TCRLA_Public/161108.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Tuesday, November 8, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 221


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

BANCO BBM: Moody's Raises Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba1
BRAZIL: President Makes Pension Reform Early 2017 Priority
VALE CANADA: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Sr. Unsecured Bond
VALE SA: Brazil President Delays Pushing for New CEO Until 2017
VALE SA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Corporate Family Rating


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BENNETT LAWRENCE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
DLG GROUP: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
EUROPEAN PROPERTY: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
KARISHA LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LENSKY FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

LENSKY MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
LOTTE MART: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
SILVERMOON LTD: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SUMMER DEL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
UNIGOYA LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

VINTAGE BLUE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up


C O L O M B I A

BANCO MERCANTIL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Global Local Deposit Rating


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Policies to Benefit Poorest, World Bank Says


M E X I C O

COMAPA ZC: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating & Maintains Negative Outlook
DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Downgrade


P U E R T O    R I C O

EJS INCORPORADO: Hires Ruben Gonzalez as Attorney
J TASTE: Disclosures Conditionally OK'd; Hearing Set For Nov. 30
MBTI OF PUERTO RICO: Taps Charles A. Cuprill as Legal Counsel
OLIVER C&I: Names Carmen Conde Torres as Legal Counsel


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: More Oil, Gas Makes it to the US


U R U G U A Y

URUGUAY: To Get $6MM IDB Loan to Launch Program to Fight Crimes


                            - - - - -


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO BBM: Moody's Raises Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina upgraded Banco BBM S.A.'s (BBM) long-term
local currency senior unsecured debt rating to Ba1, from Ba2; and
the long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured debt
rating to Aaa.br, from Aa2.br. The outlook remains negative.

These ratings of Banco BBM S.A. were upgraded:

   -- Long-term global local-currency senior unsecured debt
      rating: to Ba1 from Ba2, negative outlook

   -- Long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured debt
      rating: to Aaa.br from Aa2.br

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of BBM's ratings incorporates Bank of Communication's
majority ownership stake and the strategic importance that the
Brazilian subsidiary may have to its controlling bank.  BoCom is
expected to appoint executives to certain key positions at the
bank and will closely engage in the subsidiary's strategic
decision making process, including BBM's support to operations of
Chinese related companies in Brazil.  Moody's expects BBM's
solvency and liquidity to remain broadly consistent with current
levels, however, its deposit ratings now benefit from one notch of
uplift, to Ba1, to incorporate the expectation of affiliate
support to the Brazilian operation.

The completion of the acquisition will likely result in BBM
expanding its loan book, as it takes advantage of a new potential
universe of borrowers, including large corporate and Chinese
companies, and a recovering credit demand, following years of very
conservative risk management.  Moody's expects the bank to
leverage its balance sheet, leading to capitalization ratios that
will be lower than the current 14.3% tangible common equity to
risk weighted assets, and the 21.1% regulatory common equity tier
1 ratio.  However, its capital position is likely to accommodate
at still solid levels.  As the bank targets large corporations,
its consistently strong asset quality may improve further,
although the risk of increasing loan concentration may add
volatility to asset risk and earnings.

BBM's reliance on market funds is expected to remain high, but the
bank will likely have access to a wider pool of investors, and it
may even benefit from new funding facilities provided by the
parent.  This will support BBM's expanded strategic focus,
enabling the bank to appropriately manage its liquidity in
response to a likely extension of its assets duration.  A lower
cost of funding and greater scale will benefit profitability at
BBM's current operational infrastructure, but we anticipate some
margin compression if new corporate lending leads to lower
spreads.

                   WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

The negative outlook on BBM's ratings reflects the negative
outlook on Brazil's sovereign ratings, and which constrain the
bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA).  In the event Brazil's
sovereign rating and its country ceilings were to be lowered
further, BBM's ratings would also decline Also, a multi-notch
downgrade on BoCom's BCA could lead to a downgrade on BBM's
ratings.

A higher-than-expected deterioration of its capital position and
asset risk profile, following the new strategic focus and an
eventual higher balance sheet leverage, could put negative
pressure on BBM's BCA and ratings.

                  WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

BBM's ratings are unlikely to be upgraded because they have a
negative outlook, in line with the sovereign rating's negative
outlook.

                        METHODOLOGIES USED

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

                     LAST RATING ACTION

The last rating action on Banco BBM S.A. was on Feb. 25, 2016,
when Moody's downgraded the bank's long-term local-currency senior
unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from Baa3 and the long-term Brazilian
national scale senior unsecured debt rating to Aa2.br from Aa1.br,
following the downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2,
from Baa3.  The outlook of the bank's ratings was changed to
negative in line with the negative outlook on the sovereign bond
rating.


BRAZIL: President Makes Pension Reform Early 2017 Priority
----------------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's
government is hopeful that pension reform will pass Congress in
the first half of 2017, leaving room for other reforms in the
country's labor and tax systems possibly in the second half, a
senior government official said.

But for now, the focus is on approving an amendment to the
Constitution capping public-spending annual growth by the previous
year's inflation rate, Marcio de Freitas, President Michel Temer's
secretary of social communication, said in an interview, according
to The Wall Street Journal.

The amendment was approved by the lower house of Congress last
month and will go through two rounds of vote in the Senate, the
last one expected to happen on Dec. 13. Its chances of passage are
unclear, although the administration has a majority in the upper
house, the report notes.

Critics have said that the spending cap could lead to worse public
services, especially in health and education. Mr. de Freitas said
the government is looking to eliminate inefficiencies to make sure
those areas won't suffer, the report relays.

"The government doesn't spend in an efficient manner," he said in
an interview, adding that spending in these areas may grow faster
than inflation if cuts are made in other sectors, the report
discloses.

As for pension reform, Mr. de Freitas said the government already
has a proposal, but declined to give details, the report relays.

Brazil's social-security system requires yearly transfers from the
Treasury as payouts surpass contributions. The cost to taxpayers
this year is estimated at BRL507.8 billion ($156.5 billion), or
40% of the federal budget, going up to BRL562.4, or 42.7% of the
budget in 2017, the report notes.  The imbalance is due to a
variety of causes, including benefits paid to poor rural workers
who don't contribute into the system, the report relays.

The technically insolvent system is seen by the government as a
major cause of fiscal imbalances leading to the current economic
recession, the report says.

Both the spending cap and pension reform are seen by the Temer
administration as key to taming a ballooning debt load, now at
70.1% of gross domestic product, and to plugging a budget deficit
equal to 9.4% of GDP, as of August, the report discloses.

President Temer's agenda has faced strong reactions from unions
and other groups who fear fiscal austerity could trim labor
rights.

The report notes that Mr. de Freitas said the administration is
working on a marketing campaign to make its case to the Brazilian
voter.

"We need to clarify the issue to society," he said.

He said that higher social-security contributions and a single
minimum-age for retirement are in the cards. Currently, Brazilians
can retire as early as in their mid-50s and the rules vary based
on gender and profession, the report relays.

"Pension payouts in public service can be up to seven times as
high as those in the private sector," he said. "We need to
eliminate distortions," he added.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2, negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service.  The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.


VALE CANADA: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Sr. Unsecured Bond
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Vale S.A. 's Ba3 ratings and
related ratings, including Vale's senior unsecured rating and the
ratings on the foreign currency debt issues of Vale Overseas
Limited (fully and unconditionally guaranteed by Vale).  The
outlook was changed to stable from negative.  Moody's also
affirmed the B2 rating and changed to stable from negative the
outlook for the senior unsecured ratings of Vale Canada Ltd.

Ratings Affirmed:

Issuer: Vale S.A.

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2018,
  Affirmed at Ba3

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2023,
  Affirmed at to Ba3

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2042,
  Affirmed at Ba3

Issuer: Vale Canada Ltd.

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2032, Affirmed at B2

Issuer: Vale Overseas Limited

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2019,
   Affirmed at to Ba3

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2020,
   Affirmed at Ba3

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2021,
   Affirmed at Ba3

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2022,
   Affirmed at Ba3

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2026,
   Affirmed at Ba3

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2034,
   Affirmed at Ba3

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2036,
   Affirmed at Ba3

  Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2039,
   Affirmed at Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Vale S.A.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Vale Canada Ltd.
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Vale Overseas Limited
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The stable outlook reflects the improvement in Vale's credit
metrics throughout 2016, supported by the initiatives taken by the
company to improve its liquidity and expand production volumes at
lower costs, and Vale's financial discipline regarding capex and
dividend payments, which enhance its operating resilience.  Vale's
adjusted EBITDA margins increased to 31.5% in the LTM ended
September 2016, from 21% in 2015, while adjusted leverage
(measured by total debt/EBITDA) declined to 4.0x from 5.5x in the
same period.  The improvement in credit metrics also reflect the
recovery observed in iron ore prices, base metals and coal
relative to the levels evidenced in 2015 and early 2016.

Moody's expects Vale's leverage to decline further in the next 12-
18 months considering prices at Moody's sensitivity medium-term
ranges ($ 45-55/ton), as the company continues to undertake cost
saving measures and reduces its annual capex to around
USD4.5 billion from 2017 onwards, which will reduce debt
requirements and lead to positive free cash flow generation.
Moody's also expects Vale's metrics to benefit from the additional
sales volume coming from the S11D project, with total iron ore
production capacity of 90 million tons per year at a lower cost
base after full ramp-up by 2020.

Vale's Ba3 rating is supported by the company's diversified
product base and competitive cost position, and substantive
portfolio of long lived assets.  While Vale has diversified its
geographic footprint through various acquisitions in Canada,
Australia and elsewhere, the dominant revenue, earnings and cash
flow driver continues to be its Brazilian-based iron ore
operations and its major position in the seaborne iron ore
markets.  The rating acknowledges Vale's more focused and
disciplined approach to project development, capital allocation,
resizing of its asset portfolio to strategically important
business segments, divestiture of non-strategic assets, and focus
on cost reduction, which better positions Vale to withstand
volatility in the prices for its major products over the next
twelve to eighteen months.

Constraining the ratings are the challenging fundamentals for iron
ore, a key earning driver, and base metals prices, and our
expectation that prices will remain at lower levels for a
prolonged period, as a consequence of the slowdown in China's
economic growth and steel demand, which the World Steel
Association (WSA) forecasts to decline to 652 mm tons in 2017, a
8% decline over 2014 levels, bringing heightened uncertainty over
demand for iron ore and base metals in the next few years.  Lower
prices relative to 2011-2014 levels will prevent a faster recovery
in credit metrics for Vale and the company will likely continue to
pursue asset divestitures and other liquidity alternatives to
strengthen its capital structure and reduce debt levels at a
steady pace.  Vale's ratings also incorporate the long term
overhang represented by the uncertainties regarding the level of
support Vale will provide to Samarco and the impact it would have
on the company's liquidity and debt profile.

Vale Canada's B2 senior unsecured rating rank two notches below
Vale's rating to reflect the weaker operating performance of its
business, and the fact that Vale does not guarantee the notes.
The rating continues to reflect this subsidiary's major position
in the global nickel market, its asset base and strategic
importance to its parent.

An upward rating movement would require that Vale maintains a
strong liquidity position and continues with its asset divestiture
and partnership strategies, which will allow Vale to materially
reduce debt levels.  In addition adjusted total debt/EBITDA below
3.5x and EBIT/interest expense above 3.5x times on a sustainable
basis are necessary for an upgrade.

The ratings or outlook could suffer negative pressure should
conditions for iron ore and base metals deteriorate, leading to
lower profitability, and Vale is not able to make meaningful
progress in cost reduction and debt levels, with leverage ratios
(total debt to Ebitda) trending towards 4x or above.  A marked
deterioration in the company's liquidity position could also
precipitate a downgrade.  Negative pressure would arise to the
extent Vale is required to provide material financial support to
Samarco, or faces liabilities from litigation and class actions
resulting from the Samarco's accident, in addition to the amount
related to the Framework Agreement set with Brazilian Authorities
in March 2016 and the announced support to Samarco's working
capital needs.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Vale is one of the
largest mining enterprises globally, with substantive positions in
iron ore and nickel, and participation in copper, coal and
fertilizers, as well as supplemental positions in energy and steel
production.  Vale is the largest global supplier of iron ore, with
approximately 345 million metric tons (t) of production in the
twelve months ended September 2016 (excluding its share of
Samarco), and the largest global producer of nickel, with around
310,700 t produced during the same period.  Vale's principal
mining operations are located in Brazil, Canada, Australia,
Indonesia, and Mozambique.  In addition, the company is active in
exploration activities in nine countries.  For the twelve months
through Sept. 30, 2016, Vale had net operating revenues of
$25.6 billion.


VALE SA: Brazil President Delays Pushing for New CEO Until 2017
---------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Brazilian President Michel Temer will not
push to replace the head of the nation's largest mining company,
Vale SA, until the current executive's mandate expires in May, a
local newspaper reported.

Mr. Temer has been seeking a replacement for Chief Executive
Murilo Ferreira, who was the preferred choice of impeached former
President Dilma Rousseff and is considered by Mr. Temer's camp to
be too close to the previous administration, according to Reuters.

But the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo reported at the weekend,
without citing sources, that Mr. Temer will not try to force
Ferreira's early exit after coming up against resistance from
state pension funds that have seats on Vale's board, the report
notes.

A person with direct knowledge of the situation told Reuters last
month that Temer had met with the representative of an unnamed,
major shareholder of Vale to discuss a potential change of command
at the mining giant, the report relays.

The same person, who was briefed on the discussion, said the
company's controlling shareholders would only agree to a change of
leadership next year, when Ferreira's term ends, and under a
selection process conducted by an executive recruitment firm, the
report notes.

The government move to replace Ferreira is controversial. Vale
(VALE5.SA), the world's largest producer of iron ore, is a private
company that is supposedly free from state interference, the
report discloses.

However, Ferreira's predecessor, Roger Agnelli, was pushed out
during Rousseff's first term after the government exerted pressure
through state pension funds, the report says.

The O Globo newspaper reported Sunday, without citing sources,
that Temer's preferred candidate to replace Ferreira is Nelson
Silva, head of strategy and management at state-run oil company
Petrobras, the report notes.

Reports earlier this year said Mr. Temer was being pressured to
replace Ferreira by members of his party in the mining state of
Minas Gerais, where Vale has large operations, the report relays.

Vale has struggled in the face of slumping commodity prices and
recorded its worst ever loss last year, the report notes.

Its reputation was also damaged following the collapse of a
tailings dam last November at the Samarco mine, owned by Vale SA
and BHP Billiton, the report says.  The accident killed 19 people
and resulted in severe environmental damage across a wide swath of
southeastern Brazil, the report adds.


VALE SA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda upgraded to A2.br from A3.br the
corporate family rating assigned on its Brazilian National scale
to Vale S.A. and the senior unsecured notes (Debentures de
Infraestrutura) issued by Vale S.A.  The outlook changed to stable
from negative.

At the same time, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Vale's Ba3
ratings in the global scale local currency, the senior unsecured
rating and the ratings on the foreign currency debt issues of Vale
Overseas Limited (fully and unconditionally guaranteed by Vale).
The outlook changed to stable from negative.

Rating Actions:

Issuer: Vale S.A.

  LT Corporate Family Rating: affirmed at Ba3 (global scale);
   upgraded to A2.br from A3.br (national scale)

  BRL 1.35 billion Senior Unsecured Notes (Debentures de
   Infraestrutura) due 2020 and 2022 -- affirmed at Ba3 (global
   scale); upgraded to A2.br from A3. br (national scale)

  BRL 1.0 billion Senior Unsecured Notes (Debentures de
   Infraestrutura) -- affirmed at Ba3 (global scale); upgraded to
   A2. br from A3.br (national scale)

The outlook for all ratings is stable.

                         RATING RATIONALE

The stable outlook reflects the improvement in Vale's credit
metrics throughout 2016, supported by the initiatives taken by the
company to improve its liquidity and expand production volumes at
lower costs, and Vale's financial discipline regarding capex and
dividend payments, which enhance its operating resilience.  Vale's
adjusted EBITDA margins increased to 31.5% in the LTM ended
September 2016, from 21% in 2015, while adjusted leverage
(measured by total debt/EBITDA) declined to 4.0x from 5.5x in the
same period.  The improvement in credit metrics also reflect the
recovery observed in iron ore prices, base metals and coal
relative to the levels evidenced in 2015 and early 2016.

Moody's expects Vale's leverage to decline further in the next 12-
18 months considering prices at Moody's sensitivity medium-term
ranges ($45-55/ton), as the company continues to undertake cost
saving measures and reduces its annual capex to around USD4.5
billion from 2017 onwards, which will reduce debt requirements and
lead to positive free cash flow generation.  Moody's also expects
Vale's metrics to benefit from the additional sales volume coming
from the S11D project, with total iron ore production capacity of
90 million tons per year at a lower cost base after full ramp-up
by 2020.

Vale's Ba3 rating is supported by the company's diversified
product base and competitive cost position, and substantive
portfolio of long lived assets.  While Vale has diversified its
geographic footprint through various acquisitions in Canada,
Australia and elsewhere, the dominant revenue, earnings and cash
flow driver continues to be its Brazilian-based iron ore
operations and its major position in the seaborne iron ore
markets.  The rating acknowledges Vale's more focused and
disciplined approach to project development, capital allocation,
resizing of its asset portfolio to strategically important
business segments, divestiture of non-strategic assets, and focus
on cost reduction, which better positions Vale to withstand
volatility in the prices for its major products over the next
twelve to eighteen months.

Constraining the ratings are the challenging fundamentals for iron
ore, a key earning driver, and base metals prices, and our
expectation that prices will remain at lower levels for a
prolonged period, as a consequence of the slowdown in China's
economic growth and steel demand, which the World Steel
Association (WSA) forecasts to decline to 652 mm tons in 2017, a
8% decline over 2014 levels, bringing heightened uncertainty over
demand for iron ore and base metals in the next few years.  Lower
prices relative to 2011-2014 levels will prevent a faster recovery
in credit metrics for Vale and the company will likely continue to
pursue asset divestitures and other liquidity alternatives to
strengthen its capital structure and reduce debt levels at a
steady pace.  Vale's ratings also incorporate the long term
overhang represented by the uncertainties regarding the level of
support Vale will provide to Samarco and the impact it would have
on the company's liquidity and debt profile.

An upward rating movement would require that Vale maintains a
strong liquidity position and continues with its asset divestiture
and partnership strategies, which will allow Vale to materially
reduce debt levels.  In addition adjusted total debt/EBITDA below
3.5x and EBIT/interest expense above 3.5x times on a sustainable
basis are necessary for an upgrade.

The ratings or outlook could suffer negative pressure should
conditions for iron ore and base metals deteriorate, leading to
lower profitability, and Vale is not able to make meaningful
progress in cost reduction and debt levels, with leverage ratios
(total debt to Ebitda) trending towards 4x or above.  A marked
deterioration in the company's liquidity position could also
precipitate a downgrade.  Negative pressure would arise to the
extent Vale is required to provide material financial support to
Samarco, or faces liabilities from litigation and class actions
resulting from the Samarco's accident, in addition to the amount
related to the Framework Agreement set with Brazilian Authorities
in March 2016 and the announced support to Samarco's working
capital needs.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Vale is one of the
largest mining enterprises globally, with substantive positions in
iron ore and nickel, and participation in copper, coal and
fertilizers, as well as supplemental positions in energy and steel
production.  Vale is the largest global supplier of iron ore, with
approximately 345 million metric tons (t) of production in the
twelve months ended September 2016 (excluding its share of
Samarco), and the largest global producer of nickel, with around
310,700 t produced during the same period.  Vale's principal
mining operations are located in Brazil, Canada, Australia,
Indonesia, and Mozambique.  In addition, the company is active in
exploration activities in nine countries.  For the twelve months
through Sept. 30, 2016, Vale had net operating revenues of
$25.6 billion.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BENNETT LAWRENCE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Bennett Lawrence Offshore Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Sept. 30, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Suydam Van Zandt Schreiber
          111 Oyster Cut, Vero Beach, FL 32963
          USA
          Telephone: (212) 508-6408
          Facsimile: (212) 593-9647


DLG GROUP: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Oct. 5, 2016, the
shareholder of DLG Group Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up the
company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626


EUROPEAN PROPERTY: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Oct. 6, 2016, the
shareholder of European Property Fund No.2 resolved to voluntarily
wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626


KARISHA LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The members of Karisha Ltd., on Oct. 13, 2016, resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jeffrey D. Johnstone
          Broadhurst LLC
          40 Linwood Street
          P.O. Box 2503 Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY1-1104
          Telephone: (345) 949-7237
          Facsimile: (345) 949-7725


LENSKY FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of The Lensky Fund Limited, on Oct. 12, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kenneth Stewart
          Apex Fund Services (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 10085
          161a Artillery Court, Shedden Road
          Grand Cayman KY1 1001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 747 2739


LENSKY MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of The Lensky Master Fund Limited, on Oct.
12, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kenneth Stewart
          Apex Fund Services (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 10085
          161a Artillery Court, Shedden Road
          Grand Cayman KY1 1001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 747 2739


LOTTE MART: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Lotte Mart China Co. Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Sept. 30, 2016.

The company's liquidators are:

          Stephen Liu Yiu Keung
          Koo Chi Sum
          Telephone: (852) 2849 9404
          Facsimile: (852) 2827 0715
          Ernst & Young Transactions Limited
          62nd Floor, One Island East
          18 Westlands Road
          Island East
          Hong Kong


SILVERMOON LTD: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Aug. 22, 2016, the
sole shareholder of Silvermoon Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up
the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Eduardo J. Fuentes Zambrano
          Av. Lazaro, Cardenas 2400 Pte.
          Fraccionamiento Valle Oriente
          Edificio Losoles, Despacho A-33
          San Pedro Garza Garcia
          Nuevo Leon, C.P. 66269
          Mexico
          Telephone: 01 8182 6208 40
          Facsimile: 01 8182 6208 47


SUMMER DEL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Sept. 13, 2016, the
shareholder of Summer Del Group Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind
up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626


UNIGOYA LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Unigoya Limited, on Oct. 6, 2016, resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626


VINTAGE BLUE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Oct. 6, 2016, the
shareholder of Vintage Blue Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up
the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626



===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


BANCO MERCANTIL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Global Local Deposit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (MLA) has
affirmed all ratings and assessments assigned to Banco Mercantil
Santa Cruz S.A. (BME), including the bank's global local and
foreign currency deposit ratings of Ba3 and B1, as well as its
Bolivian national scale local and foreign currency deposit ratings
of Aaa.bo and Aa3.bo.  The ba3 baseline credit assessment (BCA)
and all short term ratings were also affirmed.  The outlook on the
long-term global scale ratings remains negative, in line with the
negative outlook on Bolivia's government bond rating.

At the same time, MLA has affirmed all ratings and assessments
assigned to Banco PYME Los Andes Procedit S.A. (PLA), including
the bank's global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of
Ba3 and B1, as well as its Bolivian national scale foreign
currency deposit rating of Aa3.bo.  The Bolivian national scale
local currency deposit rating of Aa2.bo was placed on review for
possible upgrade.  The ba3 baseline credit assessment (BCA) and
all short term ratings were also affirmed.  The outlook on the
long-term global scale ratings remains negative, in line with the
negative outlook on Bolivia's government bond rating.

This rating action follows the announcement that BME signed a
Purchase Agreement with PLA to acquire PLA for an undisclosed sum.
The completion of the transaction is subject to final regulatory
approvals.

These ratings and assessments assigned to Banco Mercantil Santa
Cruz S.A. were affirmed:

  Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba3, with
   negative outlook
  Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Not Prime
  Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of B1, with negative
   outlook
  Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime
  Bolivian long-term national scale local currency deposit rating
   of Aaa.bo
  Bolivian long-term national scale foreign currency deposit
   rating of Aa3.bo
  Baseline credit assessment of ba3
  Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba3
  Long-term counterparty rating assessment of Ba2(cr)
  Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

This rating assigned to Banco PYME Los Andes Procredit S.A. was
placed on review for possible upgrade:

  Bolivian long-term national scale local currency deposit rating
   of Aa2.bo, on review for possible upgrade

These ratings and assessments assigned to Banco PYME Los Andes
Procredit S.A. were affirmed:

  Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba3, with
   negative outlook
  Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Not Prime
  Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of B1, with negative
   outlook
  Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime
  Bolivian short-term national scale local currency deposit rating
   of BO-1
  Bolivian long-term national scale foreign currency deposit
   rating of Aa3.bo
  Bolivian short-term national scale foreign currency deposit
   rating of BO-1
  Baseline credit assessment of ba3
  Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba3
  Long-term counterparty rating assessment of Ba2(cr)
  Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

BANCO MERCANTIL SANTA CRUZ S.A.

While the acquisition will enhance BME's position as the largest
bank in the system, and in the process improve its portfolio
diversification and bolster its profitability, the affirmation
considers that these benefits will be offset by the negative
impact on the bank's capitalization.

Once regulators approve the transaction, which is anticipated by
the end of 2016, BME's leading market share will increase to 16.2%
from the current 12.8%.  In particular, BME will substantially
enlarge its footprint in the high margin small and medium-sized
enterprise (SME) segment in which PLA specializes.

Although PLA's operating costs are higher than BME's, the
acquiring bank should be able to achieve cost-saving synergies.
BME's average cost of funding may also rise following the merger,
but its overall funding costs will remain below the banking system
average, and well below PLA's historical funding costs.  The
bank's high levels of liquidity will not see a significant
deterioration after the acquisition.

However, the transaction is likely to reduce BME's fully adjusted
core capital ratio significantly, though the precise impact will
depend on the purchase price, which Moody's expects will entail a
modest premium at most.  Nevertheless, the bank's current ratings
remain consistent with the reduction in capitalization that would
result from a number of different purchase price scenarios.
Moreover, the bank's enhanced profitability could allow it to
replenish its capital to current levels in as few as 24 months.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN

The negative outlook on BME's ratings is in line with the negative
outlook on the sovereign rating.  Consequently, the bank's ratings
will face downward pressure if the sovereign is downgraded.  BME's
BCA could also be downgraded if the purchase price of PLA
ultimately entails a significantly larger premium than currently
anticipated and the bank experiences a higher than expected
decline in the capital levels as a result, or if the bank's
profitability does not improve following the acquisition as
currently anticipated, reducing the bank's capital replenishment
capacity.  While a downgrade of the BCA would not affect the
banks' global scale deposit ratings given the high probability
that BME would receive financial support from the government in
the event of stress, it could potentially put downward pressure of
the national scale local currency deposit rating.

                BANCO PYME LOS ANDES PROCREDIT S.A.

The affirmation of PLA's global scale ratings and review for
upgrade of its local currency national scale deposit rating
considers the very high likelihood that the bank will receive
support from BME once it the acquisition is complete.  Although
the banks' GSRs are the same, BME's local currency national scale
deposit rating is currently two notches higher than PLA's deposit
rating.  The affirmation also considers the bank's conservative
risk management practices, which have resulted in low delinquency
levels despite its narrow focus on relatively risky market
segments, as well as its strong capitalization ratios and stable
funding and liquidity indicators.  PLA's GSRs and foreign currency
national scale deposit rating will not benefit from uplift from
parental support because they are constrained by Bolivia's Ba3
sovereign rating and B1 foreign currency deposit ceiling.

                WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

The negative outlook on PLA's global scale ratings is in line with
the negative outlook on the sovereign rating to reflect the strong
credit interlinkages between the sovereign and the bank.
Consequently, the bank's ratings will face downward pressure if
the sovereign is downgraded.  PLA's local currency national scale
deposit rating is likely to be upgraded once the bank's
acquisition by BME closes to reflect the incorporation of parental
support into the rating.  If PLA's assets and liabilities are
directly assumed by BME as is currently expected, its ratings will
then be withdrawn.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A. is headquartered in La Paz,
Bolivia and had total assets of Bs 26,882.7 million ($3,890.4
million) and equity of Bs 1,623.4 million ($234.9 million) as of
Sept. 30, 2016.

Banco PYME Los Andes Procredit S.A. is headquartered in Santa Cruz
de la Sierra, Bolivia and had total assets of Bs 5,364 million
($776.3 million) and equity of Bs 633 million ($91.6 million) as
of Sept. 30, 2016.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Policies to Benefit Poorest, World Bank Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that a World Bank report released
Thursday, Nov. 3, suggests that the Dominican Republic can
eradicate extreme poverty through improvements in fiscal and
social policy.

The study entitled "Fiscal and redistribution policy in the
Dominican Republic" indicates that an additional expenditure of
1.3 percent of GDP to double the transfers to the poorest and
achieve universal health coverage and public education even
administrative reforms, the Caribbean country can achieve that all
Dominicans rise above the extreme poverty line, according to
Dominican Today.

"To achieve this, the report considers essential to review fiscal
policies focusing on administrative measures to reduce tax evasion
and reduce informality.  It also suggests a review of electricity
subsidies to ensure that benefit those who need it most," the bank
report says, Dominican Today notes.

"The World Bank analysis confirms that the Dominican Republic is
on the right track, limited only by the achievements in social
terms, and contributes to our plan in this new period of
implementing reforms aimed at improving the delivery of public
services to the population and make more equitable economic
growth," said Dominican Economy minister Isidoro Santana,
Dominican Today relays.

Over the past three decades, the Dominican Republic has been among
the fastest growing economies in Latin America and the Caribbean,
the World Bank notes, Dominican Today says.  "In fact, in 2014 and
2015, it was the economy that grew an average of 7.2 percent and
is forecast to continue robust economic growth in 2016, about 6
percent," the bank added.

"But despite the considerable efforts of the Government to
increase social spending in recent years, a limited revenue
capacity has restricted the scope of its policies keeping
deficiencies in the provision of public services that reduce their
impact on levels of poverty and inequality," the bank said.

"One of the main challenges for the Dominican Republic is to
broaden the fiscal space, maintaining the progressivity of the
system. In this context, the next Fiscal Pact offers a unique
opportunity to address reforms to strengthen fiscal sustainability
and achieve better results for equity and poverty reduction," said
Alessandro Legrottaglie, World Bank representative in the country,
Dominican Today notes.

The report suggests priorities to close the equity gap:

-- Reforming the system of indirect taxes, focusing on tax
    exemptions Transfer of Industrial Goods and Services (BITS),
    the main VAT of the Dominican Republic, which benefit mostly
    middle and upper classes and accounting for 3% of GDP from
    2013.

-- Reforming electricity subsidies and programs such as Bon-gas
    and Bono-luz, retaining those that benefit the poorest.

-- Increase subsidies that benefit the poor such as Eating is
    first, Incentive for school attendance and health services,
    avoiding creating new ones.

-- Continue implementation of the recommendations of the Pact for
    Education to improve quality.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


COMAPA ZC: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating & Maintains Negative Outlook
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico has affirmed the Ba2/A2.mx ratings of COMAPA
Z.C. At the same time, Moody's maintained the negative outlook on
COMAPA Z.C.'s ratings.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE RATINGS AFFIRMATION AT Ba2/A2.mx
COMAPA Z.C. has traditionally had low debt levels.  In 2015,
COMAPA's direct debt represented 5.1% of total revenues, the
lowest level among Mexican-rated water companies.  COMAPA Z.C.'s
debt is entirely composed of short-term credit line and the
company does not have any long-term debt.

COMAPA Z.C.'s financial results deteriorated between 2014 and
2015, as its gross operating balance decreased to -18.8% from -
2.7% of operating revenues.  This deterioration was the result of
personnel expenditures rising 12% while operating revenues decline
2%.  COMAPA Z.C.'s liquidity also deteriorated: its net working
capital (measured as current assets excluding irrecoverable
receivables minus current liabilities) decreased to -17.2% of
total revenues from -1.5%.  Likewise, its cash-to-current
liabilities ratio was 0.02X in 2015 compared to 0.09X in 2014.

In spite of COMAPA Z.C.'s credit profile weakening, the final
ratings incorporate Moody's expectations that the State of
Tamaulipas (Ba1/A1.mx, negative) will be willing and able to
provide extraordinary support if needed given the strategic role
COMAPA Z.C. plays for Tampico's economy.  Between 2011 and 2015,
the state's transfers to the water company represented 8% of total
revenues on average.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Downgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico placed on review for downgrade the Ba1 long-term
local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Deutsche Bank
Mexico, S.A., as well as the long and short-term Mexican National
Scale (NSR) deposit ratings of A1.mx / MX-1.

In addition, Moody's placed on review for downgrade Deutsche Bank
Mexico's ba2 standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) and ba1
adjusted BCA along with its long and short term Counterparty Risk
Assessments (CRAs) of Baa3(cr) and Prime-3(cr).

Moody's also placed on review for downgrade the Ba1 global long
term local currency issuer rating, as well as the A1.mx / MX-1
Mexican national scale long and short-term issuer ratings of
Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V., Casa de Bolsa (Deutsche
Securities Mexico, S.A. de C.V.).

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The action on Deutsche Bank Mexico's and Deutsche Securities
Mexico's ratings follows the signing of an agreement by the
companies' ultimate parent, Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche AG, BCA
ba1), to sale these operations to Mexico's InvestaBank S.A.
(InvestaBank, unrated), as part of a broader scaling back of its
global operations amid the 2020 strategic plan.

The reviews for downgrade consider that once the transaction
closes, Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico will
no longer benefit from support from Deutsche AG.  Despite the
marginal business importance of the Mexican entities to their
parent, Moody's currently assumes a High likelihood of parent
support given their shared brand name.  The reputational cost for
Deutsche Bank's global business of allowing these entities to fail
should their situation unexpectedly deteriorate before the parent
can finish winding them down, could very well outweigh the costs
of bailing them out.  Moody's continues to expect an orderly wind
down of the Mexican entities, which are not currently under
stress.

However, the reviews for downgrade also reflect the progressive
deterioration of earnings generation and business diversification
that will occur as the balance sheets shrink and existing
derivative operations are wound down through the transaction's
closing date, which is expected to occur within the next 6 to 12
months.  Moody's expects that at the sale's closing, the business
being acquired by InvestaBank will largely consist of the trustee
division of Deutsche Bank Mexico.

The assessment of high affiliate support results in one notch of
uplift in the adjusted BCA and deposit ratings of Deutsche Bank
Mexico from its standalone BCA of ba2.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Deutsche Bank Mexico, S.A.

These ratings and assessments were placed on review for downgrade:

   -- Baseline credit assessment of ba2
   -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba1
   -- Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba1
   -- Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Ba1
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of A1.mx
   -- Short-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of MX-1
   -- Long and short term Counterparty Risk Assessments of
      Baa3(cr) and Prime-3(cr)

Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V., Casa de Bolsa

These ratings were placed on review for downgrade:

   -- Long-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba1
   -- Long-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of A1.mx
   -- Short-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of MX-1

                  WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN

Deutsche Bank Mexico's and Deutsche Securities Mexico's ratings
will face increasing downward pressure as earnings decline and
business diversification deteriorates in line with the winding
down of their activities.  Ratings would also likely be downgraded
when the transaction reaches financial close.

The long-term Mexican National Scale ratings of A1.mx indicate
issuers or issues with above-average creditworthiness relative to
other domestic issuers.  The short- term Mexican National Scale
ratings of issuers rated MX-1 indicate the strongest ability to
repay short-term senior unsecured debt obligations relative to
other domestic issuers.

The principal methodology used in rating Deutsche Bank Mexico,
S.A. was Banks published in January 2016.  The principal
methodology used in rating Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V., Casa
de Bolsa was Global Securities Industry Methodology published in
May 2013.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine the rating is between Jan. 1, 2011, and Sept. 30, 2016.

The sources and items of information used to determine the rating
include 2016 interim financial statements (source: Moody's,
Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico); year-end
2013, 2014 and 2015 audited financial statements (source: Moody's,
Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico, audited by
KPMG Cardenas Dosal, S. C. member of KPMG International).

Deutsche Bank Mexico is headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico.  As
of Sept. 30 2016, it had total assets of Mx$43.8 billion and total
shareholder's equity of Mx$4 billion.

Deutsche Securities Mexico is headquartered in Mexico City,
Mexico.  As of Sept. 30, 2016, it had total assets of Mx$1.6
billion and total shareholder's equity of Mx$1.6 billion.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


EJS INCORPORADO: Hires Ruben Gonzalez as Attorney
-------------------------------------------------
EJS Incorporado seeks authority from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Puerto Rico to employ Ruben Gonzalez Marrero &
Associates as attorney to the Debtor.

EJS Incorporado requires Ruben Gonzalez to represent the Debtor in
the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.

Ruben Gonzalez will be paid at the hourly rate of $250.

Ruben Gonzalez will be paid a retainer in the amount of $15,000.

Ruben Gonzalez will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-
pocket expenses incurred.

Ruben Gonzalez Marrero, member of Ruben Gonzalez Marrero &
Associates, assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested
person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the
Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to the
Debtor and its estates.

Ruben Gonzalez can be reached at:

     Ruben Gonzalez Marrero, Esq.
     RUBEN GONZALEZ MARRERO & ASSOCIATES
     Carr. 174, Blq. 21-24
     Urb. Santa Rosa
     Bayamon, PR 00959
     Tel: (787) 798-8600

                     About EJS Incorporado

EJS Incorporado aka EJS Inc. filed a chapter 11 petition (Bankr.
D.P.R. Case No. 16-01647) on March 1, 2016. The petition was
signed by Jose Manuel Rodriguez Amador, president. According to
its bankruptcy petition, the Debtor is represented by Ada M.
Conde, Esq.  The case is assigned to Judge Edward A. Godoy. The
Debtor estimated assets at $0 to $50,000 and liabilities at $1
million to $10 million at the time of the filing.

No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in
the case.


J TASTE: Disclosures Conditionally OK'd; Hearing Set For Nov. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Mildred Caban Flores of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico has conditionally approved J Taste Inc.'s
amended disclosure statement dated Oct. 25, 2016.

The hearing to consider the final approval of the Disclosure
Statement and the confirmation of the Plan will be held on Nov.
30, 2016, at 9:0 a.m.  Objections to the final approval of the
Disclosure Statement and confirmation of the Plan, and acceptances
or rejections of the Plan must be filed on or before 14 days prior
to the date of the Confirmation Hearing.

The Debtor must file with the Court a statement setting forth
compliance with each requirement in U.S.C. Section 1129, the list
of acceptances and rejections and the computation, within seven
working days before the Confirmation Hearing.

J Taste Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D.
P.R. Case No. 15-10243).


MBTI OF PUERTO RICO: Taps Charles A. Cuprill as Legal Counsel
-------------------------------------------------------------
MBTI of Puerto Rico Inc. seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hire Charles A. Cuprill,
P.S.C., Law Offices as its legal counsel.

The firm will serve as the Debtor's legal counsel in connection
with its Chapter 11 case.

Charles Cuprill-Hernandez, Esq., will be paid an hourly rate of
$350 for his services while the firm's associates will be paid
$250 per hour.

Mr. Cuprill-Hernandez disclosed in a court filing that the members
of his firm are "disinterested persons" as defined in section
101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The firm can be reached through:

     Charles A. Cuprill-Hernandez, Esq.
     Charles A. Cuprill, P.S.C., Law Offices
     356 Fortaleza Street, Second Floor
     San Juan, PR 00901
     Tel: 787-977-0515
     Fax: 787-977-0518

                    About MBTI of Puerto Rico

MBTI of Puerto Rico, Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-08091) on Oct. 7,
2016.  The petition was signed by Barbara Alozo Vila, president.

The case is assigned to Judge Edward A. Godoy.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor disclosed $12.99 million in
assets and $16.07 million in liabilities.


OLIVER C&I: Names Carmen Conde Torres as Legal Counsel
------------------------------------------------------
Oliver C&I Corp. seeks authorization from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Carmen D. Conde
Torres of the Law Offices of C. Conde & Assoc. as legal counsel.

The Debtor requires C. Conde to:

   (a) advise the Debtor with respect to its duties, powers and
       responsibilities in this case under the laws of the United
       States and Puerto Rico in which the Debtor in possession
       conducts its operations, do business, or is involved in
       litigation;

   (b) advise the Debtor in connection with a determination
       whether a reorganization is feasible and, if not, helping
       the Debtor in the orderly liquidation of its assets;

   (c) assist the Debtor with respect to negotiations with
       creditors for the purpose of arranging the orderly
       liquidation of assets and for proposing a viable plan of
       reorganization;

   (d) prepare on behalf of the Debtor the necessary complaints,
       answers, orders, reports, memoranda of law and any other
       legal papers or documents;

   (e) appear before the Bankruptcy Court, or any court in which
       the Debtor assert a claim interest or defense directly or
       indirectly related to this bankruptcy case;

   (f) perform other legal services for the Debtor as may be
       required in these proceedings or in connection with the
       operation of and involvement with the Debtor's business,
       including but not limited to notarial services; and

   (g) employ other professional services, if necessary.

The firm will be paid at these hourly rates:

       Carmen D. Conde Torres         $300
       Associates                     $275
       Junior Attorney                $250
       Legal Assistants               $150

C. Conde will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

C. Conde required a retainer in the amount of $30,000 and was paid
by third party, MC Magraner, Corp.

Carmen D. Conde Torres, senior attorney of the firm, assured the
Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is
defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not
represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estate.

C. Conde can be reached at:

       Carmen D. Conde Torres, Esq.
       C. CONDE & ASSOC.
       254 San Jose Street, 5th Floor
       Old San Juan, P.R. 00901
       Tel: (787) 729-2900
       Fax: (787) 729-2203
       E-mail: condecarmen@condelaw.com

Oliver C & I Corp., based in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, filed a
Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-08311) on October
17, 2016.  The Hon. Mildred Caban Flores presides over the case.
Carmen D Conde Torres, Esq., serves as attorney

In its petition, the Debtor indicated $29.94 million in total
assets and $1.06 million in total liabilities.  The petition was
signed by Max Olivera, vice-president/treasurer.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: More Oil, Gas Makes it to the US
---------------------------------------------------
Aleem Khan at Daily Express reports that despite low oil and gas
prices and production, Trinidad and Tobago has found more oil and
gas to export to the world's lowest-priced market, the United
States, data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
released November 1 showed.

The EIA said oil exports from Trinidad and Tobago to the United
States more than tripled (3.2x) month-on-month in August to
1,364,000 barrels versus 421,000 barrels in July, according to
Daily Express.

Similarly, liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the U.S. from
Point Fortin went up 40 per cent month-on-month in August to 7,998
million cubic feet (mcf) versus 5,703 mcf in July, according to
the EIA. The EIA said all of the LNG from Trinidad entered via
Everett, Massachusetts, the report notes.

The release came on the same day BP Group Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) Brian Gilvary released BP's third quarter (Q3) 2016 results
and found himself having to confirm that the London-listed oil
major is in fact getting lower prices for T&T gas, but without
offering a reason, the report relays.

On a November 1 investor call, Mr. Gilvary said: "BP's third
quarter underlying replacement cost profit was US$930 million,
down 49 per cent on the same period a year ago, and 30 per cent
higher than the second quarter of 2016," the report relays

The report notes that during the question and answer (Q&A) of the
call, analyst Irene Himona of Societe Generale SA asked: "Firstly,
in Q3, your natural gas realizations outside the U.S. appear
somewhat weaker than anticipated perhaps. Can you give us any sort
of guidance on how the portfolio outside the U.S. is linked,
operating expenses (OE) versus Hub prices perhaps?"

The report relays that Mr. Gilvary responded: "On gas prices, a
lot of our non-Henry Hub gas impacts come from Trinidad and Asia
Pacific. So, it's really from the Tanjung development and the
Trinidad development. That's really where those realizations are
coming from. A lot of our new gas projects that you'll know that
start up in 2017, 2018 and 2019 are linked to domestic markets,
so, they won't be as exposed to that sort of softness that we've
seen in the LNG pricing outside the United States."

Finance Minister Colm Imbert vowed to tackle transfer pricing
during the fiscal 2017 budget debate October 24, saying he was
engaging the Inter-American Centre of Tax Administrators (CIAT)
for help. He said since 2011, the country is estimated to have
lost US$1.4 billion per year to transfer pricing in the LNG
industry, the report says.

According to the Energy Ministry's latest monthly bulletin, T&T
produced an average of 70,914 barrels of oil per day (bopd) in
September versus 65,196 barrels of oil per day (bopd) in August
versus 66,159 bopd in July. As for LNG, according to the Energy
Ministry bulletin, Atlantic sold and delivered 1.8 million cubic
metres of LNG in September versus 1.5 million cubic metres in
August versus 2.3 million in July, the report notes.

Only Galeota Mix (BP) has been exported from T&T since August:
740,546 barrels of Calypso Crude and Galeota Mix left in July, but
only 380,353 barrels of Galeota Mix in August, and 759,251 barrels
of Galeota Mix again in September were exported, the report adds.



=============
U R U G U A Y
=============


URUGUAY: To Get $6MM IDB Loan to Launch Program to Fight Crimes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Uruguay will implement a program to fight theft and domestic and
juvenile violence with help from a $6 million loan from the Inter-
American Development Bank.

In order to combat theft in Montevideo, the program will promote
both deterrence and prevention programs.

The deterrence element will include training 1,100 police officers
in community relations, dissuasion and problem solving. Crime
prevention will be pursued by training 650 officers from
Montevideo's 25 precincts on dispute resolution and other related
issues. The program will also strengthen criminal analysis and
investigation techniques, providing training as well as computing
hardware and software.

In order to reduce domestic and juvenile violence, the program
will implement integral prevention strategies in two quarters,
Marconi and Casavalle. Working with local actors, it will
strengthen "Pelota al Medio a la Esperanza," a program designed to
put recreation time to good use and deter school desertion;
implement interventions to prevent partner violence; promote
social and work reintegration of ex-convicts; create safe urban
spaces; and finance violence-prevention micro-initiatives within
local communities.

It will also support the creation of Uruguay's Applied Criminology
Center in order to stimulate the use of scientific evidence in
security policy decision-making.

The $6 million IDB loan is for a 25-year term, with 5.5 years of
grace, at a LIBOR-based interest rate. It includes an additional
$2 million in local counterpart funds.


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Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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