TCRLA_Public/161109.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, November 9, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 222


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

PROVINCIA SEGUROS: Moody's Affirms 'B3' LC Insurance Fin. Rating


B R A Z I L

BANCO SANTANDER: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Credit Ratings
BRAZIL: Health Minister Seeks to Stem Inefficiencies to Cut Costs
CEAGRO AGRICOLA: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'D' Ratings
PARANA BANCO: S&P Puts 'BB-' Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: To Prospect for Natural Gas in Bolivia


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BOWEN MIDETTE: Reaches Settlement Agreement with Stanford
WILLIS TOWERS: Reaches Settlement Agreement with Stanford


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Expert Sees Contradiction in Protecting Highlands
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Laud Central Bank on Dollars Galore


E L  S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B3; Outlook Negative


P U E R T O    R I C O

E. MENDOZA & CO: Condado 2 Asks Court to Prohibit Cash Use
EDUARDO MENDOZA: Condado 2 Wants to Prohibit Cash Collateral Use
JOSE LUIS CRESPO LORENZO: DS Okayed; Jan. 13 Plan Hearing Set


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Jobless Rate Rises to 4.4%


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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PROVINCIA SEGUROS: Moody's Affirms 'B3' LC Insurance Fin. Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo, S.A. has
affirmed its ratings on Provincia Seguros (insurance financial
strength (IFS) at B3 on the global local currency scale, and at
Baa1.ar on Argentina's national scale) but revised the outlook for
the insurer's ratings to negative, from stable.

                           RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, Provincia Seguros' negative outlook
primarily reflects a net loss reported during the fiscal year
ended June 30, 2016, that represented 45% of the company's capital
at the beginning of the fiscal year.  This negative result was
primarily driven by adjustments to the company's case reserves and
deficiency premiums reserves, subsequent to a turnover in
management.  As a result, Provincia Seguros reported a regulatory
solvency margin deficit of ARS 589 million.  The company has
communicated a plan (subject to regulatory approval) to remediate
the solvency margin deficit by December 2019.  A further
deterioration of Provincia Seguros' profitability and/or
capitalization or a failure to obtain regulatory approval for the
remediation plan along with a lack of shareholders support in case
of capital needs, could result in a rating downgrade.

Despite the negative outlook, Moody's explained that Provincia
Seguros' ratings affirmation is based on the insurer's ratings
remaining well positioned at their current level, notwithstanding
the recent financial deterioration.  Moody's went on to say that
Provincia Seguros' credit profile primarily considers its adequate
market position, as well as the advantages provided by its access
to diversified product distribution channels and the synergies
maintained with its parent bank, Banco de la Provincia de Buenos
Aires.  Offsetting these positive considerations are the company's
very high gross underwriting leverage and sustained underwriting
losses, which have resulted in Provincia Seguros becoming highly
dependent on investment returns.  The company's reliance on
investment returns to continually offset underwriting losses
remains a key challenge and weakness for the company's
profitability and overall credit profile, exposing both its
earnings and capital to systemic risk to a greater degree than
many of its competitors.

Among the factors that could lead to a downgrade of the companies'
ratings are the following: (1) failure to comply with capital
regulatory requirements and/or to gain approval for the 3-year
capital remediation plan, absent a recapitalization by its
shareholders; (2) sustained weak profitability; or (3) a downgrade
of Argentina's sovereign rating.  Conversely, the company's
outlook could return to stable in case of: (1) a sustained
improvement in capitalization (i.e.: reversing the solvency margin
deficit; (2) sustained improvement in underwriting results (i.e.
combined ratios consistently below 100%); or (3) improvement in
Argentina's government bond rating.

Provincia Seguros is 60% owned by the major Argentine financial
services group, Grupo Banco Provincia S.A., which in turn is owned
by the second-largest bank in Argentina, Banco de la Provincia de
Buenos Aires.  Grupo Banco Provincia S.A. is engaged in multiple
financial services segments and it also maintains a presence in
the life insurance industry through Provincia Seguros de Vida, and
in the mono-line workers' compensation segment through Provincia
Seguros ART.

Based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Provincia Seguros reported a net
loss of ARS 234 million and gross premiums of ARS 5.2 billion for
the fiscal year ended June 30, 2016.  As of that date,
shareholders' equity was ARS 332 million, and total assets were
ARS 5.1 billion.



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B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO SANTANDER: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Credit Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB/B' global scale and
'brAA-/brA-1' national scale issuer credit ratings on Banco
Santander (Brasil) S.A.  The outlook on the global and national
scale ratings remains negative.  At the same time, S&P is leaving
the bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'bbb-'.

The issuer credit ratings on Banco Santander Brasil reflect S&P's
assessments of its strong business position -- thanks to
significant market shares in Brazil, relatively stable revenue,
large and stable client base, and diversified business lines --
adequate capital and earnings based on average projected risk-
adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of 7.4% in the next two years.  The
ratings also reflect the bank's adequate risk position that's
based on asset quality in line with those of peers and good
diversification, as well as S&P's view of its average funding and
adequate liquidity.


BRAZIL: Health Minister Seeks to Stem Inefficiencies to Cut Costs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's
government is renegotiating contracts and searching for
inefficiencies in the country's mammoth public-health system ahead
of a likely tightening in public spending starting next year,
Health Minister Ricardo Barros said.

The government has already managed to reduce the price it pays for
drugs provided to millions of patients by renegotiating contracts
with labs, Mr. Barros said, according to The Wall Street Journal.
Mr. Barros said the savings so far, including other measures,
amount to BRL1.1 billion (US$343.3 million).

The minister said the savings will grow as the ministry speeds up
a plan to automate paperwork in the public-health network so that
information about each user will be more readily available, the
report notes.  He said that would make it easier to find
inefficiencies and help thwart attempts to game the system, the
report relays.

The cost-cutting measures come as Congress mulls capping the
annual growth in public spending by the previous year's inflation
rate, the report discloses.  The move was approved in the lower
house last month and is scheduled for a final vote on Dec. 13 in
the Senate, where President Michel Temer has a majority of votes,
the report notes.

Critics have said the limits, which would kick in next year and
stay in place for at least a decade, risk worsening public health
in a country of 200 million where most people rely on government-
provided hospitals and drugs, the report relays.

Mr. Barros said other sectors of the government may need to
compensate so health services won't suffer, the report says.

"Health . . . . won't have cuts, as President Temer has promised.
Other areas of the government will have to adjust," Mr. Barros
said. "The equation is a simple one," he added.

Brazil's 1988 Constitution entitles all citizens to taxpayer-
supported health services, the report notes.  But hospitals are
overloaded and patients are left waiting for care, sometimes for
months, the report says.  The country ranks a low 68 out of 140
nations with regard to health care in the World Economic Forum's
Global Competitiveness Index, the report relays.

But even with low quality, public health services will cost
BRL93.4 billion this year, of 7.5% of the national budget, and
BRL94.9 billion, or 7.2% of the budget next year. Official data
say the country has 492,472 hospital beds, of which 337,086 are
part of the public network, the report discloses.

Mr. Barros became the manager of this sprawling network in May. He
was appointed by Mr. Temer, who became acting president in May
after former President Dilma Rousseff was suspended and later
ousted on impeachment charges that she broke budget laws, the
report notes.

Mr. Barros said public-health spending must be tightly controlled
to avoid wasting taxpayer money, the report relays.

"We can have significant savings that will allow us to provide
[health services] with the funds available," he added.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2, negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service.  The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.


CEAGRO AGRICOLA: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'D' Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'D' global and national scale
ratings and its '6' recovery rating on Ceagro Agricola.

S&P subsequently withdrew the ratings at the company's request.
At the time of the withdrawal, Ceagro was negotiating with its
debtholders to restructure its debt following a general default on
its obligations since first half of 2015.


PARANA BANCO: S&P Puts 'BB-' Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its long term 'BB-' global scale and
'brA' national scale ratings on Parana Banco on CreditWatch
negative, with the potential for a multiple notch downgrade on the
national scale.

On Oct. 24, 2016, Parana Banco announced that its controlling
block bought the preferred shares from Cox Gestao de Recursos
Ltda., which accounts for 34.4% of total preferred shares and
10.7% of the bank's total capital.  The transaction was completed
on Oct. 28, 2016.  In addition, the board approved extraordinary
dividends distribution of R$215.9 million, which should be paid
starting from Nov. 3, 2016.

Furthermore, the shares that the bank's controlling block acquired
represent more than 33% of the free-float, which will now
represent only 20.9% of Parana Banco's total shares, below the
regulatory minimum of 25%.  In this sense, the bank will have to
make a public offering to buy back shares and cancel its
registration as publicly held bank.

The extraordinary dividends payment will weaken Parana Banco's RAC
ratio by around 150 basis points in 2016, pressuring its strong
capital and earnings score.  Moreover, S&P don't have sufficient
information to assess the impact of the public offering, which
will depend on the market adherence and shares price at the
closing date.  Also, S&P needs additional information regarding
Parana Banco's strategic plans for the next two years to assess
the impacts on the ratings of Parana Banco, which could mitigate
the impact on bank's RAC ratio.

The CreditWatch negative listing on Parana Banco reflects S&P's
view that the extraordinary dividends payment and the buyback
could jeopardize its capital position.  S&P may take a negative
rating action, including a multiple-notch downgrade on the
national scale, if the bank's capital ratio drops below 10% on
assessing its strategy after the buyback and dividends payment.
S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch listing within the next 90
days once it has sufficient information to assess the rating
impact.

In addition, S&P could downgrade Parana Banco if S&P was to revise
Brazil's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment to group '7'
from group '6' given its negative trend, because S&P believes the
bank's finances could deterioration from pressures on domestic
banking system stemming from fiscal and monetary tightening.


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: To Prospect for Natural Gas in Bolivia
-----------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that executives of Brazilian state oil company
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) and smaller Bolivian
counterpart YPFB signed a contract for a $1.2 billion natural-gas
exploration venture in southern Bolivia.

Bolivian President Evo Morales and Brazil's minister of mines and
energy, Fernando Coelho Filho, traveled to Bolivia's eastern city
of Santa Cruz for the signing ceremony.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Oct. 25, 2016, Moody's Investors Service upgraded all ratings of
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras)'s and ratings based on
Petrobras' guarantee, including the company's senior unsecured
debt and corporate family rating to B2 from B3 given lower
liquidity risk and prospects of better operating performance in
the medium term.  At the same time, Moody's raised the company's
baseline credit assessment (BCA) to b3 from caa2.



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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BOWEN MIDETTE: Reaches Settlement Agreement with Stanford
---------------------------------------------------------
The Court-appointed receiver for Stanford International Bank, Ltd.
and certain plaintiffs have reached an agreement to settle all
claims against Bowen, Midette & Britt, Inc.  As part of the
settlement agreement, Stanford and Bowen, Midette have requested
orders that permanently enjoin all including Stanford investors
(i.e., customers of Stanford who as of Feb. 16, 2009, had funds on
deposit and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by
Stanford) and all other interested parties from bringing legal
proceedings or cause of action arising from Stanford entities
against Bowen, Midette.

Complete copies of the settlement agreement, the proposed bar
orders, and other settlement documents are available on the
receiver's website at:

             http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com

Interested parties may file written objections with the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas by
Dec. 30, 2016.


WILLIS TOWERS: Reaches Settlement Agreement with Stanford
---------------------------------------------------------
The Court-appointed receiver for Stanford International Bank, Ltd.
and certain plaintiffs have reached an agreement to settle all
claims against Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company (f/k/a/
Willis Group Holdings Limited), several other Willis entities and
Amy Baranoucky, a former Willis employee.  As part of the
settlement agreement, Stanford and Willis Towers have requested
orders that permanently enjoin all including Stanford investors
(i.e., customers of Stanford who as of Feb. 16, 2009, had funds on
deposit and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by
Stanford) and all other interested parties from bringing legal
proceedings or cause of action arising from Stanford entities
against Willis Towers.

Complete copies of the settlement agreement, the proposed bar
orders, and other settlement documents are available on the
receiver's website at:

             http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com

Interested parties may file written objections with the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas by
Dec. 30, 2016.



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REP: Expert Sees Contradiction in Protecting Highlands
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic Academy of
Sciences president Milciades Mejia said government agencies
contradict each other on how to deal with the area of Valle Nuevo
Constanza.

Mr. Mejia said while the Environment Ministry strives to eliminate
all forms of farming in the area, agro sector agencies provide
various types of technical and financial assistance to squatters
farming there, according to Dominican Today.

The report notes that Mr. Mejia said while the Academy strongly
supports president Danilo Medina's effort to recover the country's
main river basins, they suggest a meeting of the National
Environment Council, to send a signal to all agencies that the
decision to rescue Valle Nuevo is State policy.

Interviewed on Telesistema Channel 11, the expert noted that when
institutions which fight to preserve the environment concentrated
all their efforts to protect Los Haitises National Park,
government agencies such as the Agricultural Bank, and the
Dominican Agrarian Institute, among others, were offering loans to
farmers to plant crops in the protected area, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Laud Central Bank on Dollars Galore
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Herrera and Santo Domingo Province
Industries Association (AEIH) President Antonio Taveras lauded the
Central Bank's "effective" and recent measures to ease the
pressure on the dollar's exchange rate, resulting from the
rationing verified in the market.

Mr. Taveras called the upward adjustment in the Monetary Policy
Rate (MPR) "appropriate," with which the monetary authority in his
view sends a clear signal that will limit any inflationary
outbreak of monetary origin, according to Dominican Today.

Mr. Taveras said the flow of dollars into the economy has
fortunately begun to improve, after seasonal factors led to the
yearend dollar shortage, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.



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E L  S A L V A D O R
====================


EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B3; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded El Salvador's issuer and
long-term debt ratings to B3 from B1 and assigned a negative
outlook to the ratings, concluding the review for possible
downgrade initiated on Aug. 11.

The downgrade to B3 is based on these key drivers:

  1) The significant increase in liquidity risks as (i) the
     government is already under financial stress and has been
     forced to prioritize payments and (ii) short-term debt
     continues to rise reaching record-high levels that are
     starting to challenge local banks' capacity and willingness
     to absorb additional amounts.

  2) The political impasse in the Legislative Assembly that leaves
     the government without necessary approval to issue long-term
     debt to retire short term debt and fund its operations.

The negative outlook reflects the risk that an agreement between
the main political parties in the Legislative Assembly could prove
elusive in coming months further extending the government's
funding problems and increasing the possibility of a credit event.
Even though Moody's does not rate El Salvador's short-term
government debt, the strained fiscal situation may impact the
credit profile of the government's long-term debt.

El Salvador's long-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings
were lowered to B1 from Ba2.  Short-term foreign-currency bond and
deposit ceilings remain unchanged at NP.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADING TO B3 FROM B1
GOVERNMENT LIQUIDITY RISKS CONTINUE TO RISE

The government of El Salvador faces increased liquidity risks,
given the continued rise of short-term government paper (LETES)
which currently stands above historical thresholds, challenging
local banks' capacity and willingness to absorb additional
amounts.  As the government has been unable to secure approval
from the Legislative Assembly to issue long-term debt, it has been
forced to increasingly finance itself with short-term debt.  As a
two-thirds majority vote in the Legislative Assembly is required
to approve long-term debt issuance, the ruling party (FMLN) needs
support from the main opposition party (ARENA) to get approval.

While the requirement to obtain legislative approval to issue long
term debt has been a long standing feature of El Salvador's debt
management, administrations in the past had brokered agreements
with the opposition to issue long-term debt and retire LETES when
the outstanding amount reached around $800 million.  Since January
2016, LETES surpassed the $800 million mark, a level at which
refinancing conditions began to deteriorate, as they test the
absorption capacity of the relatively shallow domestic market.  As
of Oct. 12, latest data available, LETES had reached a record high
of $1.022 billion.

The official limit for outstanding LETES this year is set by the
budget at 30% of the government's current revenues year-to-date,
that is, approximately $1.3 billion, and higher than the currently
outstanding amount.  However, the market limit is more relevant in
our opinion, determined by the banks' willingness to continue to
buy the short-term paper.  The increase of LETES beyond $800
million pushed the interest rate the government pays for them to
6.5%, more than double compared to the previous year.  Interest
rates have been stable since March as the government reached an
understanding with local banks to continue to roll-over short-term
debt without a substantial increase in interest rates.

However, there is a risk that interest rates could rise further as
the appetite from local banks to absorb government short-term debt
declines and so does the concentration risk associated with their
holdings, potentially making them less inclined to roll over LETES
coming due.  In a scenario we believe is unlikely, banks could
decide to stop rolling over LETES, leading to a default on short-
term debt.  Although this is not our baseline expectation, the
probability of this scenario crystallizing rises as time goes by
without an agreement.  Moody's baseline expectation is that if an
agreement is not reached and there is no long-term financing to
retire any LETES, banks would most likely continue to hold and buy
LETES to avoid triggering a credit event.  This baseline
expectation could shift if it became increasingly unlikely that a
political agreement will eventually be reached.

AN AGREEMENT IN THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY TO APPROVE LONG-TERM DEBT
ISSUANCE REMAINS UNCERTAIN

An agreement between the ruling party and the opposition to issue
long-term debt to retire short-term debt is crucial to curtail
rising government liquidity risks and preserve macroeconomic and
fiscal stability.  Reaching such an agreement, however, has been
difficult due to the contentious relationship between the two main
political parties, and their disagreements on policy priorities.

Negotiations have intensified in the last couple of weeks, with a
meeting between President Sanchez Ceren and the new head of
opposition ARENA party, Mauricio Interiano.  Such engagement at
the highest level of authority reflects the urgency of the
situation, indicated by pressure to resolve the impasse from
various stakeholders including municipalities, suppliers and local
banks.

                 RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the risk that an agreement between
the main political parties in the Legislative Assembly could prove
elusive in the next months, failing to normalize the funding
situation of the government and further straining its liquidity
position.

                 WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook, an upward movement in the rating is
unlikely at this time.  The outlook could move to stable if the
government is able to materially reduce government liquidity
risks.  The reduction of liquidity risks could come in the form of
an agreement between the FMLN and ARENA to approve long-term debt
issuance, sufficient to retire a portion of short-term debt paper
and reduce arrears.  In addition, a credible plan for addressing
the government's persistent budget deficits and rising debt ratio,
in the form of a fiscal responsibility law agreed between the main
political parties or under an IMF program, would be supportive of
the stabilization of the outlook.

Moody's would downgrade El Salvador's B3 ratings if it appeared
unlikely that an agreement allowing the government to access long-
term funding would be reached early next year, since this would
materially increase the probability of a credit event.  Even
though Moody's does not rate El Salvador's short-term government
debt, the further escalation of financial stress would impact the
credit profile of the government's long-term debt.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,303 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

  Real GDP growth (% change): 2.5% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   GDP Growth)
  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1% (2015 Actual)
  Non-Financial Public Sector Financial Balance/GDP: -3.3% (2015
   Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance)
  Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as
   External Balance)
  External debt/GDP: 59.9% (2015 Actual)
  Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
  Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
   recorded since 1983.

On Nov. 3, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the El Salvador, Government of.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's institutional
strength/framework, have materially decreased.  The issuer has
become increasingly susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2015.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.



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P U E R T O    R I C O
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E. MENDOZA & CO: Condado 2 Asks Court to Prohibit Cash Use
----------------------------------------------------------
Condado 2, LLC, asks the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Puerto Rico to enter an order prohibiting E. Mendoza & Co., Inc.,
from using cash collateral.

Condado 2 contends that it is a secured creditor, having a
mortgage over the Debtor's properties located in Puerto Rico.
Condado 2 further contends that the properties generate rent
proceeds, which are also pledged in favor of Condado 2 and
constitute cash collateral.

Firstbank Puerto Rico extended to Eduardo Mendoza Vidal and his
wife, Marta Fenrandez Torres, certain credit facilities in the
principal amount of $3,110,000, which were secured by mortgages
over five properties.  The mortgages were endorsed to Condado 2,
and were guaranteed by the Debtor and E.M. T-Shirt Distributors,
Inc., as solidary corporate guarantors.

Firstbank extended to the Debtor a certain commercial loan in the
principal amount of $800,000, whereby the five previously-
mortgaged properties were mortgaged.  Eduardo Mendoza Vidal and
Marta Fernandez Torres, Eduardo Mendoza Corporation and E.M. T-
Shirt Distributors, Inc. guaranteed the obligation.

Condado 2 tells the Court that it holds a first priority
prepetition security interest in the cash collateral through a
duly-registered Mortgage Deed and a notarized Assignment
Aggreement.  Condado 2 further tells the Court that although it is
entitled to adequate protection, the Debtor has not alleged nor
met its burden to demonstrate that Condado 2 is adequately
protected.

A full-text copy of Condado 2, LLC's Motion, dated Oct. 31, 2016,
is available at

  http://bankrupt.com/misc/EMendoza&Co2016_1606661esl11_47.pdf

Condado 2, LLC, is represented by:

          Sonia E. Colon, Esq.
          Gustavo A. Chico-Barris, Esq.
          Camille N. Somoza, Esq.
          FERRAIUOLI LLC
          PO Box 195168
          San Juan, PR 00919-5168
          Telephone: (787) 766-7000
          E-mail: scolon@ferraiuoli.com
                  gchico@ferraiuoli.com
                  csomoza@ferraiuoli.com

                About E. Mendoza & Co., Inc.

E. Mendoza & Co. Inc., based in San Juan, P.R., filed a Chapter 11
petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-06661) on Aug. 22, 2016.  The
petition was signed by Marta Fernandez Torres, secretary.  The
Debtor estimated $0 to $50,000 in assets and $1 million to $10
million in liabilities at the time of the filing.  The Debtor is
represented by Nelson Robles Diaz, Esq., at the Nelson Robles Diaz
Law Offices, PSC.


EDUARDO MENDOZA: Condado 2 Wants to Prohibit Cash Collateral Use
----------------------------------------------------------------
Condado 2, LLC, asks the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Puerto Rico to prohibit Eduardo Mendoza Corporation from using
cash collateral.

Condado 2 contends that it is a secured creditor, having a
mortgage over the Debtor's properties located in Puerto Rico.
Condado 2 further contends that the properties generate rent
proceeds, which are also pledged in favor of Condado 2 and
constitute cash collateral.

Firstbank Puerto Rico extended to Eduardo Mendoza Vidal and his
wife, Marta Fenrandez Torres, certain credit facilities in the
principal amount of $3,110,000, which were secured by mortgages
over five properties.  The mortgages were endorsed to Condado 2,
and were guaranteed by the Debtor and E.M. T-Shirt Distributors,
Inc., as solidary corporate guarantors.

Condado 2 tells the Court that it holds a first priority
pre-petition security interest in the cash collateral through a
duly registered Mortgage Deed and a notarized Assignment
Agreement. Condado 2 further tells the Court that although it is
entitled to adequate protection, the Debtor has not even alleged
nor met its burden to demonstrate that Condado 2 is adequately
protected.

Condado 2 tells the Court that the Debtor has not sought the
authorization of the Court to use Condado 2's cash collateral, nor
has it proffered any adequate protection whatsoever.  Condado 2
further tells the Court that it has not consented to the use of
cash collateral and that it wants the Debtor to be prohibited from
using the cash collateral.

A full-text copy of Condado 2, LLC's Motion, dated Oct. 31, 2016,
is available at:

  http://bankrupt.com/misc/EduardoMendoza2016_1606672esl11_37.pdf

Condado 2, LLC, is represented by:

          Sonia E. Colon, Esq.
          Gustavo A. Chico-Barris, Esq.
          Camille N. Somoza, Esq.
          FERRAIUOLI LLC
          PO Box 195168
          San Juan, PR 00919-5168
          Telephone: (787) 766-7000
          E-mail: scolon@ferraiuoli.com
                 gchico@ferraiuoli.com
                 csomoza@ferraiuoli.com

              About Eduardo Mendoza Corporation

Eduardo Mendoza Corporation filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-06672) on Aug. 22, 2016.  The petition
was signed by Mara Fernandez Torres, secretary.  The Debtor
estimated assets at $0 to $50,000 and liabilities at $100,001 to
$500,000 at the time of the filing.  The Debtor is represented by
Nelson Robles Diaz, Esq., at the Nelson Robles Diaz Law Offices,
PSC.


JOSE LUIS CRESPO LORENZO: DS Okayed; Jan. 13 Plan Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward Godoy approved the Disclosure Statement in support of
the Chapter 11 Plan proposed by the Chapter 11 trustee in the
estate of Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo as containing "adequate
information."

A hearing for the confirmation of the Plan has been scheduled for
Jan. 13, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Written objections to the Plan should be filed 14 days before the
Confirmation Hearing.

As reported in the Sept. 27, 2016 edition of the TCR, Wigberto
Lugo-Mender, the Chapter 11 Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of
Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo, has filed a Chapter 11 plan that states
that in order to provide funds for the Debtor's
intended reorganization, the Chapter 11 Trustee has determined
that the best alternative for all parties in interest is to:

     -- use the funds in possession to pay allowed administrative
and unsecured claims filed in the case; and

     -- turn over the commercial properties encumbered by the
claim filed by Banco Popular, now ROSAN, INC.

The Chapter 11 Trustee purports that it will be in the best
interest of allowed unsecured creditors that the administration of
these two stations be turned over to the secured creditor and that
the funds currently available be distributed at the least cost
possible to the allowed creditors of this estate.

General unsecured claims (Class 5) are estimated to total
$9,092,836.  Creditors under the class will receive a lump sum
payment of all proceeds deposited in the Chapter 11 Trustee
account no. 8648 in Banco Santander resulting after full payment
of allowed claims classified under Class 1 administrative claims,
Class 6 claim of Mr. Lorenzo, and priority claims pursuant to 11
U.S.C. Sec. 507(a)(8) of the Code, as these are defined in the
Plan of Reorganization.  Each member of Class 5 holding an allowed
claim will receive a pro-rata distribution of the lump sum amount
distribution within 30 days from the effective date, as per the
Schedule Payments under the Plan of Reorganization.

A copy of the Disclosure Statement is available for free at:

   http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb14-04720_338_DS_JLC_Lorenzo.pdf

                 About Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo

Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo owns two gas service stations: one
located at Malpaso Ward, Aguada, Puerto Rico, and another at
Guanabanos Ward, Aguada, Puerto Rico.

Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 14-04720) on June 9, 2014, and
was represented by Jose Ramon Cintron.  On June 23, 2016, Alberto
Lozada Colon, Esq., assumed the legal representation of the
Debtor.

On Aug. 20, 2015, Wigberto Lugo-Mender, Esq. was named Chapter 11
Trustee of the Debtor.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Jobless Rate Rises to 4.4%
---------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that amid a deepening recession,
unemployment rose to a four-year high, women lost more jobs than
men, and the rise was the steepest in five years, according to
data released by the Central Statistical Office (CSO).

In the second quarter (Q2) of 2016 unemployment rose to 4.4 per
cent of the 1.3 million population, the highest it has been since
December 2012 when it was 4.7 per cent, the CSO data showed,
according to Trinidad Express.  On a year-on-year basis,
unemployment also hit a four-year high, as it was 4.9 per cent in
Q2 2012, the report notes.

Quarter-on-quarter, unemployment rose by 60 basis points from 3.8
per cent in Q1 to 4.4 per cent in Q2, the steepest climb in
unemployment in five years, the report relays.  Said differently,
this is the most jobs lost since the quarter ended December 2011,
when unemployment climbed from 4.2 per to 5.4 per cent in the
quarter ended March 2012-120 basis points, the report notes.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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