TCRLA_Public/161226.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, December 26, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 255


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

AES PUERTO: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on $194MM Sr. Sec. Bonds
BANCO DE CREDITO: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Rating to Ba2
BUENOS AIRES: Moody's Retains B3/Baa3 Rating on Series I Notes


B A H A M A S

CLICO BAHAMAS: Policyholders to Get New Year Payback


B R A Z I L

BR PROPERTIES: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating & Revises Outlook to Neg.
GOL LINHAS: S&P Raises Rating on $300MM Term Loan to 'BB+'


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ALTRINCHAM LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
EASTGATE PHARMACEUTICALS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
FOUNTAIN VIEW: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GENERAL MOBILE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
GREEN REEF: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5

HEDGED STRATEGIES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
HERMES BPK: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
KHRONOS SPC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 26
LV GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MORVAL VONWILLER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5

ROVAL INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
SALTWATER INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
URBAN CAR: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up


C U B A

CUBA: Offers Rum to Repay US$276 Million Debt To Czech Republic


C O L O M B I A

COLOMBIA: Approves Tax Plan to Replenish Coffers Hurt by Oil Slump


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: US$1BB Initiative Seeks to Boost Border Trade
PETROCARIBE: Agreement Ends for the Dominican Republic

J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Decline in Share of Commercial Bank Loans, BOJ Says


M E X I C O

BANCO SANTANDER: Moody's Assigns Ba1(hyb) Jr. Sub. Debt Rating
DOCUFORMAS SAPI: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating; Outlook Remains Stable
GF SANTANDER: Moody's Rates New Capital Notes (P)Ba1(hyb)


P U E R T O    R I C O

AES PUERTO: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on $194MM Sr. Sec. Bonds
IGLESIA EPISCOPAL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC' on Limited Liquidity


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Dec. 19 to Dec. 23, 2016


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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AES PUERTO: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on $194MM Sr. Sec. Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 rating on AES Puerto
Rico, L.P.'s $194 million of senior secured bonds outstanding. The
bonds were issued on behalf of AES PR by the Puerto Rico
Industrial, Tourist, Educational, Medical, and Environmental
Control Facilities Financing Authority. The outlook for AES PR is
revised to developing from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

AES PR's revenues and cash flows are entirely dependent upon the
contractual sale of electricity to the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA; Caa3, developing) pursuant to a 25-year power
purchase agreement (PPA), expiring in 2027, which is one year
beyond the maturity of the bonds. PREPA's Caa3 rating incorporates
the utility's weak liquidity and Moody's belief that default risk,
in the form of either a near-term consensual restructuring or a
payment default remains high.

"Moody's affirmation of the B3 rating on AES PR recognizes that
the PREPA contagion risk for the Project's bondholders continues
to be mitigated via the priority position of PREPA's contractual
payments to AES PR as an operating expense, along with the
strategic importance of this low cost power supply to PREPA,
including its relevant role in providing an essential service to
the citizens of Puerto Rico. While we understand that new
legislation has language which would allow parties to reject
contracts, we believe that AES PR's unique position as a cost-
effective, coal-fired plant alternative for PREPA relative to fuel
oil generated power (AES PR cost is currently about 8.5 cents/kwh
vs. PREPA's 20 cents/kwh), positions the asset well and reduces
the probability that PREPA would seek to reject the contract. The
affirmation acknowledges that certain terms of the PPA are
attractive to PREPA from a cost perspective. Specifically, the
failure of AES PR to reach availability requirements enables PREPA
to reduce the amount of the capacity payment. Moreover, the terms
of the PPA requires PREPA to compensate AES PR at a lower heat
rate than the plant has historically performed, leading to a lower
energy payment for PREPA than AES PR's actual costs. Also,
capacity payments under the PPA will decline materially starting
in 2020, making the asset that much more attractive to PREPA.
Moody's also considers the secured position of the AES PR's
project lenders and the additional protections, such as debt
service reserves (DSR) and a cash flow waterfall, provided by the
project financing structure, as well as project's strong liquidity
profile", Moody's says.

Moody's notes that the Project had weaker than expected financial
and operating performance in 2016 requiring a draw on the DSR to
cover scheduled debt service this year. Furthermore, the Project's
financial performance during 2017 will face some challenges as
scheduled debt service will be elevated that year. However, given
the level of liquidity at the project, these issues are largely
captured in the B3 rating level.

AES PR's operating and financial performance in 2016 were impacted
by an extended outage in late 2015, which dampened availability
below the guarantee incorporated in the PPA for much of the year,
resulting in a lower capacity payment under the PPA, and higher
associated operating and maintenance costs. The outage occurred in
October 2015 as part of a scheduled major maintenance that
uncovered the need to complete a re-wind of the generator in Unit
2. The outage lasted 80 days through October, November and
December 2015, but because of the rolling 12-month nature of the
availability calculation, it impacted financial performance for
most of 2016. Also negatively affecting financial performance was
a small outage during May 2016 owing to a tube leak.

Despite the contractual nature of the AES PR revenues, the
Project's financial performance and metrics are dependent on
operating performance and expense management. The payments under
the PREPA PPA have both a fixed capacity payment and a variable
payment to cover variable costs, including fuel. The full capacity
payment is dependent upon the availability factor being at or
above 90% over a twelve-month period. As of October 2016, however,
the rolling 12-month availability was 84.3%, owing to the
aforementioned extended outage, resulting in AES PR not receiving
its full capacity payment from PREPA. As the year progresses, the
impact of the outage is expected to roll off due to the rolling
12-month nature of the calculation.

During 2016, the Project was also impacted by a one-time payment
made as part of a litigation settlement. Moreover, the Borrower's
faced higher debt service in 2016 owing to a term out of a $25
million working capital facility that was drawn just prior to its
expiration in November 2014. The term loan is expected to be
repaid in quarterly installments over the remaining life by
November 2017.

Taken together, the weaker financial and operating performance,
the litigation settlement and the higher debt service, resulted in
a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) calculated for the 12-month
period to the end of the third quarter of 2016 to drop to 0.87x
vs. 1.18x for the full year 2015. To meet this shortfall, AES PR
used approximately $6 million of unrestricted cash and a $6
million draw from its bank DSR to cover scheduled debt service
this year. While a credit negative, Moody's rating affirmation
recognizes that had the litigation settlement payment not occurred
during 2016, AES PR would have had a DSCR slightly in excess of
1.0x for the 12 month period to the end of the third quarter of
2016 and would have not required the use of unrestricted cash and
a draw of the DSR during this period.

Moody's expects the Project's financial and operating performance
to improve in 2017, barring any unforeseen operational issues. As
with any large power generation facility, there is always the
possibility that operating problems with surface. However, the
likelihood of this happening in 2017 is reduced given the
significant capital improvements taken during the major
maintenance and generator re-wind of late last year to improve
operating performance. Management expects availability to be 91%
in 2017, which is above the required 90% minimum in the PPA,
enabling the Project to receive its full capacity payment under
the PPA. AES PR is already seeing this improvement. Availability
for the 10 months through October 2016 (which excludes the impact
of the outage in the last months of 2015) was 90.7%, and AES PR's
management expects that full year 2016 availability will be 91.7%.
Further, the one-time litigation payment will not be recur in
2017. However, Moody's expect AES PR DSCR for 2017 to be around
0.92x owing to substantially higher debt service requirements as
the final payment of the Tranche A term loan and the final payment
due under the working capital facility term loan are due in
November 2017. AES PR expects to utilize available unrestricted
cash from its balance sheet to satisfy the shortfall; however, it
is not expected to dip again into the DSR. Once AES PR gets
through the critical year of 2017, total debt service will drop
considerably in 2018 and beyond, and the Project is expected to
comfortably cover debt service going forward.

As alluded to, the Project has adequate liquidity to get through
the next year, should operational problems materialize. Balance
sheet cash approximates $20 million. Each of the bank and the
bonds tranches has their own DSR. The required DSR for the bank
loans is $35 million, representing six months of principal and
interest. At the beginning of 2016, this was backed up by $18
million in cash and by a $17 million liquidity/reserve facility
provided by a group of banks that is committed through November
2017 (and is co-terminus with the Tranche A term loan). There was
a $6 million draw in the cash reserve during the year, leaving $12
million available. The reserve facility has not been used. The
bonds have their own DSR of $13.7 million, which represents one
year of interest. It remains in place and has not been touched.

Rating Outlook

The developing outlook is consistent with the outlook for PREPA
and incorporates recent events that suggest positive momentum
between PREPA and its creditors toward reaching a consensual debt
restructuring. The developing outlook also recognizes that once
AES PR gets through 2017, the financial metrics should improve
given the lower debt service after 2017. That said, the developing
outlook recognizes the somewhat fragile nature of the
restructuring agreement among PREPA and the creditors which, in
the end, could unravel, thereby increasing uncertainty for PREPA
and indirectly for AES PR.

Factors that Could Lead to an Upgrade

Upward pressure on the rating could develop if PREPA were to
successfully complete its restructuring and if its rating were to
be revised several notches upward and if AES PR is able to
demonstrate DSCRs above 1.0x on a sustainable basis.

           Factors that Could Lead to a Downgrade

The Project's rating could face downward pressure if there were to
be additional operational problems at the Project resulting in
lower revenues and higher expenses, particularly given the
elevated debt service in 2017, resulting in another draw on the
debt service reserve.

AES PR, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of AES Corporation
(AES: Ba3, positive), owns and operates a 454 megawatt (MW) coal-
fired cogeneration facility located on the southeastern coast of
Puerto Rico. The project sells all of its firm energy and capacity
pursuant to a 25-year power purchase agreement to PREPA, a public
corporation and governmental agency of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico. The project began operating in 2002.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Power
Generation Projects published in December 2012.


BANCO DE CREDITO: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
downgraded the long-term local currency deposit rating of Banco de
Credito de Bolivia S.A. (BCR) to Ba2 from Ba1. The outlook on the
local currency rating was changed to stable from negative. In
addition, the bank's adjusted baseline credit assessment (Adjusted
BCA) was downgraded to ba2 from baa3. The bank's other ratings,
including its Aaa.bo Bolivian national scale ratings, were not
affected by the action.

The following ratings and assessments of Banco de CrÇdito de
Bolivia S.A. were downgraded:

- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, to ba2 from baa3

- Long-term local currency deposit rating, to Ba2 Stable from
   Ba1, Negative

- Outlook, Changed To Stable(m) From Negative(m)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade follows a recent change in the bank's ownership
structure, whereby the bank's former parent, Banco de CrÇdito del
Per£ (BCP, BCA baa2), transfered 95.84% of its shares in BCR to a
Bolivian holding company, Inversiones Credicorp Bolivia S.A.
(ICBSA), control of which was assumed by BCP's immediate parent,
Grupo Credito. The transfer to ICBSA was done to comply with
Bolivia's 2013 Financial Services Law, which established that by
July 2017 all financial groups operating in Bolivia be controlled
by a holding company.

While BCP continues to account for the large majority of Grupo
Credito's assets, the downgrade considers that Grupo Credito's
capacity to provide extraordinary financial support to BCR in case
of need is weaker than was BCP's due to Grupo Credito's structural
subordination to BCP's creditors. The downgrade also incorporates
a reduction in Moody's assessment of the probability that BCR will
benefit from extraordinary financial support from its new parent
to High from Very High. The lower probability of affiliate support
considers the negative impact that interest rate caps implemented
pursuant to Bolivia's new Financial Services Law are having on the
bank's profitability.

Notwithstanding the corporate reorganization, however, there has
been no change to BCR's ultimate parent, Creditcorp Ltd, and
Moody's continues to assess a high probability that Grupo Credito
will provide support to BCR. Although BCP is no longer the direct
owner of BCR, the banks' continue to share a brand. Moreover,
there has been no change in terms of BCR's image, board of
directors, risk management practices, or committed funding lines.

Nevertheless, the uplift for affiliate support incorporated in
BCR's rating and adjusted BCA has been reduced to just one notch
from its standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba3,
compared to two and three notches respectively previously.

The local currency deposit rating now carries a stable outlook as
it is no longer constrained by Bolivia's local currency deposit
ceiling of Ba1, and consequently is unlikely to be downgraded
further even if Bolivia's sovereign rating is ultimately
downgraded in line with its negative outlook. Nor is the local
currency deposit rating likely to face negative pressure even if
the bank's BCA is downgraded, thanks to the still high probability
of affiliate support.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

There is no upward pressure at this time on the BCR's ratings
given the negative outlooks on the sovereign rating, which
constrains the bank's BCA. As a result of the credit inter-
linkages between the affected banks and the sovereign, the bank's
BCA is likely to be downgraded if and when the sovereigns rating
is downgraded, however this would not affect the bank's local
currency deposit rating. Consequently, the local currency deposit
rating is only likely to be downgraded again if and when there is
evidence of a further reduction in the probability of affiliate
support, or if there is a multi-notch downgrade of the BCA,
neither of which is anticipated at this time.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


BUENOS AIRES: Moody's Retains B3/Baa3 Rating on Series I Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. has
assigned B3 (Global Scale local currency) and Baa3.ar (Argentina
National Scale) ratings to the Province of Buenos Aires's Series
II Notes under its 2016 Local Market Bonds Program for up to
ARS8.000 million. In the same rating action, Moody's announced
that the current B3/Baa3.ar local currency ratings already
assigned to Class II of Series I remain unchanged after the
extension of its maximum authorized amount by ARS6.220 million
(together with the amount of Series II). The ratings are in line
with the province's long-term local currency issuer ratings, which
carry stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The 2016 Local Market Bonds Program has been authorized by the
provincial Decree 104/2016 and by Law 14.807 of the Province of
Buenos Aires (2016 Budget Law). The notes to be issued under the
program constitute direct, general, unconditional, secured and
unsubordinated obligations of the province and the maximum amount
to be issued under the program represents an estimated 2% of total
revenues budgeted for this fiscal year.

The bonds to be issued under the program will be payable in
Argentine pesos and sold in the local capital market. The province
is now offering a new series, Series II, with a maturity of 24
months, amortizing 33.33% of the principal in the months of June
and September and in December of 2018 the remaining 33.34% with
quarterly interest payments. At the same time The Province of
Buenos Aires is reopening the second class within the first Series
of this program (Class II issued on December 6, 2016 and
expiration on December 2019 by ARS1.465 million). The total
combined amount of the planned Series II and of the existing Class
II of Series I after its reopening will not exceed ARS6.220
million).

Moody's finally anticipates that with the issuance of full amount
authorized under this Program, the ratio of total debt to total
revenues of the Province of Buenos Aires will reach to an
estimated 50% by the end of 2016 from 44.5% in 2015.

The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
or anticipates changes in the main conditions that the notes
and/or the Program will carry. Should issuance conditions and/or
final documentation of any of the series under this program
deviate from the original ones submitted and reviewed by the
rating agency, Moody's will assess the impact that these
differences may have on the ratings and act accordingly.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns economic and
financial profiles and ratings, an upgrade of Argentina's
sovereign bonds ratings and/or the improvement of the country'
operating environment could lead to an upgrade of the Province of
Buenos Aires. Conversely, a downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings
and/or the continuation of current operating deficits coupled with
a debt to total revenues ratio rising above 55% could exert
downward pressure on the ratings assigned.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.



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B A H A M A S
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CLICO BAHAMAS: Policyholders to Get New Year Payback
----------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that after being delayed for more than
six months, about 300 anxious CLICO policyholders in the Bahamas
will finally receive their pay back in the New Year.

Minister of State for Finance Michael Halkitis has announced that
payments totaling $38 million would be made next month, according
to Caribbean360.com.

"This amount would be dispersed by Government bonds . . . . and
not cash," Mr. Halkitis said, the report notes.

The report discloses Mr. Halkitis explained that the pay back was
delayed because of the impact of Hurricane Matthew, which struck
The Bahamas on October 6.

Back in March, the Perry Christie administration had signed off on
3,389 cheques in the first payout totaling just over $11 million.

Mr. Halkitis explained that the 300 policyholders, who will get
their money in January, were left out of the initial payment
because they had not provided the necessary information, the
report relays.

In addition to the payouts, the finance official is hoping that
ongoing work to establish a new company to manage CLICO policies
will also be completed in January, the report discloses.

The company, called Coral Insurance Company Limited, will only
handle active policies, the report notes.

"Coral Insurance Company will not take on any new business, but
they will be responsible for holding those policies that remain
active and administering those. In order to do that, you have to
have a licence as an insurance company and that is where we are
going," Mr. Halkitis said, the report discloses.

The minister added that preparations were being made to ensure a
sound structure, the report relays.

"We are currently evaluating proposals received from entities that
have expressed an interest in managing the insurance portfolio of
Coral. Once selected, the manager and new board of directors along
with the business plan will be presented to the Insurance
Commission for approval. We expect that to be completed by January
so the payouts can be made," he added.



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B R A Z I L
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BR PROPERTIES: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating & Revises Outlook to Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its global scale rating outlook on BR
Properties S.A. to negative from stable.  S&P also affirmed this
rating at 'BB-'.  In addition, S&P lowered the national scale
corporate credit rating to 'brA-' from 'brA'.  S&P also lowered
the senior secured issue-level rating to 'brA' from 'brA+'.  The
recovery rating on this debt remains at '2', which indicates a
substantial recovery (between 70-90%; in the high-end of the
range).  The outlook on both scale corporate credit ratings is now
negative.

Following the December 15 acquisition announcement, S&P now
expects BR Properties' leverage and interest coverage ratios to
weaken beyond S&P's previous expectations.

The acquired asset has 81.423 square meters of gross leasable area
(GLA), which currently only has a 4% occupancy.  The acquisition
will cost R$715 million, which the company will pay R$330 million
in cash and the remaining R$385 million through a 12-years vendor
financing line.

S&P's updated base-case scenario incorporates BR Properties'
improving occupancy rates in the future, but results for 2017 will
be weaker than S&P's previous expectation because higher debt
levels will result in greater interest burden.  Even though S&P
expects a mild recovery in business conditions for next year, the
likelihood for it, in S&P's view, is smaller than before.


GOL LINHAS: S&P Raises Rating on $300MM Term Loan to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has reviewed its recovery and
issue-level ratings on Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. (GOL)
that were labeled as "under criteria observation" (UCO) after the
Dec. 7, 2016, publication of a revised recovery ratings criteria.
With S&P's criteria review complete, it is removing the UCO
designation from these ratings and raising the issue-level rating
on Gol LuxCo S.A.'s $300 million term loan to 'BB+' from 'BB'.
S&P also revised the recovery rating on this debt to '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30% to 50%; higher half
of the range) recovery in the event of default from, '5'.  S&P has
also affirmed the 'CCC' issue-level rating on the senior unsecured
notes, which VRG Linhas Aereas S.A. (due 2023), Gol LuxCo (2022),
and Gol Finance Inc. (2020) issued.  The recovery ratings on these
debts remain at '4', but on the lower end of the 30%-50% range.

The rating on the term loan continues to reflect Delta Air Lines
Inc.' (BB+/Positive/--) full guarantee, and the higher recovery
expectation on this debt due to higher recovery rating on Delta's
unsecured debt following the application of the revised recovery
criteria.  GOL's rated senior unsecured notes at its subsidiaries
also reflect the full and unconditional guarantee that the holding
company and VRG Linhas Aerea, GOL's operating subsidiary, provide.

These rating actions stem solely from the application of S&P's
revised recovery criteria and don't reflect any change in its
assessment of the corporate credit ratings for issuers of the
affected debt issues.

RATINGS LIST

Rating Raised                          To          From

Gol LuxCo S.A.
  $300 million term loan               BB+         BB
   Recovery rating                     4H          5L

Rating Affirmed

VRG Linhas AÇreas S.A.
  Senior unsecured debt due 2023       CCC
   Recovery rating                     4L

Gol LuxCo S.A.
Senior unsecured debt due 2022
   Recovery rating                     4L

Gol Finance Inc
Senior unsecured debt due 2020
   Recovery rating                     4L



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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
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ALTRINCHAM LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Altrincham Ltd. are required to file their proofs
of debt by Jan. 5, 2017, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Nov. 15, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


EASTGATE PHARMACEUTICALS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Eastgate Pharmaceuticals Fund I GP CO
Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business
on Nov. 14, 2016.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidators are:

          Mohammed Abdulah AAlali
          Pankaj Gupta
          Walkers (Dubai) LLP
          Precinct Building 5, Level 5
          Dubai International Financial Centre
          P.O. Box 506513 Dubai
          United Arab Emirates
          Telephone: +971 4 363 7999


FOUNTAIN VIEW: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Nov. 15, 2016, the members of
Fountain View Reinsurance, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate
the company's business.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kieran Mehigan
          Marsh Management Services Cayman Ltd.
          Governors Square
          Building 4, 2nd Floor
          23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
          P.O. Box 1051, Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands


GENERAL MOBILE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of General Mobile Technology Company are required to
file their proofs of debt by Jan. 5, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Nov. 17, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Liao Pen Fu
          Michelle R. Bodden-Moxam
          Portcullis (Cayman) Ltd
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          Oleander Way, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 32052 Grand Cayman KY1-1208
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946-6145
          Facsimile: (345) 946-6146


GREEN REEF: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Green Reef Ltd. are required to file their proofs
of debt by Jan. 5, 2017, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Nov. 15, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


HEDGED STRATEGIES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of The Hedged Strategies Fund (QP), Ltd
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Nov.
3, 2016.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Private Advisors, LLC
          c/o Gregory Ciaverelli
          901 E Byrd St #1400
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: 804 289 6000


HERMES BPK: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Hermes BPK Accelerator (Cayman) Limited
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Nov.
17, 2016.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Hermes Investment Management Limited
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands


KHRONOS SPC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 26
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Khronos SPC are required to file their proofs of
debt by Dec. 26, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Nov. 16, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes
          c/o Jo-Anne Maher
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +44 207 796 7614
          Facsimile: (345) 949-4647


LV GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of LV Global Managers resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business on Nov. 9, 2016.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Larrain Vial Investment Inc.
          Av. El Bosque 0117, 4th Floor
          Las Condes, Santiago
          Chile
          Telephone: +55 9 23398500
          e-mail: rurzua@larrainvial.com


MORVAL VONWILLER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Morval Vonwiller Financial Products are required
to file their proofs of debt by Jan. 5, 2017, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Nov. 15, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


ROVAL INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Roval Investment Company Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by Jan. 5, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Nov. 16, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


SALTWATER INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Jan. 5
-------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Saltwater International Investment SPC are
required to file their proofs of debt by Jan. 5, 2017, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Nov. 15, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


URBAN CAR: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------
On Nov. 15, 2016, the sole shareholder of Urban Car Park Capital
Partners Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 23, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Tat Man Choi
          China Resources Building, 37th Floor
          26 Harbour Road
          Wanchai
          Hong Kong
          Telephone +011 852 2131 2200
          Facsimile: +011 852 2131 2201



=======
C U B A
=======


CUBA: Offers Rum to Repay US$276 Million Debt To Czech Republic
---------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that Cuba has devised an innovative way
to pay off its multimillion-dollar debt to the Czech Republic --
innumerable gallons of its famous rum.

Cuba made the offer during recent negotiations on the issue,
according to the Czech finance ministry, according to
Caribbean360.com.

The communist Caribbean country owes the Czech authorities a
whopping US$276 million. Should the unique method of repaying the
debt prove acceptable, it is estimated that the Czechs would have
enough Cuban rum to last for more than a century, the report
notes.

Officials in Prague nevertheless said they preferred to get at
least some of the money in cash, the report relays.

According to BBC News, Cuba does not have much money, but it does
have lots of rum -- hence this unusual proposal, the report says.

The Czech finance ministry had reportedly said that repayment was
possible either with rum or pharmaceutical drugs. Cuban drugs lack
EU certification, however, the report discloses.

The debt dates back from the Cold War era when Cuba and what was
at the time Czechoslovakia were part of the communist bloc, the
report adds.



===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


COLOMBIA: Approves Tax Plan to Replenish Coffers Hurt by Oil Slump
------------------------------------------------------------------
Kejal Vyas at The Wall Street Journal reports that Colombian
lawmakers approved a tax-overhaul bill, a relief for President
Juan Manuel Santos as his administration seeks to recoup lost oil
revenues and maintain its investment-grade sovereign credit
rating.

The overhaul, which goes into effect on Jan. 1, allows the
government to rake in an extra COP6.2 trillion, or $2 billion, in
2017 by raising the value-added sales tax to 19% from 16%,
according to The Wall Street Journal.  That, economists say, will
be enough to appease ratings firms that earlier this year warned
of a downgrade unless Colombia compensated for fallen oil prices,
the report notes.

"These are not easy decisions and at first glance can seem
unpopular," Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas said after the tax
overhaul's 46-16 approval in the senate, the report relays.  "But
behind it all is the greatest interest of the nation: to progress
collectively, to reduce poverty and build infrastructure,"
Minister Cardenas added.

The bill aims to simplify the tax code for businesses, which will
see their burden reduced to 33% from 43% by 2019, the report
relays.  It also applies new taxes on tobacco and fuel while
toughening penalties against tax evaders, who can face four to
nine years in prison, the report notes.

Shoring up finances is crucial for the government as it looks to
end a half-century of conflict and implement a peace pact with
Marxist rebels over the next six months, the report discloses.
The accord calls for increased rural investment and development
that will put additional strain on the federal budget, which saw
revenue slashed by 3% of gross domestic product since 2014 due to
lower oil prices, the report says.

Standard & Poor's in February, followed by Fitch Ratings in July,
warned of downgrading Colombia's BBB rating unless the government
found a way to narrow a fiscal deficit estimated near 4% of
economic output this year, the widest since 2009.

While Mr. Santos's supporters have majority control of the
legislature, the tax increase was seen as a tough sell for the
government, which had spent much of its political capital on
getting the peace deal approved, the report notes.

Both the peace accord and the tax overhaul faced heavy opposition
from Mr. Santos's top rival, Alvaro Uribe, a former president
turned senator whose conservative Democratic Center Party argues
that the measures will drive investors away and ruin Colombia's
economy, the report relays.

"While the [tax] increase is positive for revenue-raising
purposes, such an unpopular move is bound to bring political
costs," ahead of 2018 presidential elections, said Nicholas
Watson, an analyst with the consultancy Teneo Intelligence, the
report adds.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: US$1BB Initiative Seeks to Boost Border Trade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Deputy Foreign Minister Hugo Rivera
disclosed details on the Laredo Initiative signed by Dominican
Republic and Haiti authorities on Dec. 7, which seeks to develop
trade along the Dominican-Haiti border.

Minister Rivera called it an "incubating" initiative aimed at
striking an agreement between both countries and Texas A & M
University (TAMIU), which has offered technical coordination based
on its experience at the Laredo, Texas-Mexico border, which boasts
trade flow of around US$1 billion daily, according to Dominican
Today.

Minister Rivera said the project proposes bilateral meetings
between Dominican and Haitian authorities to plan a "Border
Development Program," the report relays.  The first meeting is
scheduled for January in Dominican territory and the second would
be in February in Haiti, although the dates haven't been defined
thus far, the report notes.

The program seeks to modernize and improve the management of the
Dominican-Haiti border and spur facilities and "significantly
increasing bilateral trade," the report discloses.

Minister Rivera said that the agreement, which he described as
"historic" because it is the first time that both countries work
together to establish a joint plan for their borders, that is
strongly commercial and not just migratory, the report says.

                         US Participation

Minister Rivera also noted that the agreement would be between the
Dominican Republic, Haiti and the International University of
Texas A & M, which would provide technical cooperation, the report
relays.

The official added that the US embassies here and in Haiti will
take part in the initiative as witnesses, while the Haitian
embassy would provide support during the process, but the US isn't
part of the agreement, which is between the two Caribbean
countries and the university, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


PETROCARIBE: Agreement Ends for the Dominican Republic
-----------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that PetroCaribe, the energy cooperation
agreement conceived by Venezuela under the presidency of Hugo
Chavez, has reached an operational end for The Dominican Republic.

The credit conditions in the pact ceased to function
operationally, once oil prices began to decline, according to RJR
News.

The agreement's other important component, the guaranteed supply
of oil and oil products, has been waning, trimming its share to
less than 10% of its potential during 2016, the report adds.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Decline in Share of Commercial Bank Loans, BOJ Says
------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Bank of Jamaica has released information
showing the government's share of commercial bank loans declined
significantly in the past ten years.

Only 5 per cent of total commercial bank loans in September this
year was owed by the government, according to RJR News.  That is
down from 20 per cent in September 2006, the report notes.

Despite the decline in the proportion of loans to the government,
the value of the loans was hardly changed from $29 billion in 2006
compared to $28.4 billion dollars in September this year, the
report rlays.

Meanwhile, the data has revealed that banks have supplanted their
dependence on lending to the government with lending to consumers,
the report notes.

Then years ago, personal loans accounted for 36 per cent of all
loans disbursed by commercial banks, the report relays.

However, at the end of September this year, more than 45 per cent
of all loans were classified as personal loans, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2016, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Jamaica.  The outlook on the long-term sovereign credit ratings
remains stable.  In addition, S&P affirmed its transfer and
convertibility assessment at 'B+'.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


BANCO SANTANDER: Moody's Assigns Ba1(hyb) Jr. Sub. Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico has affirmed Banco Santander (Mexico), S.A.'s
(Santander) baa2 baseline credit assessment (BCA). Moody's also
assigned a Ba1 (hyb) global local currency junior subordinated
debt rating and A1.mx (hyb) Mexican National Scale junior
subordinated debt rating to the proposed perpetual non-cumulative
capital notes with principal conversion (SANTAT1 16) to be issued
by Grupo Financiero Santander MÇxico, S.A.B. de C.V. (GF
Santander). The Contingent Convertible Capital Notes (the notes)
will have no stated maturity and will be issued for an aggregate
amount of up to USD500 million, in the domestic and international
markets.

The notes issued by GF Santander will be of the same principal
amount and substantially carry the same terms and conditions as
the private notes to be issued by its main subsidiary, Santander,
which will not be rated by Moody's. The terms and conditions have
been designed to qualify Santander's back-to-back notes as
Additional Tier 1 (AT1) Capital ("Capital B†sico No Fundamental"),
under Basel III.

All other Moody's ratings for Santander are not affected by this
transaction.

Grupo Financiero Santander, S.A.B. de C.V. (600013749)

Long-Term Debt Rating Junior Subordinated: Ba1 (hyb)

$500mm Contingent Convertible Capital Notes perpetual SANTAT1 16

Mexico Long-Term National Scale Junior Subordinated: A1.mx (hyb)

$500mm Contingent Convertible Capital Notes perpetual SANTAT1 16

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS:

The following assessment of Banco Santander (MÇxico), S.A. was
affirmed:

Baseline credit assessment of baa2

The following ratings were assigned to GF Santander's Contingent
Convertible Capital Notes:

Long-term global local currency junior subordinated debt rating of
Ba1 (hyb)

Long-term Mexico National Scale junior subordinated debt rating of
A1.mx (hyb)

RATINGS RATIONALE

CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE CAPITAL NOTES AT A1.mx (hyb)/Ba1 (hyb)

The assigned Ba1 (hyb) rating is positioned three notches below
Santander's baa1 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adjusted
BCA), in line with Moody's standard notching guidance for
contractual non-viability securities. GF Santander's notes have a
contractual equity conversion at or close to the point of non-
viability (PONV) and optional and mandatory non-cumulative coupon
skip mechanisms.

Under the terms of GF Santander's notes, principal will be
partially or fully converted into equity in the event that (i)
Santander's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ("Capital
Fundamental") equals to or falls below 5.125% of risk-weighted
assets, or (ii) Santander's bank license is revoked, or (iii) if
Mexico's Banking Stability Committee makes a determination that
Santander requires financial assistance, prior to the revocation
of its license, in order to avoid a systemic risk, or (iv) any
financial entity that is a part of GF Santander experiences a
capital deficiency where the entity does not satisfy the
capitalization requirements specified under the applicable laws
and regulations of such entity and under the general regulations
specified in article 91 of the Mexican Financial Groups Law. The
conversion of the principal amount of GF Santander's notes would
need to be in an amount that would be sufficient, together with
the simultaneous conversion of the back-to-back notes issued by
Santander, to allow Santander's CET1 ratio to return to 7%
(progressively to 8.2% through 2019, including the bank's 1.2%
domestic-systemically important bank capital supplement, D-SIB)
plus any countercyclical capital supplement required by law at the
time of conversion.

GF Santander will automatically cancel interest due on the notes
if (a) Santander is classified as Class II or below pursuant
Article 122 of the Mexican Banking Law, or (b) any financial
entity that is a part of GF Santander experiences a capital
deficiency where the entity does not satisfy the capitalization
requirements specified under the applicable laws and regulations
of such entity and under the general regulations specified in
article 91 of the Mexican Financial Groups Law. Minimum capital
requirements for Santander to be classified as Class I are as
follows: 10.5% for the Total Capital (Capital Neto) ratio, 8.5%
for the Tier 1 (Capital Basico) ratio, and 7.0% for the CET1
ratio. In addition, the bank must meet the additional
aforementioned D-SIB and countercyclical capital supplements.

Furthermore, interest on the notes will be due and payable only at
GF Santander's sole and absolute discretion, at all times and for
any reason, to cancel any interest payment in whole or in part.

The notes will rank (i) junior to all present and future senior
indebtedness of the issuer, (ii) junior to all other present or
future "preferred" subordinated indebtedness (iii) pari passu with
all other present or future subordinated "non-preferred"
indebtedness and (iv) senior to all classes of capital stock of
the issuers.

The ratings assigned to the holding company's notes do not benefit
from uplift stemming from government support, because they are
intended to provide loss absorption, whereas the probability that
the government will support Santander's depositors and senior
bondholders is very high in light of the bank's large deposit
market share. Santander's A3 debt and deposit ratings benefit from
Moody's assessment of moderate probability of affiliate support
for Santander from its ultimate Spanish parent bank Banco
Santander, S.A. (Santander Spain), which results in an adjusted
BCA for Santander of baa1, one notch above its standalone BCA of
baa2.

Proceeds of GF Santander's issuance will be used to purchase Banco
Santander Mexico's back-to-back notes. The proceeds of the bank's
back-to-back notes will be used for general corporate purposes.

AFFIRMATION OF baa2 BCA

Moody's affirmation of Santander's baa2 BCA incorporates the
recent improvements to its asset quality, as indicated by a
declining nonperforming ratio and increasing reserves in the
context of more subdued loan growth, relative to 2015. The bank's
profitability also improved slightly, as a result of ample margins
and gains in operating efficiency.

Santander's capitalization, measured as tangible common equity
(TCE) to adjusted consolidated risk-weighted assets, remains weak
in comparison to peers, as calculated by Moody's, and could face
further pressures related to the uncertain economic environment in
Mexico that could increase asset risk and result in lower
profitability, in the context of Santander's high single borrower
concentrations and exposures to the troubled oil sector. However,
it is Moody's expectation that Santander's capitalization could
reach 11% over the next 12 to 18 months as a result of sustained
improvements in profitability, depending on the bank's business
expansion and capital retention strategy.

Notwithstanding the notes' regulatory eligibility for AT1 Capital,
Moody's does not incorporate them in its TCE calculation because
the notes do not provide meaningful loss absorption prior to
liquidation and well ahead of the PONV. Moody's views as low the
notes' 5.125% trigger for conversion into core capital, because
the conversion would happen only at or near the PONV.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

The BCA would face downward pressure if Santander's capitalization
falls materially short of Moody's expectations, as a result of a
decline in asset quality and profitability. A downgrade of the
bank's BCA would translate into an equivalent downgrade on the
ratings assigned to GF Santander's notes.

Moody's sees limited upward pressure on the BCA in the absence of
significant asset quality and profitability gains that would
translate into a significant boost to capitalization.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Banco Santander (Mexico), S.A.'s rating is between 01
January 2011 and 30 September 2016 (source: Banco Santander
(MÇxico), S.A. and Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores).


DOCUFORMAS SAPI: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating; Outlook Remains Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' global scale and 'mxBBB/mxA-
3' national scale ratings on Docuformas S.A.P.I. de C.V.  The
outlook remains stable.

The ratings constraint on Docuformas is its weak risk position due
to weaker asset quality than those of its domestic peers, stemming
from above-average delinquency ratios and charge-offs.  On the
other hand, Docuformas' adequate business position, reflecting the
stable and increasing operating results from its leasing business,
supports the company's credit quality.  Despite the synergies that
Docuformas gained through its acquisitions, its operations are
still concentrated in some sectors and geographic locations.  The
ratings also incorporate the company's adequate capital and
earnings assessment, based on S&P's forecasted RAC ratio of 7.3%
for the next 12-18 months.  Finally, the ratings reflect S&P's
assessments of Docuformas' funding as adequate and liquidity as
moderate.  Its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains at 'b+'.

To arrive at the anchors for nonbank financial institutions
(NBFI), S&P uses its bank anchors--derived from S&P's Banking
Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRA), which reflect the
economic risk and industry risk of each country and in a
particular banking system--as preliminary anchors, which act as a
starting point.  S&P then factors any country- and sector-specific
adjustments--and entity-specific adjustments--into these
preliminary anchors to arrive at the NBFI anchors.

"Among NBFIs that operate in Mexico, we establish a 'bb+' anchor
for finance companies (fincos), which is two notches lower than
the bank anchor.  We have reduced the differential between the
banks' anchor and the finance companies' anchor to two notches
from the preliminary anchor of three notches.  This is because
fincos in Mexico benefit from the existence of development banks
(government-owned banks) which provide a stable funding source to
this sector even in stressful situations.  Additionally, the
government has a track record of support through guarantees and
liquidity during periods of market turmoil.  The anchor for
Docuformas is equal to that for Mexican fincos because we don't
make entity-specific adjustments to it," S&P said.


GF SANTANDER: Moody's Rates New Capital Notes (P)Ba1(hyb)
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a (P)Ba1 (hyb) foreign
currency junior subordinated debt rating to the proposed perpetual
non-cumulative capital notes with principal conversion to be
issued by Grupo Financiero Santander Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V. (GF
Santander). The Contingent Convertible Capital Notes (the notes)
will have no stated maturity and will be issued for an aggregate
amount of up to USD500 million, in the domestic and international
markets.

The notes issued by GF Santander will be of the same principal
amount and substantially carry the same terms and conditions as
the private notes to be issued by its main subsidiary, Banco
Santander (Mexico), S.A.'s (Santander), which will not be rated by
Moody's. The terms and conditions have been designed to qualify
Santander's back-to-back notes as Additional Tier 1 (AT1) Capital
("Capital Basico No Fundamental"), under Basel III.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS:

The following rating was assigned to GF Santander's Contingent
Convertible Capital Notes:

  Long-term foreign currency junior subordinated debt rating of
  (P)Ba1 (hyb)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The assigned (P)Ba1 (hyb) rating is positioned three notches below
Santander's baa1 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adjusted
BCA), in line with Moody's standard notching guidance for
contractual non-viability securities. GF Santander's notes have a
contractual equity conversion at or close to the point of non-
viability (PONV) and optional and mandatory non-cumulative coupon
skip mechanisms.

Under the terms of GF Santander's notes, principal will be
partially or fully converted into equity in the event that (i)
Santander's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ("Capital
Fundamental") equals to or falls below 5.125% of risk-weighted
assets, or (ii) Santander's bank license is revoked, or (iii) if
Mexico's Banking Stability Committee makes a determination that
Santander requires financial assistance, prior to the revocation
of its license, in order to avoid a systemic risk, or (iv) any
financial entity that is a part of GF Santander experiences a
capital deficiency where the entity does not satisfy the
capitalization requirements specified under the applicable laws
and regulations of such entity and under the general regulations
specified in article 91 of the Mexican Financial Groups Law. The
conversion of the principal amount of GF Santander's notes would
need to be in an amount that would be sufficient, together with
the simultaneous conversion of the back-to-back notes issued by
Santander, to allow Santander's CET1 ratio to return to 7%
(progressively to 8.2% through 2019, including the bank's 1.2%
domestic-systemically important bank capital supplement, D-SIB)
plus any countercyclical capital supplement required by law at the
time of conversion.

GF Santander will automatically cancel interest due on the notes
if (a) Santander is classified as Class II or below pursuant
Article 122 of the Mexican Banking Law, or (b) any financial
entity that is a part of GF Santander experiences a capital
deficiency where the entity does not satisfy the capitalization
requirements specified under the applicable laws and regulations
of such entity and under the general regulations specified in
article 91 of the Mexican Financial Groups Law. Minimum capital
requirements for Santander to be classified as Class I are as
follows: 10.5% for the Total Capital (Capital Neto) ratio, 8.5%
for the Tier 1 (Capital Basico) ratio, and 7.0% for the CET1
ratio. In addition, the bank must meet the additional
aforementioned D-SIB and countercyclical capital supplements.

Furthermore, interest on the notes will be due and payable only at
GF Santander's sole and absolute discretion, at all times and for
any reason, to cancel any interest payment in whole or in part.

The notes will rank (i) junior to all present and future senior
indebtedness of the issuer, (ii) junior to all other present or
future "preferred" subordinated indebtedness (iii) pari passu with
all other present or future subordinated "non-preferred"
indebtedness and (iv) senior to all classes of capital stock of
the issuers.

The ratings assigned to the holding company's notes do not benefit
from uplift stemming from government support, because they are
intended to provide loss absorption, whereas the probability that
the government will support Santander's depositors and senior
bondholders is very high in light of the bank's large deposit
market share. Santander's A3 debt and deposit ratings benefit from
Moody's assessment of moderate probability of affiliate support
for Santander from its ultimate Spanish parent bank Banco
Santander, S.A. (Santander Spain), which results in an adjusted
BCA for Santander of baa1, one notch above its standalone BCA of
baa2.

Proceeds of GF Santander's issuance will be used to purchase Banco
Santander Mexico's back-to-back notes. The proceeds of the bank's
back-to-back notes will be used for general corporate purposes.

Moody's issues provisional (P) ratings in advance of the final
sale of notes, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings to the hybrid subordinated notes. A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

A downgrade of the Santander's BCA would translate into an
equivalent downgrade on the ratings assigned to GF Santander's
notes. Moody's sees limited upward pressure on Santander's BCA
thus there are limited upward pressure on the rating of the notes
issued by GF Santander.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


AES PUERTO: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on $194MM Sr. Sec. Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 rating on AES Puerto
Rico, L.P.'s $194 million of senior secured bonds outstanding. The
bonds were issued on behalf of AES PR by the Puerto Rico
Industrial, Tourist, Educational, Medical, and Environmental
Control Facilities Financing Authority. The outlook for AES PR is
revised to developing from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

AES PR's revenues and cash flows are entirely dependent upon the
contractual sale of electricity to the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA; Caa3, developing) pursuant to a 25-year power
purchase agreement (PPA), expiring in 2027, which is one year
beyond the maturity of the bonds. PREPA's Caa3 rating incorporates
the utility's weak liquidity and Moody's belief that default risk,
in the form of either a near-term consensual restructuring or a
payment default remains high.

"Moody's affirmation of the B3 rating on AES PR recognizes that
the PREPA contagion risk for the Project's bondholders continues
to be mitigated via the priority position of PREPA's contractual
payments to AES PR as an operating expense, along with the
strategic importance of this low cost power supply to PREPA,
including its relevant role in providing an essential service to
the citizens of Puerto Rico. While we understand that new
legislation has language which would allow parties to reject
contracts, we believe that AES PR's unique position as a cost-
effective, coal-fired plant alternative for PREPA relative to fuel
oil generated power (AES PR cost is currently about 8.5 cents/kwh
vs. PREPA's 20 cents/kwh), positions the asset well and reduces
the probability that PREPA would seek to reject the contract. The
affirmation acknowledges that certain terms of the PPA are
attractive to PREPA from a cost perspective. Specifically, the
failure of AES PR to reach availability requirements enables PREPA
to reduce the amount of the capacity payment. Moreover, the terms
of the PPA requires PREPA to compensate AES PR at a lower heat
rate than the plant has historically performed, leading to a lower
energy payment for PREPA than AES PR's actual costs. Also,
capacity payments under the PPA will decline materially starting
in 2020, making the asset that much more attractive to PREPA.
Moody's also considers the secured position of the AES PR's
project lenders and the additional protections, such as debt
service reserves (DSR) and a cash flow waterfall, provided by the
project financing structure, as well as project's strong liquidity
profile", Moody's says.

Moody's notes that the Project had weaker than expected financial
and operating performance in 2016 requiring a draw on the DSR to
cover scheduled debt service this year. Furthermore, the Project's
financial performance during 2017 will face some challenges as
scheduled debt service will be elevated that year. However, given
the level of liquidity at the project, these issues are largely
captured in the B3 rating level.

AES PR's operating and financial performance in 2016 were impacted
by an extended outage in late 2015, which dampened availability
below the guarantee incorporated in the PPA for much of the year,
resulting in a lower capacity payment under the PPA, and higher
associated operating and maintenance costs. The outage occurred in
October 2015 as part of a scheduled major maintenance that
uncovered the need to complete a re-wind of the generator in Unit
2. The outage lasted 80 days through October, November and
December 2015, but because of the rolling 12-month nature of the
availability calculation, it impacted financial performance for
most of 2016. Also negatively affecting financial performance was
a small outage during May 2016 owing to a tube leak.

Despite the contractual nature of the AES PR revenues, the
Project's financial performance and metrics are dependent on
operating performance and expense management. The payments under
the PREPA PPA have both a fixed capacity payment and a variable
payment to cover variable costs, including fuel. The full capacity
payment is dependent upon the availability factor being at or
above 90% over a twelve month period. As of October 2016, however,
the rolling 12-month availability was 84.3%, owing to the
aforementioned extended outage, resulting in AES PR not receiving
its full capacity payment from PREPA. As the year progresses, the
impact of the outage is expected to roll off due to the rolling
12-month nature of the calculation.

During 2016, the Project was also impacted by a one-time payment
made as part of a litigation settlement. Moreover, the Borrower's
faced higher debt service in 2016 owing to a term out of a $25
million working capital facility that was drawn just prior to its
expiration in November 2014. The term loan is expected to be
repaid in quarterly installments over the remaining life by
November 2017.

Taken together, the weaker financial and operating performance,
the litigation settlement and the higher debt service, resulted in
a debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) calculated for the 12 month
period to the end of the third quarter of 2016 to drop to 0.87x
vs. 1.18x for the full year 2015. To meet this shortfall, AES PR
used approximately $6 million of unrestricted cash and a $6
million draw from its bank DSR to cover scheduled debt service
this year. While a credit negative, Moody's rating affirmation
recognizes that had the litigation settlement payment not occurred
during 2016, AES PR would have had a DSCR slightly in excess of
1.0x for the 12 month period to the end of the third quarter of
2016 and would have not required the use of unrestricted cash and
a draw of the DSR during this period.

Moody's expects the Project's financial and operating performance
to improve in 2017, barring any unforeseen operational issues. As
with any large power generation facility, there is always the
possibility that operating problems with surface. However, the
likelihood of this happening in 2017 is reduced given the
significant capital improvements taken during the major
maintenance and generator re-wind of late last year to improve
operating performance. Management expects availability to be 91%
in 2017, which is above the required 90% minimum in the PPA,
enabling the Project to receive its full capacity payment under
the PPA. AES PR is already seeing this improvement. Availability
for the 10 months through October 2016 (which excludes the impact
of the outage in the last months of 2015) was 90.7%, and AES PR's
management expects that full year 2016 availability will be 91.7%.
Further, the one-time litigation payment will not be recur in
2017. However, Moody's expect AES PR DSCR for 2017 to be around
0.92x owing to substantially higher debt service requirements as
the final payment of the Tranche A term loan and the final payment
due under the working capital facility term loan are due in
November 2017. AES PR expects to utilize available unrestricted
cash from its balance sheet to satisfy the shortfall; however, it
is not expected to dip again into the DSR. Once AES PR gets
through the critical year of 2017, total debt service will drop
considerably in 2018 and beyond, and the Project is expected to
comfortably cover debt service going forward.

As alluded to, the Project has adequate liquidity to get through
the next year, should operational problems materialize. Balance
sheet cash approximates $20 million. Each of the bank and the
bonds tranches has their own DSR. The required DSR for the bank
loans is $35 million, representing six months of principal and
interest. At the beginning of 2016, this was backed up by $18
million in cash and by a $17 million liquidity/reserve facility
provided by a group of banks that is committed through November
2017 (and is co-terminus with the Tranche A term loan). There was
a $6 million draw in the cash reserve during the year, leaving $12
million available. The reserve facility has not been used. The
bonds have their own DSR of $13.7 million, which represents one
year of interest. It remains in place and has not been touched.

Rating Outlook

The developing outlook is consistent with the outlook for PREPA
and incorporates recent events that suggest positive momentum
between PREPA and its creditors toward reaching a consensual debt
restructuring. The developing outlook also recognizes that once
AES PR gets through 2017, the financial metrics should improve
given the lower debt service after 2017. That said, the developing
outlook recognizes the somewhat fragile nature of the
restructuring agreement among PREPA and the creditors which, in
the end, could unravel, thereby increasing uncertainty for PREPA
and indirectly for AES PR.

Factors that Could Lead to an Upgrade

Upward pressure on the rating could develop if PREPA were to
successfully complete its restructuring and if its rating were to
be revised several notches upward and if AES PR is able to
demonstrate DSCRs above 1.0x on a sustainable basis.

Factors that Could Lead to a Downgrade

The Project's rating could face downward pressure if there were to
be additional operational problems at the Project resulting in
lower revenues and higher expenses, particularly given the
elevated debt service in 2017, resulting in another draw on the
debt service reserve.

AES PR, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of AES Corporation
(AES: Ba3, positive), owns and operates a 454 megawatt (MW) coal-
fired cogeneration facility located on the southeastern coast of
Puerto Rico. The project sells all of its firm energy and capacity
pursuant to a 25-year power purchase agreement to PREPA, a public
corporation and governmental agency of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico. The project began operating in 2002.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Power
Generation Projects published in December 2012.


IGLESIA EPISCOPAL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC' on Limited Liquidity
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has lowered its long-term rating to 'CCC' from
'CCC+' on the Puerto Rico Industrial Medical & Higher Education &
Environmental Pollution Control Facilities Financial Authority's
series 1999 bonds, issued for Iglesia Episcopal Puertorriquena
Inc. (IEP).  The outlook is negative.

"The lower rating and negative outlook reflects IEP's vulnerable
enterprise and financial profile, characterized by very limited
liquidity and financial flexibility; a debt profile that includes
a large contingent liability due within five years; and a history
of volatile operating results--though the past three fiscal years
have been positive," said S&P Global Ratings credit analyst
Stephen Infranco.  In addition, coverage on the rated series 1999
debt was weak at just 1x, causing a rate covenant violation in
fiscal 2015 (minimum debt service coverage ratio is 1.2x).
Noncompliance with such covenant may give the right to bondholders
to declare the outstanding balance of approximately $17.8 million
as due and payable immediately.  Management indicates no
communication has been received from bondholders concerning this
instance of noncompliance and that IEP has continued paying the
outstanding bond balance in accordance with the original repayment
schedule.

Management is currently considering obtaining additional financing
through a credit facility collateralized with their own funds to
present in the open market a potential offer to purchase the
outstanding bonds at a discount although no proposal has been
offered.  S&P Global believes the noncompliance creates additional
liquidity risk should the bondholders accelerate the debt payment,
which could cause significant financial stress and rating
pressure.  Combined, these factors are more reflective of the
lower rating and negative outlook.

"The negative outlook reflects our assessment of IEP's vulnerable
credit profile given the rate covenant violation on the series
1999 debt, and the significant contingent liability on all debt
outstanding," added Mr. Infranco.  Furthermore, while IEP's
operations remain positive, and management is offsetting weaker
revenue with cost-containment initiatives, there is a still
considerable economic uncertainty and population decline in Puerto
Rico, which could weaken IEP's operations over the outlook period.

Given the economic and demographic challenges and potential for
margin compression or operating stress, S&P could lower the rating
if financial performance deteriorates or if there is any attempt
to accelerate the series 1999 debt due to the rate covenant
violation.  Furthermore, given the uncertainty surrounding the
Puerto Rico economy, including significant budgetary stress, there
could be macro-level events that are out of management control,
such as delayed payments or non-payment for health care services
that could pressure the rating.

S&P would consider a stable outlook or higher rating if financial
performance improves resulting in coverage levels above minimum
rate covenant requirements, and is sustained such that there is no
need to access the line of credit for cash flow purposes.
Furthermore, given the fragile state of the Puerto Rico economy
and the high reliance IEP has on governmental reimbursement, S&P
would want to see some resolution or stabilization of the
budgetary pressures currently affecting the commonwealth before
raising the rating.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Dec. 19 to Dec. 23, 2016
----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name                  Cpn   Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------                  ---   -----   --------  -------   ---
Andino Investment Holding     11   70.85  11/13/2020   PE     USD
Andino Investment Holding     11   68.88  11/13/2020   PE     USD
Anton Oilfield Services G     7.5  69.03   11/6/2018   CN     USD
Anton Oilfield Services G     7.5     66   11/6/2018   CN     USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 Lt   0.719   38.5               KY     EUR
BA-CA Finance Cayman Ltd    0.749  38.93               KY     EUR
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman    6.25  62.84               KY     USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman    6.25  59.51               KY     USD
BPI Capital Finance Ltd      2.29     40               KY     EUR
CA La Electricidad de Car     8.5  43.75   4/10/2018   VE     USD
Chile Government Internat   3.625   15.7  10/30/2042   CL     USD
CSN Islands XI Corp         6.875  61.25   9/21/2019   KY     USD
CSN Islands XI Corp         6.875  61.13   9/21/2019   KY     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp            7   48.8               BR     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp            7  47.75               BR     USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso    4.54  59.75  10/25/2041   PA     USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso       6  71.38  10/25/2041   PA     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45   70.8    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.35   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  70.42    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.72   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.71   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.23   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  70.52   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    7.75  74.84  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.94   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.95   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.82    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.56    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  72.94   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    7.75  74.95   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.74   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.73   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  72.77   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Empresa de Telecomunicaci       7  71.24   1/17/2023   CO     COP
Empresa de Telecomunicaci       7  71.24   1/17/2023   CO     COP
ESFG International Ltd      5.753  0.883               KY     EUR
General Exploration Partn    11.5  36.75  11/13/2018   CA     USD
General Shopping Finance       10  60.55               KY     USD
General Shopping Finance       10  60.63               KY     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10  70.88    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10  71.88    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10   50.5    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10     54    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Glorious Property Holding   13.25  74.56    3/4/2018   HK     USD
Gol Finance Inc              9.25  47.35   7/20/2020   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              8.75  37.75               BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5     61    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5  59.38    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5  59.38    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              9.25  43.38   7/20/2020   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              8.75  36.88               BR     USD
Green Dragon Gas Ltd           10  63.75  11/20/2017   HK     USD
Greenfields Petroleum Cor       9  11.35   5/31/2017   US     CAD
Honghua Group Ltd            7.45  58.25   9/25/2019   CN     USD
Honghua Group Ltd            7.45     58   9/25/2019   CN     USD
Inversora Electrica de Bu     6.5   59.5   9/26/2017   AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp             7.5  67.25   4/25/2019   HK     USD
MIE Holdings Corp             7.5  68.58   4/25/2019   HK     USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman Isl    3.38  60.22    2/7/2035   KY     EUR
Newland International Pro     9.5  24.13    7/3/2017   PA     USD
Newland International Pro     9.5  25.13    7/3/2017   PA     USD
Noble Holding Internation     6.2  65.42    8/1/2040   KY     USD
Noble Holding Internation    6.05  66.38    3/1/2041   KY     USD
Noble Holding Internation    5.25  64.71   3/15/2042   KY     USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc            7.25  57.75    4/1/2019   CY     USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc            7.25     55    4/1/2019   CY     USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe     6.35     27   6/30/2021   KY     USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe     6.35   28.5   6/30/2021   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7.5     40               KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       4.375  37.23   4/25/2025   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       7.125   33.5   6/26/2042   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        5.25   34.5   6/27/2029   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       5.125     36   6/26/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        8.25     35   4/25/2018   KY     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           7   53.5   4/21/2020   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           6  41.51    4/5/2023   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        5.25     36   6/27/2029   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       4.375     36   4/25/2025   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       7.125  33.75   6/26/2042   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7.5   42.5               KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        8.25     35   4/25/2018   KY     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       5.125  35.38   6/26/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           6  38.88    4/5/2023   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           7     44   4/21/2020   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli    6.75     17   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli   6.625     17   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli    6.75  17.38   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli   6.625  17.38   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    5.25   67.5   4/12/2017   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   12.75   56.1   2/17/2022   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       9  49.38  11/17/2021   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    9.75  44.57   5/17/2035   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6   38.5   5/16/2024   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  36.75  11/15/2026   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   5.375     37   4/12/2027   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA     5.5  36.75   4/12/2037   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  32.13  10/28/2022   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6   36.4  11/15/2026   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  35.35   5/16/2024   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    9.75   41.7   5/17/2035   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       9  45.25  11/17/2021   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   12.75  46.15   2/17/2022   VE     USD
Polarcus Ltd                  5.6  44.93   3/30/2022   AE     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     1.6148     62    5/4/2024   AR     ARS
PSOS Finance Ltd            11.75  60.13   4/23/2018   KY     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.22   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.88  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7   73.6    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.99   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.22   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.77   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.39   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.75   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.39   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.81   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.78   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7   73.6    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.98   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.98   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.77   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.99   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.97   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.88  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.84    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.55   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.85    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.45    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.81   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.75   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.74   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.97   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.99   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.85    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.45    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.74   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.78   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.84    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.99   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.55   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        4.125  37.25   11/1/2022   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA         5.75   36.6  10/24/2023   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        5.375  35.38   9/26/2024   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        4.125  37.38   11/1/2022   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA         5.75  39.63  10/24/2023   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        5.375  37.25   9/26/2024   BR     USD
Siem Offshore Inc            5.69  52.25   1/30/2018   NO     NOK
Siem Offshore Inc            5.49  51.75   3/28/2019   NO     NOK
Transocean Inc               5.05  74.75  10/15/2022   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                6.8  63.66   3/15/2038   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                7.5  65.78   4/15/2031   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                9.1  70.41  12/15/2041   KY     USD
Transocean Inc               7.45   74.9   4/15/2027   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                  8  73.55   4/15/2027   KY     USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesoro     5.25  61.99  12/29/2021   UY     UYU
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305  43.92   12/1/2039   KY     USD
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305  43.92   12/1/2039   KY     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    9.25  49.03   9/15/2027   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   11.75   49.5  10/21/2026   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   11.95   49.5    8/5/2031   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    7.75  47.38  10/13/2019   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625  65.25   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   9.375  45.85   1/13/2034   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       7  52.85   12/1/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       7     42   3/31/2038   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       9   45.5    5/7/2023   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    9.25   45.5    5/7/2028   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    8.25  44.38  10/13/2024   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       6   43.5   12/9/2020   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625   56.5   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    7.65  43.25   4/21/2025   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625  59.69   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   12.75   53.5   8/23/2022   VE     USD
Venezuela Government TICC    5.25  53.23   3/21/2019   VE     USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        10.75  25.63   2/12/2023   BR     USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        10.75  25.63   2/12/2023   BR     USD
XLIT Ltd                      6.5     70               IE     USD



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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