TCRLA_Public/170123.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, January 23, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 016


                            Headlines




A R G E N T I N A

AES ARGENTINA: Fitch Assigns 'B/BB-' IDRs, Outlook Stable
COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: Fitch Rates Sr. Notes Reopening 'B-'
SANTANDER RIO: Moody's Says Citi Deal No Impact on Credit Strength


B A R B A D O S

BARBADOS: Warns That Economy Will Struggle Unless FDI Improves


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AQR OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
BTG PACTUAL G7: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
BTG PACTUAL PAR: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
BURNABY HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CORBIN MACRO: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

FINE ACE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
FREESTYLE SPECIAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LV PACIFIC: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PANTHALASSA GP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PRASLIN LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

RIOGAMA LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SECUREX LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
THREE MOUNTAIN MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


C O S T A   R I C A

COSTA RICA: Fitch Lowers IDRs to 'BB' & Alters Outlook to Stable


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Chief's Severance Pay 'Defense' Harms Talks


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Minister Reveals Plans to Reduce Property Tax Arrears


M E X I C O

BIO PAPPEL: Moody's Withdraws B1 CFR for Business Reasons
MEXICO: New Maquiladora Investment on Hold Amid Trump Fears


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Agency Taps Denton US to Advise on Restructuring
SOTO REEFER: Banco Popular to Be Given Copy of Plan Disclosures


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Saved Only US$2.6BB Over 100Yrs, Economist Says


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Jan. 16 to Jan. 20, 2017


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


AES ARGENTINA: Fitch Assigns 'B/BB-' IDRs, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned first time Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings of 'B' and 'BB-', respectively, to
AES Argentina Generacion S.A.  The Rating Outlook is Stable.

In addition, Fitch has assigned an expected rating of
'B+(EXP)/RR3' to the company's proposed debt issuance of up to
US$300 million, which matures in 2024.  The company expects to use
the proceeds from the issuance to refinance existing debt, fund
capital expenditures and for general corporate purposes.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

AES Argentina's ratings reflect the industry's improving
regulatory risk; counterparty risk to Compania Administradora de
Mercado Mayorista Electrico S.A. (CAMMESA) as main offtaker; the
company's strong competitive position, and sound metrics supported
by an increase in dollar linked cash inflows from past due
receivables related to the Fund for Investments Required to
Increase the Electric Power Supply (FONINVEMEM).  Finally, the
company's ratings also reflect the macro-economic environment,
including high inflation and steep currency devaluation and to a
lesser degree implicit support and synergies with parent company
AES Corp.

AES Argentina's ratings are constrained by the 'B' country ceiling
of the Republic of Argentina.  Fitch has assigned a country
ceiling of 'B' to the Republic of Argentina, which limits the
foreign currency rating of most Argentine corporates.  Country
ceilings are designed to reflect the risks associated with
sovereigns placing restrictions upon private sector corporates,
which may prevent them from converting local currency to any
foreign currency under a stress scenario, and/or may not allow the
transfer of foreign currency abroad to service foreign currency
debt obligations.  Since taking power in December 2015, the
Mauricio Macri administration removed FX controls introduced in
2011 and increased the flexibility of the Argentine peso, which
should contribute towards improving the capacity of the economy to
absorb external shocks and relieve pressure on international
reserves.

Fitch expects to assign an 'RR3' Recovery Rating to AES
Argentina's proposed issuance, which reflects good recovery
prospects in the event of default given the company's solid
balance sheet and cash flow generation.  Fitch believes that the
company's default, should it occur, would be most likely driven by
transfer and convertibility restrictions imposed upon the payment
of foreign debt, not a material deterioration of the company's
business or financial profile.

                    IMPROVING REGULATORY RISK

AES Argentina's ratings reflect high regulatory risk given strong
government influence in the Electric/Utilities sector.  AES
Argentina operates in a highly strategic sector where the
government both has a role as the price/tariff regulator and also
controls subsidies for industry players.  Fitch believes the
recent resolutions implemented by the new government reflect a
trend of less government interference and discretion in the power
generation sector.  Since 2013, the Secretariat of Energy
introduced material changes to the structure and operation of the
wholesale electricity market (WEM, resulting in electric tariffs
that have almost doubled.  Additionally, the Ministry of Mining
and Energy, under Resolution 22/2016 adjusted the spot price
tariffs for energy sales under the Energia Base framework.

                       COUNTERPARTY EXPOSURE

AES Argentina depends on payments from government agency CAMMESA,
which can be volatile given that the agency depends on the
national government for funds to make payments.  In 2015, CAMMESA
received approximately USD10 billion in funds from the Argentine
treasury, which was an increase from the USD8.7 billion injection
in 2014.

During 2014-2015, AES Argentina and multiple players in the
electricity sector in Argentina experienced significant collection
delays from CAMMESA increasing to 115 days from a historical 80
days.  This trend has been reverted during the second half of 2016
and as of November 2016 became current at 41 days.  Fitch believes
the current government measures are trending toward a more stable
and sustainable system in the long term, although further
regulatory changes will need to be implemented to make it an
efficient open market.

                   STRONG COMPETITIVE POSITION

AES Argentina owns a portfolio of well diversified generation
assets in terms of operational technologies and geographical
presence with 44% hydroelectric generation and 56% thermoelectric,
allowing the company to mitigate risks associated with machine
stops and the exposure to hydrological risk faced by its
hydroelectric plants.  This, combined with a significant
generation capacity of close 2.76 GW (5 GW if considering Jose de
San Martin, Belgrano and Guillermo Brown) and a market share of
8.2% in the Argentine matrix positions AES Argentina as
competitive player in the Argentine market.  Additionally, the
geographic location of AES Argentina's generation plants provides
a relevant advantage in terms of access to fuel and to the grid in
different connection points.

                        STRONG CREDIT METRICS

As of December 2015, AES Argentina's financial metrics were strong
with a limited leverage and good coverage figures.  Debt to
EBITDA, including debt with CAMMESA, stood at 1.5x while
EBITDA/Interest expenses was 5.6x.  For the last twelve months
ending September 2016, the company's EBITDA was approximately
ARS1,146 million, compared with ARS2,346 million of financial debt
resulting in a total debt/EBITDA of 2.0x.  Net of the debt with
CAMMESA, leverage ratios for 2015 and LTM September 2016 were
1.33x and 1.69x, respectively.

Regarding the debt with CAMMESA, it is mostly related to loans
provided by the government agency for maintenance and / or
improvements of generation assets.  Such debt, denominated in
local currency, has special conditions according to the local
regulation and it will be cancelled against specific credits
(accounts receivable for certain remuneration items) that AES
Argentina has with CAMMESA, and therefore it does not result in
direct cash outflows.

Fitch expects consolidated leverage to remain around 3.0x for 2017
- 2020 although it might temporarily surpass this number as the
company funds a portion of its expansion plan with debt in 2017.
Including USD denominated receivables related to FONINVEMEM and
dividends received from associates and excluding debt with
CAMMESA, Fitch expects debt to adjusted EBITDA to be 1.7x on
average for 2017 - 2020.

                      USD DENOMINATED FLOWS

Although all the company's energy sales are denominated in ARS,
the company benefits from USD denominated receivables related to
funds contributed to the FONINVEMEM.  Fitch expects the company to
receive between USD 60- USD 70 million during 2017 -2020.  CAMMESA
has made timely payments related to FONINVEMEM since San Martin
and Belgrano began operations in 2010, FONINVEMEM receivables
related to Guillermo Brown started being paid in 2016.  Fitch
believes these receivables will cover between 2.5x-3.0x the
company's debt service.

                         KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for AES Argentina
include:

   -- Installed capacity of 2,760MW;

   -- Gross Generation of 9,155GWh in 2016, and annual average
      generation of 10,700 GWh for 2017 - 2019;

   -- Average tariff s increasing in Argentine pesos, but in USD
      terms remaining flat around USD21 to USD22 per MWh;

   -- Availability and load factors in line with historicals;

   -- Maximum dividend payout to guarantee a minimum cash balance
      of USD15 to USD20 million per year;

   -- EBITDA margins of 42% - 43%;

   -- USD denominated flows related to FONINVEMEM of approximately
      USD64 million per year, mainly associated to Guillermo
      Brown.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

An upgrade to Argentina's ratings could result in a positive
rating action. In addition, substantial positive changes in the
regulatory environment which would increase the certainty of cash
flows could prove favorable to AES Argentina Generacion's credit
quality.

AES Argentina's ratings could be negatively affected by a
combination of these:

   -- Argentina's ratings downgrade;

   -- Given high dependence on the subsidies by CAMMESA from the
      Treasury and CAMMESA being its off-taker, any further
      weakening of Argentina's fiscal accounts could have a
      negative impact on the company's collections / cash flow;

   -- A significant deterioration of credit metrics.

                             LIQUIDITY

As of Dec. 31, 2105, AES Argentina presented an adequate capital
structure with a moderate leverage and good credit metrics.  Debt
to EBITDA stood at 1.5x in ARS, having been under 2.0x for the
past five years.  Much of the debt is with CAMMESA which are
mainly related to the expansion of AES Parana's generation
capacity.

Regarding the debt with CAMMESA, it is mostly related to loans
provided by the government agency for maintenance and / or
improvements of generation assets.  Such debt, denominated in
local currency, has special conditions according to the local
regulation and it will be cancelled against specific credits
(accounts receivable for certain remuneration items) that AES
Argentina has with CAMMESA, and therefore it does not result in
direct cash outflows.

The company does not faces significant financing needs over the
foreseeable future.  AES Argentina will require refinancing its
existing debt becoming due in the next three years.  Proceeds from
the proposed issuance are expected to be used to refinance
existing debt and finance capex, improving the company's liquidity
position and mitigating its refinancing risk.

AES Argentina has wide access to short-term financing in Argentina
given its low leverage and strong relationship with local banks.
The company also has uncommitted credit lines (undrawn with
several banks).  The company has a minimum cash balance of
approximately USD15 million as an estimation based on requirements
for sustaining one month of coal inventory and one month of
working capital requirements

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has assigned these ratings:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B'; Stable Outlook;
   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB-'; Stable Outlook;
   -- $300 million senior unsecured notes due 2024 'B+(EXP)/RR3'.


COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: Fitch Rates Sr. Notes Reopening 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch rates the USD100 million reopening of CLISA-Compania
Latinoamericana de Infraestructura y Servicios S.A.'s (CLISA)
USD200 million 9.5% senior unsecured notes due 2023 'B-/RR4'.  The
USD100 million additional notes will be issued under the indenture
dated July 20, 2016, governing the USD200 million 9.5% senior
notes due 2023

Proceeds of the bond issuance reopening will be used to refinance
existing debt, and should improve CLISA's debt maturity profile as
well as lower its overall cost of debt.  The bonds will be
guaranteed by Benito Roggio e Hijos S.A. and Cliba Ingenieria
Urbana S.A. and rank pari passu in priority of payment with
CLISA's other senior unsecured debt.]

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

CLISA's ratings reflect the company's strong market position as
one of Argentina's largest privately-owned conglomerates,
supported by its businesses in various public infrastructure
works.  The company is exposed to cyclicality in its construction
business, leading to the increased importance of its waste
management business.  CLISA's main activities depend on
contractual agreements and Argentine government regulations at the
national, provincial and municipal levels.  Exposure to regulatory
risk also derives from the delay in the renegotiations of public
service contracts.  The ratings are constrained by Argentina's
country ceiling rating.

CLISA operates in four main businesses: construction and toll road
concessions (through Benito Roggio e Hijos [BRH]), water
treatment, waste management (CLIBA), and transportation.  The
company originates substantially all of its consolidated sales
from the operations of its waste management, construction and toll
road concessions and, transportation segments, which represented
44.7%, 32.4% and 14.0% of its consolidated sales, respectively,
for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2016.  These three segments
also generated 61.6%, 23.5%; and, 12.4% of the company's total
operational margin during the same period.

While the waste management business contributes the majority of
sales and EBITDA, CLISA's construction and toll road concessions
continue to be important to its overall operation and are expected
to represent approximately 30% of sales and 25% of EBITDA during
2017.  The company's cash flow from this business is exposed to
the cycles of the construction industry and public works in
Argentina.  Fitch expects activity to pick up in the medium term
after the Macri administration has reviewed its priorities for
infrastructure development.  The company is also exposed to
collection risk derived from having the government as its main
counterparty.

Financial leverage expected to remain stable: CLISA's LTM GROSS
leverage was 3.3x as of Sept. 30, 2016, compared to 3.8x at
Dec. 31, 2015.  Total debt increased to ARS5.4 billion as of
Sept. 30, 2016, from ARS4.4 billion at Dec. 31, 2015.  The
company's total EBITDA went from ARS1.2 billion to ARS1.7 billion
during the same period.  Fitch expects CLISA to manage its capital
structure with the gross debt-to-EBITDA ratio in the 3x to 4x
range during 2017-2018.  CLISA is exposed to currency mismatch
risk as approximately 60% of its debt is denominated in foreign
currency, while its cash generation is concentrated in pesos.

Fitch expects the company to manage its upcoming maturities
primarily with debt refinancing.  The successful completion of the
announced reopening will improve CLISA's current liquidity
position.  As of Sept. 30, 2016, CLISA had ARS1.4 billion of cash
and marketable securities, which compares to ARS1.7 billion of
short-term debt.  The company's interest coverage ratio, measured
as EBITDA-to-interest paid has remained stable around 1.5x during
LTM September 2016.  CLISA generated negative free cash flow of
ARS263 million for the LTM September 2016, primarily driven by
capex incurred during the period.

Fitch currently rates CLISA as:

   -- Foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-';
   -- Local currency IDR at 'B-';
   -- International senior unsecured bonds at 'B-/RR4'.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.


SANTANDER RIO: Moody's Says Citi Deal No Impact on Credit Strength
------------------------------------------------------------------
Banco Santander Rio S.A.'s (Ba3 stable) growth ambitions won't
significantly compromise its credit strength, even after the
acquisition of Citigroup's Argentine retail banking business, says
Moody's Investors Service, in a report.

Santander announced the acquisition of Citi's retail banking
business in the fourth quarter. The purchase will significantly
consolidate its geographic footprint and give the lender access to
new clients. As a result of the acquisition alone, Santander's
loan market share should rise 11.5% from 10.3%, pushing it closer
to its target of 15% of market share by 2020.

"Although the tie-up will likely lead to a drop in capital, it
will yield meaningful cross selling opportunities for Santander,
especially in cash and wealth management services," said Maria
Valeria Azconegui, a Vice President and Senior Analyst at Moody's.
"This should boost earnings, helping the bank manage an expected
modest contraction in interest margins."

In addition, Banco Santander's management expects the Citi
acquisition to lead to significant operating synergies, helping
contain the bank's operating costs.

While the bank's operating costs are high compared to regional
peers, it is in the midst of a three-year investment program that
will upgrade its branches, create new digital banking channels and
automate processes, with the goal being to reduce its cost-to-
income ratio. The bank will also benefit from slowing inflation,
which will contain salary increases.

Like all Argentine banks, Santander Rio's has negative real
funding costs, an important driver of profitability in recent
years. The bank's 15% average cost of funding , as of the third
quarter 2016, was well below the rate of inflation (40%) and the
BADLAR benchmark deposits rate (22%). As such Santander Rio could
make money simply by taking deposits and investing them in low-
risk government securities. Once the Citi acquisition is complete
total deposits are expected to rise to 90% of Santander Rio's
total funding.



===============
B A R B A D O S
===============


BARBADOS: Warns That Economy Will Struggle Unless FDI Improves
--------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Barbados administration is being warned
that the economy will continue to struggle unless foreign direct
investment picks up.

The warning has come from Anthony Pilgrim, General Manager of the
umbrella organization for local credit unions, according to RJR
News.

Mr. Pilgrim added that despite record arrivals last year, not even
the bright spot in tourism would be enough to revitalize the
struggling economy, the report notes.

The head of the Barbados Cooperative and Credit Union League
Limited (BCCULL) said the Government of Barbados must get the
pending capital projects going without further delay, the report
relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 27, 2016, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign ratings on Barbados to 'B-' from 'B'.
The outlook is negative.

The short-term ratings were affirmed at 'B.' S&P also downgraded
its transfer and convertibility assessment for Barbados to 'B-'
from 'B'.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


AQR OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of AQR Offshore Multi-Strategy Fund Ltd., on
Dec. 9, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          AQR Capital Management, LLC
          c/o Sophia Leavett
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


BTG PACTUAL G7: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of BTG Pactual G7, Ltd., on Dec. 9, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          BTG Pactual WM Gestao DE RECURSOS LTDA.
          c/o Ben Gillooly
          c/o Ogier
          89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


BTG PACTUAL PAR: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of BTG Pactual Par Asia, Ltd., on Dec. 9,
2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          BTG Pactual WM Gestao DE RECURSOS LTDA.
          c/o Ben Gillooly
          c/o Ogier
          89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


BURNABY HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Burnaby Holdings Limited, on Nov. 28,
2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 19, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Matthew Wright
          c/o Omar Grant
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands


CORBIN MACRO: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
The members of Corbin Macro Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily
wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Corbin Capital Partners, L.P.
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


FINE ACE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------
The sole member of Fine Ace Asset Management Limited, on Dec. 8,
2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 9, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Kevin Butler
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7374
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


FREESTYLE SPECIAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Freestyle Special Opportunities Master
Fund, Ltd., on Nov. 30, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate
the company' business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Adrian MacKay
          6 Peter Cooper Road, 2B
          New York, NY 10010
          USA
          Telephone: +1 (646) 924- 9987


LV PACIFIC: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of LV Pacific Opportunities, on Dec. 2, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company' business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Larrain Vial Investment Inc.
          Av. El Bosque 0117, 4th Floor
          Las Condes
          Santiago
          Chile
          Telephone: +55 9 23398500
          e-mail: rurzua@larrainvial.com


PANTHALASSA GP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Panthalassa GP Limited, on Dec. 6, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company' business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road
          George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


PRASLIN LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Praslin Limited, on Dec. 2, 2016, resolved
to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 11, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Priestleys
          c/o Anna Cummings
          P.O. Box 30310 Grand Cayman KY1-1202
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 1577
          Facsimile: (345) 947 0826


RIOGAMA LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
The members of Riogama Limited, on Dec. 7, 2016, resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company' business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 19, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zedra Directors (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Enola Reid
          136 Shedden Road
          One Capital Place, 3rd Floor
          P.O. Box 487 George Town, Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY1-1106
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914-5413


SECUREX LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Securex Limited, on Dec. 6, 2016, resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company' business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 27, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Amicorp Cayman Fiduciary Limited
          c/o Nicole Ebanks-Sloley
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 10655 Grand Cayman KY1-1006
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943-6055


THREE MOUNTAIN MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Three Mountain Global Macro Master Fund,
Ltd. on Dec. 7, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company' business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road
          George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100



===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================


COSTA RICA: Fitch Lowers IDRs to 'BB' & Alters Outlook to Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Costa Rica's Long-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency IDRs to 'BB' from 'BB+'.  The Outlooks were revised
to Stable from Negative.  The issue ratings on Costa Rica's senior
unsecured Foreign- and Local-Currency bonds are also downgraded to
'BB' from 'BB+'.  The Country Ceiling was downgraded to 'BB+' from
'BBB-'.  The Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs are
affirmed at 'B'.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects Costa Rica's deteriorating debt dynamics
driven by large fiscal deficits and continued institutional
gridlock preventing progress on reforms to correct fiscal
imbalances.  Costa Rica's central government fiscal deficits have
grown over the last five years, reaching 5.7% of GDP in 2015 (the
general government deficit reached 4.6% of GDP in 2015, which
incorporates surpluses of public pension funds).  Despite the
estimated 0.6% of GDP improvement in 2016 (due largely to
administrative measures), the fiscal deficit is expected to rise
over the next two years as a result of a higher interest burden
and spending rigidities.

The government's tax reform proposals to rein in the fiscal
deficits have made little progress in Congress given its
fragmented structure and the cumbersome legislative process.  The
outlook for passage of the crucial VAT and income tax proposals
(estimated to provide close to 2% of GDP in additional revenues)
has significantly diminished as the February 2018 congressional
and presidential elections approach.  Fitch's new baseline
scenario does not incorporate passage of any meaningful tax reform
measures in the forecast period through 2018.

As a result of the large fiscal imbalances, Costa Rica's debt
burden has risen rapidly over the last decade.  Gross general
government debt doubled to an estimated 41% of GDP in 2016 from
20% of GDP in 2008 (Fitch's general government figures net out
around 4% of GDP in public pension holdings of government debt).
The debt burden will continue to rise in the absence of meaningful
tax measures, with debt expected to reach over 60% of GDP within
the next decade.

The Stable Outlook reflects Costa Rica's resilient growth and
financing flexibility in the captive local market, which has been
able to accommodate the large fiscal deficits, mitigating Fitch's
previous concerns over the financing flexibility of the sovereign.
A dynamic and diversified export base and a vibrant tourism sector
have underpinned Costa Rica's solid economic performance, with GDP
growth estimated to have reached 4.2% in 2016.  Fitch forecasts
growth of above 4% in both 2017 and 2018.  In 2016, Costa Rica was
largely able to meet its financing needs in the local market by
tapping sizeable liquidity among various public-sector entities,
after congressional authorization for external bond issuance ended
in 2015.

Furthermore, the fall in the oil price and the buoyancy of export
and tourism receipts have underpinned an improvement in Costa
Rica's external finances, with the current account deficit falling
to an estimated 3.5% of GDP in 2016 from 4.5% in 2015.

Inflation averaged 0.7% in 2016, well below the central bank's
3%+/-1pp target due to the fall in oil prices at the beginning of
2016 and a relatively steady exchange rate (until the latter part
of the year).  As a result, the central bank's monetary policy has
remained accommodative over the last 12 months with policy rates
on hold after a cumulative 350 basis point cut in 2015-Jan 2016.
Inflation is expected to converge to the central bank's target in
2017.  High fiscal deficits, limited exchange rate flexibility,
high financial dollarization and quasi-fiscal losses at the
central bank continue to constrain monetary policy.

Costa Rica's 'BB' ratings are supported by structural indicators
that are strong relative to peers, including high per capita
income, social development and governance standards.  The ratings
are also supported by the country's successful economic model
centered around high value-added service and manufacturing
activities, which supports robust growth and foreign direct
investment inflows.

      SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Costa Rica a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BBB+' on the LT FC IDR scale.

In accordance with its rating criteria, Fitch's sovereign rating
committee decided to adjust the rating indicated by the SRM by
more than the usual maximum range of +/- 3 notches because of the
extent of Costa Rica's intractable political gridlock and sharply
rising debt burden.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative
to rated peers, as:

   -- Structural: -2 notches, to reflect a long track record of
      institutional gridlock that is not captured in the county's
      high governance indicators, as reflected by repeated failure
      to produce meaningful fiscal reform because of congressional
      fragmentation and judicial injunctions.

   -- Fiscal: -2 notches, to reflect our expectation that debt
      will continue to rise over the medium- to long-term in the
      absence of more substantive fiscal reform, as well as a
      rigid expenditure profile dominated by indexed salaries,
      rising interest payments, and constitutionally mandated
      spending in such areas as education, which makes fiscal
      consolidation difficult.

The SRM is Fitch's proprietary multiple regression rating model
which employs 18 variables based on three-year centered averages,
including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to
a LT FC IDR.  Fitch's QO is a forward-looking qualitative
framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output in
assigning the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria
that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the
SRM.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

These risk factors individually, or collectively, could trigger a
positive rating action:

   -- An easing of political gridlock that improves overall fiscal
      management, including passage and implementation of
      meaningful tax reforms;
   -- Meaningful progress on a fiscal consolidation strategy that
      improves the prospects for debt stabilization;
   -- Higher growth that improves fiscal and government debt
      dynamics.

Future developments that could individually, or collectively,
result in a negative rating action include:

   -- Significant fiscal slippage that leads to a sharper
      deterioration in debt dynamics;
   -- Evidence of sovereign financing constraints;
   -- A deterioration in prospects for foreign investment and
      growth.

                          KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch assumes that in absence of authorization of a Eurobond
issuance, Costa Rica will be able to meet its high deficit
financing needs in 2017-2018 through reliance on the local market
and/or through alternative external financing sources.

Fitch forecasts that U.S. growth and continued lower oil prices
will support economic growth in Costa Rica in 2017-2018.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Chief's Severance Pay 'Defense' Harms Talks
---------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Dominican Industries Association Executive
vice President Circe Almanzar said Labor Minister Jose Fadul's
statement on the defense of workers' severance pay contradicts
part of the talks agreed with the business sector.

"We've been talking about starting the dialogue again and in fact
part of the dialogue already broken. I'd assumed that it's part of
this year's agenda to resume the discussion on the Labor Code
reform. The negotiations of the National Wage Commission are open.
There will be a meeting in the next few days," she said, according
to RJR News.

As to the wage increase, the AIRD executive said there will be a
minimum wage readjustment this year, the report notes.

                             Labor Minister

"He isn't without reason that this year corresponds to the
discussion over the minimum wage, but we're astonished that a
position is already assumed on the issue of unemployment when it's
already part of the Labor Code discussions . . . .  We hope that
the minister, since he has always been a great mediator, to keep
doing so," the report quoted Mr. Almanzar as saying.

Mr. Fadul said he will protect the severance pay for "as long as
he holds his post" and as an example noted that an employee who
has worked in a company for 25 years "cannot be told to go home
with one hand over his back and another in front," the report
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Minister Reveals Plans to Reduce Property Tax Arrears
--------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that local Government Minister Desmond McKenzie
has outlined plans to reduce property tax arrears.

Mr. McKenzie said more than J$9 billion is owed in property tax
and his ministry will be embarking on an aggressive collection
drive. The clampdown will also target elected representatives,
according to RJR News.

The Local Government Minister says he has a list containing the
names of councilors who have property tax arrears dating back 20
years, the report notes.

"This is not only going to be at the level of the local
representatives. We will extend it to Parliament also. I will be
writing to members of the upper and lower house seeking their
assistance to ensure that the elected representatives of the
people are compliant with the obligations," the report quoted Mr.
McKenzie as saying.

The Local Government minister was speaking with RJR News on
Wednesday following a regional sensitization session with members
of the Manchester and Clarendon Municipal Corporations at the Golf
View Hotel in Mandeville, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 28, 2016, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Jamaica.  The outlook on the long-term sovereign credit ratings
remains stable.  In addition, S&P affirmed its transfer and
convertibility assessment at 'B+'.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


BIO PAPPEL: Moody's Withdraws B1 CFR for Business Reasons
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn for business reasons Bio
Pappel Scribe, S.A. de C.V.'s B1 Corporate Family Ratings.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

The following ratings were withdrawn:

  LT Corporate Family Rating, B1

Prior to the withdrawal, the outlook on the rating was stable.

The period of time covered in the financial information used to
determine Bio Pappel Scribe, S.A. de C.V. rating is between
01/01/2012 and 06/30/2016 (source: Bio Pappel Scribe S.A. de
C.V.).


MEXICO: New Maquiladora Investment on Hold Amid Trump Fears
-----------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that concerns about the policies to be pursued by
the incoming Trump administration have caused a freeze on new
investment in maquiladoras on the Mexican side of the border,
where thousands of workers in that industry face an uncertain
future.

Case in point is Ciudad Juarez, a city across from El Paso, Texas,
where the first of the maquiladoras -- plants where goods are
assembled for export -- was installed in 1968 and the maquila
industry accounts for more than 60 percent of the local economy,
according to EFE News.

"The current situation is one of uncertainty, of doubt about what
(President-elect Donald) Trump may do," said Manuel Ochoa, vice
president of business development for the Tecma Group, a provider
of shelter services to facilitate the setting-up of maquiladoras
in Mexico by foreign manufacturers, the report notes.

President Trump has said he will impose tariffs of up to 35
percent on US companies who move operations to Mexico with the
idea of selling their products back to the American market, the
report relays.

That would mark an abrupt shift away from the current climate of
virtually tariff-free US-Mexico trade for qualifying goods under
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which the
president-elect says must be renegotiated, the report notes.

Inside the maquiladoras, conversations among workers reflect their
fear of being laid off in the near future, the report relays.

"The bosses haven't told us anything, but there's been talk that
the maquila could close and they're going to throw us out on the
street," Mary, a worker at a factory with US capital in Ciudad
Juarez, told EFE News.

At present, the more than 320 maquiladoras installed there employ
some 250,000 men and women, a sixth of the city's total
population, the report discloses.

Amid pressure by President Trump, Ford made a surprise
announcement early this year that it would cancel plans for a $1.6
billion plant in the north-central state of San Luis Potosi and
instead invest that money in Michigan, a move seen in Ciudad
Juarez as a bad omen, the report notes.

But Hector Nunez Polando, director of the Economic Development of
the North Civil Association, sounded a note of optimism, the
report discloses.

"The main impact would be on new (investment), on growth; it's
very difficult to remove what's already been established," Mr.
Nunez said, the report adds.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Agency Taps Denton US to Advise on Restructuring
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority of Puerto Rico
has selected Dentons US as its legal advisor on all aspects of its
restructuring and revitalization efforts, including development
and implementation of the Fiscal Plan, restructuring and
renegotiation of municipal bond debt, communications with
creditors and with the PROMESA Oversight Board, among others.

Leaders on the Dentons team and their respective roles include:

   -- Sam J. Alberts, Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy
partner, will serve as project lead.  His background includes
successfully representing the Official Committee of Retirees in
the City of Detroit bankruptcy, the largest municipal bankruptcy
case in US history.  He has also represented the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation and
International Finance Corporation.

   -- Claude Montgomery, Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy
partner with financial institution representation experience who
co-led the Dentons team representing the Official Committee of
Retirees in the City of Detroit bankruptcy is leading the
financial restructuring effort.

   -- Jonathan Ballan, Corporate partner, will lead the municipal
financing aspect.  He has served as counsel on municipal bond
transactions for the New York Yankees, the Empire State
Development Corporation, New York Transportation Development
Corporation and New York Liberty Development Corporation, among
others.

   -- Michael Zolandz, Federal Regulatory and Compliance partner
is leading the policy, regulatory and government affairs aspects.

The Firm has also assembled teams for all the relevant issues
facing the Government including public private partnerships,
litigation, securities, securitization, contracting, healthcare,
tax, Puerto Rican law and others.

According to the Government of the Puerto Rico, "The Dentons team
is also notable for its vast experience in the areas of government
finance and public policy, including a leading role in the City of
Detroit bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 9 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code, where they successfully represented and Defended
the pensioners of said city."

                         About Dentons

Dentons -- http://www.dentons.com/-- is the world's largest law
firm, delivering quality and value to clients around the globe.
Dentons is a leader on the Acritas Global Elite Brand Index, a BTI
Client Service 30 Award winner and recognized by prominent
business and legal publications for its innovations in client
service, including founding Nextlaw Labs and the Nextlaw Global
Referral Network.


SOTO REEFER: Banco Popular to Be Given Copy of Plan Disclosures
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mildred Caban Flores of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico granted Banco Popular PR's Special Loans'
request to be served with a copy of Soto Reefer Containers, Inc.'s
disclosure statement and plan.

Soto Reefer Containers, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr.
D.P.R. Case No. 16-07602) on September 26, 2016, and is
represented by Rosana Moreno Rodriguez, Esq., at Moreno & Soltero
Law Office, LLC.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Saved Only US$2.6BB Over 100Yrs, Economist Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Doughty at RJR News reports that Trinidad and Tobago has
only saved US $2.6 billion in its hundred years of oil production,
Group Economist Marla Dukharan, RBC Financial (Caribbean Limited)
said.

Ms. Dukharan was speaking to the issues of "Connecting Citizens
with their energy resources" forum held at the Trinidad and Tobago
Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Columbus Circle, Westmoorings
while doing a critical review of the Trinidad and Tobago
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative's (TTE ITI) 2014 to
2015 report launched last year, according to RJR News.

Ms. Dukharan was speaking to transparency and its importance.

She noted that the Heritage and Stabilization Fund (HSF) had
gotten to approximately USD $5.7 billion before it was dipped into
last year, the report notes.

Asking if anyone actually knew how much the country had
contributed to the HSF, Ms. Dukharan noted the country had only
saved US $2.6 billion despite producing oil for 100 years, the
report relays.

The fund manager, she said, had generated the rest to get the
country to where it was before it was dipped into, the report
notes.

In a 2016 study done by a former central bank economist, she said,
it was found that spending all the country's energy revenue
creates macro- economic volatility, the report relays.

"The paper found that the optimal level of saving for energy
revenue is 80 percent," she said, the report notes.

Ms. Dukharan said she was pleased there were efforts to establish
a revenue authority to improve tax collection but, "to me it is
very disappointing of that US $2.6 billion that we saved that
brought us to $5.7 billion we are dipping into it without having
an acceptable level of tax compliance. We are not collecting that
taxes that are due to us whether from the energy sector but
particularly from the non-energy sector." TT was among countries
that did not escape the resource curse citing an extract done from
a 2012 study that showed countries like Canada and Botswana had
escaped the that "resource curse" while countries like TT and
Venezuela who had not escaped the resource curse or the paradox of
plenty, the report relays.

"The study found that resource rich countries on average contrary
to what we might expect have had worse economic development than
countries poor in resources. One reason for this paradox of plenty
as we call it in economics is that there is a well-established
high correlation between resource abundance and corruption," she
said, the report discloses.

"There is a tendency for oil in particular to impede democracy.

This is why transparency is so important in TT," she added.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Jan. 16 to Jan. 20, 2017
---------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name                  Cpn   Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------                  ---   -----   --------  -------   ---
Andino Investment Holding     11   68.88  11/13/2020   PE     USD
Andino Investment Holding     11   70.85  11/13/2020   PE     USD
Anton Oilfield Services G     7.5  69.03   11/6/2018   CN     USD
Anton Oilfield Services G     7.5     66   11/6/2018   CN     USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 Lt   0.719   38.5               KY     EUR
BA-CA Finance Cayman Ltd    0.749  38.93               KY     EUR
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman    6.25  62.84               KY     USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman    6.25  59.51               KY     USD
BPI Capital Finance Ltd      2.29     40               KY     EUR
CA La Electricidad de Car     8.5  43.75   4/10/2018   VE     USD
Chile Government Internat   3.625   15.7  10/30/2042   CL     USD
CSN Islands XI Corp         6.875  61.25   9/21/2019   KY     USD
CSN Islands XI Corp         6.875  61.13   9/21/2019   KY     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp            7   48.8               BR     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp            7  47.75               BR     USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso    4.54  59.75  10/25/2041   PA     USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso       6  71.38  10/25/2041   PA     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45   70.8    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.35   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  70.42    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.72   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.71   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.23   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  70.52   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    7.75  74.84  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.94   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.95   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    8.45  69.82    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.56    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  72.94   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest    7.75  74.95   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.74   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  73.73   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Ecuador Government Domest     7.7  72.77   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Empresa de Telecomunicaci       7  71.24   1/17/2023   CO     COP
Empresa de Telecomunicaci       7  71.24   1/17/2023   CO     COP
ESFG International Ltd      5.753  0.883               KY     EUR
General Exploration Partn    11.5  36.75  11/13/2018   CA     USD
General Shopping Finance       10  60.55               KY     USD
General Shopping Finance       10  60.63               KY     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10  70.88    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10  71.88    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10   50.5    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt      10     54    2/1/2019   SG     USD
Glorious Property Holding   13.25  74.56    3/4/2018   HK     USD
Gol Finance Inc              9.25  47.35   7/20/2020   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              8.75  37.75               BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5     61    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5  59.38    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc               7.5  59.38    4/3/2017   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              9.25  43.38   7/20/2020   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc              8.75  36.88               BR     USD
Green Dragon Gas Ltd           10  63.75  11/20/2017   HK     USD
Greenfields Petroleum Cor       9  11.35   5/31/2017   US     CAD
Honghua Group Ltd            7.45  58.25   9/25/2019   CN     USD
Honghua Group Ltd            7.45     58   9/25/2019   CN     USD
Inversora Electrica de Bu     6.5   59.5   9/26/2017   AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp             7.5  67.25   4/25/2019   HK     USD
MIE Holdings Corp             7.5  68.58   4/25/2019   HK     USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman Isl    3.38  60.22    2/7/2035   KY     EUR
Newland International Pro     9.5  24.13    7/3/2017   PA     USD
Newland International Pro     9.5  25.13    7/3/2017   PA     USD
Noble Holding Internation     6.2  65.42    8/1/2040   KY     USD
Noble Holding Internation    6.05  66.38    3/1/2041   KY     USD
Noble Holding Internation    5.25  64.71   3/15/2042   KY     USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc            7.25  57.75    4/1/2019   CY     USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc            7.25     55    4/1/2019   CY     USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe     6.35     27   6/30/2021   KY     USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe     6.35   28.5   6/30/2021   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7.5     40               KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       4.375  37.23   4/25/2025   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       7.125   33.5   6/26/2042   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        5.25   34.5   6/27/2029   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       5.125     36   6/26/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        8.25     35   4/25/2018   KY     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           7   53.5   4/21/2020   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           6  41.51    4/5/2023   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        5.25     36   6/27/2029   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       4.375     36   4/25/2025   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       7.125  33.75   6/26/2042   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7.5   42.5               KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd        8.25     35   4/25/2018   KY     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd       5.125  35.38   6/26/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           6  38.88    4/5/2023   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd           7     44   4/21/2020   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli    6.75     17   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli   6.625     17   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli    6.75  17.38   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli   6.625  17.38   10/1/2022   KY     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    5.25   67.5   4/12/2017   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   12.75   56.1   2/17/2022   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       9  49.38  11/17/2021   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    9.75  44.57   5/17/2035   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6   38.5   5/16/2024   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  36.75  11/15/2026   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   5.375     37   4/12/2027   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA     5.5  36.75   4/12/2037   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  32.13  10/28/2022   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6   36.4  11/15/2026   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       6  35.35   5/16/2024   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA    9.75   41.7   5/17/2035   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA       9  45.25  11/17/2021   VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA   12.75  46.15   2/17/2022   VE     USD
Polarcus Ltd                  5.6  44.93   3/30/2022   AE     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     1.6148     62    5/4/2024   AR     ARS
PSOS Finance Ltd            11.75  60.13   4/23/2018   KY     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.22   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.88  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7   73.6    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.99   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.22   9/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.77   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.39   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.75   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.39   9/10/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.81   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.78   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7   73.6    7/1/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.98   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.98   6/11/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.77   6/12/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.99   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.97   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.88  12/19/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.84    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.55   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.85    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.45    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.81   9/30/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.75   7/17/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.74   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.97   6/12/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    7.75  74.99   11/8/2028   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.85    7/1/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.45    4/2/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  69.74   5/30/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  73.78   6/11/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.84    2/6/2034   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis     7.7  72.99   9/10/2029   EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis    8.45  70.55   3/19/2034   EC     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        4.125  37.25   11/1/2022   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA         5.75   36.6  10/24/2023   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        5.375  35.38   9/26/2024   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        4.125  37.38   11/1/2022   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA         5.75  39.63  10/24/2023   BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA        5.375  37.25   9/26/2024   BR     USD
Siem Offshore Inc            5.69  52.25   1/30/2018   NO     NOK
Siem Offshore Inc            5.49  51.75   3/28/2019   NO     NOK
Transocean Inc               5.05  74.75  10/15/2022   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                6.8  63.66   3/15/2038   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                7.5  65.78   4/15/2031   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                9.1  70.41  12/15/2041   KY     USD
Transocean Inc               7.45   74.9   4/15/2027   KY     USD
Transocean Inc                  8  73.55   4/15/2027   KY     USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesoro     5.25  61.99  12/29/2021   UY     UYU
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305  43.92   12/1/2039   KY     USD
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305  43.92   12/1/2039   KY     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    9.25  49.03   9/15/2027   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   11.75   49.5  10/21/2026   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   11.95   49.5    8/5/2031   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    7.75  47.38  10/13/2019   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625  65.25   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   9.375  45.85   1/13/2034   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       7  52.85   12/1/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       7     42   3/31/2038   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       9   45.5    5/7/2023   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    9.25   45.5    5/7/2028   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    8.25  44.38  10/13/2024   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte       6   43.5   12/9/2020   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625   56.5   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte    7.65  43.25   4/21/2025   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte  13.625  59.69   8/15/2018   VE     USD
Venezuela Government Inte   12.75   53.5   8/23/2022   VE     USD
Venezuela Government TICC    5.25  53.23   3/21/2019   VE     USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        10.75  25.63   2/12/2023   BR     USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        10.75  25.63   2/12/2023   BR     USD
XLIT Ltd                      6.5     70               IE     USD


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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