TCRLA_Public/161215.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, December 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 248


                            Headlines



B O L I V I A

PANAMERICAN SECURITIES: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Issuer Ratings


B R A Z I L

BANCO SAFRA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings; Outlook Negative
BRAZIL: Passes Constitutional Amendment to Cap Public Spending
COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long Term Currency IDRs


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BARCY: Members' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 22
BCM SELECT: Sole Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
BCM SELECT MASTER: Sole Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
BCM SELECT OFFSHORE: Sole Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
BITE FINANCE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 13

BMB COMIT I: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 23
CAYMAN COMMODITIES: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 19
CP MGMT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
JAZZ ASSURANCE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
KARISHA LTD: Members Receive Wind-Up Report

LYNX MULTI-STRATEGY: Members' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 14
OBAIR INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 22
SHK PRIVATE: Sole Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 21


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Puerto Plata Needs RD$100MM++ for Fixes


H O N D U R A S

INVERSIONES ATLANTIDA: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR; Outlook Positive


J A M A I C A

ATL JAMAICA: Recalls Honda Models Due to Faulty Airbags


P U E R T O    R I C O

GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT: S&P Lowers ICR to 'D' on Missed Payments
PUERTO RICO: Says Debt Must be Restructured, Rejects Austerity


V E N E Z U E L A

BANESCO BANCO: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Currency Issuer Default Ratings
BANCO DEL CARIBE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings
BANCO EXTERIOR: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Issuer Default Rating
BANCO NACIONAL: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Issuer Default Rating
BANCO OCCIDENTAL: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings

MERCANTIL CA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Issuer Default Ratings
VENEZUELA: Citizens Rush to Banks to Exchange Bills


                            - - - - -


=============
B O L I V I A
=============


PANAMERICAN SECURITIES: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Issuer Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (MLA)
announced that it has withdrawn all of its ratings for Panamerican
Securities S.A. for business reasons.

These ratings of Panamerican Securities S.A. were withdrawn:

  Long-Term Global Scale Local Currency Issuer Rating: Caa1,
   stable outlook
  Long-Term Global Scale Foreign Currency Issuer Rating: Caa1,
   stable outlook
  Long-term National Scale Local Currency Issuer Rating: Ba3.bo,
   stable outlook
  Long-term National Scale Foreign Currency Issuer Rating: Ba3.bo,
   stable outlook

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.  For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings".  While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms
of default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of
default consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR
to which it maps back at that particular point in time.  For
information on the historical default rates associated with
different global scale rating categories over different investment
horizons, please see:

https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_
189530

Panamerican Securities S.A. is headquartered in La Paz, Bolivia,
and as of June 2016 it had Bs 52.5 million in assets and Bs 22.7
million in shareholders' equity.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO SAFRA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB/B' global scale and
'brAA-/brA-1' national scale ratings on Banco Safra S.A.  The
negative outlook on the bank reflects the negative economic and
industry risk trend in S&P's BICRA on Brazil and the negative
outlook on the sovereign.

S&P's ratings on Banco Safra reflect Brazil's 'bb+' anchor and
S&P's view of the bank's adequate business position, moderate
capital and earnings, strong risk position, and below average
funding and adequate liquidity.


BRAZIL: Passes Constitutional Amendment to Cap Public Spending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's
Senate approved a measure capping public spending, delivering a
victory to embattled President Michel Temer, who is struggling to
close a massive budget deficit and revive the nation's moribund
economy.

In an unusually rapid session with little discussion, lawmakers
voted 53 to 16 to approve a constitutional amendment limiting the
country's annual spending growth to the previous year's inflation
rate, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The move was a drastic shot of discipline for Brazil's government,
whose public debt and deficits have expanded at rates so worrisome
that three major credit agencies have downgraded the nation's
credit rating to junk status, the report notes.

Several economists and analysts praised the constitutionally
enforced limits as the only way for Brazil's government to live
within its means and restore investor confidence, the report
relays.  "This is a first, but very important and large step,"
said Zeina Latif, an economist at XP Investment, an asset-
management firm in Sao Paulo, the report says.

The spending cap applies to the federal budget starting in 2017,
except for education and health costs, which will be subject to
the limits starting in 2018, the report notes.  It was the
centerpiece of austerity measures proposed by Mr. Temer to shore
up Brazil's shaky public finances, the report discloses.

Brazil's budget deficit was a hefty 8.3% of gross domestic product
in October, after growing almost steadily from 1.8% of GDP in July
2011. Gross debt was 70.3% of GDP in October, up from its more
recent low of 51% of GDP in December 2012, the report relays.

Mr. Temer became president in August after his left-wing
predecessor, Dilma Rousseff, was impeached and ousted from office.
Mr. Temer, a pro-business centrist, was vice president at the time
and moved up to take Ms. Rousseff's place, the report notes.  As
such, many Brazilians say Mr. Temer doesn't have a mandate for
such sweeping change as that approved, the report relays.

The WSJ notes that Ms. Rousseff, who was removed from office for
allegedly violating budget laws, had broadly expanded the deficit
by giving subsidized loans and tax breaks to favored industries
and offering incentives to keep consumers spending.  Ms. Rousseff
denied the allegations against her during her Senate trial, the
report discloses.

Meanwhile, XP Investment's Ms. Latif and many other economists say
more changes are needed, including a pension-reform proposal sent
to Congress that would require Brazilians to work longer and pay
higher social-security contributions, the report notes.

"If pensions keep growing unchecked you'll need to cut somewhere
else, until you have nowhere else to cut," she said. "We need
fiscal balance," she added, notes the report.

But the measure drew the ire of opposition politicians, labor
unions and citizens concerned that spending limits could harm
Brazil's troubled health-care and education systems, the report
notes.

Mr. Temer has come under fire in recent weeks as his cabinet has
become embroiled in scandals, the report relays.  In a survey
published this weekend in the Folha de S. Paulo newspaper, 63% of
Brazilians polled said they would like Mr. Temer to resign, the
report notes.

But many Brazilians aren't sold on that argument.  Many blame
pervasive corruption by the nation's political class for helping
plunge the nation into recession, the report discloses.  Around 50
sitting lawmakers are being investigated as part of an epic graft
investigation centered on Brazil's state oil company, the report
notes.

"They should cut lawmakers' salaries instead," said Luciana
Azevedo Lima, a 26-year old college student, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'/
Negative Outlook.  Brazil's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-
Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'BB'. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'BB+' and the Short-Term Foreign and Local-Currency
IDRs at 'B'.


COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long Term Currency IDRs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Companhia Siderurgica Nacional's (CSN)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B-'. Fitch has also affirmed CSN's National Scale rating at
'BB-(bra)'. The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

The 'B-' rating reflects CSN's extremely leveraged capital
structure and its limited ability to generate substantial cash
flow from its steel business in Brazil. The recovery in iron ore
prices and an improved outlook for iron ore from earlier in 2016
have bolstered cash flow generation from its iron ore business,
and should place the company in a better position to negotiate
asset sales during the next 12 months.

The Negative Outlook continues to reflect high refinancing risk
between 2018 and 2020. Fitch's base case assumes that CSN will be
able to complete a refinancing of at least BRL5 billion of debt
due in 2018 with local banks during the first half of 2017.
Failure to progress within this timeframe would result in a
downgrade to 'CCC'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Severe Deterioration in Local Steel Industry; Limited Improvement
in 2017

Brazilian steel demand is expected to decline 16% during 2016,
reaching 17.9 million tons, after dropping 17% in 2015. Current
levels are similar to industry performance of 2009. Given the
still poor perspectives for improvement in Brazil's GDP during
2017, local steel demand is expected to recover a modest 3.5%,
according to Instituto Aco Brasil. Fitch projects that CSN's local
sales volumes will drop by 10% in 2016, after falling by 20% in
2015, and then expand by 5% during 2017, reflecting the restart of
its second blast furnace in third quarter 2016 (3Q16).

A bright spot for the local industry is that steel producers have
been able to apply consecutive price increases since the end of
2Q16 due to a drop in inventory levels, which have supported
improved operating results during 3Q16. In the case of CSN, the
company announced 10% price increases in May, June, and July and
recently pushed prices up by an additional 5%. Fitch expects price
increases of between 8% to 10% during 2017, excluding a more
meaningful double-digit increase to automakers.

Challenge to Sustain Rebound in CFFO; Iron Ore Price Dynamics is
Key

The deterioration of CSN's operating cash flow largely reflects
the combination of sharp declines in steel volumes, low iron ore
prices, and high interest expenses. Short-term recovery relies on
the ability to continue to pass along price increases in the
domestic steel segment, manageable coal costs, and on sustained
iron ore prices above USD60 per ton.

Fitch's base case scenario projects CSN's adjusted EBITDA at
approximately BRL3.7 billion for 2016 and BRL3.2 billion in 2017,
considering Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD45. CSN's operating
performance and cash flow generation are largely sensitive to iron
ore price. If iron ore prices, which are currently at over USD80,
remain robust and average USD60 throughout next year, the
company's 2017 EBITDA would be BRL4.8 billion.

During the LTM ended Sept. 30, 2016, CSN generated BRL3.3 billion
of adjusted EBITDA, and CFFO of BRL725 million. These results
compare with BRL2.9 billion and BRL2.1 billion, respectively, in
2015, which benefited from an extraordinary non-recurring dividend
of BRL595 million received from the corporate reorganization of
Congonhas Minerios.

Considering the current capital structure and the annual BRL2.9
billion interest burden CSN faces, Fitch estimates CSN's FCF to
remain negative at around BRL1 billion during 2017, considering
Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD45 per ton. At USD60 per ton,
FCF would be positive by BRL460 million.

Fitch's base case scenario considers capex of BRL1.1 billion,
which represents a steady decline from BRL1.6 billion in 2016 and
2015. During 2016, CSN efficiently managed working capital,
leading to an inflow that resulted in positive operating cash
flow. Going forward, working capital requirements will be neutral
to negative, as inventories are already at low levels, and
accounts receivable might be pressured in order to support
continued sales expansion.

Unsustainable Capital Structure; Asset Sale Remains Paramount to
Avoid Debt Restructuring

Fitch's base case scenario estimates CSN's net leverage to be
around 6.9x during 2016. Absent an asset sale this ratio will
increase to 8.4x at Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD45 per ton.
Considering the range of iron ore prices of USD50 to USD60 per
ton, net leverage could decline to the range of 5.2x to 7.0x
during 2017. Per Fitch's criteria, CSN's net leverage was 7.7x as
of the LTM period ended Sept. 30 2016, an improvement from 8.7x at
the end of 2015, mostly reflecting the impact of appreciation of
the BRL on the company's total debt.

Fitch believes the most likely asset disposal to be completed by
CSN will be the sale of a minority stake in Congonhas Minerios
that could represent an inflow of around BRL8 billion. On a pro
forma basis, net leverage ratios during 2017 would decline to 5.7x
at Fitch's iron ore price deck of USD45 per ton. Given the range
of USD50-USD60 per ton for iron ore prices in 2017, net leverage
would be in the range of 3.4x to 4.7x.

Elevated Refinancing Risks

CSN faces an unsustainable debt amortization profile. As of Sept.
30, 2016, CSN reported cash and cash equivalents of BRL5.4 billion
compared to total debt of BRL30.3 billion. The company faces debt
amortization of BRL2.3 billion in 2016/17, BRL5.6 billion in 2018,
BRL14.4 billion between 2019 and 2020 (BRL6.4 billion of cross-
border issuances) and BRL8.1 billion after 2021. Fitch's base case
scenario assumes that the CSN will be able to roll over at least
BRL5 billion of local bank debt during the first half of 2017.

Fitch considers the asset sale to be paramount to avoid a debt
restructuring. Successful asset sales of around BRL8 billion would
lead to an improvement in leverage ratios during 2018, potentially
allowing CSN to refinance its bonds issuances due 2019 and 2020.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- 1% decrease in steel volumes sold during 2016; expansion of
      5% in 2017

   -- 18% increase in iron ore volumes sold during 2016 and 3%
      increase in 2017

   -- Average iron ore price of USD56 per ton during 2016 and
      Fitch's price deck of USD45 per ton in 2017

   -- EBITDA of BRL3.7 billion in 2016 and BRL3.2 billion in 2017

   -- Successful refinancing of 2018's local banking debt

   -- No dividends paid in 2016 and 2017

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The inability to refinance the 2018 local banking debt during 1H17
would lead to a downgrade of CSN's ratings. Further deterioration
of the steel industry in Brazil, or inability to proceed with
price increases would also pressure free cash flow generation and
liquidity, and consequently the ratings.

A revision in the Rating Outlook to Stable could occur if CSN is
successful in its 2018 debt refinancing in conjunction with
improving industry fundamentals, which would lead FCF
stabilization. Rating upgrades would largely depend on the size of
the asset sales and solid industry fundamentals.

LIQUIDITY

CSN has historically maintained a robust cash position.
Nevertheless, its debt amortization schedule is unsustainable, as
highlighted above. As of Sept. 30, 2016, CSN had BRL5.4 billion of
cash and marketable securities and BRL30.3 billion of total debt.
CSN's debt primarily consists of prepayment export financings
(37%), local bank loans (24%), senior notes (18%) and perpetual
bonds (11%).

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B-';

   -- National long-term rating at 'BB-(bra)' ;

   -- CSN Islands XI senior unsecured long-term rating guaranteed
      by CSN at 'B-/RR4';

   -- CSN Islands XII senior unsecured long-term rating guaranteed
      by CSN at 'B-/RR4';

   -- CSN Resources S.A. senior unsecured USD note long-term
      rating guaranteed by CSN at 'B-/RR4'.

The Rating Outlook remains Negative.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BARCY: Members' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 22
---------------------------------------------
The members of Barcy will hold their final meeting on Dec. 22,
2016, to receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


BCM SELECT: Sole Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of BCM Select Equity I Onshore, Ltd received
on Dec. 12, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Basswood Capital Management, LLC
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


BCM SELECT MASTER: Sole Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of BCM Select Equity I Master, Ltd received
on Dec. 12, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Basswood Capital Management, LLC
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


BCM SELECT OFFSHORE: Sole Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of BCM Select Equity I Offshore, Ltd received
on Dec. 12, 2016, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Basswood Capital Management, LLC
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


BITE FINANCE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 13
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Bite Finance International (Cayman) Ltd will
hold their final meeting on Dec. 13, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Graham Robinson
          c/o Tanya Armstrong
          P.O. Box 2499 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946-0820
          Facsimile: (345) 946-0864


BMB COMIT I: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 23
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of BMB Comit I LDC will hold their final meeting
on Dec. 23, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Christopher Rowland
          c/o Richard Murphy
          FFP Limited
          Harbour Centre, 2nd Floor
          42 North Church Street, George Town Grand Cayman
          10 Market Street, #769 Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9006
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 640 5863


CAYMAN COMMODITIES: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 19
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Cayman Commodities Trading SEZC will hear
on Dec. 19, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Tarsem A. Basran
          Roxbury Hamilton Directors Group Limited
          Campbells, Floor 2, Romasco Place, Road Town
          P.O. Box 4541
          Tortola VG1110, British Virgin Islands
          Telephone: +1 (284) 494 2423
          Facsimile: +1 (284) 494 2475


CP MGMT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 15
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of CP MGMT Nominee Limited will hold their final
meeting on Dec. 15, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Brijesh Kalaria
          The Blackstone Group
          345 Park Avenue
          31st Floor
          New York, New York 10154
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 390 2819


JAZZ ASSURANCE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------
The members of Jazz Assurance Company received on Dec. 13, 2016,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

Dr. Lee Robert Domangue is the company's liquidator.


KARISHA LTD: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------
The members of Karisha Ltd. received on Dec. 12, 2016, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jeffrey D. Johnstone
          Broadhurst LLC
          40 Linwood Street
          P.O. Box 2503 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7237
          Facsimile: (345) 949-7725


LYNX MULTI-STRATEGY: Members' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 14
-----------------------------------------------------------
The members of Lynx Multi-Strategy Fund Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on Dec. 14, 2016, at 10:15 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes
          SSARIS Advisors, LLC,
          c/o Corey Stokes
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814-9277
          Facsimile: (345) 949 4647


OBAIR INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Dec. 22
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Obair Investment Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on Dec. 22, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Christopher Kennedy
          c/o Omar Grant
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949-8295


SHK PRIVATE: Sole Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Dec. 21
---------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of SHK Private Equity Managers Ltd. will hear
on Dec. 21, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Wan Pui Lun Joe
          Lee Garden One, 42nd Floor
          33 Hysan Avenue
          Causeway Bay
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +85239202472
          Facsimile: +85239202473


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Puerto Plata Needs RD$100MM++ for Fixes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Mayor Walter Musa said his town
requires more than RD$100.0 million to deal with the heavy damages
from the torrential rains and ensuing flooding.

Mayor Musa said he has only received RD$10 million from the
Tourism Ministry and the city council's funds to deal with Puerto
Plata's major problems caused by swelled rivers in the
municipality in his view, "are barely a grain of sand," according
to Dominican Today

"If we evaluate everything that needs to be done in the town we
will realize that it takes more than 10 times that amount to solve
the problems caused by the rains that began on November 8 . . . ,"
the report quoted Mr. Musa as saying.

"The rains caused havoc," said the official upon rendering a
report to the city council for November, adding that the area most
affected was the result of the large amount of mud and debris
dumped by the flooding, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


===============
H O N D U R A S
===============


INVERSIONES ATLANTIDA: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR; Outlook Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it assigned its 'B' long-term issuer
credit rating to Inversiones Atlantida S.A.  The outlook is
positive.

The ratings on Inversiones Atlantida reflect its status as a non-
operating holding company.  Therefore, the ratings on the company,
and consequently on its proposed senior notes, are one notch below
its consolidated operating entities' creditworthiness, which
includes its main operating entity, Honduras-based universal bank
Banco Atlantida, S.A. (Banco Atlantida), due to the dependence on
the latter's dividend upstream to service debt at the holding
level.  S&P's consolidated analysis of the operating entities
reflect Inversiones Atlantida's adequate business position mainly
based on the business and operating revenue stability stemming
mainly from the bank's operations.  S&P also views its capital and
earnings assessment as moderate, based on its forecasted average
risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of 5.7% for the next 18 months.
The ratings also reflect S&P's assessment of the company's risk
position as adequate reflecting its adequate asset quality
indicators compared with those of its most immediate peers and
other banks operating in the same economic risk score.  The
ratings also incorporate S&P's assessment of its funding as
average and liquidity as adequate. The group credit profile (GCP)
is 'b+'.

S&P's bank criteria use our BICRA economic risk and industry risk
scores to determine a bank's anchor, the starting point in
assigning an issuer credit rating.  The anchor for banks operating
only in Honduras (or that have a significant majority exposure
there) is 'bb-'.

Honduras' economic risk continues to reflect its developing
economy, limited economic diversification, and weak political
institutions.  Per capita GDP has remained very low, at only
US$2,350 at year-end 2015.  In S&P's opinion this is major barrier
for the population's ability to borrow and to withstand economic
shocks.  Honduras also continues to be challenged by
infrastructure constraints, significant human development needs,
and high rates of poverty and violent crime, all of which hurt
medium-term growth prospects.  S&P also sees an extremely high
credit risk in the economy, based on its view that Honduran
private sector debt capacity is sharply limited by the
population's low income levels, which affects people's capacity to
repay debt, and relatively high ratio of loans to GDP.  Moreover,
S&P assess the country's payment culture and rule of law as very
weak.

"Our assessment of Honduras' industry risk takes into account its
weak institutional framework.  We consider that regulators have
been reactive in the past and have been unsuccessful in foreseeing
and tackling bank failures.  The fact that Honduras still lags on
many international regulatory standards--including Basel III
capitalization rules--also factors into our assessment.  The
banking sector has limited access to external funding, while local
capital markets, which barely exist, are narrow and shallow,
reducing system-wide financial flexibility.  Nonetheless, we view
the banking system's stable and adequate core customer deposit
base as a mitigating factor," S&P said.

In S&P's opinion, Inversiones Atlantida's business position is
adequate, mirroring Banco Atlantida's business stability and
market share in the Honduran banking system.  Inversiones
Atlantida benefits from the bank's reputation because the latter
is the main corporate lender in the country especially for energy,
environmental, infrastructure projects and to the agricultural
sector.  The latter, along with a well-defined strategy through a
moderate risk appetite, has helped the bank maintain a steady
business volume, reflected in historically stable operating
revenue.  As a result, as of Sept. 30, 2016, most of the bank's
operating revenue comes from interest income of its corporate
portfolio.  However, the bank is planning to increase its retail
lending share in the Honduran financial system.  Although S&P
expects the bank have a balanced revenue mix in the future, it
believes it will take some time to materialize because of a strong
competition.  Banco Atlantida is the second-largest lender in the
country with 17.0% of total assets and 18.3% of total loans.  S&P
don't expect significant changes in our business position
assessment for the next 12-18 months.

S&P's moderate assessment of the consolidated capital and earnings
reflects its expectation of a projected RAC at the group level of
around 5.7% for the next two years.  Inversiones Atlantida has
maintained its stable capitalization levels mainly due to the
bank's consistent internal capital generation through retained net
income and recapitalization dividends policy.  S&P's base-case
scenario incorporates these assumptions:

   -- Honduras' GDP growth of 3.6% in 2016 and 3.7% in 2017;
   -- A loan portfolio growth of 13% by year-end 2016 and 11% in
      2017 in line with the bank's growth expectations;
   -- The group's nonperforming assets (NPAs) of around 2.9% at
      the end of 2016 and in 2017;
   -- The group's net income of HNL926 million in 2016 and
      HNL1.1 billion in 2017;
   -- No capital injection in the next two years;
   -- A dividend payment of HNL300 million in 2016 and
      HNL350 million in 2017; and
   -- The group's net interest margins (NIM) to increase to 5.9%
      by year-end 2016 and 6.0% in 2017 due to expansion in retail
      lending that charges higher interest rates.

Inversiones Atlantida's quality of capital and earnings is
adequate, in S&P's view, because its capital base doesn't include
any hybrid instruments, and the proportion of loan loss reserves
to total adjusted capital (TAC) of nearly 26% helps protect the
capital base.  NIMs represent the majority of the bank's revenue,
and S&P expects it to post core earnings to average adjusted
assets ratio of about 1.2% in the next two years.

S&P views the group's risk position as adequate because of its
adequate asset quality, moderate risk appetite, and prudent
origination standards.  In S&P's view, the group's other operating
subsidiaries--an insurance company, securities firm, and other
nonbank financial institutions--don't pose any risks to the group.
Inversiones Atlantida's asset quality metrics are almost the same
as Banco Atlantida's, which are stronger than those of its direct
peers and the Honduran financial system.  In the past three years,
the bank's lending grew 8.9%, below the domestic financial
system's 10.3%.  However, S&P expects Banco Atlantida's loan
portfolio growth of about 13% by the end of 2016 thanks to the
expected expanding retail banking business.  As of Sept 30, 2016,
the group's nonperforming assets (NPAs) were at their lowest level
in recent years, 2.7%.  However, its net charge-offs (NCOs)
reached a peak of 1.2%, due to the bank's specific uncollectable
loans especially from the bank.  On the other hand, the group's
NPAs reserve coverage of 176.4% is higher than most of those of
its peers and of the Honduran banking industry.

Although, the bank exhibits a slight customer concentration since
its top 20 customers represent 27.1% of its total customer base
and 1.7% of its TAC based mostly on corporate lending, S&P
believes the prudent origination policies allows the bank to
manage this concentration.  On the other hand, the focus on
corporate lending results in a 33.7% share of dollar-denominated
loans of Banco Atlantida's total loans as of Sept. 30, 2016,
compared with the Honduran financial system's of around 31%.
Still, such exposure isn't materially different from those of its
main peers in the country. In addition, the bank grants around 67%
of its dollar-denominated loans to entities that generate cash
flows in the greenback.  Although S&P expects a higher loan
portfolio growth by year-end 2016 and in 2017 than in previous
years, further asset quality deterioration is unlikely because S&P
believes NPAs and NCOs will total around 4.6%.

Inversiones Atlantida's funding assessment is average and mirrors
the bank's funding structure, share of retail deposits within it,
and S&P's expectations that these characteristics won't change in
the future.  As of Sept 30, 2016, the funding base consisted of
core to customer deposits (84.3%) and other credit facilities
(15.7%).  A significant share of the deposit base comes from
retail deposits, which S&P deems as more stable during times of
market distress.  The funding composition is similar to that of
other Honduran banks.  Banco Atlantida's stable funding ratio
(SFR) at second-quarter of 2016 was 124.3% with a three-year
average of 128.5%, compared with the Honduran financial system's
112.5% and 112.2%, respectively.  The bank's nationwide footprint
and recognizable brand have allowed it, in S&P's view, to have a
very stable funding base that also could benefit from flight to
quality.  Despite higher-than-average SFR, S&P believes Banco
Atlantida's funding structure and the share of retail deposits is
similar to those of other larger banks in Honduras.  S&P's
baseline expectation is that its SFR will be around 120% for the
next 12-18 months as a result of its sizable deposit base and
steady growth in funding needs.  Overall S&P views funding level
as a rating strength for Banco Atlantida and the group.

"We assess Inversiones Atlantida's liquidity as adequate which
also mirror the bank's metrics.  This in turn reflects our broad
liquid assets to short-term wholesale funding with a 8.4x average
for the past three fiscal years.  Despite these higher ratios than
those of peers in Latin America and Honduras, we view them as
adequate because of the country's underdeveloped debt capital
market, limiting financial flexibility, and the lack of a
secondary market.  In this regard, we believe that additional
liquidity cushion is necessary to cope with refinancing risk,
because it's higher in Honduras than in more developed economies.
Consequently, we believe Banco Atlantida and the group have an
adequate liquidity cushion to cope with liquidity needs and
wholesale maturities for the next 12 months," S&P said.

The positive outlook on Inversiones Atlantida reflects that of the
sovereign because the ratings on the latter constrain ratings on
the company.  S&P also expects Inversiones Atlantida's main
subsidiaries to keep its leading position in the Honduran
financial system and that its capital and earnings will remain
moderate in the next 12-18 months, owing to S&P's expectations for
loan portfolio growth and internal capital generation.

If S&P was to revise the outlook on the sovereign to stable and
there are no changes in the GCP, S&P will take the same action on
the company.

If S&P upgrades Honduras in the next 18-24 months, a similar
action will follow on Inversiones Atlantida.




=============
J A M A I C A
=============


ATL JAMAICA: Recalls Honda Models Due to Faulty Airbags
-------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Local Honda dealers, ATL Jamaica, have
issued a recall for eight models of the car due to faulty airbags.

Motorists with the affected models are advised to visit the
offices in Kingston or Montego Bay to have the airbags serviced
free of cost, according to RJR News.

The affected models are: 2001-2007 Honda Accord, 2001-2004 Honda
Civic, 2002-2004 Honda CR-V, 2002-2004 Honda Fit, 2001-2004 Honda
Stream, 2003-2008 Honda Pilot; and 2009-2011 Honda City, the
report notes.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT: S&P Lowers ICR to 'D' on Missed Payments
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it lowered its issuer credit rating on
Government Development Bank For Puerto Rico (GDB) to 'D' (default)
from 'SD' (selective default) and lowered its issue-level ratings
on GDB's series 2006-B bonds to 'D' from 'CC'.  The downgrade
follows confirmation of GDB having missed principal and interest
payments due Dec. 1, 2016.

On Dec. 9, the trustees of the aforementioned securities, through
an Electronic Municipal Market Access filing, confirmed that GDB
had failed to make $19.1 million of principal and approximately
$10.6 million of interest payments on certain of its senior bonds.
With the Dec. 1 non-payment, GDB is now delinquent on all of its
rated debt issues outstanding--on either principal or interest, or
both.  As a result, in addition to lowering the 2006 series B
senior notes rating to 'D', we are also lowering our ICR on GDB to
'D'.

With the passage of the Puerto Rico Emergency Moratorium and
Financial Rehabilitation Act in April 2016, most of GDB's
functions and responsibilities have already been transferred to a
new entity called the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency & Financial
Authority (AAFAF). As part of that restructuring, the government
has moved most of its treasury deposits to private commercial
banks.  The new entity, AAFAF, has assumed GDB's role as the
island's fiscal agent and financial adviser, and is overseeing the
commonwealth's debt restructuring efforts.  At this stage, S&P
believes GDB's existence as a viable operating entity is highly
uncertain, given that it is in wind-down mode.  This is reflected
in our 'D' (default) ICR on the bank.


PUERTO RICO: Says Debt Must be Restructured, Rejects Austerity
--------------------------------------------------------------
EFE says Puerto Rico's outgoing governor said that the island's
massive debt load needed to be restructured and that the financial
control board established by Washington to oversee that process
should not impose economically damaging austerity measures.

Alejandro Garcia Padilla, who will step down on Jan. 2, said at a
forum in Washington on the US commonwealth's present situation and
future outlook that the control board threatened the right to
self-government enshrined in the island's constitution, says the
report.

                       *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on June 15,
2016, that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Puerto Rico law
that would have let its public utilities restructure their debt
over the objection of creditors leaving it to Congress to help the
island resolve its fiscal crisis.  Siding with bondholders
challenging the law, the court ruled 5-2 that the measure was
barred under federal bankruptcy law.

Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority in the 5-to-2
decision, said the law was at odds with the federal bankruptcy
code, which bars states and lower units of government from
enacting their own versions of bankruptcy law.

Puerto Rico is struggling with $72 billion in debt and has argued
that it needs to restructure at least some of it under Chapter 9,
the part of the bankruptcy code for insolvent local governments.
But Puerto Rico is not permitted to do so, because Chapter 9
specifically excludes it.

The federal law, Justice Thomas wrote, "bars Puerto Rico from
enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure the
debt of its insolvent public utilities." Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer and
Elena Kagan joined him.

Consequently, Puerto Rico opted to default on $911 million in
constitutionally guaranteed debt, or roughly half of the $2
billion in principal and interest that came due July 1, EFE News
reported.

The reported further noted that Puerto Rico enacted a debt
moratorium due to liquidity restraints -- a move that coincided
with a new U.S. law signed by President Obama that installs a
financial control board to restructure the island's debt and
provides a retroactive stay on lawsuits by bondholders.

On July 11, 2016, the TCR-LA reported that S&P Global Ratings has
downgraded the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's general obligation
secured debt to 'D' (default) from 'CC' following the
commonwealth's default.

On July 7, 2016, Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from
'C' and general obligation (GO) bond rating to 'D' from 'C'
following the payment default on certain GO bonds on July 1, 2016.
Both ratings are removed from Rating Watch. Ratings on securities
that have not defaulted will remain at 'C' until the point of
default. The ratings on non-defaulted bonds remain on Rating Watch
Negative.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


BANESCO BANCO: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Currency Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Following a peer review, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banesco Banco
Universal, C.A.'s (BBU) foreign and local currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'. No Rating Outlook is assigned at this
rating level. Fitch has also downgraded Banesco's Long-term
National Rating to 'A(ven)' from 'A+(ven)' and its short-term
National Rating to 'F1(ven)' from 'F1+(ven)'.

The downgrade of Banesco's national ratings reflects changing
relativities and greater compression of bank ratings on the local
scale, as well as increasing uniformity of performance amid shared
operating challenges. Additionally, the downgrade also considers
severe pressures on capitalization as internal capital generation
has not kept pace with inflation induced asset growth. As such,
Banesco's financial profile is now more in line with lower rated
banks on the national scale in Venezuela.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

As with other emerging market commercial banks in highly
speculative rating categories, the operating environment highly
influences BBU's ratings. Like all Venezuelan banks, the
sovereign's creditworthiness constrains BBU's ratings due to
exposure to public sector (mostly sovereign) securities, as well
as vulnerability to the government's economic and regulatory
policy choices. Venezuela's IDR is currently rated 'CCC' by Fitch.
High inflation distorts the comparison of financial metrics with
regional peers (Latin American commercial banks with a Viability
Rating [VR] of 'b+' and below).

Capitalization also highly influences its credit profile. Like
other Venezuelan banks, BBU's capital ratios have come under
pressure as asset growth has exceeded internal capital generation
since early 2014. At 6.7% as of Sept. 30, 2016, the bank's
tangible common equity/tangible assets ratio lagged the system
average though this was in line with other large private sector
banks as of Sept. 30, 2016. Additionally, BBU has tighter reserve
coverage of gross loans relative to its domestic peers.

Fitch recognizes that an adjustment of foreign currency assets to
a more market oriented exchange rate and a revaluation of fixed
assets due to inflation would materially increase capitalization
ratios. Nevertheless, in Fitch's view, this does not offset the
inherent risk of operating in Venezuela given the depth of the
economic crisis and the uncertainty in prospective regulatory
measures. Capital ratios are likely to remain under pressure in
2017 due to inflation-induced growth and lower profitability.

Given the bank's high level of liquid assets, the large negative
mismatch between short-term assets and liabilities is manageable
as long as domestic monetary market conditions remain liquid and
any potential liberalization of capital controls is measured. Most
liquid assets consist of cash and bank deposits (96% of total) and
covered 34% of total deposits and short-term funding as of Sept.
30, 2016. Fitch views a greater proportion of cash favorably, as
public sector securities may be of limited liquidity in a stress
scenario given the shallow domestic debt market. Furthermore, cash
and bank deposits accounted for 30% of BBU's total assets.

Higher margins and rapid nominal loan growth was not sufficient to
offset the drag of pressures from increased operating, credit and
tax expenses in 2016. Though BBU's profitability in nominal terms
was similar to other large private sector banks in Venezuela, it
has dropped sharply. As is the case with other Venezuelan banks,
Fitch expects expenditure pressures to continue over the medium
term.

BBU's impaired loans to gross loans ratio has remained below 1%
since 2011, in line with domestic peers and reflecting the effect
of inflation on the denominator. At 2.5% of gross loans as of
Sept. 30, 2016, Fitch views coverage of gross loans as tight,
given the severity and uncertainty of the current economic, social
& political crisis and historical NPL levels following economic
adjustment of previous crises.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The banks' Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's expectation of no support. Despite
BBU's systemic importance, support cannot be relied upon given
Venezuela's highly speculative rating and lack of a consistent
policy on bank support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

A downgrade of the sovereign's IDRs would result in a similar
action on the IDRs and VRs of this bank, which is currently capped
at the sovereign. A sustained decline in capitalization below
regulatory minimums would also pressure BBU's ratings. Additional
government intervention that pressures financial performance could
negatively affect the bank's IDRs, VR and National ratings. While
not Fitch's base case due to capital controls and high domestic
market liquidity, a persistent decline in deposits would pressure
ratings.

There is no upside potential to the bank's ratings in the near
term in light of the current economic crisis.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Venezuela's propensity or ability to provide timely support BBU is
not likely to change given the sovereign's very low speculative-
grade ratings. As such, the SR and SRF have no upgrade potential.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions on BBU:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'CCC';

   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings affirmed at
      'C';

   -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'ccc';

   -- Support affirmed at '5';

   -- Support Floor affirmed at 'NF';

   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'A(ven)' from
      'A+(ven)';

   -- Short-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'F1(ven)'
      from 'F1+(ven)'.


BANCO DEL CARIBE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco del Caribe, C.A. Banco
Universal's (Bancaribe) Viability Rating (VR) at 'ccc' and its
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'. No Rating Outlook is
assigned at this rating level. Fitch has taken this rating action
following the completion of it private-sector Venezuelan banks
peer review.

Fitch affirmed the ratings as there has been no material change in
Bancaribe's company profile or performance since the last review.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

VR, IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The operating environment and capitalization highly influence the
bank's VR and IDRs.

Bancaribe's national scale ratings consider the same strengths and
weaknesses as its international ratings but based on the relative
creditworthiness of entities within Venezuela.

The sovereign's creditworthiness constrains Bancaribe's
international ratings due to its exposure to public sector
securities, as well as vulnerability to the government's policy
choices and the country's economic performance. Venezuela's IDR is
currently rated 'CCC' by Fitch. High inflation distorts the
comparison of financial metrics with regional peers (Latin
American commercial banks with a VR of 'b+' and below).

Robust asset growth in nominal terms continues to pressure
Bancaribe's capital ratios. The ratio of regulatory total capital
to risk-weighted assets for September 2016 (12.30%) is below the
13.9% average for the years 2012-2015 and is approaching the
minimum requirement in Venezuela. Fitch is concerned that these
tight capital ratios will reduce Bancaribe's financial flexibility
and increase regulatory uncertainty for the bank.

Retail deposits provide the backbone of the bank's funding base.
Bancaribe's strategy is to focus on very short-term deposits
and/or demand deposits, benefiting net interest income and being
less volatile than term deposits. A change in the funding mix
should have a minimal impact on the bank's asset and liability, at
least under the current scenario of foreign exchange controls.

Bancaribe's return on average assets ratio (ROAA) deteriorated
during 2016. Inflation and currency depreciation led to important
increase of the non-financial costs such as salaries, maintenance
and imported equipment. In Fitch's view, it could be difficult to
maintain stringent control of operating and credit expenses given
the severe macroeconomic imbalances in Venezuela.

Bancaribe has been able to preserve good nonperforming loans (NPL)
to gross loans ratio although this level remains above the banking
system median and compares below its larger domestic peers. At
2.6% of gross loans as of Sept. 30, 2016, Fitch views coverage of
gross loans as tight, given the severity and uncertainty of the
current economic, social & political crisis and historical NPL
levels following economic adjustment of previous crises.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Bancaribe' Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's expectation of no support. Despite
the banks' systemic importance, support cannot be relied upon
given Venezuela's very low rating and lack of a consistent policy
on bank support. Government interference in the banking system
could also negatively influence foreign shareholder support if
required.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR, IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The bank's IDRs and National ratings are sensitive to changes in
the sovereign's IDRs, resulting in a similar action on the IDRs
and VRs of the bank, which are currently capped at the sovereign.
A decline in capitalization below regulatory minimums would also
pressure Bancaribe's ratings. Additional government intervention
that pressures the bank's financial performance could negatively
affect the bank's IDRs, VRs and National ratings. While not
Fitch's base case due to capital controls and liquidity in the
domestic market, a persistent decline in deposits would pressure
ratings.

Upside potential to any of the bank's ratings in the near term is
limited in light of the current economic crisis.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Venezuela's propensity or ability to provide timely support is not
likely to change given the sovereign's low speculative-grade
ratings. As such, the SR and SRF have no upgrade potential.

Fitch has affirmed Bancaribe's ratings as follows:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
      at 'CCC';

   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings at 'C';

   -- Viability rating at 'ccc';

   -- Support at '5';

   -- Support floor 'NF';

   -- National long-term rating at 'A-(ven)'

   -- National short-term rating at 'F2(ven)'.


BANCO EXTERIOR: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed Banco Exterior, C.A. Banco Universal's
(Exterior) Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed Exterior's
Viability Rating (VR) at 'ccc', Support Rating at '5' and Support
Rating Floor at 'NF', following Fitch's peer review of Venezuelan
Private Sector Banks. No Rating Outlook has been assigned at this
rating level. The downgrade of Exterior's National Long-term
rating to 'A(ven)' from 'A+(ven)' reflects changing relativities
in the local market.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, VR and NATIONAL RATINGS

Exterior's international ratings are significantly constrained by
the weak operating environment, characterized by a persistent
economic contraction, severe macroeconomic imbalances, lack of
adequate government policy response and high inflation (which
Fitch projects at 339.9% for 2016).

Inflation-led asset growth (averaging 64% annually from 2012 to
2015) has put increasing pressure on tangible common equity
compared to tangible assets (6.1% at September 2016), as evident
throughout the banking system. Exterior's regulatory capital ratio
was 12.8% at August 2016, in line with the average for the
country's largest private banks.

Exterior's ratings also consider the bank's significant reliance
on short-term deposit funding, in line with the banking system as
a whole. The mismatch of Exterior's short- term liabilities with
short-term assets, and Exterior's liquidity, remains adequate
given the capital controls in place.

Exterior's loan quality ratios are stable, supported by inflation-
led loan growth. Reserve coverage exceeded 700% of impaired loans
at June 2016, comparing favourably to regional peers, but below
the local banking system average. In context of the current
economic crisis, Exterior's significant holdings of public sector
securities (71.3% of equity at September 2016) would be a source
of concern in the event of a forced economic adjustment. This is
mitigated by its minimal exposure to USD denominated public sector
securities, with the exception of relatively small USD6.3 million
investments in local currency securities with foreign exchange
hedge features.

The bank's nominal profitability also demonstrates stability, but
should be seen in light of high inflation as unchanging regulatory
interest rate caps and floors has pressured profits in real terms.

Fitch's downgrade of Exterior's National Long-term Rating reflects
changing relativities and greater compression of bank ratings on
the local scale, as well as increasing uniformity of performance
amid shared operating challenges. Exterior's national ratings also
reflect its position as the ninth largest bank by assets (six
largest private bank) with a mid-sized franchise focused on
serving small and medium-sized enterprises. It is majority owned
by the Spanish banking group, Grupo Bancario IF.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The banks' Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's expectation of no support. Support
cannot be relied upon given Venezuela's highly speculative rating
and lack of a consistent policy on bank support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The bank's IDRs, VR and National ratings have limited upside
potential in the near term in light of the current economic
crisis. Exterior's ratings are constrained by the sovereign and
sensitive to a change in the sovereign's ratings. In addition,
while not Fitch's base case due to capital controls in place, a
persistent decline in deposits would pressure ratings.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Venezuela's propensity or ability to provide timely support
Exterior is not likely to change given the sovereign's very low
speculative-grade ratings. As such, the SR and SRF have no upgrade
potential.

The rating actions are as follows:

   Banco Exterior, C.A. Banco Universal

   -- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'CCC';

   -- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'C';

   -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'ccc';

   -- Support Rating affirmed at '5';

   -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'NF';

   -- National Long-Term Rating downgraded to 'A(ven)' from
      'A+(ven)';

   -- National Short-Term Rating affirmed at 'F1(ven)'.


BANCO NACIONAL: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Banco Nacional de Credito, C.A., Banco
Universal's (BNC) National Long-Term Rating to 'BBB(ven)' from
'BBB-(ven)'. In addition, Fitch has affirmed BNC's Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'CCC' and Viability Rating (VR) at
'ccc' following Fitch's peer review of Venezuelan banks. No Rating
Outlook is assigned at this rating level.

Fitch's upgrade of BNC's National Long-Term Rating reflects the
improved capitalization, stable asset quality and liquidity
metrics that are more in line with its peers. Although these
factors did not impact the IDR rating, which is constrained by the
operating environment, they were deemed relevant enough to
favorably impact the national ratings as the National Scale Credit
Ratings are an assessment of credit quality relative to the rating
of the lowest credit risk in a country. Fitch's upgrade of BNC's
National Long Term Rating also reflects changing relativities and
greater compression of bank ratings on the local scale, as well as
increasing uniformity of performance amid shared operating
challenges.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The operating environment continues to be the key factor
constraining BNC's VR, which drives its IDR and does not take into
account state support. Like all Venezuelan banks, BNC's VR is
strongly linked to the creditworthiness of the sovereign, given
the significant level of government intervention, high level of
exposure to sovereign securities and its vulnerability to the
government's policy choices and the country's economic
performance.

BNC's ratings are also heavily influenced by the bank's capital,
liquidity and funding profile. Although most deposits are
available on demand, deposits have been stable, in part due to the
government's capital controls. Furthermore, expansive fiscal and
monetary policies continue to drive deposit growth, BNC has a
large negative mismatch between short-term assets and liabilities,
and access to longer-term funding is limited, as is the case
across the Venezuelan banking system.

Over the past three years, BNC's loan growth has consistently
exceeded that of the system, and its exposure to the public sector
was among the highest compared with other Venezuelan
universal/commercial banks rated by Fitch. However, the bank's
corporate focus, conservative lending policies and low-risk
products have enabled the bank to report a low impaired loan to
gross loan ratio, which compares favorably to its peers. The
bank's reserves for impaired loans to gross loans improved to
2.2%; however, this level was still slightly below the average of
the banking system at Sept. 30, 2016. In light of the loan
concentration and difficult operating environment that continues
to impact the bank's clients, Fitch views this reserve coverage
level as weak.

High nominal loan growth has led to tighter capitalization;
however, this was mitigated by fresh capital injections. The
bank's total regulatory capital ratio was slightly below the
system's average although the bank's tangible common equity to
tangible assets ratio was above that of the system. Capital levels
are considered weak relative to Latin American peers in highly
speculative countries, particularly in light of the low level of
reserves compared with the size of the loan portfolio.

BNC's profitability continued to lag that of its Venezuelan peers.
Despite similar margins, the bank's lower efficiency and limited
cross-selling hinders profitability. The bank's efficiency ratios
were partly impacted by the bank's growth strategy.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The banks' Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's expectation of no support. Support
cannot be relied upon given Venezuela's highly speculative rating
and lack of a consistent policy on bank support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Should Venezuela's macroeconomic/political woes deepen, as
reflected in its sovereign ratings, BNC's ratings could be
downgraded. This is the main downside risk for BNC and the rest of
Venezuela's banks.

Although not Fitch's base case, BNC's VR, National and long-term
IDRs could be upgraded if the operating environment improves (more
stable economic background, less intrusive regulation) and the
bank reduces its exposure to the public sector. A sustained
improvement of the bank's financial profile could be positive for
the bank's national ratings.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Venezuela's propensity or ability to provide timely support of BNC
is not likely to change given the sovereign's very low
speculative-grade ratings. As such, the SR and SRF have no upgrade
potential at this time.

The rating actions are as follows:

   BNC

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'CCC';

   -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'C';

   -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'ccc';

   -- Support Rating at '5';

   -- Support Rating Floor at 'NF';

   -- National Long-Term rating upgraded to 'BBB(ven)' from 'BBB-
      (ven)';

   -- National Short-Term rating affirmed at 'F3(ven)'.


BANCO OCCIDENTAL: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Following a peer review, Fitch Ratings affirmed Banco Occidental
de Descuento, Banco Univeral C.A.'s (BOD) foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'. No Rating Outlook
is assigned at this rating level.

The ratings were affirmed as there has been no material change in
BOD's company profile or performance since the last review.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

As with other emerging market commercial banks in non-investment
grade rating categories, the operating environment highly
influences BOD's ratings. Like all Venezuelan banks, the
sovereign's creditworthiness constrains BOD's ratings due to
exposure to public sector (mostly sovereign) securities, as well
as vulnerability to the government's economic and regulatory
policy choices. Venezuela's IDR is currently rated 'CCC' by Fitch.
High inflation distorts the comparison of financial metrics with
regional peers (Latin American commercial banks with a Viability
Rating [VR] of 'b+' and below).

BOD's capitalization also highly influences its credit profile.
Despite capital contributions in 2012 and 2013, stronger internal
capital generation since 2014, and the full amortization of
goodwill related to the Corp Banca merger in 2015, the bank's
tangible common equity/tangible assets ratio has remained below 7%
since 2013 due to rapid nominal asset growth. This ratio compares
unfavorably to both domestic and Latin American peers.
Furthermore, the bank's regulatory capital/risk weighted assets
ratio stood at 12.1% at end-June 2016, very close to the minimum
of 12% required in Venezuela. Fitch is concerned that these tight
capital ratios will reduce BOD's financial flexibility and
increase regulatory uncertainty for the bank.

Given BOD's high level of liquid assets, the large negative
mismatch between short-term assets and liabilities is manageable
as long as domestic monetary market conditions remain liquid and
any potential liberalization of capital controls is measured. Most
liquid assets consist of cash and bank deposits (91% of total) and
covered 31% of deposits and short-term funding as of Sept. 30,
2016. Fitch views a greater proportion of cash favorably, as
public sector securities may be of limited liquidity in a stress
scenario given the shallow domestic debt market.

Even with reduced funding costs, the weight of increased credit
costs and the additional burden on the bank's cost structure
imposed by operating in a country with the highest inflation
levels in the world as well as heavy regulation have made it
difficult for BOD to maintain an improving trend in its
profitability ratios. As a result, BOD's profitability ratios once
again lag those of larger Venezuelan banks. As is the case with
other Venezuelan banks, Fitch expects operating, credit and tax
expenses to pressure profitability over the medium term.

BOD has the weakest loan quality indicators among domestic peers
(commercial banks with market shares exceed 5% of financial system
assets). A growing proportion of retail and compulsory loans also
increases the vulnerability of the bank's loan quality indicators
to the current economic crisis.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The banks' Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's expectation of no support. Despite
BOD's systemic importance, support cannot be relied upon given
Venezuela's sub-investment grade rating and lack of a consistent
policy on bank support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

A downgrade of the sovereign's IDRs would result in a similar
action on the IDRs and VRs of this bank, which is currently capped
at the sovereign. A decline in capitalization below regulatory
minimums would also pressure BOD's ratings. Additional government
intervention that pressures financial performance could negatively
affect the bank's IDRs, VR and National ratings. While not Fitch's
base case due to capital controls and high domestic market
liquidity, a persistent decline in deposits would pressure
ratings.

There is no upside potential to the bank's ratings in the near
term in light of the current economic crisis.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Venezuela's propensity or ability to provide timely support BOD is
not likely to change given the sovereign's very low speculative-
grade ratings. As such, the SR and SRF have no upgrade potential.

Fitch has affirmed BOD's ratings as follows:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs at 'CCC';

   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings at 'C';

   -- Viability Rating at 'ccc';

   -- Support at '5';

   -- Support Floor at 'NF';

   -- Long-term national-scale rating at 'BBB-(ven)';

   -- Short-term national-scale rating 'F3(ven)'.


MERCANTIL CA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term (LT) Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Mercantil C.A. Banco
Universal (Mercantil) at 'CCC' following Fitch's peer review of
Venezuelan Private Sector Banks. No Rating Outlook is assigned at
this rating level. Fitch has also downgraded Mercantil's LT
National rating to 'A+(ven)' from 'AA-(ven)'.

Fitch's downgrade of Mercantil's national long-term rating
reflects changing relativities and greater compression of bank
ratings on the local scale, as well as increasing uniformity of
performance amid shared operating challenges. Additionally, as
internal capital generation cannot keep pace with inflation
induced asset growth, intensified pressure on capitalization also
drove the downgrade.


KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Similar to other commercial banks operating in emerging markets in
highly speculative rating categories, the operating environment
highly influences Mercantil's ratings. Like all Venezuelan banks,
the sovereign's creditworthiness constrains Mercantil's ratings
due in part to exposure to public sector (mostly sovereign)
securities, as well as vulnerability to the government's economic
and regulatory policies. Venezuela's IDR is currently rated 'CCC'
by Fitch. High inflation distorts the comparison of financial
metrics with regional peers (Latin American commercial banks with
a Viability Rating [VR] of 'b+' and below).

Capitalization also highly influences the bank's ratings.
Mercantil's capital ratios, like those of other Venezuelan banks,
have come under pressure as asset growth has exceeded internal
capital generation over the past few years. Despite conservatively
lower growth than its domestic peers this year, the bank's
tangible common equity/tangible assets ratio of 6.3% as of Sept.
30, 2016, fell below the average ratio of the banking system.

Fitch recognizes that an adjustment of foreign currency assets to
a more market oriented exchange rate and a revaluation of fixed
assets due to inflation would materially increase capitalization
ratios. Nevertheless, in Fitch's view, this does not offset the
inherent risk of operating in Venezuela given the depth of the
economic crisis and the uncertainty in prospective regulatory
measures. Capital ratios are likely to remain under pressure in
2017 due to inflation-induced growth and lower profitability.

Mercantil's liquidity is adequate for its market. Most liquid
assets consist of cash and bank deposits which covered 30% of
deposits and short-term funding and nearly 27% of total assets as
of Sept. 30, 2016. Fitch views a greater proportion of cash
favorably, as public sector securities may be of limited liquidity
in a stress scenario given the shallow domestic debt market.

Fitch views the negative mismatch between short-term assets and
liabilities that affects all Venezuelan banks as manageable as
long as domestic monetary market conditions remain liquid and any
potential liberalization of capital controls is measured. Fitch
also notes that in past crises, Mercantil has benefited from a
flight to quality which also supported deposit stability.


Higher margins were not sufficient to offset the drag of pressures
from increased operating, credit and tax expenses in 2016. As a
result, Mercantil's profitability metrics were below that of the
system. As is the case with other Venezuelan banks, Fitch expects
expenditure pressures to continue over the medium term.

Mercantil's impaired loans to gross loans ratio has remained well-
below 1% for many years and despite a recent weakening it is
currently in line with domestic peers. The bank's level of loan
loss provisions are above the system's averages with a ratio of
3.2% of gross loans as of Sept. 30, 2016. However, Fitch views
coverage of gross loans as tight, given the severity and
uncertainty of the current economic, social & political crisis and
historical NPL levels following economic adjustment of previous
crises.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The bank's Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's expectation of no support. Despite
Mercantil's systemic importance, support cannot be relied upon
given Venezuela's highly speculative rating and lack of a
consistent policy on bank support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

A downgrade of the sovereign's IDRs would result in a similar
action on the IDRs, and VRs of these banks, which are currently
capped at the sovereign. Additional government intervention that
pressures financial performance could negatively affect the bank's
IDRs, VR and National ratings. While not Fitch's base case, due to
capital controls and high domestic market liquidity, a persistent
decline in deposits would pressure ratings.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Venezuela's propensity or ability to provide timely support of
Mercantil is not likely to change given the sovereign's very low
speculative-grade ratings. As such, the SR and SRF have no upgrade
potential at this time.


The rating actions are as follows:

   Mercantil

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'CCC';

   -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs affirmed at 'C';

   -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'ccc';

   -- Support Rating affirmed at '5';

   -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'NF';

   -- Long-Term National rating downgraded to 'A+(ven)' from 'AA-
      (ven)';

   -- Short-Term National rating downgraded to 'F1(ven)' from
      'F1+(ven)'.


VENEZUELA: Citizens Rush to Banks to Exchange Bills
---------------------------------------------------
Anatoly Kurmanaev at The Wall Street Journal reports that
Venezuelans desperately rushed to banks to dump cash after the
government announced it is eliminating the largest circulating
bank note to combat contraband in a country whipsawed by the
world's deepest recession and highest inflation.

In the financial district of downtown Caracas, National Guard
troops carrying assault rifles stood outside banks as crowds of
people lined up to deposit stacks of 100-bolivar bills, which
President Nicolas Maduro said would become void, according to The
Wall Street Journal.  In the provinces, where there are fewer
banks, the situation was chaotic, with sporadic fighting breaking
out among residents waiting as early as 5 a.m. in lines that
stretched up to four blocks, the report notes.  A 100-bolivar bill
is worth just 3 U.S. cents on the black market.

"I'm fainting here, from heat and from rage," said Yesenia
Delgado, a 33-year-old homemaker, as she stood to deposit her
mother's pension, worth just $8, in 90-degree heat in the western
city of Maracaibo, the report relays.

The government's measure has brought the country to a standstill
ahead of Christmas festivities, the report says.  Doctors,
engineers and lawyers closed offices or skipped shifts to join
pensioners and homemakers in bank lines, the report discloses.  In
remote towns without readers for credit or debit cards, most
businesses have opted to close for several days rather than deal
with obsolete piles of cash they would have on their hands from
people eager to unload their bolivars, the report notes.

People carrying boxes, backpacks and plastic bags full of cash
made for an unusual sight in a country with one of the world's
highest crime rates, the report relays.  But, many of those
hauling their money brushed aside concerns, the report notes.

"If the gangsters take this cash, they would have to come back to
deposit it again," said pediatrician Cesar Morado, 55 years old,
who skipped his hospital shift to deposit money.

The ordeal is the latest for Venezuelans forced to line up for
food while dealing with rampant crime and inflation running at
470%, the report says.

"I reject this measure not because I'm antigovernment or anti-
Maduro," said Maracaibo pensioner Manuel Leon, clutching his life
savings of 50,000 bolivars, worth just $13, outside the bank.  "I
reject it because of basic common sense," he added.

Mr. Maduro said outlawing the 100-bolivar notes, which account for
half the country's cash supply, would destroy what he claims are
Colombian smugglers who hoard bolivars to buy price-controlled
food and gasoline in Venezuela, which is then resold at a markup,
the report notes.  That trade had been robust but has recently
dried up since the Venezuelan government, struggling financially,
is unable to keep shelves stocked with subsidized products, the
report discloses.

Mr. Maduro closed the borders with Colombia and Brazil to prevent
stacks of bolivars from making it back to the country, the report
says.  He said new notes and coins up to VEB500 bolivars would
start circulating.  But a manager at one of the foreign companies
in charge of printing new notes said it would take months to
deliver and distribute them, the report relays.

The VEB100 bank notes are nearly worthless because of raging
inflation expected to hit 1,600% next year, the report notes.
Indeed, the VEB6.1 billion bank notes the government is trying to
collect are worth only $160 million on the black market, a tiny
sum for a once-proud oil giant, the report says.

In the Colombian border city of Cucuta, the epicenter of cross-
border trade, many businesses stopped accepting VEB100-bolivar
notes, which traders on the street were selling for nearly a third
of the price of a VEB50-bolivar note, the report notes.

"What am I going to do with all of these?" said Josefina Ruiz, a
72-year-old Colombian who accumulated stacks of bolivars selling
soft drinks from a cooler just outside the border crossing, the
report discloses.  She waved bills to prospective customers and
had several more bricks of bills in a bag strapped to her chest,
the report relays.

Cucuta residents and operators of exchange houses in Cucuta
scoffed at Mr. Maduro's accusations that coup-plotting
conspirators were at work in Colombia against Venezuela's
government. Venezuelan shoppers desperate to buy food flock over
the border with only bolivars because controls prohibit access to
U.S. dollars.

"Of course, that's where all our bolivars are going to go," said
Carlos Chacon, councilman in San Antonio on the Venezuelan side of
the border. "Over here, we have no deodorant or even beans to
buy."

The Cucuta exchange association estimates that 50,000 Venezuelans
cross the border each day, each spending an average of VEB30,000,
making for a daily total street value of less than $400,000, said
Juan Fernando Gonzalez, president of the association, the report
notes.

"There is no mafia, no plot," said association president Juan
Fernando Gonzalez, notes the report.  "Here is only a reality that
Venezuela doesn't want to accept -- that here we have a free
market," he added.

Some Venezuelans lined up outside banks seemed to believe Mr.
Maduro had announced the measure to distract the country from a
deepening political crisis and from legal action restarted by the
opposition-controlled Congress against him, the report notes.

"All this is just a smokescreen to keep the people distracted from
all their other problems," said Hafet Rodr°guez, a 76-year-old
pensioner who spent three hours outside the bank in eastern
Caracas to deposit 10,000 bolivars, or just over $2.50, the report
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2016, Fitch Ratings affirmed Venezuela's Long-Term
Foreign-and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (LT FC/LC IDR)
at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed the sovereign's Short-Term
Foreign Currency (ST FC) IDR at 'C' and country ceiling at 'CCC'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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