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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Tuesday, February 14, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 032


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BUENOS AIRES: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on $750MM Sr. Unsec. Notes
BUENOS AIRES: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to New US$750MM Notes


B O L I V I A

BANCO LOS ANDES: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' LC Deposit Ratings


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: S&P Affirms 'BB' Sovereign Credit Rating; Outlook Negative
BRAZIL: Court Suspends Rio State Governor
EIKE BATISTA: Brazil Prosecutors Charge Businessman
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: S&P Raises Rating to BB- on Better Liquidity
RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Credit Ratings

SAO PAULO STATE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Issuer Credit Ratings


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

HABROK GENERAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
INSPARO AFRICA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LCDC FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
LCDC INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
OHA AVAERO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

LA NANA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PEGASUS ADMINISTRATION: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PWP DIVERSIFIED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SPARKLE INTERNATIONAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
TRANSPACIFIC VENTURES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


C O L O M B I A

BANCO AGRICOLA: Fitch Lowers IDRs to BB-, Revises Outlook to Neg.


C O S T A   R I C A

AERIS HOLDING: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $127MM Senior Notes
INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE: Moody's Cuts CFR to Ba2; Outlook Negative


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO G&TC: S&P Affirms 'BB' Long Term Issuer Credit Rating


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Opposition "Disappointed" at News of JPS Divestment Plan


M E X I C O

MEXICO: Multinationals Say Trump Unlikely to Tear Apart NAFTA


P E R U

PERU: Offers $30,000 Reward for Capture of Former President


V E N E Z U E L A

* VENEZUELA: Iran Praises Efforts to Stabilize Oil Prices


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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BUENOS AIRES: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on $750MM Sr. Unsec. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' issue-level rating to the
province of Buenos Aires' (PBA; B-/Stable/--) senior unsecured
dollar-denominated notes for $750 million due 2023.  The province
will use the proceeds to fund social programs, and infrastructure
and other investment projects, improve the debt maturity profile
and make debt service payments.  Additionally, PBA will transfer
about 11% of the proceeds to a special municipal fund, created
under the province's 2017 budget.  At the same time, S&P's 'B-'
issue-level rating on PBA's existing 7.875% 2027 notes remains
unchanged following the $750 million add-on for a total
outstanding amount of $1.75 billion.

S&P doesn't view the new issuance or the add-on as harmful to the
province's financial profile, and S&P expects PBA's moderate debt
burden to continue supporting the province's credit profile.
Including the new issuance and the add-on, S&P estimates that
PBA's total debt stock will reach around 49% of the province's
operating revenue.  While the province's debt has risen from 45%
of operating revenue in 2015, S&P believes that the debt level is
still moderate and will be mitigated by debt repayments and
inflation, which S&P expects to reach around 20% this year.

PBA's 'B-' credit rating and 'b-' stand-along credit profile
(which is a means of assessing the intrinsic creditworthiness of
PBA under the assumption that there is no rating cap) reflect its
individual credit profile and the institutional framework in which
it operates.  PBA, like all local and regional governments (LRGs)
in Argentina, operates under a very volatile and underfunded
institutional framework.  At the same time, PBA's very weak
budgetary performance and flexibility, and its weak economy,
financial management, and liquidity are rating constraints.  On
the other hand, the province's moderate contingent liabilities and
debt burden support its creditworthiness.

Current governor, Maria Eugenia Vidal of the Cambiemos political
coalition, previously served as vice mayor of the Buenos Aires
city under Mauricio Macri, who was elected as a president in late
2015.  S&P expects the relationship between the provincial and
national governments to be strong through 2019.  As a
demonstration of this support, the national government has
provided extraordinary financial assistance to PBA and advanced
coparticipation funds, among other policies, which S&P expects to
continue over the next several years.  Although S&P views the
renewed relationship between the PBA and national governments
positively, it highlights the province's fiscal dependence on the
latter and the lack of policies that guarantee this support as
part of PBA's financial framework.  Part of the structural gap
originates from the outdated structure of Argentina's tax-sharing
coparticipation scheme and nominal caps on other funds, such as
transfers from the Fondo Conurbano.  Reforms of the revenue
distribution schemes are currently under discussion.  However, S&P
believes that they will be politically difficult to achieve, given
that changes to the coparticipation scheme require unanimous
approval by all provinces and changes to the Fondo Conurbano,
which currently benefits PBA, would likely require other provinces
to forsake part of their share.  In addition, although the
province has recently implemented spending efficiency measures,
high inflation and choppy economic performance hinder its long-
term financial planning, budgeting process, and predictability of
revenue and expenditures.

The stable outlook on PBA mirrors the one on the sovereign. The
outlook reflects renewed dialogue between LRGs and the federal
government about tackling fiscal and economic challenges in the
short to medium term.  Given that S&P don't believe that PBA could
meet the conditions to have a higher rating than the sovereign,
S&P would only consider raising its ratings on the province in the
next 12 months if S&P was to raise Argentina's foreign and local
currency ratings, along with the transfer and convertibility
assessment (T&C).  Such an upgrade would have to be accompanied by
a growing track record of the province's satisfactory long-term
capital and financial planning, as well as improved budgetary
flexibility or consistently stronger budgetary performance in the
form of operating surpluses.  At the same time, structural
improvements in the institutional framework, in which the province
operates, could help strengthen its creditworthiness.  On the
other hand, S&P could lower the ratings on PBA during the same
period if Argentina's T&C assessment weakens, if S&P was to lower
the sovereign local or foreign currency ratings, or if S&P
perceives that the province's financial commitments are
unsustainable, or that PBA faces a near-term payment crisis.

RATINGS LIST

Province of Buenos Aires
  Issuer credit rating              B-/Stable/--
  Sr. unsec. notes due 2027         B-

Rating Assigned

Province of Buenos Aires
$750M sr. unsec. notes due 2023    B-


BUENOS AIRES: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to New US$750MM Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 (Global Scale Foreign
Currency) rating to new Senior Unsecured Notes to be issued by the
Province of Buenos Aires for USD750 million due in 2023. At the
same time Moody's also said that the B3 (Global Scale Foreign
Currency) rating assigned of the Senior Unsecured Notes for
USD1,000 million due in 2027 remain unchanged after the extension
of its principal by an additional amount of USD750 million. The
ratings are in line with the province's long term foreign currency
issuer rating, which carry a stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The issuance of these new bonds due in 2023 and the reopening of
the already outstanding Senior Unsecured Notes due in 2027 (PBJ27)
for USD1,000 million have been authorized by the Provincial Law
Nß14.879 (Provincial's budget for 2017), by Governor's Decree Nß74
of 2017 and by a specific Resolution of the provincial Ministry of
Economy which set the specific conditions of the Notes. The
Province of Buenos Aires will use the net proceeds of these two
offers to fund social, infrastructure and or other public
investments projects as well as to improve the debt maturity
profile of the Province and make debt service payments.

The rated bonds constitute direct, general, unconditional and
unsubordinated obligations of the province. The new Notes due in
2023 will be denominated and payable in US dollars and will be
subject to the State of New York Law. According to the above
mentioned resolution, these Notes will amortize in three annual
installments equivalent to 33.33% of the outstanding principal the
first two of them -- in 2021 and in 2022 -- and to 33.34% the last
one in February of 2023. These Notes will pay 6.5% fixed interest
rate on a semiannual basis.

With regards to the additional amount of the Notes due in 2027
(PBJ27) they will have identical terms and conditions as the
initial 2027 Notes, except for the issue date and issue price.
After the reopening of this series, its principal will reach to
USD1,750 million.

Following the issuance of these new Notes and the additional
tranche to be issued of the Notes due in 2027 (PBJ27) coupled with
the expected debt amortization and the effect of the exchange
evolution over the provincial's foreign currency debt; Moody's
anticipates that the ratio of total debt to total revenues of the
Province of Buenos Aires will increase to 52% -approximately- by
the end of 2017 from the 50% level estimated for the end of 2016.

The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
nor anticipates changes in the main conditions that the Notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
these Notes deviate from the original ones submitted and reviewed
by the rating agency, Moody's will assess the impact that these
differences may have on the ratings and act accordingly.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns economic and
financial profiles and ratings, an upgrade of Argentina's
sovereign bonds ratings and/or the improvement of the country'
operating environment could lead to an upgrade of the Province of
Buenos Aires. Conversely, a downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings
and/or the continuation of current operating deficits coupled with
a debt to total revenues ratio rising above 55% could exert
downward pressure on the ratings assigned.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.



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B O L I V I A
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BANCO LOS ANDES: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' LC Deposit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
withdrawn all ratings assigned to Banco PYME Los Andes Procredit.
S.A., including the long and short-term local currency deposit
ratings of Ba3 and Not Prime; long and short-term foreign currency
deposit ratings of B1 and Not Prime; long and short-term local
currency Bolivian national scale deposit ratings of Aaa.bo and
BO-1; long and short-term foreign currency Bolivian national scale
deposit ratings of Aa3.bo and BO-1. Moody's has also withdrawn the
baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba3; the adjusted BCA of ba3
and the long- and short-term counterparty risk assessments of
Ba2(cr) and Not Prime(cr).

The following ratings were withdrawn:

Issuer: Banco PYME Los Andes Procredit S.A.

Long-term global local currency deposit rating, previously rated
Ba3 with negative outlook

Short-term global local currency deposit rating, previously rated
Not Prime

Long-term foreign currency deposit rating, previously rated B1
with negative outlook

Short-term foreign currency deposit rating, previously rated Not
Prime

Bolivian long-term national scale local currency deposit rating,
previously rated Aaa.bo with stable outlook

Bolivian short-term national scale local currency deposit rating,
previously rated BO-1

Bolivian long-term national scale foreign currency deposit rating,
previously rated Aa3.bo with stable outlook

Bolivian short-term national scale foreign currency deposit
rating, previously rated BO-1

Baseline credit assessment, previously rated ba3

Adjusted baseline credit assessment, previously rated ba3

Long-term counterparty rating assessment, previously rated Ba2(cr)

Short-term counterparty risk assessment, previously rated Not
Prime(cr)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings following the reorganization of
Banco Pyme Los Andes Procredit S.A. after its acquisition by Banco
Mercantil Santa Cruz concluded on February 1st 2017.

Banco PYME Los Andes Procredit S.A. is headquartered in Santa Cruz
de la Sierra, Bolivia and had total assets of Bs 5,243 million
($758.8 million) and equity of BS663 million ($96.0 million) as of
December 31, 2016.



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B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: S&P Affirms 'BB' Sovereign Credit Rating; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative Republic of
Brazil.  The outlook on S&P's long-term credit ratings remains
negative.  S&P also affirmed the short-term foreign and local
currency ratings at 'B'.  The transfer and convertibility
assessment is unchanged at 'BBB-'.  In addition, S&P affirmed the
national scale rating at 'brAA-', and the outlook on this rating
remains negative.

                              RATIONALE

Following the impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff, the
Michel Temer Administration is pursuing a corrective policy agenda
that focuses on stabilizing and slowly strengthening Brazil's
medium-term fiscal and growth trajectories.  However, political
and economic challenges remain considerable.  S&P continues to
expect a prolonged adjustment process with a slow correction in
fiscal policy amid modest growth this year and a subdued growth
trajectory.  Fiscal accounts at key local governments are in
distress, complicated by potential health and security issues.

The Temer Administration has leveraged the strength of its
Congressional base and economic team to pass a constitutional
amendment to cap spending growth over the coming decade.  This
positive first step needs to be reinforced by additional fiscal
measures, such as the social security reform currently in
Congress, to facilitate its implementation.  In the meantime,
Brazil's fiscal trajectory is one of continued primary deficits
and a high level of debt.  In 2017, S&P expects a general
government deficit of 8.6% of GDP to decline to 6.4% by 2019. This
is consistent with a general government primary deficit that
averages 1.6% in 2017-2019. Brazil's interest burden is still
high, despite the decline in 2016 associated with gains on real-
denominated currency swaps, and contributes to the large deficit.
The slightly larger change in general government debt to GDP vis-
a-vis the headline deficit incorporates some fluctuations in
central bank repurchase operations and an end to off-budget
(below-the-line) spending.

S&P expects general government debt, net of liquid assets (not
including international reserves), to rise to 67% of GDP by 2019
from 52% in 2016.  S&P expects interest to revenues to average 17%
during 2017-2019 given still-high interest rates despite expected
monetary easing.  S&P assess contingent liabilities from the
financial sector and all Brazilian nonfinancial public enterprises
(including Petrobras) as limited.  This revised assessment
considers Petrobras' improved financial profile, with a stand-
alone credit profile of 'bb-', its debt of 6% of GDP, and S&P's
assessment of a very high likelihood of extraordinary government
support if needed.

S&P's rating on Brazil reflects its view of its established
political institutions that provide important backing for economic
stability.  S&P finds that the ongoing investigations of
corruption allegations against high-profile individuals and
companies in both the private and public sectors and across
political parties increased near-term political uncertainty.
These independent investigations and subsequent prosecutions of
corrupt practices are a testament to the institutional framework
in Brazil.  However, continued solid coalition dynamics are key to
advancing the agenda put forth by the Temer Administration.

The depth and persistence of the contraction in real GDP is
pronounced.  With per capita GDP expected at US$9,814 for 2017
following three years of negative GDP growth, Brazil's growth
prospects are, in S&P's opinion, below that of other countries at
a similar stage of development.  S&P estimates that real GDP
contracted by 3.5% in 2016, and S&P expects growth below 1% in
2017 that will pick up toward 2.5% over the next several years.

Political uncertainties and spillover effects associated with the
corruption investigations and curtailment of private investment
have hit investment sentiment more broadly -- and with it, growth.
These risks have not fully dissipated, and coupled with the high
level of indebtedness of households, key corporates, and the
government, S&P expects a slow pickup in growth.  Continued
efforts to restore macroeconomic balance are critical, as is
advancing microeconomic reform to support investment and growth.
The government's agenda, among other items, includes increased
labor flexibility, renewed emphasis on private-sector
participation in infrastructure projects, and easing bureaucratic
bottlenecks.  Congress already passed legislation facilitating
increased private-sector participation in pre-salt exploration and
production.  Even following implementation, the positive impact on
growth is likely to take time.  In addition, given the proximity
of the 2018 elections, policy uncertainty may weigh on investment
in the nearer term.

Inflation dynamics have improved significantly.  Consumer price
inflation declined to 6.3% at year-end 2016 from 10.7% at year-end
2015.  The sharp increase in administered prices in 2015 has
waned, the Brazilian real has strengthened, and the credibility of
the team at the central bank has re-anchored inflation
expectations.  With inflation expectations for 2017 within the
inflation target band of 4.5% plus/minus 1.5% coupled with the
very weak economy, the bank initiated an easing cycle in November
2016, which S&P expects to continue over 2017.

In addition, Brazil's external accounts continue to adjust with
the current account deficit of 1.3% of GDP in 2016, down from the
4.2% peak in 2014.  S&P expects the current account deficit to
average about 1.5% of GDP in 2017-2019 and be fully financed by
foreign direct investment (FDI).  S&P do, however, expect narrow
net external debt to increase and average 9% of current account
receipts in 2017-2019 as the private sector taps global markets
and reserve accumulation slows amid increased global market
uncertainty.  S&P calculates its estimates of external debt on a
residency basis.  They include nonresident holdings of locally
issued real-denominated government debt estimated at about
US$132 billion as of December 2016 (about 56% of current account
receipts), down from the peak of US$153 billion in 2014.  This
reflects depreciation of the real since that time. (At year-end
2016, these holdings were still higher in reais terms vis-a-vis
2014, though lower than in 2015.)

S&P's external debt data, however, do not include debt of
approximately 40% of current account receipts raised offshore by
Petrobras and transferred in the form of FDI to the head office.
S&P does include it in Brazil's net external liability position of
305% of current account receipts in 2016.  This ratio is one of
the largest among the sovereigns S&P rates, suggesting that there
are greater risks to Brazil's external accounts should market
conditions deteriorate than it would appear looking at debt
indicators alone.  The Brazilian real is an actively traded
currency, and Brazil has lower external financing needs compared
with its current account receipts and a high level of
international reserves relative to some of its peers.

S&P's 'BB' local currency rating is the same as the foreign
currency rating.  This results from the weaknesses in Brazil's
fiscal position, which include high deficits and a high debt and
interest burden that impede policy flexibility.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is at least a
one-in-three likelihood that it could lower the ratings on Brazil
later this year.  Political dynamics remain somewhat fluid and at
risk given three years of economic contraction, rising
unemployment, heightened fiscal pressures across local
governments, and social tension.  Moreover, potential political
fallout from the proactive corruption investigations and key plea
bargain deals by private-sector participants that are in the final
stages of being processed could complicate policy implementation.
While the Temer Administration and Congress have advanced some
legislation aimed at strengthening Brazil's fiscal and growth
trajectories, given the combination of the early stage and size of
the correction needed, S&P looks for further evidence of progress
in stabilizing the economy and lower political uncertainty.
Potential for setbacks to policy proposals or policy reversals
could lead to downgrade.  Such a scenario could result, for
example, from heightened governability challenges or pressures at
the local government level spilling over to national politics.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if, in its view, political
uncertainties further dissipate, in turn reinforcing prospects for
further success in approving corrective policy measures to stanch
fiscal deterioration and strengthen GDP growth prospects.  S&P
expects that these improvements could help Brazil exit from the
current, lingering recession, facilitate improved fiscal
performance, and provide more room to maneuver in the face of
economic shocks.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Brazil (Federative Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Global Scale                          BB/Negative/B
  Brazil National Scale                 brAA-/Negative/--
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BBB-
Senior Unsecured
  Global Scale                          BB
  National Scale                        brAA-
Short-Term Debt                        B


BRAZIL: Court Suspends Rio State Governor
-----------------------------------------
Paul Kiernan at The Wall Street Journal reports that Rio state
Gov. Luiz Fernando de Souza was suspended from office by a court,
which ordered a new election, charging "abuse of economic and
political power" and saying Mr. de Souza used his position to
benefit companies that donated to his campaign.

The move, which also applied to Vice Gov. Francisco Dornelles on
the same charges, came after the state went billions of dollars in
the red while spending to host the 2016 Olympics, some of it on
contracts that prosecutors now say were marred by corruption,
according to The Wall Street Journal.

"It was proven that administrative contracts worth millions were
signed in exchange for donations," said Marco Couto, a judge on
the electoral court who voted in favor of the sanction, the report
notes.

Mr. de Souza's predecessor, Sergio Cabral, was accused of graft
and jailed in November, the report relays.  Police accused Mr.
Cabral of extracting kickbacks from inflated construction
contracts, including a costly renovation of the famed Maracana
soccer stadium ahead of the 2014 World Cup finals, the report
disloses.

All three officials are members of the ruling party of President
Michel Temer, who took over after Dilma Rouseff was impeached for
lack of fiscal oversight, the report notes.

Messrs. de Souza and Dornelles will be allowed to remain in office
while they appeal, but the decision is likely to complicate Rio's
efforts to dig itself out of a brutal fiscal crisis, the report
says.  In the first 10 months of last year, the state government
cut spending by 20% from 2014 levels and delayed salary payments
to hundreds of thousands of employees and pensioners. Even so, it
spent 22% more than it collected, the report relates.

The court's ruling, if upheld, would also deprive Mr. Temer's
party, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, or PMDB, of its most
important state governorship, at a time when the president is
dependent on broad support from Brazil's political establishment
to win votes in Congress, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'/
Negative Outlook.  Brazil's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-
Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'BB'. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'BB+' and the Short-Term Foreign and Local-Currency
IDRs at 'B'.


EIKE BATISTA: Brazil Prosecutors Charge Businessman
---------------------------------------------------
Rogerio Jelmayer and Luciana Magalhaes at The Wall Street Journal
report that Brazilian prosecutors filed charges against
businessman Eike Batista, once the country's richest person,
alleging he was involved in a scheme that paid bribes to a former
Rio de Janeiro governor.

Mr. Batista is accused of corruption and money laundering, a
spokeswoman for the prosecutor's office said. Authorities will
unveil more details about the charges during a news conference,
she said, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The businessman was arrested and jailed at the end of January as
part of a probe into allegations he paid $16.5 million in bribes
to former governor of Rio de Janeiro state Sergio Cabral while Mr.
Cabral was in office from 2007 to 2014, the report notes.

"The payment of bribes took place due to Eike's interests in
projects in the state of Rio de Janeiro, of which Sergio Cabral,
as governor, had great influence and decision-making power,"
prosecutors said in a statement obtained by the news agency.

Mr. Batista's lawyer wasn't immediately available to comment.

The former billionaire lost most of his fortune in 2012 and 2013
when his high-profile investments in oil production, shipbuilding
and logistics crumbled after his oil fields missed production
targets, the report relays.

Mr. Batista is the latest high-profile businessman to be ensnared
in the probe, which has led to long prison sentences for a string
of industrial elites who benefited from contracts of state run oil
company Petrobras, the report notes.

Prosecutors also filed charges of corruption and money-laundering
against Rio's governor, the report discloses.

Mr. Cabral was arrested in November as part of the same probe into
alleged bribery and misuse of government money, the report notes.
The former governor, who remains in prison, has denied wrongdoing,
the report adds.


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: S&P Raises Rating to BB- on Better Liquidity
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its global scale ratings on Petroleo
Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) to 'BB-' from 'B+', including its
corporate credit rating and the ratings on the senior unsecured
notes issued through the company's financing vehicles (Petrobras
International Finance Co. and Petrobras Global Finance B.V.).  The
issue-level ratings are the same as corporate credit rating,
incorporating the holding operating nature and businesses
diversification, which in S&P's view mitigate potential structural
subordination to priority liabilities at the subsidiaries' level,
and secured debt that accounts for less than 10% of total debt.
S&P don't apply recovery analysis on Petrobras because domestic
legislation doesn't provide a clear path to debt restructuring for
government-related entities (GRE) in Brazil. Therefore, S&P is not
in a position to assess the timing or procedures that would be
involved in the event of an insolvency of any GRE, as is the case
for Petrobras.

S&P also raised the company's SACP to 'bb-' from 'b-'.  At the
same time, S&P raised its Brazilian national scale corporate
credit rating on the company to 'brA' from 'brBBB-'.  The outlook
on the ratings is now stable.

The upgrade reflects S&P's view that Petrobras' liquidity has
improved significantly amid an improving governance and ongoing
liability management, which allowed the company to ease
refinancing pressures and to maintain a solid cash position.  The
capex cuts and the implementation of the new pricing policy have
also contributed to improved cash flow generation prospects and a
more balanced capital structure.  In addition, S&P sees positively
the management's focus on profitability and the ongoing overhaul
of the decision-making process, internal controls, and compliance
standards.

S&P views the "Lava Jato" corruption investigation as indicative
of Petrobras' past inability to identify critical strategic risks
and to determine and deploy meaningful risk limits and controls.
However, the company took several measures to improve its internal
controls, relationship with suppliers, decision-making process,
and governance.  These include the creation of the Governance,
Risk and Compliance department with the hiring of an independent
executive, the elimination of approvals by single individuals, a
more independent board of directors, a more realistic business
plan focused on operational safety and profitability, and the
introduction of a formal fuels pricing policy that define at least
import parity.  Due to the recent implementation of these
measures, it's currently unclear if they will prevent corruption
of a similar magnitude from occurring.  Nevertheless, Petrobras'
improving corporate and governance standards compare well with
those of its peers, in S&P's view.  In addition, they reflect a
strategy and conduct of business in a realistic manner, while
Petrobras maintains its competitive position.  As a result, S&P
changed its management and governance score on the company to fair
from weak.

S&P continues to view Petrobras' business profile as the ratings'
strongest component.  The company's exploration and production
business is sound in terms of the scale, quality, lifetime, and
replacement level of reserves.  S&P also incorporates Petrobras'
dominant market position in the other segments of Brazil's
hydrocarbon industry (refining, transportation, and distribution).
Pre-salt fields are already producing at a higher rate than
initial expectations.  Nevertheless, S&P believes that depressed
oil prices pose long-term risks to the company, given that S&P
estimates breakeven levels for pre-salt fields are $35-$40/bbl.

Main ratings constraints are now related to the company's
challenges to entrench its deleveraging, which in S&P's view,
would depend on these factors:

   -- The sustainability of its pricing policy even under
      scenarios of considerably stronger oil prices (which is
      unlikely in our base case) and changes in the government.
      Mr. Temer's appointment as Brazil's Acting President and
      deterioration in the company's credit quality--following the
      launch of a massive corruption probe-impelled Petrobras to
      improve its governance.  Therefore, S&P is concerned about
      the sustainability of new governance standards once a new
      administration takes office, because the government will
      continue to control Petrobras.  S&P believes that the
      potential partnerships in the downstream business could
      temper the impact of the government's interference in the
      fuels pricing mechanics, likely reinforcing import parity
      continuity over governmental changes.

   -- Contingencies stemming from obligations (about R$130 billion
      in legal proceedings, for which provisions are very limited)
      and the class/individual actions.  However, Petrobras'
      recent settlements with 15 individual plaintiffs might
      indicate that it should be manageable in terms of liquidity.
      The company's maintenance of a solid cash position also
      tempers the potential effect of cash drains.  The execution
      of the divestment plan and the delivery of production curve
      through higher capex efficiency.

All these factors reflect the negative assessment for comparable
rating analysis.


RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB/B' foreign and local currency
issuer credit ratings on the city of Rio de Janeiro.  S&P also
affirmed its 'brAA-' national scale rating on the city.  The
outlook remains negative.

Marcelo Crivella, of the conservative Brazilian Republican Party
(PRB), was elected as Rio's mayor in October 2016.  Mr. Crivella,
who took office in January 2017, ran on a platform of
strengthening security, shrinking the size of government, and
embracing the private-sector's role in the economy.  Since taking
office, Mr. Crivella's administration has proposed fiscal
austerity that initially center around cost-cutting measures
because they don't require legislative support.  Despite the
change in political leadership, the city has maintained strong
accountability, and S&P expects continuity in several managerial
positions.  While Rio's fiscal performance deteriorated in 2016
partly due to Brazil's recession, the new administration has
already taken steps to reduce spending.  S&P expects these
measures, along with the revenue-strengthening policies that will
likely be passed in 2017 and implemented in 2018, to support the
city's fiscal sustainability over the next several years.

Rio's financial management, which S&P views as strong, continues
to support our assessment of the city's 'bbb-' SACP.  However, S&P
caps its long-term rating on Rio at the same level as the 'BB'
global scale ratings on Brazil.  In S&P's opinion, the city
doesn't meet the conditions to have a higher rating than the
sovereign.  This is primarily due to Rio's liquidity levels,
which, although currently adequate, wouldn't be sufficient to
cover its debt service under a hypothetical stress scenario.

Yet the city's inherent strengths lead us to keep its 'bbb-' SACP
unchanged.  The SACP is not a rating but a means of assessing the
intrinsic creditworthiness of a local and regional government
(LRG) under the assumption that there's no sovereign rating cap.
The SACP is a combination of S&P's assessment of an LRG's
individual credit profile and the institutional framework in which
it operates.  All Brazilian LRGs operate under an evolving but
unbalanced institutional framework.  The current fiscal framework
was established by the 1988 Constitution, the 1997-1999
restructuring of states' debt, and the Fiscal Responsibility Law
(FRL).  S&P believes that the framework continues to present high
visibility of Brazilian LRGs' revenue sources and expenditure
responsibilities.  Likewise, S&P deems that the sovereign has
continued to provide cushion from the recession's impact through
ongoing and extraordinary transfers to LRGs, while enhancing LRGs'
compliance with the FRL.

Despite the city's role as a host of the 2016 Olympic Games in
August and the Paralympic Games in September, Brazil's economic
contraction weakened Rio's economy, which S&P expects to only
gradually recover.  The economic boost that the international
sporting events provided failed to offset the impact of the
domestic downturn.  Unemployment in the city, though lower than
the national level, rose to more than 7% in 2016 from 4.8% in
2015.  Formal job creation in Rio was negative throughout 2016,
and S&P don't expect to see substantial signs of economic recovery
until at least mid-2017.  S&P expects Brazil's real GDP to grow
only 0.9% in 2017, following a 3.3% contraction in 2016.
Nevertheless, S&P believes that the city's fairly high revenue
base -- though average globally -- will continue to support Rio's
creditworthiness, with a GDP per capita that S&P estimates at an
average of $16,200 for the past three years.

The recession has stressed Rio's budgetary flexibility and
performance.  While the city's capex levels have historically been
high, particularly due to the preparation for hosting the Games,
S&P expects them to drop to around 9% of total spending in 2017
due to current economic woes.  At the same time, S&P believes it
will be difficult for the city to significantly raise revenue
given the weak economy and the need for legislative approval for
tax reforms.  S&P expects Rio's own-source revenue to continue
representing around 65% of its operating revenue through 2019.
S&P also believes that the city's operating balance will further
deteriorate in 2017 -- reaching a deficit of 3.6% of operating
revenues from a surplus of 1.9% in 2016.  This will come from
continued tax revenue weakness given the delay in the city's tax
revenues to respond to any uptick in economic activity, larger
interest payments, and rising healthcare and education spending,
particularly due to the fiscal crisis at the state level.  S&P
expects the city's operating balance to gradually strengthen after
2017, thanks to the gaining momentum in economic recovery and the
administration's fiscal austerity measures, resulting in an
operating surplus of 2.1% of operating revenue by 2019.
Nevertheless, S&P believes that a sharp cut in Rio's capex will
temper the strain on its operating balance; S&P expects the city's
deficit after capital revenues and spending to average 4.3% of
total revenue in the next three years.

In part because Rio's new administration doesn't plan on funding
any new, large investment projects amid its fiscal belt-
tightening, S&P don't expect the city to procure significant
levels of new debt beyond those it already signed.  Therefore, S&P
expects the city's debt burden to continue declining, reaching 56%
of operating revenue by 2019 from 67% at the end of 2016.  These
levels are significantly lower than 85% in 2015, due to the
implementation of a federal law that retroactively lowered the
interest rate on LRGs debt that they owe to the federal
government.  Following implementation of the law in 2016, this
type of debt for Rio dropped to R$748 million in 2016 from
R$6.5 billion in 2015.

In addition to the city's low debt burden, S&P believes that Rio
has moderate contingent liabilities.  The city incorporates all
but one government-related entity (GRE) into its finances, debt,
and liquidity reserves.  This GRE is Companhia de Desenvolvimento
Urbano da Regiao do Porto do Rio de Janeiro S/A (CDURP), a mixed-
purpose company whose main function is to implement projects and
public services in the city's port.  As of Nov. 30, 2016, CDURP
had assets of R$5 billion, net worth at R$243 million, and
liabilities for R$4.8 billion.  The company doesn't have loans
from banks.  Additionally, the city has these public-private
partnerships:

   -- Porto Maravilha, for which CDURP is the public counterparty;
   -- The light rail vehicle (VLT) that connects the city's port
      area with its downtown; and
   -- Barra Olympic Park.

Additionally, the city has concessions for a sewage treatment
service, Saneamento Zona Oeste, a zoo, and a toll road.

Rio's liquidity is adequate, in S&P's opinion.  S&P estimates that
the city's internal liquidity is around R$2.9 billion, though S&P
expects Rio's liquidity ratio to be somewhat volatile, given the
fluctuations in the city's cash level following the change in
administration in January 2017.  While S&P expects Rio's liquidity
to cover debt service by around 2.3x in 2017, the city's liquid
assets dropped to R$1.9 billion in December 2016 from
R$3.9 billion in January 2016, as a result of Rio's growing
financing needs, along with the change in administration and the
settling of current liabilities.  S&P believes this drop, along
with continued weak budgetary performance in 2017, will lead to
some volatility in the city's liquidity ratio.

S&P assesses Rio's access to external liquidity as limited.  This
assessment considers Brazil's Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA) of '6'.  S&P's BICRAs, which evaluate and
compare global banking systems, are grouped on a scale from '1' to
'10', ranging from what S&P views as the lowest-risk banking
systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').  S&P expects
that the availability of external financing will continue to be
restricted given Brazil's current economic slump.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is a greater
than one-in-three likelihood that it could lower the ratings on
Rio in the next year if S&P was to downgrade Brazil, given that
the city doesn't meet the criteria to have a higher rating than
the sovereign.  On the other hand, S&P could revise the outlook on
the city to stable during the same period to mirror a similar
action on the sovereign.


SAO PAULO STATE: S&P Affirms 'BB' Issuer Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its global scale 'BB' long-term
foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on the state of
Sao Paulo.  S&P assigned a 'bb+' SACP to the state.  The SACP is
not a rating but a means of assessing the intrinsic
creditworthiness of a local and regional government (LRG) under
the assumption that there's no sovereign rating cap.  S&P also
affirmed its national scale 'brAA-' rating on the state.  The
outlook on the long-term foreign and local currency and national
scale ratings remains negative.

The ratings on Sao Paulo mainly reflect its satisfactory financial
management, average budgetary flexibility compared with those of
its international peers, and strong budgetary performance, which
S&P expects to remain in 2017 and 2018.  The state has maintained
adequate fiscal measures during the recession and it has
historically complied with the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL),
which S&P views positively.  Despite Brazil's economic slump, Sao
Paulo's own-source revenues remained at around 90% of total
revenue, and S&P expects the state to maintain this level in 2017
and 2018 as the economy recovers slowly.  Also, S&P expects Sao
Paulo to maintain satisfactory financial management and strong
budgetary performance as a result of ongoing revenue and
expenditure controls that have reduced deficits.

The SACP results from the combination of S&P's assessment of an
LRG's individual credit profile and the institutional framework in
which it operates.  All Brazilian LRGs operate under an evolving
but unbalanced institutional framework.  However, S&P considers
that the individual credit profile of the state of Sao Paulo is
stronger than those of its domestic peers, such as the state of
Minas Gerais.  Only the city of Rio de Janeiro has an SACP one
notch higher than the state of Sao Paulo.

The state economy is stronger than those of its national peers;
however, S&P assess Sao Paulo's economy as weak because of its
contraction in 2016 and the annual GDP per capita of just below
$16,000 in 2017 and 2018, according to S&P's estimates.  As a
result of Brazil's recession, the state's main tax revenue has
shrunk during the last couple of years.  Sao Paulo has limited
ability to cut its operating expenses because more than 70% of
which consists of debt interest payments, state government
payroll, and transfers to municipalities.  Exacerbating these
budgetary constraints, the state has limited access to external
liquidity and the borrowing caps that the FRL imposes on LRGs.
However, S&P believes that Sao Paulo's liquidity position has
slightly improved as a result of the debt renegotiation agreements
with the central government, but it's likely to remain less than
adequate in 2017 and 2018.  S&P expects Sao Paulo's debt burden to
remain moderate, consistently below 120% of operating revenue in
the next few years.  The state's contingent liabilities also are
moderate, in S&P's view.

Sao Paulo has also a strong budgetary performance, in S&P's view,
compared with those of its domestic and international peers.  In
S&P's 2017 base-case scenario, it estimates that operating surplus
will be above 4% of operating revenue and the deficit after
capital expenditures (capex) will remain below 1% of total
revenue.  S&P don't expect Sao Paulo's overall budgetary
performance to weaken in 2017 and 2018 because S&P's base-case
scenario assumes that economy will start growing.  For Sao Paulo
to maintain its currently strong budgetary performance, it would
have to maintain strict controls over its operating and capital
expenses.  Deficits after borrowings close to 5% of total revenue
could hurt the state's finances amid limited external liquidity.

S&P expects Sao Paulo to maintain its 2017 capex levels similar to
those in the past two years.  S&P's base-case scenario assumes
that the state will keep investing around 6% of total expenses, if
it has access to loans of more R$4 billion annually from
government-owned banks -- mainly Banco do Brasil and Caixa
Economica Federal -- and from multilateral lending agencies.

Sao Paulo's consolidated debt reached R$277.9 billion as of the
end of 2016 or equivalent to 150% of its expected operating
revenue for that year.  As a result of the debt renegotiation
agreements with the central government, Sao Paulo's stock debt
dropped by R$17.4 billion at the end of last year, and interest
payments represented less than 4% of the state's operating
revenue.  After 2018, S&P estimates that interest payments will
represent above 5% of operating revenue and total debt service
would be between 8% and 9% of annual operating revenue.  With very
limited external financing expected for 2017 and 2018, S&P expects
the state's debt levels to remain moderate.  Sao Paulo's debt
level is still higher than some of domestic peers such as Santa
Catarina but lower than those of its global peers' with the same
rating such as the Autonomous Community of Valencia (BB/Stable/B).
The state's contingent liabilities are moderate; S&P's analysis
incorporates the impact from the cross-default clauses in Sao
Paulo's government-related entities' loan agreements with the
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES).

The state's satisfactory financial management is one of the main
credit strengths.  S&P believes that the administration will
remain committed to fiscal sustainability through revenue and
expenditure balance, well-documented assumptions in the budget
process, as well as transparency and willingness to continue
payment debt obligations.  Any change in these aspects could
weaken its credit quality.

S&P considers Sao Paulo's liquidity as less than adequate based on
S&P's view of its moderate debt service costs and limited access
to external liquidity.  S&P also incorporates in its base-case
scenario the federal government's restrictions in authorizing the
state's new borrowings.  S&P expects Sao Paulo to have a
liquidity-to-debt service coverage ratio of about 84% in 2017
compared with around 60% last year, mostly due to the debt
renegotiation with the central government.  In 2017, S&P expects
debt service to reach R$12.6 billion or around 6% of the state's
operating revenues.  Beyond 2018, S&P estimates debt service to
still remain below 9% of operating revenue as the grace period
ends.

The negative outlook on Sao Paulo reflects S&P's view that there
is at least a one in three likelihood of a downgrade in the next
12 months if S&P was to lower the rating on Brazil.  S&P doesn't
believe that the state could have a higher rating than the
sovereign.  Also, the negative outlook reflects the weakening
trend in the institutional framework, and the downward
reassessment on the latter could weaken the state's credit
quality.  S&P could also take a negative rating action if Sao
Paulo's deficits after capex rise more than expected and the
state's liquidity position deteriorates beyond S&P's base case,
though S&P doesn't expect it this year.  S&P could revise the
outlook to stable to mirror a similar action on the sovereign.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


HABROK GENERAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Habrok General Partner, Ltd, on Dec. 13, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Elian Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Limited
          Lynden John, Authorized Signature
          Jodi Brown, Authorized Signature
          Lynden John - email lynden.john@elian.com
          Telephone: +1 (345) 815-1456


INSPARO AFRICA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Insparo Africa Fixed Income Master Fund,
on Dec. 16, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          c/o Cate Barbour
          Walkers
          6 Gracechurch Street
          London EC3V 0AT
          United Kingdom
          Telephone: +44 207 2204970


LCDC FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of LCDC Fund, on Dec. 14, 2016, resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Yip Ka Kay
          Suite 3406, Jardine House
          1 Connaught Place
          Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone + 011 852 2360 32798
          Facsimile: + 011 852 2360 2799


LCDC INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of LCDC Investment Management Limited, on Dec.
14, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Yip Ka Kay
          Suite 3406, Jardine House
          1 Connaught Place
          Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone + 011 852 2360 32798
          Facsimile: + 011 852 2360 2799


OHA AVAERO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Oha Avaero Genpar Ltd., on Dec. 14, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road
          George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


LA NANA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------
The shareholders of La Nana, on Dec. 12, 2016, resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Feb. 3, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


PEGASUS ADMINISTRATION: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Pegasus Administration Limited, on Dec.
15, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


PWP DIVERSIFIED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of PWP Diversified Equities Offshore Fund
Ltd., on Dec. 12, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road
          George Town Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


SPARKLE INTERNATIONAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Sparkle International Holding Limited, on Dec.
16, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 24, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Kevin Butler
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7374
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


TRANSPACIFIC VENTURES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 15, 2016, the members of
Transpacific Ventures Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate
the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 31, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Mike Green
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue, George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1(345)814-2223
          Facsimile: +1(345)949-8258



===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


BANCO AGRICOLA: Fitch Lowers IDRs to BB-, Revises Outlook to Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
of Banco Agricola, S. A., and Banco Davivienda Salvadoreno, S.A.,
to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The Rating Outlooks are revised to Negative
from Stable. Fitch has also downgraded Agricola's Viability Rating
(VR) to 'b' from 'bb-', and Davivienda Sal's VR to 'b' from 'b+'.
The banks' Short-Term IDRs were affirmed and the National ratings
are unaffected. A full list of rating actions is at the end of
this rating action commentary

Fitch's rating actions and Outlook revisions follow the recent
downgrade of El Salvador's sovereign rating to 'B' from 'B+', its
Sovereign Rating Outlook revision to Negative from Stable, as well
as the country ceiling downgrade to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The downgrade
reflects El Salvador's harsh political environment that has
imposed additional limits to the government's financing options as
well its ability to take further measures to restore public
finances, while the Negative Outlook reflects the persisting risks
to meeting financing needs for 2017 in the absence of a political
agreements.

The National scale ratings of these banks and the ones related to
their respective local holding companies in El Salvador
(Inversiones Financieras Banco Agricola, S.A. and Inversiones
Financieras Davivienda, S.A.) remain unaffected, as national
ratings are local relative rankings of creditworthiness within a
particular jurisdiction, and the relative strengths and weaknesses
remain unchanged.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATINGS (SRs)

The IDRs of Agricola and Davivienda Sal are driven by the support
of their respective parents, both rated above the El Salvador
sovereign (Bancolombia and Banco Davivienda (Davivienda) at
'BBB'/Outlook Negative). The IDRs of Agricola and Davivienda Sal
have been downgraded to 'BB-' as they are constrained by El
Salvador's country ceiling of 'BB-'. The rating downgrades do not
imply any changes in Fitch's assessment of their respective
parent's capacity or propensity to provide support to their
subsidiaries, should it be required.

The SRs of both banks are affirmed at '3' given that Fitch's
assessment of the probability of support to these banks by the
respective shareholders is moderate. The agency's opinion is based
on the relative importance of the operations in Central America to
their respective parents, and on the significant reputational risk
that default would pose to their respective parents.

VR

Agricola's and Davivienda Sal's VRs have been downgraded to
reflect the high influence of the operating environment in the
banks' performance and prospects and its high exposure to El
Salvador's debt. While Agricola's VR was above the sovereign, the
current rating action reflects that both Agricola and Davivienda's
VRs are intrinsically linked to a worsened economic situation in
El Salvador. As per Fitch's criteria, banks are rarely rated above
the sovereign and, in the agency's opinion, the deteriorated
Salvadorian operating environment constrains these banks' ratings
to the sovereign's creditworthiness.

Agricola's VR is also moderately influenced by its sound financial
performance, asset quality above local peers and still-good
capital base. The institution maintains a leadership position in
the Salvadorian market and a stable and granular deposit base,
which is the core of its funding structure.

Davivienda's VR is moderately influenced by its modest
profitability, aligned with industry average, sound but decreasing
capital position, and adequate asset quality. Davivienda's funding
profile is robust, also underpinned by a large and granular
deposit base.

AGRICOLA SENIOR TRUST

The LT-IDR of Agricola Senior Trust's (AST) loan participation
notes was downgraded to 'BB-' to 'BB'. The rating of the notes is
at the same level of Agricola's Long-Term IDR, reflecting that the
notes are AST's senior obligations, secured by the trust's sole
asset, a 100% participation in a senior unsecured loan from Bank
of America N.A. to Agricola.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs and VRs

Agricola's and Davivienda Sal's IDRs are sensitive to a change in
the El Salvador Sovereign Rating and Country Ceiling. The Negative
Outlook implies that any negative rating action on the sovereign
would also lead to a similar action on Davivienda, Agricola and
Agricola Senior Trust's IDRs and in both banks' VRs.

SUPPORT RATING

The SR is potentially sensitive to any change in assumptions
around the propensity or ability of Bancolombia and Banco
Davivienda to provide timely support to their respective
subsidiaries. This scenario is unlikely given the relative
strength of both banks relative to the El Salvador Sovereign
rating.

The rating actions are:

Banco Agricola, S.A.

-- Long-Term IDR downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB'; Outlook revised
    to Negative from Stable;
-- Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B';
-- Viability Rating downgraded to 'b' from 'bb-';
-- Support Rating affirmed at '3'.

Agricola Senior Trust

-- Loan participation notes downgraded to BB- from BB.

Davivienda Salvadoreno, S.A.

-- Long-Term IDR downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB'; Outlook to
    Negative from Stable;
-- Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B';
-- Viability Rating downgraded to 'b' from 'b+';
-- Support Rating affirmed at '3'.



===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================


AERIS HOLDING: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on $127MM Senior Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Ba2 rating of Aeris Holding
Costa Rica S.A.'s senior notes issuance of US$127 million. The
outlook is stable.

The rating action reflects Moody's views that Aeris holds certain
characteristics that limit its exposure to the deterioration in
the credit quality of Costa Rica as signaled in the recent Moody's
rating action on the Government of Costa Rica (Ba2 negative).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2 rating and stable outlook of Aeris reflects certain
characteristics that limit its exposure to the Government of Costa
Rica: substantial international revenues, access to international
financing, a transparent tariff setting framework under the
Contrato de Gestion Interesada ("CGI"), and the track record and
profile of its international sponsors, Airports Worldwide Inc.
(unrated) and CCR S.A. (Ba3 negative).

Moody's rating and outlook is also supported by the project
finance features under the Notes, including a trust managed cash
waterfall, a 6-month (one semiannual payment) debt service reserve
account, a forward looking 3-month Operation and Maintenance
Reserve Account, limitations on additional indebtedness,
distribution lock-up tests, and a Capital Expenditure Prefunding
Account, equivalent to around 20% of the total Capital Program.

Passenger traffic over 2015 and 2016 has been strong. Traffic grew
by 10.8% in 2015 and by 11.3% in 2016. This performance produced
key financial metrics in line with expectations. According to
preliminary financial information for 2016, Cash interest coverage
("CIC", cash flow available for debt service / interest) is
approximately 2.6x and Funds from operations ("FFO") to debt is
7.3%.

Notwithstanding, Moody's recognizes that Aeris has various
linkages with the Government of the Costa Rica that could limit
its underlying credit profile if the credit quality of Cost Rica
deteriorates further. These include the reliance on the CGI with
the government under which the airport operates, the tariff
setting process that requires government approval and the airport
exposure to the economic, political and event risks of Costa Rica.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's does not expect upward pressure on the rating in the near
term. However, upward pressure could develop over the medium term
if Aeris' passenger growth exceeds projections on a sustainable
basis leading to consistent stronger credit metrics with Moody's
debt service coverage ratio above 1.8 times. In addition, an
upgrade would need to be supported by Moody's assessment that the
linkages with the government do not have any material negative
impact on Aeris' credit profile.

Downward pressure on the debt rating could develop due to
sustained decreases in passenger traffic and cash flow generation
as a result of an economic slowdown, or if there are significant
capital expenditure overruns, or Aeris' credit metrics weaken on a
sustained basis with cash interest coverage ratio consistently
below 2.0 times or its FFO/Debt ratio was consistently below 7.5%.
Significant departure from the Capex program, leading to lower
tariffs and an impacted ability to generate cash flow for debt
service, could also lead to a lower rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Privately
Managed Airports and Related Issuers published in December 2014.


INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE: Moody's Cuts CFR to Ba2; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 the senior
unsecured rating and the Corporate family ratings of Instituto
Costarricense de Electricidad and the senior secured rating and
Corporate family ratings of Reventazon Finance Trust. The outlook
remains negative.

Downgrades:

Issuer: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)

-- Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2
    from Ba1

Downgrades:

Issuer: Reventazon Finance Trust

-- Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1

-- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2 from
    Ba1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)

-- Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Reventazon Finance Trust

-- Outlook, Remains Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of ICE's ratings is prompted by the February 9, 2017
downgrade of Costa Rica's government bond rating to Ba2 from Ba1
with a negative outlook. The rating action on the Reventazon
Finance Trust's ratings follows the downgrade of ICE's rating as
the Project is very highly dependent on ICE's financial
performance given the obligations that ICE has assumed under the
contractual arrangements as Sponsor, EPC contractor, lessee and
operator.

Given that ICE is fully owned by the Costa Rican government, it
falls under the scope of Moody's rating methodology for
government-related issuers (GRIs). The Costa Rican government
guarantees certain loans executed by ICE (around 10% of its
outstanding indebtedness) but does not guarantee ICE's debt
obligations rated by Moody's (around US$1 billion of notes).
However, Moody's believes that there is a "high" likelihood of
government extraordinary support in the case of financial distress
for several reasons including reputational given the company's
status as a major government-owned entity and its strategic
importance to the country's economy overall. Furthermore, Moody's
views that the government of Costa Rica and ICE are exposed to
common risk factors as capture by the "high" default dependence
assigned to ICE.

ICE's Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA), which is a representation
of the group's intrinsic creditworthiness before taking into
account possible extraordinary support from the sovereign is ba3,
based on a scale of aaa to ca which aaa indicates the highest
credit quality. ICE's BCA captures its key role as an autonomous
government entity and its dominant position as the largest
vertically integrated utility in the country.

The BCA factors in their fully regulated nature and the overall
credit supportive framework. Moody's opinion is moderated by some
inconsistencies in the implementation of the cost recovery
mechanisms during the last two tariff reviews procedures. The BCA
captures the deterioration in the consolidated key credit metrics
that result from the increased leverage associated with the
Reventazon hydro-project, which was recorded off-balance until
year-end 2016. Moody's anticipates that ICE's credit metrics will
remain robust for ICE's Ba-rating category with Retained Cash flow
(RCF) to debt and Cash flow (CFO pre-W/C) interest coverage in
excess of 9% and 3.0x, respectively.

The BCA is tempered by the modest size of ICE's operations and its
service territory. Moody's acknowledges the diversification
benefits associated with the telecommunications operations but
there is limited upside potential to the BCA given the challenges
faced by ICE in this sector. The BCA is also tempered by the
issuer's exposure to foreign exchange risk and corporate
governance weaknesses including ICE's qualified audit opinions.
ICE's failure to comply with all its financial covenants is
another credit concern because certain pieces of ICE's outstanding
indebtedness include cross-default provisions. However, Moody's
notes that the violated covenants are embedded in the multilateral
loans which alleviates Moody's concerns as Reventazon Finance
Trust's ratings reflect the ratings of ICE as this hydro-electric
project is highly dependent on the utility's financial performance
given the obligations that ICE has assumed under contractual
arrangements as Sponsor, EPC contractor, lessee, and operator.

The negative rating outlook of ICE and Reventazon Finance Trust
reflects the negative outlook of the Ba1 Costa Rican government
rating and Moody's expectation that the high implied extraordinary
support and dependence levels from the sovereign will not change.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

In light of the current negative outlook of the ratings of ICE and
the Costa Rican government, limited prospects exist for the
ratings of ICE and Reventazon Finance Trust's to be upgraded over
the near to medium term.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

ICE's ratings are likely to come under pressure following a
downgrade in the sovereign rating or in the case of lower than
anticipated implied sovereign support or if ICE's BCA is also
reviewed downward. Negative rating pressure on the BCA could
surface from a deterioration in the credit supportiveness of the
Costa Rican regulatory framework or if ICE's indebtedness
increases significantly above anticipated levels such that the
credit metrics deteriorate and cash flow interest coverage falls
below 2.0x or RCF to debt declines below 6% for an extended
period. In addition, ratings could be downgraded if the issuer is
not able to comply with its covenant-package under its loan
agreements.

A downgrade of ICE's ratings would also likely result in an
downgrade of Reventazon Finance Trust's ratings. Moody's
recognizes the benefits to Noteholders of investing through a
Participation Agreement in a IDB B-loan given their preferred
creditor status including the historical performance of IDB-loans
to distressed borrowers. However, the Ba2 ratings assigned to ICE
and to the Notes, presume a very low probability of default under
the Notes and a corresponding low probability that ICE would
become a distressed borrower whereby the benefits of having
preferred creditor status would be a factor in assessing default
and recovery risks for bondholders.

The methodologies used in rating Instituto Costarricense de
Electricidad (ICE) were Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities
published in December 2013, and Government-Related Issuers
published in October 2014. The principal methodology used in
rating Reventazon Finance Trust was Regulated Electric and Gas
Utilities published in December 2013.

Headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica, ICE is a government-owned
vertically integrated electric utility as well as an integrated
telecommunications service provider. ICE is the largest electric
utility in Costa Rica accounting for the vast majority of the
country's transmission assets as well as over 75% of the installed
capacity and electricity generation. The group's market share in
the distribution of power also exceeds 75% after considering ICE's
98.6% ownership stake in Compa§ia Nacional Fuerza y Luz that
serves the capital.



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


BANCO G&TC: S&P Affirms 'BB' Long Term Issuer Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long- 'BB' and short-term 'B'
issuer credit ratings on Banco G&T Continental S.A. (Banco G&TC).
The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains at 'bb+'.  The
outlook is still negative.

The ratings on Banco G&TC continue to reflect its large market
share because it's one of the top financial institutions in the
country.  They also reflect the bank's projected risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) ratio of 5.4% on average for the next two years due
to its internal capital generation capacity, a reduced dividend
payment, and several capital injections that have strengthened
Banco G&TC's equity in the past few years.  S&P's assessment also
takes into account the bank's highly dollarized balance sheet and
stable funding base, relying on retail deposits with manageable
short-term obligations.  The ratings on the Republic of Guatemala
(BB/Negative/B) limit those on Banco G&TC because S&P don't
believes the latter would withstand a stress scenario for capital
and liquidity, considering the bank's significant exposure to the
sovereign.  This is because S&P rarely rates financial
institutions above the sovereign long-term rating because, during
sovereign stress, the latter's regulatory and supervisory powers
may restrict a bank's or financial system's flexibility, and
because banks are affected by many of the same economic factors
that cause sovereign stress.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Opposition "Disappointed" at News of JPS Divestment Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Phillip Paulwell, Opposition Spokesman on
Energy, has expressed disappointed that the government is going
ahead with the divestment of its remaining shares in the Jamaica
Public Service Company.

In the Throne Speech, Governor General Sir Patrick Allen confirmed
that the government will begin the process of selling the shares
during the 2017/2018 fiscal year, according to RJR News.

Mr. Paulwell was not pleased. "I think it is a bad time to do
that, especially because we know that 292 megawatts of the
existing JPSCo assets will taken out of operation very shortly,
and that is going to diminish the value of the shares," he told
RJR News, the report notes.

Mr. Paulwell also expressed dismay at news that the government
will not be participating in the LNG investment project that the
JPS is about to embark on, the report relays.

"That's a major, major disappointment for me because that is how
the government, I believe, could expand and retain the value (of
its shares) in the JPSCo," he added.

In response, Energy Minister Andrew Wheatley said Mr. Paulwell's
reaction was premature, the report notes.

"The Throne Speech did not capture all the elements (of the
divestment plan) and so what he got was just a summary, but I'm
sure that over the next couple of days and weeks he will get a
full appreciation as it relates to the plans for the JPS and
generally the energy sector," he said, adding that Paulwell's
comments were from "a very misinformed position," the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'
with a Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior
unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at
'B'. The Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country
Ceiling is affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and
Local Currency IDRs at 'B'.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


MEXICO: Multinationals Say Trump Unlikely to Tear Apart NAFTA
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that an organization comprising the 50 largest
multinational companies operating in Mexico said that they would
pay close attention to the actions taken by US President Donald
Trump's administration but were not overly concerned and regarded
the potential dismantling of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) as unviable.

"It's a reason to be very carefully observant, but we're convinced
that it's a great opportunity for Mexico to reassess its strategic
pillars in the trade area," the president of the Executive Council
on Global Enterprises (CEEG), Frederic Garcia, told EFE.

The CEEG comprises nearly 50 multinational firms that are market
leaders in Mexico, including Coca-Cola, ExxonMobil and Microsoft,
companies that provide 500,000 direct jobs and 1.5 million
indirect jobs and account for 10 percent of the country's gross
domestic product (GDP), 11 percent of its exports and 40 percent
of total foreign direct investment, according to EFE News.

The report notes that top executives at those companies have
informed the CEEG and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto that
they have no intention of reducing their activities in the Aztec
nation or ceasing to invest or produce, Garcia said, adding that a
current pause on investment was due to temporary uncertainty.

In less than 15 years, the CEEG intends to bring about a more
competitive Mexico by making the country more globalized,
efficient and inclusive, Mr. Garcia said, the report relays.

Specific objectives include making Mexico one of the world's top
five exporters and doubling its labor productivity, as well as
doubling the nation's GDP per capita and creating and sustaining a
million new formal jobs annually, the report notes.

With respect to NAFTA, a trade deal that has linked the United
States, Mexico and Canada since 1994 but which Trump has
repeatedly criticized as a destroyer of American jobs, the CEEG
noted that nearly 150 organizations and companies in the US food
and agriculture sector have urged the president to preserve the
gains achieved as a result of that trade agreement, the report
discloses.

Mr. Garcia also noted that in the auto industry the North American
countries' productive processes were closely integrated, the
report relays.

"I seriously doubt that President Trump would cast aside the
relationship with Mexico," he said, adding that in practice it
would be very difficult to undo those trade ties, the report adds.



=======
P E R U
=======


PERU: Offers $30,000 Reward for Capture of Former President
-----------------------------------------------------------
Associated Press reports that Peruvian authorities moved to detain
a former president tied to a region wide-graft scandal, offering a
$30,000 reward for his capture and alerting Interpol that he may
be in the U.S. or Israel.

Peru's government said that it has information that Alejandro
Toledo is in San Francisco, according to Associated Press.  Mr.
Toledo, who governed Peru from 2001 to 2006, is a visiting scholar
at Stanford University in California, the report notes.

Authorities have also reached out to Israel because they said Mr.
Toledo may have plans to take advantage of his wife's dual
Belgian-Israeli citizenship to seek refuge in the country, which
doesn't have an extradition treaty with the South American nation,
the report relays.

The international manhunt comes a day after a judge issued an
arrest order for Mr. Toledo, finding that the evidence presented
by prosecutors suggested there was a high probability he had
received bribes from a Brazilian construction firm that has
admitted to paying off officials throughout Latin America, the
report discloses.

The report says that Mr. Toledo is accused of taking some $20
million in bribes from Odebrecht SA to favor the company so it
could win a contract to build a highway from Brazil to Peru's
Pacific Coastline.
Mr. Toledo, who was last believed to be in Paris weeks ago, has
denied any wrongdoing, the report notes.

Odebrecht SA last year admitted in a plea agreement with the U.S.
Justice Department to paying some $800 million in bribes to
politicians throughout Latin America including $29 million in
Peru, the report says.

A spokeswoman for Mr. Stanford said that Mr. Toledo isn't an
employee of the university but as a scholar has use of office
space and access to libraries to conduct research for a book he is
preparing on education in Latin America, the report relays.
Although not paid by Stanford, he receives a stipend for his
research through a gift, the report notes.

"Stanford upholds every person's right to due process. Should
there be an arrest, his visiting scholar status would be on hiatus
until the outcome of a trial or judicial process," Lisa Ann Lapin
said in an email, declining further comment, the report adds.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


* VENEZUELA: Iran Praises Efforts to Stabilize Oil Prices
---------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the Iranian foreign minister praised on
Venezuela's efforts as one of the key factors that has helped
stabilize oil prices at current levels.

Iranian Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif made these remarks during a
meeting held in Tehran with his Venezuelan counterpart Delcy
Rodriguez, according to EFE News.

According to a statement posted on the Iranian foreign ministry
website, Mr. Zarif expressed his satisfaction with Iranian-
Venezuelan relations, and praised the efforts exerted by Caracas
in its capacity as the current president of the Non-Aligned
Movement, the report notes.

EFE News relays that Mr. Rodriguez is on an official visit to
Tehran, accompanied by Venezuelan oil minister Nelson Martinez,
and is also scheduled to meet with Iranian oil chief Bijan Namdar
Zanganeh.

The Venezuelan minister explained on her Twitter account that the
meeting highlighted the deep bilateral relations and the strategic
cooperation between the two countries, the report discloses.

At the end of 2016, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) and other oil producers, including Russia, agreed
to limit crude oil extraction in order to stabilize international
prices, the report notes.

Mr. Zarif said Iran is ready to support international cooperation
and help maintain the oil price agreement in the interest of all
OPEC member and non-member states, the report relays.

Mr. Rodriguez arrived in Tehran after a visit to Moscow, where she
met with her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov.

The Russian minister highlighted the close cooperation between
Moscow and Caracas in the framework of OPEC and recalled the
contribution of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in the
coordination of oil prices, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 5, 2016, Fitch Ratings affirmed Venezuela's Long-Term
Foreign-and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (LT FC/LC IDR)
at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed the sovereign's Short-Term
Foreign Currency (ST FC) IDR at 'C' and country ceiling at 'CCC'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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