/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/161101.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Tuesday, November 1, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 216 Headlines B R A Z I L COMPANHIA DE SANEAMENTO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Global Scale Rating GRUPO RBS: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative MRS LOGISTICA: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' IDR, Outlook Negative SAMARCO MINERACAO: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'RD' SAMARCO MINERACAO: 21 People Charged With Homicide in Dam Collapse SUZANO PAPEL: Agrees to $259MM Land Deal, Securing Supply for Mill C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ALFA CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ALTERRA INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 18 BELLOWS LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings BLUE ORCHID: Commences Liquidation Proceedings CAIS CORVEX: Commences Liquidation Proceedings CENTURY HOLDING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings CRANSHIRE CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings CRANSHIRE CAPITAL MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings FELIX (CI): Commences Liquidation Proceedings HIGASHI OGISHIMA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14 N7 BARKAT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings SENTINEL LIFE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings TRIANGLE HOLDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14 G U A T E M A L A GUATEMALA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Foreign Sovereign Credit Ratings G U Y A N A * GUYANA: to Cut Mortality Rates With US$8MM IDB Support M E X I C O CFG HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR; Outlook Remains Stable P U E R T O R I C O DAVAMADA INC: Unsecureds To Recoup 1.58%-1.72% Under Plan HECTOR ANIBAL: Dec. 7 Plan Confirmation Hearing Set PANADERIA ZULMA: Hires Hector Morales as Accountant T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O ARCELORMITTAL SA: Foreigner Most Likely to Buy Firm V E N E Z U E L A PDVSA: Swiss Give US$51 Million in Frozen Assets in Probe - - - - - =========== B R A Z I L =========== COMPANHIA DE SANEAMENTO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Global Scale Rating ------------------------------------------------------------- S&P is affirming its 'BB' global scale and 'brA+' national scale ratings on Brazil-based water and sewage company Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo. Its 'bb' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains unchanged. The ratings on the company remain limited by those on the state of Sao Paulo, and the negative outlook indicates that S&P would downgrade SABESP if S&P was to take the same similar rating action on its controlling shareholder. GRUPO RBS: S&P Affirms 'BB' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative --------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' corporate credit and debt ratings on Grupo RBS (RBS). S&P's '3' recovery rating, indicating expectations of a substantial (50%-70%, in the higher band of the range) recovery in the event of default, remains unchanged. For S&P's analysis, it uses the combined financial statements of RBS TV Comunicacoes S.A. and its subsidiaries and RBS Midia, Digital e Participacoes S.A. and its subsidiaries. The outlook on the corporate credit rating remains negative. In March 2016, RBS announced that it has agreed to sell its TV, radio, and newspaper operations in the state of Santa Catarina. Although the transaction still depends on the approval by the Ministry of Communications, S&P is already analyzing it separately from the group because it assess the risk of the transaction's rejection as low. As a result of the sale, the company currently has an even smaller scale and narrower geographic diversification than those of its peers with nationwide operations. As a result, S&P revised its business risk profile to weak from fair. RBS has been implementing several initiatives to reduce costs and expenses, but the smaller scale and weaker advertising industry conditions, which limit the company's revenue growth, should result in its EBITDA margin of 13%-14% in the next few years, down from historical levels of 16%-18%. Still, RBS' leadership in television and radio segments in the state of Rio Grande do Sul and its affiliation with the largest Brazilian media company, Rede Globo, should allow it to recover revenue growth in these segments once the industry growth likely returns in the next quarters. With the proceeds from the sale in the state Santa Catarina, S&P expects RBS to post stronger credit metrics despite its lower EBITDA. S&P believes the company will use part of the proceeds to reduce its debt to better align with its smaller scale, but S&P will also monitor other potential cash outflows such as extraordinary dividend distributions or acquisitions. MRS LOGISTICA: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' IDR, Outlook Negative -------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned new ratings to MRS Logistica S.A. as: -- Long-Term National Rating 'AAA(bra)', Outlook Stable ; -- Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BBB-', Outlook Stable; -- Foreign Currency (FC) IDR 'BB+'; Outlook Negative. MRS's FC IDR is constrained by Brazil's 'BB+' Country Ceiling, and its Negative Rating Outlook follows Fitch's Negative Outlook for Brazil sovereign (FC IDR 'BB'). generates its revenues in Brazil, and the company does not have cross-border issuances in place. KEY RATING DRIVERS MRS's ratings are based on its strong and resilient operational cash generation, conservative capital structure, robust financial flexibility and very low exposure to competition. The company's business model is strong due to the captive demand for transportation and low exposure to the inherent volatilities of business environment in Brazil and the iron ore price cycle. Its business model is also supported by a shareholders' agreement that establishes a well-defined tariff model and has protected the company's operational margins and profitability, enhancing the predictability of future results. MRS's credit metrics have remained strong in the past five years, although the company has undertaken substantial capex during this period. Fitch's projections indicate that MRS will sustain its solid operational margins and credit metrics in the coming years, which benefit from its severely tested business model and continuous positive free cash flow (FCF) generation. Solid Business Profile MRS runs a mature and important railway concession in Brazil that expires in 2026. The company operates 1700-kilometer-rail lines, which integrate Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Sao Paulo with the most important ports in Brazil's Southeast. The company is the sole provider of railway transportation for large clients -- which are at the same time the company's major shareholders -- in its coverage area. The competition threat by other transportation modals is marginal. MRS's operational model has consistently protected its operating cash flow generation and balance sheet for more than a decade. This model is supported by take-or-pay contracts with captive clients who represent 80% of the company's revenue. Furthermore, the model includes a tariff protection mechanism to cover the operating costs and capex. It also guarantees an adequate and pre-defined return over equity. In recent years, MRS's operating cash flow generation has proved to be resilient against strong economic downturns and unfavorable movements of the exchange rate, fuel and iron ore prices, the main transported good. MRS's transported volumes have grown at an average annual rate of 5% in the last five years and are expected to increase in the coming years. In June 2016, latest 12 months (LTM), MRS transported 170 million tons which compare favorably with 155 million tons in 2012. The average freight net rate was BRL19.10 per ton in June 2016. Strong Operational Margins Protected by Shareholder's Agreement MRS's shareholder's agreement provides a tariff model that benefits the company's profitability and cash flow generation capacity. The tariff model establishes, on an annual basis, freight rates for each captive client during one cycle, through a pre-defined cargo volume and a return target over equity ratio. Furthermore, the model determines tariff adjustments on a quarterly basis in the event of substantial cost increases, chiefly regarding fuel. This operating model has proven to be efficient over many years and has translated into high EBTIDA margin resilience that was, on average, around 40% between 2012 and June 2016 LTM. The company's main individual shareholder is Mineracoes Brasileiras Reunidas S.A (MBR), which is controlled by Vale S.A. (Vale, 'BBB'/Stable Outlook) and own 44% of MRS's capital. Combined, they were responsible for almost half of MRS's revenues in 2015. MBR and Vale's operations, as well as those of other main shareholders, such as CSN (18.6%), Usiminas (11.1%) and Gerdau (1.3%), are heavily dependent on MRS's iron ore transporting capacity in its coverage area. Positive Free Cash Flow Historically, MRS has reported consistent operating cash flow generation. In June 2016 LTM, the company generated EBITDAR and funds from operations (FFO) of BRL1.6 billion and BRL1.0 billion, respectively. Fitch believes that MRS's EBITDAR will steadily increase, as the company gains scale and continues benefitting from increases in non-captive freight orders following capex completion in infrastructure and undercarriage material. MRS's FCF was negative between 2012 and 2014 impacted by average capex of BRL948 million annually. Following the conclusion of improvement measures, MRS is expected to return to lower levels of capex (around 20% of revenues) at least until 2019. Fitch expects a FCF of BRL358 million by 2016, which will remain positive throughout the low capex period. In the LTM through June 2016, MRS generated FCF of BRL226 million, after capex of BRL649 million and dividends of BRL180 million. Capital Structure Likely to Remain Conservative MRS's leverage is low and consistent with the ratings assigned. In June 2016 LTM, MRS's adjusted net leverage, measured as adjusted net debt/EBITDAR ratio was 2.7 times (x), relatively flat compared to the 2012-2015 period. The conversion of EBITDAR into FFO has been historically high, which results in low FFO adjusted leverage within the 2.5x to 3.0x range. Fitch expects a reduction of the EBITDAR- based net adjusted leverage to the 2.0x to 2.5x range for the next two to three years. On June 30, 2016, MRS posted adjusted total debt of BRL4.723 million, which included off balance debt related to leasing and concession obligations of BRL1.373 million. The company has made use of long-term and low cost credit lines to finance capex and local market issuances to finance its turnover capital. Low Risk Industry Railway transportation in Brazil enjoys a solid demand, low competition amongst the different operators, high barriers to entry and medium to high profitability. These advantages, along with the current government's resolution to enhance the country's transportation infrastructure, result in a favorable credit environment for Brazilian railway companies. KEY ASSUMPTIONS Fitch's main assumptions for MRS are: -- Volume increase of low one digit in 2016, no growth in 2017; -- Tariff increases of 1% per annum in 2016 and 2017; -- Average annual capex of BRL650 million in the 2016 to 2019 period. RATING SENSITIVITIES Events that could individually or collectively lead to a negative rating action regarding the LC IDR include: -- Deterioration of EBITDA margins to lower than 35% on a sustainable basis; -- Adjusted net debt/EBITDAR ratios consistently above 3.5x; -- Severe deterioration of credit quality of its major clients and/or shareholders. A downgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating ('BB', Negative Outlook) and of the country ceiling could lead to a negative rating action regarding the FC IDRs of MRS. On the other hand, positive actions towards the sovereign rating may lead to positive actions regarding MRS's FC IDRs, currently limited by the Brazilian country celling. LIQUIDITY The company's liquidity is satisfactory. In June 2016, the cash and marketable securities totaled BRL532 million. Historically, the cash to short-term debt coverage ratio has remained around 0.7x. However, MRS benefits from a strong and predictable operating cash flow generation and solid access to credit lines that, combined, provide the company with substantial financial flexibility. The short-term debt coverage ratio, measured by cash+CCFO to short-term debt, has remained robust at around 2.0x in the last four years. Fitch expects the company to maintain the current coverage level on a recurring basis. SAMARCO MINERACAO: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'RD' -------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Foreign Currency and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings of Samarco Mineracao S.A. to 'RD' from 'C', and National Long-term ratings to 'RD(bra)' from 'C(bra)'. KEY RATING DRIVERS The downgrades follow the expiration of the 30-day grace period after the non-payment of the company's interest payments on its USD500 million 2024 senior unsecured notes. Payment of the bond was due on Sept. 26, 2016, with the 30-day grace period expiring on Oct. 26, 2016. Samarco also missed an interest payment on its USD700 million 2023 senior unsecured notes on Oct. 24, 2016. The company has entered a 30-day grace period to remedy the payment. Given Samarco's expiration of its prior 30-day grace period on its 2024 notes and the company's dire liquidity scenario, it is unlikely the company will amend the payment on its 2023 notes within the 30-day grace period. Fitch's 'RR3' recovery rating for the company's bonds reflects above average recovery prospects. For this to occur, the company will need to be able to restart operations at the level of 50% or more of current capacity. Fitch believes recovery prospects will deteriorate should the restart of the plant be pushed beyond 2017. If Samarco is not able to restart its operations, which remains a distinct possibility, recovery prospects would likely be less than 10% and the notes would be downgraded to 'C'/'RR6'. KEY ASSUMPTIONS Fitch's main concern remains Samarco's ability to restart operations and whether the company will be able to comply with its various reparation agreements to date. In addition, the company's financial obligations and its ability to generate income, remain sources of concern. RATING SENSITIVITIES The company's ratings could be revised to 'D' from 'RD' pursuant to Fitch's rating definition. An upgrade is unlikely in the near term absent a distressed debt exchange. LIQUIDITY Fitch assumes that liquidity at Samarco is extremely strained. Access to new financing, as well as financial assistance from shareholders, should be possible if the company resumes operations. FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS Fitch takes these rating actions: Samarco Mineracao S.A. -- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR downgraded to 'RD' from 'C'; -- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR downgraded to 'RD' from 'C; -- National Long-Term Rating downgrade to 'RD(bra)' from 'C(bra)'; -- Senior unsecured debt rating affirmed at 'CC/RR3'. SAMARCO MINERACAO: 21 People Charged With Homicide in Dam Collapse ------------------------------------------------------------------ Paul Kiernan at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazilian federal prosecutors filed homicide charges against 21 people in connection with a catastrophic collapse of a mining dam last year that killed 19 people. Those charged include current and former top executives of mining giants Vale SA and BHP Billiton Ltd. and their joint venture, Samarco Minera‡ao SA, according to The Wall Street Journal. Among them are former Samarco Chief Executive Ricardo Vescovi, Vale's current iron-ore director Peter Poppinga, and eight Vale and BHP representatives at Samarco, the report notes. The charges mark the end of a nearly yearlong criminal investigation into the Nov. 5, 2015, failure of Samarco's Fundao tailings dam in southeast Brazil, the report relays. Believed to be the biggest disaster of its kind anywhere, the incident released a torrent of sludge that washed away villages, displaced hundreds of people and traveled more than 400 miles through southeast Brazil's Rio Doce basin before reaching the Atlantic Ocean, the report notes. Almost a year later, the river is still tainted a rusty red from sediment, its washed-out banks visible from the cruising altitude of commercial airliners, the report discloses. Additional charges against the 21 individuals include the crimes of causing a flood, landslide and grave bodily harm, the report relays. Vale, BHP and Samarco were also charged with 12 different kinds of environmental crimes, the report says. Employees of a consulting firm that performed periodic checkups on Fundao were charged with presenting false stability reports, the report notes. In an emailed statement, Samarco said it "refutes" the charges and said the prosecutors ignored defense statements that it presented over the course of the investigation, "which prove that the company had no prior knowledge of the risks to its structure," the report notes "Safety was always a priority in the management strategy of Samarco, which reiterates that it never reduced investments in this area," the company added, the report relays. BHP Billiton said it "rejects outright the charges against the company and the affected individuals. We will defend the charges against the company, and fully support each of the affected individuals in their defense of the charges against them," the report notes. Vale reaffirmed its "deep respect and total solidarity" with the disaster's victims but said it "vehemently repudiates" the charges filed, the report relays. It added that its representatives on Samarco's board confirmed that they "were never informed by Samarco's technical or leadership team of any irregularities that could have represented real or untreated risks to the dam, nor by any consultancy responsible for monitoring the structure," the report says. The individual defendants couldn't be reached. If convicted of "qualified homicide," the individuals could face sentences of between 12 and 30 years in prison, prosecutors said, adding that Brazil has extradition agreements with most or all of the countries from which the suspects hail, the report relays. "[The victims] were killed by the violent passage of the tailings mud, they had their bodies thrown against other objects, such as pieces of wood, they had their bodies mutilated and . . . . . dispersed across an area of 110 kilometers," federal prosecutor Eduardo Santos de Oliveira said at a press conference. "The motivation of the homicides was the excessive greed of the companies -- Samarco, here charged, as well as its shareholders -- in the name of profit," he added. Potential penalties for Vale, BHP and Samarco range from payment of fines and funding of charitable programs to partial or total suspension of their activities. Prosecutors added that they requested damage payments for the victims, the amount of which remains to be determined, the report notes. A judge must accept the charges for a trial, which would take place before a jury, to begin, the report relays. In a report released in August, the companies presented a report on the factors that contributed to Fundao's failure, the report notes. All three firms have apologized for the disaster and committed to a full remediation of the damage. But Brazilian courts rejected a March settlement signed by the companies and the government, the report discloses. Prosecutors are seeking to replace it with a civil lawsuit filed in May in which they sought BRL155 billion ($49 billion) in damages and compared the Samarco disaster to BP's Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the report notes. The prosecutors' case hinges what they say is evidence that Samarco and its shareholders were aware of chronic structural problems at Fundao dating back to April 2009, the report recalls. They say Samarco's board -- made up of Vale and BHP officials -- was informed of flaws in the dam but responded by pressuring the company to extract more iron ore, the report notes. Samarco's board was also allegedly informed of the likely consequences of a dam failure, prosecutors said, the report says. Company risk managers allegedly had estimated as recently as 2015, according to prosecutors, that a collapse of Fundao could kill 20 people, stop Samarco's operations for two years and deal a substantial blow to the mining companies' reputations, the report discloses. Surviving residents of the devastated community of Bento Rodrigues reported after the accident that they received no official warning from Samarco in the crucial minutes after the dam gave way, the report notes. "There were internal committees, operational committees, dam committees, in which the issues were discussed, and on those committees there were representatives of Vale and BHP," prosecutor Jose Adercio Leite Sampaio said, the report relays. "Based on the minutes, on what was debated in those minutes, on the documents that were presented at those meetings, we identified the list of people on the charge sheet," he added. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct. 27, 2016, S&P Global Ratings has lowered its issue-level rating on Samarco Mineracao S.A.'s (D/--) senior unsecured notes due 2023 to 'D' from 'CC'. SUZANO PAPEL: Agrees to $259MM Land Deal, Securing Supply for Mill ------------------------------------------------------------------ Reuters reports that Suzano Papel & Celulose SA, Brazil's second biggest pulp producer, has agreed to pay $259 million for land and a small hydropower dam as part of an effort to secure supply of cellulose at lower costs for a key mill in the country. Suzano said it would pay about $245 million for about 75,000 hectares (185,329 acres) of land between the Brazilian states of Maranhao and Tocantins, of which about 60 percent are arable, according to Reuters. The cost of the mini dam was $14 million. The deal highlights growing demand for arable land across Brazil's northern and northeastern regions as speculation mounts that lawmakers plan to ease existing restrictions on sales of land to foreign investors in coming months, the report notes. For pulpmakers, buying land in Brazil has become strategic -- the country's soil productivity is bigger than in regions such as Scandinavia or Chile. Under the deal, which requires regulatory approval, Suzano said it bought the land and the dam from steelmaking mills Cia Siderurgica Vale do Pindare SA and Cosima Siderurgica de Maranhao Ltda, the report relays. Sao Paulo-based Suzano said third-quarter net income came in at BRL53 million ($17 million), reversing a loss of BRL959 million a year earlier. The result missed a consensus estimate of BRL115.7 million compiled by Thomson Reuters. Net revenue shrank 27 percent in the quarter, driving earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization -- a key gauge of operational profitability -- down 48 percent on an annual basis, the report notes. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug. 16, 2016, S&P Global Ratings raised its national scale rating on Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A. to 'brAA+' from 'brAA'. In addition S&P affirmed its 'BB+' global scale ratings on Suzano and S&P's 'BB+' issue-level ratings on the financing vehicles Bahia Sul Holding GMBH and Suzano Trading Ltd, which Suzano guarantees. The outlook is stable. S&P also affirmed its '3' recovery rating on the issue-level ratings, indicating its expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70% in the higher range of the band) of the notes under a hypothetical default scenario. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== ALFA CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ----------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of Alfa Capital Partners Limited, on Oct. 7, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidators are: Andrew Johnson Alan Turner Telephone: 345 640 6703 Circumference FS (Cayman) Ltd. P.O. Box 32322 Grand Cayman KY1-1209 Cayman Islands ALTERRA INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 18 ---------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Alterra Investments Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Nov. 18, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Sept. 30, 2016. The company's liquidator is: Matthew Wright c/o Omar Grant P.O. Box 897 Windward 1 Regatta Office Park Grand Cayman KY1-1103 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949 7576 Facsimile: (345) 949 8295 BELLOWS LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ---------------------------------------------- On Sept. 28, 2016, the shareholder of Bellows Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 18, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Harry J. Thompson P.O. Box 32315 Grand Cayman KY1-1209 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 946-4111 Facsimile: (345) 946-4222 BLUE ORCHID: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ---------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of Blue Orchid Select, Ltd., on Oct. 4, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Walkers Liquidations Limited c/o Neil Lupton Cayman Corporate Centre 27 Hospital Road, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-9008 Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100 CAIS CORVEX: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ---------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of Cais Corvex Offshore Fund Ltd., on Oct. 3, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Capital Integration Systems LLC 598 Madison Avenue, 11th Floor, New York New York 10022 United States of America Telephone: +1 212 202 2972 e-mail: legal@caisgroup.com CENTURY HOLDING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings -------------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of Century Holding Company Ltd., on Oct. 7, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Walkers Liquidations Limited Cayman Corporate Centre 27 Hospital Road, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-9008 Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100 CRANSHIRE CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ---------------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of Alfa Capital Partners Limited, on Oct. 4, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Mitchell P. Kopin Cranshire Capital Advisors, LLC Suite 703, 3100 Dundee Road Northbrook Illinois 60062 United States of America Telephone: +1 (857) 562 9030 CRANSHIRE CAPITAL MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ----------------------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of Cranshire Capital Master Fund, Ltd., on Oct. 4, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Mitchell P. Kopin Cranshire Capital Advisors, LLC Suite 703, 3100 Dundee Road Northbrook Illinois 60062 United States of America Telephone: +1 (857) 562 9030 FELIX (CI): Commences Liquidation Proceedings --------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of Felix (CI) Limited, on Oct. 5, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Anthony Levy 30 Gresham Street, London EC2V 7PG United Kingdom HIGASHI OGISHIMA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14 ------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Higashi Ogishima Holding are required to file their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Oct. 7, 2016. The company's liquidator is: Richard Fear c/o Ryan Charles P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 814 7364 Facsimile: (345) 945 3902 N7 BARKAT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings -------------------------------------------- The shareholder of N7 Barkat Ltd., on Sept. 28, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 18, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Harry J. Thompson P.O. Box 32315 Grand Cayman KY1-1209 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 946-4111 Facsimile: (345) 946-4222 SENTINEL LIFE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ------------------------------------------------ The shareholder of Sentinel Life Insurance SPC Ltd, on Sept. 28, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by Oct. 18, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Harry J. Thompson P.O. Box 32315 Grand Cayman KY1-1209 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 946-4111 Facsimile: (345) 946-4222 TRIANGLE HOLDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14 ------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Triangle Holding are required to file their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Oct. 7, 2016. The company's liquidator is: Richard Fear c/o Ryan Charles P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 814 7364 Facsimile: (345) 945 3902 ================= G U A T E M A L A ================= GUATEMALA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Foreign Sovereign Credit Ratings -------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook to negative from stable and affirmed its 'BB/B' foreign currency and 'BB+/B' local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Guatemala. The transfer and convertibility assessment is unchanged at 'BBB-'. RATIONALE The outlook revision reflects an at least one-in-three possibility of a downgrade over the next 24 months if the interest burden as a share of general government revenues and GDP growth deteriorate beyond S&P's current forecast. Also, continuously weak government institutions and a lack of agreement on highly needed reforms could trigger a downgrade. Declining public-sector investments and increased poverty reflect the government's inability to promote sustainable growth over the long term. Also, a reduction of the sovereign's already low general government revenues to GDP would translate to a higher interest payment burden, despite S&P's forecast for low fiscal deficits for the next two years. High political fragmentation would continue to be an obstacle to the approval of highly needed structural reforms. Low external deficits, a stable debt level to GDP, and sound monetary policy that has kept inflation declining over the last three years are positive credit factors. After almost nine month in office, the current Administration of President Jimmy Morales has been able to manage political instability that emerged last year following corruption investigations of the previous Administration. Significant challenges remain, however, to strengthen government's transparency and execution capacity and to recover confidence in the country's revenue collection authority that was at the center of fraud and corruption cases. Also, further reforms will be needed to improve the representation and accountability of Guatemala's political party system, which remains fragmented and volatile. Speeding economic growth presents a big challenge for Guatemala over the next years. Declining public infrastructure investment, a less dynamic export sector, and lower foreign direct investment (FDI)--already observed in 2015--are likely to result in real GDP growth of about 3.6% in 2016-2018. This growth rate will be insufficient to reverse the country's increasing poverty levels, which reached 59% of the total population in 2015, from 51% in 2006, according to the National Institute of statistics (INE), and to significantly increase its low GDP per capita of US$3,900 in 2015. Along with higher public infrastructure investments, the government's ability to increase spending on highly needed security and the health and education sectors will also be major factors in GDP growth over the next years. Consistently low GDP growth could weaken S&P's rating on the sovereign. S&P expects Guatemala's fiscal deficit to remain below 2% of GDP in 2016-2018. As much as S&P sees low fiscal deficits as a rating strength, in cases like in Guatemala, this is not entirely positive because these reflect declining public infrastructure investment, coupled with a weak revenue collection. In 2015, general government revenue accounted for a low 10.8% of GDP, down from 11.64% of 2013, while public-sector infrastructure investment (direct real investment, according to the official definition) declined to 0.4% of GDP from 1.8% five years ago. As of Aug. 31, 2016, public infrastructure investment remains significantly below budget. In S&P's view, chances are low that the government can approve a comprehensive fiscal reform in the next couple of years. Consistent with low fiscal deficits and GDP growth, the country's general government debt has remained stable at 24% of GDP over the last three years. Interest paid has also remained low at 1.5% of GDP. S&P expects that the change in general government debt remains below 2% of GDP in 2016-2018, reflecting the government fiscal deficits. Despite general stability with regard to GDP, compared with general government revenues, interest payments have been increasing to 14.4% in 2015 from 12.7% in 2011, and S&P expects this average to be close to 15% in 2016-2018. This increased interest payment burden could cause S&P to lower its debt assessment for Guatemala. Externally, the country continues to benefit primarily from low oil prices and the accompanying derivatives, which have contributed to a declining trade deficit (to 8.7% of GDP in 2015, down from 11.5% in 2013). S&P expects that over the next three years the sovereign's current account deficit (CAD) will remain below 2% of GDP. Last year, a reduced trade deficit, along with strong remittances growth of close to 10%, resulted in a CAD of 0.3% of GDP, its lowest level over the last five years. As in previous years, S&P expects that FDI will cover most -- if not all -- of CAD in the following years. Accordingly, S&P is forecasting Guatemala's gross external financing needs to remain broadly stable at around 93% of current account receipts plus usable reserves in 2016-2019, while its narrow net external debt would stay in line with the 37% figure in 2015. Guatemala's foreign currency debt represented 48% of total debt in 2015, down from 55% in 2010, and the central bank reserves continued to increase to $8.9 billion as of Oct. 17, 2016. Both make the country less vulnerable to external shocks. Nevertheless, its concentration in trade with the U.S. remains a source of vulnerability. In 2015, 37% of imports originated in the U.S., while 34% of exports went to the U.S. Also, roughly 80% of remittances came from the U.S. last year. In S&P's view, because both trade and remittances are closely linked to the U.S., Guatemala is exposed to sudden changes in the U.S. trade and immigration policies. The country's external data still shows shortcomings, although accounting improvements have reduced errors and omissions in the balance of payments over the last three years. Monetary policy continues to reflect the central bank's mandate to control inflation as well as its operational independence despite recent political instability and a change in national government this year. In 2015, inflation was the lowest it's been in last six years, at 2.4%, although S&P expects that this could average around 4.3% over the next three years as oil prices start to recover. Because inflation has been declining over the last three years, the central bank cut monetary policy three times in 2015 (by 100 basis points in total) to its current 3% since October 2015, which has also contributed to economic growth. S&P estimates that contingent liabilities from the financial sector and the nonfinancial public sector are limited, despite the increase from last year. S&P expects the banking system's nonperforming loans to average around 1.75% of total loans at the end of 2016. OUTLOOK The negative outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Guatemala's government institutions will remain weak, resulting in low public- sector investment and in consistently low general government revenues. This in turn could hurt the country's long-term growth prospects and the possibility to overcome its immense social needs. S&P could lower the ratings if the Administration fails to increase its general government revenues enough to boost public- sector investment and keep its interest payment below 15% of general government revenues over the next 12 to 24 months. Also, lower-than-forecasted economic growth and unexpected increases in the sovereign's fiscal and external deficits could result in a downgrade. S&P could revise outlook to stable in the next 12-24 months if the government is able to propose and implement a reform agenda that strengthens Guatemala's public institutions, significantly increases its revenue level, and bolsters its GDP growth prospects. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The committee agreed that no key rating factors had improved or deteriorated. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action To From Guatemala (Republic of) Sovereign Credit Rating Foreign Currency BB/Neg./B BB/Stable/B Local Currency BB+/Neg./B BB+/Stable/B Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BBB- Senior Unsecured BB =========== G U Y A N A =========== * GUYANA: to Cut Mortality Rates With US$8MM IDB Support -------------------------------------------------------- The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved an US$8 million loan for a program to help reduce maternal, perinatal and neonatal deaths in Guyana. This program seeks to improve the quality of care at 140 health facilities and in 88 communities, benefitting at least 140,000 women and 9,000 newborns per year. Despite progress achieved during the last decade, Guyana continues to experience one of the highest maternal and infant mortality rates in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a maternal mortality rate estimated at 121 per 1,000 live births and an infant mortality rate at 22 per 1,000 live births. Given that about 93 percent of deaths in children less than one year of age occurred in the neonatal period, the program will support and improve maternal and child health care with a focus on improving access to quality neonatal health services and providing a better path to and quality of reproductive and maternal health services. This operation draws from the IDB's experiences with the Mesoamerican Health Initiative and incorporates lessons learned on evidence-based biomedical and operational interventions. It will closely monitor results to ensure that those interventions can contribute to the success of the program. The total cost of the project is US$8 million to be financed as follows: US$4 million from the IDB's ordinary capital resources and US$4 million from the Fund for Special Operations (FSO) of the Bank. The loan from the Bank's ordinary capital has a six-year grace period and a 30-year term. The FSO funding has a term of 40 years with a 40-year grace period and a fixed annual rate of 0.25 percent. =========== M E X I C O =========== CFG HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR; Outlook Remains Stable --------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' issuer credit rating on CFG Holdings, Ltd. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue-level rating on its senior secured debt. The outlook remains stable. The ratings constraint on CFGLTD is its moderate business position, which reflects the concentration of its revenue source in its unsecured consumer lending. S&P also considers that the company has a undiversified funding structure and lacks alternative liquidity sources. The ratings also incorporate S&P's assessment of CFGLTD's risk position as moderate, reflecting above-average delinquency levels on its loans and above-average historical credit losses. On the other hand, CFGLTD's very strong capital and earnings is a rating strength, based on S&P's forecasted RAC ratio above 15% for the next 12-18 months thanks to internal capital generation and steady loan growth. S&P affirmed its 'B+' rating on CFGLTD's $178 million senior secured notes, given their unconditional and irrevocable guarantee from Caribbean Financial Group Holdings L.P. (parent company), Caribbean Financial Group Inc. (an affiliate of CFGLTD), and the latter's existing and future subsidiaries, subject to certain exceptions. The rating on the notes is one notch above the issuer credit rating because CFGLTD is a non-operating holding company that relies on the creditworthiness of its consolidated operating subsidiaries. ====================== P U E R T O R I C O ====================== DAVAMADA INC: Unsecureds To Recoup 1.58%-1.72% Under Plan --------------------------------------------------------- Davamada, Inc.'s small business disclosure statement and plan dated October 14, 2016, provides that Class 2 Unsecured Convenience Claims under or equal to $10,000, will receive a lump- sum distribution of $1,000, on the effective date of the plan, while Class 3 Unsecured convenience class that are over $10,001, will receive a lump-sum distribution of $3,000 on the effective date of the plan, a second lump-sum distribution of $3,500 at the 13 month of the Plan and third and final lump-sum distribution of $3,500 on month 30 of the Plan. Each claim holder under Class 2 will receive pro-rata distributions, as per the allowed amounts. Based on the current allowed amounts, each claim holder in Class 2 will receive approximately 1.58% of the allowed amount. Each claim holder under Class 3 will receive pro-rata distributions, as per the allowed amounts. Based on the current allowed amounts, each claim holder in Class 3 will receive approximately 1.72% of the allowed amount. Mr. Hector L. Andujar Aguiar, the equity interest holder, will receive no distribution under the reorganization plan. A full-text copy of the Disclosure Statement dated October 14, 2016, is available at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-10223-124.pdf * * * Judge Brian K. Tester has conditionally approved the Disclosure Statement and scheduled the hearing for the consideration of the final approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Plan and of any objections as may be made to either for November 16, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. Acceptances or rejections of the Plan may be filed in writing by the holders of all claims on/or before 10 days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan. Any objection to the final approval of the Disclosure Statement and/or the confirmation of the Plan shall be filed on/or before 10 days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan. The Debtor will file with the Court a statement setting forth compliance with each requirement in Section 1129, the list of acceptances and rejections and the computation of the same, within seven working days before the hearing on confirmation. About Davamada, Inc. Davamada, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-10223) on Dec. 23, 2015. Javier Vilarino, Esq., at Vilarino & Associates LLC serves as the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel. HECTOR ANIBAL: Dec. 7 Plan Confirmation Hearing Set --------------------------------------------------- Judge Brian K. Tester of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico approved the disclosure statement explaining Hector Anibal Martinez Hernandez's plan and will convene a hearing on December 7, 2016, at 9:00 A.M., to consider confirmation of the Plan. That any objection to confirmation of the plan shall be filed on/or before seven days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan. The Troubled Company Reporter, on Sept. 13, 2016, reported that the Debtor's Plan proposes that holders Class 7 General Unsecured Creditors will receive from the Debtor a non-negotiable, non- interest bearing, promissory note dated as of the Effective Date. Creditors in this class will receive a total repayment of 100% of their claimed or listed debt plus 3.5% annual interest. These claims, which total $47,814.69, will be paid in five equal annual payments of $11,236.46 (this payment includes principal and interest) each. The first annual payment will be due Sept. 1, 2017, and subsequently the first day of September of each year. The Class is impaired. The allowed liability to unsecured creditors is in the amount of $1,344,966.97. The source of payments proposed under the Plan will come from the Debtor's income from businesses and sale of real properties. The Disclosure Statement is available at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-03458-111.pdf Hector Anibal Martinez Hernandez filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-03458) on May 7, 2015, and is represented by Homel Antonio Merado Justiniano, Esq. PANADERIA ZULMA: Hires Hector Morales as Accountant --------------------------------------------------- Panaderia Zulma Inc. seeks authorization from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Hector A. Morales of Morales Munoz & Asociados CPA, PSC as accountant. The Debtor requires the accounting firm to work on these matters: (a) reconciliation of financial information to assist Debtor in the preparation of monthly operating reports; (b) assist in the reconciliation and clarification of proof of claims filed and amount due to creditors; (c) provide general accounting and tax services to prepare year-end reports and income tax preparation; and (d) assist Debtor and Debtor's counsel in the preparation of the supporting documents for the Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan, including negotiation with creditors. The accounting firm will be paid at these hourly rates: Hector A. Morales, CPA $90 CPA Supervisor $75 Senior Accountant $50 Staff Accountant $40 Morales Munoz will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred. Hector A. Morales assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estate. Morales Munoz can be reached at: Hector A. Morales MORALES MUNOZ & ASOCIADOS CPA, PSC 405 Avenida Esmeralda Ave. Suite 2 PMB 311 Guaynabo, PR 00969 Tel: (787) 370-5250 Fax: (787) 545-6480 E-mail: cpahectormorales@gmail.com Panaderia Zulma Inc., filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-07217) on September 11, 2016, disclosing under $1 million in both assets and liabilities. The Debtor is represented by Myrna L. Ruiz-Olmo, Esq. =============================== T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O =============================== ARCELORMITTAL SA: Foreigner Most Likely to Buy Firm --------------------------------------------------- http://www.trinidadexpress.com/20161027/business/foreigner-most- likely-to-buy-arcelormittal (rousel/revise) Sue-Ann Wayow at Trinidad Express reports that the purchaser of the ArcelorMittal steel plant in Pt. Lisas will most likely be a foreigner, according to the liquidator in charge of selling the plant, Christopher Kelshall. Mr. Kelshall told The Express that although advertisements have been displayed locally, the target market was an international one. Mr. Kelshall said an advertisement was also placed in the November issue of an international steel magazine published in the United Kingdom, the report notes. The magazine should be released by weekend, the report relays. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 8, 2016, Fitch Ratings issued a correction to the May 6, 2016 rating release on ArcelorMittal S.A. The Negative Rating Sensitivities now reference a failure to improve leverage to below 3.5x by end 2018, in line with the preceding paragraph, rather than above as previously stated. Fitch has affirmed ArcelorMittal's (AM) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'BB+'. The Outlook is Negative. ================= V E N E Z U E L A ================= PDVSA: Swiss Give US$51 Million in Frozen Assets in Probe ---------------------------------------------------------- http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-moneylaundering- swiss-idUSKCN12P2D7 (rousel/revise) Joshua Franklin at Reuters reports that Switzerland has given around $51 million in formerly frozen assets to the United States in connection with a U.S. investigation into alleged corruption at oil company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), authorities said. The transfer followed a December request to Switzerland from the United States to freeze $118 million in assets in connection with the U.S.'s PDVSA probe, the Swiss Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) said in an emailed statement, according to Reuters. "On 11 October 2016 the FOJ has ordered the handing over of the assets of about $51 million . . . . The assets have been transferred about a week later to the U.S. authorities (Treasury Forfeiture Fund Suspense Account). The rest of the assets of $67 million still remain frozen," the FOJ said, the report notes. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct. 27, 2016, S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) to 'SD' from 'CC'. At the same time, S&P lowered its issue-level ratings on the company's $3.0 billion 5.25% senior unsecured notes due April 2017 and on its $4.1 billion 8.5% senior unsecured notes due November 2017 to 'D' from 'CC'. *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2016. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552. * * * End of Transmission * * *