TCRLA_Public/161122.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Tuesday, November 22, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 231


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

BM&FBOVESPA: Moody's Puts Ba1 Global Debt Rating to Sr. Debentures
BRAZIL: Poised to Emerge From a Deep Recession, IMF Says
RIO DE JANEIRO: Descends Into Insolvency, Security Deteriorates


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CONDAO RESORT: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
ESAF PARTNERS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 23
GOLDWATER MASTER: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 30
HEALTHCARE BIOTECH: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 28
INDOCHINA HOTELS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5

INDOCHINA LAND HOI: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
INDOCHINA LAND: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
INDOCHINA QUANG II: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
INDOCHINA QUANG III: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
MARCO POLO: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 30

OAK HILL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 1
ZEN ASSET: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 29
ZEN MACRO: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 29


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fitch Hikes LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'BB-'


H A I T I

HAITI: IMF Approves US$41.6 Million Financial Assistance


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Records Decline in Second Quarter Earnings


P A N A M A

ISTMO COMPANIA: S&P Lowers ICRs to 'BB' & Puts on CreditWatch Neg.


P U E R T O    R I C O

DR. T-SHIRT: Seeks to Hire Rodriguez & Asociados as Legal Counsel
EMPRESAS ALVARO: Taps Luis Flores Gonzalez as Legal Counsel
GA DESIGN: Hires Ferraiuoli LLC as Tax Counsel
ISLA BONITA INVESTMENT: Hires Gonzalez as Counsel
IT'S YOGURT: Employs Juan Bigas Valedon as Bankruptcy Counsel

OUT OF THIS WORLD: Names Carmen Conde Torres as Counsel
SOCIEDAD EL PARAISO: Disclosures OK'd; Plan Hearing on Dec. 14


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Moody's Rates $3.4BB Sr. Sec. Notes Caa3


                            - - - - -


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BM&FBOVESPA: Moody's Puts Ba1 Global Debt Rating to Sr. Debentures
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. (MAL) assigned a Ba1 global local
currency debt rating and a Aaa.br national scale debt rating to
the three-year local currency senior unsecured debentures
(debentures) to be issued by BM&FBovespa S.A. (BM&FBovespa).  The
proposed debentures will be due December 2019, for a total value
of BRL 3.0 billion.  The outlook on the global local currency debt
rating is negative, in line with the negative outlook on Brazil's
sovereign bond rating.

The debentures issuance is intended to finance the cash
disbursement associated with the merger with Cetip S.A.

  Long term local currency debt rating, Assigned Ba1, negative
   outlook

  Brazilian national scale debt rating, Assigned Aaa.br

                       RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating reflects BM&FBovespa's dominant position in most of its
business segments, and particularly in derivatives and equities,
sustaining appropriate cash generation to service its debt.  Also,
it incorporates Moody's expectation that the combination of its
activities with Cetip will further enhance the company's market
position as the integrated exchange, depositary and clearing
service provider in the Brazilian financial market and relative to
competitive threats.

The proceeds from the announced BRL 3.0 billion debenture issuance
will be added to BM&FBovespa's current unrestricted cash position
of about BRL 6.0 billion, which thereafter, will collectively be
addressed to meet the necessary cash disbursement for Cetip's
shareholders upon the conclusion of the deal, which is subject to
the approval of regulators and antitrust agency.

Moody's notes that under the deal terms, the cash payment could
vary as a function of the floor and cap prices defined for the
BM&FBovespa's shares.  Considering that the cash disbursement
could achieve an estimated maximum amount of BRL 9.3 billion,
Moody's anticipates that BM&FBovespa will have sufficient
resources to meet the payment obligation, following the debenture
issuance.

At the same time, Moody's notes that the combination of the
activities with Cetip will increase BM&FBovespa's earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) by 60%,
while the EBITDA relative to net revenues will remain at high
levels, equivalent to around 70%.  Consequently, even after
incorporating the incremental debt, BM&FBovespa's capital
structure immediately after the merger is expected to be
consistent with its current Ba1 rating, whereby the total debt to
EBITDA is not expected to exceed 2.6x.  Over time, the company's
repayment capacity could be further enhanced by the potential
revenue synergies and cost savings, which management estimates to
be around BRL 100 million in the third year.

In addition, the strong cash generation of the combined company,
which is estimated to exceed BRL 2.0 billion per year, coupled
with expectations that capital expenditures will remain low, will
provide BM&FBovespa meaningful financial flexibility to manage the
higher leverage ratios, allowing it to consistently reduce debt
levels over the course of the coming years.

BM&FBovespa's ratings are positioned one notch above the Ba2
Brazilian government bond rating to reflect its dominant position
in the local market and systemic importance as an integrated
exchange, depository, and clearing, as well as its role as a
central counterparty via its clearing houses.  The exchange's
adequate debt service capacity and the appropriate risk management
mechanisms also support the ratings.  At the same time,
BM&FBovespa is exposed to the Brazilian government risk in the
form of collateral holdings of government securities.  In
addition, the company's cash position, as well as a significant
portion of the settlement funds that safeguard BM&FBovespa against
counterparty default, is invested in Brazilian government bonds.
The negative outlook on BM&FBovespa's ratings, therefore, follows
the negative outlook on Brazil's sovereign bond rating.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN/UP

A decrease in operational margins that could substantially impact
the company's debt service capacity would have negative
implication for the ratings.

Negative pressure on the ratings could also derive from a
downgrade of the sovereign rating.

At the same time, there is limited upward pressure on
BM&FBovespa's ratings, which are already positioned one notch
above the sovereign rating (Ba2 negative).


BRAZIL: Poised to Emerge From a Deep Recession, IMF Says
--------------------------------------------------------
On October 31, 2016, the Executive Board of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with
Brazil.

The government that took office in May 2016 has announced a series
of measures to address long standing fiscal imbalances and budget
rigidities. A strong push to implement the proposed measures on
the expenditure side would go a long way towards restoring policy
credibility and market confidence with positive effects on
investment and growth. Early implementation of key fiscal policy
measures would also help moderate inflation expectations and
facilitate monetary policy easing.

Brazil is poised to emerge from a deep recession. The economy has
contracted markedly in 2015 and 2016, reflecting mostly long-
standing domestic issues, although terms of trade changes and weak
global demand also played an important role. Tighter financial
conditions and slowing credit and uncertainty surrounding the
political scene have been the main factors behind the declining
investment and consumption, and the ratcheting unemployment. A
sharp realignment of regulated prices and monetary policy
tightening also represented a drag on growth.

Headline and core inflation have been above the central target and
around the upper limit of the central bank's tolerance range for
several years. Monetary policy has correspondingly remained at its
current tight level for over a year. But in 2016, some price
increases have begun to moderate although disinflation proceeded
slowly due to above target, albeit declining, inflation
expectations and rising food prices.

The central bank has intervened in the foreign exchange market
less frequently than in the past and broadly symmetrically,
limiting corrective action to containing short-term excessive
volatility. Taking advantage of the market rally started in March
2016, the central bank has lowered the net notional value of
outstanding FX swaps to about US$35 billion (from a high of about
US$110 billion) by issuing reverse swaps and failing to roll over
maturing swaps.

International reserves are above most IMF adequacy and other
standard indicators and FDI fully financed the current account
deficit which narrowed from 4.3 percent of GDP in 2014 to 3.3
percent in 2015. Brazil's external position remained, however,
moderately weaker than the level consistent with fundamentals
reflecting the recent reversal of exchange rate depreciation that
occurred in 2015.

The health of the banking sector deteriorated somewhat but remains
solid: the system wide capital ratios fell in 2015, but remain
well above the regulatory minima; liquidity risk increased in
2015, but the overall funding profile of the system remained
strong; external funding exposures are low and foreign exchange
risks are largely hedged; profitability declined owing to a spike
in provisions for loan losses and higher funding costs; non-
performing loans (NPLs) have gradually increased, but remain
moderate at 4.1 percent. Banks have remained well provisioned with
loan loss reserves covering 150 percent of NPLs. However,
nonfinancial corporates are leveraged and vulnerable.

Fiscal outcomes have been disappointing. In 2015 the non-financial
public sector primary deficit reached 1.9 percent of GDP and the
overall deficit was 10.4 percent of GDP. The primary deficit in
2016 is expected to reach 2.7 percent of GDP, and the overall
balance would be close to that observed in 2015.

Since May 2016, the government announced a series of measures to
strengthen macro policies and restore credibility. Notably, the
government has sent to Congress a constitutional amendment
limiting the growth in federal noninterest spending to the rate of
consumer price inflation of the previous year for the next 20
years. The government has also announced a reform of the social
security system, needed in its own right and also necessary to
make the expenditure limit viable.

Fund staff expects activity to start to recover gradually, but
remain weak for a prolonged period. Staff project output growth of
-3.3 percent in 2016 and about ´ percent in 2017. The projection
is predicated on the assumption the fiscal spending cap and social
security reform are approved in a reasonable timeframe, and the
government will meet the proposed fiscal targets for 2016 and
2017. With these improvements on the fiscal front, and assuming
uncertainty continues to decline, investment is projected to
continue to recover, supporting a gradual return to positive
sequential growth beginning in late 2016. The outlook is subject
to downside risks, including the re-intensification of political
uncertainties (e.g., as a result of developments in the corruption
probe) and risks related to a protracted period of slower growth
in advanced and emerging economies, especially China, further
declines in export commodity prices, and tighter financial
conditions.

                     Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors agreed that Brazil's difficult economic
situation had resulted from several factors, including past policy
missteps, policy uncertainty, and external shocks. The recession
has lowered growth, raised unemployment, and undermined public and
private balance sheets. However, the economy appeared to be
stabilizing and near term prospects were for a gradual resumption
of economic growth. Looking forward, Directors strongly emphasized
the need for fiscal consolidation to ensure macroeconomic
stability and comprehensive structural reforms to raise potential
growth.

Directors welcomed the authorities' announced fiscal strategy
noting that it had helped boost confidence and market sentiment.
They supported the focus on controlling expenditure growth,
including through the proposed federal spending cap. This
expenditure restraint may need to be complemented with revenue
measures to achieve fiscal targets if revenue collections
disappoint in the future. Most directors noted the potential
positive effects of a front loaded fiscal consolidation strategy
on borrowing costs, savings, confidence, debt sustainability and
medium term growth. While recognizing the necessity of
consolidation measures, a number of other Directors cautioned
against more front loaded measures until growth is on a strong
recovery path.

Directors underlined the need for reform of social security
schemes, including those for civil servants at all levels of
government, in view of unfavorable demographic trends and large
actuarial imbalances. They emphasized the centrality of this
reform for the viability of the federal spending cap. Directors
also expressed concern over subnational finances, and encouraged
the authorities to continue to develop durable solutions in
coordination with the states.

Directors noted that monetary policy had been appropriately
calibrated, with the tight stance of the last two years warranted
by strong inflation pressures. While conditions for a gradual
easing cycle are taking shape now, with inflation expectations
converging toward the target, Directors recommended that monetary
policy should remain relatively tight until more tangible progress
in fiscal adjustment and reforms is made and inflation
expectations move closer to the central bank's inflation target.
Directors welcomed the intention to strengthen Brazil's inflation
targeting framework by enhancing the central bank's autonomy and
improving its communications.

Directors underscored that the floating exchange rate system and
reserve buffers were two main sources of strength for Brazil and
should be preserved. They welcomed the reduction in foreign
exchange intervention, and recommended that market intervention be
limited to smoothing excessive volatility.

Directors highlighted that the financial system has remained sound
amidst the recession and low credit growth and see scope for
making the financial system even more robust by enhancing the
financial safety net. Directors underscored the need for continued
vigilance and close monitoring of the health of the corporate
sector and its links to the banking sector.

Directors strongly recommended that the authorities step up their
structural reforms efforts to raise long term growth, including in
the areas of tax policy, labor markets, and infrastructure. They
also underscored the importance of trade reforms to increase
competitiveness and efficiency.

Directors commended Brazil for the effective implementation of
AML/CFT measures and encouraged the authorities to pursue further
reforms. They noted the need for strengthened reporting of fiscal
statistics of SOEs, public banks, and states' finances, and
encouraged the authorities to monitor and enforce subnational
fiscal rules.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'/
Negative Outlook.  Brazil's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-
Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'BB'. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'BB+' and the Short-Term Foreign and Local-Currency
IDRs at 'B'.


RIO DE JANEIRO: Descends Into Insolvency, Security Deteriorates
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rio de Janeiro has dealt with a deteriorating security situation
as the state government, which is responsible for the bulk of
local policing, descends into insolvency, Benjamin Parkin at The
Wall Street Journal reports.

The Journal says five police officers and at least seven civilians
are dead following a weekend of violence in Rio de Janeiro as the
2016 Olympic host city struggles with a deepening security crisis.

Four state military police were killed when their surveillance
helicopter went down Saturday night during a security operation at
the notorious City of God favela, where shootouts between
authorities an armed drug traffickers raged throughout the day,
according to The Wall Street Journal.

Eyewitness video showed the helicopter spinning out of control as
it fell, the report notes.  Rio state civil police and the air
force have launched investigations into the cause of the crash to
determine if the aircraft was shot down by gang members, the
report relays.  A fifth police officer was killed while on patrol
in another Rio neighborhood, the report discloses.

City of God residents said that they found the bodies of seven
youths who had earlier gone missing after hundreds of police
descended on the working-class community in response to the crash,
setting up checkpoints and making a number of arrests, the report
notes.

In a video, the father of one of the victims said his son's body
showed signs of having been shot at point-blank range, the report
relays.  Homicide police said they are investigating the deaths.

A spokesman for the state security secretary said the neighborhood
would be occupied indefinitely by Special Forces and local
battalions, the report discloses.

According to The Journa, crime is rising while paychecks for
police, firefighters and other civil servants have been delayed
repeatedly because there are too few funds to pay them.

Parts of downtown Rio were paralyzed by large protests, as
government workers, including police, resisted a proposed
austerity package that would slash state spending and could force
them to contribute more to shore up a collapsing pension system,
the report notes.

The City of God is one of a number of favelas that received a
community police unit, known as a UPP, as the city prepared to
host the World Cup in 2014 and the Summer Olympics this year, the
report relays.  Hundreds of police stormed the City of God in
2009, routing local gangs and setting up a permanent presence with
the aim of taking back the streets for residents, the report
notes.  But the pacification program is unraveling as funding has
dwindled and a string of police atrocities has undermined
residents' trust, the report relays.

UPP-occupied communities across the city have frequently been
scenes of violent-and often deadly-clashes between police and
heavily armed drug traffickers, who experts say have regrouped
after initial losses, the report notes.

An 85,000-strong security force deployed during the Olympics did
little to reverse the trend. Murders, muggings and other violent
crimes are on the rise in Rio this year, the report says.  Both
the state security secretary and a police chief recently resigned,
with the head of the investigative police Fernando Veloso saying a
lack of resources prevented police from doing their jobs, the
report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'/
Negative Outlook.  Brazil's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-
Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'BB'. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'BB+' and the Short-Term Foreign and Local-Currency
IDRs at 'B'.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


CONDAO RESORT: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Condao Resort Development Ltd will hear on
Dec. 5, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Paul Piro
          Capital Place, 10th Floor, 06 Thai Van Lung Street
          District 1, Ho Chi Minh City
          Vietnam
          Telephone: +84.8.3520.2030
          Facsimile: +84.8.3520.2036


ESAF PARTNERS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 23
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Esaf Partners Limited will hold their final
meeting on Dec. 23, 2016, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Norman Chan
          PO Box 1344 George Town KY1-1108
          dms House 20 Genesis Close
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


GOLDWATER MASTER: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Goldwater Master Fund, Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on Nov. 30, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes
          Goldwater Asset Management LP
          c/o Jo-Anne Maher
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +44 207 796 7614
          Facsimile: (345) 949 4647


HEALTHCARE BIOTECH: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 28
---------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of The Healthcare Biotech Fund Ltd will hold
their final meeting on Nov. 28, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Gene Dacosta
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7765
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


INDOCHINA HOTELS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Indochina Hotels and Residences will hear on
Dec. 5, 2016, at 9:30 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Paul Piro
          Capital Place, 10th Floor, 06 Thai Van Lung Street
          District 1, Ho Chi Minh City
          Vietnam
          Telephone: +84.8.3520.2030
          Facsimile: +84.8.3520.2036


INDOCHINA LAND HOI: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Indochina Land Hoi An Golf Course II Ltd. will
hear on Dec. 5, 2016, at 10:30 a.m., the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Paul Piro
          Capital Place, 10th Floor, 06 Thai Van Lung Street
          District 1, Ho Chi Minh City
          Vietnam
          Telephone: +84.8.3520.2030
          Facsimile: +84.8.3520.2036


INDOCHINA LAND: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Indochina Land Project Management Company will
hear on Dec. 5, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Paul Piro
          Capital Place, 10th Floor, 06 Thai Van Lung Street
          District 1, Ho Chi Minh City
          Vietnam
          Telephone: +84.8.3520.2030
          Facsimile: +84.8.3520.2036


INDOCHINA QUANG II: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Indochina Quang Nam Resort Holding II will hear
on Dec. 5, 2016, at 11:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Paul Piro
          Capital Place, 10th Floor, 06 Thai Van Lung Street
          District 1, Ho Chi Minh City
          Vietnam
          Telephone: +84.8.3520.2030
          Facsimile: +84.8.3520.2036


INDOCHINA QUANG III: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 5
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Indochina Quang Nam Resort Holding III will
hear on Dec. 5, 2016, at 11:30 a.m., the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Paul Piro
          Capital Place, 10th Floor, 06 Thai Van Lung Street
          District 1, Ho Chi Minh City
          Vietnam
          Telephone: +84.8.3520.2030
          Facsimile: +84.8.3520.2036


MARCO POLO: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 30
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Marco Polo Pure Pan-China Master Fund will
hold their final meeting on Nov. 30, 2016, at 11:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Marco Polo Pure Asset Management (Cayman Islands)
Limited
          Ugland House
          P.O. Box 309 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


OAK HILL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 1
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Oak Hill Credit Alpha Finance I (Offshore),
Ltd. will hold their final meeting on Dec. 1, 2016, at 10:50 a.m.,
to receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


ZEN ASSET: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 29
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Zen Asset Management Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on Nov. 29, 2016, at 9:15 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Cheung Ngai, Jacky
          Harneys Services (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Place, 4th Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 10240 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-8599
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-4451


ZEN MACRO: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Nov. 29
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Zen Macro Dynamic Fund will hold their final
meeting on Nov. 29, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Cheung Ngai, Jacky
          Harneys Services (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Place, 4th Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 10240 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-8599
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-4451


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fitch Hikes LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on the
Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Country Ceiling affirmed at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of the Dominican Republic to 'BB-' reflects its
continued strong growth momentum and rising per capita income,
reduced external vulnerabilities and fiscal restraint through the
2016 election cycle.

High economic growth rates have raised Dominican Republic's per
capita GDP to USD6,734, greater than the 'BB' median. Fitch
expects the economy to expand 6.7% in 2016 supported by strong
domestic demand and external receipts of tourism and remittances.
Growth could slow to 5.5% in 2017 (albeit still higher than the
peer median) driven by higher oil prices, higher-cost external
financing conditions, and tighter monetary stance.

External imbalances have been progressively reducing in recent
years, mainly reflecting lower oil prices. Fitch expects the
Dominican Republic to sustain low current account deficits (CAD)
of 1.7% and 2.1% of GDP in 2016 and 2017, respectively, financed
sustainably by net foreign direct investment (FDI). Tourism,
remittances, and gold exports support the growth in current
external receipts (CXR). Slowly rising oil prices are forecast to
gradually widen the CAD, but this effect will be tempered as the
new coal plants begin operating in 2018 and substitute coal for
diesel imports.

The governing PLD party demonstrated fiscal restraint through the
2016 election, in which President Danilo Medina won a second term
with a congressional majority, supporting policy continuity.
Higher spending during the previous 2012 election year resulted in
the widening of the fiscal deficit to 5.3% of GDP from 2.5% in
2011. Fitch expects the government to register a 3% of GDP deficit
in 2016, in line with the government's trend of moderate fiscal
deficits since 2013. In 2016, the government is offsetting lower-
than-budgeted revenues with lower electricity subsidy and other
expenditure reductions while extra-budgetary public coal-plant
investments will add 0.6% of GDP to capital expenditure.

Fitch expects a similar general government deficit at 3.1% of GDP
in 2017. The government started in 2H16 to implement tax
administration measures to capture +0.6pp GDP in new revenues in
2017. The government could run a small primary surplus in 2018,
supported by lower electricity-subsidy and capital spending. The
government has postponed the introduction of a tax reform until at
least 2017 after the tax-administration measures are implemented.
The tax-reform delay and limited progress on the electricity pact
reform highlights slower reform momentum.

Dominican Republic's general government debt, expected to reach
36.7% of GDP in 2016, is lower than the 'BB' median, but the
government's low tax base points to weaker debt tolerance than
'BB' peers. General government debt-to-revenues exceeds 250% while
interest-to-revenues is high at 20%. Continued quasi-fiscal
electricity-sector losses are likely to prevent the government
debt burden from stabilizing. However, the government financing
flexibility is supported by its access to international capital
markets, multilateral borrowing, and the developing domestic bond
market.

Inflation remains subdued at 0.9% yoy as well as core inflation at
1.8% yoy. Oil prices are expected to contribute to a pick-up in
2017. An inflation-targeting regime adopted in 2012 is still
taking root, and inflation expectations remain anchored to the
DOP/USD exchange rate. The central bank raised the monetary policy
rate 50bps to 5.5% effective Nov. 1 to address the positive output
gap, expected U.S. monetary tightening, and uncertainty arising
from U.S. trade policy.

The financial system remains broadly stable with a moderate level
of financial dollarization. Commercial banks' credit portfolios do
not show signs of stress, with low NPLs at 1.8%, and
capitalization ratios are adequate at 15.4%. However, real credit
growth has been high in recent years, averaging around 13% for
2013-15.

Dominican Republic's external balance sheet is weaker than 'BB'
peers. Sustained external borrowing is raising the sovereign's net
foreign debt toward 18.2% of GDP in 2016 while total external debt
service also surpasses the 'BB' median. The country's
international reserves, USD5.5bn, have risen although Fitch's
international liquidity ratio for Dominican Republic remains below
100%, reflecting its vulnerability to external shocks.

Downside risks to growth and external accounts could emerge in
case of a shift in trade and immigration related policies under
the administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. The
Dominican Republic has extensive trade (through CAFTA-DR) and
financial ties with the U.S.

The U.S. represents 36.6% of tourist air arrivals, receives half
of Dominican Republic's merchandize exports, and contributes 5.3%
of GDP in workers' remittances (2015).

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns the Dominican Republic a score
equivalent to a rating of 'BB+' on the Long-term FC IDR scale.
Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative
to rated peers, as follows:

   -- Public finances: -1 notch, to reflect risks to the Dominican
      Republic's limited budget flexibility, constrained by the
      narrow tax base, rising interest bill and current
      expenditure rigidities. The quasi-fiscal losses of the
      electricity sector continue to put pressure on the
      government's debt dynamics. Recapitalization of the central
      bank remains a contingent liability for the sovereign.

   -- External finances: -1 notch, to reflect the Dominican
      Republic's weaker external liquidity position and
      vulnerability to external shocks.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlook is Stable. The main factors that, individually or
collectively, could lead to a positive rating action are:

   -- Strengthened international reserves position;

   -- Strengthening of the government's revenue base, fiscal
      consolidation and reduction of public debt burden.

The main factors that could lead to a negative rating action are:

   -- Increased budget deficits and/or weaker growth leading to a
      marked increase in the government debt burden;

   -- Deterioration of the international reserves position and
      current account deficit;

   -- Emergence of fiscal financing constraints.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The ratings and Outlooks are sensitive to a number of assumptions:

   -- Fitch forecasts that U.S. growth of 1.4%, 2%, and 2.2% in
      2016, 2017, and 2018 respectively will support the Dominican
      Republic's economic growth and external finances.

   -- Fitch's fiscal and external forecasts assume that annual
      gold production is sustained at 1 million ounces and
      international prices average USD1,100 per ounce in 2016-
      2018. Further, they assume a gradual rise of the average
      Brent oil price from USD42 per barrel (bp) in 2016 to USD55
      pb in 2018.


=========
H A I T I
=========


HAITI: IMF Approves US$41.6 Million Financial Assistance
--------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on
November 18, 2016 approved SDR 30.7125 million (about US$41.6
million) in financial assistance for the Republic of Haiti under
the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) to help the authorities meet
urgent balance of payments needs arising from the effects of
Hurricane Matthew. The funds will be made available immediately.

The strong category 4 hurricane hit the country in early October,
killing more than 500 people, displacing more than 175,000 into
temporary shelters, and putting over 1.4 million in immediate need
of humanitarian assistance. It caused widespread destruction of
buildings and infrastructure in the southwestern departements of
Grand Anse, Sud and Nippes. Preliminary estimates put the total
damage and loss at US$1.9 billion, about 23 percent of Haiti's
GDP.

Following the Executive Board's discussion, Mr. Tao Zhang, Deputy
Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following
statement:

"The severe impact from Hurricane Matthew has plunged the country
into a new humanitarian crisis even as Haiti is still recovering
from the devastating 2010 earthquake, the lingering impact of a
prolonged drought, and a sharp decline in external assistance.
International relief efforts in response to the hurricane will
help Haiti respond quickly to the crisis. IMF financing through
the Rapid Credit Facility will help meet urgent foreign exchange
needs and ease the pressure on the balance of payments.

"Emergency relief and reconstruction costs will significantly
raise the overall fiscal deficit and the increase in imports of
goods and services will widen the external current account deficit
over the next few years. While preparing for the large increase in
spending that will be needed to support reconstruction, the
authorities recognize the need to contain risks. In particular,
they have affirmed their commitment to limit the non-hurricane
budget deficit to approximately 2.3 percent of GDP in fiscal year
2016/17.

"While increased imports to support the rebuilding efforts will be
partially financed by international reserves, gross reserves are
anticipated to remain adequate, and the central bank will maintain
exchange rate flexibility. To maintain the sustainability of
public debt, the authorities have affirmed their intent to sustain
prudent financing of the deficit, not enter into any non-
concessional loan contracts during fiscal year 2016/17, and avoid
the accumulation of public sector arrears.

"The authorities are committed to revising their strategy for
growth and social protection to ensure that rebuilding and
recovery efforts support the long-term goals of poverty reduction
and stronger growth. The IMF will continue to play a key role in
coordinating and catalyzing international support for Haiti's
reconstruction and development efforts. In this regard, mobilizing
the assistance of the donor community will be crucial to achieving
disaster recovery, as well as longer-term development objectives.
The authorities intend to consult with the IMF in laying out a
medium-term economic plan and ensuring sustainability of the
balance of payments."


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


DIGICEL GROUP: Records Decline in Second Quarter Earnings
---------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Irish Independent newspaper is reporting
that Digicel Group's second-quarter earnings were pushed lower due
to currency swings in its markets.  It said two sources confirmed
the decline.

Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization reportedly slid about 11 per cent because of
unfavorable foreign exchange rates during the second three months
of its financial year from a year earlier, according to RJR News.

On a constant-currency basis, earnings rose about one per cent
while services revenue dropped about 6 per cent, the report notes.

According to a source, who disclosed that Digicel said it planned
to reduce its debt ratios over the next two years, total revenue
dropped about seven per cent, RJR News says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 27, 2016, Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Digicel
Group Limited (DGL) and its subsidiaries Digicel Limited (DL) and
Digicel International Finance Limited (DIFL), collectively
referred to as 'Digicel' as follows.

DGL
-- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'; Stable Outlook;
-- $US 2.0 billion 8.25% senior subordinated notes due 2020 at
    'B-/RR5';
-- $US 1 billion 7.125% senior unsecured notes due 2022 at
    'B-/RR5'.

DL
-- Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Stable Outlook;
-- $US 250 million 7% senior notes due 2020 at 'B/RR4';
-- $US 1.3 billion 6% senior notes due 2021 at 'B/RR4';
-- $US 925 million 6.75% senior notes due 2023 at 'B/RR4';

DIFL
-- Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Stable Outlook;
-- Senior secured credit facility at 'B+/RR3'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


===========
P A N A M A
===========


ISTMO COMPANIA: S&P Lowers ICRs to 'BB' & Puts on CreditWatch Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale financial strength and
issuer credit ratings on Istmo Compania de Reaseguros, Inc. (Istmo
Re) and on its core subsidiaries, Liffey Reinsurance Co. Ltd.
(Liffey Re) and Istmo Mexico Compania de Reaseguros S.A. de C.V.
(Istmo Re Mexico), to 'BB' from 'BBB-'.  S&P also lowered its
national scale ratings on Istmo Re Mexico to 'mxA' from 'mxAA'.
In addition, S&P placed all ratings on these entities on
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that the deteriorating operating
performance will erode Istmo Re's capital, hamper its ability to
service its debt, and hinder its ability to compete in the market.
Furthermore, S&P believes the company's competitive position has
weakened, as Istmo Re is pursuing an aggressive strategic overhaul
through the expansion of its lines of business and operations in
regions where it currently doesn't have a strong presence.  S&P
believes all of these factors are challenging the company's
performance over the near term.  As a result, S&P revised its
assessment on the company's business and financial risk profiles.
S&P continues to assess Istmo Re's management and governance as
fair; however, S&P has concerns over the company's effectiveness
in pursuing its strategy and about its risk tolerances.

Istmo Re is shifting its core reinsurance operation to a Lloyd's
syndicate, Probitas 1492, which it launched in late 2015.  The
company is also expanding its primary insurance business with
plans to launch operations in Mexico, Chile, and Colombia through
its Aseguradora Del Istmo (ADISA) brand. (The company is currently
operating primary insurance in Panama and Costa Rica.) Based on
its reports to the Panamanian stock exchange, Istmo Re plans to
gradually reduce its core reinsurance operations out of its
Panama-based reinsurance company.  In S&P's previous assessment,
it has expressed its opinion that such an aggressive growth
strategy outside of Istmo Re's historical reinsurance business is
inconsistent with its financial resources and capabilities.

S&P's revision of the financial risk profile assessment on Istmo
Re to less than adequate from lower adequate reflects a revision
of S&P's capital and earnings assessment to moderately strong from
strong because the company's capital adequacy has deteriorated,
according to S&P's risk-based capital model for insurers.  In
particular, the consolidated group reported a $5.5 million net
loss in 2015 (before unrealized gains and losses) and a net loss
of $11.4 million as of June 2016 (the latest information
available).  Therefore, S&P's projections for the end of 2016 and
the next two years incorporate an erosion in Istmo Re's capital
base, because S&P views the company's internal capital generation
capacity as impaired due to its technical losses and high
financing costs (interest expenses) in the next year as well.

"We're maintaining the company's risk position as moderate and its
financial flexibility as weak.  However, the rise in Istmo Re's
leverage to $69 million in June 2016 from $62.1 million at the end
of 2015 (mainly short-term bank debt) is increasingly pressuring
the company's ability to service interest on its debt amid the
expected losses for this year and the next one, unless the
reinsurer undertakes initiatives to improve its technical results
and restructure its balance sheet to reduce its interest expenses.
In this sense, our main area of concern is the company's EBITDA to
fixed charge coverage, which could lead us to limit our financial
risk profile assessment to very weak if this ratio falls below
1.5x in a prospective three-year horizon, potentially resulting in
a multi-notch downgrade to the 'B' category," S&P said.

"At the same time, we revised our business risk profile assessment
to vulnerable from fair following the shift in the company's
competitive position to less than adequate from adequate, due to
our view of Istmo Re's weaker operating performance and
difficulties in pursuing its growth initiatives.  The company's
technical losses widened, resulting in a combined ratio of 123.5%
in June 2016, as a result of a rise in the net loss ratio to 76.3%
from 45.9% in 2015, with a five-year average of 48.5%, as well as
a higher net expense ratio than the company's five-year average at
42.6%.  We don't expect technical results to improve in 2017
because, in our view, the current loss ratio mirrors the risk
qualities of Istmo Re's current reinsurance portfolio.  Moreover,
expenses will remain high given that the company launches new
operations," S&P noted.

"Our competitive position assessment as less than adequate also
reflects our view that Istmo Re's strategic choices for the past
two years will have the following consequences.  First, the weaker
financial risk profile may hinder the company's ability to compete
in its existing reinsurance lines because financial strength is a
key parameter assessed by the brokers and cedents, which may put
the company at a disadvantage vis-Ö-vis its strong reinsurance
peers.  Second, Istmo Re's new operations lack the same
presence/brand recognition that it enjoys in its historical
business lines.  Particularly, the company has a very limited
track record of operating in the Lloyd's marketplace, despite
additional and experienced staff.  Also, its ADISA brand doesn't
have a track record or any brand recognition in the markets that
Istmo Re is currently entering.  We consider the new operations
will amount to 50% or more of the group's gross premiums written
in the next two to three years, and they're likely to dilute the
Istmo Re brand in the years to come.  Finally, we reassessed our
view of the company's diversity of income sources, which we no
longer consider as a positive factor, given that Istmo Re can no
longer reap benefits from its wide band of businesses, consisting
of reinsurance, insurance, as well as a mix of life and non-life
portfolios.  Its core reinsurance business no longer contributes
to the group's EBIT, while its insurance operations, although
profitable, are still small and currently unable to offset the
losses of its reinsurance operations," S&P said.

S&P's assessment of management and governance remains as fair.
However, S&P is concerned over Istmo Re's strategic approach and
risk tolerances, which S&P views as aggressive, given a highly
leveraged balance sheet amid sharp growth.

Finally, S&P considers Istmo Re's liquidity as adequate despite
some concerns over the short-term nature of its debt, which mainly
consists of credit lines and loans secured by real estate
collateral (collateral not in the company's balance sheet) from
local banks, which need to be refinanced each year.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


DR. T-SHIRT: Seeks to Hire Rodriguez & Asociados as Legal Counsel
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. T-Shirt Corp. seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Puerto Rico to hire legal counsel.

The Debtor proposes to hire Rodriguez & Asociados, CSP to give
legal advice regarding its duties under the Bankruptcy Code and
provide other legal services related to its Chapter 11 case.

The hourly rates charged by the firm are:

     Jaime Rodriguez-Rodriguez    $250
     Co-Counsel                   $175
     Paralegals                    $50
     Law Clerks                    $50

Mr. Rodriguez-Rodriguez disclosed in a court filing that his firm
is a "disinterested person" as defined in section 101(14) of the
Bankruptcy Code.

The firm can be reached through:

     Jaime Rodriguez-Rodriguez, Esq.
     Rodriguez & Asociados, CSP
     P.O. Box 2477
     Vega Baja, PR 00694
     Phone: (787)858-5324 / (787)858-8780
     Email: lcdojaimerodriguez@yahoo.com

                    About Dr. T-Shirt Corp.

Dr. T-Shirt Corp. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-08784) on November 1,
2016.  The petition was signed by Irvin Cortes Gonzalez,
vice-president.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets of less
than $50,000 and liabilities of less than $500,000.


EMPRESAS ALVARO: Taps Luis Flores Gonzalez as Legal Counsel
-----------------------------------------------------------
Empresas Alvaro Torres Corp. seeks approval from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hire legal
counsel in connection with its Chapter 11 case.

The Debtor proposes to hire the Law Offices of Luis D. Flores
Gonzalez to assist in the preparation of a bankruptcy plan, to
examine claims of creditors, and provide other legal services.

The hourly rates charged by the firm are:

     Luis Flores Gonzalez     $200
     Legal Assistants          $60
     Paraprofessionals         $40

Mr. Gonzalez does not have any connection with the Debtor or any
of its creditors, and is eligible to serve as counsel for the
bankruptcy estate, according to court filings.

Mr. Gonzalez maintains an office at:

     Luis D. Flores Gonzalez, Esq.
     Law Offices of Luis D. Flores Gonzalez
     Georgetti 80, Suite 202
     Rio Piedras, PR 00925
     Tel: (787) 758-3606
     Email: ldfglaw@coqui.net
     Email: ldfglaw@yahoo.com

                  About Empresas Alvaro Torres

Empresas Alvaro Torres Corp. sought protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-08029) on October
6, 2016.  The petition was signed by Frances J. Alvaro Torres,
president.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets and
liabilities of less than $500,000.


GA DESIGN: Hires Ferraiuoli LLC as Tax Counsel
----------------------------------------------
GA Design & Sourcing Corp., seeks authority from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ
Ferraiuoli, LLC as special counsel to the Debtor.

GA Design requires Ferraiuoli to:

   a. provide legal advice concerning applicable tax exemption
      benefits under Puerto Rico law; and

   b. provide legal support in relation to a submitted petition
      for extension of industrial tax exemption, including
      additional filings as may be required, and to tax credit
      application.

Ferraiuoli will be paid at these hourly rates:

     Alexis Gonzalez Pagani, Associate            $185
     Boris Jaskille, Senior Member                $225
     Ediberto Lopez, Senior Associate             $195
     Jossie Pagan, Paralegal                      $105
     Lidia Ivette Martinez, Paralegal             $105
     Pedro Notario, Capital Member                $255
     Reinaldo Diaz, Associate                     $185
     Rosa Soto, Paralegal Supervisor              $115
     Sonia Colon, Senior Member                   $220

Ferraiuoli will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

Boris Jaskille, member of Ferraiuoli, LLC, assured the Court that
the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in
Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any
interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

Ferraiuoli can be reached at:

     Boris Jaskille, Esq.
     FERRAIUOLI, LLC
     221 Ponce de Leon Avenue, Suite 500
     San Juan, PR 00917
     Tel: (787) 766-7000
     Fax: (787) 766-7001

                       About GA Design

GA Design & Sourcing Corp., based in Caguas, Puerto Rico, filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
3:16-bk-04166) on May 25, 2016. The Debtor is represented by
Javier Vilarino, Esq., at Vilarino & Associates, LLC.  Judge Brian
K. Tester presides over the case.


ISLA BONITA INVESTMENT: Hires Gonzalez as Counsel
-------------------------------------------------
Isla Bonita Investment Holding Company, Inc., seeks authority from
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to
employ Jose Guillermo Gonzalez Law Office as counsel to the
Debtor.

Isla Bonita requires Gonzalez to represent the Debtor in the
bankruptcy proceedings.

Gonzalez will be paid at the hourly rate of $200.

Gonzalez will be paid a retainer in the amount of $8,200, plus
$1,717 filing fees.

Gonzalez will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

Jose Guillermo Gonzalez, member of Jose Guillermo Gonzalez Law
Office, assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested
person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the
Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to the
Debtor and its estates.

Gonzalez can be reached at:

     Jose Guillermo Gonzalez, Esq.
     JOSE GUILLERMO GONZALEZ LAW OFFICE
     351 Ave. Ponce De Leon
     San Juan, PR 00918
     Tel: (787) 765-9713
     Fax: (787) 771-9197
     E-mail: jg_gonzalezlaw@hotmail.com

                       About Isla Bonita

Isla Bonita Investment and Holding Co, Inc., filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-06580) on August
18, 2016, disclosing under $1 million in both assets and
liabilities.  The Debtor is represented by Jose Guillermo
Gonzalez, Esq.

No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in
the case.


IT'S YOGURT: Employs Juan Bigas Valedon as Bankruptcy Counsel
-------------------------------------------------------------
It's Yogurt Capital Ventures LLC seeks authorization from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Juan C.
Bigas Valedon and his law firm, Juan C. Bigas Law Office, as
counsel.

The Debtor requires Juan Bigas Valedon to represent its Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings.

Juan Bigas Valedon will be paid at an hourly rate of $250.00 plus
the incurred expenses.

Juan Bigas Valedon received a retainer in the amount of $2,283.00
from the Debtor.

Juan C. Bigas Valedon, member of Juan C. Bigas Law Office, assured
the Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is
defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not
represent any interest adverse to the Debtors and their estates.

Juan Bigas Valedon can be reached at:

         Juan C. Bigas Valedon, Esq.
         JUAN C. BIGAS LAW OFFICE
         P.O. Box 7011
         Ponce, PR 00732-7011
         Tel: 787-259-1000
         Fax: 787-842-4090

It's Yogurt Capital Ventures LLC filed a Chapter 11 petition
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-05998) on July 29, 2016, and is
represented by Juan Carlos Bigas Valedon, Esq., at Juan C. Bigas
Law Office.


OUT OF THIS WORLD: Names Carmen Conde Torres as Counsel
-------------------------------------------------------
Out of This World, Inc., dba Budatai seeks authorization from the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ
Carmen D. Conde Torres from the Law Offices of C. Conde & Assoc.
as legal counsel.

The Debtor requires Ms. Conde Torres to:

   (a) advise the Debtor with respect ot its duties, powers and
       responsibilities in this case under the laws of the United
       States and Puerto Rico in which the Debtor in possession
       conducts its operations, do business, or is involved in
       litigation;

   (b) advise the Debtor in connection with a determination
       whether a reorganization is feasible and, if not, helping
       the Debtor in the orderly liquidation of its assets;

   (c) assist the Debtor with respect to negotiations with
       creditors for the purpose of arranging the orderly
       liquidation of assets and for proposing a viable plan of
       reorganization;

   (d) prepare on behalf of the Debtor the necessary complaints,
       answers, orders, reports, memoranda of law and any other
       legal papers or documents;

   (e) appear before the bankruptcy court, or any court in which
       Debtor assert a claim interest or defense directly or
       indirectly related to this bankruptcy case;

   (f) perform other legal services for the Debtor as may be
       required in these proceedings or in connection with the
       operation of, and involvement with the Debtor's business,
       including but not limited to notarial services; and

   (g) employ other professional services, if necessary.

The firm will be paid at these hourly rates:

       Carmen D. Conde Torres      $300
       Associates                  $275
       Junior Attorney             $250
       Legal Assistant             $150

The firm will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

The Debtor paid the firm a $15,000 retainer.

Carmen D. Conde Torres, senior attorney of the firm, assured the
Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is
defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not
represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estate.

The firm can be reached at:

       Carmen D. Conde Torres, Esq.
       C. CONDE & ASSOC.
       254 San Jose Street, 5th Floor
       Old San Juan, PR 00901
       Tel: (787) 729-2900
       Fax: (787) 729-2203
       E-mail: condecarmen@condelaw.com

Out Of This World, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
(Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-08730) on October 31, 2016, disclosing
under $1 million in both assets and liabilities.

The Debtor is represented by Carmen D. Conde Torres, Esq.

SOCIEDAD EL PARAISO: Disclosures OK'd; Plan Hearing on Dec. 14
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Brian K. Tester of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico has approved Sociedad El Paraiso S.E. and
Conrado Rosa Guzman's disclosure statement dated Aug. 18, 2016,
referring to the Debtors' plan of reorganization.

A hearing for the consideration of confirmation of the Plan will
be held on Dec. 14, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.

Any objection to confirmation of the Plan must be filed on or
before seven days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation
of the Plan.

The Debtors will file with the Court a statement setting forth
compliance with each requirement in Section 1129, the acceptances
and rejections, and the computation of the same, within seven
working days before the hearing on confirmation.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter, the Debtors filed a
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization that will set aside $42,017 to
pay general unsecured creditors.  Under the plan, Class 11 general
unsecured creditors will receive from the Debtors a promissory
note, providing a payment of $42,017 to be made in consecutive
monthly installments of $700 over five years.

                    About Sociedad El Paraiso

Sociedad El Paraiso, SE, a special partnership organized by
Conrado Rosa Guzman in Puerto Rico, operates privately-owned
properties
leased to third parties for residential and commercial purposes.

The Debtors sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Lead Case No. 14-09700) on Nov. 24, 2014.
The petitions were signed by Conrado Rosa Guzman, authorized
representative.

At the time of the filing, Sociedad El Paraiso estimated its
assets and debts at $1 million to $10 million.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Moody's Rates $3.4BB Sr. Sec. Notes Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Caa3 rating to Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA)'s 8.5% $3.4 billion in senior secured
notes due 2020.  The outlook on the rating in negative.

On Oct. 28, 2016, PDVSA exchanged its 5.250% senior notes due 2017
and 8.50% senior notes due 2017 for 8.50% $3,367,529,000 senior
secured notes due in October 2020.  The 2020 notes will be
amortized in four equal installments, starting in 2017.  The 2020
notes are secured by a first-priority security interest on 50.1%
of the capital stock of CITGO Holding, Inc. (Caa1 stable) and are
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by PDVSA Petroleo, S.A.
(unrated).

Issuer: Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.

  Backed Long term Foreign Currency Debt Rating, Assigned Caa3

                         RATING RATIONALE

The ratings of PDVSA and its notes combine: (i) the company's
underlying baseline credit assessments (BCA), which represent the
issuer's intrinsic credit risks regardless of government support
and (ii) Moody's assumptions about the willingness and the ability
of its government to provide extraordinary support in a distressed
situation.

PDVSA's ratings reflect the inextricable relationship between
PDVSA and the Government of Venezuela as well as the company's
status as a driver of Venezuela's economy, a key source of the
government's revenues and the country's primary source of foreign
exchange.  PDVSA's caa3 BCA reflects Moody's view of a high
probability of default or debt restructure in the next twelve to
eighteen months, on the back of low cash generation related to low
oil prices and lack of visibility regarding the company's
investing and refinancing capacity over the short to medium term.
This negatively compares to the company's material maturities of
$7.3 billion in 2017 and $1.3 billion in 2018, as per 2015
financial statements.  Moody's assumes a high probability of
support from the government and a very high depended between the
company and the government.  The equalization of the caa3 BCA and
the Caa3 issuer rating reflects Moody's view of a symbiosis
between PDVSA and the Government of Venezuela and the rating
agency's expectation that in a continued fiscal and economic
deterioration, the government will become even more dependent on
PDVSA and the company's access to capital will continue to be hurt
by sovereign risk concerns.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that the loss
bondholders would have to bear in the event of a default -- a
credit development to which Moody's assigns a very high
probability of occurrence -- is extremely difficult to assess with
precision given Venezuela' highly volatile economic and political
environment.  However, Moody's anticipates that loss-given-default
could be greater than 35%.

The 2020 notes have a first-priority security interest on 50.1% of
the capital stock of CITGO Holding, Inc.  Moody's typically does
not grant a high consideration to security packages based on
capital stock given i) the difficulty in estimating value and ii)
the low priority claim of stocks in case of bankruptcy.  In
addition, given PDVSA's high liquidity risk and probability of
default, Moody's believes that executing the change of control at
CITGO Holding may prove difficult and slow, reducing the
effectiveness of the security package.  Thus, although the
security interest on the capital stock of CITGO Holding enhances
protection of investors at the 2020 notes as compared to unsecured
debt, the enhancement is not material.  CITGO Holding is based In
Delaware, U.S., and is a holding company with no direct operations
and no significant assets other than its ownership of 100% of the
capital stock of Citgo Petroleum Corporation (B3 stable), which is
engaged in the refining, marketing and transportation of petroleum
products, including gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel,
petrochemicals and lubricants, mainly within the continental
United States.  CITGO Holding also has 100% of Citgo Holding
Terminals, Southwest Pipeline Holding and Midwest Pipeline
Holding, all operating companies.

Given the negative outlook on PDVSA's ratings, an upgrade is not
envisioned at this point.  However, an upgrade of Venezuela's
sovereign rating coupled with a change in sovereign considerations
with regards to support and dependence.  Also, a material
improvement of the company's liquidity and leverage metrics could
trigger a positive rating momentum.

Further liquidity deterioration, including material cash outlays
to the government, could led to a downgrade.  Also, a downgrade on
the sovereign's credit ratings would lead to a downgrade on
PDVSA's ratings.

PDVSA, the state oil company of Venezuela, is one of the world's
largest integrated petroleum companies.  Virtually all of its
upstream exploration and production and most of its downstream
refining and marketing operations are located in Venezuela.  As of
December 2015, its annual revenues and assets amounted $55.3
billion and $202 billion, respectively.  As of June 30, 2016,
PDVSA's consolidated debt amounted to $43.2 billion.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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