TCRLA_Public/161102.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, November 2, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 217


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BANCO DE SANTIAGO: Moody's Withdraws B3 Deposit Ratings


B R A Z I L

REDE D'OR: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR & Revises Outlook to Positive


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BRIGHT ELEMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
CARLYLE LIQUID GENERAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CARLYLE LIQUID OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CARLYLE TREND FEEDER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CARLYLE TREND MATER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

DAIRY HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
EACM EVENT-DRIVEN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
FOOD HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
JADARA FRONTIER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
MARCO POLO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

STAR GATE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
WAKEFIELD INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Demands to Probe Plane Bribe Scandal Mount
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Bans Export of Exclusive Semiprecious Stone


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO INDUSTRIAL: S&P Revises Outlook on BB Rating to Negative


P A N A M A

PANAMA: S&P Revises Outlook on 3 Panamanian Banks to Negative


V E N E Z U E L A

CITGO PETROLEUM: Fitch Affirms 'B' IDR, Off CreditWatch Negative
VENEZUELA: Business Owner Denounces "Harassment" of His Family
VENEZUELA: Fails to Send Crude to Dominican Republic Refinery


                            - - - - -



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


BANCO DE SANTIAGO: Moody's Withdraws B3 Deposit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo announced
that it has withdrawn all of its ratings for Banco de Santiago del
Estero S.A. for business reasons.

These ratings of Banco de Santiago del Estero S.A. were withdrawn:

  Long- and short-term global local-currency deposits: B3/Not
   Prime, stable outlook

  Long- and short-term global foreign-currency deposits: Caa1/Not
   Prime, stable outlook

  Long-term National Scale local-currency deposit rating: Baa3.ar,
   stable outlook

  Long-term National Scale foreign-currency deposit rating:
   Ba1.ar, stable outlook

  Long- and short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment: B2(cr)/Not
   Prime(cr)

  Baseline Credit Assessment: b3

  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment: b3

Banco de Santiago del Estero S.A. is headquartered in Santiago del
Estero, Argentina, and as of March 2016 it had ARS 12,039 million
in assets and ARS 1,813 million in equity.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


REDE D'OR: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR & Revises Outlook to Positive
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Rede D'Or Sao Luiz S.A.'s Foreign and
Local Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings at 'BB+' and its
National Scale long-term rating at 'AA+(bra)'.  The Rating Outlook
for the Local Currency IDR and national scale ratings have been
revised to Positive from Stable.  The Rating Outlook for the
Foreign Currency rating remains Negative, and follows Fitch's
Negative Outlook for the Brazilian sovereign (FC IDR 'BB').  Rede
D'Or's operations are only in Brazil.

The Positive Outlook for Rede D'Or's Local Currency and national
scale ratings reflects Fitch's expectation that Rede D'Or's credit
profile will continue to strengthen over the medium term as its
profitability and cash flow generation continues to increase.
This is expected to allow further deleveraging despite the
company's aggressive growth strategy.  Fitch's base case scenario
incorporates that the company will have flexibility to spend
around BRL2 billion in acquisitions during the next three years
while managing to maintain net adjusted debt to EBITDAR ratios
below 2.0x.

Rede D'Or's ratings reflect its strong competitive position in the
fragmented hospital industry in Brazil, its prominent business
scale, and the defensive nature of its business fundamentals
across economic cycles.  The needs for constant investment in
technology and equipment renewal, as well as potential regulatory
issues, are seen as manageable risks.  The ratings also consider
that Rede D'Or will remain fiscally disciplined and maintain a
robust liquidity position as part of its proactive liability
management strategy to mitigate refinancing risks.

Rede D'Or's operating performance has not been affected by
Brazil's economic downturn.  The increasing imbalance between
supply and demand of hospitals in the region where the company
operates, and the high medical inflation in Brazil that
remunerates Rede D'Or's services, are key factors offsetting the
recessionary environment.  Among the company's main challenges
remains its ability to efficiently manage working capital needs
since counterparties are facing more cash flow pressure.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Robust Business Profile

Rede D'Or is one of the largest private hospital networks in
Brazil's fragmented and underdeveloped hospital industry.  The
company owns 32 hospitals, manages two other and has two under
construction.  The company has solid business positions, with
ample scale differential in the regions where it operates: Rio de
Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Recife.  Business scale is a key
issue in this industry and supports the ratings of Rede D'Or, as
it allows fixed cost dilution and provides significant bargaining
power with counterparties and the medical community in general.

The geographic concentration of the company in Rio de Janeiro and
Sao Paulo is partially mitigated by robust economic activity in
these regions compared with other parts of Brazil, as well as the
strength of the health insurance companies.  Nevertheless, the
concentration in these two cities makes the company more
vulnerable to new entrants.  Since early 2015, there is a new
regulatory framework for the Brazilian hospital industry that
allows foreign interest-ownership, which may boost competition in
the long term.

Rede D'Or is expected to continue to pursue both organic and
inorganic growth.  The company has an aggressive track record of
acquisitions.  From 2010 to June 2016, Rede D'Or acquired 18
hospitals, adding 2.9 thousand operating beds.  Since April 2015,
Rede D'Or counts with a new shareholder HPT Participacoes SA
(Carlyle Group), which made a capital injection of BRL1.8 billion.

Profitability Continues to Improve; Working Capital and Capex
Pressure Free Cash Flow (FCF)

Rede D'Or has been efficient in increasing profitability through
economies of scale and achieving synergies from its acquisitions.
The company's net revenue grew 133% between 2012 and the latest 12
months (LTM) period ended in June 30, 2016, while average
operating beds expanded by 42% to 4.7 thousand.  During this
period, the company's occupancy rate ranged from 79% to 81%, while
its EBITDAR margin expanded to 29% from 18%.  Rede D'Or's
operating margin is amongst the highest of its hospital peers
globally.

Rede D'Or's challenge is to effectively increase its operating
cash flow generation (CFFO), which compares poorly to others
investment grade peers.  Per Fitch's calculations, the company's
EBITDAR substantially increased to BRL2.1 billion in the LTM to
June 2016 from BRL557 million in 2012.  While its funds from
operations (FFO) were BRL1.3 billion during the LTM, its CFFO was
only BRL494 million due to high working capital requirements.  FCF
generation has been historically negative - averaging negative
BRL480 million between 2012 and June 2016.

Under Fitch's base case scenario, Rede D'Or's CFFO, EBITDAR and
FCF for 2016 are expected to be approximately BRL600 million,
BRL2.4 billion and negative at BRL140 million, respectively.

Deleveraging Trend

The mix of equity and profitability gains has been supporting Rede
D'Or's deleverage process.  Until 2014, most of Rede D'Or's growth
was financed through debt.  The company's FFO adjusted leverage
reached 3.0x as of the LTM to June 30, 2016, while its net
adjusted debt/EBITDAR ratio was 2.7x for the same period.  These
ratios compare with averages of 4.2x and 3.8x, respectively,
between 2012 and 2015.  Fitch's base case scenario incorporates
that the company should continue to benefit from improvements in
operating cash flow generation and be able to maintain net
adjusted leverage ratios below 2.0x over the next three years.

                         KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- BRL2 billion in acquisitions up to 2019;
   -- EBITDA margins of around 28%;
   -- Continued high working capital needs, pressuring CFFO;
   -- Average capex of BRL700 million up to 2019;
   -- Dividends of 25% net income.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a positive rating action on Rede D'Or local
currency IDR and national scale include:

Maintenance of strong performance
   -- EBITDA margins consistently around 28%;
   -- Improvements in CFFO generation ability to generate neutral
      to positive FCF;
   -- Maintenance of strong liquidity position, with cash
      +CFFO/short term debt above 2.0x on consistent basis.

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a negative rating action:

   -- EBITDA margins declining to below 24%;
   -- Deterioration of sound liquidity position, with cash/short-
      term debt ratio below 1.0x on consistent basis, leading to
      refinancing risk exposure;
   -- Net adjusted leverage above 3.0x.

                             LIQUIDITY

Rede D'Or has a track record of keeping strong cash balances, with
an average coverage of cash to short-term debt of 3.7x during the
last five years.  As of June 30, 2016, the company had BRL5.9
billion of debt, of which BRL898 million is due in the short term.
Rede D'Or's cash on hand plus BRL1.2 billion of local debentures
issued in August 2016 is sufficient to support debt amortization
up to mid-2019.  Fitch expects that Rede D'Or will remain
disciplined with its liquidity position and will maintain its
proactive approach in liability management to avoid exposure to
refinancing risks.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch affirms these ratings:

   -- Foreign Currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+';
      Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook revised to Positive
      from Stable;
   -- National scale rating at 'AA+(bra)'; Outlook revised to
      Positive from Stable.

Rede D'Or's FC IDR is constrained by Brazil's 'BB+' Country
Ceiling, and its Negative Rating Outlook follows Fitch's Negative
Outlook for Brazil sovereign (FC IDR 'BB').  Rede D'Or's
operations are only in Brazil.  The company does not have cross-
border issuances.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BRIGHT ELEMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Bright Elements Investment Limited are required
to file their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Oct. 6, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


CARLYLE LIQUID GENERAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Carlyle Liquid Tactical General Partner,
on Sept.28, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Morrison
          FTI Consulting (Cayman) Ltd.
          Suite 3212, 53 Market Street
          Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 30613 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 6832


CARLYLE LIQUID OFFSHORE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Carlyle Liquid Tactical Offshore Feeder
Fund, on Sept. 28, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Morrison
          FTI Consulting (Cayman) Ltd.
          Suite 3212, 53 Market Street
          Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 30613 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 6832


CARLYLE TREND FEEDER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Carlyle Trend Following Offshore Feeder
Fund, on Sept. 28, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Morrison
          FTI Consulting (Cayman) Ltd.
          Suite 3212, 53 Market Street
          Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 30613 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 6832


CARLYLE TREND MATER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 28, 2016, the sole shareholder of Carlyle Trend Following
Mater FND resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Morrison
          FTI Consulting (Cayman) Ltd.
          Suite 3212, 53 Market Street
          Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 30613 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 6832


DAIRY HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
Dairy Holdings Limited commenced liquidation proceedings.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Oct. 27, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zolfo Cooper
          38 Market Street
          Canella Court, 2nd Floor
          Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY-9006
          Telephone: +1 (345)-814-4038


EACM EVENT-DRIVEN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of EACM Event-Driven Offshore Fund, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Oct. 6, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


FOOD HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
Food Holdings Limited commenced liquidation proceedings.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Oct. 27, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zolfo Cooper
          38 Market Street
          Canella Court, 2nd Floor
          Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY-9006
          Telephone: +1 (345)-814-4038


JADARA FRONTIER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Jadara Frontier Fund Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Oct. 7, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Gene Dacosta
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7765
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


MARCO POLO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On Oct. 11, 2016, the sole shareholder of Marco Polo Pure Pan-
China Master Fund resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Marco Polo Pure Asset Management (Cayman Islands)
            Limited
          Ugland House, South Church Street, George Town
          P.O. Box 309 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


STAR GATE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Star Gate Holding are required to file their
proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Oct. 7, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


WAKEFIELD INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
--------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Wakefield International Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 5, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Bute Director Services Ltd.
          c/o Jo-Anne Maher
          Mourant Ozannes, Attorneys-at-law
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +44 207 796 7614
          Facsimile: (345) 949-4647



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Demands to Probe Plane Bribe Scandal Mount
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the civic movement Citizen
Participation became the latest entity to demand that the Justice
Ministry do its job and investigate, identify and prosecute
Dominican government officials and accomplices who ballooned the
cost and took bribes to buy eight Super Tucano aircraft.

PC said the aircraft deal's ballooned prices were reported since
2007, and that the planes weren't equipped with night flight
avionics and artillery, while Colombia acquired those same
aircraft at a significantly lower cost, according to Dominican
Today reports.

                               Demands

The legal think tank Institutionalism and Justice Foundation
(Finjus) and Santo Domingo archbishop Francisco Ozoria have also
demanded a thorough investigation by the Justice Ministry, the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Bans Export of Exclusive Semiprecious Stone
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Energy and Mines Ministry -- MEM
-- will for the first time regulate exports of Dominican
Republic's semiprecious stones ambar and larimar, the latter found
only in the Dominican Republic.

In a statement, MEM said the measure seeks to develop micro, small
and medium, handmade jewelry businesses as well as create formal
jobs in the towns where they are mined, according to Dominican
Today.

It said Resolution R-MEM-REG-047-2016 bans the export of larimar
in bulk and ambar in an integral state, with traces of impurities,
the report notes.

Energy and Mines minister Antonio Isa Conde said the priority is
to regulate small-scale mining to exploit the riches it generates
with the least possible harm to people and the environment, the
report relays.

The MEM has 1,200 registered larimar miners and 2,000 of amber and
works to provide health insurance for small miners, as well as
training to be competitive in the value chain, the report says.

                   Export of Polished Pieces

Mr. Isa said since October 21, the export of ambar and larimar is
allowed only in separate and polished pieces, the report
discloses.  "Previously, they were exported in their natural
state, raw or semi-processed, creating distortions on the origin
and the source of these stones in international destinations," the
report quoted Mr. Isa as saying.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


BANCO INDUSTRIAL: S&P Revises Outlook on BB Rating to Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it revised its long-term global scale
rating outlook on three Guatemalan banks (Banco Industrial S.A.,
Banco G&T Continental S.A., and Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala,
S.A.) to negative from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
their respective issuer credit ratings.

The rating action on these entities follows S&P's outlook revision
on Guatemala.  All things being equal, if S&P downgrades the
sovereign in the next 12-24 months, it would take the same rating
action on the three Guatemalan banks even if their stand-alone
credit profiles (SACPs) and/or group status remain unchanged.
Such a potential rating action on these banks would reflect S&P's
belief that if a financial institution has exposure to the country
of domicile of more than 50%, S&P generally considers it highly
likely that the entity would fail a stress test associated with a
sovereign foreign currency default.  The bulk of these three
commercial banks' exposures are in Guatemala.

The outlook revision on Guatemala reflects an at least one-in-
three possibility of a downgrade over the next 24 months if the
interest burden as a share of general government revenues and GDP
growth deteriorate beyond S&P's current forecast.  Also,
continuously weak government institutions and a lack of agreement
on highly needed reforms could trigger a downgrade.

Declining public-sector investments and increased poverty reflect
the government's inability to promote sustainable growth over the
long term.  Also, a reduction of the sovereign's already low
general government revenues to GDP would translate to a higher
interest payment burden, despite S&P's forecast for low fiscal
deficits for the next two years.  High political fragmentation
would continue to be an obstacle to the approval of highly needed
structural reforms.  Low external deficits, a stable debt level to
GDP, and sound monetary policy that has kept inflation declining
over the last three years are positive credit factors.

After almost nine month in office, the current Administration of
President Jimmy Morales has been able to manage political
instability that emerged last year following corruption
investigations of the previous Administration.  Significant
challenges remain, however, to strengthen government's
transparency and execution capacity and to recover confidence in
the country's revenue collection authority that was at the center
of fraud and corruption cases.  Also, further reforms will be
needed to improve the representation and accountability of
Guatemala's political party system, which remains fragmented and
volatile.

The negative outlook on the three Guatemalan financial
institutions reflects S&P's view that if it downgrades the
sovereign in the next 12-24 months, S&P could take the same action
on these entities.  This is because S&P rarely rate financial
institutions above the sovereign long-term rating because, during
sovereign stress, the latter's regulatory and supervisory powers
may restrict a bank's or financial system's flexibility, and
because banks are affected by many of the same economic factors
that cause sovereign stress.

On the other hand, if S&P was to revise the outlook on the
sovereign ratings to stable, it would take a similar action on
these three banks.

RATINGS LIST
                                 To                  From
Banco Industrial S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating       BB/Negative/B       BB/Stable/B

Banco G&T Continental S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating       BB/Negative/B       BB/Stable/B

Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating       BB/Negative/B       BB/Stable/B



===========
P A N A M A
===========


PANAMA: S&P Revises Outlook on 3 Panamanian Banks to Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on these Panamanian banks
to negative from stable:

   -- Banco Latinoamericano de Comercio Exterior S.A. (Bladex);

   -- Global Bank Corporation y Subsidiarias; and

   -- Multibank Inc. y Subsidiarias.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its counterparty credit ratings --
and issue-level ratings where applicable -- on these four banks.

In addition, S&P kept the ratings and outlooks on these following
banks unchanged:

   -- Banco General S.A.;
   -- Banistmo S.A.;
   -- BAC International Bank Inc.; and
   -- Atlantic Security Bank.

S&P is maintaining its BICRA score on Panama (BBB/Stable/A-2) at
group '5'.  S&P's assessments on its economic risk score and
industry risk score remain unchanged, at '6' and '5',
respectively, which anchors banks operating in the country at
'bbb-'.  However, S&P is revising the BICRA industry risk trend to
negative from stable, and keeping the economic risk trend as
stable.

For the past three years, anti-money laundering scandals, namely
the inclusion in Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) "grey list",
the "Panama Papers", and the "Waked Case", continue to put an
unfavorable spotlight on Panama.  In addition, the scandals reveal
some weaknesses and significant areas for improvement in the
banking regulation and supervision, as well as the governance and
transparency in the country's financial system.  S&P believes
there have been deficiencies in identifying and remedying problems
in the financial sector, and the Panamanian banking regulator
still lags in the implementation of international regulatory
standards.  The recent "Waked Case" is an example of this.  It
wasn't so long ago that domestic regulatory body was celebrating
the country's exit from the FATF's "grey list".  But shortly
afterwards, the "Panama Papers" and the "Waked Case" scandals
broke out.  In second-quarter 2016, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated the
"Waked Money Laundering Organization" and its leader Mr. Abdul
Waked--among other entities and individuals--as a "Specially
Designated Narcotics Traffickers" under the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act and labeled them to be tied to drug money
laundering activities.  Among the entities that were implicated
was Balboa Bank & Trust Corp., a small bank in Panama that
represents less than 1% of the domestic financial system's total
assets.  Despite the Panamanian government and the regulator's
efforts and quick response to this event that prevented major
disruptions to domestic banks' day-to-day business operations,
this case highlights the vulnerabilities of domestic institutional
framework.

Additionally, the government and the regulator are currently
conducting a rigorous investigation to determine gaps in oversight
of Balboa Bank.  Despite significant efforts to improve
surveillance, S&P believes that the regulatory body still tends,
in some major matters, to be more reactive than proactive.
Following these scandals, S&P expects it to take the necessary
steps to enhance its monitoring capabilities and powers, but it
will take time before S&P can see a proven track record.

If the negative industry risk trend -- in the form of delays in
the enhancements and improvements in regulatory oversight,
governance and transparency, or new scandals that weaken the
system's sound financial and operating performance --
materializes, S&P would revise its industry risk assessment to a
weaker category.  Such an action could result in a revision of
S&P's BICRA group score that could lower the anchor for banks
operating in Panama by one notch, to 'bb+'.

Nonetheless, S&P believes there are certain factors that could
prompt S&P to revise the industry risk trend back stable.  These
could consist of significant regulatory enhancements that
strengthen the regulatory oversight and surveillance capabilities,
as well as the governance and transparency, or during a more
prolonged time these recent scandals don't impair the soundness of
the Panamanian banking system or cause erosion of funding.

S&P is revising its capital and earnings assessment on Banco
General to strong from adequate based on S&P's forecasted risk-
adjusted capital (RAC) ratio, which S&P now estimates to be around
10.7%, up from S&P's previous forecast of 9.8%.  The better RAC
ratio stems from the bank's perpetual bonds, which the regulator
now classifies as Tier 1.  The bonds contain these features:

   -- Can suspend coupons;
   -- There are no material restrictions on deferrals;
   -- They are perpetual; and
   -- There are no incentives to redeem the perpetual bonds.

Consequently, S&P is granting these bonds intermediate equity
content.  As a result, S&P is revising Banco General's SACP upward
to 'bbb+' from 'bbb.'  In this regard, even if the negative
industry risk trend materializes, S&P would revise the bank's SACP
downward but its ratings would remain unchanged.

The negative outlook on Bladex, Global Bank, and Multibank for the
next 12-18 months reflect shortfalls in regulation, supervision,
governance and transparency in the Panamanian financial system.
These factors could prompt S&P to revise the industry risk score
to a weaker category and lower the anchor.  This in turn could
result in lower stand-alone credit profiles (SACPs) and one-notch
downgrades of these banks (including the Mexican national scale
issue-level ratings for Bladex).  The latter could occur if during
the outlook timeframe banks lack factors that would strengthen
their SACPs and temper the shortfalls in domestic banking
governance and transparency.  Conversely, if S&P sees these
shortfalls abating and institutional framework strengthens, it
could revise the industry trend to stable.  Such a scenario would
trigger a similar action on these bank's outlooks.

The outlooks on Banco General, Banistmo, BAC International Bank,
and Atlantic Security Bank remain unchanged.  If S&P was to revise
Banco General's SACP downward, its ratings would remain unchanged.
The outlooks on the other three banks are tied to those of their
ultimate parent companies.  In addition, a hypothetical revision
of BICRA to a weaker category and the lower anchor could result in
lower SACPs on these three banks.  However, downgrades in such a
scenario are unlikely because ratings on these entities are also
tied to their current group status to their parents, and they're
already lower than Panamana's sovereign rating.

BICRA SCORE SNAPSHOT
Panama
                      To                      From

BICRA Group           5                       5

Economic risk         6                       6
Economic resilience
                      Intermediate Risk       Intermediate Risk
Economic imbalances   High Risk               High Risk
Credit risk in the economy
                      High Risk               High Risk

Industry risk         5                       5
Institutional framework
                      Intermediate Risk       Intermediate Risk
Competitive dynamics  Low Risk                Low Risk
System-wide funding   Very High Risk          Very High Risk

Trends
Economic risk trend   Stable                  Stable
Industry risk trend   Negative                Stable

*Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) economic risk
and industry risk scores are on a scale from 1 (lowest risk) to 10
(highest risk).

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed, Outlook Action

                          To                 From

Banco Latinoamericano de Comercio Exterior S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating
                          BBB/Negative/A-2   BBB/Stable/A-2
Senior Unsecured          BBB/mxAAA          BBB/mxAAA
Commercial Paper          mxA-1+             mxA-1+

Global Bank Corporation y Subsidiarias
Counterparty Credit Rating
                          BBB-/Negative/A-3  BBB-/Stable/A-3
Senior Unsecured          BBB-               BBB-

Multibank Inc. y Subsidiarias
Counterparty Credit Rating
                          BBB-/Negative/A-3  BBB-/Stable/A-3

Ratings And Outlook Unchanged

Banistmo S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating
                          BBB-/Negative/A-3

BAC International Bank Inc.
Counterparty Credit Rating
                          BBB-/Negative/A-3

Atlantic Security Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating
                          BB+/Stable/B

Banco General S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating
                          BBB/Stable/A-2
Senior Unsecured          BBB



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


CITGO PETROLEUM: Fitch Affirms 'B' IDR, Off CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has removed from Rating Watch Negative and affirmed
the ratings of CITGO Petroleum and CITGO Holding (HOLDCO)
following the completion of PDVSA's (Long-Term IDR 'CC') debt
exchange offer.  As part of the exchange, PDVSA offered 50.1% of
HOLDCO stock as collateral for $3.4 billion in new PDVSA senior
notes.  Fitch believes the key risks to CITGO creditors relate to
potential change of control issues, which could be driven by a
PDVSA default or the ultimate outcome of pending litigation and
arbitral awards against PDVSA.

Ultimately, a change of control has the potential to relieve
significant rating constraints on the CITGO structure.  Mitigation
of parent company risk would likely be a positive development from
a CITGO lenders perspective, implying a greater likelihood of
obtaining change of control consents.  Fitch believes that the
liquidity and refinancing risks following a change of control are
manageable given underlying CITGO credit fundamentals and that
these risks are embedded in current CITGO ratings.  The Rating
Outlook is Stable.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

PDVSA Ownership Key Rating Constraint

There is a relatively strong operational linkage between CITGO and
parent PDVSA.  This relationship is evidenced by a history of use
of CITGO as a source of dividends to its parent, frequent
placement of PDVSA personnel into CITGO executive positions,
control of CITGO's board by its parent, and existence of a crude
oil supply agreement.  However, there are important legal and
structural separations between the two entities.

CITGO is a Delaware corporation with U.S. domiciled assets and is
separated from PDVSA by two Delaware C-Corps, CITGO Holding, Inc.,
and PDV Holding Inc.  The most important factor justifying the
rating notching between CITGO and PDVSA is the strong covenant
protections in CITGO's secured debt, which limit the ability of
the parent to dilute CITGO's credit quality.  Key covenants
include limitations on guarantees to affiliates, restrictions on
dividends to HOLDCO and PDVSA, asset sales, and incurrence of
additional indebtedness.  CITGO debt has no guarantees or cross-
default provisions related to PDVSA debt.

Change of Control Mechanics

In the case of a PDVSA default on the new senior notes due 2020,
foreclosure on the equity collateral would likely trigger change
of control provisions in existing CITGO debt.  If CITGO was unable
to obtain sufficient consents from lenders, the company would be
obligated to make an offer to repurchase outstanding senior notes
at 101.  CITGO would have a 90-day repurchase window, providing
some time to refinance the notes or otherwise raise sufficient
liquidity.  HOLDCO's $656 million term loan would be required to
be repaid within three days of a change in control.  A change on
control would constitute an event of default under CITGO's
revolving credit agreement and $639 million term loan.  Lenders
would have the option to accelerate the loans or provide change of
control consent.

While Fitch believes CITGO would likely have the ability to either
obtain lender consents or refinance the existing debt package,
external events including capital market shocks or difficulty
reaching consensus amongst a diverse bondholder group could impair
the company's ability to do so within the applicable repurchase
windows.

Separately, it is possible that parties to pending arbitration and
litigation (ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Crystallex, among others)
against Venezuela and/or PDVSA would attempt to attach PDV
Holding's remaining unpledged equity stake in HOLDCO, currently
49.9% following the recent debt exchange.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for CITGO include:

   -- No major capital projects over the forecast horizon with
      annual capex of $300 million;
   -- Regional crack spreads decline to normalized levels over the
      forecast horizon;
   -- No material increases in corporate SG&A and refining
      operating expense per barrel;
   -- CITGO Petroleum pays approximately 100% of net income to
      CITGO Holding as available under the restricted payments
      basket.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

CITGO PETROLEUM

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

   -- Weakening or elimination of key covenant protections
      contained in the CITGO Petroleum senior secured debt through
      refinancing or other means;

   -- A sustained operational problem at one or more refineries.

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

   -- Improved ratings at PDVSA;

   -- Stronger structural separations between CITGO Petroleum and
      PDVSA leading to a wider notching rationale between the two;

   -- A change in ownership to a higher rated entity.

                         CITGO HOLDING

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

   -- Weakening or elimination of key covenant protections
      contained in CITGO Holding senior secured debt through
      refinancing or other means;

   -- Operational problems at CITGO Petroleum which negatively
      impacted the dividend stream to CITGO Holding.

Any change in existing covenant protections that weakened existing
credit protections could change the rationale for notching between
CITGO Petroleum and PDVSA, which could negatively impact the
ratings at CITGO Holding.

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

   -- Improved ratings at PDVSA or CITGO Petroleum;
   -- Stronger structural separations between CITGO Holding and
      PDVSA leading to a wider notching rationale between the two;
   -- A change in ownership to a higher rated entity.

                              LIQUIDITY

At June 30, 2016, CITGO Petroleum had approximately $913 million
in available liquidity, consisting of $817 million in revolver
availability, $29 million in cash, and $67 million in availability
on the A/R facility.  Fitch believes this will be adequate for
near-term liquidity requirements in the ordinary course of
business, which would consist primarily of working capital needs
in the event of another large move in crude oil or product prices.
Fitch expects that capex, dividends, and other calls on liquidity
will be funded primarily with operating cash flows.  CITGO
Petroleum has no maturities until the term loan B due in 2021,
with a remaining principle of $639 million.  CITGO Holding's
secured term loan B is due in 2018, with a remaining principle of
$656 million.  As of June 30, CITGO Holding has prepaid
approximately $644 million of the term loan B through the excess
cash flow feature of the credit agreement.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has removed from Rating Watch Negative and affirmed these
ratings:

CITGO Petroleum Corp.
   -- Long-term IDR at 'B';
   -- Senior secured credit facility at 'BB/RR1';
   -- Senior secured term loans at 'BB/RR1';
   -- Senior secured notes at 'BB/RR1';
   -- Fixed-rate industrial revenue bonds at 'BB/RR1'.

CITGO Holding Inc.
   -- Long-term IDR at 'B-';
   -- Senior secured term loans at 'B+/RR2';
   -- Senior secured notes at 'B+/RR2'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


VENEZUELA: Business Owner Denounces "Harassment" of His Family
--------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Lorenzo Mendoza, president of Empresas
Polar, the largest private food company in Venezuela, denounced
Monday what he considered the "harassment" by the government
intelligence service of himself, his family and the more than
30,000 employees of his company.

"I wish to reject as strongly as possible the harassment and
persecution of which I am the victim -- I, my workers and my
family -- by the political police of the Sebin" national
intelligence service, Mr. Mendoza told reporters at Polar
headquarters on the east side of Caracas, according to EFE News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2016, Fitch Ratings affirmed Venezuela's Long-Term
Foreign-and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (LT FC/LC IDR)
at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed the sovereign's Short-Term
Foreign Currency (ST FC) IDR at 'C' and country ceiling at 'CCC'.


VENEZUELA: Fails to Send Crude to Dominican Republic Refinery
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the chief executive officer of the Dominican
Republic's State-owned oil refinery on Sunday revealed that
Venezuela isn't dispatching crude to the country, for which it has
had to resort to other markets.

The lack of supply has been in effect since January.

Despite the situation, Venezuela has not stated an interest in
selling its 49 per cent stake in the refiner

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2016, Fitch Ratings affirmed Venezuela's Long-Term
Foreign-and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (LT FC/LC IDR)
at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed the sovereign's Short-Term
Foreign Currency (ST FC) IDR at 'C' and country ceiling at 'CCC'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *