/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/170117.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Tuesday, January 17, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 012
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Peso Bonds to be Admitted to Widely Tracked Bond Index
CORDOBA: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Global Scale Rating to 2017 Notes
RIO NEGRO: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Global Scale Rating to 2017 Notes
TOYOTA ARGENTINA: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating to Class 22 Issuance
B R A Z I L
LIBRA TERMINAL: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'RD' on Restructuring Approval
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating on USD4BB Notes
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
AQUAMARINE HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
BARNSTAR OPPORTUNITIES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CLOUGH EMETH: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
EIRE CP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
EIRE FREEHOLD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
EJF ENERGY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
JBS GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
NEWTON COMPANY: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
PRIVATE EQUITY ADVISORS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PRIVATE EQUITY HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PRS BLACKTHORPE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
RION MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SIMON MURRAY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
H O N D U R A S
HONDURAS: Moody's Rates US$700MM Unsec. Bond Due 2027 'B2'
P U E R T O R I C O
CLINICA SANTA ROSA: Wants Premium Financing from IPFS Corporation
CRISTALEX INC: Hires Falcon-Sanchez & Associates as Accountant
HARO INVESTMENT: Unsecureds to Get Full Payment, Plus 4%
MINI MASTER: Hires Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co. as Fin'l Consultant
PUERTO RICO INFRASTRUCTURE: S&P Cuts 2011B Bonds Rating to 'D'
PUERTO RICO: Pension Bondholders Get Second Chance at Day in Court
PUERTO RICO: Turns to Lewandowski to Lobby Trump on Debt
PUERTO RICO: Another Investor Lawsuit Filed Over Bonds
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Honors Payment to Farmers
- - - - -
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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Peso Bonds to be Admitted to Widely Tracked Bond Index
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Economist reports that emerging markets have not been the same
without Argentina, a country that embodies the promise and peril,
the romance and the rockiness of the asset class. In 1988, it was
one of the ten original members of the most popular emerging-
market equity index, introduced by MSCI, according to The
Economist. In the late 1990s, it was also the biggest member of
the benchmark-bond indices compiled by JPMorgan Chase. But once it
defaulted at the end of 2001, Argentina was exiled from global
debt markets, the report notes. And after it subsequently imposed
capital controls on "hot money", its shares suffered a similar
banishment, ejected from MSCI's index in 2009, the report relays.
It became a remote "frontier market", like countries such as
Bangladesh, the report discloses.
Since Mauricio Macri succeeded Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner as
president at the end of 2015, Argentina has been finding its way
back from the financial periphery, according to the Economist. It
has floated its currency and lifted capital controls, recently
abolishing a remaining requirement that foreign investors keep
their money in the country for at least 120 days, the report
relays. In April, the government sold $16.5 billion of dollar
bonds to international investors in a single day (a record for an
emerging market), the report says. Later this year, MSCI will
decide whether to welcome Argentina's shares back into its
emerging-market index, starting with companies with an overseas
listing, such as Adecoagro, which farms sugar and soya beans,
among other things. And on January 5th, JPMorgan Chase said it
would admit Argentina's peso bonds into its widely tracked
benchmark indices, probably from February, the report notes.
Until 2016, the Argentine government had to sell most of its bonds
to fellow Argentines, including the country's banks and its
public-pension reserve fund, the Economist notes. But although it
was mostly sold to locals, the debt was chiefly denominated in
dollars, the report relays. Over 70% of the government's debt is
still denominated in foreign currencies, according to the ministry
of finance, the report notes. The high inflation and capricious
currency policies of the post-default years meant Argentines did
not trust the peso to hold its value, the report discloses. So
for all of the nationalist fire of Ms. Kirchner and her husband,
her predecessor as president, their policies left them heavily
reliant on the greenback to attract creditors, the report notes.
* * *
On Oct. 17, 2016, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Fitch Ratings has affirmed Argentina's sovereign
ratings as:
-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'B', Outlook Stable;
-- Senior unsecured Foreign Currency bonds at 'B';
-- Country Ceiling at 'B';
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B'.
As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment. Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.
On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.
CORDOBA: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Global Scale Rating to 2017 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned a (P)B3 (Global Scale, local currency) and Baa2.ar
(Argentina National Scale) ratings to the 2017 Short-Term Treasury
Note Program of the Municipality of Cordoba. The ratings are in
line with the municipality's long term local currency issuer
ratings, which carry a stable outlook.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The 2017 program, authorized by laws Nß12.619 and Mayor's Decree
Nß4.833/16 considers a maximum outstanding issuance amount of
ARS650 million in different series with maturities up to 365 days.
The assigned debt ratings reflect Moody's view that the
willingness and capacity of the Municipality of Cordoba to honor
these short-term treasury notes is in line with the municipality's
long-term credit quality as captured in the B3/Baa2.ar issuer
ratings.
The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
or anticipates changes in the main conditions that the notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
any of the series under this program deviate from the original
ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's will
assess the impact that these differences may have on the ratings
and act accordingly.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns' economic and
financial profiles, and upgrade of Argentina's sovereign bonds
ratings and/or the improvement of the country's operating
environment could lead to an upgrade of the Municipality of
C¢rdoba ratings. Conversely, a downgrade in Argentina's bond
ratings and/or further systemic deterioration or idiosyncratic
risks arising in the Municipality of Cordoba --such as a sharp
impairment of its financial results coupled with higher debt
levels -- could exert downward pressure on the ratings assigned
and could translate in to a downgrade in the near to medium term.
RIO NEGRO: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Global Scale Rating to 2017 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned provisional (P)B3 (Global Scale local currency) and
Baa3.ar (Argentina National Scale) ratings to the 2017 Short-Term
Treasury Note Program of the Province of Rio Negro. The ratings
are in line with the province's long term local currency issuer
ratings, which carry stable outlook.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The Short-Term Treasury Note Program of the Province of Rio Negro
has been authorized by the province's 2017 Budget Law Nß 5.173
whereas Governor's Decree Nß09/2017 set the general issuance
conditions of the bills. The assigned debt ratings reflect Moody's
view that the willingness and capacity of the Province of R°o
Negro to honor these short-term treasury notes is in line with the
provincial's long-term credit quality as reflected in the
B3/Baa3.ar issuer ratings in local currency.
According to the term sheet reviewed by Moody's, the bills will
all be issued in local currency, will mature in up to 365 days --
maximum- with bullet amortization and the maximum issuance and
outstanding amount authorized under the program is exactly
ARS4.000 million, which represents 13% of the total revenues
budgeted for 2017. Moody's anticipates that the Province's total
debt will rise to approximately 33% of the total expected
provincial revenues for 2017 fiscal year from the 26% at the end
of 2015 fiscal year. This expected increase in the debt to total
revenues ratio is still consistent with the Province of R°o Negro
current ratings.
The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
or anticipates changes in the main conditions that the notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
any of the series under this program deviate from the original
ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's will
assess the impact that these differences may have on the ratings
and act accordingly.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN
Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns' economic and
financial profiles and ratings, an upgrade of Argentina's
sovereign bonds ratings and/or the improvement of the country's
operating environment could lead to an upgrade of the Province of
R°o Negro. Conversely, a downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings
and/or the continuation of strong cash financing deficits coupled
with a debt to total revenues ratio rising above 40% could exert
downward pressure on the ratings assigned.
TOYOTA ARGENTINA: Moody's Gives Ba3 Rating to Class 22 Issuance
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. (MLA)
assigned a Ba3 senior unsecured local currency global debt rating
and an Aaa.ar national scale local currency debt rating to Toyota
Compa§°a Financiera de Argentina S.A.(TCFA)'s Class 22 expected
issuance up to ARS250 million, which will be due in 24 months. All
the ratings have stable outlook.
The following ratings were assigned to Toyota Compa§ia Financiera
de Argentina:
ARS250 million Senior Unsecured Debt Issuance:
Ba3 Global Local Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating
Aaa.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Senior Unsecured
Debt Rating
RATINGS RATIONALE
The Ba3 global local currency senior debt rating is constrained by
Argentina's local currency country ceiling of Ba3, and reflect the
very high probability that Toyota's ultimate parent, Toyota Motor
Corporation (Japan) (Aa3 stable), will support the issuer, whose
standalone credit quality is reflected by its b3 BCA. Moody's
assessment of a very high probability of parental support
considers TCFA's key role as the financial agent for Toyota
Corporation in Argentina and its strong commercial and strategic
importance to the corporation. Thanks to parental support, the
company remains one of the strongest credits in Argentina despite
significant credit challenges that constrain TCFA's BCA and its
debt ratings relative to global peers.
The BCA considers Argentina's ongoing macroeconomic challenges
together with TCFA's monoline business model dedicated to the
financing of Toyota vehicles and the increasing level of
competition within the car-financing industry in Argentina.
Despite significant improvements since the new administration took
office in December 2015 and softened or eliminated various
burdensome government controls on the financial system which
should help support earnings, Argentina continues to face
significant economic and institutional challenges, including high
inflation and weak growth. Although the company posted very strong
profitability during 2016, this was partly distorted by the high
rate of inflation. While non-performing loans remain low thanks to
the company's focus on middle and high-income individuals,
delinquency levels in the market are likely to rise given the
current economic situation. These risks are balanced in part by
the TCFA's satisfactory risk management practices that are aligned
to those of its parent companies as well as its adequate
capitalization. The ratings also include risks associated with a
liability structure mainly reliant on market funds, as is the case
of other automobile finance companies.
The stable outlook on the company's ratings is in line with the
stable outlook B3 rating for Argentina's government bond rating.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
The entity's rating could face upward pressure if Argentina's bond
rating is upgraded or if Argentina's operating environment
continues to improve. On the other hand, the rating could go down
if the operating environment deteriorates, affecting TCFA's
business prospects.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
LIBRA TERMINAL: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'RD' on Restructuring Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Libra Terminal Rio S.A.'s Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'RD'
from 'C' and National Long-Term Rating to 'RD(bra)' from 'C(bra)'
following investor approval of the restructuring plan submitted by
the company.
Fitch has also downgraded the rating assigned to the 1a Emissao de
debentures in total amount of BRL270 million due 2019 to 'D(bra)'
from 'C(bra)'.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
The downgrade is driven by the acceptance (by the company's
creditors) on Jan. 9, 2017, of the debt restructuring plan, which
ultimately extended amortizations due in 2017 and the overall
maturity of the debentures to 2020, aiming to avoid a traditional
payment default. The debt restructuring is considered a
Distressed Debt Exchange (DDE) according to Fitch's applicable
criteria.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Once sufficient information is available, the 'RD' rating will be
re-rated to reflect the appropriate IDR for the Issuer's post
restructuring capital structure, risk profile, and prospects. The
debentures will be re-rated to reflect the terms of the 4th
Amendment to the respective indenture.
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating on USD4BB Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB' rating to Petroleo Brasileiro
S.A.'s (Petrobras) proposed USD4 billion notes issuance. The
notes will be issued by Petrobras Global Finance B.V. (PGF) and
will be unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by Petrobras.
Proceeds will be used to refinance existing debt and for general
corporate purposes.
Linkage to the Sovereign
Petrobras' ratings continue to reflect its close linkage with the
sovereign rating of Brazil due to the government's control of the
company and its strategic importance to Brazil as its near-
monopoly supplier of liquid fuels. By law, the federal government
must hold at least a majority of Petrobras' voting stock. The
government currently owns 60.5% of Petrobras' voting rights,
directly and indirectly, and has an overall economic stake in the
company of 46%.
Government Support
Petrobras' credit linkage to the sovereign is evidenced by the
increased independence from the federal government given by the
recent implementation of an autonomous pricing policy as well as
by lending commitments from government-controlled banks in the
past to bolster Petrobras' liquidity. Absent implicit and
explicit government support, Petrobras' credit metrics are not
consistent with the assigned rating but are in line with a 'BB-'
standalone credit quality. As of Sept. 30, 2016, the company
reported total financial debt of USD123 billion and Fitch-defined
gross leverage was 5.7x.
Cash Flow Remains Under Pressure
Fitch expects Petrobras' cash flow generation to remain under
pressure, despite price increases and the company's efforts to
reduce capex. The company is expected to generate enough cash
flow from operations (CFFO) to cover capex and interest expenses
and to rely on its access to the capital debt markets to refinance
upcoming principal maturities. Any future debt reduction will
depend to some extent on the company's ability to lower capex and
to a greater extent on the success of its divestiture program,
which in Fitch's view is uncertain and difficult to predict,
although the company has demonstrated substantial progress so far.
The company's business plan incorporates asset divestments of
USD19.5 billion for 2017 and 2018. This compares with
USD15.1 billion for 2015-2016, of which USD13.6 billion have been
approved or negotiations are closed, and/or are pending board
approval. Petrobras expects to complete the remaining
USD1.5 billion asset sale of the 2015-2016 divestiture target
during 2017-2018 period.
Credit Metrics to Remain Weak
Fitch expects Petrobras' leverage, as measured by total
debt/EBITDA, to remain above 5x over the medium term and for
leverage to decline only if the company's divestiture program is
successful. As of Sept. 30, 2016, the company reported total
financial debt of approximately USD123 billion. As of year-end
2015 total proved reserves (1P) were approximately 10.5 billion
barrels of oil equivalent (boe) and proved developed (PD) reserves
were 5.4 billion boe, under SEC criteria. This translates into
debt/1P of USD12/boe and debt/PD reserves of USD24.5/boe.
Marginal Growth Potential
Fitch's rating case assumes Petrobras' gross production to
increase to approximately 3.1 million barrels of oil equivalent
per day (boed) over the next two to three years. Thereafter,
production is assumed to remain relatively flat over the ensuing
two years.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
A negative rating action on Petrobras could result from a
downgrade of the sovereign and/or the perception of a lower
linkage between Petrobras and the government.
A positive rating action on Brazil could lead to a positive rating
action on Petrobras.
LIQUIDITY
Petrobras' liquidity position is currently supported by robust
cash and marketable securities, stable cash flow generation and
continued access to debt capital markets. As of Sept. 30, 2016,
Petrobras reported USD22 billion of cash and marketable
securities. This liquidity is considered adequate when compared
with short-term debt of USD11 billion. The company's liquidity is
also supported by its funds from operations (FFO) of approximately
USD20 billion as of the LTM ended Sept. 30, 2016, which is
expected to be used to cover capex of approximately USD18 billion
-- USD20 billion per year in the short term. The company
expects capex to decline in the medium term after revising
its business plan, which lowered the company's capex
projections to USD74.1 billion for the 2017 to 2019 period
from USD98.4 billion for the 2016 to 2018 period under the
previous plan.
FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS
Fitch currently rates Petrobras as:
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras)
-- Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB';
Outlook Negative;
-- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR 'BB'; Outlook Negative.
Petrobras International Finance Company (PIFCO)
-- International debt issuances 'BB'.
Petrobras Global Finance B.V. (PGF)
-- International debt issuances 'BB'.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
AQUAMARINE HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Aquamarine Holdings (Cayman) Ltd. resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Nov. 29, 2016.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Walkers Liquidations Limited
Cayman Corporate Centre
27 Hospital Road
George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9008
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100
BARNSTAR OPPORTUNITIES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Barnstar Opportunities Master Fund, SPC
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Nov.
30, 2016.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 9, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Mourant Ozannes
Maynard Hellman
c/o Corey Stokes
94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay
P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 814-9277
Facsimile: (345) 949-4647
CLOUGH EMETH: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Clough Emeth Offshore Fund, Ltd. resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Nov. 29, 2016.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Austin C. McClintock
Walkers
190 Elgin Avenue
George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9001
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 914 6386
EIRE CP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Eire CP No. 1 Limited resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Nov. 29, 2016.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 9, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Mourant Ozannes
c/o Michael Walton
Corey Stokes
94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay
P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 814-9277
Facsimile: (345) 949-4647
EIRE FREEHOLD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Eire Freehold Holdings Limited resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Nov. 29, 2016.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 9, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Mourant Ozannes
c/o Michael Walton
Corey Stokes
94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay
P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 814-9277
Facsimile: (345) 949-4647
EJF ENERGY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
The shareholders of EJF Energy Opportunities Offshore Fund Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Dec.
1, 2016
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Walkers Liquidations Limited
Cayman Corporate Centre
27 Hospital Road
George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9008
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100
JBS GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of JBS Global Opportunities Investment
Advisory Services resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business on Nov. 28, 2016.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Walkers Liquidations Limited
Cayman Corporate Centre
27 Hospital Road
George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9008
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100
NEWTON COMPANY: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Newton Company Ltd. resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations on Nov. 30, 2016.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 9, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Renato Bullani
E. Bossi 23, 6830 Chiasso
Switzerland
Telephone: +41 91 695 2777
Facsimile: +41 91 682 9805
PRIVATE EQUITY ADVISORS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 29, 2016, the sole shareholder of Private Equity
Concentrated Energy II Offshore Advisors, Inc. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Walkers Liquidations Limited
Cayman Corporate Centre
27 Hospital Road
George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9008
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100
PRIVATE EQUITY HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 29, 2016, the sole shareholder of Private Equity
Concentrated Energy II Offshore Holdings Advisors, Inc. resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Walkers Liquidations Limited
Cayman Corporate Centre
27 Hospital Road
George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9008
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100
PRS BLACKTHORPE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 9, 2016, the sole shareholder of The PRS Blackthorpe Fund
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
EFG Capital Advisors, Inc.
c/o Tim Cone
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
Ogier
89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9009
Cayman Islands
RION MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
On Dec. 1, 2016, the sole shareholder of Rion Master Fund Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Rion Capital, LLC
c/o Tim Cone
89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9009
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
SIMON MURRAY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Simon Murray & Co. China Fund Limited resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business on Nov. 24, 2016.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Red Gate Asset Management Company Limited
c/o Maples and Calder
Attorneys-at-law, Ugland House
P.O. Box 309, Grand Cayman KY1-1104
Cayman Islands
===============
H O N D U R A S
===============
HONDURAS: Moody's Rates US$700MM Unsec. Bond Due 2027 'B2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 rating to the $700
million senior unsecured 6.250% rate bond issued by the government
of Honduras, maturing on January 19, 2027. The bond's rating
follows the B2 issuer rating of the government of Honduras, whose
outlook is positive.
RATINGS RATIONALE
Moody's upgraded Honduras' ratings to B2 from B3 in May 2016 and
maintained a positive outlook reflecting the following key
drivers: (i) Honduras' fiscal profile has improved significantly,
with central administration deficit decreasing to 3.6% of GDP in
2016 from 7.9% in 2013, and debt-to-GDP expected to plateau at
around 46% of GDP. In addition, (ii) authorities have implemented
institutional enhancements that have brought increased discipline
to the budget process, tighter controls on government
expenditures, and improved tax administration.
The positive outlook reflects Moody's view of a likely
continuation of progress in 2017, expecting compliance with fiscal
targets, improvement in government debt affordability (i.e.,
declining interest payments-to-revenue ratio), as well as signals
that prudent fiscal policy will continue in the next
administration.
Continuing strong growth with GDP increasing at annual rates of
3.5% or above, compliance with fiscal deficit targets set in the
fiscal responsibility law, and declining government debt ratios
could lead to a further upgrade of Honduras' rating. Continuing
the extension of debt maturities in the domestic market and a
continued reduction in the interest rate burden could also add
upward pressure to the ratings.
Conversely, the outlook could be revised to stable if policy
behavior is not consistent with newly created institutional
arrangements, thus preventing additional progress on the fiscal
consolidation front and stalling the positive trends that have
been observed in recent years.
This credit rating and any associated review or outlook has been
assigned on an anticipated/subsequent basis.
======================
P U E R T O R I C O
======================
CLINICA SANTA ROSA: Wants Premium Financing from IPFS Corporation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Clinica Santa Rosa, Inc., asks the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico for authorization to enter into a Premium
Finance Agreement with IPFS Corporation.
The Debtor tells the Court that it does not have the full amount
to pay the premium of the Insurance Policy, in the amount of
$299,315.
The Debtor further tells the Court that it needs to enter into the
Premium Finance Agreement in order to continue its insurance
policies, as required.
The Debtor relates that it has made the arrangements to renew the
Insurance Policy and has made down payments on the same to Fulcro
Insurance, Inc., in the amount of $88,566.
The Debtor seeks to obtain premium financing from IPFS Corporation
with the following relevant terms, among others:
(a) Amount Financed: $206,655
(b) Total of Payments: $210,749
(c) Annual Percentage Rate: 4.730%
(d) Finance Charge: $4,094.16
The Debtor proposes to grant IPFS Corporation with a first
priority security interest in the policies, including:
(1) all money that is or may become due under the agreement
because of a loss under the policies that reduces
unearned premiums;
(2) any return of premiums or unearned premiums under the
policies; and
(3) any dividends that may become due the debtors in
connection with policies.
The Debtor contends that in the event that it defaults under the
terms of the Premium Finance Agreement, IPFS Corporation may, in
accordance with the terms of the agreement and without further
order of the Court, cancel the policies listed in the agreement or
any amendment thereto, and receive and apply the unearned or the
return premiums to the Debtor's account.
A full-text copy of the Debtor's Motion, dated Jan. 11, 2017, is
available at:
http://bankrupt.com/misc/ClinicaSantaRosa2016_1609033eag11_81.pdf
About Clinica Santa Rosa
Clinica Santa Rosa, Inc., engaged in a healthcare business, filed
a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-09033) on Nov.
14, 2016. The petition was signed by Fernando Alarcon Ocasio,
president. At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets
at $1 million to $10 million and liabilities $10 million to $50
million.
The Debtor is represented by Antonio I. Hernandez Santiago, Esq.
The U.S. Trustee for the District of Puerto Rico appointed Edna
Diaz De Jesus and the Patient Care Ombudsman for Clinica Santa
Rosa.
CRISTALEX INC: Hires Falcon-Sanchez & Associates as Accountant
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cristalex, Inc., seeks authorization from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Falcon-Sanchez &
Associates, PSC, as accountant for Debtor.
The Debtor requires the Firm to:
a. reconcile financial information to assist the Debtor in
the preparation of monthly operating reports;
b. assist in the reconciliation and clarification of proof of
claims filed and amount due to creditors;
c. provide general accounting and tax services to prepare
year-end reports and income tax preparation;
d. assist the Debtor and Debtor's counsel in the preparation
of the supporting documents for the Chapter 11
Reorganization Plan, including negotiation with creditors.
The Firm will be paid at these hourly rates:
Ismael Falcon Ortega, CPA $200
CPA Supervisor $125
Senior Accountant $100
Staff Accountant $75
The Firm will receive a retainer of $1,000
The Firm will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.
Ismael Falcon Ortega, CPA, of Falcon-Sanchez & Associates, PSC,
assured the Court that the firm does not represent any interest
adverse to the Debtor and its estates.
The Firm may be reached at:
Ismael Falcon Ortega, CPA
Falcon-Sanchez & Associates, PSC
1510, FD Roosevelt Ave.
Guaynabo, PR
Tel: (787)273-7979
Fax: (787)273-9797
About Cristalex Inc.
Cristalex, Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-06385) on August
11, 2016. The petition was signed by Marta Pagan Batista,
president.
At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets of
Less than $500,000 and liabilities of $500,001 to $1 million.
HARO INVESTMENT: Unsecureds to Get Full Payment, Plus 4%
--------------------------------------------------------
Haro Investment Corp. filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico its proposed Chapter 11 plan.
The plan classifies claims into unsecured priority, unsecured and
secured (if the disputed unsecured claim of Condado 3 LLC is
determined by the court to be entitled to such status). Unsecured
priority claims and unsecured claims will be paid in full, plus 4%
interest from the date of the filing of the Chapter 11 petition.
The plan will be funded by the sale or rental of the real
properties of Haro Investment, according to the company's
disclosure statement filed on Dec. 27, 2016.
A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at:
http://bankrupt.com/misc/HaroInvestment_DS12272016.pdf
Haro Investment is represented by:
Maximiliano Trujillo, Esq.
Maximiliano Trujillo-Gonzalez
100 Grand Paseos Blvd., Suite 112
San Juan, PR 00926-5902
Phone: (787)438-8802
Fax (787)200-5063
Email: maxtruj@gmail.com
About Haro Investment Corp.
Haro Investment Corp. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-09944) on December 22,
2016. The petition was signed by Rolando Silva, secretary.
At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated assets and
liabilities of less than $500,000.
MINI MASTER: Hires Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co. as Fin'l Consultant
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mini Master Concrete Services, Inc., seeks authorization from the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ
CPA Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co. as financial consultant for Debtor.
The Debtor requires the Firm to assist in the restructuring of its
affairs by providing advice in strategic planning and the
preparation of schedules, the Debtor's plan of reorganization,
disclosure statement, business plan, and participate in the
Debtor's negotiation with its creditors.
The Firm's accountants and professionals who will work on the
Debtor's case and their hourly rates are:
Luis R. Carrasquillo $175
Marcelo Gutierrez $125
Lionel Rodriguez Perez $90
Carmen Callejas Eehevarria $85
Alfredo J. Segarra $80
Other CPA's $90-$125
Janet Marrero $45
Iris L. Franqui $45
The Firm has received a retainer in the sum of $20,000.
Luis R. Carrasquillo, CPA, principal of CPA Luis R. Carrasquillo &
Co., assured the Court that the firm does not represent any
interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.
The Firm may be reached at:
Luis R. Carrasquillo, CPA
CPA Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co.
28 Street, #TI-26
Turbo Gardens Avenue
Caguas, PR 00725
Tel: (787)746-4555
(787)746-4556
Fax: (787)746-4564
E-mail: luis@cpacarrasquillo.com
About Mini Master Concrete Services
Mini Master Concrete Services, Inc. filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-09956) on December 22, 2016.
Hon. Mildred Caban Flores over the case. Charles A. Cuprill, PCS
Law Offices represents the Debtor as counsel.
The Debtor disclosed total assets of $15.78million and total
liabilities of $5.46 million. The petition was signed by Carmen M.
Betancourt. president.
PUERTO RICO INFRASTRUCTURE: S&P Cuts 2011B Bonds Rating to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on Puerto Rico
Infrastructure Financing Authority's (Port Authority Project)
series 2011B revenue bonds to 'D' from 'CC'. The bonds are backed
by a letter of credit (LOC) from the Government Development Bank
for Puerto Rico.
This action follows S&P Global Ratings Dec. 9, 2016, lowering of
its rating on the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico.
The long-term rating is based on the LOC facility provided by the
Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico. The long-term
components of S&P's ratings address the likelihood that
bondholders will receive interest and principal payments when due
if they do not exercise the put option.
Changes to the ratings on these bonds could result from, among
other things, changes to the ratings on the underlying bonds, the
support provider, the expiration or termination of the LOC
agreements, or the amendments to the transactions' terms.
PUERTO RICO: Pension Bondholders Get Second Chance at Day in Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Nick Brown at Reuters reports that a U.S. federal appeals court
has decided creditors of Puerto Rico's pension bonds are entitled
to a hearing on whether they can proceed with a lawsuit against
the island's government over a fiscal emergency law it passed last
year.
The First U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled holders of bonds
issued by Puerto Rico's Employee Retirement System, its biggest
public pension, are entitled to a hearing, overturning a November
ruling by a federal judge in Puerto Rico, according to Reuters.
The appeals court said the lower court was correct, however, in
blocking a similar lawsuit by bondholders of Puerto Rico's highway
authority, the report notes.
The lawsuits were two of many filed last year against the ailing
U.S. territory, after former Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla
instituted an emergency law allowing him to maintain public
services by diverting revenue streams that had been earmarked as
collateral for bondholders, the report dicloses.
Under a federal Puerto Rico rescue law known as PROMESA, passed in
2016, lawsuits over debt payments are frozen while the island
tries to reach consensual restructuring deals with holders of $70
billion in debt issued by myriad public entities, the report
notes.
But many creditors sued anyway, arguing the fiscal emergency law
was unconstitutional, and saying the so-called "stay" of
litigation did not apply to them, the report relays.
Puerto Rico's courts have largely denied these efforts, keeping
the stay in place, the report discloses. In November, a San Juan
federal judge blocked a handful of these creditors from pursuing
their lawsuits without holding a hearing on the issue, the report
notes.
The appeals court's ruling vacates that decision with respect only
to the pension bondholders. It does not allow their lawsuit to
proceed, but says the bondholders at least deserve a hearing
before a court can decide whether it should proceed, the report
relays.
The pension bondholders have said the government's diversion of
funds is harmful to them because it may not leave enough money in
the coffers to pay them back, the report notes.
Puerto Rico's main employee pension faces a shortfall of more than
$45 billion, and is less than 1 percent funded, which experts say
is among the lowest in the history of U.S. public pensions, the
report relays.
The appeals court also disagreed with the lower court's decision
not to allow Puerto Rico's federal oversight board to participate
in any litigation, the report notes.
The board, created under PROMESA to manage Puerto Rico's finances,
had sought to intervene in the lawsuits, to oppose the creditors'
efforts to lift the stay, the report says. PROMESA "appears to
grant the board such a right," the appeals court said, the report
adds.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on June 15,
2016, that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Puerto Rico law
that would have let its public utilities restructure their debt
over the objection of creditors leaving it to Congress to help the
island resolve its fiscal crisis. Siding with bondholders
challenging the law, the court ruled 5-2 that the measure was
barred under federal bankruptcy law.
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority in the 5-to-2
decision, said the law was at odds with the federal bankruptcy
code, which bars states and lower units of government from
enacting their own versions of bankruptcy law.
Puerto Rico is struggling with $72 billion in debt and has argued
that it needs to restructure at least some of it under Chapter 9,
the part of the bankruptcy code for insolvent local governments.
But Puerto Rico is not permitted to do so, because Chapter 9
specifically excludes it.
The federal law, Justice Thomas wrote, "bars Puerto Rico from
enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure the
debt of its insolvent public utilities." Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer and
Elena Kagan joined him.
Consequently, Puerto Rico opted to default on $911 million in
constitutionally guaranteed debt, or roughly half of the $2
billion in principal and interest that came due July 1, EFE News
reported.
The reported further noted that Puerto Rico enacted a debt
moratorium due to liquidity restraints -- a move that coincided
with a new U.S. law signed by President Obama that installs a
financial control board to restructure the island's debt and
provides a retroactive stay on lawsuits by bondholders.
On July 11, 2016, the TCR-LA reported that S&P Global Ratings has
downgraded the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's general obligation
secured debt to 'D' (default) from 'CC' following the
commonwealth's default.
On July 7, 2016, Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from
'C' and general obligation (GO) bond rating to 'D' from 'C'
following the payment default on certain GO bonds on July 1, 2016.
Both ratings are removed from Rating Watch. Ratings on securities
that have not defaulted will remain at 'C' until the point of
default. The ratings on non-defaulted bonds remain on Rating Watch
Negative.
PUERTO RICO: Turns to Lewandowski to Lobby Trump on Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
Jesse Eisinger at propublica.org reports Puerto Rico's newly
elected governor, Ricardo Rossello, is in discussions to hire
Donald Trump's former campaign manager, Corey Lewandowski's
lobbying firm, at a time when the island's creditors are hoping
that the incoming Trump administration will be more sympathetic to
them than the Obama administration has been.
"There's no contract, but we have active talks" with the governor,
says Barry Bennett, who recently formed Avenue Strategies with Mr.
Lewandowski, propublica.org relays.
The governor wants Avenue to lobby the new administration
regarding Puerto Rico's fiscal crisis, though it's too early to
say exactly what steps the firm would push for, Mr. Bennett said,
propublica.org notes. Mr. Bennett denied a report by Caribbean
Business that Mr. Lewandowski recently arranged a get-together
between the new governor, Ricardo Rossello, and Trump, the report
relays. A spokesman for Rossello confirmed that the governor did
not meet with Trump, the report adds.
A Trump transition team spokeswoman did not respond to requests
for comment, propublica.org relays.
propublica.org relates that Mr. Lewandowski gained a bulldog
reputation as Trump's campaign manager. He was charged with
battery for grabbing a Breitbart News reporter after a Trump press
conference, but charges against him were later dropped. He was
ousted from the campaign and became a CNN commenter but remained
close with the incoming president, the report notes.
Puerto Rico, a commonwealth, is a territory of the United States.
Puerto Ricans however do not vote in presidential elections but
send a delegate to Congress who has limited voting rights. Puerto
Rico is facing a fiscal crisis, with over $72 billion in debt that
it cannot afford, and about $43 billion in unfunded pension
liabilities, the report relays.
propublica.org cites that last June, Congress passed a law, called
Promesa, allowing Puerto Rico to file for a type of bankruptcy if
necessary. Bondholders could lose out in a bankruptcy, as the
island's entire debt would be restructured. The law also
established an oversight board to oversee Puerto Rico's affairs,
putting the island under more direct federal rule, the report
adds.
Mr. Rossello is expected to hold talks with creditors through the
first part of the year, seeking to strike a deal and avoid
bankruptcy, according to people familiar with the matter,
propublica.org relays.
Hedge funds with investments in Puerto Rican bonds include
Aurelius Capital Management and Monarch Alternative Capital, the
report discloses.
Bondholders contend that the Obama administration ignored their
financial interests in favor of seeking to protect the pensions of
public employees and create a model for other municipalities
facing similar fiscal crises, propublica.org notes. Now with a new
governor and a new American president, some of the bondholders
believe their negotiating position has improved, the report
relays.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on June 15,
2016, that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Puerto Rico law
that would have let its public utilities restructure their debt
over the objection of creditors leaving it to Congress to help the
island resolve its fiscal crisis. Siding with bondholders
challenging the law, the court ruled 5-2 that the measure was
barred under federal bankruptcy law.
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority in the 5-to-2
decision, said the law was at odds with the federal bankruptcy
code, which bars states and lower units of government from
enacting their own versions of bankruptcy law.
Puerto Rico is struggling with $72 billion in debt and has argued
that it needs to restructure at least some of it under Chapter 9,
the part of the bankruptcy code for insolvent local governments.
But Puerto Rico is not permitted to do so, because Chapter 9
specifically excludes it.
The federal law, Justice Thomas wrote, "bars Puerto Rico from
enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure the
debt of its insolvent public utilities." Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer and
Elena Kagan joined him.
Consequently, Puerto Rico opted to default on $911 million in
constitutionally guaranteed debt, or roughly half of the $2
billion in principal and interest that came due July 1, EFE News
reported.
The reported further noted that Puerto Rico enacted a debt
moratorium due to liquidity restraints -- a move that coincided
with a new U.S. law signed by President Obama that installs a
financial control board to restructure the island's debt and
provides a retroactive stay on lawsuits by bondholders.
On July 11, 2016, the TCR-LA reported that S&P Global Ratings has
downgraded the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's general obligation
secured debt to 'D' (default) from 'CC' following the
commonwealth's default.
On July 7, 2016, Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from
'C' and general obligation (GO) bond rating to 'D' from 'C'
following the payment default on certain GO bonds on July 1, 2016.
Both ratings are removed from Rating Watch. Ratings on securities
that have not defaulted will remain at 'C' until the point of
default. The ratings on non-defaulted bonds remain on Rating Watch
Negative.
PUERTO RICO: Another Investor Lawsuit Filed Over Bonds
------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean News Now reports that a securities arbitration law firm
filed a claim against UBS Financial Services Inc. of Puerto Rico
and UBS Financial Services, Inc. for $8.5 million.
According to the claim, the claimant entrusted assets to UBS with
the investment objective of capital preservation, the report
notes. However, UBS ultimately concentrated the account in Puerto
Rico government bonds and its proprietary Puerto Rico closed-end
bond funds, which are leveraged and concentrated in PRGBs,
according to Caribbean News Now.
UBS purchased and held for the claimant PRGBs and UBS PR CEBFs,
both of which are closely tied to the performance of Puerto Rico's
economy, the report notes. The claimant believed the purchases
were consistent with their low risk tolerance, the report relays.
However, the over concentration in these PRGBs and UBS PR CEBFs
was fraught with excessive risk given the claimant's investment
objective and risk tolerance, the report says.
UBS failed to disclose to the claimant the risks associated with
over concentrating the account in these securities, the report
notes. Had this information and the true nature of the risk of
the recommended allocation been known to the claimant or properly
disclosed, he would not have invested his assets in these
products, the report discloses.
The law firm representing the claimant, Klayman & Toskes, in
conjunction with Carlo Law Offices, is currently investigating, on
behalf of their clients, the sales practices of UBS in connection
with investment recommendations provided to their customers, the
report adds.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on June 15,
2016, that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Puerto Rico law
that would have let its public utilities restructure their debt
over the objection of creditors leaving it to Congress to help the
island resolve its fiscal crisis. Siding with bondholders
challenging the law, the court ruled 5-2 that the measure was
barred under federal bankruptcy law.
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority in the 5-to-2
decision, said the law was at odds with the federal bankruptcy
code, which bars states and lower units of government from
enacting their own versions of bankruptcy law.
Puerto Rico is struggling with $72 billion in debt and has argued
that it needs to restructure at least some of it under Chapter 9,
the part of the bankruptcy code for insolvent local governments.
But Puerto Rico is not permitted to do so, because Chapter 9
specifically excludes it.
The federal law, Justice Thomas wrote, "bars Puerto Rico from
enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure the
debt of its insolvent public utilities." Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer and
Elena Kagan joined him.
Consequently, Puerto Rico opted to default on $911 million in
constitutionally guaranteed debt, or roughly half of the $2
billion in principal and interest that came due July 1, EFE News
reported.
The reported further noted that Puerto Rico enacted a debt
moratorium due to liquidity restraints -- a move that coincided
with a new U.S. law signed by President Obama that installs a
financial control board to restructure the island's debt and
provides a retroactive stay on lawsuits by bondholders.
On July 11, 2016, the TCR-LA reported that S&P Global Ratings has
downgraded the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's general obligation
secured debt to 'D' (default) from 'CC' following the
commonwealth's default.
On July 7, 2016, Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from
'C' and general obligation (GO) bond rating to 'D' from 'C'
following the payment default on certain GO bonds on July 1, 2016.
Both ratings are removed from Rating Watch. Ratings on securities
that have not defaulted will remain at 'C' until the point of
default. The ratings on non-defaulted bonds remain on Rating Watch
Negative.
===============================
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
===============================
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Honors Payment to Farmers
--------------------------------------------
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that Planning Minister Camille
Robinson-Regis said the Trinidad & Tobago government continues to
honour its commitments to pay money to cane farmers to help them
transition out of the sugar industry.
Commenting on the issue in the Senate, Robinson-Regis explained
that the former People's Partnership (PP) regime agreed by Cabinet
minute of August 4, 2015, "to the payment of the sum of
$57,965,675 to cane farmers as the final settlement to the 2007
transitional payment out of the sugar industry," according to
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. She explained this sum is the
equivalent of EUR8 million received from the European Union (EU)
for payment to cane farmers, the report notes.
Robinson-Regis said the Direct Cane Farmers Delivery Group and the
Trinidad Islandwide Cane Farmers Association agreed last September
to the compensation package that was offered, the report relays.
She stated that under this package, 2,324 cane farmers are
eligible to receive, "an amount equal to 53 percent of the sum of
tranches two and three," the report relays.
According to Robinson- Regis, "In this compensation to former cane
farmers, the highest money value is a little over $500,000 and the
minimum or lowest payment is TT$12,000."
She added, "It is in keeping with the previous agreement that
depends on the value of the cane farmer production." The minister
said payments of TT$12,000; between TT$12,000 and TT$100,000;
between TT$100,001 and TT$200,000; TT$200,001 and TT$300,000;
TT$400,001 and TT$500,000 and TT$500,001 and TT$600,001 were made
to 644; 1,638; 34, six; one and one farmers, respectively, the
report relays.
She explained this, "makes it a total of TT$84,965,675 in addition
to the already paid sum of TT$82,111,774 paid to cane farmers in
2007." Robinson-Regis said to date cheques have been prepared for
97 cane farmers which amounts to TT$2, 413,306, the report notes.
Indicating that payment to cane farmers continues daily, Robinson-
Regis said although the Cane Farmers Association of TT (CFATT) and
Cane Farmers Co-operative Society (CFCS) have taken legal action,
this does not debar individual farmers from coming into the
ministry and accepting the payments, the report says.
While the eight million EU grant was not intended to be a cash
payment to cane farmers, Robinson-Regis said the PP agreed in
January 2015, that further cash payment be made from the grant,
the report relays.
Having determined that cane farmers had already received a
substantial amount of money and many had already transitioned out
of the sugar industry, Robinson-Regis said Government decided that
the eight million euros be the, "the only amount given in cash to
the cane farmers," the report adds.
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.
* * * End of Transmission * * *