TCRLA_Public/161213.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Tuesday, December 13, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 246


                            Headlines



B A R B A D O S

* BARBADOS: To Improve Energy Security With US$34-Million IDB Loan


B R A Z I L

COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long Term Currency IDRs
RADIO E TELEVISAO: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B'; Outlook Remains Neg.
OURO VERDE: S&P Affirms Preliminary 'BB-' Global Scale Rating


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

APTINA INC: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
BALI ANCHOR: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 22
CAMBRIDGE COMPANY: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 19
COLLINSVILLE FINANCIAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
DACAPA INVESTMENT: Members' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 22

EMPIRE CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
FRONTIER RIDGE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT: Shareholders' Meeting Set for Dec. 19
IONIC SELECT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
LA ROCA: Members' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 22

LYNX MULTI-STRATEGY: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 14
MAHA VESSEL: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 19
TREMONT RESEARCH: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 13
VANTONA LTD: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 13


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to US$750MM Sr. Notes


E L   S A L V A D O R

BANCO AGRICOLA: S&P Cuts Ratings to 'B-/C'; Removes from Watch Neg
EL SALVADOR: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'B-'


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO AGROMERCANTIL: S&P Affirms 'BB' LT ICR; Outlook Remains Neg.


G U Y A N A

GUYANA: Stops Buying Barbados and Trinidad Dollars


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: 2016 a Rough Year for Gas Sector Says JGRA President


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD CEMENT: Former Boss Says Independent Valuation Needed


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Issuer Default Ratings
VENEZUELA: President Orders VEB100 Withdrawn From Circulation


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Exports Will Contract Around US$50 Billion in 2016


                            - - - - -


===============
B A R B A D O S
===============


* BARBADOS: To Improve Energy Security With US$34-Million IDB Loan
------------------------------------------------------------------
This US$34 million Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loan will
enhance Barbados' energy security and sustainability by
diversifying its energy mix through promoting the use of cleaner
fuels for power generation, increasing the use of renewable energy
sources, and increasing energy efficient applications by Barbados'
Government and private sector.

The Barbadian Government's priorities in the electricity sector
include reducing electricity prices, increasing energy security,
using cleaner fuels, and reducing negative environmental impacts.
Barbados aims to have renewable energy contribute 65 percent of
total peak electrical demand by 2030 and to achieve a 22 percent
reduction in electricity consumption by 2029. Barbados intends to
achieve a 30 percent economy-wide reduction in Greenhouse Gas
emissions by 2030 compared with 2008.

The project will finance improvements to Barbados' existing
natural gas infrastructure to ensure natural gas service
continuity. The loan will increase energy efficiency and renewable
energy applications within the National Petroleum Corporation's
(NPC) and Barbados National Oil Company Limited's (BNOCL)
operations to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions. It will also enable
the implementation of a Public-Private Partnership project to
import and supply LNG for power generation as well as to provide
technical support to NPC/BNOCL to foster greater operational
efficiency.

Juan Carlos de la Hoz, IDB's Representative in Barbados stated:
"This is the first IDB loan promoting LNG in the Caribbean which
will not only substantially improve the natural gas network and
expand the Micro LNG plant for industrial and commercial use in
Barbados." "The loan also promotes the use of renewable energy, by
providing more than 1 megawatts (MW) with a combination of wind
and solar power, contributing to increase Barbados' installed
renewable energy capacity for power generation from zero in 2009
to 19 MW in 2016; this represents more than 12 percent penetration
of renewable energy in the country's energy mix," de la Hoz added.

The loan is for a 24-year term and will be financed by the IDB's
Ordinary Capital resources with a 6.5 year grace period and a
LIBOR-based interest rate.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long Term Currency IDRs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Companhia Siderurgica Nacional's (CSN)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B-'. Fitch has also affirmed CSN's National Scale rating at
'BB-(bra)'. The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

The 'B-' rating reflects CSN's extremely leveraged capital
structure and its limited ability to generate substantial cash
flow from its steel business in Brazil. The recovery in iron ore
prices and an improved outlook for iron ore from earlier in 2016
have bolstered cash flow generation from its iron ore business,
and should place the company in a better position to negotiate
asset sales during the next 12 months.

The Negative Outlook continues to reflect high refinancing risk
between 2018 and 2020. Fitch's base case assumes that CSN will be
able to complete a refinancing of at least BRL5 billion of debt
due in 2018 with local banks during the first half of 2017.
Failure to progress within this timeframe would result in a
downgrade to 'CCC'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Severe Deterioration in Local Steel Industry; Limited Improvement
in 2017

Brazilian steel demand is expected to decline 16% during 2016,
reaching 17.9 million tons, after dropping 17% in 2015. Current
levels are similar to industry performance of 2009. Given the
still poor perspectives for improvement in Brazil's GDP during
2017, local steel demand is expected to recover a modest 3.5%,
according to Instituto Aco Brasil. Fitch projects that CSN's local
sales volumes will drop by 10% in 2016, after falling by 20% in
2015, and then expand by 5% during 2017, reflecting the restart of
its second blast furnace in third quarter 2016 (3Q16).

A bright spot for the local industry is that steel producers have
been able to apply consecutive price increases since the end of
2Q16 due to a drop in inventory levels, which have supported
improved operating results during 3Q16. In the case of CSN, the
company announced 10% price increases in May, June, and July and
recently pushed prices up by an additional 5%. Fitch expects price
increases of between 8% to 10% during 2017, excluding a more
meaningful double-digit increase to automakers.

Challenge to Sustain Rebound in CFFO; Iron Ore Price Dynamics is
Key

The deterioration of CSN's operating cash flow largely reflects
the combination of sharp declines in steel volumes, low iron ore
prices, and high interest expenses. Short-term recovery relies on
the ability to continue to pass along price increases in the
domestic steel segment, manageable coal costs, and on sustained
iron ore prices above USD60 per ton.

Fitch's base case scenario projects CSN's adjusted EBITDA at
approximately BRL3.7 billion for 2016 and BRL3.2 billion in 2017,
considering Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD45. CSN's operating
performance and cash flow generation are largely sensitive to iron
ore price. If iron ore prices, which are currently at over USD80,
remain robust and average USD60 throughout next year, the
company's 2017 EBITDA would be BRL4.8 billion.

During the LTM ended Sept. 30, 2016, CSN generated BRL3.3 billion
of adjusted EBITDA, and CFFO of BRL725 million. These results
compare with BRL2.9 billion and BRL2.1 billion, respectively, in
2015, which benefited from an extraordinary non-recurring dividend
of BRL595 million received from the corporate reorganization of
Congonhas Minerios.

Considering the current capital structure and the annual BRL2.9
billion interest burden CSN faces, Fitch estimates CSN's FCF to
remain negative at around BRL1 billion during 2017, considering
Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD45 per ton. At USD60 per ton,
FCF would be positive by BRL460 million.

Fitch's base case scenario considers capex of BRL1.1 billion,
which represents a steady decline from BRL1.6 billion in 2016 and
2015. During 2016, CSN efficiently managed working capital,
leading to an inflow that resulted in positive operating cash
flow. Going forward, working capital requirements will be neutral
to negative, as inventories are already at low levels, and
accounts receivable might be pressured in order to support
continued sales expansion.

Unsustainable Capital Structure; Asset Sale Remains Paramount to
Avoid Debt Restructuring

Fitch's base case scenario estimates CSN's net leverage to be
around 6.9x during 2016. Absent an asset sale this ratio will
increase to 8.4x at Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD45 per ton.
Considering the range of iron ore prices of USD50 to USD60 per
ton, net leverage could decline to the range of 5.2x to 7.0x
during 2017. Per Fitch's criteria, CSN's net leverage was 7.7x as
of the LTM period ended Sept. 30 2016, an improvement from 8.7x at
the end of 2015, mostly reflecting the impact of appreciation of
the BRL on the company's total debt.

Fitch believes the most likely asset disposal to be completed by
CSN will be the sale of a minority stake in Congonhas Minerios
that could represent an inflow of around BRL8 billion. On a pro
forma basis, net leverage ratios during 2017 would decline to 5.7x
at Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD45 per ton. Given the range
of USD50-USD60 per ton for iron ore prices in 2017, net leverage
would be in the range of 3.4x to 4.7x.

Elevated Refinancing Risks

CSN faces an unsustainable debt amortization profile. As of Sept.
30, 2016, CSN reported cash and cash equivalents of BRL5.4 billion
compared to total debt of BRL30.3 billion. The company faces debt
amortization of BRL2.3 billion in 2016/17, BRL5.6 billion in 2018,
BRL14.4 billion between 2019 and 2020 (BRL6.4 billion of cross-
border issuances) and BRL8.1 billion after 2021. Fitch's base case
scenario assumes that the CSN will be able to roll over at least
BRL5 billion of local bank debt during the first half of 2017.

Fitch considers the asset sale to be paramount to avoid a debt
restructuring. Successful asset sales of around BRL8 billion would
lead to an improvement in leverage ratios during 2018, potentially
allowing CSN to refinance its bonds issuances due 2019 and 2020.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- 1% decrease in steel volumes sold during 2016; expansion of
      5% in 2017

   -- 18% increase in iron ore volumes sold during 2016 and 3%
      increase in 2017

   -- Average iron ore price of USD56 per ton during 2016 and
      Fitch's price deck of USD45 per ton in 2017

   -- EBITDA of BRL3.7 billion in 2016 and BRL3.2 billion in 2017

   -- Successful refinancing of 2018's local banking debt

   -- No dividends paid in 2016 and 2017

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The inability to refinance the 2018 local banking debt during 1H17
would lead to a downgrade of CSN's ratings. Further deterioration
of the steel industry in Brazil, or inability to proceed with
price increases would also pressure free cash flow generation and
liquidity, and consequently the ratings.

A revision in the Rating Outlook to Stable could occur if CSN is
successful in its 2018 debt refinancing in conjunction with
improving industry fundamentals, which would lead FCF
stabilization. Rating upgrades would largely depend on the size of
the asset sales and solid industry fundamentals.

LIQUIDITY

CSN has historically maintained a robust cash position.
Nevertheless, its debt amortization schedule is unsustainable, as
highlighted above. As of Sept. 30, 2016, CSN had BRL5.4 billion of
cash and marketable securities and BRL30.3 billion of total debt.
CSN's debt primarily consists of prepayment export financings
(37%), local bank loans (24%), senior notes (18%) and perpetual
bonds (11%).

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B-';

   -- National long-term rating at 'BB-(bra)' ;

   -- CSN Islands XI senior unsecured long-term rating guaranteed
      by CSN at 'B-/RR4';

   -- CSN Islands XII senior unsecured long-term rating guaranteed
      by CSN at 'B-/RR4';

   -- CSN Resources S.A. senior unsecured USD note long-term
      rating guaranteed by CSN at 'B-/RR4'.

The Rating Outlook remains Negative.


RADIO E TELEVISAO: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B'; Outlook Remains Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Radio e Televisao Bandeirantes
Ltda.'s (RTB) long-term foreign-currency and local-currency Issuer
Default ratings to 'B' from 'BB-'.  Fitch has also downgraded the
company's National Long-term Rating to 'BBB-(bra)' from 'A(bra)'.
The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects RTB's continued weak liquidity profile,
mainly its high level of short-term debt with low cash balance and
high interest expenses.  The company's revenue and EBITDA
generation have also deteriorated compared to 2015 levels under
tough economic conditions that have dampened advertising demand in
Brazil.

The Negative Outlook reflects Fitch's view that any material
recovery in the operational outlook would be difficult and that
this would limit FCF generation and liquidity profile improvement.
A further downgrade could occur unless RTB improves its debt
maturities profile within the next few quarters and materially
turns around its operational cash flow generation.

RTB is part of Grupo Bandeirantes de Comunicacao (Band), a
diversified media group and one of the group's major free-to-air
(FTA) TV and radio broadcasters in Brazil.  RTB's ratings are
based on Band's combined credit profile given the centralized
group's cash management and a strong operational linkage among the
group's companies under shared executives and control by the same
major shareholder.

Weak Liquidity:
Band's liquidity profile is weak given its high proportion of
short-term debt and low cash position.  Despite successful
refinancing of some of its short-term debt maturities during 2016,
the company's short-term debt was still high at BRL301 million,
which represented 37% of its total debt as of Sept. 30, 2016.  The
company's readily available cash balance during the period was
just BRL59 million, while it also kept BRL30 million in the escrow
account related with the debentures.  Fitch expects Band to
continue to face limited financial flexibility as its short-term
debt matures, which would require ongoing negotiation for credit
extension at high interest expenses.

Band's ability to successfully execute its cost savings
initiatives while ensuring content attractiveness will be key in
improving its profitability and cash flow generation to
comfortably cover its high finance expenses and gradually reduce
short-term debt.  The company's adjusted net leverage, which was
3.0x as of Sept. 2016, is considered relatively low for the rating
level, but the benefit is fully diluted given its poor liquidity
condition.

Unfavorable Industry Trend:
Media companies continue to experience weak demand for advertising
due to unfavourable macro-economic environment in Brazil and
waning importance of free-to-air TV (FTA) due to pay-TV and
internet advertisement growth.  Weak market conditions will
continue to impede any material advertising price improvements as
advertisers' budgets remain constrained, which could pressure
Band's FTA operations.  Fitch does not foresee any material
recovery in the advertising demand in the near term given current
weak macro environment in Brazil.  FTA's industry revenues
declined for the first time in more than a decade to
BRL22.1 billion in 2015 after reaching a record BRL23.2 billion in
2014.

Weak TV Market Position:
Band's market position is weak, and Fitch does not foresee any
material improvement in the company's market share given intense
competitive landscape.  The company is the fourth-largest TV
operator in a highly concentrated industry in Brazil, where the
market is dominated by Globo Participacoes S.A.  Band's TV
audience market share was 4.3% in 2015, a modest improvement from
4% in 2007.

Diversified Media Portfolio:
Band is a nationwide diversified media group in Brazil.  Its main
business is FTA television and radio, which combined represented
close to 70% of revenue in 2015.  Band boasts strong operational
integration across various media platforms backed by the sharing
of production infrastructure and talent, as well as the
distribution of content under the common management.  This helps
the group maintain quality of content across the segments with an
efficient cost structure.

                         DERIVATION SUMMARY

Band's business profile, in terms of weak market position in its
main TV business and a small operational scale, is materially
weaker than its regional peers in the investment grade categories.
The company's leverage is low for the 'B' category, but this is
offset by its weak liquidity profile and access to credit, given
high short-term debt reliance and financing cost, as well as a
predominantly collateralized debt profile.  Also, the company's
corporate governance, with its complex group structure, is
considered weak, in line with the rating level.  No country-
ceiling, parent/subsidiary or operating environment aspects impact
the rating.

                          KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for RTB include:

   -- Continued successful rollover of its short-term debt;
   -- Negative revenue growth due to the weak advertisement
      industry in Brazil in the short to medium term;
   -- Modestly improved EBITDA margins based on cost savings
      initiatives in 2017 and 2018;
   -- Net leverage to remain at around 3.0x in the short to medium
      term.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action:

   -- No material short-term debt reduction and low cash balance,
      resulting in continued weak financial flexibility;
   -- Continued EBITDA contraction with negative FCF generation;
   -- Failure to reach 1.0x of readily-available cash plus cash
      flow from operations / short-term debt.

Positive rating action is unlikely in the short to medium term,
given the company's weak capital structure amid the tough
operational outlook in Brazil.

                              LIQUIDITY

RTB's liquidity profile is weak, which is the key rating driver.
The company's short-term debt amounted to BRL301 million, while
its readily-available cash balance was just BRL59 million as of
Sept. 30, 2016, while it also kept BRL30 million in the escrow
account related with the debentures.  The company has a high
short-term debt reliance, which represented 37% of its total debt
during the same period.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded these ratings:

Radio e Televisao Bandeirantes Ltda.

   -- Long-term foreign-currency and local-currency IDRs to 'B'
      from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;
   -- National Long-term Rating to 'BBB-(bra)' from 'A(bra)';
      Outlook Negative.


OURO VERDE: S&P Affirms Preliminary 'BB-' Global Scale Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its preliminary 'BB-' global scale and
'brA' Brazilian national scale ratings on Ouro Verde Locacao e
Servico S.A.  The outlook is stable.

The ratings on Ouro Verde are preliminary, and S&P intends to
review those over the next 90 days, pending the conclusion of
senior notes issuance.

The affirmation reflects that Ouro Verde has maintained its
strategy to seek longer-term sources of funding to improve its
capital structure and reduce refinancing pressures.  The company
has recently concluded a debentures issuance in the local market
and is negotiating for long-term loans with banks, which addresses
short-term funding needs.  S&P still expects the company to extend
a larger amount of debt maturities to significantly reduce short-
term debt and improve liquidity.

The company's operational performance through 2016 has been in
line with S&P's expectations, generating fairly stable cash flow
despite weak economic activity in Brazil.  S&P expects that to
continue, given S&P's view of still slow economic activity in 2017
and the company's strong contracted portfolio position.  Also, S&P
expects the slower growth rhythm to allow for slight improvement
in metrics, as capital expenditure needs would likely remain for
maintenance of the company's fleet over the next few quarters.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


APTINA INC: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Aptina, Inc. will hold their final meeting on
Dec. 15, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mark N. Rogers
          5005 East McDowell Road
          Maildrop: A-700
          Phoenix Arizona 85008
          United States of America


BALI ANCHOR: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 22
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Bali Anchor Investments Limited will hear on
Dec. 22, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          John Chi On Ho
          c/o Richard Bennett
          Telephone: +852 3656 6069
          Facsimile: +852 3656 6001


CAMBRIDGE COMPANY: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 19
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Cambridge Company Limited will hold their
final meeting on Dec. 19, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Westport Services Ltd.
          c/o Bonnie Willkom
          P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 5122
          Facsimile: (345) 949 7920


COLLINSVILLE FINANCIAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Collinsville Financial Ltd. received on
Nov. 18, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Amicorp Cayman Fiduciary Limited
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 10655 Grand Cayman KY1-1006
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Nicole Ebanks-Sloley
          Telephone: (345) 943-6055


DACAPA INVESTMENT: Members' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 22
---------------------------------------------------------
The members of Dacapa Investment Company will hold their final
meeting on Dec. 22, 2016, to receive the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


EMPIRE CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Empire Capital Partners Enhanced, Ltd. will
hold their final meeting on Dec. 15, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Empire Capital Management, L.L.C.
          One Gorham Island
          Suite 201 Westport
          Connecticut 06880
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (203) 454 1019


FRONTIER RIDGE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Frontier Ridge Global Fund, Ltd. will hold
their final meeting on Dec. 15, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          FR Investment Manager, LLC
          c/o Westport Capital Partners LLC
          40 Danbury Road Wilton
          Connecticut 06897
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (203) 429-8602
          e-mail: mporosoff@westportcp.com


INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT: Shareholders' Meeting Set for Dec. 19
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Independent Development Co Ltd will hold their
final meeting on Dec. 19, 2016, at 10:30 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Westport Services Ltd.
          c/o Bonnie Willkom
          P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 5122
          Facsimile: (345) 949 7920


IONIC SELECT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ionic Select Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.
will hold their final meeting on Dec. 15, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Stephen Sargison
          31 Woodland Drive, Lower Valley
          P.O. Box 414 SAV Grand Cayman KY1-1502
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 947 2390


LA ROCA: Members' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 22
-----------------------------------------------
The members of La Roca Investment Company will hold their final
meeting on Dec. 22, 2016, to receive the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


LYNX MULTI-STRATEGY: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 14
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Lynx Multi-Strategy Fund II Ltd. will hold
their final meeting on Dec. 14, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes
          SSARIS Advisors, LLC
          c/o Corey Stokes
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814-9277
          Facsimile: (345) 949 4647


MAHA VESSEL: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 19
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Maha Vessel Limited will hear on Dec. 19, 2016,
at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Guy Neivens
          P.O. Box 33639, Abu Dhabi
          United Arab Emirates
          Telephone: +971 2551 1336
          Facsimile: +971 2551 1556


TREMONT RESEARCH: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 13
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Tremont Research Investments Ltd. will hold
their final meeting on Dec. 13, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Delta FS Limited
          c/o Andrew Edgington
          Suite 3-211 Gavernors Square
          23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
          P.O. Box 11820 Grand Cayman KY1-1009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 743 6630


VANTONA LTD: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 13
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Vantona Ltd will hold their final meeting on
Dec. 13, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Trident Liquidators (Cayman) Ltd.
          c/o Lisa Thoppil
          One Capital Place, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 847, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 0880
          Facsimile: (345) 949 0881


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E C U A D O R
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ECUADOR: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to US$750MM Sr. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it assigned its 'B' issue rating to the
Republic of Ecuador's senior unsecured notes issuance of
US$750 million.  The rating on the notes is the same as the
foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Ecuador.  The notes
are due in 2026 and have a coupon of 9.65%.

RATINGS LIST

Republic of Ecuador
Issuer Credit Rating            B/Stable/B

New Rating

Republic of Ecuador
Senior Unsecured
  US$750 mil notes               B


=====================
E L   S A L V A D O R
=====================


BANCO AGRICOLA: S&P Cuts Ratings to 'B-/C'; Removes from Watch Neg
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on Banco Agricola to 'B-/C'
from 'B/B'.  At the same time, S&P removed the ratings from
CreditWatch negative, where it placed them on Oct. 14, 2016.  The
outlook is negative.

S&P revised its BICRA score on El Salvador (foreign currency:
B-/Negative/B; local currency: B-/Negative/B) to group '8' from
'7'.  S&P also revised its economic risk score to '9' from '8' and
maintained its '6' industry risk score.  As a result, S&P revised
the anchor for banks operating in the country to 'bb-' from 'bb.'

The weaker BICRA economic risk score reflects a continuing drop in
El Salvador's economic resilience, which S&P views as having an
extremely high risk.  In S&P's opinion, the country's economic
growth remains vulnerable to changes in the U.S. commercial and
immigration policies because 48.4% of El Salvador's exports are
destined for the U.S. and remittances from the latter represented
16% of the Central American country's GDP in 2015.  S&P has also
revised downward its economic growth assessment on El Salvador for
2017-2019.  Political stalemate in the country has dampened
investor confidence, and high crime rates continue to depress
investments.

Despite the current sovereign credit stress, S&P is revising El
Salvador BICRA's economic risk trend to stable from negative.
This is because S&P already views economic resilience and credit
risk in the economy as having an extremely high risk.

S&P's industry risk score remains unchanged at '6' with a negative
trend.  In S&P's opinion, if political polarization keeps
weakening the government's ability to gain access to liquidity,
the country's credit stress will worsen.

The negative outlook on Banco Agricola reflects an at least one-
in-three likelihood of a downgrade in the next 12 months if the
sovereign credit stress drains Banco Agricola's liquidity stemming
from its exposure to the government and considering that most of
its cash is deposited at the central bank.

Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) economic risk and
industry risk scores are on a scale from 1 (lowest risk) to 10
(highest risk).


EL SALVADOR: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on El Salvador to 'B-' from 'B'.
At the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications.  The outlook is negative.  S&P also
affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings and removed
them from CreditWatch negative.  The 'AAA' transfer and
convertibility assessment is unchanged.

                            RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects a continued erosion of El Salvador's fiscal
and debt profiles and raising concerns about its access to
adequate liquidity to meet its funding requirements for 2017 and
2018.  Recent political agreements between the government and
opposition parties could gradually improve the government's access
to liquidity to meet its debt servicing needs, including payments
due to the country's pension system.  The downgrade also reflects
the country's weakening prospects for economic growth in a context
of lower investor confidence and the need to undertake fiscal
adjustment to stabilize the government's growing debt burden.

The delay in gaining Congressional approval for external debt
issuance reduced the government's liquidity, translating into
further increases in its already high short-term debt (LETES).
The stock of short-term debt has reached $1.18 billion, close to
the legal ceiling of $1.3 billion.  The recent fiscal agreement in
Congress allows for the issuance of up to $550 million of new debt
that can be used for repaying LETES, as well as curing growing
arrears owed to suppliers and local governments.  However,
Congress has not approved further debt issuance that would be
needed to finance the 2017 fiscal budget.

Accompanying the last debt issuance authorization in November
2016, a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) was also approved with the
objective of reducing the fiscal deficit from an estimated 4.4% of
GDP this year to below 3% of GDP over three years.  The FRL also
caps short-term debt at 20% of current revenues (from 30%
currently) and caps total debt at 65% of GDP (or 42% excluding
debt issued to fund the country's pension system).  S&P thinks
that it will be difficult for the government to meet these
ambitious targets, especially in a context of likely low GDP
growth.  The recent fiscal agreements between the government and
opposition parties in Congress pave the way for a possible
agreement with the International Monetary Fund to address the
country's weak public finances.

Last year, the fiscal deficit declined to 3.3% of GDP from 3.6%
the year before.  However, the underlying fiscal position is much
weaker as the government has accumulated arrears to suppliers,
delays in transfers to local and regional governments as well as
payments for subsidies.  Considering arrears, the fiscal deficit
is likely to exceed 4% of GDP this year and could remain at that
level in the next couple of years, absent a substantial fiscal
adjustment.  The government has limited capacity to raise
significantly its revenues, given the large informal sector and
many years of poor GDP growth.  Weighting on S&P's fiscal
assessment is the significant shortfalls in the country's basic
services and infrastructure.

Adding pressure to the fiscal adjustment is the pending pension
reform, which is supposed to be discussed over the next year.
Annual shortfall of the pension system represented 2% of GDP 2015.
Last November, the national court declared as unconstitutional a
recently approved change in the pension trust law that allowed the
Fideicomiso de Obligaciones Previsionales to fund its maturing
obligations to the country's private-sector pension funds by
issuing debt.  The government will be obligated to make its next
payment to the Fideicomiso de Obligaciones Previsionales, due in
the first quarter of 2017, in cash, putting pressure on its
liquidity.

The general government debt burden has steadily risen in recent
years.  S&P estimates that, including pension-related debt, net
general government debt could average 66% of GDP for 2017-2019.
also, interest rates have risen significantly over the last year,
mainly for short-term debt issuance.  S&P projects interest paid
to be over 22% of general government revenues on average for 2016-
2019.

S&P estimates that the banking sector and public-sector
enterprises pose a limited contingent liability to the sovereign,
according to S&P's criteria.  El Salvador has a relatively small
state-owned enterprise sector, given privatization the sovereign
implemented in previous years.

El Salvador's economic growth remains vulnerable to a change in
U.S. commercial and migratory policies because the U.S. is its
main trading partner (48.4% of El Salvador's exports are to the
U.S.), and remittances from the U.S. represented 16% of GDP in
2015.  S&P is lowering its economic trend growth assessment for
2017-2019.  Political stalemate has dampened investor confidence,
and high crime rates continue to heavily weigh on investments.  In
S&P's estimations, 2016 real GDP growth will likely moderate to
2.3% from 2.5% in 2015 and average 1.4% for 2017-2019.
Additionally, per capita GDP growth would remain at 1.1%, on
average, for the same period.

Positive performance in the trade deficit combined with the growth
in remittances flows has reduced significantly the current account
deficit (CAD) for the first half of 2016.  For year-end, S&P
estimates this could narrow to 3.1% of GDP from 3.6% in the year
before.  Although, exports and remittances could be sensitive to
shifts in U.S. policies, which could increase the CAD to 5%, on
average, in 2017-2019, according to our calculations.  On the
other side, S&P do not expect foreign direct investment (FDI) to
pick up in the following years and to remain below 1% of GDP in
2016-2018.  S&P projects that El Salvador's gross external
financing requirements will average 108% for 2016-2019, and its
narrow net external debt could start picking up in 2017, reaching
92% of its CARs.

On the monetary side, official dollarization has contributed to
lower inflation and helped to stabilize the financial system in El
Salvador.  However, El Salvador lacks monetary flexibility,
leaving fiscal policy as the main tool for economic policy.

The banking system remains well-capitalized, with regulatory
capital hovering around 17% since 2010 (16.9% as of June 2016).
It is mostly foreign-owned and, at the same time, highly
concentrated, with more than 90% of assets held by foreign
institutions and six banks holding 84% of system balance sheet.
The asset quality of the loan portfolio has improved since
midyear--data show a decline in nonperforming loans to 2.1%.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the at least one-in-three likelihood
of a downgrade in the next 12 months if continued political
stalemate worsens the sovereign's access to funding over the next
year, constraining its ability to meet its debt maturities and
fund its fiscal deficit.  It also reflects S&P's expectation of
slow economic growth for 2017-2019.  Failure to undertake a timely
and effective fiscal adjustment, as well as improve access to
liquidity, could result in a downgrade.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if successful political
negotiations between the government and opposition parties result
in an agreement that could lead to a medium-term fiscal adjustment
and greater flexibility to meet debt servicing and other financing
needs.  Staunching the recent deterioration of the sovereign's
debt and fiscal profile, as well as its growth prospects, could
eventually stabilize the rating at its current level.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that "institutional and governance
effectiveness" risk had deteriorated.  All other key rating
factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded; Ratings Off CreditWatch; Outlook Negative; Ratings
Affirmed
                                To                 From
El Salvador (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating        B-/Negative/B      B/Watch Neg/B


Downgraded; Ratings Off CreditWatch
                                To                 From
El Salvador (Republic of)
Senior Unsecured               B-                 B/Watch Neg


==================
G U A T E M A L A
==================


BANCO AGROMERCANTIL: S&P Affirms 'BB' LT ICR; Outlook Remains Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'BB' long- and 'B'
short-term global scale issuer credit ratings on Banco
Agromercantil de Guatemala S.A. (BAM).  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'BB' issue-level rating to Intertrust SPV (Cayman)
Ltd.'s $300 million senior notes due April 10, 2019.  Intertrust
SPV (Cayman) Ltd. acts as trustee of the Agromercantil Senior
Trust. BAM fully guarantees the notes, so the rating on the notes
is the same as the long-term ICR on the bank.  The outlook remains
negative.

The issuer credit ratings (ICR) on BAM continue to reflect S&P's
view of its business position as adequate reflecting its solid
market share in the Guatemalan banking industry and current
business diversification.  S&P also views its capital and earnings
as adequate, based on its forecasted RAC ratio of 6.9% on average
for 2017 and 2018.  The assessment of the bank's risk position as
moderate is based on its still high dollar-denominated loan
portfolio compared to the system's average.  The ratings also
incorporate S&P's assessment of BAM's funding as average and
liquidity as adequate.  The bank's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) remains at 'bb'.

S&P's bank criteria use our BICRA economic risk and industry risk
scores to determine a bank's anchor, the starting point in
assigning an issuer credit rating.  The anchor for banks operating
only in Guatemala is 'bb+'.

S&P's opinion of Guatemala's economic risk mainly continues to
reflect the low GDP per capita and high poverty levels that have
constrained credit growth and debt capacity levels in the country.
The latter, coupled with increasing foreign currency lending,
results in very high credit risk in the economy in the event of
severe economic and market stress, which could lead to higher-
than-expected credit losses.  The economic risk assessment also
takes into account the country's limited fiscal flexibility,
stemming from a low tax base that constrains government
expenditures in key areas, such as infrastructure and law
enforcement.  On the other hand, S&P considers risks from economic
imbalances in Guatemala as low.  The country's real estate market
is still underdeveloped and limits the potential for credit asset
bubbles in this segment.  Despite recent, and expected, double-
digit lending growth, the potential for a credit-fueled bubble is
limited because of a low ratio of credit to GDP (up 1.8 basis
points [bps] in the last four years, which S&P don't expect to
increase) and an underdeveloped real estate market.

S&P's industry risk score hasn't changed; in its assessment, S&P
takes into account Guatemala's regulatory track record, which has
remained weak despite a stronger regulatory framework and scope of
supervision.  Nevertheless, the current regulatory framework has
not yet fully adopted or implemented international standards, such
as Basel III.  Conversely, competitive risks remain moderate
thanks to the banking sector's sound profitability, with a focus
on simple banking products amid the lack of significant market
distortions.  Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) hold a market
share of about 3%, which is fairly low. Guatemala's banking system
has a historically stable core customer deposit base and access to
multilateral external credit lines, but the small and
underdeveloped domestic capital market still prevents funding
diversification and financial flexibility.

"BAM's business position remains adequate, in our opinion,
reflecting its solid market share in the Guatemalan banking
system, steady operating revenue in the past few years, and the
integration with its parent company, Bancolombia S.A. y Companias
Subordinadas (Bancolombia, BBB-/Negative/A-3).  As of Sept. 30,
2016, BAM is the fourth-largest bank in Guatemala in terms of
total assets, loans, and deposits with 8.4%, 10.6%, and 7.7%
respectively.  Although the bank's operating revenue remained
practically flat as of September 2016 compared with the same
period of 2015, due to slow lending growth this year, corporate
lending has grown on a consistent basis in the past four years.
Commercial loans (corporate and small- to mid-size enterprises)
represented 83% of the total portfolio, followed retail banking
services (10%; including personal loans, credit cards, auto
loans), and mortgages (7%).  Thanks to the integration with
Bancolombia that includes three new members on the bank's board,
BAM seeks to increase the retail lending share.  However, the bank
will face a strong competition; therefore, we believe it will take
some time for a more balanced revenue base to materialize.  As a
result, we don't expect significant changes in BAM's business
position in the next 12-18 months," S&P noted.

S&P's assessment of BAM's capital and earnings remains adequate.
This opinion stems from S&P's forecasted RAC ratio of about 6.9%
for 2017 and 2018.  The ratio reflects S&P's base-case scenario
assumptions, which include these factors:

   -- Guatemala's expected GDP growth of 3.6% for the next two
      years;

   -- Loan portfolio growth of 7.0% for the next two years due to
      uncertain economic and political conditions;

   -- NPAs and net charge-offs (NCOs) will remain around 2% and
      0.8%, respectively, for the next two years;

   -- Core earnings to adjusted assets at 1.0%-1.1%;

   -- Efficiency level near 60% in 2017 and 2018;

   -- A drop in net interest margin (NIM) to 4.85% in 2016, but
      S&P expects it to recover to 5.05% in 2017 and 5.15% in
      2018; and

   -- A dividend payout similar to the last year.

Although S&P's forecasted RAC ratio is on the border line of
moderate and adequate assessments, S&P views the bank's capital
and earnings as adequate because, in its view, BAM's quality of
capital has remained sound due to high-quality capital base that
consists of paid-in capital, reserves, and retained earnings.  As
of Sept. 30, 2016, the bank's core earnings to adjusted assets was
0.9%, slightly lower than three-year average of 1.06% due to lower
net income generation.  However, S&P expects this indicator to
recover to 1.0%-1.1% in the next two years.

S&P's assessment of BAM's risk position is moderate, mainly
reflecting its still highly dollarized lending and customer
concentration.  As of Sept. 30, 2016, the bank's dollar-
denominated loan portfolio slipped to 48% of its total loans from
51% for the same period last year.  This exposure is higher than
the Guatemalan banking system's 39%.  Although the exchange rate
between the Guatemalan Quetzal (GTQ) and the dollar has remained
stable during past few years, S&P considers that a potential GTQ
depreciation could jeopardize the domestic banks' financial
performance.  The dollarized lending is a common feature among
most of the banks in Guatemala.  BAM is also exposed to customer
concentration its top 20 economic groups exposures represented 34%
of the loan portfolio and 2.4x of the bank's total adjusted
capital (TAC) as of Sept. 30, 2016, which makes the bank
vulnerable in case any of these groups defaults.  BAM's NPAs
slightly weakened to 2.0% at the end of the third quarter of 2016,
but they were lower than the industry average of 2.2%, while the
bank's reserve coverage was above 100%.

S&P continues to view BAM's funding as average due to its stable
funding ratio (SFR) of more than 100% and its wide deposit base,
which S&P considers one of the most stable funding sources.  As of
Sept. 30, 2016, the bank's funding structure mainly consists of
deposits, which represent 78%, while inter-bank loans and notes
make up the rest.  The deposit base is highly fragmented because
82% of it is from retail sector and top 20 depositors only
represent 8% of the bank's funding.  In the same period, BAM's SFR
was 111.6%, compared with the three-year average of 116.8%, but
S&P still considers it adequate to cover the bank's funding needs.
S&P expects deposits to remain as BAM's main source of funding
with a SFR above 100% for the next few years.

S&P considers that the bank has adequate liquidity.  BAM is not
exposed to significant refinancing risks in the short term due its
prudent liquidity management.  The bank's broad liquid assets to
short-term wholesale funding have been consistently above 2.0x,
which is in line with those of its immediate peers.  BAM's
liquidity benefits from its liquid assets that mainly consist of
cash and government securities that represent 25.8% of the bank's
total assets.  The broad liquid assets to short-term wholesale
funding was 2.86% at the end of the third quarter of 2016, and S&P
expects it will remain at similar levels for the next two years.
Although the current and expected liquidity levels are sound, S&P
deems them as adequate, given Guatemalan underdeveloped debt
capital market.

After Bancolombia's acquisition of BAM, S&P views it as a core
subsidiary because it operates in business lines integral to the
overall group strategy and its business risk is similar to that of
Bancolombia.  Therefore, S&P considers it highly unlikely that BAM
would be sold.  In this regard, S&P expects BAM and Bancolombia to
be fully integrated in the medium term and that BAM will represent
a stable source of income, through dividend payments, for its
parent.  Despite S&P's current core group status, BAM's ICR will
remain limited by the foreign-currency ratings on Guatemala
(BB/Negative/B) given the bank's exposures to the government and
economy.

The negative outlook on BAM reflects that on the sovereign, and
S&P's expectation that the bank will maintain a RAC ratio of
around 6.9% in the next 18 to 24 months.  Therefore, S&P expects
the bank's internal capital generation to compensate for a modest
portfolio growth and high dividend payout.

S&P could revise the outlook on the bank to stable if it takes a
similar action on the sovereign.

S&P can lower the ratings on the bank if S&P downgrades the
sovereign.

RATINGS SCORE SNAPSHOT
Issuer Credit Rating               BB/Negative/B

SACP                               bb
Anchor                             bb+
Business Position                  Adequate (0)
Capital and Earnings               Adequate (0)
Risk Position                      Moderate (-1)
Funding and Liquidity              Average and adequate (0)

Support                            0
GRE Support                        0
Group Support                      +2
Government Support                 0

Additional Factors                 -2



===========
G U Y A N A
===========


GUYANA: Stops Buying Barbados and Trinidad Dollars
--------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that worrying signs on Guyana's foreign
exchange market has forced the Guyana Government to step in and
temporarily suspend the buying of Barbados and Trinidad dollars
from local cambios.

Central Bank Governor Dr. Gobin Ganga raised concern that people
have been coming from the neighbouring CARICOM states with their
money to buy United States dollars, according to Caribbean360.com.
But that won't be allowed from now on -- for the time being, at
least, the report notes.

However, Ganga, who made the announcement at a recent press
conference, said people with a legitimate need for the two
currencies would still be able to access it from the Central Bank,
the report relays.

Ganga's announcement came on the heels of local media reports that
Guyana was facing a shortage of US dollars, the report says.  He
said this triggered a rush on some bank for huge amounts of
"illegitimate" foreign exchange without the necessary
documentation, the report relays.

"We had requested from the commercial banks invoices to
substantiate some of these requests.  All that you received were
some letters requesting a certain amount sent to a commercial
bank, or an email or a verbal request.  Obviously if there is a
legitimate demand you would have an invoice accompanying," the
report quoted Mr. Ganga as saying.

Mr. Ganga insisted there was no shortage of the American dollars
and commercial banks were well able to meet genuine requests, the
report notes.

"There is no chronic situation out there.  The commercial banks
are dealing with this issue as we speak.  Some of them have been
bringing back some foreign currencies that they had elsewhere to
address some of the demand," the report further quoted Mr. Ganga
as saying.

Dr. Ganga warned banks against processing dishonest requests for
US dollars saying it could put the country in a difficult
position, citing situations where Trinidad and Tobago could not
foot the US$1million bill from the Guyana Sugar Corporation or pay
a rice exporter $700,000, the report notes.

Information from the central bank shows that while there was $8
million Barbados in circulation in Guyana in 2014, the figure has
since leaped to $13 million, the report relays.

For the same period, the amount of Trinidad currency in
circulation moved from TT$9.1 million to TT$38 million, the report
adds.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: 2016 a Rough Year for Gas Sector Says JGRA President
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Jamaica Gasoline Retailers Association,
JGRA, has described 2016 as a bad year for the sector.

The association says the sector was plagued by problems which had
a long term impact on its members, according to RJR News.

"The first six months in the year, we suffered a lot because of
the bad gas issue . . . . we still have contracts hanging over our
heads -- it's been a rough year," said JGRA President, Phillip
Chong, the report notes.

Meanwhile, the JGRA said there are signs that more problems are on
the horizon for gasoline retailers in 2017, the report relays.

"We still have the contract issues and we are seeing more signs of
the marketing companies pressing for their contracts . . . . the
solution is simple-  just agree to good terms.  But that is not
how the cookie crumbles, the marketers seem to want more," the
report quoted Mr. Chong as saying.

And oil prices rose by more than 5 per cent after OPEC and non-
OPEC producers agreed to curb oil output and ease a global glut,
the report relays.

The agreement between OPEC and a number of other oil producing
nations was the first joint action since 2001, following more than
two years of low prices that strained many government's budgets
and spurred unrest in countries from the Middle East to Latin
America, the report notes.

Brent futures for February delivery rose 5 percent to US$56.94
cents per barrel with U.S. crude spiking a similar amount to
$54.07 cents per barrel, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2016, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Jamaica.  The outlook on the long-term sovereign credit ratings
remains stable.  In addition, S&P affirmed its transfer and
convertibility assessment at 'B+'.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


TRINIDAD CEMENT: Former Boss Says Independent Valuation Needed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that former Group Chief
Executive Officer of Trinidad Cement Limited (TCL), Dr. Rollin
Bertrand, has suggested that the board of directors of the company
hire a reputable investment banking firm to do an independent
valuation of TCL's shares and make a recommendation to the
company's shareholders whether they should accept or reject the
latest takeover bid by the Mexican cement giant, Cemex.

Cemex on December 5, made a bid to buy 132,616,942 TCL shares at a
cash price of TT$4.50 each through an indirect subsidiary Sierra
Trading, according to Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.

If the bid succeeds, Sierra Trading would own up to 74.9 per cent
of TCL's shares because the company already owns 39.5 per cent,
the report notes.

In statements issued in Port of Spain, New York and Mexico City,
the company said its offer is a 33.13 per cent premium over the
closing price of TCL shares on the Trinidad and Tobago Stock
Exchange the previous Friday, the report relays.

Dr. Bertrand recalled that in 2002 Cemex offered a price of
TT$5.62 for a hundred per cent of the company's shares but the
offer was rejected by the board, the report notes.  However, he
said Cemex then made a hostile bid of TT$7.15, this time pitching
its offer directly to shareholders, the report discloses.

He said the board hired the U.S. investment banking firm J.P.
Morgan to do an independent valuation of the company's shares and
J.P. Morgan valued the shares at TT$10 each or U.S $1.64, the
report says.

Dr. Bertrand called the latest Cemex offer "ridicuously low" and
said he is anxious to see the advice of an independent valuation,
adding that his own calculations suggested a share value of
between TT$9.45 to TT$18.29 with an average of TT$13.75, the
report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
December 8, 2016, S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B-' long-term
corporate credit and issue-level ratings on Trinidad Cement
Limited Group (TCL) on CreditWatch with positive implications.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.'s (PDVSA)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings at
'CC' and the company's National Scale long-term rating at
'CCC(ven)'.  Fitch has also affirmed the approximately
USD30 billion of senior unsecured debt outstanding at 'CC/RR4' and
the company's recent senior secured notes issuance of
approximately USD3.4 billion at 'CC/RR4'.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

PDVSA's ratings reflect the company's weakening liquidity position
as a result of transfers to the central government and decreased
hydrocarbon price environment.  PDVSA's credit quality continues
to reflect its close linkage to the government of Venezuela as a
state-owned entity, combined with absolute government control over
business strategies and internal resources.  This underscores the
close link between the company's credit profile and that of the
sovereign.  PDVSA's cash flow generation has historically been
significantly affected by the large funds transfers to the central
government.

PDVSA's international long-term ratings of 'CC' are one notch
below Fitch's sovereign ratings for Venezuela of 'CCC'.  This
reflects the company's near-term liquidity pressures.  Although
Fitch continues to expect that PDVSA will receive financial aid
from the Venezuelan government to make upcoming principal and
interest payments, the company claimed in October 2016 that it
could be difficult to make scheduled payments on its existing
debt, which heightened uncertainty as to PDVSA's liquidity.
Venezuelan government external reserves amounted to less than
USD11 billion as of October 2016, of which a significant portion
was in gold.  PDVSA's cash on hand as of March 31, 2016, amounted
to approximately USD5.5 billion.  The Venezuelan government does
not have cross-border principal payments until 2018 and interest
expenses average approximately USD3 billion per year.

                        LINKAGE TO SOVEREIGN

PDVSA's credit quality continues to be closely linked to that of
the Venezuelan government.  Venezuela's ratings (IDR 'CCC')
reflect the sovereign's weakened external reserves, high commodity
dependence, rising macroeconomic distortions, limited reduced
transparency in official data, and continued policy and political
uncertainty.  The sovereign's strong repayment record and
relatively low debt amortization profile mitigate imminent risks
to debt service.  PDVSA is fully owned by the government and its
transfers have historically represented around 45% of the
government's revenues.  It is of strategic importance to the
economic and social policies of the country, as oil accounts for
around 95% of total exports.

                       LIMITED TRANSPARENCY

The Venezuelan government displays limited transparency in the
administration and use of government-managed funds, as well as in
fiscal operations, which poses challenges to accurately assessing
its fiscal state and the full financial strength of the sovereign.
PDVSA displays similar characteristics, which reinforces the
linkage of its ratings to the sovereign.

                       FOCUS SHIFTS TO RECOVERY

PDVSA's 'CC' rating suggests that default of some kind appears
probable.  If a default or restructuring occurs, Fitch anticipates
average recovery for PDVSA's bondholders of 31%-50%, and likely
closer to the lower end of the range.  While Fitch's recovery
analysis yields a high recovery, the willingness of Venezuela's
government to extend concessions to investors will likely move
actual recovery closer to the lower end of the 31%-50% range.  In
addition, should oil prices remain depressed, an average recovery
may lead to additional future defaults in order to further reduce
obligations and allow for necessary transfers to the government.
The senior secured notes also have an 'RR4' average Recovery
Rating, as the collateral provided may only marginally enhance
recovery given default, which could still range between 31% -50%.

                         KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Linkage to government: PDVSA's ratings assume that implicit
support from the government, given the company's strategic
importance, would likely materialize should the company need it.

Slow hydrocarbon price recovery: Fitch assumes West Texas
Intermediate crude prices to average approximately USD42 per
barrel (bbl) in 2016 and to slowly recover to approximately USD65
per bbl in the long term.

Stable Production: PDVSA's ratings assume the company's production
will remain relatively flat or decline only marginally over the
rating horizon.

                   RATING SENSITIVITIES

Catalysts for a downgrade include non-payment of a financial
obligation, or a downgrade to Venezuela's ratings.  Although not
expected in the short- to medium-term, catalysts for an upgrade
include a stabilization in the company's liquidity position and
improvement in the short-term debt maturity profile, or an upgrade
to Venezuela's sovereign rating.

                             LIQUIDITY

PDVSA's liquidity position is expected to continue to weaken as a
result of low oil prices and near-term debt service payments and
transfers to the central government.  As of March 2016, PDVSA
reported cash of USD5.5 billion, which compared unfavorably with
estimated principal payments of approximately USD6.4 billion over
the next 12 months.  The company's current liquidity position is
uncertain given expenditures, transfers to government, and
interest and principal debt payments that might have driven down
liquidity from the last reported amount.  Under Fitch's base case
scenario, which assumes oil prices of USD45/bbl in 2017, and
investments of USD9 billion annually, PDVSA's liquidity position
will continue to deteriorate.  Venezuela's gross international
reserves have declined by more than USD4 billion to less than
USD11 billion between January and October 2016.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch affirmed these ratings:

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR at 'CC';
   -- National Scale long-term rating at 'CCC(ven)';
   -- Sr. unsecured notes at 'CC/RR4';
   -- Sr. secured notes due 2020 at 'CC/RR4'.


VENEZUELA: President Orders VEB100 Withdrawn From Circulation
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro ordered
the central bank to withdraw all VEB100 bills from circulation to
stop Colombian organized crime groups supposedly stockpiling
currency to destabilize the economy.

The president said during his weekly show, "En contacto con
Maduro" (In Contact with Maduro), that some nationally chartered
banks were involved in the effort to destabilize the economy,
according to EFE News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2016, Fitch Ratings affirmed Venezuela's Long-Term
Foreign-and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (LT FC/LC IDR)
at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed the sovereign's Short-Term
Foreign Currency (ST FC) IDR at 'C' and country ceiling at 'CCC'.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: Exports Will Contract Around US$50 Billion in 2016
--------------------------------------------------------
Latin American and Caribbean exports are expected to fall
approximately $50 billion, or 6 percent, in 2016, a lower
contraction rate than the 15 percent observed in 2015.  This
relative improvement was mainly due to a rebound of commodity
prices, according to a report conducted by the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) using detailed data for 24 countries in the
region. The value of total exports should reach $850 billion in
2016.

The annual report "Trade Trend Estimates-Latin America and the
Caribbean" argues that export volumes did not display sufficiently
high growth rates to give a significant boost to the region's
export performance, which registered a contraction for the fourth
consecutive year.

The export contraction was due primarily to a fall in sales to the
United States (-5 percent) and to the region itself (-11 percent),
which together explained three quarters of the total, and, to a
lesser extent, to China (-5 percent), the rest of Asia, and the
European Union (-4 percent each).

"An acceleration of demand, particularly in the United States and
in China, could sustain exports, but the resurgence of trade
protectionism could bias the forecast", stated Paolo Giordano,
Principal Economist of the Integration and Trade Sector and the
report's coordinator.

The main factor driving the region's export performance was the
fall in commodity prices. Although the deflationary trend has been
easing since the beginning of 2016, when signs of recovery were
first observed, prices have not yet reached the levels displayed
prior to their collapse at the end of 2014, with the exception of
sugar and gold.

At the subregional level, the report shows that the export decline
slowed down noticeably in South America, while it remained
relatively stable in Mexico and in some countries of Central
America and the Caribbean. The more measured contraction for the
regional aggregate was mainly due to the performance of South
American exports, which benefited from the stabilization of
commodity prices. In contrast, in South America and in
Mesoamerica, manufactures exports did not support a stronger
recovery due to lower demand from within the region, and from the
United States with regard to Mexican exports.

The prospects for a reversal of the downward trend in 2017 are
associated with a scenario in which commodity prices continue to
improve, and intraregional trade recovers.Those countries whose
real exchange rates have depreciated could also harness greater
price competitiveness to stimulate manufactures sales and
diversify their export baskets.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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