TCRLA_Public/161006.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Thursday, October 6, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 198


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

CAPEX SA: S&P Affirms 'B-' Ratings; Outlook Remains Stable
NEWSAN SA: Moody's Withdraws B3 Corporate Family Rating


B E R M U D A

GP INVESTMENTS: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR; Outlook Remains Negative


B R A Z I L

BANCO PAN: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' Ratings & Removes from Watch Neg.
CENTRAIS EOLICAS: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on BRL35MM Debentures
CITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' FC Long-Term IDR
STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Withdraws 'SD' Ratings


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CHINA FISHERY: Seeks $1.9M Private Sale of Golf Club Membership
CONQUEST MANAGED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 26
CONQUEST MANAGED MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 26
CONSULTORIA SUDAMERICANA: Members' Final Meeting Set for Oct. 24
COPPERSTONE ALPHA: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 11

COPPERSTONE CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 11
DB CAPITAL: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 26
DB CAPITAL ASIA: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 26
LCA C&K: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 6
NORTH GROVE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

PGR CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 11
RED T INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 26
TWO SIGMA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
WENSLEYDALE LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Oct. 19


C O L O M B I A

CREDIVALORES: S&P Affirms 'B+' LT Counterparty Credit Rating


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Firms Balk at Gov't Push to Sell Power Plants Stake
* DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Central Bank Keeps Benchmark Rate at 5.0%


M E X I C O

GRUPO IDESA: Fitch Cuts Long Term Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-'


U R U G U A Y

ADMINISTRACION NACIONAL: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+'; Outlook Negative


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: IMF Forecasts Deeper Recession in Region


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


CAPEX SA: S&P Affirms 'B-' Ratings; Outlook Remains Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'B-' foreign- and
local-currency ratings on CAPEX S.A.  The outlook remains stable.

The local-currency rating reflects S&P's expectation that despite
CAPEX's solid credit metrics and adequate liquidity position, the
company won't be able to withstand a sovereign stress scenario.
As a result, the 'B-' rating on the Republic of Argentina
continues to limit the local-currency rating on CAPEX.

The foreign-currency rating on CAPEX reflects S&P's belief that
the company wouldn't be able to continue honoring its foreign-
currency obligations under potential restrictions on accessing
foreign currency or transferring funds abroad.  As a result, S&P's
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment on the sovereign
limits the foreign-currency rating on CAPEX.

For the 12 months ended July 31, 2016, CAPEX's credit metrics
remained in line with S&P's expectations, with debt to EBITDA of
2.7x and EBITDA interest coverage of 3.9x compared with 3.0x and
3.9x, respectively, for the same period in 2015.

The company faces a $200 million bullet debt payment in March
2018, and Argentina's local currency has depreciated more than 60%
since July 31, 2015.  Offsetting these factors are CAPEX's dollar-
linked oil and gas revenues, which have kept domestic oil prices
above international prices (currently about $68/barrel).  Tariff
increases in the electric power segment have also helped bolster
CAPEX's credit metrics.  (The most recent increase, in February
2016, raised tariffs by an average of 49% for CAPEX and other
power generators operating the same technology.)  As a
consequence, CAPEX's debt to EBITDA metrics remained stable
compared with the same period in 2015.

Over the past fiscal year, CAPEX was able to increase its oil
production to 41.743 m3/year from 35.623 m3/year.  This is a 17.2%
increase compared to a 12.6% decrease over the previous year.

CAPEX's EBITDA generation continues to hinge on still-high
domestic oil prices.  The recent electric tariff increases will
improve the segment's profitability, given that prior domestic
tariffs didn't fully reflect the industry's costs and Argentina's
high inflation.

For the upcoming 12 months, S&P expects CAPEX's credit metrics to
slightly improve, benefiting from its dollar-linked oil and gas
segment (in which S&P expects the company to maintain similar
production levels as in fiscal-year 2016 through investments of
about $44 million and stable domestic prices), and a full year of
collections on the updated electric tariff scheme (in which S&P do
not project further increases for the upcoming 12 months).

In addition, in 2017 or early 2018, S&P expects that CAPEX will
refinance its $200 million bullet bond (currently paying a 10%
coupon), which matures in March 2018.  Since Argentina cured its
default 2016, some domestic corporate entities have successfully
accessed the international markets to issue new debt or refinance
existing debt.  Accordingly, S&P believes that CAPEX would be able
to refinance its debt at similar or better terms.

S&P's ratings also incorporate its assessment of the company's
business risk profile (BRP) as vulnerable, mostly because of the
weak regulatory environment in the country.  Despite the recent
tariff adjustments in the energy sector to better align tariffs
with market prices, with the objective of reducing subsidies and
attracting foreign investment, S&P still views the regulatory
framework as unpredictable.  If S&P continues to see an
improvement in the business conditions for CAPEX, such as by a
formal and predictable tariff scheme mechanism, S&P would consider
raising its BRP assessment, which would translate into a higher
stand-alone credit profile for CAPEX.

S&P assess the company's financial risk profile as aggressive,
with expected debt to EBITDA metrics of 2.3x-2.7x, funds from
operations to debt of about 20%-25%, and annual interest payments
of about $25 million.

S&P's base-case scenario also assumes these main variables:

   -- Power generation of about 3,900 gigawatt hours for fiscal-
      year 2017 and stable output afterwards.

   -- Tariffs based on Resolution 22/16, which vary depending on
      the type of plant technology and scale.  (For Capex, S&P
      assumes fixed costs of about 84.3 Argentinian pesos
      (ARP)/MWh, variable costs of ARP46.3/MWh, and ARP11.7/MWh
      for additional remuneration.)  S&P excludes further
      adjustments of those tariffs for the next few years due to
      the level of uncertainty on the amount and timing.

   -- Annual oil and gas production (a mix of oil and natural
      gasoline) of 65,000 m3-68,000 m3 in fiscal-year 2017,
      falling 5% thereafter, and sold at about $67 per barrel.

   -- Cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative
      costs increasing 25%-30%, in line with S&P's inflation
      expectation.

   -- Annual capital expenditures of about $40 million-
      $45 million.

   -- A tax rate of 35%.

   -- No dividend distribution.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectations of CAPEX's adequate
operating and financial performance in the next 12 months, with
debt to EBITDA metrics in the 2.3x-2.7x range, supported by still-
high domestic oil prices and electric tariff increases that will
help to increase CAPEX's profitability.

Downside scenario

Given that CAPEX won't be able to withstand a sovereign stress
scenario, in S&P's view, it could lower the local-currency rating
if S&P was to do the same to its local-currency rating on
Argentina because the latter caps the rating on CAPEX.  In
addition, if S&P was to lower Argentina's T&C assessment, S&P
could take the same action on the foreign-currency rating on
CAPEX.  S&P could also downgrade CAPEX if its debt to EBITDA
surpasses 5.0x and its expected sources to uses drops to less than
1.0x.  However, S&P currently believes such a scenario is
unlikely.

Upside scenario

S&P could raise its local-currency rating on CAPEX if S&P was to
do the same to its local-currency rating on Argentina, given that
the company's anchor score is higher than the sovereign rating.
S&P could raise the foreign-currency rating on CAPEX if S&P was to
take the same action on Argentina's T&C assessment.


NEWSAN SA: Moody's Withdraws B3 Corporate Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. has
withdrawn Newsan S.A.'s B3/Baa1.ar corporate family rating and
senior unsecured bank credit facility rating, for its own business
reasons.

These ratings were withdrawn:

   -- Corporate Family Rating: B3/Baa1.ar
   -- Senior unsecured bank credit facility: B3/Baa1.ar

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Newsan S.A. is one of
the leading manufacturers of digital consumer electronic products,
components and audio and home appliances, with a widely known
brand name in the local retail market.  For the last twelve months
ended on June 30, 2016, total revenues amounted to ARS17.1 billion
(approximately USD1.5 billion), of which 18.5% derive from exports
of its food activities (mainly prawn, frozen hake and squid).
Newsan is 100% family-owned company.



=============
B E R M U D A
=============


GP INVESTMENTS: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR; Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' long-term issuer credit
rating on Bermuda-based asset manager GP Investments Ltd.  The
outlook remains negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' rating on the company's
perpetual bonds with a recovery rating of '3', indicating S&P's
expectation that lenders could expect meaningful recovery (in the
lower half of the 50%-70% range) in the event of a payment default
or bankruptcy.

The ratings on GP Investment reflect its weak business risk
profile compared to other global asset managers and its
intermediate financial risk.

GP Investments is part of the Brazilian GP Group (not rated),
created in 1993 with private equity operations mainly in Brazil.
S&P's assessment of the company's business risk profile as weak
reflects the relatively small assets under management (AUM) base,
compared to other global asset managers, and its limited
diversification, with an investment portfolio focused on 10
companies, mostly located in Brazil.  The entity compares less
favorably with other global private equity firms that have greater
geographic reach and portfolio diversification. GP Investments'
average profitability and good position and track record in the
Latin American private equity business only partially mitigate
these weaknesses.

"As of June 2016, the AUM base of GP Investment was $2.8 billion,
increasing from $2.0 billion by year-end 2015, given the
incorporation of BR Properties, with the acquisition of the
company by GP Investments (with a 2.2% stake) and by an
international global co-investor (with 67.8% stake).  Also as of
June 2016, GP Investments had proportionate investments in the
funds it manages, for a total of $173 million, and direct
investments in companies (BRZ Investimentos, Par Corretora, and BR
Properties) of $78 million.  In May 2016, GP Investments increased
its participation in the Switzerland based investment company
Spice Private Equity Ltd. to 58.5% (from 31.7%), now consolidating
into its financial statements of the entity, changing into a
broader target on investments, and providing some diversification
outside Brazil.  For the rest of 2016, we expect overall
performance and valuation of investments of GP Investments to
remain influenced by challenging economic conditions in Brazil to
gradually improve as from 2017," S&P said.

"GP Investments' intermediate financial risk profile is based on
our modest debt-to-adjusted total equity (ATE) core ratio of about
0.5x for the next two years, in conjunction with supplementary
ratios that point to greater risk.  We believe GP Investments
carries significant on-balance-sheet investments, including seed
capital for new funds or investments in alternative asset classes
that diversify the business mix at its core business of managing
third-party assets.  As a result, we believe debt-to-ATE is an
important indicator of leverage in the context of the material on-
balance-sheet risks it carries.  The firm has volatile
profitability and cash flow generation, mainly reflecting the
nature of its private equity business, especially when considering
the relatively high stakes in the four funds that it manages.  We
believe its management fees are insufficient to cover its
operating and financial expenses.  And, as a result, adjusted
EBITDA interest coverage was low at 0.8x in fiscal 2015, and we
expect coverage to be at about 0.7x on average over the next two
years including the company's deleveraging of its financial debt
(with reductions in its perpetual bonds and bank loan).  This
highly leveraged supplementary ratio is included in our overall
financial risk profile," S&P said.

In S&P's view, GP Investment maintains strong liquidity despite
recent investments and reductions in debt and other uses.  The
company had $135 million in cash (including $77 million cash at
Spice Private Equity) and $57 million in financial securities as
of June 30, 2016.  S&P expects these liquid assets--and its
management fees, interest income, and the proceeds from potential
divestments and performance fees--will remain well in excess of
its operating expenses and investment commitments.

The negative outlook on GP Investments reflects the rating outlook
on Brazil, where it focuses most of its investments and revenue
generation.  S&P rarely rates financial firms above the foreign
currency ratings on the countries to which they have material
exposures because S&P considers it unlikely that these
institutions would remain unaffected by developments in these
economies.  Thus, even though GP Investments is domiciled in
Bermuda and shows some diversification, its operations are largely
focused on the Brazilian market and cyclical industries.  The
deterioration in business conditions in the Brazilian market would
erode cash flow generation of the entity and could lead to a
weakening in its cash reserves and financial profile.

S&P could lower the ratings on the entity over the next 12 months
if it was to downgrade the sovereign further.  Also the ratings of
the entity could be under pressure if liquidity position of the
entity significantly deteriorates to weak levels (from current
strong levels) due to unexpected uses of cash reserves.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it was to take a similar
action on the sovereign and if all credit factors remain stable.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO PAN: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' Ratings & Removes from Watch Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+/B' global scale and
'brBBB-/brA-3' national scale ratings on Banco Pan S.A. and
removed them from CreditWatch with negative implications following
a similar action on its parent, Banco BTG Pactual S.A., on
Sept. 28.  The outlook is negative.

The ratings on Banco Pan reflect its 'b+' stand-alone credit
profile (SACP), which is based on the bank's moderate business
position given its somewhat diversified portfolio focused on
payroll lending and vehicle financing; its weak capital and
earnings (with a forecasted risk-adjusted capital [RAC] ratio of
about 4.5% for the next two years); its moderate risk position
given its asset quality metrics; and its adequate funding and
liquidity, which stems from the funding support the bank receives
from Caixa Economica Federal (CEF).

Under S&P's bank criteria, it uses its BICRA economic risk and
industry risk scores to determine a bank's anchor, the starting
point in assigning an issuer credit rating.  S&P's anchor for a
commercial bank operating only in Brazil is 'bb+', based on the
country's economic risk score of '7' and an industry risk score of
'5'.

Brazil's economic risk reflects the country's low GDP per capita
levels and political and economic challenges in the country, which
remain considerable.  In S&P's view, credit risks in the economy
have increased.  S&P believes that Brazil's challenging economic
conditions, high inflation, rising interest rates, and tighter
credit conditions will weaken the corporate sector, which would be
reflected in higher non-performing loans and credit losses.
Furthermore, S&P expects these conditions will place a higher
burden on Brazil's already highly indebted households as
unemployment rises.  S&P expects the banking sector's asset
quality will continue deteriorating amid rising credit losses.

S&P's industry risk assessment for Brazil reflects the large
presence of government-owned banks in the financial system, which
has caused significant distortions over the past few years,
weakening competitive dynamics.  However, the pressure on banks'
margins has eased over the past few months as reference rates have
increased sharply.  Domestic financial regulation has been
improving thanks to its extensive coverage and access to domestic
and international capital markets.  In addition, banks' dependency
on external funding is fairly low, accounting for 8.6% of the
system's total liabilities in the past two years.

S&P's assessment of Banco Pan's business position as moderate
reflects the bank's small market share and revenue volatility as
the bank shifts its credit origination towards lower risk segments
such as payroll lending, while maintaining its expertise on
vehicle financing.  As of June 30, 2016, Banco Pan was the 20th-
largest bank in Brazil by assets (R$27 billion), with a market
share of less than 1%. Payroll discounted loans accounted for 38%
of the portfolio as of June 30, 2016, followed by vehicle
financing (28%), small and midsize operations (SMEs; 19%), real
estate (5%), and others (10%).  In S&P's view, the bank's strategy
to diversify and expand its portfolio to improve performance has
yet to lead to sustainable results.  Due to the challenging
economic environment in Brazil, Banco Pan hasn't been able to grow
its portfolio in order to fully compensate its current cost
structure, which pressures its profitability.  Nevertheless, the
bank continues improving its overall risk profile, with increasing
participation of payroll loans and real estate in the overall
portfolio.  Banco Pan has a broad national presence with around
110 points of sale in Brazil's largest cities. It's also very
active in the new and used vehicles segment.

S&P's weak capital and earnings assessment reflects its forecasted
RAC ratios of about 4.5% for the next 15 months. Banco Pan has
historically operated comfortably above the minimum regulatory
capital requirements.  As of June 16, its Basel III ratio was at
14.0% (minimum required is 10.5%) and Tier I ratio was 10%
(minimum required is 6.0%).

S&P's base-case scenario assumptions for 2016 and 2017 include
these factors:

   -- Brazil's GDP contraction of 3.6% in 2016 and growth of 1.0%
      in 2017;

   -- Loan portfolio growth of 5% in 2016 and 2017, and 15% growth
      on other earnings assets;

   -- Maintenance of loans assignments without recourse to CEF;

   -- Still-poor profitability, yet gradual recovery as the bank
      improves its efficiency;

   -- Stable asset quality as a result of the higher participation
      of payroll discounted loans, with NPLs of around 6.0% and a
      charge-offs ratio of 3.5% despite Brazil's stressed economy;

   -- No dividend payouts for the next two years; and

   -- Stable net interest margins.

Banco Pan's moderate risk position reflects S&P's view that the
bank has maintained a consistent and well-defined approach in its
lending for vehicle financing, payroll discounted loans, and SMEs
since a new management team took over in 2011.  More recently, the
bank has been focusing more on growing payroll lending, which has
eased the asset quality pressures from other higher risk segments
such as SMEs and vehicle financing.  Still, its NPL ratio are
higher than its peers', at 6.0%, as of June 2016, despite a
declining trend in the last few years due to the improvement in
portfolio origination that started in 2011.  Net charge-offs
improved significantly in the past two years to around 3.5% from
7.3% as of December 2014, as the bank made an effort to clean up
its legacy portfolio.  S&P expects the gradual reduction in
charge-offs to continue given the much lower risk and improved
asset recovery conditions that Banco Pan has been generating,
especially in vehicle financing.  On the other hand, S&P expects
all banks that offer unsecured retail loans and lending to SMEs to
continue to face delinquency risks in 2016 and 2017, which may
jeopardize Banco Pan's asset quality.

"We continue to view Banco Pan's funding and liquidity as
adequate.  Even though the bank lacks an ample retail deposit
base, we incorporate ongoing funding support mostly from CEF,
which we consider a stable funding source given that these funding
lines are committed.  In this sense, we also consider Banco Pan's
liquidity as adequate.  In a stressed liquidity scenario, we
believe the bank would benefit from having CEF as a shareholder,
which materially mitigates its funding dependency on institutional
and corporate investors.  As of June 2016, its stable funding
ratio was 96% and its broad liquid assets to short-term wholesale
funding ratio was 1.55x, supporting its adequate funding and
liquidity assessment.  We believe Banco Pan can increase its cash
position materially, either by raising interbank deposits or
through the sale of its credit portfolio to CEF, if needed," S&P
said.

"We have revised the group status of Banco Pan to BTG Pactual to
moderately strategic from strategically important.  Despite the
close integration and reputational links between the banks, and
the fact that BTG would likely be liable in case Banco Pan faces
insolvency, we believe Banco Pan is less important to the group's
long-term strategy because we expect BTG Pactual to focus on its
core investment banking activities.  We expect extraordinary
support from the group in some foreseeable circumstances in case
Banco Pan faces distress, yet the more fragile financial position
of the parent might constrain its ability to provide support.
This change has no impact on the ratings on Banco Pan since the
bank currently doesn't receive any notch of uplift from its
parent.  Furthermore, despite the large equity interest that CEF
has on Banco Pan, we do not believe CEF would extend any
timeliness extraordinary group support to Banco Pan beyond what we
already factor into its SACP," S&P noted.

The negative outlook on Banco Pan for the next 12 months reflects
S&P's view of the negative economic and industry risk trend in our
BICRA on Brazil.  As with most banks in Brazil, S&P believes the
bank finances could deteriorate because of pressures on Brazil's
banking system as a result of the sovereign's fiscal and monetary
tightening.  Under such a scenario, S&P could revise the bank's
SACP downward and lower the ratings.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's belief that the bank's
finances could deteriorate because of negative pressures on
Brazil's banking system.  S&P could also take a negative rating
action as a result of a revision of the bank's business position,
which could occur if the bank fails to maintain a stable revenues
base, thereby jeopardizing its profitability metrics, or if its
capital metrics reach below 3.0%.  Finally, S&P could lower the
ratings following a downgrade of BTG Pactual of more than one
notch.

S&P could revise its outlook on Banco Pan to stable if S&P revises
its BICRA economic risk trend on Brazil to stable, provided that
the bank's asset quality and operating revenues remain steady.


CENTRAIS EOLICAS: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on BRL35MM Debentures
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina assigned a Ba2 global scale rating and a
Aa2.br Brazil national scale rating to Cea I - Centrais Eolicas
Assurua I Spe S/A BRL35 million senior secured debentures, to be
issued in the form of infrastructure debentures pursuant to Law
12,431.  The outlook for all ratings is negative.  This is the
first time that Moody's has rated the company's securities.

CEA I is a special purpose vehicle fully owned by CEA Energia S.A.
(not rated), for which the main ultimate shareholders are Ferraz
de Campos Family Office, Bayar Participacoes and Gel Engenharia.
CEA I has total installed capacity of 68MW consolidating the
Assurua II, V, VII wind power projects located in the State of
Bahia (cluster Xique-Xique), that started operations in April,
2016.  The G97 2.0 MW wind turbines were supplied by Gamesa, with
a two-year guarantee.  Gamesa will be responsible for the O&M
during the first five years with the possibility to increase for
five additional years.  The company's generated energy is fully
contracted for 20 years through a reserve energy auction (LER
2013) contract signed with CCEE at physical guarantee of
33.6 GWAvg.

Moody's anticipates that the debentures will be issued by mid-
October.  The assigned ratings are based on preliminary
documentation received by Moody's as of the rating assignment
date.  Moody's does not expect changes to the documentation
reviewed over this period or anticipates changes in the main
conditions that the debentures will carry.  Should issuance
conditions and/or final documentation program deviate from the
original ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's
will assess the impact that these differences may have on the
ratings and act accordingly.

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

The fully-amortizing debentures will have a 12-year maturity with
a bi-annual tailor-made amortization schedule.  The debentures'
security package includes: (i) pledge of the issuer's shares (ii)
pledge of its projects' (Assurua II, V, VII) shares and equipment;
(iii) pledge of the concession rights; (iv) pledge of receivables;
(v) pledge of reserve accounts; (vi) assignment of insurance
proceeds; and (vii) assignment of a letter of credit from Itau
Unibanco S.A. (Ba2, negative) valid up to 2018.  The security
package will be shared between BNDES and the infrastructure
debenture investors on a pari-passu basis.

The debentures will have usual and customary project finance
covenants, similarly shared between the indenture and the BNDES
loan, such as a minimum DSCR of 1.2x measured on an annual basis
in addition to limitations on indebtedness, dividend distribution
and security coupled with the need to maintain the project's
authorizations.  Non-compliance with these covenants can trigger
cross-default and debt acceleration under both BNDES's loan and
the debentures as well as change of control or capital increases,
if not previously approved by creditors.

The Ba2 rating reflects the (i) fully contracted revenue profile
with a 20-year take or pay contract with CCEE (Brazilian
Electricity Clearing House) as per the LER 2013 auction; (ii)
adequate fuel source given the PPA conditions and a strong
capacity factor, according to wind studies and the project's
limited operational track record; (iii) well known O&M operator
and guarantees with a five year contract with Gamesa; (iv) proven
technology and (v) adequate financial metrics under conservative
assumptions.  The overall supportive regulatory environment
further supports the rating.  On the other hand, the rating is
somewhat constrained by (i) the sponsor's short operating track
record; (ii) relatively weak liquidity provisions compared to
typical projects globally through a three month reserve account;
(iii) relatively low minimum required DSCR of 1.2x.

Rating Outlook

The negative outlook reflects our view that in spite of the
predictable and stable cash flows from the 20-year PPA contract
with CCEE, the project has a local-content revenue profile that
limits its upside credit profile to the current outlook on
Brazil's sovereign rating.  Moreover, we understand that the off-
taker (CCEE) is closely linked to the national electricity
regulator, Aneel and consequently, to Brazil's credit quality.

What Could Change the Rating - Up/ Down

In light of the negative outlook, Moody's do not expect upward
rating pressure in the short to medium term.  Moody's recognizes,
however, that wind studies suggest a capacity factor potentially
above the P90 1 year scenario used in our projections.

The rating could be downgraded if there is a significant and
sustained deterioration in CEA I's credit metrics or if the DSCR
falls below 1.2x as per Moody's standard adjustments.
Additionally, a wind-fuel performance consistently below our
expectations could also trigger a downgrade as well as the
deterioration in the credit quality of CEA Energia and/or its
ultimate shareholders.  A change in control or in the corporate
structure could also pressure the rating as well as a perceived
weakened commitment from the sponsors with the project.  Further
deterioration in Brazil's sovereign credit quality could also
trigger a rating action as well as our perception of a decline in
the level of supportiveness, consistency and predictability of the
Brazilian regulatory environment for the electricity sector.  Any
changes from the documentation received and the final indentures
that lead to a weaker credit profile, project structure and/or
security package could also trigger a downgrade.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Power
Generation Projects published in December 2012.


CITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' FC Long-Term IDR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Brazilian city of Rio de
Janeiro's National long-term rating to 'AA(bra)' from 'AA+(bra)'
with a Stable Outlook as a result of ratings recalibration
following successive downgrades of the sovereign over the last 18
months.

In addition, Fitch has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BB'. The Rating Outlook remains Negative. The
Outlook reflects the Negative Outlook assigned to Brazil.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the IDRs assigned to the City of Rio de Janeiro
(CRio) reflect the generation of operating margins that reached
4.9% in 2015 in a declining trend. This is higher than 'BB' rated
peers (3.9%). The declining trend observed since 2015 is
attributable to the prolonged economic downturn. The ratings are
strongly related to those assigned to the Federative Republic of
Brazil. For this reason, CRio's ratings have a Negative Outlook.

Despite the fact that the Federal Government remains directly and
indirectly the city's main creditor, debt service related to
financial institutions has been increasing at a fast pace,
consuming the equivalent of 74% of the city's operating balance in
2015. Unless operating balances increase, direct debt service will
continue to consume a relevant portion of it, thus exerting
pressure over investments and cash positions, in Fitch's opinion.

CRio has engaged in several credit operations to improve
transportation and logistics in Rio. Whereas 'BB' rated entities'
capex represented 10.1% of total expenditures, it reached 19.9%
for CRio. As a result, debt service until 2018 should consume a
large portion of the city's operating balance. This is
counterbalanced by the fact that federal creditors are responsible
for 96% of new credit operations until 2018.

The prolonged economic recession has not yet translated into a
poor fiscal performance for CRio, partially explained by the fact
that the city traditionally host large events, such as the
Olympics. Nevertheless, there should be some increase in operating
expenditures in 2017 given that in early 2016 the city assumed the
operating expenditures of two hospitals owned by the State of Rio
de Janeiro (IDR of C). Additional pressures in healthcare and law
enforcement may negatively impact the city's operating margins.
Federal and state transfers are important components of the city's
operating revenues, corresponding to 24.7% of the total in 2015.

Despite consuming some 37.5% of total annual personnel
expenditures in 2015, the pension system has some assets and its
actuarial deficit of BRL3.2 billion corresponded to a low 14.5% of
the city's operating revenues. This is much better when compared
to large Brazilian states, partially explained by the fact that
contrary to states, Brazilian cities do not have to support law
enforcement.

Fitch considers CRio's liquidity as adequate, with no short-term
concerns. Total debt service of BRL818 million in 2016 is fully
covered by the city's outstanding cash position of BRL3.6 billion.
This liquidity amount corresponds to 16.2% of the city's operating
revenues in 2015. The short-term obligations are mainly composed
of debt service and payments to suppliers (42%) and general labor
liabilities (22%).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating Actions Linked to the Sovereign: Any rating action
affecting the Federative Republic of Brazil, currently rated
'BB'/Negative, will exert a direct influence on CRio's ratings.

Fiscal Performance and Debt: An operating margin lower than 2%
coupled with a higher level of financial debt, and expressed by a
direct debt/current balance higher than 20 years will exert
negative pressure on CRio's ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The ratings and Outlooks are sensitive to these assumptions:

   -- Fitch assumes a high level of sovereign support for the Rio
      de Janeiro given the national relevance of the city and the
      high exposure to Federal Government decisions;

   -- We also assume that the new government will resume the
      government's legislative agenda, especially those items
      affecting subnationals, such as pension reform and federal
      debt renegotiation.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

   City of Rio de Janeiro

   -- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Negative
      Outlook;

   -- Foreign Currency Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Local Currency Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Negative
      Outlook;

   -- Local Currency Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- National Long-term rating downgraded to 'AA(bra)' from
      'AA+(bra)'; Stable Outlook;

   -- National Short-term rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'.


STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Withdraws 'SD' Ratings
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it withdrew its 'SD' global- and
national-scale ratings on the State of Rio de Janeiro due to lack
of sufficient information of satisfactory quality.  This is not
allowing S&P to perform adequate surveillance of the ratings.

At the time of the withdrawal, the State of Rio de Janeiro's
default on its loans with the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) and Credit Suisse had been cured, as expected under the
sovereign guarantee mechanisms.  Also, the state has an estimated
past-due debt service obligation of about 30 million Brazilian
real with a bilateral lending agency, which is expected to be
fully paid by the sovereign in the coming weeks.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


CHINA FISHERY: Seeks $1.9M Private Sale of Golf Club Membership
---------------------------------------------------------------
China Fishery Group Ltd. (Cayman) and affiliates ask the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York to
authorize the private sale of The Hong Kong Golf Club membership
memorialized by Certificate No. 0936 ("Golf Club Membership") to
Biel Crystal Manufactory Ltd. ("Purchaser") for HK$15,100,000 (or
approximately USD$1,947,445).

A hearing on the Motion is set for Oct. 25, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. (NY
Time).  The objection deadline is Oct 18, 2016 at 4:00 p.m. (NY
Time).

The Debtors, along with certain non-Debtor affiliated entities,
are part of a corporate family known as the Pacific Andes Group,
which is one of the world's foremost vertically integrated seafood
companies.  The Pacific Andes Group provides seafood products to
leading global wholesalers, processors and food service companies
and has operations across the seafood value chain.

Pacific Andes International Holdings Ltd. (Bermuda) ("PAIH"), a
debtor, owns memberships to Golf Club. One of those memberships is
the Golf Club membership which has a monthly subscription fee of
HK$2,840 (or approximately US$366).

Prior to the Petition Date, PAIH entered into an agreement, dated
April 26, 2016 ("April 2016 Agreement"), with potential purchaser,
the Biel Crystal (HK) Manufactory Ltd. ("Initial Purchaser") to
sell the Golf Club Membership for HK$15,000,000 (or approximately
USD$1,934,548), inclusive of a transfer fee payable to the Golf
Club of HK$3,200,000 (or approximately USD$412,704).  Accordingly,
the net sum to be received by PAIH upon the sale closing was
HK$11,800,000 (or approximately USD$1,521,844).

The April 2016 Agreement states that the Golf Club Membership was
to be purchased free and clear of all charges, mortgages, liens,
encumbrances, equities and claims of any kind.  There are no
liens, claims or encumbrances on the Golf Club Membership.

The sale was brokered by Everfine Membership Services Ltd., which
is a Hong Kong-based regional operation specializing in providing
brokerage services for the sale, rental and purchase of golf and
country club, social club, marina and yacht club memberships,
including memberships in the Golf Club.

The Confirmation Agreement required the transfer of the Golf Club
Membership to be completed within 3 months of the date of the
Confirmation Agreement and was subject to approval by the Golf
Club.  A 1% service fee (or HK$150,000 which is approximately
US$19,345) was to be paid by PAIH to Everfine upon completion of
the transfer of the Golf Club Membership.  The 1% service fee is
Everfine's usual and customary fee for providing brokerage
services.  Accordingly, after closing of the sale and payment of
the 1% service fee, the net payment to PAIH would be HK$11,650,000
(or approximately US$1,502,499).

Prior to PAIH entering into the Confirmation Agreement and the
April 2016 Agreement, PAIH contacted several other brokers to sell
the Golf Club Membership.  In addition to Everfine, PAIH contacted
Sakura Membership Services Ltd. and Noblesse Membership Service
Ltd. and obtained 3 proposed sale confirmation agreements for a
corporate membership with the Golf Club.

Sakura proposed a sale of a golf club membership for HK$14,000,000
(or approximately US$1,805,578), inclusive of a transfer fee
payable to the Golf Club of HK$3,200,000 (or approximately
US$412,704) and a 1% service fee of the total consideration with
10% discount which was HK$126,000 (or approximately US$16,250).  A
sale of the Golf Club Membership through Sakura would result in
net
payment to PAIH of HK$10,674,000 (or approximately US$1,276,624).

The first proposed sale confirmation offered by Noblesse, dated
March 11, 2016, was for HK$14,700,000 (or approximately
US$1,895,857), including a transfer fee payable to the Golf Club
of HK$3,200,000 (or approximately US$412,704) and 1% commission to

Noblesse of HK$147,000 (or approximately US $18,959).  Based on
the offer, a sale of the Golf Club Membership through Noblesse
would result in net payment to PAIH of HK$11,353,000 (or
approximately US$1,464,195).

The second proposed sale confirmation offered by Noblesse, dated
April 1, 2016, was for HK$14,300,000 (or approximately
US$1,844,269), including a transfer fee payable to the Golf Club
of HK$3,200,000 (or approximately US$412,704) and 1% commission to
Noblesse of HK$143,000 (or approximately US $18,443).  Based on
the offer, a sale of the Golf Club Membership through Noblesse
would result in net payment to PAIH of HK$10,957,000 (or
approximately US$1,413,123).

Based on information obtained from Everfine, a second-hand
membership in a golf club, such as the Golf Club Membership, costs
HK$15,000,000 (or approximately USD$1,934,548).

In light of the offers for the Golf Club Membership, PAIH decided
to enter into the Confirmation Agreement with Everfine and the
April 2016 Agreement with the Initial Purchaser as the best and
highest offer for the Golf Club Membership.

As required by the April 2016 Agreement, the Initial Purchaser and
PAIH informed the Golf Club of the proposed transfer of the Golf
Club Membership and sought the Golf Club's approval for the
transfer. By letter dated July 7, 2016, the Golf Club requested
that the Initial Purchaser submit another application using a
financial entity that is registered in Hong Kong with more
significant assets and/or trading history together with the
requisite financial information.

Accordingly, on or about July 12, 2016, the parties re-executed a
sale and purchase agreement for the Golf Club Membership ("July
2016 Agreement") on the same terms and conditions as the April
2016 Agreement with the Purchaser, a company related to the
Initial Purchaser.  The parties then entered into an amendment to
the July 2016 Agreement dated Aug. 18, 2016 ("Amendment").

A copy of the April 2016 Agreement attached to the Motion is
available for free at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/China_Fishery_160_Sales.pdf

Pursuant to the Amendment, the consideration was increased to
HK$15,100,000 (or approximately USD$1,947,445) which included a
transfer fee payable to Golf Club of HK$3,300,000 (or
approximately USD$425,601).  The net sum to be received by PAIH
upon the transfer remained, as under the April 2016 Agreement,
HK$11,800,000 (or approximately USD$1,521,844).  Notwithstanding
the increase in purchase price, the service fee due to Everfine
remained at HK$150,000 (or approximately US$19,346).

By letter dated Aug. 19, 2016, the Golf Club notified the
Purchaser of the approval of the transfer of the Golf Club
Membership upon terms and conditions agreed to by the parties.

By check dated Aug. 25, 2016, the Purchaser paid HK$15,100,000 (or
approximately USD$1,947,445) to the Golf Club and, in turn, the
Golf Club issued a check to PAIH in the amount of HK$11,800,000
(or approximately USD$1,521,844) dated Sept. 3, 2016.  The monies
received by the Debtors from the sale of the Golf Club Membership
are currently being held by the Debtors pending outcome of the
Motion.  The proposed sale was disclosed to bankruptcy counsel in
connection with preparation for the 11 U.S.C. Section 341 meeting
and the proposed sale was disclosed during that meeting on Sept.
21, 2016.

Prior to the transaction, the Debtors had no relationship with the
Initial Purchaser nor the eventual Purchaser, nor had the Debtors
previously conducted business with either the Initial Purchaser or
the eventual Purchaser.  PAIH was, at all times, seeking to
maximize the return on the Golf Club Membership and engaged in
good-faith, arm's-length negotiations with the brokers, including
Everfine, the Initial Purchaser and the eventual Purchaser.
Likewise, the Debtors believe that the brokers, including
Everfine, the Initial Purchaser and the eventual Purchaser engaged
with PAIH in good-faith and at arm's length.

Accordingly, the Debtors request the Court to approve the private
sale of the Golf Club Membership nunc pro tunc to the Purchaser,
the terms of the sale, authorize the employment, retention of and
payment to Everfine, as broker, nunc pro tunc to June 30, 2016,
and
grant related relief.

The Purchaser can be reached at:

          BIEL CRYSTAL (HK) MANUFACTORY LTD.
          BR No. 61066817 of Room A5
          Block A, 10/F., Mei Hing Industrial Building
          16-18 Hing Yip Street
          Kwun Tong, Hong Kong

                 About China Fishery Group

China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its affiliates sought
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S. D.
N.Y. Case No. 16-11895) on June 30, 2016.  The petition was signed
by Ng Puay Yee, chief executive officer.

The case is assigned to Judge James L. Garrity Jr.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated its assets at $500
million to $1 billion and debts at $10 million to $50 million.

Howard B. Kleinberg, Esq., Edward J. LoBello, Esq. and Jil
Mazer-Marino, Esq. of Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C. serve
As legal counsel.  The Debtor has tapped Goldin Associates, LLC,
as financial advisor and RSR Consulting LLC as restructuring
consultant.


CONQUEST MANAGED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 26
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Conquest Managed Futures Select Fund Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 26, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Sept. 6, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Kim Charaman
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


CONQUEST MANAGED MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 26
--------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Conquest Managed Futures Select Master Fund Ltd.
are required to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 26, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Sept. 6, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Kim Charaman
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


CONSULTORIA SUDAMERICANA: Members' Final Meeting Set for Oct. 24
----------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Consultoria Sudamericana Inc. will hold their final
meeting on Oct. 24, 2016, at 12:00 noon, to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808
          P.O. Box 30622, Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


COPPERSTONE ALPHA: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 11
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Copperstone Alpha Fund will hold their final
meeting on Nov. 11, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Norman Chan
          dms House, 20 Genesis Close
          P.O. Box 1344 George Town KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


COPPERSTONE CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 11
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Copperstone Capital will hold their final
meeting on Nov. 11, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Norman Chan
          dms House, 20 Genesis Close
          P.O. Box 1344 George Town KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


DB CAPITAL: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 26
---------------------------------------------------------
The sole member of DB Capital Partners Latin America, G.P. Limited
will hear on Oct. 26, 2016, at 10:30 a.m., the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Heide Silverstein
          c/o DB Investment Partners, Inc.60 Wall Street
          New York, NY 10005
          USA
          Telephone: +1 (212) 250-4299


DB CAPITAL ASIA: Sole Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 26
--------------------------------------------------------------
The sole member of DB Capital Partners Asia G.P. Limited will hear
on Oct. 26, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Heide Silverstein
          c/o DB Investment Partners, Inc.60 Wall Street
          New York, NY 10005
          USA
          Telephone: +1 (212) 250-4299


LCA C&K: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 6
---------------------------------------------
The creditors of LCA C&K Limited are required to file their proofs
of debt by Oct. 6, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Sept. 9, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Muhammad Aslam Koomar
          Ebene Esplanade, 5th Floor
          24 Cybercity
          Ebene
          Mauritius
          Telephone: +230 401 2359
          Facsimile: +230 401 2301
          e-mail: akoomar@internationalproximity.com


NORTH GROVE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of North Grove Global Emerging Markets Offshore
Fund Ltd. received on Sept. 19, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Gabriel Wallach
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 914 6386


PGR CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 11
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of PGR Capital Systematic Strategies will hold
their final meeting on Nov. 11, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          Norman Chan
          dms House, 20 Genesis Close
          P.O. Box 1344 George Town KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


RED T INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Oct. 26
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Red T Investments Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Oct. 26, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Sept. 14, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zedra Directors (Cayman) Limited
          Zedra Trust Company (Cayman) Limited
          FirstCaribbean House, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 487 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7128


TWO SIGMA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------
On Sept. 16, 2016, the sole shareholder of Two Sigma U.S. Equity
Variable Exposure Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the
company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Two Sigma Advisers, LP
          c/o Jody Powery-Gilbert
          Ogier
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands


WENSLEYDALE LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Oct. 19
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Wensleydale Limited will hold their final
meeting on Oct. 19, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

          David Boyd
          Jose Santos
          c/o Forbes Hare Trust Company Limited
          Cassia Court, Suite 716
          10 Market Street, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9006
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 943 7700


===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


CREDIVALORES: S&P Affirms 'B+' LT Counterparty Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has affirmed its 'B+' long-term
and 'B' short-term counterparty credit ratings on Colombia-based
nonbank financial institution Credivalores - Crediservicios SAS.
The outlook remains stable.

The ratings continue to reflect S&P's assessment of Credivalores'
adequate business position, which is underscored by a diversified
business mix and good market position; its adequate capital and
earnings, underpinned by S&P's forecast risk-adjusted ratio (RAC)
ratio of 8.2%, on average, for the next 12 to 18 months; and its
adequate risk position, mainly driven by its lending and
underwriting standards, which are stronger than those of other
NBFIs S&P rates in the region.  The ratings are constrained by
S&P's view of the company's moderate funding, with a concentrated
funding structure and lower financial flexibility than other NBFIs
S&P rates in Latin America, and only adequate liquidity.  The
stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains at 'b+'.

The ratings also incorporate S&P's positive view of Credivalores'
credit profile compared with other NBFIs we rate in the region.
S&P believes Credivalores' credit fundamentals will allow it to
navigate through the slowing Colombian economy.  In S&P's view,
the company's credit losses will likely be manageable for the next
12-18 months because payroll discount loans account for 57% of its
total loans, and S&P don't expect the unemployment rate to affect
this portfolio, since more than 80% of its payroll clients are
public employees or retirees.

The anchor that starts S&P's rating analysis of NBFIs is three
notches below the anchor for banks in the same country.  This is
to reflect NBFIs' typical lack of access to central bank credit
lines, lower regulatory oversight, and higher competitive risk
relative to banks.  In the case of NBFIs in Colombia, S&P applies
the standard notching relative to the bank anchor of 'bb+'; so
S&P's starting point for rating Credivalores is 'b+', given that
100% of its loan portfolio exposure is in Colombia.

S&P regards Credivalores' business position as adequate because of
its good market position compared with that of other Colombian
NBFIs; its diversified portfolio, which has three main business
lines (payroll, 57% of total loans; credit cards 35%; and
insurance financing 7.5%); and a steady revenue base that has been
increasing over the past few years.  Furthermore, S&P believes
Credivalores' corporate governance is adequate and its management
team has long-standing experience and a good track record in the
industry.  Even though NBFIs continue to face intense competition,
Credivalores is one of the largest non-regulated consumer finance
companies in Colombia, with almost 2% of the country's payroll
discount lending market.  Also, it has maintained above-average
growth, with no important revenue concentration that could hamper
its operations.  In S&P's view, as it has seen over the past
several years, Credivalores' revenues are less sensitive to market
fluctuations than those of other local and regional NBFIs, due to
its less-risky business products, especially payroll discount
loans.  For the next 18 months, S&P expects it will continue with
similar business operations because management will remain focused
on its core competencies.  Therefore, S&P anticipates no changes
to its current business position assessment in the next 12 months.

Credivalores' capital, leverage, and earnings remain adequate, in
S&P's view.  As of Dec. 31, 2015, our RAC ratio for the company
was 8.5%, but since then, in S&P's view, economic risk in Colombia
has increased.  Given the resulting higher risk weights,
Credivalores' RAC ratio would now be 7.6% because all of its
exposure is in Colombia.  Nevertheless, S&P believes that loan
portfolio growth, which it projects at 30% over the next two
years, coupled with good internal capital generation and no
dividend payment, will gradually strengthen the RAC ratio to
around 8.2%, on average, for the next 18 months.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Credivalores
will maintain a RAC ratio of 8.2%, on average, for the next 12
months, even with higher risk-weighted assets stemming from
increased economic risk in Colombia.  S&P also expects
Credivalores will display manageable asset quality indicators and
a concentrated funding structure with limited financial
flexibility.  The stable outlook also incorporates S&P's view of
the company's adequate business position, reflected in a good
market position and diversified business mix.

S&P could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if
Credivalores' liquidity were to come under significant pressure
due to weaker financial flexibility or a sharp deterioration of
asset quality indicators.  The latter could occur if the company
enters riskier segments or unknown markets, or if it relaxed its
underwriting standards to pursue credit growth.  This could
increase the company's NPAs well above those of its main
competitors, by more than 10% (measured as NPAs plus credit
losses), or lead to higher loan loss provisions, thereby adversely
affecting internal capital generation.  As a consequence, S&P's
projected RAC ratio could fall below 7% and trigger a negative
rating action.

S&P could raise the ratings in the next 12 months if Credivalores
were to continue diversifying its funding sources and gain
additional financial flexibility, including through increasing the
amount of unencumbered assets for use against potential additional
funding.


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REP: Firms Balk at Gov't Push to Sell Power Plants Stake
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the president of the Santo Domingo
industries grouped in AEIH said the government's push to sell
US$1.0 billion in shares in the Punta Catalina coal-fired power
plants even before the project concludes is "surprising" and an
"adventure."

Antonio Taveras spoke in reference to a meeting with the business
sector just two months ago, when senior Government officials had
stated having enough funds to advance construction of the power
plant this year, according to Dominican Today.

The business leader noted that in that same meeting the officials
said only US$500 million more was needed to finish the work and
the source of funding already been identified, the report notes.
"The officials responded in that manner when some entrepreneurs
made a firm proposal to acquire a 49% stake in Punta Catalina
(south)," the report relays.

Mr. Taveras called the attempt to balance the 2017 budget by
offering shares in Punta Catalina an "adventure," since in his
view there's "no publicly known firm basis that could ensure this
operation," the report relays.

"Despite this sales ad, we don't believe it will be easy for the
government to find investors in a project whose real cost is the
best kept secret," Mr. Taveras said, noting that the Electricity
Pact would be the best scenario to discuss and analyze the sale of
the power plant project, the report notes.

Mr. Taveras said even the participants in the Electricity Pact
don't fully know about Punta Catalina's costs, construction
procedures, budget management or the project's source of funds to
finance it, the report relays.  "This occurs even though this
information has been a constant demand by the private sector
present in the Economic and Social Council," the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.


* DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Central Bank Keeps Benchmark Rate at 5.0%
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Dominican Republic's Central Bank
said it will maintain its benchmark rate at 5.0% annually.

It said the decision was taken during its September monetary
policy meeting, "which took into account the balance of risks
around inflation projections, market expectations, the domestic
macroeconomic context and the relevant international environment
for the Dominican economy," according to Dominican Today.

The Central Bank said the annual rate of inflation stood at 1.47 %
in August, the report notes.

"Domestically, economic activity and domestic demand evolve
positively. In January-August, the Monthly Economic Activity
Indicator (IMAE) shows a real growth of around 6.8% year on year,
indicating that the economy would grow this year above its
potential," the central bank said, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


GRUPO IDESA: Fitch Cuts Long Term Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Grupo IDESA, S.A. de C.V. (IDESA) to 'B' from 'BB-'. The
Rating Outlook has been revised to Stable from Negative.

The rating downgrade is based on expectations of continued
pressure to IDESA's petrochemical operations due to deteriorating
spreads in core products that combined with higher debt should
result in very weak leverage ratios through 2018. IDESA's EBITDA
is expected to decline to about USD45 million during 2016 from
USD74 million a year ago. Meanwhile IDESA's debt has increased by
about 50% to USD437 million as of June 30, 2016.

The increase in debt has been used to support funding requirements
for its 25% share of Etileno XXI, IDESA's joint venture with
Braskem that started operations in March. Dividends from this
joint venture are restricted by project financing until certain
financial and operating benchmarks are achieved. Fitch's base case
does not assume material dividends from Etileno XXI until 2019.

The 'RR3' Recovery Rating (RR) on the notes reflects good recovery
prospects in event of default. The above average recovery
estimates reflect the value of IDESA's 25% stake in Etileno XXI.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weak Expected FCF generation

IDESA's CFFO remained relatively stable during 2014-2015 at around
USD35 million despite lower product prices, primarily due to
equally lower feedstock prices and the positive effect of the
appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the Mexican peso on the
company's profitability. Feedstock prices, which are somewhat more
correlated to the price of ethane, have not declined in similar
proportion during the LTM hurting IDESA's profitability. As a
result, FCF has declined from about USD30 million per year to USD4
million as of the LTM as of second-quarter 2016. Fitch expects
IDESA to continue to generate neutral to negative FCF during 2016-
2017. FCF generation and incremental debt was mainly used to fund
joint venture investments of about USD350 million during 2013 to
2016.

Elevated Leverage

IDESA's gross leverage was 5.4x at year-end 2015 and 8.9x as of
second-quarter 2016, respectively. Increasing leverage has been a
combination of severely contracting petrochemical spreads and to
less extent declining production volumes. Fitch's base case
suggests leverage should remain elevated in 2016-2017 at around
10x as underlying petrochemical spreads remain fragile. Leverage
should decline to still relatively elevated levels below 7x by
2018 as cash flows from JV investments are received. Equity
contributions from current or new shareholders would be viewed
positively for credit quality.

High Reliance on Commodity Chemicals

IDESA has limited pricing power with its suppliers and customers,
as the company's main product prices are based on international
reference prices and somewhat correlated to the price of oil.
Positively, the price of ethane-based ethylene oxide (EO), IDESA's
main raw material, has also declined with lower natural gas
prices. Fitch expects only modest upward pricing pressure in EO
due to the wide availability of ethane in North America.

Strong Business Position Domestically

IDESA generates the majority of its EBITDA from ethylene glycols
(EG) and ethanol amines (EA), product lines in which the company
maintains a dominant position. In EG, where domestic demand
outstrips supply, the company is Mexico's largest producer, with
32% of domestic market share. In EA, IDESA serves 60% of the
domestic market, exporting close to 60% of its production to
Europe, Asia and South America.

Country, Production Site and Supplier Concentration

About 90% of IDESA's total revenues come from the Mexican domestic
market. Production capacity is heavily concentrated in its
Coatzacoalcos plant, which is dependent on smooth operations at
Pemex Petroquimica (PPQ), IDESA's sole supplier of EO. IDESA's
participation in Etileno XXI should significantly diversify
IDESA's cash flow sources and is considered positive for long-term
credit quality.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Revenues in USD fall about 15% during 2016 reflecting weak
      product pricing, partially offset by stronger sales volumes
      in distribution. For 2017 - 2018, revenues increase mid-high
      single digits trending upwards with Fitch's Brent oil price
      deck expectations of USD45 and USD55, respectively.

   -- EBITDA contracts to around USD45 million in 2016 and remains
      under pressure during 2017-2018 reflecting weaker
      petrochemical spreads partially mitigated by stronger
      margins in IDESA's distribution business.

   -- Cash flows received from joint ventures during 2018 support
      deleveraging.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a negative rating action include:

   -- Failure to ramp up of Etileno XXI's capacity utilization to
      levels above 85% by early 2018;

   -- Lower than expected polyethylene spreads that result in
      lower than expected cash flows to IDESA;

   -- Underlying weak cash flow generation that results in EBITDA
      declining below USD40 million.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a positive rating action include:

   -- Material dividends from Etileno XXI received during the
      earlier part of 2018;

   -- Capital infusions that result in gross leverage levels
      around 5x would be considered positive for credit quality.

LIQUIDITY

IDESA's intrinsic liquidity is tight. CFFO has declined from USD35
million a year ago to USD19 million as of the LTM to second-
quarter 2016. Expected negative FCF will likely need to be funded
with USD29 million in cash and marketable securities. The
company's main debt obligations are its USD300 million senior
unsecured notes due in 2020 and bank debt. IDESA has USD26 million
available undrawn from a contracted USD130 million committed
credit line with Banco Inbursa. This credit line ranks equal in
right of payment to existing unsecured debt and will likely be
used to partially refinance USD31 million of short-term debt.
Interest payments under this loan are due at maturity in 2020
which should provide some near-term flexibility.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

   IDESA

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR to 'B' from 'BB-';

   -- Long-term local currency IDR to 'B' from 'BB-';

   -- USD300 million senior unsecured notes due 2020 to 'B+/RR3'
      from 'BB-';

The Rating Outlook is Stable.



=============
U R U G U A Y
=============


ADMINISTRACION NACIONAL: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its stand-alone credit profile on
Administracion Nacional de Combustibles Alcohol y Portland (ANCAP)
to 'b' from 'b-'.  As a result, S&P raised its corporate credit
rating on ANCAP to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  The outlook is negative.

"The upgrade reflects our opinion that the company's liquidity
position has strengthened.  Since October 2015, ANCAP was able to
pay down and refinance more than $200 million in short-term debt,
has benefited for an about $600 million capitalization from the
Ministry of Finance (MEF; the capitalization was previously a loan
granted to cancel a debt with Petroleos de Venezuela, or PDVSA),
and received in September 2016 a $300 million loan from CAF to
cancel and roll-over short term debt.  Moreover, we see that
ANCAP's operating and financial performance has improved as a
consequence of lower oil purchase prices leading to higher EBITDA
margins (about 17% as of June 2016, compared with the 7% in June
2015) and positive cash flow generation, and we expect EBITDA
generation of $240 million-$280 million for 2016.  As a result,
for the upcoming 12 months, we are forecasting that ANCAP's
liquidity sources-to-uses ratio will exceed 1.2x, and for that
reason we are reassessing our liquidity score to less than
adequate from weak," S&P said.

"At the same time, the rating continues to reflect our view of a
very high likelihood that the government of the Oriental Republic
of Uruguay would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to the company in the event of financial distress.  Our
view is based on our assessment of ANCAP's very important role as
the country's sole petroleum importer, refiner, and supplier of
refined products to the domestic distributors.  The company also
has a very strong link with the government, particularly regarding
budget approval process, debt authorization, and tax payments.
Our view of a very high likelihood of extraordinary support from
the government provides a four-notch upgrade from ANCAP's stand-
alone credit profile of 'b'," S&P noted.

S&P continues to see ANCAP's business risk profile as weak,
derived from its small scale of operations when compared to global
peers, and without asset and geographic diversification, as
ANCAP's single refinery concentrates its operations in Uruguay.
Additionally, the company operates in a very volatile industry, in
which profitability is dependent on international oil prices.
This is partially offset by ANCAP's strong competitive advantage,
being the nation's sole petroleum importer, and with an about 60%
market share in the retail segment.

The entity's financial risk profile is still highly leveraged.
Although ANCAP has reversed its negative EBITDA generation from
the past five years, credit metrics are still weak, with debt to
EBITDA figures above 6x.

Additionally, S&P sees that ANCAP benefits from ongoing support
from the government, shown by the fact that ANCAP had been able to
renegotiate bank loans at lower rates together with MEF, and that
fuel prices were not lowered since 2015, despite the decrease in
oil purchase prices.  This differentiation when compared to peers
in the same industry makes S&P provide an additional notch to its
SACP from its 'b-' anchor, which derives from the combination of a
weak business risk profile and a highly leveraged financial risk
profile.

The negative outlook primarily reflects the negative rating
outlook on Uruguay.  If S&P downgraded the sovereign to 'BBB-'
from 'BBB', it would downgrade ANCAP to 'BB' given that S&P's view
of a very high likelihood of extraordinary government support
raises the ANCAP rating by four notches from the SACP.

Assuming no changes in S&P's opinion of government extraordinary
support and no changes in our ratings on the sovereign, any
positive rating action on ANCAP would depend on an improvement in
the company's business risk profile (for example, if S&P continues
to see ANCAP's operating efficiency improve due to improved and
sustained profitability) as well as on lower leverage (by reaching
a debt to EBITDA closer to 5x).

If S&P revised the outlook on Uruguay to stable, S&P would do the
same for ANCAP.

S&P could downgrade ANCAP if S&P sees that its liquidity position
significantly deteriorates, with sources to uses remaining below
1x and with limited flexibility to re-finance short term debt.

Additionally, any negative rating action on Uruguay, or S&P's view
of a lower likelihood of extraordinary support from the
government, would lead to a downgrade of ANCAP.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: IMF Forecasts Deeper Recession in Region
-----------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the International Monetary Fund said that
the economy of Latin America and the Caribbean will shrink 0.6
percent this year, compared with its earlier projection of a 0.5
percent contraction.

The prediction is part of the latest edition of the IMF's World
Economic Outlook, which points out that while major regional
economies such as Brazil and Venezuela are suffering, most other
countries in the area continue to expand, according to EFE News.

IMF economists also expect the region as a whole to enjoy growth
of 1.6 percent in 2017, the report notes.

"Confidence appears to have bottomed out in Brazil, and growth is
forecast at -3.3 percent for 2016 and 0.5 percent in 2017, on the
assumption of declining political and policy uncertainty and the
waning effects of past economic shocks," the IMF said, the report
relays.

It projects further deterioration in petroleum-rich Venezuela,
where gross domestic product declined 6.2 percent last year and is
on course to fall another 10 percent in 2016 "as the decline in
oil prices since mid-2014 has exacerbated domestic macroeconomic
imbalances and balance of payments pressures," EFE News notes.

Venezuela's jobless rate will top 20 percent in 2017, the Fund
said, EFE News relays.  Argentine GDP is likewise predicted to
shrink 1.8 percent this year before adding 2.7 percent in 2017.

According to EFE News, falling oil prices are also a factor in the
economic woes of Ecuador, the IMF said, forecasting GDP declines
of 2.3 percent this year and 2.7 percent in 2017.

Colombia and Chile are experiencing a slowdown this year, but
remain in positive territory, with gains of 2.2 percent and 1.7
percent, respectively, the report says.

Within the region, only Peru and Paraguay -- each expanding at a
3.5 percent clip -- are doing better this year compared with 2015.

Latin America's No. 2 economy after Brazil, Mexico, will end the
year with growth of 2.1 percent, down from 2.5 percent in 2015,
the IMF said, though adding that the Aztec nation will resume an
upward trajectory, the report adds.

                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *