TCRLA_Public/170223.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Thursday, February 23, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 39


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BANCO HIPOTECARIO: Posts ARS136.4 Million Net Income in 4th Qtr
PAMPA ENERGIA: Merges With Petrobras Argentina
CHUBUT PROVINCE: Moody's Rates USD188,126,336 Bills Program 'B3'


B E L I Z E

BELIZE: S&P Puts 'CC' Rating on CreditWatch Neg. on Missed Payment


B R A Z I L

BANCO DO BRASIL: Seeks Faster Digital Banking Rollout
INTERCEMENT PARTICIPACOES: Fitch Lowers IDRs to B+; Outlook Stable


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BLUECREST QUANTITATIVE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
BLUECREST QUANTITATIVE MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CICC BRIDGE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
EXUMA OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
FOCUS 250: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

GLADE BROOK: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GTN CAYMAN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LG III: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LGB - HV CR: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

LGB II - HV CR: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LGB IIA - HV CR: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SPECTRUM FIXED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SPECTRUM WORLDWIDE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
WEISS MULTI-STRATEGY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

WILDHORN FUND: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
WILDHORN GENERAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
WILDHORN LP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


E L   S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to US$601.085MM Sr. Notes
EL SALVADOR: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to $601.08MM Bonds


M E X I C O

CEMENTOS PACASMAYO: S&P Affirms BB+ CCR; Outlook Stable
CEMEX SAB: To Sell 15.6% of Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, Keep 7.4%


P U E R T O    R I C O

OFG BANCORP: Reports 4Q16 and 2016 Results


                            - - - - -



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


BANCO HIPOTECARIO: Posts ARS136.4 Million Net Income in 4th Qtr
----------------------------------------------------------------
Banco Hipotecario S.A. reported fourth quarter 2016 consolidated
results.

Total net income for the year was ARS615.3 million, compared to
ARS1,085.8 million of 2015.  Net income for the fourth quarter was
ARS136.4 million, compared to ARS103.6 million and ARS522.7
million of last quarter and same quarter of previous year,
respectively.

Net financial margin for the year was ARS2,819.4 million, compared
to ARS3.034,5 million for 2015. Net financial margin for the
quarter was ARS776.0 million, compared to ARS576.4 million of last
quarter and ARS1,211.6 million of same quarter of last year.

Aggregated net income from services of ARS3,888.4 million, 28.5%
higher than 2015. Net income from services for the quarter was
ARS1,144.4 million, 13.3% higher than previous quarter and 35.9%
higher than fourth quarter 2015.

Loans to the private sector increased 17.4% in the quarter and
31.1% YoY.

Deposits decreased 1.8% in the quarter and 6.9% YoY while our
financial indebtedness increased 64.5% in the quarter and 129.7%
YoY.

NPL increased to 2.7 % from 2.0% of 2015. Coverage ratio was
89.3%.

Equity ratio of 11.6%, compared to 13.8% of 2015.

In the second quarter of the year, the Bank reopened its Series 29
for US$ 150 million, while in the fourth quarter issued ARS6,078.3
million at Badlar + 2.5% bonds due 2020 in the international DCM.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Oct. 10, 2016, S&P Global Ratings said that it assigned its 'B-'
issue-level rating on Banco Hipotecario S.A.'s class XL senior
unsecured notes due in 2020 for the equivalent amount in Argentine
pesos of up to $400 million.


PAMPA ENERGIA: Merges With Petrobras Argentina
----------------------------------------------
Pampa Energia S.A. disclosed that on February 16, 2017, the
General Extraordinary Shareholder's Meeting approved the merger of
Pampa -- as the surviving company -- with Petrobras Argentina,
Petrobras Energia Internacional S.A. and Albares Renovables
Argentina S.A. -- as the absorbed companies -- in accordance with
the Preliminary Merger Agreement executed on December 23, 2016
(the 'Merger'). The approval of the Merger was resolved by a
majority vote of 99.99% of the shares with a right to vote.

Moreover, the General Extraordinary Shareholder's Meeting of
Petrobras Argentina approved the Merger by a majority of 92.98% of
the shares with a right to vote, having registered 0.16% of votes
against it, 0.03% of abstentions and 6.83% of shareholders that
did not participate of the Shareholders Meeting.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Jan.
12, 2017, Fitch Ratings has assigned Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'B' and 'BB-',
respectively, to Pampa Energia S.A.  The Rating Outlook is Stable.


CHUBUT PROVINCE: Moody's Rates USD188,126,336 Bills Program 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned B3 (Global Scale local currency) and Baa2.ar (Argentina
National Scale) ratings to the Province of Chubut's USD188,126,336
Short-Term Treasury Bills Program. The ratings are in line with
the province's long term issuer ratings, which carry stable
outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Short-Term Treasury Bills Program was originally created by
Resolution Nß 163/12 of the provincial Ministry of Economy for a
maximum amount of USD50 million which was subsequently increased
to USD188.1 million by Resolution Nß1/16. On February 8, 2017
Resolution Nß 17 of the Nation's Secretary of Finance authorized
the issuance conditions of the bills within the program. The
assigned debt ratings reflect Moody's view that the willingness
and capacity of the Province of Chubut to honor these short-term
treasury notes is in line with the provincial's long-term credit
quality as reflected in the B3/Baa2.ar issuer ratings.

According to the term sheet reviewed by Moody's, the short-term
bills will all be issued in local currency, will mature in up to
365 days with bullet amortization. After the issuance of these new
Bills up to the maximum authorized amount, Moody's does not
anticipate an increase in the Province's total debt because of the
following key reasons: 1) the maximum amount under the 2017 Short
Term Bills Program is the same as the current program, 2) the
province will use a portion of the proceeds of this offer to repay
existing debts and 3) the province expects an increase in its
total revenues for this fiscal year.

The applied ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
or anticipates changes in the main conditions that the notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
any of the classes under this program deviate from the original
ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's will
assess the impact that these differences may have on the ratings
and act accordingly.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns economic and
financial profiles and ratings, and upgrade of Argentina's
sovereign bonds ratings and/or the improvement of the country'
operating environment could lead to an upgrade of the Province of
Chubut's.

Conversely, a downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings and/or further
systemic deterioration or idiosyncratic risks arising in this
Province -- with for instance a debt to total revenues ratio
sustained at a 75% level - could exert downward pressure on the
ratings assigned and could translate in to a downgrade in the near
to medium term.


===========
B E L I Z E
===========


BELIZE: S&P Puts 'CC' Rating on CreditWatch Neg. on Missed Payment
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'CC' long-term foreign currency
sovereign credit rating on Belize on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'CC' long-term local currency
rating.  The outlook is negative.  S&P also affirmed the 'C'
short-term foreign and local currency ratings.  Finally, S&P
affirmed its transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment at 'CC'.

                            RATIONALE

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view that there is at
least a one-in-two likelihood that it will lower the rating on
Belize to 'SD' within 90 days.

The government of Belize failed to pay the US$13 million
semiannual interest coupon due on Feb. 21, 2017, of its US$526.5
million bond due in 2038.  The bond, which has a step-up interest
rate, will begin accruing interest at 6.767% in August 2017 from
the existing 5%.

The terms of the bond incorporate a stated grace period of 30
days, and the government hopes that a final deal with the
creditors will be met before the expiration of the grace period.
The government says that it will make the payment only after
reaching an agreement.  According to S&P's methodology, it will
lower the issuer credit rating to 'SD' and the affected issue to
'D' if the payment is not made within stated grace period.

Belize is currently in debt rescheduling discussions with the
creditors of the 2038 bond.  On Jan. 12, 2017, the government
published a consent solicitation statement that proposes two
amendments to the terms of the 2038 bonds.  The first proposal is
to delay the beginning of the payment of the principal to 2036
instead of August 2019.  The second proposal is to reduce the
interest rate on the bonds through maturity to 4%.  The period
during which holders of Belize's 2038 bond may respond to the
offer has been extended three times.  The offer is now scheduled
to expire on Feb. 24, 2017.  In S&P's view, the government's
announcement is tantamount to an intention to undertake an
exchange offer or similar restructuring that S&P would classify as
distressed, even though it has not yet completed.  Even if the
coupon payment is made, once the restructuring is officially
launched, and assuming we characterize it as a distressed exchange
as per S&P's criteria, it will lower the issue rating on the
eligible bond to 'D' and the issuer credit rating on Belize to
'SD'. Upon completion of the restructuring, S&P will reassess the
sovereign's general credit standing, most likely raising the
foreign currency rating to the 'CCC' or low 'B' categories.

S&P believes the government is less likely to default on its local
currency-denominated debt, and it has made no mention of its
intention to restructure this debt.  However, given that Belize
has limited monetary policy and exchange rate flexibility, S&P's
local currency rating is the same as its foreign currency rating.

                            CREDITWATCH

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch within the three months.
Absent payment of Belize's interest coupon within the stated grace
period of 30 days, S&P will downgrade Belize to 'SD' and the
affected issue to 'D'.  A exchange offer or similar restructuring
that S&P would classify as distressed within the next three months
will lead to the same rating action.  Given the relatively high
likelihood of the debt restructuring, S&P expects to maintain the
CrediWatch Negative even if the government makes the payment on
the coupon within the 30-day grace period.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Rating Placed On CreditWatch Negative
                               To                  From
Belize
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign Currency             CC/Watch Neg./C     CC/Neg./C

Ratings Affirmed

Belize
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Local Currency                        CC/Neg./C
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   CC
Senior Unsecured                       CC
Short-Term Debt                        C


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO DO BRASIL: Seeks Faster Digital Banking Rollout
-----------------------------------------------------
Guillermo Parra-Bernal at Reuters reports that Banco do Brasil SA
will accelerate the rollout of digital banking products for 63
million clients as a way to boost profitability and reduce
operational costs, Chief Executive Officer Paulo Rogerio
Caffarelli said.

In a conference call to discuss fourth-quarter results, Mr.
Caffarelli reiterated that the state-controlled lender will focus
solely on cutting the return on equity gap it has with private-
sector lenders, according to Reuters.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July
7, 2016, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB/B' global scale
ratings on Banco do Brasil S.A., its 'BB' ratings on the bank's
senior unsecured debt, its 'B' ratings on the bank's subordinated
debt, and its 'B-' rating on the bank's junior subordinated debt.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'brAA-' national scale ratings
on its core subsidiary, Ativos S.A. Securitizadora de Creditos
Financeiros.  The outlook remains negative.


INTERCEMENT PARTICIPACOES: Fitch Lowers IDRs to B+; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of InterCement Participacoes
S.A. to 'B+' from 'BB-' and the Long-Term National Rating to 'A-
(bra)' from 'A+(bra)'. Fitch has also downgraded Cimpor's
unsecured notes due 2024 'B+' from 'BB-' and assigned a Recovery
Rating (RR) of 'RR4'. The 'RR4' on the notes reflects average
recovery prospects in event of default. The Rating Outlook is
Stable. A full list of rating actions follows at the end of this
release.

The rating downgrades reflect InterCement's high leverage and
limited ability to reduce leverage to less than 5.0x in the medium
term. The continued deterioration of the Brazilian cement market
will pressure the company's cash flow generation in 2017, which
will not be offset by the expected improvements in operating
margins and profits in Argentina and Paraguay.

Fitch's base case indicates InterCement's net leverage to remain
around 7.0x, per the agency's methodology, during 2017 with a
modest decline to below 6.5x in 2018, without incorporating any
asset sale. As an exercise, considering an asset sale of around
EUR500 million, Fitch's forecasts net leverage to decline to 6.0x
during 2017, which would have remained high for the 'BB' rating
category.

The Stable Outlook reflects an expectation that the company will
sell assets and that is leverage will remain below 6.0x in 2017.
The inability to sell assets would like lead to additional
negative rating actions.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Contraction in Brazil's Cement Market to Persist in 2017

Cement producers in Brazil will continue to face further headwinds
up to mid-2018 as industry fundamentals remain weak amid the
country's economic malaise. Cement sales dropped 12% in the
country during 2016. This follows a 9% decline in 2015. Fitch
expects cement volumes to show meaningful recovery only in 2018,
as high unemployment levels, elevated inventories of real estate
property and a dearth of infrastructure projects provide strong
headwinds.

Severe Deterioration of EBITDA Generation in Brazil; Currency
Depreciation Across Others Regions

InterCement's weak performance largely reflects the deterioration
of its key markets and also local currency depreciation. During
the nine-months period ended on Sept. 30 2016, consolidated sales
volumes dropped by 15%, with Brazil declining 19%. Brazil accounts
for 20% of EBITDA, a decline from its historical average of 42%.
Around 70% of InterCement's EBITDA was originated within countries
rated 'B' or lower by Fitch.

Challenge to Recover Operating Cash Flow

Fitch projects consolidated EBITDA margins to remain around 19%
during 2016 with some improvement in 2017 as a result of cost
cuttings initiatives and operational efficiencies. The company has
taken several measures to increase capacity utilization rates by
mothballing some facilities and reducing fixed costs. Fitch
expects InterCement to generate around EUR395 million of EBITDA in
2016 and EUR422 million in 2017. These figures compare negatively
with EBITDA of EUR519 million in 2015 and EUR628 million in 2014.

Due to the severe decline in volumes and currency depreciation,
InterCement's cash flow from operations was negative by EUR 8
million during the LTM period ended Sept. 30 2016. Free cash flow
was negative by EUR150 million, due to EUR88 million of capex and
EUR54 million of dividends.

High Leverage; Limited Improvement If Asset Sale Strategy is
Successful

InterCement's capital structure is unbalanced. The limited
operating cash flow improvement expected in 2017 will not be
sufficient to significantly deleverage. Fitch projects net
leverage of around 7.4x by year-end 2016, declining toward 7.0x in
2017, without asset sale. Fitch's leverage ratio calculation
differs from the net debt/EBITDA financial covenant that
InterCement is subject to on its financial debt. The company is
tested annually on a 4.5x net debt/EBITDA ratio. During last
December, 2016 the company successfully renegotiated a waiver for
this covenant with no associated fee.

Fitch believes that InterCement has some flexibility to enhance
its capital structure in the medium term. During 2015, the company
raised EUR52 million through the sale of nonstrategic assets in
Brazil (quarries in Guarulhos and Barueri) and Paraguay (16% of
the capital of Iguazu Cimentos). It also raised an additional
EUR52 million with the sale of an indirect minority participation
in BAESA (hydroelectric plant). If the company is able to raise
EUR500 million through asset sales, Fitch's forecasts net leverage
would be about 6.0x during 2017.

No Equity from Camargo Correa is Expected in the Short Term

Fitch's base case does envisage any capital support from Camargo
Correa S.A (Camargo Correa; rated 'BB-'/Outlook Stable),
InterCement's controlling shareholder, in the short term. Camargo
Correa just completed an asset sale in which it raised BRL5.9
billion of cash. Fitch expects Camargo to use these resources to
manage its own refinancing needs and shall leave InterCement to
manage its leverage issues.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS:

-- 18% decline in Brazilian volumes in 2016 and 6% in 2017;
-- Slightly improvement in operating margins following capacity
shutdowns during 2015 and 2016;
-- Capex levels around EUR125 million;
-- Maintenance of adequate liquidity profile, efficient liability
management strategy to avoid refinancing risks in the short term.
-- No asset sale is incorporated in Fitch's base case.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative Rating Action: Fitch would view a combination of the
following as negative to credit quality:

-- Inability to reduce net leverage to below 6.5x within the next
12 to 18 months;
-- Deterioration in InterCement's sound liquidity profile, or
increasing refinancing risks.

Positive Rating Action: Factors that could lead to a positive
rating action:

-- Additional proactive steps by the company to materially
bolster its capital structure in the absence of high operating
cash flow.

-- Faster than expected deleverage to below 5x on a sustained
basis, and consistent FCF generation to pay down gross debt
levels.

LIQUIDITY

InterCement's cash flow challenges continue to weaken its
liquidity position and have heightened refinancing risks during
2018 - 2019. As of Sept.30, 2016, InterCement reported cash and
cash equivalents of EUR559 million, which compares to total debt
of EUR3.3 billion. The company had debt amortizations of EUR431
million between the end of 2016 and 2017. InterCement faces debt
amortizations of EUR394 million in 2018 and EUR802 million in
2019. Approximately 50% of the company's debt is denominated in
euros and 18% in dollar. InterCement typically hedges 24 months of
its short-term maturities through derivative contracts.


FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

InterCement Participacoes S.A.
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'B+' from 'BB-';
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR to 'B+' from 'BB-';
-- Long-Term National Rating to 'A-(bra) from 'A+(bra).

InterCement Brasil S.A.
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'B+' from 'BB-';
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR to 'B+' from 'BB-';
-- Long-Term National Rating to 'A-(bra) from 'A+(bra).

Cimpor Financial Operations B.V.
-- Senior Unsecured Notes unconditionally guaranteed by
InterCement Brasil S.A. due 2024 'B+' from 'BB-'.

Fitch has also assigned a Recovery Rating RR4 to the notes. The
'RR4' Recovery Rating (RR) on the notes reflects average recovery
prospects in event of default.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BLUECREST QUANTITATIVE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Bluecrest Quantitative Equity Fund Limited
on Dec. 21, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aisling Clarke
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


BLUECREST QUANTITATIVE MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Bluecrest Quantitative Equity Master Fund
Limited on Dec. 21, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aisling Clarke
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


CICC BRIDGE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of CICC Bridge Matrix Core Fund Ltd. on
Dec. 21, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 24, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Natasha Morgan
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


EXUMA OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Exuma Offshore Fund Ltd, on Dec. 21, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Coatue Management, L.L.C.
          c/o Sophia Leavett
          Ogier
          89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9009
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877


FOCUS 250: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------
The members of Focus 250 Ltd., on Dec. 21, 2016, resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 24, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Kevin Butler
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7374
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


GLADE BROOK: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Glade Brook Global Offshore Fund Ltd. on
Dec. 19, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aisling Clarke
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Global Alternative Investments Corporation
on Dec. 19, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aisling Clarke
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


GTN CAYMAN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of GTN Cayman Ltd. on Dec. 21, 2016, resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 24, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Marc Randall
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


LG III: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of LG III - HV CR Limited on Dec. 19, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aisling Clarke
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


LGB - HV CR: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of LGB - HV CR Limited on Dec. 19, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aisling Clarke
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


LGB II - HV CR: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of LGB II - HV CR Limited on Dec. 19, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aisling Clarke
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


LGB IIA - HV CR: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of LGB IIA - HV CR Limited on Dec. 19, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aisling Clarke
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


SPECTRUM FIXED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Spectrum Fixed Income Fund, on Dec. 18, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mr. Christos Kongorozis
          c/o Yury Anikin
          4 Annis Komninis Street
          Solea building, flat 801
          1060 Nicosia
          Cyprus


SPECTRUM WORLDWIDE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Spectrum Worldwide Investments Ltd., on
Dec. 19, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ms. Elena Sizova
          Yury Anikin
          Yiannoy Kranidioti 5, 2
          Koyklia, 8510
          Paphos, Cyprus
          e-mail: info@agafinance.ch


WEISS MULTI-STRATEGY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 21, 2016, the members of
Weiss Multi-Strategy Partners II (Cayman) Ltd. resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 25, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Norman Chan
          PO Box 1344 KY1-1108
          dms House George Town
          20 Genesis Close
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


WILDHORN FUND: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of The Wildhorn Fund on Dec. 16, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ewan Christian
          29 Queen Anne's Gate
          London SW1H 9BU
          UK
          Telephone: +442073402825
          Facsimile: +448707108448


WILDHORN GENERAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Wildhorn General Partner Limited, on
Dec. 16, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ewan Christian
          29 Queen Anne's Gate
          London SW1H 9BU
          UK
          Telephone: +442073402825
          Facsimile: +448707108448


WILDHORN LP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of The Wildhorn L.P. on Dec. 15, 2016,
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ewan Christian
          29 Queen Anne's Gate
          London SW1H 9BU
          UK
          Telephone: +442073402825
          Facsimile: +448707108448


=====================
E L   S A L V A D O R
=====================


EL SALVADOR: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to US$601.085MM Sr. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' issue rating on the Republic
of El Salvador's senior unsecured notes issuance of US$601.085
million.  The notes are due in February 2029 and have a coupon of
8.625%.  The proceeds from the issuance will be used to refinance
short-term debt and to cover government expenses carried over from
fiscal 2016.  The rating on the notes is the same as the long-term
foreign currency sovereign credit rating on El Salvador.

S&P's ratings on El Salvador reflect a continued erosion of its
fiscal and debt profiles and rising concerns about its access to
adequate liquidity to meet its funding requirements for 2017 and
2018.  Moreover, the ratings reflect the country's weakening
prospects for economic growth in a context of lower investor
confidence and the need to undertake fiscal adjustment to
stabilize the government's growing debt burden.

The negative outlook on El Salvador reflects the at least one-in-
three likelihood of a downgrade in the next 12 months if continued
political stalemate worsens the sovereign's access to funding over
the next year, constraining its ability to meet its debt
maturities and fund its fiscal deficit.  It also reflects S&P's
expectation of slow economic growth for 2017-2019.  Failure to
undertake a timely and effective fiscal adjustment, as well as
improve access to liquidity, could result in a downgrade.

RATINGS LIST

Republic of El Salvador
Sovereign Credit Rating             B-/Negative/B

New Rating

Republic of El Salvador
Senior Unsecured
  US$601 mil. notes due 2029         B-


EL SALVADOR: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to $601.08MM Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a senior unsecured B3
rating to the Government of El Salvador's bond for $601.085
million maturing on February 28, 2029. The coupon is 8.625%

The B3 rating on El Salvador's bond mirrors the Government of El
Salvador's B3 (negative outlook) issuer rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's downgraded El Salvador's issuer and long-term debt ratings
on 07 November to B3 from B1 and assigned a negative outlook. The
key drivers for the two-notch downgrade to B3 are: (1) The
significant increase in liquidity risks as (i) the government is
already under financial stress and has been forced to prioritize
payments and (ii) short-term debt continues to rise reaching
record-high levels that are starting to challenge local banks'
capacity and willingness to absorb additional amounts. (2) The
political impasse in the Legislative Assembly that leaves the
government without necessary approval to issue sufficient long-
term debt to retire short term debt and fund its operations.

The country's "low (+)" economic strength reflects the small scale
of the economy (GDP: $26 billion, at par with B median: $23
billion) and moderate GDP per capita, above the B median ($8,300
PPP basis versus B median: $7,823). Economic growth has been
lackluster over the past decade, averaging just 1.7% annually, one
of the lowest among countries rated by Moody's and less than half
the 4.7% median for B-rated peers. Low growth is partly
attributable to El Salvador's historically low rates of investment
and low productivity. In addition, the country relies upon
remittances and foreign direct investment from, and exports to,
the US, which leave the country exposed to a downturn in the US
economy or a shift in US economic policies.

Institutional strength is "low (-)", reflecting, on the one hand,
World Bank governance indicators that rank better than the median
for the B peer group, and on the other, limited fiscal policy
effectiveness in addressing negative debt trends. El Salvador
ranks better than B-peers in government effectiveness, regulatory
quality and control of corruption. At the same time, policy making
has been ineffective in addressing negative fiscal and debt
trends, and political impasse has left the government without
necessary approval to issue long term debt and fund its
operations.

Government financial strength is "moderate". In spite of repeated
efforts at fiscal consolidation, partial implementation of fiscal
adjustment measures and continued weak growth have made it
difficult for the government to narrow the fiscal deficit on a
sustained basis. Government deficits averaged 3.7% of GDP over the
last five years and non-financial public sector (NFPS) debt
reached 62% of GDP in 2016.

Susceptibility to event risk is "high (-)", reflecting the
escalating government liquidity risks due to the rise of short-
term debt, which has strained local banks absorption capacity.
Since the rising liquidity risks are derived from legislative
gridlock and political polarization, political risk is set at
"moderate". Aside from the liquidity risks derived from LETEs, the
rest of the government's debt service commitments are manageable.
The sovereign has annual gross financing needs of around 5.2% of
GDP and has an average maturity of 12 years.

Vulnerability to external shocks is related to the country's
dependence on imported commodities (food and oil). The current
account posts recurrent deficits averaging 5.1% of GDP in the last
five years. Given relatively weak FDI inflows at an average of
1.3% of GDP during the last five years, El Salvador relies on
external debt to cover its current account deficit. External debt
amounted to 60% of GDP and 137% of current account receipts in
2016, above 42% and 116% of the B-median respectively.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the risk that an additional
agreement between the main political parties in the Legislative
Assembly could prove elusive, failing to normalize the funding
situation of the government and further straining its liquidity
position.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook, an upward movement in the rating is
unlikely at this time. The outlook could move to stable if the
government is able to materially reduce government liquidity
risks. The reduction of liquidity risks could come in the form of
an additional agreement between the FMLN and ARENA to approve a
second tranche of long-term debt issuance, sufficient to retire a
significant portion of short-term debt paper. Clarity on how a
fiscal adjustment will be implemented, in compliance with the
newly approved Fiscal Responsibility Law and/or under an IMF
program, would be supportive of the stabilization of the outlook.

Moody's would downgrade El Salvador's B3 ratings if it appeared
unlikely that an additional agreement allowing the government to
access long-term funding would be reached this year, since this
would materially increase the probability of a credit event. Even
though Moody's does not rate El Salvador's short-term government
debt, the further escalation of financial stress would impact the
credit profile of the government's long-term debt.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


CEMENTOS PACASMAYO: S&P Affirms BB+ CCR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Cementos Pacasmayo
S.A.A. (CPAC) to stable from positive.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'BB+' corporate credit and issue-level ratings on
CPAC.

The outlook revision reflects CPAC's operating and financial
results which were below S&P's previous forecast, and its
expectation that the deleveraging trend and cash flow metrics'
improvement will take longer than anticipated to materialize.  In
2016, the company's sales growth and EBITDA margin took a hit from
the execution delays of large infrastructure projects and lower
construction activity in Peru.  Moreover, the higher-than-expected
cash outflows, including working capital requirements, capital
expenditures (mainly related to a slight postponment of the
Piura's capex from 2015 to 2016), and dividend distributions
reduced sharply the company's cash balance to about PEN80 million
in year-end 2016 from PEN158 million in 2015.  Consequently,
CPAC's adjusted leverage at 2.5x and discretionary cash flow (DCF)
to debt of -3.5% in 2016, were weaker than S&P's previous base-
case scenario of 1.8x and 9.5%.

CPAC's ratings continue to reflect the large infrastructure gap in
Peru, which S&P expects should gradually translate into higher
cement consumption in the second part of 2017, together with the
robust demand for housing improvement and self-construction.  S&P
also incorporates CPAC's leading market position in northern Peru,
resulting in above-average profitability compared with those of
its industry peers.  The company also benefits from a strong
retail distribution network, increasing operating efficiencies,
and ability to reduce costs and to raise its prices, all of which
mitigated recent cement volume losses.  In S&P's view, the Piura
plant will also raise CPAC's EBITDA margin close to 34% in the
next few years, reflecting additional operating efficiencies,
including lower transportation and energy costs, and the
elimination of clinker imports.  In S&P's view, the mitigating
factors are the company's narrow band of products, geographic
concentration in northern Peru, and smaller scale of operations
compared with those of other global cement producers.
Consequently, in S&P's view, these factors expose the company to
the industry cyclicality in Peru.

S&P's financial risk profile assessment incorporates its
expectation that CPAC' stop-line and profitability will gradually
improve in the next 12 months, particularly in the second half of
2017, amid higher public and private spending on infrastructure
projects in the northern part of Peru, coupled with additional
operating efficiencies at the Piura plant.


CEMEX SAB: To Sell 15.6% of Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, Keep 7.4%
------------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that Cement
giant CEMEX S.A.B. de C.V. said that it will sell 15.6% of Grupo
Cementos de Chihuahua SAB in a secondary share offering for around
$240 million, not the full 23% stake that it had planned to
relinquish.

Cemex priced 51.8 million GCC shares, including overallotments, at
MXN95 Mexican ($4.63)a share.

The price is at the low end of the 95-115 peso range that Cemex
had expected for the shares, according to The Wall Street Journal.
The Monterrey-based company will remain with 7.4% of GCC, and also
has a minority stake in Camcem, a controlling company with a
majority stake in GCC that resulted from GCC's corporate
restructuring last year, the report notes.

The offering, to be carried out on the Mexican stock exchange and
via a private placement outside of Mexico, was expected to close
around Feb. 15, the report relays.

The sale is part of Cemex's asset-divestment plan, which it has
been using to lower debt, the report discloses.  The company sold
assets last year for around $2 billion, including a cement plant
in Texas, and two terminals and a building materials business in
Texas and New Mexico to GCC for $306 million, the report notes.

Cemex lowered its debt last year by $2.3 billion, and increased by
$500 million its debt-reduction target for 2016-2017 to as much as
$4 billion, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings raised its global scale ratings
on CEMEX S.A.B. de C.V. and its subsidiaries, CEMEX Espana S.A.,
CEMEX Mexico S.A. de C.V., and CEMEX Inc. to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  S&P
also raised its national scale ratings on these companies to 'mxA-
/mxA-2' from 'mxBBB/mxA-2'.  At the same time, S&P raised its
global scale issue-level rating on CEMEX's senior secured debt to
'BB-' from 'B+'.  S&P also raised its national scale issue-level
ratings to 'mxA-' from 'mxBBB', on the company's local currency
senior unsecured debt.  The recovery rating on all CEMEX's rated
senior debt remains at '3', which indicates that bondholders can
expect a meaningful (50%-70%, in the higher band of the range)
recovery in the event of a payment default.  The outlook is
stable.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================

OFG BANCORP: Reports 4Q16 and 2016 Results
------------------------------------------
OFG Bancorp reported results for the fourth quarter and year ended
December 31, 2016.

Net income available to shareholders increased to $12.1 million,
or $0.27 per share fully diluted, from $11.7 million, or $0.26 per
share fully diluted, in 3Q16 and a loss of $4.4 million, or
($0.10) per share, in the year ago 4Q15.

Compared to 3Q16, results included increases of 13.8% in net
interest income after provision and 11.7% in banking and wealth
management revenues, while non-interest expenses fell 4.6%.

The Oriental Bank franchise continued to deliver strong
performance with loan production of $258.0 million, the highest
quarterly level during 2016; a 3.9% year over year increase in
customer deposits; and a 5% annual account growth.

Credit quality remained strong as the non-performing loan rate at
3.46% fell to its lowest level in five quarters, and early and
total delinquency rates declined from 3Q16 and 4Q15 to 3.31% and
6.49%, respectively.

Major performance ratios improved from both 3Q16 and 4Q15,
including return on average assets of 0.96%, return on average
tangible common equity of 7.31%, efficiency ratio of 55.36%, and
tangible common equity ratio of 10.33%.

A full text copy of the company's financial result is available
free at:

                          https://is.gd/ZTbkLx


As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 14, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services downgraded OFG
Bancorp Preferred Stock rating to CCC from CCC+/Watch Neg.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *