/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/161110.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Thursday, November 10, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 223
Headlines
B R A Z I L
AES TIETE: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on BRL180MM Debentures
BM&FBOVESPA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' ICRs; Outlook Remains Negative
BRAZIL: Freezes Rio Bank Accounts
CONCESSIONARIA RODOVIAS: Moody's Cuts Issuer Ratings to B2/Ba2.br
CONCESSIONARIA ROD: Moody's Rates BRL270MM Sr. Debentures Ba2
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
ASCEND TELECOM: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 28
BCS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 17
ESMERALDA INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 7
GB VOYAGER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
OJART INC: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PANG INC: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PP CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 5
RAB PARTNERS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
RAB SPECIAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SCIENS IG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 30
SILVER CREEK: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SUN MIRACLE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 8
ZEELANDER OFFSHORE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 7
C O L O M B I A
BANCOLOMBIA SA: Moody's Lowers For. Curr. Sub. Debt Rating to Ba2
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Deputy Wants Coal Plant Contract Nixed
E L S A L V A D O R
AES EL SALVADOR TRUST: Moody's Cuts CFR to B2; Outlook Negative
M E X I C O
MEXICO: Peso in Free-Fall as Trump Looks Set to Win
N I C A R A G U A
NICARAGUA: Moody's Retains B2 Rating on Economic Growth
P U E R T O R I C O
AIR SUB: Disclosures Conditionally OK'd; Hearing on Dec. 7
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Could Lose US$429-Mil. From FTA, IDB Says
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Job Losses as Hotel Occupancy Crashes
- - - - -
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
AES TIETE: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on BRL180MM Debentures
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. assigned a Ba2 rating on the global
scale and Aa1.br rating on the Brazilian national scale (NSR) for
the BRL180 million senior unsecured debentures to be issued by AES
Tiete Energia S.A. (with 7-year and 1-month maturity). The
outlook remains negative.
The debentures will have a 7-year and 1-month maturity with annual
interest payments starting in December 2017 and a tailor-made
amortization schedule consisting of two principal payments amount
adjusted by inflation (IPCA) (i) 50% in 2022 and (ii) 50% in 2023.
The debentures will have a quarterly financial covenant of Net
Debt to EBITDA lower than 3.5x or in case of asset acquisition,
3.85x for 36 months. Moody's anticipates that the debentures will
be issued by mid-November. The assigned ratings are based on
preliminary documentation and Moody's does not anticipate changes
in the main conditions that the debentures will carry. Should
issuance conditions and/or final documentation deviate from the
original ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's
will assess the impact that these differences may have on the
ratings and act accordingly.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The Ba2 rating reflect AES Tiete's relatively strong historical
credit metrics for the rating category as well as its resilient
access to the local banking and capital markets together with
management's prudent administration of the generation business.
Moody's rating also incorporates the improved hydrology conditions
and the consequent better cash generation although Moody's sees a
lower level of revenues from 2016 onwards due to the termination
of the bilateral supply contract with Eletropaulo Metropolitana
Eletricidade de Sao Paulo S.A. (Ba3, negative) set above market
prices. Capex pressures from the contractual obligation to expand
generation capacity by 15% in the State of Sao Paulo coupled with
high dividend payout and the judicial dispute over the costs (BRL
273.2 million, provisioned as of June, 2016) from the exposure to
the spot market during the hydrological crisis weigh on the
ratings. The Aa1.br national scale rating represents the standing
of the company's credit quality relative to its domestic peers.
What Could Change the Rating - Up /Down
The company's ratings and outlook are constrained by the sovereign
rating therefore a stabilization of Brazil's rating could also
lead to a stabilization of AES Tiete's outlook.
Sales volumes below Moody's expectations or a significant mismatch
on spot market exposure could prompt a downward action as well as
rapid or significant deterioration of leverage and liquidity
levels. Quantitatively, the ratings could be downgraded if
Moody's sees a downturn in the company's overall credit quality
and metrics so CFO (pre-WC) to total debt falls below 25% and
interest coverage drops below 2.5x on a sustainable basis. A
weakened support of the regulatory framework could also prompt a
downward action as well as further deterioration in the
sovereign's credit quality. Moody's doesn't incorporate any asset
acquisition or M&A activity in the current ratings.
AES Tiete is a hydropower generation company with a 30-year
concession, granted in December 1999 to operate an installed
capacity of 2,658 MW, equivalent to around 2% of Brazil's
electricity capacity, and 1,278 MW of assured average energy. The
company has 9 hydro-power plants (HPPs) and 3 small hydro-power
plants (SHPPs) located in the State of Sao Paulo. AES Tiete has
95% of its energy contracted for 2016 and 88% for 2017 and did not
adhere to the law 13,203 that hedges the hydrological risk for a
premium as negotiated with the regulator, Aneel, although Moody's
expects the company to maintain a uncontract 10-15% cushion
through its portfolio management.
According to Moody's standard adjustments, AES Tiete reported net
operating revenues of BRL2,064 million and EBITDA of BRL1,272
million in the LTM ended in June, 2016.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Unregulated
Utilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in October
2014.
BM&FBOVESPA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' ICRs; Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB/B' issuer credit
ratings on BM&FBOVESPA S.A -- Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e
Futuros (BM&FBOVESPA). The outlook remains negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'BB' ratings on the company's $612 million senior
unsecured notes due 2020, which are at the same level as the
issuer credit rating.
The ratings on BM&FBOVESPA are limited by those on Brazil. The
downgrade of Brazil to the current rating occurred in February
2016, after which S&P ran a stress test to assess the company's
potential resilience to hypothetical scenario of Brazil's default
in local and foreign currencies. Previously, S&P's stress test
was focused on the scenario in which the sovereign defaulted only
in foreign currency because at that time there was a gap between
the local and the foreign currency sovereign ratings. These two
ratings are now aligned. Under this much harsher scenario, S&P
assessed that BM&FBOVESPA won't have enough resources to absorb
potential clearing losses stemming from the joint default of
several clearing members. This is because, in this stress
scenario, the market value of sovereign bonds posted as collateral
by defaulting members would depreciate so that the clearing house
might not have enough resources within its financial safeguards.
In addition, the company sold its dollar-denominated investment in
CME Group Inc. (AA-/Stable/A-1+), which had been a significant
counter-cyclical asset that helped BM&FBOVESPA to meet the
solvency stress test in past periods. S&P expects the proceeds of
the sale of to be used to complete the company's merger with CETIP
S.A.-Mercados Organizados after regulatory approval.
BM&FBOVESPA's SACP remains at 'a-' and reflects S&P's view of the
company's strong business risk profile, given its dominant market
position in Brazil and a diversified revenue mix, and low
leverage. The company's SACP incorporates a three notches
deduction to reflect the concentration of clearing risks onto some
key Brazilian clearing members and their relatively weaker
creditworthiness than those of their global peers, as well as the
fact that cash margins are mainly invested into speculative-grade
Brazil government bonds. At the same time, S&P views favorably
the robustness and sophistication of BM&FBOVESPA's financial
safeguards and the staff's competence that monitors them. S&P
will continue monitoring clearing and settlement risks to ensure
the planned integration of the four clearinghouses won't result in
overall weaker financial safeguards.
In April 2016, BM&FBOVESPA announced that its board of directors
and the board of directors of CETIP approved the terms for the
combination of operations of the two entities. The transaction
would imply a cash payment and an equity component (issuance of
BM&FBOVESPA's shares for each share of CETIP). The final price
(and equity component of the deal) is tied to the price of
BM&FBOVESPA's shares at the closing. In S&P's view, the
transaction would enhance BM&FBOVESPA's already strong business
risk profile, given the significant increase in revenue and
broader diversification in business lines that are complementary
to the company's existing ones. CETIP is the largest depository
of corporate and fixed income securities in Brazil, providing a
wide range of services, including registration, custody,
settlement, risk management, and market data. However, if
completed, the transaction could weaken BM&FBOVESPA's financial
risk profile because S&P believes part of the cash component of
the transaction would be met with additional debt issuances.
Depending on the outcome of pro forma projections, this could
either result in unchanged SACP or in its revision to 'bbb'. The
post-transaction SACP would depend on the debt level and financial
metrics of the combined entity, S&P's forward-looking projections,
and our view of the further impact of economic developments in
Brazil on BM&FBOVESPA's business and financial risk profiles.
S&P rates BM&FBOVESPA's $612 million senior unsecured notes at
'BB', the same level as its long-term issuer credit. To rate the
issues of market financial infrastructure entities that have an
issuer credit rating of 'BB+' or below, we don't perform a
recovery analysis, because these institutions are typically highly
and prudently regulated and there are limited examples of
liquidations to determine recovery. Instead, S&P assess the level
of priority liabilities in relation to total adjusted assets to
define the degree of subordination to more senior obligations.
Under current levels of priority liabilities and total adjusted
assets, S&P rates the company's senior unsecure notes the same as
its long-term credit rating. S&P expects to reassess
subordination levels and impact on the ratings of the rated notes
after the closing of transaction with CETIP.
BRAZIL: Freezes Rio Bank Accounts
---------------------------------
BBC News reports that the Brazilian government has frozen the bank
accounts of Rio de Janeiro state, ordering it to pay millions of
dollars in overdue debt.
Many public workers have not been paid in months. Rio de Janeiro
has been struggling with a long-standing financial crisis because
of a drop in global oil and commodity prices, according to BBC
News.
It declared a financial emergency ahead of the Rio Olympics
earlier this year, the report notes.
State governor Luiz Fernando Pezao announced austerity measures.
Mr. Pezao said that unless they were approved, the state could not
guarantee that workers would receive their full salaries next
year, the report relays.
The Rio financial secretariat said the state was "blocked from
making any kind of payment until the amount it owes the state has
been paid," the report notes.
The state has been hard hit by Brazil's worse recession in a
century, and officials say it owes the federal government about
$53 million (GBP43 million).
With tax revenues dropping, Rio has already made sharp budget
cuts.
Governor Pezao announced more austerity measures, including cuts
to social program, a tax increase for retired people, a sales tax
increase and a transport fare rise, the report notes.
The report relays Mr. Pezao said he would travel to the capital
Brasilia to negotiate with the federal government.
Officials told Reuters news agency that they hoped to have the
accounts unfrozen in the coming days.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2, negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.
CONCESSIONARIA RODOVIAS: Moody's Cuts Issuer Ratings to B2/Ba2.br
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has downgraded the global and the Brazilian
national scale (NSR) issuer rating of Concessionaria Rodovias do
Tiete S.A. to B2/Ba2.br from B1/Baa2.br, respectively. At the
same time, Moody's downgraded the global scale rating and the NSR
of the company's senior secured debentures issued in 2013 to
B2/Ba2.br from B1/Baa2.br. The outlook remains negative.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The one notch downgrade reflects Rodovias do Tiete deteriorating
credit quality resulting from poor traffic performance in 2015/16
that has significantly impacted revenues combined with increasing
financial costs. Rodovias de Tiete has high leverage of BRL 1.4
billion total debt for which the debt amortization schedule
starting in 2017 will exert additional pressure on the metrics.
Moreover, the company needs to meet an elevated BRL 400-500
million Capex program within the next six years. The State of Sao
Paulo regulatory Agency (ARTESP) notifications and fines sent to
the company regarding delays in projects and maintenance as well
as environmental issues also weighed on the downgrade.
Additionally, the debenture's financial covenants of debt to cap
and debt service coverage ratio pressured the ratings as Moody's
see potential covenant breach starting in 2017.
What Could Change the Rating - Up /Down
In light of the latest rating action and the negative outlook, an
upgrade of the ratings is unlikely in the near term. The outlook
could be stabilized if traffic volume significantly recovers to
somewhat offset the negative free cash flow generation or if
liquidity improves and leverage declines. The ratings could be
further downgraded if there are material delays or costs overruns
on the capital expenditure program that negatively impact revenues
or lead to non-compliance with ARTESP's schedule. Moody's
assessment of weaker shareholders support would also add pressure
to the ratings.
Further deterioration of leverage and liquidity levels that lead
to potential covenant breaches could also prompt a rating
downgrade as well as a rapid or significant downturn in the
company's overall credit quality and metrics so FFO to Debt ratio
stays below 5% on a sustainable basis or DSCR below 1x. Political
interference in the normal course of business or a deterioration
in the supportiveness of the concession and regulatory framework
could also prompt a downward action.
Rodovias do Tiete holds a 30-year toll road concession granted by
ARTESP in April 2009 to expand, operate and maintain a 415 km toll
road system composed by five roads located in the State of Sao
Paulo: SP-101 (Rodovia Jornalista Francisco Aguirra Proenáa), SP-
113 (Rodovia Dr. Joao Jose Rodrigues), SP-308 (Rodovia Comendador
M†rio Dedini), SP-300 (Rodovia Marechal Rondon) e SP-209 (Rodovia
Prof. Joao Hipolito Martins). The service area includes 25
municipalities, where the largest cities are Bauru, Campinas, and
Piracicaba, with a diversified traffic profile, mainly composed by
agricultural, industries and commuters. Heavy traffic accounts
for 56% of total equivalent vehicles (VEQ) with light vehicles
representing the remaining 44%.
In the six months ended in June 30 2016, the company registered
BRL189 million in Net Sales, EBITDA of BRL146 million, and a net
loss of BRL76 with total debt of BRL1.4 billion, as per Moody's
standard adjustments. Rodovias do Tiete is owned by a joint
venture of Atlantia Bertin Concessoes S.A. (50%) and the
Portuguese ASCENDI International Holdings B.V. (50%). Atlantia-
Bertin Concessoes is a joint venture between Italian toll-road
operator Atlantia S.p.A ((P)Baa2, stable) and Brazil's Grupo
Bertin (not rated).
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Privately
Managed Toll Roads published in May 2014.
CONCESSIONARIA ROD: Moody's Rates BRL270MM Sr. Debentures Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda., on Nov. 8, 2016, corrected its press
release on CCR Group. The ninth paragraph of the Regulatory
Disclosures section was changed to the following: "CCR Group,
which comprises Concessionaria Rod. Oeste SP Viaoeste S.A., rated
in this Press Release accounted for 5% or more of the annual
revenue of Moody's America Latina, Ltda. during the preceding
calendar year."
The revised ratings release is as follows:
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has assigned a Ba2 global scale
rating and a Aa1.br national scale rating to the BRL270 million
senior unsecured debentures due in 2021, to be issued by
Concessionaria Rod.Oeste SP Viaoeste S.A. ViaOeste's issuer and
senior unsecured ratings remain unchanged at Ba2/Aa1.br. Proceeds
from the issuance will be used to cover capital investments. The
outlook for the ratings is negative.
The senior unsecured non-convertible debentures are expected to be
issued by Nov. 15, 2016. The debentures will benefit from a
conditional corporate guarantee from ViaOeste's parent CCR S.A.
("CCR" -- rated Ba3/A2.br) that will cover the early termination
of the concession contract. CCR and the state of Sao Paulo are
disputing a 2006 decision by the state's regulator ARTESP to
extend the life of the company's concession from 2018 to 2022.
The current ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's
does not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this
period nor anticipates changes in the main conditions that the
debentures will carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final
documentation of the debentures deviate from the original ones
submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's will assess
the impact that these differences may have on the ratings and act
accordingly.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The increase in debt from the issuance will result in a reduction
of the company's Funds from Operations (FFO)-to-Debt on a proforma
basis to around 43% from 56% in the LTM period ended June 30,
2016. However, Moody's expects that ViaOeste's strong FFO
generation and future debt amortization will lead the FFO/Debt
ratio to return to its pre-issuances levels in the next 6 to 12
months.
ViaOeste's ratings are supported by (i) the strong asset features
of the company's concession which includes one of the busiest
highways in the an economically robust and populous area in the
state of Sao Paulo, a solid track record of high traffic volumes
as well as a balanced traffic profile, (ii) the mature profile of
the concession leading to relatively modest capital expenditures
requirements; (iii) solid credit metrics evidenced by a FFO/Debt
and Cash Interest Coverage ratios of 56.3% and 6.8x respectively
in the twelve months ended 30 June 2016, and (iv) a relatively
supportive regulatory environment for operating toll road
concessionaires in the state of Sao Paulo despite uncertainties
created by the legal dispute over extension of the concession.
The Ba2/Aa1.br ratings also reflect : (i) the on-going decline in
ViaOeste's traffic volumes resulting from Brazil's prolonged
recession; (ii) the track record of high dividend distributions
which Moody's expects will continue in the foreseeable future;
(iii) the high level of investment activity of its controlling
shareholder (CCR) which tends to exert more pressure on the
upstreaming of dividends coming from ViaOeste.
The senior unsecured debentures will have a 5-year tenor from the
issuance date with a bullet principal payment due on November
2021. Interests will be payable in semi-annual installments
starting one year following issuance. The debentures will have
cross-default clauses with other debt at ViaOeste. Acceleration
events under the debentures documentation include the non-payment
by ViaOeste of any financial obligation above BRL 60 million,
change of the company's control and the termination of the
concession contract. An acceleration event would also occur upon
the payment of dividends above the minimum required by Brazilian
Corporate Law if the Net Debt to EBITDA ratio exceeds 4.0 times,
except in the case in which ViaOeste contracts a letter of credit
equivalent to the outstanding amount of debt.
As existing debentures at ViaOeste do not benefit from any
guarantee, Moody's notes that CCR's conditional guarantee granted
to the 2021 debentures establishes a higher claims position for
holders of such debentures relative to existing debentures holders
under a scenario where the concession ends in 2018. The
occurrence of such event could result in some differentiation
between the ratings of the 2021 debentures and the ratings of
existing debentures.
RATING OUTLOOK
The negative outlook is in line with the sovereign's negative
rating outlook, given the domestic nature of the company's
operations, and also reflects uncertainties relative to the
extension of the company's concession beyond 2018.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN
In light of the negative outlook, an upgrade of the ratings is
unlikely in the near term. The outlook could move to stable in
the case of a stabilization of the outlook of Brazil's sovereign
rating, provided that uncertainties around the extension of the
concession have been clarified.
Further deterioration in the sovereign's rating could exert
downward pressure on the ratings. A rating downgrade could also
occur upon an earlier than expected termination of the concession
and/or if liquidity risk arises. Quantitatively, a rating
downgrade could occur if RCF/ CAPEX stays below 1.0x, and Cash
Interest Coverage remains below 3x on a sustainable basis.
ABOUT VIAOESTE
ViaOeste is an operating subsidiary of CCR, one of Brazil's
largest toll-road concession groups, which operates and maintains
3,265 kilometers of toll road concessions.
ViaOeste holds a 24-year and 9-month concession to operate and
maintain the toll road services of the 169-kilometer Castello
Branco-Raposo Tavares road system, which connects the municipality
of Sao Paulo (not rated), the capital city of the State of Sao
Paulo (Ba2, negative) with 11 million inhabitants, to the western
region of the State, serving 16 municipalities, including the
capital city. In the twelve months ended June 30, 2016, ViaOeste
reported net operating revenues (excluding construction revenues)
of BRL905 million and EBITDA of BRL685 million.
The concession was granted in March 1998 to a consortium of
construction companies, which sold it to CCR in 2005. CCR is
controlled by the Andrade Gutierrez Group, the Camargo Correa
Group and the Soares Penido Group with a combined participation of
51.22%; the remaining 48.78% shares are free float. ViaOeste
accounts for approximately 14% and 15% of CCR's consolidated net
operating revenues and EBITDA, respectively. In FY2015, CCR
reported consolidated net operating revenues of BRL6.1 billion and
EBITDA of BRL4.2 billion.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
ASCEND TELECOM: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 28
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ascend Telecom Holdings Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by Nov. 28, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 18, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
Andre Slabbert
Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
75 Fort Street
P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +13456400556
BCS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 17
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of BCS Global Funds, SPC are required to file their
proofs of debt by Dec. 17, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.
The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Oct. 17, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
Trinity Fund Administration (Cayman) Ltd
c/o Angela Nightingale
Citrus Grove, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 10364 Grand Cayman KY1-1004
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 946 6620
Facsimile: (345) 946 6720
ESMERALDA INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 7
-----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Esmeralda Investments are required to file their
proofs of debt by Dec. 7, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 21, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
CDL Company Ltd.
P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
Cayman Islands
GB VOYAGER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On Oct. 11, 2016, the sole shareholder of GB Voyager Fund, Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Jay Min
Swiss Re Management (US) Corporation
55 East 52nd Street
New York, New York 10055
United States of America
Telephone: +1 (212) 317 5354
OJART INC: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------
On Oct. 7, 2016, the sole shareholder of Ojart Inc. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Mark Kernohan
Fiduciarie Kernohan & Associates S.A.
40 Rue de Geneve
P.O. Box 471 1225 Chene Bourg
Switzerland
Telephone: +41 22 860 1944
PANG INC: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Pang Inc., on Oct. 7, 2016, resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Mark Kernohan
Fiduciarie Kernohan & Associates S.A.
40 Rue de Geneve
P.O. Box 471 1225 Chene Bourg
Switzerland
Telephone: +41 22 860 1944
PP CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 5
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of PP Capital XX Ltd. will hold their final
general meeting on Dec. 5, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 12, 2016.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
Lynden John
Tamara Hill
Telephone: +1 (345) 815 1456
RAB PARTNERS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
The shareholders of RAB Partners Limited, on Oct. 20, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Avalon Ltd.
Reference: GL
Landmark Square, 1st Floor, 64 Earth Close
P.O. Box 715 Grand Cayman KY1-1107
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (+1) 345 769 4422
Facsimile: (+1) 345 769 9351
RAB SPECIAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
The shareholders of RAB Special Opportunities Fund Limited, on
Oct. 14, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Avalon Ltd.
Reference: GL
Landmark Square, 1st Floor, 64 Earth Close
P.O. Box 715 Grand Cayman KY1-1107
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (+1) 345 769 4422
Facsimile: (+1) 345 769 9351
SCIENS IG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 30
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Sciens IG SPV Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Nov. 30, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 20, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
Andre Slabbert
Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
75 Fort Street
P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +13456400556
SILVER CREEK: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Silver Creek Insurance Strategies GP,
Ltd., on Oct. 17, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Silver Creek Capital Management LLC
c/o Eric E. Dillon
1301 Fifth Avenue, 40th Floor
Seattle
Washington 98101
United States of America
Telephone: +1 206 774 6000
e-mail: eric@silvercreekcapital.com
SUN MIRACLE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 8
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Sun Miracle Inc. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Dec. 8, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 14, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
Ran Dong
c/o Michelle R. Bodden-Moxam
Portcullis TrustNet (Cayman) Ltd.
The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
Oleander Way, 802 West Bay Road
P.O. Box 32052 Grand Cayman KY1-1208
Cayman Islands
ZEELANDER OFFSHORE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 7
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Z.O.E. (Zeelander Offshore Exploration) are
required to file their proofs of debt by Dec. 7, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 21, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
CDL Company Ltd.
P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
Cayman Islands
===============
C O L O M B I A
===============
BANCOLOMBIA SA: Moody's Lowers For. Curr. Sub. Debt Rating to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Bancolombia S.A.'s standalone
baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to ba1, from
baa3, and its long-term foreign currency subordinated debt to Ba2,
from Ba1. At the same time, Moody's affirmed the bank's long- and
short-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of
Baa2 and P-2, respectively, and long-term foreign currency senior
unsecured debt rating of Baa2 with a stable outlook.
Moody's also affirmed Bancolombia's long- and short-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment of Baa1(cr) and Prime-2(cr).
Issuer: Bancolombia S.A.
These ratings and assessments have been downgraded:
Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, to Ba2 from Ba1
Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, to ba1 from baa3
Baseline Credit Assessment, to ba1 from baa3
These ratings and assessments have been affirmed:
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Baa2
Long Term Local and Foreign Currency Deposit Rating, Baa2
Short term Local and Foreign Currency Deposit Rating, P-2
Long Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Baa1(cr)
Short term Counterparty Risk Assessment, P-2(cr)
Outlook, Remains Stable
RATINGS RATIONALE
Moody's downgraded Bancolombia's standalone BCA to ba1, from baa3,
to incorporate the bank's greater exposure to less developed, and
in some cases increasingly risky, operating environments in
Central America.
The downgrades follow the downgrade on Nov. 7, 2016, of the El
Salvador's government's bond rating to B3, from B1, in line with
increased liquidity risks facing the government stemming from its
persistently high and rising short-term debt and the legislative
impasse that has so far this year prevented the approval of long-
term debt issuance to retire short-term paper. Bancolombia owns
El Salvador's largest bank, Banco Agricola, S.A., the assets of
which represented 7% of the parent's total, as of June 2016.
The deterioration of the country's institutional strength and
increase in government liquidity risk reflected by the downgrade
of the Salvadoran sovereign prompted a reassessment of the
country's Macro Profile to "Very Weak +," from "Weak." As a
result, Moody's lowered Bancolombia's weighted Macro Profile,
which also considers the bank's exposures to Panama and Guatemala,
to "Moderate," from "Moderate +," the Macro Profile for Colombia.
The bank's Macro Profile reflects the riskiness of the operating
environments to which Bancolombia is exposed and provides the
context within which its financial profile is assessed.
The downgrade of El Salvador and the reassessment of its macro
profile comes on top of a substantial increase of Bancolombia's
relative exposure to Central America over the last 18 months, to
one-third of assets as of June 2016, from just over a quarter as
year-end 2014, as a result of the depreciation of the Colombian
peso since mid-2014 and the consolidation of the bank's Guatemalan
subsidiary, Grupo Financiero Agromercantil (unrated), the holding
company of Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala, S.A. (BAM, unrated)
in December 2015. Guatemala, which has a "Weak" Macro Profile,
now accounts for another 7% of Bancolombia's exposures. However,
the bank's largest Central American operation is Banistmo, S.A.
(unrated), the second largest bank in Panama, which has a
"Moderate" Macro Profile. Banistmo accounts for about 20% of
Bancolombia's total assets.
The downgrade of the BCA also considers the bank's low adjusted
capitalization, and hence loss absorption capacity, which declined
substantially in recent years. As a result of significant
increases in intangibles and risk-weighted assets (RWAs) due to
the depreciation of the Colombian peso, tangible common equity
(TCE) has fallen to just 6.2% of fully adjusted RWAs as of June
2016 from 8.8% since 2014. Even the bank's reported Tier 1 ratio
is relatively modest at just 8.5%. However, Moody's expects a
modest rebound in capital due to slowing loan growth and reduced
capital consumption. Notwithstanding the decrease in capital and
increased exposure to higher risk operating environments, the BCA
continues to be supported by the bank's proven earnings generation
capabilities, broad access to core funding, and good asset
quality.
Despite the downgrade of the BCA, Moody's nevertheless affirmed
Bancolombia's deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings at Baa2 to
reflect the very high probability that Bancolombia will receive
government support in a situation of financial stress, which now
results in two notches of uplift from the bank's ba1 BCA. The
bank's subordinated debt rating, which does not benefit from
government support was downgraded in line with the BCA. The sub
debt is notched down from the BCA to reflect lower expected
recovery in the event of a bank failure given its lesser priority
of claim.
The stable outlook considers Moody's expectation that the bank's
key financial indicators will prove resilient to the slowdown in
economic growth in Colombia.
What Could Change the Rating Up or Down
While Bancolombia's outlook may be stable, the BCA and ratings are
nevertheless weakly positioned at current levels and are
vulnerable to further downward pressure in the event of a
relatively modest but sustained deterioration of the bank's
financial fundamentals. Specifically, the BCA could be downgraded
if nonperforming loans rise above 2% of gross loans, or if the
bank's capitalization remains below 6.5% and loan loss reserve
coverage falls below 2-times nonperforming loans. If the BCA is
lowered to ba2, the debt and deposit ratings would likely be
lowered as well, notwithstanding public support.
The BCA is unlikely to face upward pressure unless the bank's
TCE/RWAs rises above 9%. Even if the BCA increases, however,
Bancolombia's deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings are
unlikely to be affected because they are at the same level as
Colombian government's bond rating.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Banks"
published in January 2016.
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Deputy Wants Coal Plant Contract Nixed
----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that after rejecting the government's
US$600 million bond issue to finance the Punta Catalina coal-fired
plants, Deputy Fidelio Despradel said the contract with Brazil
contractor Odebrecht should be canceled at once, "for failing to
meet its financing commitments."
Mr. Despradel said in addition to the alleged ballooned cost of
more than US$1 billion, the Brazilian multinational's turnkey
contract requires it to seek its own financing in case of
unforeseen events, according to Dominican Today.
The minority party lawmaker said Odebrecht has yet to comply with
its commitments, "because the high level of pollution generated by
coal energy has prevented access to soft financing such as those
available in the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB)," the report notes.
To deal with the situation, the deputy for Alianza Pais proposes
an immediate audit by the Accounts Chamber on the Punta Catalina
project, and for the authorities to subsequently call for tenders
to convert the plants to natural gas and conclude the work, the
report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.
====================
E L S A L V A D O R
====================
AES EL SALVADOR TRUST: Moody's Cuts CFR to B2; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the senior unsecured long
debt rating and Corporate Family Rating of AES El Salvador Trust
II bis (Trustco II) to B2 from Ba3. The rating outlook is
negative. This concludes the review for possible upgrade that
commenced on Aug. 12.
Trustco II issued the 10-year $310 million senior global notes due
in 2023 for the benefit of four affiliated electric distribution
companies in El Salvador: Compania de Alumbrado Electrico de San
Salvador (CAESS), Empresa Electrica de Oriente (EEO), AES Clesa y
Compania (CLESA) and Distribuidora Electrica de Usulutan (DEUSEM).
These four distribution utilities which are majority owned by AES
Corporation (AES; Ba3 positive) unconditionally and severally
guarantee the debt of Trust II bis, collectively the guarantors.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The downgrade and review of the ratings of Trustco II is prompted
by the Nov. 7, downgrade of El Salvador government bond rating to
B3 from B1 with a negative outlook.
Trust II's B2 CFR and senior unsecured ratings reflect the
guarantors' consolidated credit profile given the joint and
multiple guaranties provided by each of these regulated utilities
which represent a senior unsecured obligation of each guarantor.
The B2 ratings further reflect Trust II's dependence on the
guarantors' payments under a promissory note to service the
$310 million Notes.
The rating action factors in the country's significant
macroeconomic deterioration and fiscal challenges. The guarantors
have experienced growing delays to receive electricity subsidies
from the government's Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica (CEL).
Those subsidies currently range between $5 and $6 million per
month, equivalent to around 10% of the guarantors' consolidated
revenues. Since 2012 CEL is the conduit through which the
government funds electricity subsidies in El Salvador.
The rating action captures a number of strengths including that
the guarantors recorded end of October a cash balance of
$36 million and that a 3-year $16.5 million committed credit
facility remains available until early February 2017. In
addition, under the terms of the Notes, the structure has a six-
month interest only debt service reserve account. The rating
action also considers the financial covenant embedded in the $310
million Notes that limits the guarantors' ability to incur
incremental indebtedness to a maximum total capitalization to debt
of 65%. It further assumes that AES will reduce the dividend
pressure on its El Salvadorian subsidiaries should they face
liquidity challenges. Moody's anticipates that the guarantors
will be able to record robust consolidated performance leading to
strong metrics for the rating category. Specifically, CFO pre-W/C
to debt will continue to exceed 5% on a sustainable basis. The
guarantors' financial and liquidity profile as well as their
limited dependence on the local capital markets further supports
the Trustco II ratings.
FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE
The prospects of an upgrade of Trustco II's B2 ratings are limited
given the negative outlook and the current sovereign rating for El
Salvador. Trustco II's outlook could be stabilized should the
outlook of El Salvador be changed to stable assuming the
guarantors' liquidity profile is adequate for the B2 rating.
FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN DOWNGRADE
A downgrade of Trustco's B2 ratings is likely to follow a
downgrade of the sovereign ratings. Negative momentum on the
rating is likely if the government's fiscal challenges and/or
CEL's financial difficulties impact the guarantors' liquidity
profile and/or their ability to extend the committed credit
facilities. Moody's assessment that the guarantors' financial
and/or liquidity profiles are no longer appropriate to maintain
the one-notch difference between Trustco II's ratings and the
sovereign rating could also result in a downgrade.
In addition, downward pressure on the ratings is likely if Moody's
perceives a deterioration in the regulatory framework that reduces
the predictability and consistency in which the regulation is
applied and/or an outcome of the next tariff review (due in
December 2017) that is not credit supportive. Negative momentum
is also likely if the consolidated key credit metrics deteriorate
significantly; Specifically, if the consolidated interest coverage
ratio and the CFO pre-W/C to debt fell below 2x and 5%,
respectively, for an extended period. An aggressive distribution
policy particularly amid the current delays to collect the subsidy
payments, would also likely result in a downgrade.
The guarantors' ultimate parent company is AES which holds
indirect ownership stakes that range in between 80.08% (CLESA),
75.11% (CAESS) and 89.11% (EEO), averaging 80% overall. For the
Last Twelve Month period ended September 2015, the guarantors
reported CFO of around US$105 million (excluding net interest) and
consolidated assets of $735 million.
===========
M E X I C O
===========
MEXICO: Peso in Free-Fall as Trump Looks Set to Win
---------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the growing lead for Donald Trump in
Tuesday's U.S. presidential election drove the Mexican peso down
to a record low against the dollar.
The Mexican currency was trading at 20.70 to the greenback,
Citibanamex said on its Web site, down 11 percent from Nov. 8's
close, according to EFE News.
The peso's dive began after the results from the key swing state
of Florida began trending in favor of Trump in his race against
Democrat Hillary Clinton, the report notes.
The value of the peso has fluctuated with the U.S. electoral polls
in recent months as a result of Trump's promises to build a wall
on the U.S.-Mexico border and to renegotiate -- if not scrap --
the North American Free Trade Agreement, the report relays.
In comments to Televisa television, analyst Luis de la Calle spoke
of predictions that the peso could fall to 23 to the dollar if
Trump wins the White House, the report notes.
But when asked about the potential effects of a Trump presidency
on the Mexican economy, De la Calle said that a crisis is not
inevitable, the report discloses.
What Mexico cannot avoid, he said, is a "period of uncertainty."
The Mexican government has taken steps to cushion the economy from
any turbulence arising from a Trump win, Finance Secretary Jose
Antonio Meade said, the report relays.
Those steps include drafting a 2017 budget "that brings us back to
a primary surplus," putting aside funds to meet all sovereign debt
obligations that come due during the first five months of next
year, and presenting a new business plan for state oil company
Pemex, Meade told Radio Formula, the report notes.
"All this allows that this volatility we are already seeing does
not affect any real (economic) variable," he said.
"We are calm," Mr. Meade said, adding that should Trump win, the
Mexican government will closely monitor the reactions in financial
markets.
"We are alert and we have instruments to react according to what
we are seeing," he said, downplaying the likelihood of any
dramatic announcements in Mexico on the day after the U.S.
election, regardless of the outcome, Mr. Meade adds.
=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================
NICARAGUA: Moody's Retains B2 Rating on Economic Growth
-------------------------------------------------------
Nicaragua's economy is one of the fastest growing in Latin
America, but the nation is also one of the poorest and smallest of
all sovereign issuers rated by Moody's Investors Service. The
nation's B2 rating reflects these dynamics, as well as Nicaragua's
low scores in World Bank governance indicators and other surveys
that measure ease of doing business and perceived corruption
levels, says Moody's in a report.
Of the 131 countries that Moody's rates, only 21 have economies
that are smaller than Nicaragua's, which had nominal GDP of $12
billion in 2015. Nonetheless, Nicaragua's economy has grown by an
average of 5.2% per year over the past five years, above the 4.3%
median for B-rated nations.
A high share of foreign currency-denominated government debt (92%)
exposes the government's balance sheet to exchange rate risk. Low
fiscal deficits coupled with concessional external debt at very
favorable terms, however, mitigate rollover and government
liquidity risks. The central government debt ratio has remained
at around 30% of GDP since 2007 coming well below the 49% median
of B-rated countries.
Nicaragua's susceptibility to external shocks stemming from its
trade and financing links with Venezuela has been considered a
relevant credit weakness. Under the Petrocaribe program,
Nicaragua pays for oil imports from Venezuela at full market
price, but then receives half the amount back in the form of
concessional loans.
However, the vulnerability to shocks emanating from the program
have diminished considerably over the last year, says Ariane
Ortiz-Bollin, an Analyst at Moody's.
"Because of lower oil prices, Nicaragua has received fewer loans
from Petrocaribe," says Ortiz-Bollin. "A large portion of those
loans were used to fund energy subsidies, and lower oil prices
have meant less spending on subsidies. Social and infrastructure
spending that was previously financed with these loans has also
been reduced, or incorporated into the government's balance sheet,
with only a moderate impact on the fiscal deficit."
Moody's report also assesses the potential impact of the
"Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act," which was passed by
the US House of Representatives and is now under discussion in the
US Senate.
======================
P U E R T O R I C O
======================
AIR SUB: Disclosures Conditionally OK'd; Hearing on Dec. 7
----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Mildred Caban Flores of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico has conditionally approved Air Sub Corp,
et al.'s disclosure statement dated Oct. 25, 2016, referring to
the Debtors' plan of reorganization.
A hearing for the consideration of the final approval of the
Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Plan and of
objections as may be made to either will be held on Dec. 7, 2016,
at 9:00 a.m.
Any objection to the final approval of the Disclosure Statement
and the confirmation of the Plan will be filed on or before 14
days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.
Acceptances or rejections of the Plan may be filed in writing by
the holders of all claims on or before 14 days prior to the date
of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.
The Debtors will file with the Court a statement setting forth
compliance with each requirement in U.S.C. Section 1129, the list
of acceptances and rejections and the computation of the same,
within seven working days before the hearing on confirmation.
Air Sub Corp filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr.
D.P.R. Case No. 16-01709) on March 2, 2016, estimating its assets
at up to $50,000 and liabilities at between $500,001 and $1
million. Nilda M. Gonzalez Cordero, Esq., at Gonzalez Cordero Law
Offices serves as the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.
N & N Sub Corp. Filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr.
D.P.R. Case No. 16-02596) on April 1, 2016, estimating its assets
at up to $50,000 and its liabilities at between $100,001 and
$500,000.
Subway Senorial Parana Corp. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-02597) on April 1, 2016,
estimating its assets at up to $50,000 and its liabilities at
between $100,001 and $500,000.
Nilda M. Gonzalez Cordero, Esq., at Gonzalez Cordero Law Offices
serves as the Debtors' bankruptcy counsel.
================================
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
================================
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Could Lose US$429-Mil. From FTA, IDB Says
------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that a new study by the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), authored by IDB economist Jeetendra Khadan
and The University of the West Indies (UWI) senior economics
lecturer Roger Hosein, has found Trinidad and Tobago stands to
lose the most in the Caribbean from a Caribbean Community
(Caricom) Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
The October 2016 paper "Trade, Economic and Welfare Impacts of the
Caricom-Canada Free Trade Agreement" was released last month.
In it, Khadan and Hosein said: "The four Caricom countries
expected to experience the most losses in actual dollars from
liberalising tariffs on Canadian imports are Trinidad and Tobago
(US$429 million), Jamaica (US$411.4 million) and The Bahamas
(US$199.9 million)," according to Trinidad Express.
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Job Losses as Hotel Occupancy Crashes
--------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that a lack of efficiency in the
transportion system between Trinidad and Tobago, as well as
increased competition are being blamed for the drastic decrease in
hotel occupancy rates recently.
And as a result workers are being sent home, according to Trinidad
Express.
Hoteliers have two main suggestions to solve the problem: have
proper transport and market Tobago, the report notes.
Wendy Hamlin, reservations manager for Blue Haven Hotel in
Scarborough said five workers have already been sent home since
the occupancy rate dropped a 40 per cent in the last two months,
the report relays.
Mr. Hamlin told the Express: "Most of our guests are local. It is
not the tourist season and the majority of them can't get on (a
flight or vessel) can't come. Obviously we need better
transportation. "
Hundreds of passengers were left stranded at the ANR International
Airport in Tobago because there were technical difficulties on one
of the aircraft expected to bring them to Trinidad, the report
relays. There were several other reports of difficulties with CAL
aircrafts along the domestic air-bridge.
Roger Patino, one of the owners at Enchanted Waters at Shirvan
Road said he has not sent home workers but the restaurant that
supposed to be reopened in October was closed until November 23.
He said out of a staff of eight, two resigned and the others were
allowed to work elsewhere until the restaurant re-opens, the
report says.
Mr. Patino told the Express: "My restaurant is not open because I
am just not seeing the people on the island, so the reopening date
of the restaurant has been pushed back because it does not make
any sense. Financially, your cash dropped. We are going to come
back, but to come back and not seeing people sitting down on the
chairs, then financially it is very difficult. You are just
putting out money in expenses and you can't survive."
Mr. Patino said: "This is normally a slow period, September into
October but the people are not seeing the number of tourists
whether foreign or local tourists that Tobago should have. A lot
of business, restaurants or whoever may be, a lot of people are
suffering because there is not that many people on the island,"
the report notes.
Mr. Patino said: "We need to market the destination and fix the
air and the sea bridge. You can't market your destination if you
can't even get here."
And Curtis Lee, general manager of Blue Waters Inn in Speyside
said although no workers have yet been sent home, the occupancy
rate has dropped, the report says.
Mr. Lee said the high season would usually be in November,
December and January and would consist mostly of tourists from
Europe who wanted to get away from the cold, the report notes.
Local tourists were not travelling as much he said and as a
result, there was a rush to woo tourists by hoteliers since there
were so few, the report adds.
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2016. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.
* * * End of Transmission * * *