TCRLA_Public/170303.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Friday, March 3, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 45


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Discloses Record Wheat Harvest
BANCO MACRO: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
BANCO SUPERVIELLE: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDRs; Outlook Stable
BBVA BANCO: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating


B R A Z I L

BANCO SANTANDER: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
ODEBRECHT SA: Looking to Reach Settlements With LatAm Prosecutors
VALE SA: CEO Murilo Ferreira to Step Down in May


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CONSECTOR PARTNERS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
CORUM FUND: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
CP AFFLUENCE: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
CP STRATEGIES: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
EVERBRIGHT CAPITAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

EXELION ESTATE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
MIRAN MULTI STRATEGY: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
RAINBOW PROPERTIES: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
TARAH HOLDINGS: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
YUAN ZHU: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report


C O L O M B I A

EMPRESA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES: Fitch Affirms BB+ IDR


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Leader Warns Against Exporting to Just 1 Nation


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Bonds Trade Up as Investors React to Cost Cutting


M E X I C O

GRUPO EMBOTELLADOR: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Remains Negative


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Sovereign Credit Ratings


                            - - - - -



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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Discloses Record Wheat Harvest
-----------------------------------------
Alianz News reports that the Argentine government disclosed a
record wheat harvest of 18.3 million tons for the 2016-2017
season, a 62 percent increase over last year, authorities said.

"This is the most important harvest in the history of the
Argentine Republic and for us it's a starting point in
management," said Agriculture Minister Ricardo Buryaile at a press
conference, according to Alianz News.

The report notes that the figure exceeds the government's forecast
and imply that there will be 11 million tons of wheat for export
and a 45 percent increase in cropland devoted to the grain.

The record was achieved despite the fact that many of the
country's most important production areas have been affected by
poor weather conditions over the past year, the report relays.

The decline in output in those areas was compensated for by
increases in other parts of the country, which is among the
world's largest wheat producers, the report notes.

"We always rely on the agricultural sector thinking that it is a
dynamic sector, a growing, thriving sector," said the minister,
who added that the figures show that the Mauricio Macri government
"was not wrong" to adopt various measures in its first year in
office, including reducing export taxes, the report relays.

Minister Buryaile said that the results were achieved because
"predictability" had been returned to producers and as many as 20
international markets had been opened up, the report notes.

"After 20 years, the country has recovered a balanced rotation
between pulses and soybeans that is what is going to allow it to
have sustainability in output in the medium term and continue
growing," Deputy Agriculture Minister Luis Urriza said, the report
relays.

The ministry also released other figures that are still not final,
including the fact that the corn harvest will exceed 40 million
tons, with 24 million tons of that going to exports, the report
discloses.

During the 2016-2017 season, the Argentine government estimates
that it will attain the objective of 130 million tons for all
agricultural products combined, says the report.

Minister Buryaile also commented on the government's aim to
strengthen fiscal reforms to eliminate "unfair" taxes on producers
and the halt in Argentine lemon imports ordered by the US
administration of Donald Trump, the report notes.

The minister said that both on the lemon issue and the process to
resume sales of Argentine beef in the US -- suspended since 2001
due to health restrictions that were lifted last year -- Argentina
had taken all the necessary sanitary and legal steps, as a result
of which it hopes for good news in the coming weeks, the report
relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Jan. 30, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 rating
to the Government of Argentina's US$3.25 billion bond due 2022 and
the US$3.75 billion bond due 2027. The outlook on the Government
of Argentina's rating is stable.

On Oct. 17, 2016, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Fitch Ratings has affirmed Argentina's sovereign
ratings as:

   -- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
      (IDRs) at 'B', Outlook Stable;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign Currency bonds at 'B';

   -- Country Ceiling at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B'.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.


BANCO MACRO: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Macro S.A.'s Foreign and Local
Currency Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B' and its
Viability Rating (VR) at 'b'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS AND VR
Despite recent improvements in Argentina's economic policy
framework and normalizing relations with foreign creditors, the
still adverse operating environment is the principal driver of
Macros' VR and IDRs. In Fitch's view, a reduction in regulatory
risk, a correction of macroeconomic imbalances and economic
recovery, will take time to materialize.

Macro's ratings also factor in the bank's sound and stable
franchise, adequate and resilient earnings, well-controlled asset
quality, high loss absorption capacity, as well as its stable
funding and good liquidity. Macro focuses primarily on low- and
middle-income individuals and small- and medium-sized companies,
ranking fourth among private sector banks with a market share of
5.5% of the banking system by assets at October 2016.

Macro has a relatively higher risk appetite than its closest peers
due to its middle market, retail focus. Nevertheless, it
demonstrates sound risk control. Non-performing loans (NPLs)
represented 1.5% of gross loans at September 2016 (1.6% as of
December 2015), in line with the private sector peers. Loan
impairment charges have also improved slightly to 1.4% of average
gross loans at September 2016 (1.6% at December 2015) while
maintaining ample reserve coverage equivalent to 153.4% of NPLs.

Macro's capitalization has historically been sound, supported by
strong internal capital generation and earnings retention. Fitch
core capital (FCC) recovered to 17.3% of risk weighted assets at
September 2016 (14.8% at December 2015) after exceptionally strong
asset growth in 2015 caused a modest deterioration in capital
metrics. While the bank plans to continue growing over the medium
term, either organically or through acquisitions, Fitch expects
Macro's capitalization ratios to remain adequate.

Macro's financial performance is supported by solid and
diversified earnings, well-contained operating costs and stable
provisioning, comparing favorably to the banking system average.
In addition, Macro's main funding source is its ample retail
deposit base. As of September 2016, customer deposits accounted
for 75.1% of total funding liabilities. The bank's deposit base
shows a certain degree of concentration, partially explained by
its financing agent business. As of December 2015, top 20
depositors represented 19.2% of total deposits. In Fitch's
opinion, the risk of this concentration is mitigated by the bank's
adequate liquidity. As of September 2016, liquid assets (cash,
bank deposits, and trading securities) represented 58.2% of
customer deposits.

Ratings on Macro's senior, unsecured issuances are in line with
the bank's long term IDR.

SUBORDINATED SECURITIES
Macro's subordinated medium term notes are rated one notch below
Macro's VR of 'b', reflecting loss severity. The securities, which
comply with local Tier II capital requirements, are subordinated
to all senior unsecured creditors.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
The Support Rating of '5' and the Support Rating Floor of 'NF'
reflect that, although possible, external support for Macro cannot
be relied upon given the sovereign's track record.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS AND VR
Macro's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings would likely move in line
with a downgrade of Argentina's sovereign rating. In addition,
Macro's ratings could be affected in the event of a material
deterioration in asset quality, earnings, and/or loss absorption
capacity. Fitch considers it unlikely that Argentine banks could
be rated above the sovereign, making any upside potential in
Macros's ratings contingent on positive developments in the
sovereign rating.

SUBORDINATED SECURITIES
Due to the current compression in the rating of Macro's
subordinated issuances, a potential upgrade of the bank's VR will
not necessarily result in a similar action on outstanding
subordinated notes.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
Changes in the SRs and SRFs of Macro are highly unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed Banco Macro's ratings:

-- Foreign Currency Long-term IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;

-- Foreign Currency Short-term IDR at 'B';

-- Local Currency Long Term IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;

-- Local Currency Short Term IDR at 'B';

-- Viability Rating at 'b';

-- Support Rating at '5';

-- Support Rating Floor at 'NF';

-- USD400 million Tier II subordinated medium term notes at
    'B-/RR6'.


BANCO SUPERVIELLE: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDRs; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Supervielle S.A.'s Foreign and
Local Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'. The
Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR AND IDRs

Banco Supervielle's Viability Rating (VR) and IDRs are driven by
the still adverse economic and operating environment, albeit some
structural recent improvements of Argentina's policy framework
could benefit the bank's performance. The ratings also consider
the bank's improved capitalization, its sound and stable asset
quality, adequate profitability and funding and liquidity profile,
and gradually strengthening franchise.

In Fitch's view, regardless of its overall adequate financial
condition, Supervielle's ratings are currently capped by the
sovereign rating. Although the new government is taking measures
in the right direction and reducing political and regulatory
intervention into the banking system, the local environment in
Argentina is still characterized by ample economic imbalances and
measures are being taken gradually and, therefore, the recovery of
the economy is taking time to materialize.

Supervielle is a medium-sized bank with roughly 2.66% of the
system's loans (ranks 13th) and 1.90% of deposits as of November
2016, but it is gradually improving its competitive position in
core business lines. It has a strong presence in factoring,
leasing, and retail loans, with a particularly sound regional
franchise in certain provinces.

Although sound and recurrent core earnings are among Supevielle's
strengths, its profitability ratios are under some pressure mainly
due to rising costs and higher loan loss provisions. Fitch
believes that Supervielle will continue recording adequate
profitability metrics based on its expanding portfolio's capacity
to generate operating income. In addition, the normalization of
the regulatory environment will likely benefit the bank's revenues
once the economy recovers as most of the distorting regulatory
measures taken by the previous Government have been removed and
now allows the bank to resume growth in the lower segments.

Fitch considers that Supervielle's asset quality is adequate.
However, at a consolidated level, Supervielle's impairments are
somewhat higher than that of the Argentine financial system, which
is explained by its relevant consumer finance business through its
subsidiary Cordial Compania Financiera. As with the rest of the
financial system, Supervielle's asset quality is slowly
deteriorating due to the adverse economic conditions, a trend
Fitch expects to continue in the medium term as the economic
recovery will likely be seen towards the second half of 2017. At
Dec. 31, 2016, Supervielle's non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio was
2.78% of total loans, compared to 3.18% at Dec. 31, 2015, and 1.8%
for the system at Dec. 31, 2016. Although the bank's NPLs have
decreased since December 2015, this is largely explained by higher
charge-offs, which rose to 0.75% of total loans at Dec. 31, 2016
(from -0.59%).

Supervielle's capital adequacy is adequate and improved
significantly after the Supervielle Group issued USD250 million in
fresh capital through an IPO in the Buenos Aires and New York
stock exchanges in May 2016, and most of the capital raised was
allocated in the bank. As of Sept. 30, 2016, the bank's Fitch core
capital to risk-weighted assets and its tangible common equity to
tangible assets ratio improved to 11.45% and 12.34%, respectively,
significantly above the figures shown at Dec. 31, 2015 (7.71% and
7.22%).

SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT

The long-term rating of Supervielle's senior unsecured debt
issuance is at the same level as the bank's Long-Term Local
Currency IDR considering the absence of credit enhancement or
subordination feature. The recovery rating of 'RR4' assigned to
Supervielle's senior debt issuance reflects the average expected
recovery in case of bank liquidation.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

The 'B-/RR6' rating of Supervielle's subordinated debt reflects
that these securities are plain-vanilla subordinated liabilities,
without any deferral feature on coupons and/or principal.
Therefore, these are notched only once to reflect the below
average expected recoveries for these bonds in case of bank
liquidation and the high compression arising from the low VR of
the issuer.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Supervielle's SR of '5' and SRFs of 'NF' reflect that, although
possible, external support for this bank, as with most Argentine
banks, cannot be relied upon given the ample economic imbalances.
In turn, the sovereign ability and willingness to support banks is
highly uncertain.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs AND VR

Given their low level, Supervielle's ratings would move in line
with any change of Argentina's sovereign rating. In addition,
Supervielle's ratings could be affected if the operating
environment drives a material deterioration in its financial
profile.

Under current circumstances, Fitch considers unlikely that
Argentine banks could be rated above the sovereign. Therefore,
upside potential in the Supervielle's ratings is heavily
contingent upon positive developments in the sovereign rating
dynamics.

SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT
The rating for Supervielle's new debt issuance would move in line
with the bank's Long-Term IDR.

SUBORDINATED DEBT
The rating of the subordinated debt will likely remain one notch
below Banco Supervielle's VR under most circumstances, meaning
that this issue rating would move accordingly with any change in
the bank's VR.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
Changes in the SRs and SRFs of Supervielle are highly unlikely in
the foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco Supervielle:
-- Foreign and Local Currency Long-Term IDRs at 'B'; Outlook
Stable;

-- Foreign and Local Currency Short-Term IDRs at 'B';

-- Viability Rating at 'b';

-- Senior unsecured notes at 'B/RR4'.

-- Subordinated debt at 'B-/RR6';

-- Support at '5';

-- Support Floor at 'NF'.


BBVA BANCO: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed BBVA Banco Frances S.A.'s Viability
Rating (VR) at 'b' and its long-term local currency Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'B'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

VR AND IDR
Despite recent improvements in Argentina's economic policy
framework and normalizing relations with foreign creditors, the
still adverse operating environment is the principal driver of
BBVA Frances's VR and IDR. In Fitch's view, a reduction in
regulatory risk, a correction of macroeconomic imbalances and
economic recovery, will take time to materialize.

BBVA Frances's ratings consider the bank's integration into the
global risk management policies and procedures of its main
shareholder, Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA; 'A-
'/Outlook Stable). They also factor in BBVA Frances's strong
franchise and position as the country's third largest private
lender with a market share of 5.8% of banking system assets at
November 2016.

BBVA Frances' asset quality remains sound, comparing favourably to
peers. NPLs increased modestly to 0.85% as of September 2016
(0.66% at December 2015). Like the rest of the Argentine banking
system, loan quality indicators are supported by strong credit
growth. At BBVA Frances, loan portfolio grew on average 26.3%
annually from 2012 to 2015 BBVA Frances's reserve coverage remains
high at 248.6% of impaired loans at September 2016.

In terms of profitability, an uptick in the proportion of earning
assets, improved contribution of non-interest income, as well as
controlled administrative costs, helped offset a moderate decline
in net interest margin to 7.9% at September 2016 (8.7% at year-end
2015). Operating profitability has remained relatively stable,
averaging 6.6% of risk weighted assets from 2012 to 2015.

BBVA Frances' capital indicators, while adequate, have come under
pressure due to high annual asset growth which has exceeded the
bank's internal capital generation by four percentage points on
average from 2012 to 2015. Fitch estimates that solid
profitability will permit capitalization levels to remain
adequate.

The bank's main funding source is core customer deposits,
accounting for 84% of funding at September 2016. The largest
proportion consists of term deposits (41.4%), followed by savings
accounts (37.4%). The bank's liquidity buffers have modestly
declined but remain ample. Liquid assets covered 52.6% of customer
deposits at September 2016 (61.3% at year-end 2015).

SUPPORT RATING
The bank's Support Rating of '5' reflects that, although external
support for BBVA Frances from Spain's BBVA is possible, it cannot
be relied upon, in Fitch's view, given country risks in Argentina.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR AND IDR
BBVA Frances's VR and IDR would likely move in line with a
downgrade of Argentina's sovereign rating. In addition, the bank's
ratings could be affected in the event of a material deterioration
in asset quality, earnings, and/or loss absorption capacity. Fitch
considers it unlikely that Argentine banks could be rated above
the sovereign, making any upside potential in BBVA Frances's
ratings contingent on positive developments in the sovereign
rating.

SUPPORT RATING

Changes to BBVA Frances's support rating are highly unlikely in
the foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed BBVA Banco Frances S.A.'s ratings as follows:

-- Local Currency Long-term IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;

-- Viability Rating at 'b';

-- Support Rating at '5'.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO SANTANDER: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Santander Rio S.A.'s Viability
Rating (VR) and local currency (FC) long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'b' and 'B', respectively. The Rating Outlook is
Stable. A full list of rating actions follows at the end of this
press release.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR AND IDRs

Santander Rio's ratings are driven by the still volatile and
adverse economic and operating environment, albeit some structural
recent improvements of Argentina's policy framework could benefit
the bank's performance in the medium term.

Santander Rio's ratings benefit from its strong and growing
franchise as the largest private sector bank in the country and
the ample experience of its main shareholder, Spain's Banco
Santander S.A. (Santander; 'A-'/Outlook Stable), although the
ratings do not factor any extraordinary support from its parent.

In Fitch's view, regardless of Santander Rio's overall sound
financial condition, its ratings are currently capped by the LC
sovereign rating. Although the new government is taking measures
in the right direction and reducing political and regulatory
intervention into the banking system, the local environment is
still characterized by ample economic imbalances and measures are
being taken gradually and, therefore, the recovery of the economy
is taking time to materialize.

Santander Rio is a universal commercial bank with a strong
position in most market segments. It is the largest private bank
measured by loans and deposits, with market shares of 9.9% and
8.7% respectively as of Nov. 30, 2016.

Santander Rio's profitability is adequate although, like the rest
of the financial system, has been under pressure affected by
slower loan growth and high inflation. Net fees and commissions
income is a key strength of Santander Rio's, covering roughly 50%
of non-interest expenses.

Like the main banks in the system delinquency remains at
historically low levels, aided by loan growth and inflation. Thus,
non-performing loans (NPL) of Santander Rio represented a low 1.2%
of the total loan portfolio, while loan reserves covered 1.31
times NPL.

The bank's capital adequacy metrics stand at adequate levels,
albeit lower than its closest peers in part due to stronger loan
growth. The Fitch core capital to risk-weighted assets ratio stood
at 11.8% as of Sept. 30, 2016, showing a declining trend due to
the strong growth in lending in recent years.

Santander Rio's main funding source is core customer deposits and
its liquidity levels are ample and benefit from strong deposit
growth and low demand of long term credit.

SUPPORT RATING
The Support Rating of '5' reflects that, although possible,
external support for Santander Rio from Spain's Santander, cannot
be relied upon given the high political interference risk and
ample economic imbalances.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs AND VR

Santander Rio's ratings would move in line with any change of
Argentina's sovereign rating. Also Santander Rio's ratings could
be affected if the difficult operating environment drives material
deterioration in asset quality, earnings, and/or loss absorption
capacity.

Under current circumstances, Fitch considers unlikely that
Argentine banks could be rated above the sovereign. Therefore,
upside potential in Santander Rio's ratings is heavily contingent
upon positive developments in the sovereign rating dynamics.

SUPPORT RATING
Changes in the SR of Santander Rio are highly unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed Santander Rio's ratings:

-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;

-- Viability rating at 'b';

-- Support Rating at '5'.


ODEBRECHT SA: Looking to Reach Settlements With LatAm Prosecutors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Brazilian builder Odebrecht said it was looking to reach
settlements with prosecutors in several Latin American countries
where the company is currently under investigation for allegedly
bribing government officials to win business.

In December, Odebrecht and its petrochemical unit Braskem pleaded
guilty and agreed to pay a combined total penalty of at least $3.5
billion to resolve charges with authorities in the United States,
Brazil and Switzerland.

As reporter in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 2, 2016, The Wall Street Journal related that Marcelo
Odebrecht, the jailed former head of Brazilian construction giant
Odebrecht SA, agreed to sign a plea-bargain agreement in
connection with Brazil's largest corruption probe ever, according
to a person close to the negotiations.  The move could roil the
nation's political class yet again.  The testimony of the former
industrialist, which is part of the deal, has the potential to
implicate numerous politicians who allegedly took kickbacks from
contractors as part of a years-long graft ring centered on
Brazil's state-run oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, known as
Petrobras, according to The Wall Street Journal.


VALE SA: CEO Murilo Ferreira to Step Down in May
------------------------------------------------
Paul Kiernan at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazilian
mining giant Vale SA said its chief executive plans to step down
when his term ends in May, amid widespread reports of pressure to
replace him with a political appointee.

Vale Chief Executive Officer Murilo Ferreira won't renew his
contract when it expires on May 26, after six years on the job,
the company said in a press release, according to The Wall Street
Journal.  No reason was given for the decision.

Multiple Brazilian news outlets have reported in recent weeks that
conservative Sen. Aecio Neves has been maneuvering in Brasilia,
the capital, to replace Mr. Ferreira with a candidate of his
choosing, the report notes.  Politicians in Brazil often use high-
level appointments as bargaining chips, and Mr. Neves' PSDB party
is a key ally in President Michel Temer's governing coalition, the
report relays.

While Vale is not outright controlled by the state and generally
operates like a private company, the Brazilian government holds a
substantial portion of its voting stock via state-run pension
funds and other entities, and it has managed to shake up the
company's management in the past, the report discloses.  Mr.
Ferreira was installed in 2011 at the behest of former President
Dilma Rousseff.

Since Ms. Rousseff was impeached last year, Brazil's ruling PMDB
party and its allies have been eager to replace Mr. Ferreira with
a loyalist of their own, two people familiar with the matter said,
the report notes.  Though the private members of Vale's
controlling group have been mostly happy with Mr. Ferreira's
running of the company, they didn't feel it was worth getting into
a fight with the government over, one person said, the report
relays.

A spokeswoman for Mr. Neves, who criticized the nomination of
political appointees to state-controlled firms when Ms. Rousseff
was president, denied that he had been involved in Mr. Ferreira's
exit, the report says.  Investors have been generally pleased with
appointments Mr. Temer's government has previously made to state-
controlled firms, such as oil company Petroleo Brasileiro SA, the
report notes.

In a conference call with reporters, Mr. Ferreira avoided saying
whether he had been forced out, but said that his age was a factor
in the decision and that "the line has to keep moving," the report
discloses.  Vale has an age limit of 65 for executives.  Mr.
Ferreira will turn 64 in June.  CEOs serve two-year terms at the
company.

But he added that because the company operates a large number of
concessions in its mining and logistics businesses, it deals
constantly with the government and regulatory agencies, the report
notes.

"You receive pressure, you receive different demands.  It's part
of being a company that has a lot of concessions," the report
quoted Mr. Ferreira as saying.

Vale Chairman Gueitiro Genso thanked Mr. Ferreira for his service
and said the board would hire an international headhunting firm to
support its search for a replacement, the report notes.

As CEO, Mr. Ferreira guided Vale through a number of crises, from
a nearly 80% drop in the price of iron ore to a catastrophic dam
failure at the company's Samarco joint venture that killed 19
people, the report relays.  He also reduced costs by slashing
noncore projects from the company's investment portfolio, and
oversaw the final stages of a landmark iron-ore mining project
known as S11D, the report notes.

"During his term, Vale became a leaner and more agile company,
significantly increasing its operational competitiveness and
maintaining a healthy level of debt," the company said in the
press release, the report discloses.

Mr. Ferreira's efforts to make Vale more globally competitive and
his handling of the Samarco disaster stirred discontent in his
home state of Minas Gerais, which Mr. Neves represents in Brazil's
Senate, the report says.  Centuries of intensive mining there by
Vale and others have depleted the state's ore reserves and left
some operations vulnerable to commodity downturns, the report
relays.

S11D, located in the northern state of Para, is seen by many as a
hedge against Minas Gerais' decline, the report notes.  Built at a
cost of $14 billion, it will increase Vale's production capacity
by 25%, churning out the 90 million metric tons a year of the
highest-quality, lowest-cost iron ore in the world, the report
discloses.

"Minas Gerais needs jobs, it has a deficit and needs revenue, and
Vale isn't taking into account its social responsibility," said
Newton Cardoso, Jr., a PMDB congressman from the state, the report
notes.  "There needs to be government intervention in the long-
term policies at Vale to guarantee that mining towns can
transition from a mining economy to a new economy."

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Dec.
23, 2016, Moody's Investors Service comments that the agreement
entered by Vale S.A. (Ba3 stable) with The Mosaic Company (Baa2
negative) for the sale of the majority of Vale's fertilizers
assets is credit positive. The USD 2.5 billion transaction shows
Vale's commitment to adjust operations to the challenging
environment and reduce debt levels through the sale of non-core
assets.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


CONSECTOR PARTNERS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Consector Partners Offshore, Ltd. received on,
Jan. 26, 2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Consector Capital, LP
          Timothy J. Stewart
          712 5th Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York
          New York 10019
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 235 0347


CORUM FUND: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of The Corum Fund Inc. received on, Jan. 26,
2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Taco Van Der Mast
          Cate Barbour
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 4970


CP AFFLUENCE: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of CP Affluence received on, Jan. 25, 2017, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

           Walkers Liquidations Limited
           Cayman Corporate Centre
           27 Hospital Road
           George Town
           Grand Cayman KY1-9008
           Cayman Islands
           Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


CP STRATEGIES: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of CP Strategies received on, Jan. 26, 2017, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

           Walkers Liquidations Limited
           Cayman Corporate Centre
           27 Hospital Road
           George Town
           Grand Cayman KY1-9008
           Cayman Islands
           Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


EVERBRIGHT CAPITAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Everbright Capital Management (Cayman) Limited
received on, Jan. 25, 2017, the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Kevin Butler
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7374
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


EXELION ESTATE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Exelion Estate Fund received on, Jan. 26,
2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Taco Van Der Mast
          Cate Barbour
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 4970


MIRAN MULTI STRATEGY: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Miran Multi Strategy Fund received on,
Jan. 26, 2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

           Walkers Liquidations Limited
           Cayman Corporate Centre
           27 Hospital Road
           George Town
           Grand Cayman KY1-9008
           Cayman Islands
           Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


RAINBOW PROPERTIES: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Rainbow Properties Fund received on, Jan. 3,
2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Taco Van Der Mast
          Cate Barbour
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 4970


TARAH HOLDINGS: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Tarah Holdings received on, Jan. 26, 2017, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

           Walkers Liquidations Limited
           Cayman Corporate Centre
           27 Hospital Road
           George Town
           Grand Cayman KY1-9008
           Cayman Islands
           Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


YUAN ZHU: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Yuan Zhu Co., Ltd. received on, Jan. 26, 2017,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

           Walkers Liquidations Limited
           Cayman Corporate Centre
           27 Hospital Road
           George Town
           Grand Cayman KY1-9008
           Cayman Islands
           Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


===============
C O L O M B I A
===============


EMPRESA DE TELECOMUNICACIONES: Fitch Affirms BB+ IDR
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Bogota
S.A. E.S.P.'s (ETB) ratings:

-- Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'BB+';

-- COP530 billion senior notes due 2023 at 'BB+';

-- National long-term rating at 'AA+(col)'.

The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating actions reflect ETB's continued struggle to curb its
ongoing cash flow deterioration, which has pressured its cash and
cash equivalent holdings to approximately COP 240 billion as of
September 2016, well below the level posted in 2015 (COP 613
billion) and 2014 (COP 1 trillion). The company's cash position
deterioration is expected to continue with a projected average
negative FCF after dividends of approximately to COP 170 billion
pesos in 2017 to 2019.

The Negative Outlook reflects Fitch's view that ETB's weak
operation and projected negative FCF will lead to increasing
leverage in 2017 to 2019, despite recent stabilization in EBITDA
generation. ETB's relatively weak revenue performance, limited
geographical diversification and a small subscriber base could
limit the company's ability to achieve a meaningful EBITDA
improvement and deleverage in the short to medium term. Continued
leverage deterioration to above 3,5x on a sustained basis in 2017
to 2019, in the absence of material subscriber growth and network
penetrations, will result in a further ratings downgrade.

Weak Operating Profile

ETB's operating profile remains weak following four years of
EBITDAR contraction during 2012 to 2015. Although the company was
able to rein in further EBITDA deterioration through a modest
diversification of its revenue sources and the implementation of
cost saving initiatives during the 2016, these efforts were not
enough to materially improve its cash flow generation. Fitch
forecasts only a modest improvement in the company's cash flow
generation in 2017 to 2018 due to slow subscriber growth given a
competitive landscape, while its traditional fixed-line copper
operation continues to shrink and its mobile business contribution
remains marginal.

Aggressive Subscriber Growth Target Questionable

ETB's business strategy aims to materially increase its Fiber to
the Cabinet (FTTC) customers through an aggressive roll-out and
penetration of its FTTC network to compensate for the slow
penetration of its Fiber to the Home Network (FTTH) in 2013 to
2016. The company's goal is to increase its TV subscriber base on
its FTTC network by an average of 72% in 2017 to 2019 while TV and
internet subscribers connected to its FTTH network are expected to
grow by an average of 26% and 22% respectively during the same
period. The company expects its B2B business' revenues to grow at
an average rate of 7% per year during the projection period, a
target that may be difficult to realize following the steep
contraction of 12% in 2016.

Although ETB expects to successfully execute its business strategy
to grow its revenue base by an average of 10% during the
projection period, Fitch remains cautious about the ability of ETB
to improve its revenue base in this magnitude. Fitch projects an
average revenue growth in the low single digits and a lower
subscriber growth rate than the company's target given the tough
competitive pressures expected in the sector in coming years.
Fitch believes that the current competitive environment and
operational challenges faced by the company in the near term,
especially in 2017 given challenging macroeconomic conditions and
weakening consumption due to the tax reform, would make it
difficult for the company to achieve its stated goals.

Challenging Operating Environment

ETB faces strong competitive pressures in Bogota, which could
hinder material ARPU improvement for its key service offerings
while the ongoing fixed-mobile substitution trend continues to
weaken ETB's core fixed voice operation, which still is one of its
main cash generation businesses. Slower than expected service
quality improvement could limit its ability to reduce churn rates
and materially grow its subscriber base through the planned
expansion of non-traditional services. As a result, Fitch expects
ETB's continued limited diversification in geography and service
revenues to prevent it from achieving a larger business scale thus
limiting its ability to turn around the deterioration in its cash
flow generation capacity.


Continued Negative FCF

Fitch forecasts continued negative FCF generation during 2017-2019
despite ETB's lower capex budget. ETB's 2016 capex is estimated
50% lower than the 2015 level of COP854 billion, which will not be
covered by its reduced CFFO generation. ETB plans to execute a
capex program equivalent to an average capex intensity of 26% in
2017 to 2019 to shore up its home and mobile businesses to achieve
a meaningful revenue diversification. Negatively, Fitch projects
ETB's CFFO to average COP 285 billion during this period, which
will be insufficient to meet its reduced capex expenditure. As a
result, Fitch estimates ETB to post an average negative FCF of
approximately COP170 billion per year during this period.

Increasing Leverage

Fitch expects ETB's leverage metrics to deteriorate in the short
to medium term due to persistent negative FCF generation which
will require the company to incur additional debt for an aggregate
amount of COP 400 billion in 2017 to 2018. The company's adjusted
debt will also be impacted by its efforts to increase its
footprint in the 4G/LTE segment for its mobile business, which
results in an incurrence of rental expenses of approximately 8% of
projected revenues, which Fitch incorporates as adjusted off-
balance-sheet debt.

As a result, Fitch estimates the company's total adjusted debt to
reach close to COP 1.3 trillion by 2017, COP 1.5 trillion by 2018
and COP 1.7 trillion by 2019. The increased debt level, in
conjunction with an expected moderate EBITDA performance of
approximately COP350 billion a year will drive the company's net
leverage, measured by total adjusted net debt to EBITDAR, to 2.6x
in 2017, 2.9x by end-2018 and 3.2x by end-2019 which unfavourably
compares to just 0.2x at end-2014 and 1.8x at end-2015,
respectively. A further deterioration in the leverage metrics over
3.5x in a sustained manner could lead to further negative rating
actions.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Revenues grow at a 1.6% average per year in 2017 to 2019;

-- CFFO averages approximately COP 285 billion per year below
    average capex needs of COP390 billion per year in 2017 to
    2019;

-- Projected negative FCF, compounded by average dividend
    distributions of COP 66 billion/year require to contract
    new debt;

-- ETB contracts new loans for up to COP 400 billion in 2017 to
    2018 to finance its capex program;

-- Adjusted net debt averages 2.9x in 2017 to 2019 and ends at
    3.2x at FY 2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Considerations that could lead to a negative rating action (Rating
or Outlook):

-- Relatively weak network penetration;

-- Inability to improve EBITDA performance in a meaningful
    magnitude;

-- Further deterioration in FCF generation;

-- Sustained increase in adjusted net leverage above the 3.5x
    in a sustained basis.

A positive rating action is unlikely given the increase in
leverage and expectation of negative FCF over the next few years.

LIQUIDITY

ETB's liquidity profile continued to weaken despite its efforts to
implement austerity measures and meaningful capex downsizing to
preserve cash. ETB was not able to reverse the cash balance
erosion trend, which started since 2014 due to continued negative
FCF generation. The company's cash and liquid investment holdings
are expected to close 2016 at approximately COP 270 billion, well
below the level posted in 2015 (COP 613 billion) and 2014 (COP 1
trillion). Positively, ETB does not face any material debt
maturity until 2023 when its COP530 billion notes become due.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed Empresa de Telecomuncaciones de Bogota S.A.
E.S.P.'s ratings:

-- Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB+', Outlook Negative;

-- Local Currency IDR at 'BB+', Outlook Negative;

-- Bond rating at 'BB+';

-- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA+'(col), Outlook Negative.


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REP: Leader Warns Against Exporting to Just 1 Nation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Exporters Association
(Adoexpo) President Alvaro Sousa warned against concentrating the
country's exports toward just one nation.

In remarks to open the Adoexpo luncheon, the business leader said
although Dominican Republic exports to more than 150 countries,
some 47% of its products end up in one nation, according to
Dominican Today.

The report notes that Mr. Sousa said among Adoexpo's objectives is
to establish a National Export Strategy that promotes
competitiveness and innovation.  "In this plan our offer of
exportable products and services must be in keeping with the
current and future needs and demands of international markets,"
the report relays.

Mr. Sousa said he's upbeat over the clear and continuous plans to
expand to other markets, not only at the level of countries, but
also in export volumes, the report notes.

Mr. Sousa added that the country must continue to bolster public-
private partnerships that offer facilities and benefits to those
companies that wish to sell abroad, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


DIGICEL GROUP: Bonds Trade Up as Investors React to Cost Cutting
----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Digicel Group bonds traded up on Thursday,
Feb. 23 as investors reacted to a plan to dramatically cut costs
at the telecoms group.

The yield, or return investors demand, on Digicel's April 2022
bond fell to 12.1 percent from 12.8 percent a day earlier,
according to RJR News.  This is down from 15 per cent in November.

Higher ranked Digicel bonds also traded up, the report notes.

The company has no major bond debt maturing until 2020.

Ireland's Independent newspaper reported that Digicel's financial
results due soon for the third financial quarter will be closely
watched by investors, the report relays.

They will be looking for signs that a EUR1.6 billion investment
program over the last three years is starting to pay off in
greater customer revenues from higher value added areas like
fibre-to-the home as well as data and cable, as traditional voice
calls decline, the report notes.

Digicel Group, owned by Irish billionaire Denis O'Brien, said it
planned to let go as many as 1,500 workers or 25 percent of its
staff -- over 18 months as part of a radical cost-cutting program,
the report relays.

The business, which operates across 31 different markets,
announced the plan in response to a decline in earnings linked to
the fallout from the strengthening of the dollar over the past
year and declining income from traditional voice calls, the report
notes.

Currency swings hit Digicel because it borrows in dollars but its
income is in a mix of local currencies in the markets where it
operates, many of which have weakened compared to the greenback,
the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 27, 2016, Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Digicel
Group Limited (DGL) and its subsidiaries Digicel Limited (DL) and
Digicel International Finance Limited (DIFL), collectively
referred to as 'Digicel' as follows.

DGL

-- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'; Stable Outlook;

-- $US 2.0 billion 8.25% senior subordinated notes due 2020 at
    'B-/RR5';

-- $US 1 billion 7.125% senior unsecured notes due 2022 at
    'B-/RR5'.

DL

-- Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Stable Outlook;
-- $US 250 million 7% senior notes due 2020 at 'B/RR4';
-- $US 1.3 billion 6% senior notes due 2021 at 'B/RR4';
-- $US 925 million 6.75% senior notes due 2023 at 'B/RR4';

DIFL

-- Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Stable Outlook;
-- Senior secured credit facility at 'B+/RR3'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


GRUPO EMBOTELLADOR: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Remains Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'B-' corporate credit
and issue-level ratings on Grupo Embotellador Atic S.A. (Atic).
The outlook remains negative.

"Despite Atic's improved liquidity due to last year's short-term
debt refinancing, our ratings continue to reflect its weak
operating and financial performance, as in our view, the company
hasn't been able to achieve economies of scale or consolidate its
market position in some of its key markets," said S&P Global
Ratings credit analyst Pablo Buch.

Although the company's margins and credit metrics could show a
gradual improvement on the back of efficiencies to be realized
from the reallocation of certain production lines and increased
focus on its better-performing operations, such as Peru and
Central America, intense competition coupled with its limited
ability to pass through dollar-related costs to consumers, will
continue to constrain its profitability and overall cash flow
generation.

Despite the improvement of Atic's liquidity position following
last year's refinancing, S&P maintains a negative outlook,
reflecting the potential that its ratings on the company could
further be lowered within the next 6 to 12 months if the sluggish
performance of markets such as Brazil and Mexico continue to
constrain cash flow generation leading to debt service concerns.
Under such scenario, Atic's EBITDA interest coverage would trend
toward 1.0x.  S&P could also lower ratings if it deems Atic's
capital structure unsustainable in the long-term, absent
unforeseen positive events.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable in the next 12 months if
Atic's efforts to improve operating profits in Brazil, Mexico, and
Thailand aid overall margins, leading its debt to EBITDA and
EBITDA to interest coverage toward 5.0x and 3.0x, respectively.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: S&P Affirms 'CCC' Sovereign Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 28, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign.

                              RATIONALE

S&P's rating on Venezuela reflects S&P's assessment that the
sovereign is vulnerable to default absent unforeseen positive
financial and economic developments.  Moreover, Venezuela's credit
profile reflects its monetary, exchange rate, and fiscal
inflexibility and limited external liquidity, compounded by weak
institutional and governance effectiveness.  S&P believes that the
sovereign's ability to service its debt is under severe strain due
to continued economic contraction, high inflation, growing
impoverishment, and heightened political tensions.

S&P estimates that the economy will contract at least 2% in 2017
in real terms, following a contraction of around 10% in 2016 and
6.2% in 2015.  Per capita GDP growth is estimated to have been
negative 4% on average during 2012-2016, a much worse performance
than most other energy-based economies.  It is likely to remain
negative during 2017-2018.

The combination of poor monetary, fiscal, and other policies has
resulted in rising inflation.  Doubts about the accuracy of
reported economic data (whose disclosure has decreased, and delays
in reporting have mounted since early 2016) have weakened market
confidence and made it more difficult to make forecasts.  The
latest published information shows a 180% inflation rate in 2015.
S&P estimates inflation was 460% in 2016 and that it will
accelerate in 2017.

S&P expects that Venezuela's politics will remain highly polarized
between the government, led by President Nicolas Maduro of the
leftist Chavista political movement, and an opposition that won a
majority in the National Assembly in elections held in December
2015.  The central government, along with the Chavismo controlled
Supreme Court, has been in open confrontation with the National
Assembly.  Political tensions are likely to remain high,
exacerbated by growing shortages of basic goods, high inflation,
and falling living standards.

Low oil prices have undermined fiscal policy, resulting in large
budget deficits and inflationary financing from the central bank.
Fiscal information is not available since 2014, but estimates made
by different private sources and by the International Monetary
Fund suggest that the general government deficit was around 20%-
25% of GDP last year.  It is likely to be at a similar level in
2017.

Venezuela's reported low debt stocks and interest burden are
misleading as the government uses the preferential foreign
exchange rate of 10 bolivares (VEF) per $US1 to account for
external debt.  Venezuela's fiscal deficits will be mostly
financed by domestic sources, but if the preferential exchange
rate were to depreciate at the same pace as S&P Global Ratings'
inflation rate expectation (900% in 2017), as S&P's base-case
scenario suggests, the increase in Venezuela's net general
government debt could be as much as 40% of GDP in 2017.  Under
S&P's base-case scenario, net general government debt could spike
toward 45% of GDP and interest payments toward 25% of general
government revenue in 2017.

Prolonged low oil prices have exacerbated the consequences of
inconsistent macroeconomic policies, which have led to the
currently poor state of the economy.  Venezuela derives about 15%
of its GDP, about half of government revenues, and 95% of exports
from the hydrocarbons sector.  In December 2016, S&P Global
Ratings reviewed its Brent and WTI price assumptions to remain
steady at US$50 over 2017-2018.

Very low external flexibility continues to constrain S&P's rating
on Venezuela.  As of year-end 2016, S&P estimated non-gold
international reserves around US$3 billion to US$4 billion, and
gold reserves were below US$8 billion.  S&P estimates that foreign
direct investment and the restricted funding available from
external debt markets will not be enough to fully finance the
current account deficit, which S&P estimates will be 4% of GDP in
2017.  As a result, S&P expects the country's already low level of
international reserves to decline further this year, raising the
risk of default.  The government is already incurring substantial
arrears to nonfinancial creditors.

The government has not published balance of payments and
international investment position data since September 2015.  S&P
estimates that the country's gross external financing needs in
2016 were around 200% current account receipts (CAR) plus usable
reserves, likely similar to its projected level for 2017, and
twice the level in 2013.  S&P expects Venezuela to finance this
need by the public sector running arrears with most of its
suppliers and noncommercial creditors, and liquidating external
assets.  S&P expects Venezuela's external debt net of reported
public- and financial-sector assets will remain around 250% of CAR
during 2016-2018.

With nearly 300 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, Venezuela
has a rich resource endowment.  Nevertheless, its state-owned
energy company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), continues to
miss its production targets. Crude oil output likely declined to
2.4 million barrels per day in 2016 from 2.7 million barrels per
day in 2015 (down from 3.3 million in 2004).  Oil output may
decline again as Venezuela has been unsuccessful at attracting new
investment.

Although the central government has given priority to paying
external debt servicing over current expenditure, S&P believes
pressure is growing for it to reschedule its commercial debt or
undertake a debt exchange that S&P would view as tantamount to
default.

In October 2016, PDVSA performed a distress debt exchange, which
led S&P to lower its rating on PDVSA to 'SD' (selective default).
In November, S&P raised the PDVSA rating to 'CCC-' with a negative
outlook, reflecting S&P Global Ratings' expectation that PDVSA
could default again in the first half of 2017.  The company faces
US$9.5 billion external debt service in 2017.  PDVSA's debt is not
guaranteed by the government, and the government's debt does not
have cross-default clauses connected with the debt of the national
oil company.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the heightened risk of the
Venezuelan government defaulting or undertaking a distressed debt
exchange due to prolonged low oil revenues, high budget deficits,
rising inflation, and severe economic contraction.  Failure to
introduce substantial corrective measures to stabilize the
economy, alleviate shortages, and strengthen public finances could
further weaken the government's ability to finance itself.  That,
along with lower external assets and sustained political
polarization, underpins S&P's assessment that there is at least a
one-in-three chance of a government debt default over the next
year or two.

Steps to defuse the heightened political tensions in Venezuela
would reduce the risks of eroding governability and high
volatility in economic policies.  That, along with prompt,
corrective reforms that begin to address the country's economic
imbalances and to strengthen its external liquidity, could lead to
a stabilization of the ratings at their current level.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that "Debt rating factor" had deteriorated.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating                CCC/Negative/C
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   CCC
Senior Unsecured                       CCC


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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