TCRLA_Public/161209.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Friday, December 9, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 244


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

PVCRED SERIE XXX: Moody's Rates ARS119,952,000 Cl. A Debt Sec. Ba3


B O L I V I A

LAMIA AIRLINES: Bolivian Authorities Detain Head


B R A Z I L

CHINA CONSTRUCTION: S&P Keeps 'B+/B' Ratings on CreditWatch Dev.
EVEN CONSTRUTORA: Moody's Assigns B1 Global Scale Rating
USINAS SIDERURGICAS: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to Caa2


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CALEDONIAN BANK: To Declare Fourth Interim Dividend
DENWENS LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 22
DIRECT STRATEGIES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
EMERGING MARKETS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
FRIENDOU INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 20

GOLDMAN SACHS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
HEARTSTRINGS FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
LS CORONATION: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 12
MULLER CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
NAVISTAR SPECIAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 14

RGM TRADING: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SUNFUN INFO: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 20
UBP REALISATION: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 21


G U A T E M A L A

* GUATEMALA: To Get $60 Million-IDB Loan to Fight Impunity


M E X I C O

HIPOTECARIA SU: Moody's Cuts BRHSCCB 06U Certs Ratings to 'Caa1'
SONORA: Moody's Cuts Issuer Rating to 'Ba3/A3.mx'


N I C A R A G U A

* NICARAGUA: Economy Buoyant Amid Challenging Conditions, IMF Says


P U E R T O    R I C O

AMERICAN PARKING: Needs Until March 6 to File Chapter 11 Plan
CORDERO CORDERO: Unsecured Creditors to be Paid 100%
L & R DEVELOPMENT: Hires Inmuebles Bienes as Realtor


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: New Currency Will Go Into Circulation on Dec. 15


                            - - - - -



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A R G E N T I N A
=================


PVCRED SERIE XXX: Moody's Rates ARS119,952,000 Cl. A Debt Sec. Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (Moody's)
has rated Fideicomiso Financiero Pvcred Serie XXX. This
transaction will be issued by TMF Trust Company (Argentina) S.A.-
acting solely in its capacity as issuer and trustee.

As of today, the securities for this transaction have not been
placed in the market yet. The transaction is pending approval from
the Comision Nacional de Valores, if any assumption or factor
Moody's considers when assigning the ratings change before
closing, the ratings may also change.

   -- ARS 119,952,000 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities
      (VRDA TV) of "Fideicomiso Financiero Pvcred Serie XXX",
      rated Aaa.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Ba3 (sf)
      (Global Scale)

   -- ARS 53,892,000 in Certificates (CP) of "Fideicomiso
      Financiero Pvcred Serie XXX", rated Caa1.ar (sf) (Argentine
      National Scale) and Caa3 (sf) (Global Scale).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rated securities are payable from the cash flow coming from
the assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of
approximately 7,681 eligible personal loans denominated in
Argentine pesos, bearing fixed interest rate, originated by Pvcred
S.A., a financial company owned by Comafi's Group in Argentina.
Only the installments due after February 28, 2017 will be assigned
to the trust.

The VRDA TV will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus
300bps). The VRDA TV's interest rate will never be higher than 33%
or lower than 21%.

Overall credit enhancement is comprised of subordination, various
reserve funds and excess spread.

The transaction has initial subordination level of 27.6% for the
VRDA TV, calculated over the pool's principal balance as of
February 28, 2017. The subordination level will increase overtime
due to the turbo sequential payment structure. The transaction
will have a grace period for principal and interest payment until
April 2017.

The transaction also benefits from an estimated 49.5% annual
excess spread, before considering losses, taxes or prepayments and
calculated at the caps of 33% for the VRDA TV.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed
when rating this transaction. Although Moody's analyzed the
historical performance data of previous transactions and similar
receivables originated by Pvcred S.A., the actual performance of
the securitized pool may be affected, among others, by the
economic activity, high inflation rates compared with nominal
salaries increases and the unemployment rate in Argentina.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo
sequential payment structure, when compared with the level of
projected losses in the securitized pool.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this
transaction through the initial subordination levels for each
rated class, as well as the historical performance of Pvcred S.A.
portfolio. In addition, Moody's considered factors common to
consumer loans securitizations such as delinquencies, prepayments
and losses; as well as specific factors related to the Argentine
market, such as the probability of an increase in losses if there
are changes in the macroeconomic scenario in Argentina.

These factors were incorporated in a cash flow model that takes
into account all the relevant features of the transaction's assets
and liabilities. Monte Carlo simulations were run, which
determines the expected loss for the rated securities.

Moody's analyzed the historical performance data of previous
transactions and similar receivables originated by Pvcred S.A.,
ranging from July 2014 to October 2016. Moody's has observed a
weaker performance of Refis loans compared to Unregulated Pvcred
Loans. In addition, Moody's has observed a weaker performance of
Open Market Loans compared to Existing Loans.

In assigning the rating to this deal, Moody's assumed a lognormal
distribution of losses for each one of the different securitized
sub-pools: for the loans of Existing Clients, a mean of 18%; for
loans of Open Market, a mean of 35% and for the "Refinanciados"
loans, a mean of 45% with a coefficient of variation of 60% for
each of the three sub-pools. Also, Moody's assumed a lognormal
distribution for prepayments with a mean of 50% and a coefficient
of variation of 70%.

Servicer default was modeled by simulating the default of Banco
Comafi S.A. as the servicer consistent with its current rating of
B3/Baa1.ar. In the scenarios where the servicer defaults, Moody's
assumed that the defaults on the pool would increase by 20
percentage points.

The model results showed 1.3% expected loss for Class A Floating
Rate Debt Securities and 25.9% for the Certificates.

Moody's also evaluated the back-up servicing arrangements in the
transaction. If Pvcred S.A. is removed as collection agent, Banco
Comafi S.A. will be appointed as the back-up collection agent.


=============
B O L I V I A
=============


LAMIA AIRLINES: Bolivian Authorities Detain Head
------------------------------------------------
Paul Kiernan at The Wall Street Journal reports that Bolivian
authorities have detained the head of charter airline LaMia in
connection with a crash that killed 71 people.

Retired Bolivian Gen. Gustavo Vargas, who co-owned LaMia alongside
a pilot who died in the crash, was apprehended and remains in
police custody, said Policarpio Toledo Arce, a spokesman for the
Bolivian public prosecutor, according to The Wall Street Journal.

"Everything points to charges being pressed but according to the
law he has to make his declarations first," Mr. Toledo said, the
report notes.

A phone call to LaMia's Santa Cruz office wasn't answered. Mr.
Vargas couldn't immediately be reached for comment, notes the
report.

The crash, which killed most members of Brazilian soccer team
Chapecoense, was one of the worst aviation accidents in
professional sports history, the report relays.  Details that have
emerged from the ensuing investigation suggest that what caused
the plane to go down -- fuel exhaustion -- could have been
prevented by routine planning and precaution, the report notes.

LaMia's final flight plan was in violation of international safety
requirements, as it didn't include a refueling stop, the report
discloses.  The nearly 2,000-mile flight from Santa Cruz, Bolivia,
to Medellin, Colombia, stretched the Avro RJ85 aircraft's fuel
autonomy to its limit, the report says.

Bolivian journalists found that Mr. Vargas's son, Gustavo Steven
Vargas Villegas, was head of aircraft registration at the
country's civil aviation authority, the report notes.  Mr. Vargas
Villegas resigned.

Mr. Vargas Villegas couldn't be reached for comment.  Bolivia's
civil-aviation authority, DGAC, couldn't provide his contact
information. It wasn't clear if the aircraft's registration was an
issue in the crash, as investigations are continuing, the report
says.

Meanwhile, Celia Castedo, the airport official whom Bolivian
authorities accused of "failing to carry out her duties as a
public official" by not preventing the flight from departing on
Nov. 28, sought asylum in Brazil, the report notes.  She had
previously released a transcript of her conversation with the
plane's onboard dispatcher in which she objected to LaMia's flight
plan, the report relays.  The transcript was published by Bolivian
daily El Deber and independently verified by The Wall Street
Journal, the report discloses.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


CHINA CONSTRUCTION: S&P Keeps 'B+/B' Ratings on CreditWatch Dev.
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it's keeping its 'B+/B' global scale
and 'brBBB' national scale ratings on China Construction Bank
(Brasil) Banco Multiplo S.A. (CCB Brasil) on CreditWatch
developing.

The CreditWatch developing reflects S&P's view that the bank
hasn't yet stabilized its Tier I regulatory ratio above the
minimum required level.  Despite receiving a paid-in capital
injection of R$760 million from its parent, the bank was unable to
sustain its Tier I regulatory ratio.  On Dec. 7, 2016, CCB Brasil
published its audited financial statement, which had been overdue
since August 2016, recognizing DTAs impairments of R$110 million
due to a downward revision on its technical projection for the
next 10 years.  After this adjustment, the bank regulatory Tier I
ratio as of June 2016 dropped to 6.9% from 7.5%.

According to the central bank's September 2016 figures, CCB
Brasil's Tier I ratio was exactly at the minimum required of 6.0%.
The decline of the ratio was due to losses, the bank has been
facing in the past three years due to deleveraging of its
portfolio amid asset quality deterioration.  However, this ratio
does not include the DTAs impairment recently reported.  S&P
estimates that after the adjustment it Tier I ratio should be
around 5.0%, thus lower than the minimum required.  In addition
S&P expects the bank's losses to continue in 2016, which will
continue pressuring its Tier I regulatory ratio, unless CCB Brasil
implements its capital plan to improve its ratios.  During the
second half of 2016, CCB Brasil has been taking some actions to
enhance its capital position with the support of its parent, which
could return its Tier I ratios above requirements by year-end
2016.

As a result of the delay on publishing its financial statement and
due to its capital regulatory forbearance, S&P believes CCB Brasil
could have breached a covenant on its unrated Tier II subordinated
bond.  So far, the possibility of covenant breaching didn't impact
the bank's liquidity.  Nevertheless, S&P believes the bank's cash
position is more than enough to cope with this debt, if needed.
In addition, CCB Brasil's broad liquidity assets to short-term
wholesale funding reached 0.6x as of June 2016, which S&P believes
to be consistent with our view of the bank's liquidity position as
moderate.

S&P continues to consider that CCB Brasil has strategic importance
to China Construction Bank Corp (A/Stable/A-1).  Therefore, S&P
expects the parent to provide extraordinary support in order to
recapitalize the bank's Tier I ratio if needed or to provide
liquidity.  S&P believes that CCB Brasil provides a channel for
its parent to operate in the Brazilian market, where it intends to
explore business opportunities with companies that are engaged in
the large-scale trade between Brazil and China.  As a result, S&P
applies three notches uplift to CCB Brasil's 'ccc+' stand-alone
credit profile (SACP).  The ratings on the bank also incorporate
its moderate business position because it operates as a midsize
bank that focuses on lending to small- to medium-size enterprises
(SMEs).  S&P views CCB Brasil's risk position as weak, given
recent asset quality deterioration and its funding as below
average.


EVEN CONSTRUTORA: Moody's Assigns B1 Global Scale Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's AmÇrica Latina Ltda assigned a B1 rating on the global
scale and Baa2.br on the Brazilian national scale to the BRL100
million debentures issuance proposed by Even Construtora e
Incorporadora S.A. ("Even") with final maturity in 2019. Even's
B1/Baa2.br corporate family ratings remain unchanged. Proceeds
will be used for liability management. The outlook for the ratings
is negative.

The rating of the notes assumes that the final transaction
documents will not be materially different from draft legal
documentation reviewed by Moody's to date and assume that these
agreements are legally valid, binding and enforceable.

Ratings Assigned:

   -- BRL100 million debentures due in 2019: B1 (global scale);
      Baa2.br (national scale)

Ratings Unchanged:

   -- Corporate Family Ratings (CFR): B1 (global scale); Baa2.br
      (national scale)

   -- BRL150 million (BRL100 million outstanding) senior unsecured
      debentures due in 2017 (6th issuance): B1/Baa2.br

The outlook for the ratings is negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Even's B1/Baa2.br corporate family rating reflects its strong
brand name and market share in the city of Sao Paulo, with a solid
track record in the construction of apartments for the middle
income families. The ratings also consider Even's relative
conservative financial policies that result in efficient cost
control mechanisms and manageable debt profile. On the other hand,
the company's reduced scale and diversification constrain the
rating, particularly under the challenging industry fundamentals.

The B1/Baa2.br rating assigned for the notes stands at the same
level as Even's B1 corporate family rating given the comfortable
level of residual and unencumbered assets that, in case of a
default, should provide good recovery for the unsecured debt
holders (3.0x as of September 30, 2016) or serve as an alternate
source of liquidity. Even's consolidated debt is composed of a mix
of secured construction loans, representing about 64% of its total
debt as of September 30, 2016, and unsecured debt and working
capital loans of about 36%.

The proposed debentures will be secured by the shares of special
purpose entities ("SPEs") related to the specific projects under
construction that will be required to cover at least 120% of the
outstanding amount of the obligations at all times until the final
maturity in 2019. In spite of this credit enhancement, Moody's
consider this obligations as senior unsecured given the absence of
a real estate asset pledge.

Even has grown mostly organically since its IPO in 2007, reaching
some BRL2.5 billion in net revenues in 2012. Since then, revenues
and margins have been gradually shrinking with lower launches, a
contraction that was consistent with other Brazilian homebuilders
as per the industry's cycle adjustment. In the last twelve months
ending in September 2016, the company launched new units of BRL1.2
billion, which compares to BRL2 billion in 2014 and BRL2.5 billion
in 2013.

Despite the significant challenges imposed by the recessionary
economy since mid-2015, Even has been able to sustain relatively
stable leverage as measured by a gross debt to total
capitalization ratio of approximately 46%. On the other hand,
liquidity has been deteriorating with sales cancellations
representing about 33% of the last twelve months contracted sales.
As such, cash coverage of short term debt fell to 62.7% in
September 2016, from 75.5% in December 2015 and 101% in December
2014.

Proceeds from the transaction will be entirely used to refinance
existing debt obligations, including the 6th debentures issuance.
"As such, we expect Even's liquidity profile to improve slightly
following the transaction, as it will lengthen the company's
amortization schedule." Moody's said. At the end of September
2016, Even had BRL473 million in corporate debt and approximately
BRL 596 million in debt related to project loans maturing until
the end of 2017. While the projects loans will be paid upon the
successful mortgage take-out of receivables from completed units
of approximately BRL895 million, further improvement in liquidity
and in the corporate debt maturity profile will depend on
additional liability management initiatives and on the adequate
management of working capital throughout 2017.

The negative outlook takes into consideration the company's
evolving business profile and ongoing challenges to consistently
improve its operations and reduce leverage amid the weakening
industry fundamentals in the Brazilian homebuilding market.

A rating upgrade is unlikely in the short term, but ratings
outlook could stabilize if Even increases in size in terms of
revenues and EBIT, diversify its business profile and at the same
time maintain or improve leverage metrics. For example, an upgrade
could be considered if the company consistently maintains its
total debt to capitalization below 40% (46% in the 3Q16), gross
margin close to 28% (20.8% in the 3Q16) and EBIT interest coverage
above 3.5 times (1.2x in the LTM ending 3Q16). An upgrade would
also require improvement in its liquidity position, as per an
unrestricted cash to short term debt position that is above 1.0x
(0.63x in the 3Q16) on a sustainable basis.

On the other hand, Even's ratings could be further downgraded if
the company faces significant deterioration in its liquidity
profile due to a larger than anticipated distribution to
shareholders or a prolonged downturn in the homebuilding industry
that leads to a debt to capitalization ratio above 50%, gross
margin below 14% or EBIT interest coverage consistently below
1.0x. A meaningful change in the proportion of secured versus
unsecured debt or a decrease in the amount of unencumbered assets
that could be used to pay down the unsecured debentures could also
result in a downgrade of Even's unsecured ratings.

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, and established in 1974, Even is a
real estate developer with activities in the states of Sao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul and focus on residential
developments with average units priced above BRL350,000. The
company is vertically integrated, executing all real estate
development phases from the analysis of the prospective land to
the construction of the units and sale to the final homebuyer. In
the twelve months ended September 30, 2016, Even reported
consolidated net revenues of BRL2.0 billion (USD558 million) and
net profit of BRL17 million (USD4.8 million).

USINAS SIDERURGICAS: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has upgraded Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas
Gerais S.A ("Usiminas") corporate family ratings to Caa2 from Ca
(global scale) and to Caa2.br from Ca.br (national scale). The
outlook for the ratings is stable.

Ratings upgraded:

Issuer: Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais S.A.

   -- Corporate Family Rating: Caa2 (from Ca) in the global scale
      and Caa2.br (from Ca.br) in the national scale

The outlook for the ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of Usiminas' ratings to Caa2 reflects primarily the
conclusion of a debt restructuring in September 2016 and a BRL 1
billion capital increase in July 2016, which has reduced liquidity
pressures in the short-term and will allow the company to focus
more closely on its operations. Usiminas negotiation with
creditors representing 92% of its total debt has concluded with a
payment extension of up to 10 years, with a 3-year grace period.
The Caa2 ratings continue to incorporate the likely default, per
Moody's definition, on the bonds due 2018 following a planned
exchange offer that would lead to changes in the notes' terms and
conditions as announced in November 2016.

Nevertheless, even with the conclusion of the debt extension and
the capital injection, liquidity challenges remain. Usiminas had
BRL 2.4 billion in consolidated cash at the end of 3Q16, out of
which only about BRL 805 million was available at the parent
company. The balance is largely restricted at its 70% owned
subsidiary Mineracao Usiminas S.A. ('MUSA', unrated) and may not
be immediately accessible to meet Usiminas' financial obligations.
In order to access MUSA's cash balance, either through a return of
capital or intercompany loan, Usiminas needs approval from 30%-
owner Sumitomo Corporation.

The ratings continue to reflect Usiminas' solid position in the
Brazilian flat-steel market, and the measures taken by Usiminas to
adjust operations to the feeble demand in the domestic market. In
May 2015, Usiminas announced the temporary halt of two blast
furnaces in its Cubatao and Ipatinga mills; in June 2015 the
company announced the reduction of working hours in its
headquarters in Belo Horizonte for three months; and in October
2015, the temporary interruption of activities of the primary
areas of the Cubatao plant (including sinter and coke plants,
blast furnaces and steelworks), concluded in January 2016. The
downsizing process at the Cubatao steel mill has significantly
reduced Usiminas' cost structure and production capacity,
providing flexibility to the company amid the deterioration of the
steel market in Brazil. In any case, despite the operational
improvement observed in 3Q16, Usiminas' operations continue to be
challenged by weak market fundamentals for steelmakers in Brazil,
which will continue to constrain the company's ability to generate
positive free cash flows. "Credit metrics will remain pressured --
we expect leverage (measured by total adjusted debt to EBITDA) to
stay above 10x (19.1x in LTM ended September 2016) and interest
coverage to remain negative in the next 12 to 18 months (-0.9x in
LTM ended September 2016)." Moody's said.

The stable outlook incorporates our assumption that Usiminas will
be able to meet the conditions set by creditors and will continue
to pursue liquidity alternatives while it gradually recovers its
ability to generate sustainable cash flows from operations.

Additional negative rating actions can be considered if Usiminas
fails to meet the conditions established by creditors under the
debt renegotiation or fails to establish an agreement with
bondholders, or enters into a debt restructuring that results in
higher than expected losses to creditors.

Although unlikely in the short term, the ratings could be upgraded
if Usiminas is able to successfully complete the adjustments in
its capital structure, eliminating liquidity pressures, while
market fundamentals for Brazilian steelmakers improve along with
Usiminas' cash flow generation. Quantitatively, this would be the
case if Usiminas is able to reduce adjusted leverage to levels
below 6.0x (Adjusted Debt/EBITDA) and increase adjusted interest
coverage to above 1.5x (EBIT/Interest Expense). The maintenance of
a comfortable liquidity profile would also be required for an
upgrade.

Headquartered in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Usinas Siderurgicas
de Minas Gerais S.A. - Usiminas (Usiminas) is the largest
integrated flat-steel manufacturer in Latin America, with
production of 3.6 million tons of crude steel and consolidated net
revenues of BRL 8.7 billion (approximately USD 2.4 billion
converted by the average exchange rate)in the LTM ended September
2016. Usiminas also owns iron ore mining properties, steel
distribution and capital goods subsidiaries in Brazil.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Steel
Industry published in October 2012.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


CALEDONIAN BANK: To Declare Fourth Interim Dividend
---------------------------------------------------
Caledonian Bank Limited intends to declare a fourth interim
dividend.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 5, 2016, will be included in the company's fourth dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Keiran Hutchison
          c/o Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


DENWENS LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 22
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Denwens Limited are required to file their proofs
of debt by Dec. 22, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart C E Mackellar
          Zolfo Cooper (BVI) Limited
          c/o Sean Ward
          Telephone: +1 (284) 393-9600
          Facsimile: +1 (284) 393 9601
          e-mail: sean.ward@zolfocooper.vg


DIRECT STRATEGIES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 10, 2016, the sole shareholder of Direct Strategies
(Quantitative) Offshore L Holdings Ltd resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          c/o Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


EMERGING MARKETS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 10, 2016, the sole shareholder of Emerging Markets
(Quantitative) Offshore Ltd resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


FRIENDOU INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 20
-------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Friendou International Inc. are required to file
their proofs of debt by Dec. 20, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Nov. 4, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Maricorp Services Ltd.
          c/o Roger L. Nelson
          46 Canal Point Drive, #31 The Strand
          Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          P.O. Box 2075
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-9710


GOLDMAN SACHS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 10, 2016, the sole shareholder of Goldman Sachs Direct
Strategies Quantitative Fund Offshore, Ltd. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          c/o Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


HEARTSTRINGS FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 8, 2016, the sole shareholder of Heartstrings Fund
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jeffrey Stower
          c/o Georgina Williams
          P.O. Box 493 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 345-914-4398/ +1 (345) 949-4800
          Facsimile: +1 345-949-7164


LS CORONATION: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 12
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of LS Coronation Offshore, Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by Dec. 12, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Nov. 3, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes Select Equity Group, L.P.
          c/o Corey Stokes
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814-9277
          Facsimile: (345) 949-4647


MULLER CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
On Nov. 11, 2016, the sole shareholder of Muller Capital resolved
to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ka Ho Wong
          c/o Richard Bennett
          Central Tower, 11th Floor
          28 Queen's Road Central
          Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 3656 6069
          Facsimile: +852 3656 6001


NAVISTAR SPECIAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 14
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Navistar Special Situations Fund, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by Dec. 14, 2016, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 31, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          James Macfee
          c/o Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
          Clifton House, 75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 640 0540


RGM TRADING: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
On Nov. 11, 2016, the sole shareholder of RGM Trading
International Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the
company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          RGM Trading, LLC
          c/o Jody Powery-Gilbert
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


SUNFUN INFO: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 20
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Sunfun Info Co., Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Dec. 20, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Nov. 4, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Chang, Li
          No.7, Aly. 7, Ln. 197, Shangren St.
          Xinfeng Township, Hsinchu County 304
          Taiwan (R.O.C.)


UBP REALISATION: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 21
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of UBP Realisation Fund are required to file their
proofs of debt by Dec. 21, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Nov. 10, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Christopher Yeramian
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 3469
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


* GUATEMALA: To Get $60 Million-IDB Loan to Fight Impunity
----------------------------------------------------------
A $60 million loan requested by the government of Guatemala and
approved by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) will help
the Attorney General's office fight impunity.

The goal of the project is to increase the office's efficiency in
processing complaints that it receives and bring about court
trials for the crimes with the highest social impact. This will be
done through the department making better use of the resources at
its disposal, improvements in how prosecutors present complaints
for courts to consider, and a shorter waiting time for people who
have asked the Attorney General's office for information.

Only two percent of complaints received by the Attorney General's
Office end up in guilty verdicts, according to the International
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala. This indicates that the
probability of being put on trial in Guatemala is low,
contributing to high crime rates turning into a vicious circle.
Many violent crimes in Guatemala are not reported to criminal
justice authorities because people think it is pointless.

The program calls for reworking the internal organs of the
Attorney General's Office, a purging of backlogged cases, greater
automation to speed up the registry of some common complaints
(such as loss or theft of cell phones), and better human resources
management and training, among other steps.

The plan also aims for improvements in the use of statistics to
support decision-making in several areas within the Attorney
General's Office.

The program will finance an expansion of the current headquarters
of the office to ease physical crowding and move the criminal
investigation unit closer to prosecutors' offices, and also pay
for studies of victimization and perception at the national level
so as to assess people's trust in the justice system in Guatemala.
Also, the system for managing cases will be overhauled,
particularly for child abuse and violence against women in the
prosecutor's office for the Jalapa district.

Among other desired effects, the program aims to increase the
number of sentences achieved per prosecutor per year from three to
five over the course of five years and reduce processing time. One
objective over these five years, for instance, is to cut from 307
to 200 the average number of days that transpire from the time a
complaint is received in cases of crimes against minors to the
issuance of a request for a formal indictment.

The loan has an amortization period of 25 years and an interest
rate based on LIBOR. Overall, the operation seeks to streamline
judicial cases involving corruption that are presently underway,
thereby supporting the country's policy of transparency and zero
tolerance for corruption.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


HIPOTECARIA SU: Moody's Cuts BRHSCCB 06U Certs Ratings to 'Caa1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico downgraded the ratings of four senior
certificates and confirmed the ratings of two certificates from
five Mexican RMBS sponsored by Hipotecaria Su Casita, S.A. de C.V.
Sociedad Financiera de Objeto Multiple E.N.R. (Su Casita). The
collateral backing the affected transactions consists of first-
lien, fixed-rate loans denominated in UDIS or Mexican pesos and
granted primarily to low-income borrowers. This rating action
concludes the review for downgrade initiated in September 2016.

The rating actions are as follows:

   Servicer: PENDULUM, S. DE R.L. DE C.V.

   Issuer: Hipotecaria Su Casita - BRHSCCB 06

   -- BRHSCCB 06 Certificate -- Confirmed Baa1 (sf) (global scale,
      local currency); placed on review for downgrade on 1
      September 2016

   -- BRHSCCB 06 Certificate -- Confirmed Aa1.mx (sf) (national
      scale); placed on review for downgrade on 1 September 2016

   Issuer: Hipotecaria Su Casita - BRHSCCB 06-2 and BRHSCCB 06-3

   -- BRHSCCB 06-2 Certificate -- Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) from
      Baa2 (sf) (global scale, local currency); placed on review
      for downgrade on 1 September 2016

   -- BRHSCCB 06-2 Certificate -- Downgraded to Aa3.mx (sf) from
      Aa2.mx (sf) (national scale); placed on review for downgrade
      on 1 September 2016

   Issuer: Hipotecaria Su Casita - BRHSCCB 06U and BRHSCCB 06-2U

   -- BRHSCCB 06U Certificate -- Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) from B1
      (sf) (global scale, local currency); placed on review for
      downgrade on 1 September 2016

   -- BRHSCCB 06U Certificate -- Downgraded to B2.mx (sf) from
      Baa2.mx (sf) (national scale); placed on review for
      downgrade on 1 September 2016

   Issuer: Hipotecaria Su Casita - BRHSCCB 06-5U and BRHSCCB 06-6U

   -- BRHSCCB 06-5U Certificate -- Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) from
      Ba3 (sf) (global scale, local currency); placed on review
      for downgrade on 1 September 2016

   -- BRHSCCB 06-5U Certificate -- Downgraded B2.mx (sf) to from
      A3.mx (sf) (national scale); placed on review for downgrade
      on 1 September 2016

   -- BRHSCCB 06-6U Certificate -- Confirmed Caa3 (sf) (global
      scale, local currency); placed on review for downgrade on 1
      September 2016

   -- BRHSCCB 06-6U Certificate -- Confirmed Caa3.mx (sf)
      (national   scale); placed on review for downgrade on 1
      September 2016

   Issuer: Hipotecaria Su Casita - BRHSCCB 07 and BRHSCCB 07-2

   -- BRHSCCB 07 Certificate -- Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) from Baa1
      (sf) (global scale, local currency); placed on review for
      downgrade on 1 September 2016

   -- BRHSCCB 07 Certificate -- Downgraded to Aa2.mx (sf) from
      Aa1.mx (sf) (national scale); placed on review for downgrade
      on 1 September 2016

RATINGS RATIONALE

Today's actions conclude the rating reviews initiated in September
2016 due to heightened concerns about i) future collateral
performance after the transfer of servicing to Pendulum from
Santander Vivienda resulted in a weakening of collections, and ii)
possible interest payment shortfall, due to declining collections.

Moody's notes significant deterioration in the performance of the
rated deals, in particular in the late delinquency buckets,
specifically 180+ days, with an average increase of 13% since the
transfer. This is a major concern because recovery of the loans
from 180+ buckets is particularly challenging in Mexico, where
legal proceedings can be lengthy and foreclosure expenses very
high. As a consequence, credit enhancement in the form of over-
collateralization has deteriorated, particularly for the pools
denominated in UDIS, for example: BRHSCCB 06U and BRHSCCB 06-5U.

Moody's analyzed over-collateralization, future losses, credit
enhancement and cash availability for each deal. During the rating
reviews, Moody's reassessed the lifetime loss expectation for the
portfolios based on collateral performance to date.

Under the MILAN approach, Moody's first performed a portfolio
analysis of the securitized collateral pool. The results of this
analysis are the portfolio's expected losses (Portfolio EL) and
Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN CE).
"The Portfolio EL captures our expectations for performance given
the current economic outlook, while the MILAN CE captures the loss
we expect the portfolio to suffer in the event of a severe
recession scenario." Moody's said. Moody's uses the two outputs
from its portfolio analysis to determine a probability loss
distribution. In the structural analysis, Moody's uses a cash flow
model to assess the structural features of the RMBS transaction.
The structure is assessed using each scenario in the loss
distribution. Finally, Moody's assesses counterparty default risk
and legal risk to derive the final ratings.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

Factors that could lead to a rating downgrade include: a
deterioration in the performance of the underlying collateral that
results in higher expected losses, lower cash availability and
weakening of the certificates' available credit enhancement.

Factors that could lead to a rating upgrade include: an
improvement in the performance of the underlying collateral that
results in lower expected losses, improved liquidity and
strengthening of the certificates' available credit enhancement.


SONORA: Moody's Cuts Issuer Rating to 'Ba3/A3.mx'
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico downgraded the state of Sonora's issuer ratings
to Ba3/A3.mx from Ba2/A2.mx. The outlook remains negative.

A MXN 4.4 billion (original amount) enhanced loan from Banorte was
also downgraded to Baa3/Aa3.mx from Baa2/Aa2.mx

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE OF THE ISSUER RATING TO Ba3/A3.mx FROM
Ba2/A2.mx

The downgrade of Sonora's issuer ratings reflects the state's
large cash financing deficits6%. and increasing debt levels.
Sonora' financial results deteriorated over the last three years,
from a cash financing surplus of 1.5% of total revenues in 2013 to
a deficit of 4.8% in 2015 and are expected to remain weak across
the medium-term, in the range of -5% to -6% of total revenues.
Although financial results through the third quarter of 2016 show
a surplus of MXN 1 billion, Moody's estimates the state will
register a consolidated deficit of 6.2% of total revenues in 2016
and 5.2% in 2017 in light of higher capital expenditures. To
assist with financing requirements, over the first three quarters
of 2016 the state increased its long-term debt by MXN 2.5 billion
and is expected to contract an additional MXN 2.5 billion in 2017.
As a result, Moody's expects the state's debt-to-total revenues
ratio will rise to 40.3% and 43% in 2016 and 2017, respectively.
These metrics would no longer be consistent with peers rated Ba2.

In spite of the debt increases mentioned above, Sonora's debt and
liquidity metrics are expected to remain fairly stable over the
next two years. By the end of 2017, the state will have fully used
its December 2015 approval to acquire MXN5 billion in additional
debt. Moreover, its liquidity metrics are broadly in line with
those of peers in the Ba3 rating category: Sonora's net working
capital stood at -8.7% of total expenditures while the median of
Mexican states in the Ba3 rating category represented -10.3%.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook incorporates a combination of systemic
pressures reflected in the negative outlook of Mexico's (A3,
negative) sovereign bond rating, and Moody's expectation that the
state's plans to contain operating expenditures may not be
fulfilled, potentially leading to debt and liquidity levels worse
than our expectations in the next 18 to 24 months.

RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE OF THE ENHANCED LOAN DEBT RATINGS TO
Baa3/Aa3.mx FROM Baa2/Aa2.mx

The rating downgrade of the MXN 4.4 billion (original face value)
enhanced loan with Banorte reflects the downgrade of Sonora's
issuer ratings. Per Moody's methodology on rating enhanced loans,
the loan ratings are directly linked to the credit quality of the
issuer, which ensures that underlying contract enforcement risks,
economic risks and credit culture risks (for which the issuer
rating acts as a proxy) are embedded in the ratings of the
enhanced loan.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook, a rating upgrade in the medium-term is
unlikely. However, the outlook could be stabilized if the State of
Sonora registers balanced cash financing results over the near and
medium term. Conversely, the state's ratings could be downgraded
if it continues registering deficits, leading to further
deterioration in its liquidity metrics, or increases in its debt
levels.

Given the links between the loan and the credit quality of the
obligor, an upgrade of the state of Sonora's issuer ratings would
likely result in an upgrade of the ratings on the enhanced loan.
Conversely, a downgrade of Sonora's issuer ratings could also
exert downward pressure on the debt ratings of the loan. In
addition, the ratings could face downward pressure if debt service
coverage levels fall materially below our expectations.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Rating Methodology
for Enhanced Municipal and State Loans in Mexico published in June
2014 and Regional and Local Governments published in January 2013.
Please see the Rating Methodologies page on www.moodys.com.mx for
a copy of these methodologies.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine State of Sonora's rating is between 01/01/2011 and
30/09/2016.


=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================


* NICARAGUA: Economy Buoyant Amid Challenging Conditions, IMF Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
A staff team from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led by
Gerardo Peraza visited Managua from November 29 to December 5,
2016. The visit took place as part of a regular dialogue with the
authorities in order to assess the performance of the Nicaraguan
economy. Staff reviewed recent economic developments and discussed
the medium-term development strategy, policy agenda and the
economic outlook.

Mr. Peraza issued the following statement at the conclusion of the
visit.

"Notwithstanding challenging external conditions, economic
activity remains buoyant. Growth in 2016 is projected at 4.7
percent, largely supported by strong agricultural and commercial
activity. Inflation is projected to moderate to below 4 percent
given low food and other commodity prices. The consolidated public
sector deficit is projected to reach 3.1 percent of GDP in 2016,
modestly higher than in 2015, notably because of higher pension
and investment expenditure of the social security institute,
election-related spending, and increased investment in
infrastructure. Despite a smaller oil bill, the external current
account is expected to deteriorate, owing to weak external demand
and lower prices of key exports. Gross international reserves are
projected to remain stable at about 4 months of imports (excluding
imports from the free trade zone). The financial system appears to
be robust, notwithstanding strong credit growth, with capital
adequacy ratios remaining above the regulatory level and non-
performing loans being low and stable.

"Nicaragua's main challenge is to maintain strong, sustainable and
inclusive growth in the context of greater uncertainty regarding
global trade and economic activity. While the reduction in
Petrocaribe flows has been absorbed so far without major impact on
the availability of external financing, macroeconomic risks should
be closely monitored and mitigating policies put in place. For
this reason, Nicaragua needs to continue strengthening its public
finances by creating fiscal buffers, including by reducing tax
exonerations and poorly targeted components of electricity
subsidies. It is also imperative to address the financial
sustainability of the social security institute.

"Efforts to strengthen financial stability are ongoing. In
particular, the implementation of banking regulations in line with
Basel III in terms of liquidity and solvency is welcome. Amid
declining concessional financing, it would be important to improve
the resilience of the domestic financial system and deepen
domestic financial markets. These efforts need to be accompanied
by strengthening central bank independence and balance sheets. The
introduction of macro-prudential tools that can strengthen the
financial system would be welcome.

"Further strengthening the statistical framework is crucial for
improving macroeconomic management. Additional efforts are needed
to continue strengthening the accuracy and consistency of the
reporting of national and external accounts, as well as of fiscal
statistics and the reports on public debt.

The staff team met with members of the economic cabinet, officials
from the central bank, the ministry of finance, the
superintendency of banks, and other representatives of public and
private sector entities.

"The IMF team wishes to thank the authorities for their
cooperation and candor. The next Article IV mission, which will be
led by Fernando Delgado, is scheduled to take place in May 2017."


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


AMERICAN PARKING: Needs Until March 6 to File Chapter 11 Plan
-------------------------------------------------------------
American Parking System, Inc. requests the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Puerto Rico for an extension of its
exclusivity periods within which the Debtor may file a Disclosure
Statement and Plan of Reorganization and solicit acceptances that
will lead to the confirmation of the plan of reorganization,
through and including March 6, 2017.

The Debtor relates that the filing of its Chapter 11 petition was
incited by the Puerto Rico Treasury Department, in the midst of
negotiating the payment of a sales tax liability, the Treasury
closed the Debtor's facilities, jeopardizing a business of over 35
years and the jobs of over 165 employees.

Since the October 11, 2016 bar date for filing proof of claim for
governmental entities have already elapsed, the Debtor is
currently in the process of reconciling its claims, including the
proofs of claim filed by the Department of Treasury that are
completely overstated and need to be further evaluated so the
Debtor may file the corresponding objections to claims.

The Debtor relates that since it was unable to extend the deadline
to pay the agreed upon discounted payoff to its then secured
creditor Condado 2 LLC, the Debtor was forced to scramble to get
DIP financing, which was subsequently approved by the Court.

As such, the Debtor's efforts since the commencement of its
Chapter 11 case have been geared towards extending the agreement
with its secured creditor and then towards obtaining the needed
DIP Financing.  Now, since the Debtor has already obtained the DIP
Financing to comply with the discounted payoff agreement and
eliminating on the way more than $29,000,000 of its debts, the
Debtor can now focus on its reorganization plan.

                  About American Parking

Headquartered in San Juan, Puerto Rico, American Parking System
Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D. P.R.
Case No. 16-02761) on April 8, 2016, estimating its assets at up
to $50,000 and its liabilities at between $10 million and $50
million.  The petition was signed by Miguel Cabral Veras,
president.  Judge Edward A Godoy presides over the case.

Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq., at Fuentes Law Offices, LLC,
serves as the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.  The Debtor employs WRG
Certified Public Accountants, P.S.C., and its managing partner,
CPA William Rodriguez, as financial advisor.


CORDERO CORDERO: Unsecured Creditors to be Paid 100%
----------------------------------------------------
General unsecured creditors will be paid in full under a plan
proposed by Cordero Cordero & Asociados-Asesores Legales P.S.C. to
exit Chapter 11 protection.

Under the restructuring plan, general unsecured claims are divided
into two classes.  Class 5 includes unsecured claims held by
employees of the company and by secured creditors who have agreed
that a portion of their claims be treated as unsecured.  The debt
under this class is estimated at no more than $11,149.85.

Class 6 consists of all general unsecured claims of a single
holder that are listed by Cordero in its schedules or as to which
a proof of claim has been filed.  The debt under this class is
estimated in the amount of $3,891.48.

Both classes will be paid 100% by the company.

Cordero will get the funds to implement the plan from its ongoing
legal service operations and from accounts receivables due from
the State Insurance Funds and the Social Security Administration,
according to the company's disclosure statement filed on November
10 with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Puerto Rico.

A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at
https://is.gd/xIuHDB

Cordero is represented by:

     Mar°a Soledad Lozada Figueroa
     Lozada Law & Associates
     P.O. Box 9023888
     San Juan PR 00902-3888
     Phone: (787) 533-1400
     Email: msl@lozadalaw.com

                     About Cordero,Cordero

Cordero, Cordero & Asociados-Asesores Legales, P.S.C. sought
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R.
Case No. 16-00828) on February 4, 2016.  The petition was signed
by Jose Ramon Cordero Rodriguez, president.

The case is assigned to Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated its assets and
liabilities at $1 million to $10 million.


L & R DEVELOPMENT: Hires Inmuebles Bienes as Realtor
----------------------------------------------------
L & R Development & Investment Corporation, seeks authority from
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to
employ Inmuebles Bienes Raices, LLC as realtor to the Debtor.

L & R Development requires Inmuebles Bienes to market and sell the
Debtor's real properties, known as:

   a. Lots of land in Urban Praderas, Hatillo
     -- Segregated lots of land 8 and 9
     -- Lots of land 2, 7, 8, 9 and 8A
     -- Lots of land 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11

   b. Properties located at Catano
     -- 1,322 square meters
     -- 187 square meters
     -- Lot of land and structure

   c. Property located at Bo. Puente, Camuy with 6,399 square
      meters

   d. Apartment No. 380 in Chalets de la Playa, Vega Baja

Inmuebles Bienes will be paid 3% of the value of the property
sold.

Inmuebles Bienes will also be reimbursed for reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred.

Saenid Lopez, member of Inmuebles Bienes Raices, LLC, assured the
Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is
defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not
represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

Inmuebles Bienes can be reached at:

     Saenid Lopez
     INMUEBLES BIENES RAICES, LLC
     Carr. No. 2, Km. 85.9, Bo. Carrizales
     Hatillo, PR 00659
     Tel: (787) 638-5183

                      About L&R Development

L&R Development & Investment Corp. sought protection under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 16-08792) on
November 1, 2016.  The petition was signed by Joaquin Lopez,
president.

The case is assigned to Judge Brian K. Tester.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor disclosed $3.05 million in
assets and $5.56 million in liabilities.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: New Currency Will Go Into Circulation on Dec. 15
-----------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Venezuela's new currency will go into
circulation on Dec. 15 in denominations of 20,000, 10,000, 5,000,
2,000, 1,000 and 500 bolivares, with 100-, 50- and 10-bolivar
coins, the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) said.

The 20,000-bolivar bill, which will be the largest in circulation
in the Andean nation, is 200 times bigger than the largest bill in
circulation now, the 100-bolivar bill, according to EFE News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2016, Fitch Ratings affirmed Venezuela's Long-Term
Foreign-and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (LT FC/LC IDR)
at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed the sovereign's Short-Term
Foreign Currency (ST FC) IDR at 'C' and country ceiling at 'CCC'.



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *