only marginally
enhance recovery given default, which could still range between
31% and 50%.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Linkage to government: PDVSA's ratings assume that implicit
support from the government, given the company's strategic
importance, would materialize should the company need it.

Slow hydrocarbon price recovery: Fitch assumes West Texas
Intermediate crude prices to average approximately USD42 per
barrel in 2016 and to slowly recover to approximately USD65 per
bbl in the long term.

Stable Production: PDVSA's ratings assume the company's production
will remain relatively flat or decline marginally over the rating
horizon.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Catalysts for a downgrade include a downgrade to Venezuela's
ratings, a substantial increase in leverage to finance capital
expenditures or government spending and a sharp and extended
commodity price downturn. Although not expected in the short- to
medium-term, catalysts for an upgrade include an upgrade to
Venezuela's sovereign rating and/or the company's real
independence from the government.

LIQUIDITY

PDVSA's current liquidity position is believed to be weak as a
result of the current low oil price environment and transfers to
the central government. As of December 2015, PDVSA reported cash
of USD5.8 billion, which compared unfavorably with short-term debt
of USD6.8 billion. The company's current liquidity position is
uncertain given expenditures, transfers to government, and
principal debt payments that might have driven down liquidity from
the last reported amount as of year-end 2015. Under Fitch's base
case scenario, which assumes oil prices of USD42/bbl in 2016 and
USD45/bbl in 2017, and investments of USD25 billion annually,
PDVSA's liquidity position will continue to deteriorate. Debt
amortizations for 2017 are estimated at approximately USD7.2
billion, of which USD5.1 billion is capital market debt
obligations. The proposed debt issuance could lower 2017 principle
payments by USD1.6 billion. Venezuela's gross international
reserves have declined by USD4.3 billion to USD12 billion between
January and June 2016.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch expects to assign the following ratings:

   -- USD7 billion of senior secured notes due 2020 'CCC/RR4'.



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *