TCRLA_Public/170410.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, April 10, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 71



ARGENTINA: Unions Go on 24-Hr Strike to Protest Austerity Measures
BUENOS AIRES: Gets IIC Support to Improve Safety & Connectivity


ENERGISA S.A.: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDRs; Outlook Stable
ODEBRECHT SA: Bonds are Both the Best and Worst in Brazil
OI SA: Spurns Intellectually Dishonest Calls for Takeover by State

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CJVP LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GANYMEDE PARENT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
J-ONE ASSETS: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
KINGDOM 5-KR-103: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
MINGSHEN GLOBAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 19

TELLURIAN NEW: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
VEIO CAPITAL MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 19
VEIO CAPITAL OFFSHORE: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 19
VEIO CAPITAL US: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 19
WESVAALSO LTD: Members Receive Wind-Up Report

P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on $8BB Bonds


ACI AIRPORT: Fitch Affirms Rating on $200MM Secured Notes at BB+


VENEZUELA: Bond Sell-Off Accelerates as $2 Billion Payment Looms


* Fitch Sees Shallow Economic Recovery for Latin America in 2017
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 3 to April 7, 2017

                            - - - - -


ARGENTINA: Unions Go on 24-Hr Strike to Protest Austerity Measures
Taos Turner at The Wall Street Journal reports that labor unions
launched a nationwide strike in Argentina, shutting down schools,
banks and public transportation to protest austerity measures that
have taken a toll on consumption and sharply increased public service

The strike, the first against President Mauricio Macri's 16-month-old
government, comes as unions demand higher wages to compensate for high
inflation, which has pushed an estimated 1.5 million people into
poverty, according to The WSJ.

It also comes amid rising political polarization as Argentina gears up
for congressional elections in October that could determine how much
leverage Mr. Macri has to continue pushing market-oriented policies,
the report notes.

Public school teachers in Argentina's biggest province, Buenos Aires,
have been on strike for nearly a month, locking close to one million
children out of class as they demand a 25% raise, the report
discloses.  The local government is offering 19%.

"The government's policies haven't led to the results people were
hoping for," said Juan Carlos Schmidt, head of Argentina's General
Workers Confederation, the report relays.

Argentine officials estimate the 24-hour strike would cost almost $1
billion in lost output as factories suspend vehicle production and
truckers halt delivery of goods, the report notes.

Bus stops, train stations and airports across the country were empty
as employees stayed home, the report says.  Protesters -- many of whom
are political activists critical of Mr. Macri -- blocked roads in and
around the capital, leading to standoffs with police, the report
relays.  Local media reported arrests and injuries as security forces
tried to remove protesters from a major highway leading into
Argentina's capital, the report notes.

"It's very hard to understand the strike. Employment is rising, wages
are recovering and the economy is beginning to grow," Economy Minister
Nicolas Dujovne said in an interview with The WSJ.

Argentina's economy shrank 2.3% last year after the government
devalued the currency, leading inflation to spike, the report recalls.
The surge in inflation, exacerbated by a move to slash subsidies for
transportation, electricity and gas, hit families and small businesses
hard. Consumption fell sharply and companies laid off workers during
the first half of 2016, the report notes.

"This general strike shows people's unrest," said Alberto Fernandez,
the former cabinet chief of late president Nestor Kirchner, notes the
reprot.  "There's a feeling that the path that we are taking will lead
us to a precipice, and people feel defrauded," he added.

Mr. Macri said his austerity measures have been painful but necessary
to dismantle over a decade of populist policies that spooked investors
and halted economic growth, the report relays.  Analysts expect the
economy to grow about 3% this year.

Workers who support the strike say that budget cuts have seriously
affected public services, but government officials say spending on
such services has not been reduced, the report notes.

Unions have challenged successive Argentine governments with crippling
national strikes several dozen times since the return of democracy in
1983, the report recalls.  Powerful union bosses are credited with
pressuring former President Raul Alfonsin to resign before the end of
his term in 1989 as hyperinflation rattled the nation and after a
dozen general strikes, the report notes.

This time, though, union leaders have been careful to note that while
they don't like the government's policies they have no intention of
pushing Mr. Macri out of power, the report relays.

"I'm here to reaffirm our democratic vocation. I want the government
to fulfill its term," the report quoted Mr. Schmidt as saying.

A heavily unionized nation, most tax-paying workers in the country are
represented by labor groups, the report notes.  In many cases, unions
have more influence over salaries and workplace disputes than do
companies, which are often required to raise wages even if they are
losing money, the report notes.

In recent years, double-digit inflation has led to hefty salary
increases, often surpassing 25% or 30% annually, the report discloses.
This year, as the government tries to reduce inflation to 17% or less,
unions are pushing for raises above that rate, saying they need to
recover purchasing power that was lost last year when inflation
totaled about 37%, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 8, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook
on the Government of Argentina's rating to positive from stable
and affirmed the issuer rating at B3, senior unsecured ratings at
B3 and Ca, senior unsecured shelf and MTN program at (P)B3 and
(P)Ca, short term ratings at NP and global MTN program at (P)NP.

TCRLA reported on Jan. 30, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has
assigned a B3 rating to the Government of Argentina's US$3.25
billion bond due 2022 and the US$3.75 billion bond due 2027. The
outlook on the Government of Argentina's rating is stable.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.

BUENOS AIRES: Gets IIC Support to Improve Safety & Connectivity
President of Argentina, Mauricio Macri, Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) President, Luis Alberto Moreno, and Inter-American
Investment Corporation (IIC) Chief Executive Officer, James P.
Scriven, signed a financing package of $252.5 million with Autopistas
Urbanas, S.A. (AUSA) to improve road safety and connectivity in the
metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, Argentina.

The transaction shows the commitment of the IIC to finance more
transportation projects in the region. The IIC will finance new
upgrades of the metropolitan road network including the construction
of a bridge connecting the Argentine capital and the city of Lanus.
The financing package will also be used to relocate a segment of the
Illia Highway that currently runs over the Barrio 31, an informal
settlement located in downtown Buenos Aires. The relocation of the
highway is a critical component of current urbanization efforts of
this neighborhood.  These investments will improve the quality of life
of residents in those communities, enhancing mobility and reducing
travel time for commuters.

The $252.5 million financing package includes an existing IDB Group
loan of $128.1 million from 2014 and a new IIC loan totaling $24.4
million, as well as a syndicated loan of $100 million from Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Federated Investors. The
financing package allowed AUSA to access international commercial
lending for the first time.  It is considered one of the most
competitive packages ever obtained by a company in Argentina in recent
years, signaling the increasing appetite from international lenders in
financing investments in the country.

In addition to long-term financing, the IIC offers a road safety
product known as Highway+, designed and tested with technical
cooperation resources to reduce road accidents and fatalities. The IIC
is the only development bank that offers such a product for private
sector operators, collaborating with clients when road safety
challenges arise.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 27, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed the City of Buenos Aires's
(CBA) ratings as follows:

-- Long-term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
    (IDRs) at 'B';
-- Short-term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B';
-- Euro medium-term note programme (EMTN) up to USD2.29 billion
    long-term rating at 'B';
-- Series 11 for USD500 million long-term rating at 'B';
-- Series 12 for USD890 million long-term rating at 'B';
-- Programme of short-term treasury bills up to ARS6.5 billion
    short-term rating at 'B'.


ENERGISA S.A.: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDRs; Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Energisa S.A.'s Long-Term Foreign and Local
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB' and its Long-Term
National scale rating at 'AA(bra)'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed Energisa's subsidiaries' Long-Term Foreign and
Local Currency IDRs at 'BB+' and Long-Term National scale rating at
'AA+(bra)'. The Rating Outlook remains Stable for the Local Currency
IDR and for the National scale rating, and Negative for the Foreign
Currency IDR. A full list of rating actions follows at the end of this
press release.


The rating actions reflect Fitch's view that Energisa will continue to
improve its consolidated credit profile after the initial negative
impact of the acquisition of the Grupo Rede's distribution companies
(DisCos). Energisa's ratings reflect the expectation that the group
will remain with net leverage in the range of 2x-3x in the next four
years, despite negative free cash flow (FCF). Positively, the group
should retain its robust liquidity position and lengthened debt
maturities on a consolidated basis. The re-IPO in 2016 of BRL1.5
billion improved its capital structure, reducing pressure on the
group's liquidity and leverage ratios in a scenario of macroeconomic

Fitch also considers that Energisa is succeeding in improving the
below-average operational performance of the subsidiaries acquired
from Grupo Rede, located in areas of historically high energy
consumption growth. Despite the relatively recent integration,
positive results have already been noticed and reflected in
consolidated operational cash generation. Fitch also considered the
group well positioned to compensate for negative pressures on energy
consumption, delinquency and energy losses due to the challenging
Brazilian macroeconomic environment.

Energisa's asset diversification through 13 power distribution
companies is positive for its business profile as it dilutes
operational risks. Fitch considers the distribution segment riskier
than transmission and generation and incorporates in its analysis
moderate regulatory and hydrological risks for the power sector.

The one-notch difference between Energisa's ratings and those of its
subsidiaries is based on the relevance and structural subordination of
the holding company's debt compared to the operating companies. The
holding company debt represented approximately 21% of consolidated
debt as of Dec. 31, 2016 and the ratio of total debt/dividends
received at 5.9x was high. The Negative Outlook on the Foreign
Currency IDRs of the operational companies is due to Brazil's country
ceiling, which is at 'BB+' and sovereign rating at 'BB'/Negative

Improving Financial Profile
Fitch projects consolidated net leverage ratio to remain at 2x-3x
until 2020, supported by Energisa's current businesses. If new assets
or projects are added to the portfolio, the agency will review its
projections. Increasing cash flow generation due to the fourth tariff
review cycle, expected to be concluded in all Energisa's DisCos until
2018, and the liquidity provided by the re-IPO in 2016 should help to
keep credit metrics adequate for the current IDRs. In 2016,
consolidated leverage, measured by Total Adjusted Debt/EBITDA was
4.4x, with 2.9x on a net basis, in comparison with 4.4x and 3.4x,
respectively, in 2015.

FCF Under Pressure
Energisa's consolidated free cash flow (FCF) is expected to stay
negative in the following years as a result of high capital
expenditures and dividend distribution. The improvement of operations
of the DisCos formerly belonging to Grupo Rede associated with the
original DisCos' maintenance capex programs require a significant
amount of investments that will keep pressuring consolidated FCF.
Nevertheless, part of this pressure could be offset by some additional
EBITDA coming from the acquired DisCos after the fourth review tariff
initiated in 2016 and ending in 2018. Fitch expects capex needs of
BRL4.9 billion from 2017 to 2020.

In 2016, the recovery of non-manageable costs along with cost
reductions benefited Energisa's consolidated cash flow. The group's
cash flow from operations (CFFO) of BRL1.1 billion was much higher
than previous years (BRL549 million in 2015), although not sufficient
to cover capex of BRL1.3 billion and dividends payments of BRL124
million, leading to negative FCF of BRL371 million.

Manageable Debt at the Holding Level

Fitch considers the debt maturity schedule at the holding level to be
manageable, despite the still low amount of dividends received in the
last years (BRL286 million in 2016). The high total debt-to-dividends
received ratio of 5.9x last year is somewhat mitigated by a high cash
balance of BRL839 million, the lengthened debt maturity profile for
its BRL1.7 billion of total debt, and a potential debt conversion into
equity of BRL500 million. This analysis does not consider potential
acquisitions and capital injections into new projects.

Energy Consumption to Recover
Fitch estimates 0.7% growth in Energisa's concession area in 2017,
which adds to operational cash generation. High energy tariffs and a
challenging macroeconomic environment negatively affected consumption
levels in 2016, with a reduction of 1.6% in Energisa's concession
area. The deteriorated economic environment has also pressured energy
losses and delinquency ratios.


Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case include:

-- Consolidated energy consumption increase of 0.7% in 2017 and
    average of 3.9% for 2018-2020 period;
-- Annual average capex of BRL1.2 billion from 2017 to 2020;
-- Payout dividend ratio of around of 50% after 2017;
-- No mergers or acquisitions.


Future developments that may individually or collectively lead to a
negative rating action include:

-- New projects or acquisitions involving significant amounts
    predominantly financed by debt;
-- Consolidated net leverage consistently above 3.5x;
-- CFFO + cash and equivalents/short-term debt ratio below 1.3x;
-- At the holding level: dividends received + cash and
    equivalents / debt service below 1.0x

Future developments that may individually or collectively lead to a
positive rating action include:
  -- Consolidated net leverage continuously below 2.0x;
  -- CFFO + cash and equivalents/short-term debt above 2.5x.


Energisa group presents a strong liquidity position and is expected to
continue accessing different sources of funds for capex and
short-term-debt refinancing. At the end of 2016, cash and equivalents
of BRL2.7 billion represented 1.7x its short-term debt of BRL1.6
billion. The cash and equivalents + CFFO-to-short-term debt ratio has
improved to 2.3x in 2016 from 1.6x in the previous year, evidence of
the company's better debt repayment schedule and stronger CFFO. On a
standalone basis, the holding company had a robust liquidity position
of BRL839 million compared with short-term debt of BRL192 million.


Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable
-- Long-Term National Scale Rating at 'AA(bra)'. Outlook Stable

Energisa Paraiba - Distribuidora de Energia S/A (Energisa Paraiba)
-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
-- Long-Term National Scale Rating at 'AA+(bra)'. Outlook Stable

Energisa Sergipe - Distribuidora de Energia S/A (Energisa Sergipe)
-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
-- Long-Term National Scale Rating at 'AA+(bra)'. Outlook Stable

Energisa Minas Gerais - Distribuidora de Energia S/A (Energisa Minas Gerais)
-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
-- Long-Term National Scale Rating at 'AA+(bra)'. Outlook Stable

ODEBRECHT SA: Bonds are Both the Best and Worst in Brazil
Aline Oyamada at Bloomberg News reports that Odebrecht SA is rewarding
some bondholders while others get burned.

Notes issued by the holding company and backed by the construction arm
plunged April 5 after newspaper Valor Economico reported executives
had told creditors that it will inevitably file for bankruptcy,
according to Bloomberg News.  The bonds are the worst performers in
Brazil this year, losing more than a third of their value, as
speculation mounted the scandal-tainted builder would struggle to meet
its obligations, Bloomberg News notes.

At the same time, defaulted securities issued by Odebrecht's oil and
gas unit are soaring -- racking up some of the best returns in
emerging markets -- as bondholders negotiate with the driller on
easing payment terms to avoid a bankruptcy filing for Odebrecht Oleo &
Gas, the report relates.

Bloomberg News discloses that the divergence shows that bonds from the
same parent company have wildly different outlooks. While all of them
are trading at deeply distressed levels, investors are wagering that
the notes from the energy unit backed by drilling rigs are a safer bet
given that the construction unit -- which has lost out on billions of
dollars in contracts since becoming embroiled in a bribery scandal in
2014 -- seems to be burning through cash. Odebrecht told Valor that it
continues to make good progress on efforts to restructure its

"Odebrecht's construction company is very asset-light," said Ray
Zucaro, the chief investment officer of Miami-based RVX Asset
Management, Bloomberg News relays.  "Before they had a reputation, but
now it's gone. Meanwhile, Odebrecht Oil & Gas bonds due 2022 have
actual drill rigs which are all working and have contracts," he added.

Bloomberg News notes that Odebrecht's oil and gas unit said on March
31 it expects to pay the interest on the 2022 notes by April 7, more
than 30 days after it was due, while it negotiates a debt
restructuring.  Bloomberg reported last month that an ad-hoc committee
of holders was in talks with the company on a deal that would avoid
writing down the principal owed on the bonds.

The company declined to comment on bond performance in an emailed
response to questions, says Bloomberg News.

The group, which has businesses ranging from sugar and ethanol to
construction, has been selling assets to manage its large debt load as
it seeks to rebuild its reputation after agreeing to pay a record
graft fine related to Brazil's Carwash probe, Bloomberg News relays.
More than 75 of the company's executives and former executives have
signed plea deals with Brazilian prosecutors on the case, and scion
Marcelo Odebrecht has been jailed for almost two years, Bloomberg News

With credit markets still all but shut to the group, it has been
forced it to borrow from or sell assets to its most profitable units
as some subsidiaries struggle to pay debt, Bloomberg News relates.
But even as the company tried to turn the page on the corruption
scandal, business continues to dwindle, the report notes. Newspaper
Folha de S. Paulo reported that the builder's backlog shrunk 20
percent in the last three months of 2016, or $4.3 billion in projects,
Bloomberg News says.

Exotix Partners recommended selling Odebrecht notes amid "worrying"
business trends, saying the current pace of decline in cash isn't
sustainable and could lead the company to default on debt this year if
the trend holds and no significant projects are added, Bloomberg News
relays.  Odebrecht Finance notes backed by the building unit due 2042
fell about 8 cents to 28 cents on the dollar on April 6.

Odebrecht's building arm said in an emailed response to questions that
the company is doing "all that's needed to turn the page" and is
negotiating deals with several of the countries it operates in,
Bloomberg News discloses.  "The company keeps an active channel of
communication with its bondholders" to keep them informed and avoid
volatility in the notes, it said, Bloomberg News adds.

As reporter in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 2, 2016, The Wall Street Journal related that Marcelo
Odebrecht, the jailed former head of Brazilian construction giant
Odebrecht SA, agreed to sign a plea-bargain agreement in
connection with Brazil's largest corruption probe ever, according
to a person close to the negotiations.  The move could roil the
nation's political class yet again.  The testimony of the former
industrialist, which is part of the deal, has the potential to
implicate numerous politicians who allegedly took kickbacks from
contractors as part of a years-long graft ring centered on
Brazil's state-run oil company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, known as
Petrobras, according to The Wall Street Journal.

OI SA: Spurns Intellectually Dishonest Calls for Takeover by State
Fabiola Moura at Bloomberg News reports that Oi SA and one of its
largest shareholders are pushing back against calls for a government
takeover to usher the Brazilian phone company out of bankruptcy

Groups unhappy with the company's restructuring plan are pressuring
the government to intervene, even though the bankruptcy process is
following its course and operations have been unaffected, said Nelson
Tanure, the company's second-largest shareholder, according to
Bloomberg News.  He didn't say who he suspects of lobbying the
government, which has been laying the legal groundwork to replace Oi's
executive team if service begins to deteriorate, the report notes.

"There is an intellectually dishonest game going on here," Tanure said
in an interview in Rio de Janeiro, notes the report.  "Oi improved all
its clients' satisfaction indexes since filing for bankruptcy, but
there is a heavy lobby in Brasilia" for the intervention.

Bondholders representing a majority of Oi's creditors rejected the
company's latest proposal to restructure $19 billion in debt, saying
it still heavily favors shareholders, Bloomberg News relays.   The
plan would let bondholders swap their debt for a stake that could
eventually reach 38 percent, far less than the 95 percent one group of
debtholders has proposed, the report notes.  Oi must win approval from
creditors and other stakeholders to exit bankruptcy, and the company
has said it is listening to feedback from the other parties about the
new plan, Bloomberg News notes.

A government takeover would take place in case of an imminent
deterioration of Oi's telecommunications services, Telecommunications
Secretary Andre Borges said in an interview, according to the report.
Telecommunications regulator Anatel would choose an executive with the
proper expertise to run Oi, he said. "Our only concern is that
services be maintained," Mr. Borges added.

A draft of the decree giving the government the option to take over
Oi's operations is likely to be published in the coming days,
newspaper Valor Economico said, Bloomberg News notes. The government
won't immediately intervene in the company after the decree is
published, giving shareholders a last chance to push for an agreement
with creditors, Valor said, Bloomberg News says.

While Bloomberg's interview with Tanure was taking place, Oi released
a statement saying management is "committed to the company's
sustainability, and the positive results it's been getting show the
company's viability and operational strength."  Oi reported
fourth-quarter operating profit that beat analysts' estimates, and the
phone carrier ended 2016 with BRL7.85 billion ($2.5 billion) in cash,
Bloomberg News notes.

A government takeover of the company's management would disrupt
operations and cause losses for all the parties involved, Tanure said,
Bloomberg News relays.

"Oi's executives are extremely serious and competent. They are the
ones who need to run the company," Mr. Tanure said.  Executives and
the board are in full harmony and seeking an agreement with creditors,
which include Anatel, public and private banks as well as bondholders
and smaller credit holders, such as suppliers, Bloomberg News relays.

"We are intensely and tirelessly seeking possible alternatives to make
the understanding between shareholders and creditors viable as soon as
possible," Oi Chief Executive Officer Marco Schroeder said in the
statement obtained by Bloomberg News.

                            *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 24, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'D' corporate
credit and issue-level global and national scale ratings on Oi
S.A.  At the same time, S&P withdrew the recovery ratings on the
company's rated debt, until it has an updated capital structure
once Oi emerges from judicial reorganization.

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CJVP LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
The sole shareholder of CJVP Ltd., on March 6, 2017, passed a
resolution to liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100

GANYMEDE PARENT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
The sole shareholder of Ganymede Parent Limited, on March 3, 2017,
passed a resolution to liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100

J-ONE ASSETS: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
The members of J-One Assets Corporation received on April 3, 2017, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property

The company's liquidator is:

          Gonzalo Jalles
          Harneys Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          Harneys Services (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Place, 4th Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 10240 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 - 8599

KINGDOM 5-KR-103: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
The members of Kingdom 5-KR-103, Ltd. received on April 4, 2017, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property

The company's liquidator is:

          HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud
          c/o Kingdom Holding Company
          Kingdom Center - Floor 66
          P.O. Box 1 Riyadh 11321
          Saudi Arabia
          Telephone: +966 1 211 1111 (ext. 1211)

MINGSHEN GLOBAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 19
The members of Mingshen Global Fund will hold their final meeting on
April 19, 2017, at 11:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Pan Zhi Yong
          Harneys Services (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Place, 4th Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 10240 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands

TELLURIAN NEW: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
The members of Tellurian New Frontier Partners Limited will hold their
final meeting on May 11, 2017, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          dms House 20 Genesis Close
          P.O. Box 1344 George Town KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 749 2512
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877

VEIO CAPITAL MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 19
The members of VEIO Capital Master Fund Limited will hold their final
meeting on April 19, 2017, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lau Fu Wing
          Suite 3105
          Alexandra House, 31st Floor
          18 Chater Road
          Hong Kong

VEIO CAPITAL OFFSHORE: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 19
The members of Veio Capital Offshore Feeder Fund Limited will hold
their final meeting on April 19, 2017, to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lau Fu Wing
          Suite 3105
          Alexandra House, 31st Floor
          18 Chater Road
          Hong Kong

VEIO CAPITAL US: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 19
The members of VEIO Capital US Feeder Fund Limited will hold their
final meeting on April 19, 2017, to receive the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lau Fu Wing
          Suite 3105
          Alexandra House, 31st Floor
          18 Chater Road
          Hong Kong

WESVAALSO LTD: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
The members of Wesvaalso Ltd. received on March 28, 2017, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands

P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on $8BB Bonds
Moody's Investors Service has revised the outlook on the Puerto Rico
Electric Power Authority (PREPA) to negative from developing, while
affirming the Caa3 rating on PREPA's approximately $8.0 billion of
Power Revenue Bonds.

Summary Rating Rationale

The change in outlook to negative from developing considers the
uncertainty that persists regarding the final terms of the
restructuring plan between PREPA and its creditors. The rating action
also reflects the recent outlook change to negative from developing on
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Commonwealth: Caa3 negative), given
the uncertainty around restructuring plans for debt issued by the
Commonwealth and the economic challenges across the island that also
affect PREPA. The Caa3 rating affirmation incorporates Moody's
continued belief that the expected recovery rate for creditors could
approximate 65% to 80% in the event of a default, which is highly

PREPA and its creditors had reached a broad outline of a consensual
restructuring plan more than a year ago in January 2016, known as the
Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA), which calls among other things
for bondholders to exchange their bonds for new securitization bonds
at an exchange ratio of 85%. The parties also entered into a
Forbearance Agreement to reduce the risk of litigation and to allow
time to work on a definitive restructuring agreement. The RSA and
Forbearance Agreement have been extended numerous times while the
parties continued to negotiate, and the latest expiration date was
March 31, 2017. The new Puerto Rican administration put forth a
proposal to modify the terms of the RSA in order to seek additional
concessions from bondholders, which introduces additional risk and
uncertainty to the execution of a final consensual agreement. Moody's
understand that the parties agreed to extend the RSA until April 13,
2017. While this suggests that the parties are close to a final
agreement, this also highlights the fragility of the situation. There
is the possibility that the consensual deal could unravel, which could
lead to protracted litigation between PREPA and its bondholders.

On March 21, 2017, PREPA, the Puerto Rican government and its fiscal
agent, the Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (or AAFAF,
its initials in Spanish) announced proposed revisions to the terms of
the RSA. The exchange ratio of 85% would be maintained, but there were
other significant proposed modifications. Among other things, the
exchange would be split into PREPA and securitization tranches. In
addition, the length of periods of principal deferral and
capitalization of interest would be increased from 5 to 7 years, and
the overall maturity of the new deal would be extended to 2047.
Moody's view is that should a deal emerge, it is likely to be
somewhere in between the original RSA and this latest proposal, but
its final outcome is unknown at this stage, and as such, execution
risk remains high.

The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
(PROMESA), which was enacted by the US government last year and
established an oversight board to approve eventual debt restructuring
plans, allows PREPA to implement its restructuring plans as part of a
Pre-existing Voluntary Agreement by providing a mechanism for
voluntary agreements to adjust debts through Title VI of PROMESA
(Creditor Collective Action). Under PROMESA, there is also a provision
under Title III that allows for in-court adjustments of debts similar
to a Chapter 9 bankruptcy. While Moody's understand that it is still
PREPA's intention to avail itself of Title VI, the utility could
utilize Title III if negotiations with creditors break down.

The outlook change also reflects PREPA's worsening liquidity. Moody's
understand that PREPA is forecasted to have insufficient internal
liquidity to meet its next debt service payment on July 1, 2017 of
about $400 million, representing principal and interest. In the
absence of creditors lending money to PREPA, which has occurred in the
past, PREPA will default on this payment. While creditors have
provided support in the past, there is increasing uncertainty as to
whether parties could reach an arrangement given the uncertainty about
execution of the RSA.

Notwithstanding these negative trends, PREPA has achieved several
positive milestones, which gives rise to a restructuring occurring. On
January 10, 2017, the Puerto Rico Energy Commission (PREC) approved a
final rate order for a base-rate increase for PREPA of 1.025 cents per
kilowatt-hour (kWh). This base-rate increase is the first since 1989
and will help to stabilize the utility's longer-term financial
position. This is in addition to PREC's approval of a non-bypassable
3.1 cents/kWh surcharge to cover debt service on the securitization
bonds that PREPA expects to issue as part of its debt restructuring.
Also, three of the seven lawsuits brought by interested parties
challenging the validity of the surcharge and PREPA's restructuring
have been withdrawn. In addition, a lower court recently ruled in
PREPA's favor in a fourth validation case, a case brought by PREPA's
largest union, which has filed an appeal with the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court. According to PREPA's management, they have succeeded in
consolidating the remaining three lawsuits into one case.


The negative outlook considers the uncertainty and obstacles to
executing on a complex restructuring plan as well as the long-term
capital investment program focused on converting oil-based power
generation to natural gas in the face of a very challenging economic
environment within the Commonwealth. While Moody's believes that an
out-of-court restructuring continues to be the most likely outcome,
the negative outlook factors in the fragile nature of the agreement
and the chance that such an agreement may unravel causing parties to
pursue more litigious avenues.


In light of the negative outlook, the rating is not expected to move
upward over the near-to-medium term. The outlook could stabilize and
upward rating pressure could emerge if the restructuring occurs on
terms that are largely similar to the terms contemplated in the RSA.


The rating could be pressured downward if the RSA collapses and/or the
prospects for recovery worsen.


The principal methodology used in this rating was U.S. Public Power
Electric Utilities with Generation Ownership Exposure published in
March 2016.


ACI AIRPORT: Fitch Affirms Rating on $200MM Secured Notes at BB+
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the long-term rating on ACI Airport
SudAmerica, S.A.'s (ACI) USD200 million senior secured notes at 'BB+'.
The Rating Outlook remains Stable.


Summary: The rating is driven by Carrasco International Airport's
(MVD) strategic but modest traffic base and its strong O&D share of
passenger traffic, coupled with a rate setting mechanisms that
provides adequate protection against exchange rate fluctuations and
inflation escalation. Debt is fixed rate and fully amortising.
Structural subordination is mitigated by the very low likelihood of
dividends' lock out until 2021 and by a springing guarantee from then
onwards. Credit metrics are strong for the rating category according
to applicable criteria, with the rating constrained to sub-investment
grade levels over the medium term due to weak debt service coverage
ratios (DSCRs) up to 2019 and, to a lesser extent, to termination risk
up to 2018. Debt repayment is not dependent upon traffic growth,
withstanding a negative 2.64% CAGR over debt tenor.

Important Small-Scale International Gateway with Little Reliance on
Growth [Revenue Risk - Volume: Midrange]:
Located in Uruguay's capital city, MVD is the main international
gateway to Uruguay with approximately 85% of the country's flights.
MVD is almost exclusively an O&D airport with only 1% of passengers
transferring to other destinations. CAGR for 2006-2016 was 5.53%,
despite the bankruptcy of the country's flagship carrier, Pluna, and
the resulting loss of capacity and status as a regional hub. Despite
expected 2016-2032 CAGR of 2.67%, the project does not depend on
growth to meet its obligations.

Inflation and Exchange Adjusted Tariffs [Price Risk: Midrange]:
Revenues are 95% denominated in USD with Aeronautical revenues being
adjusted by a global index that considers foreign exchange and
inflation rates. Tariffs do not decrease under the adjustment scheme;
however, increases have occasionally been subject to political risk.
No increase in tariffs is assumed over the life of the concession.

No Significant Investments Needed [Infrastructure Development &
Renewal: Stronger]:
The airport's current capacity of 4.5 million passengers/year is well
below management's forecast of 2.5 million to 3 million passengers at
the end of the concession term. Under the amended concession
agreement, which extended the term through 2033, the new taxi-way
construction (USD10 million) was extended until the end of the
concession, with no other significant mandatory investments needed in
the remaining term.

Subordinated Fixed-Rate Amortizing Issuance [Debt Structure: Midrange]:
The issuance is conservatively structured with 100% fixed rate and
fully amortizes over the life of the debt. A 'springing guarantee'
covenant requires Puerta del Sur S.A. (PDS, or the opco) to issue a
guarantee of the rated debt following the payment in full of opco debt
in 2021. Cash flow available for debt service (CFADS) for the rated
debt is structurally subordinated to the notes issued at the opco
level and subject to dividend distribution tests through maturity of
the opco notes in October 2021. Lock-out of dividends is considered
highly unlikely, as a trigger breach prior to 2021 would require
severe stress in traffic declines in excess of 40%. Should a lock-out
occur, the issuance also benefits from deferrable debt service for up
to 12 months.

Limited Exposure to Termination Events:
Breach of contract termination events are standard and manageable by
the concessionaire; however, a unilateral termination for public
interest by the government in the short term (up to 2018) would leave
the transaction exposed to a loss of less than 10% given the debt
level and subordinate nature of the issuance. Fitch considers the risk
unlikely given (i) the recent extension of the concession and general
public good-will for the project; (ii) the increased concession fee
paid by the concessionaire to the government; (iii) the airport's
operating status with no material infrastructure construction needs;
and (iv) the stability of Uruguay as an investment grade country.

Weaker Metrics in the Short-term:
DSCRs average 1.78x and 1.52x for the base and rating cases, deemed
strong for the rating category according to applicable criteria.
However, coverage in the early years of the transaction life is
weaker. Respective minimum DSCRs for the base and rating cases are
1.20x and 1.13x, with the minimums occurring in the near term while
the senior debt is outstanding. Consolidated leverage is low compared
to 'BB+' peers at 4.57x Net Debt / EBITDA in 2016 and 2.9x expected
for 2021. No dependence on traffic growth to support debt requirements
is needed, as breakeven annual traffic growth is negative 2.64%,
considering ACI's debt service reserve account (DSRA).

Peer Group:
The airport's nearest peers include Lima Airport Partners S.R.L.
('BBB+'/Stable Outlook), which serves as an international gateway
airport with significant O&D (92%) and adequate leverage when compared
to its revenue profile (average DSCR is 3.44x and future maximum
consolidated Net Debt/CFADS is 8.81x), and Aeropuerto Internacional de
Tocumen ('BBB'/ Stable Outlook), which serves as the main gateway to
Panama and functions as both an O&D and transit facility to the
region. Unlike these peers, Carrasco International Airport has a
significantly lower enplanement base and weaker near-term financial
coverage ratios, which limit rating upgrades in the short term.


-- Unlikely in the medium term, due to weak DSCR metrics up to
    2019 and limited but relevant termination risk until 2018.
    Traffic performance consistently in line with Fitch's base
    case expectations could trigger a positive rating action
    approaching 2019.

Rating can be downgraded if traffic levels materially diverge from
rating case projections in the medium to long term.


The airport's traffic performance in 2016 has surpassed Fitch's Base
Case assumptions, after presenting practically 0% growth in 2015.
Traffic has grown 11.1%, versus an expectation of only 1.4% at Fitch's
base case. Revenues and EBITDA were also higher than expected at
USD77.8 million (3.1% higher) and USD 45.8 million (6% higher),

ACI's DSCR of 1.7x was higher than Fitch's base case expectation of
1.57x. Considering the debt service reserve account (DSRA) already
funded at ACI and available cash at the opco, consolidated Net Debt /
EBITDA was 4.59x.

Fitch expects 2.8% and 2.4% traffic growth for 2017 in the base and
rating cases, respectively. Long-term traffic growth is expected to be
in line with past years at 2.67% and 1.52% CAGR in the 2016-2032

Additionally, no tariff increases were considered under the GIA for
both cases. Under the base case, minimum DSCR is 1.20x in 2018, with
an average, of 1.78x; under the rating case, minimum DSCR is 1.13x in
2018, with an average of 1.52x.


The security package supporting the notes is typical for project
financings and includes a pledge of 100% of the shares of the opco,
PDS and a covenant to issue a guarantee from the entity; a pledge of
100% of the shares of Cerealsur S.A., direct owner of PDS's shares,
and a guarantee from the entity; the transaction distribution, issuer
and debt service accounts; all of the issuer's property; and all
present and future payments, proceeds and claims of any kind with
respect to the foregoing. The transaction includes a 'springing
guarantee' covenant, which requires the opco to issue a guarantee of
the rated debt following the payment in full of the opco debt in
September 2021. Therefore, the rated debt will become pari passu with
all senior unsecured debt at the opco because of the guarantee.


VENEZUELA: Bond Sell-Off Accelerates as $2 Billion Payment Looms
Pan Kwan Yuk at The Financial Times reports that crunch time is
looming once again for Venezuela.

The sell-off in dollar bonds issued by Venezuela and state-owned oil
company PDVSA picked up steam as the spiraling crisis in the South
American country triggered fresh fears of a default ahead of a
multi-billion bond payment due this week, according to The Financial

The country's benchmark 2027 bond fell 3 per cent to a 10-month low of
44.6 cents on the dollar.  Bonds issued by PDVSA also took a leg
lower, with the note due in 2035 down 2.7 per cent at 43.1 cents on
the dollar.

The cost of insuring Venezuelan debt against a default has risen
sharply after the country's Supreme Court -- which is controlled by
President Nicolas Maduro's socialist government -- kicked off the
latest chapter in Venezuela's descent by moving to take over the
opposition-dominated National Assembly, The Financial Times notes.

Although the decision was quickly reversed, the pushback against Mr.
Maduro's creeping authoritarianism has done little to soothe market
nerves, in keeping with the topsy-turvy logic that has come to define
Venezuela, The Financial Times relays.

Indeed, as some analysts have noted, the Supreme Court move to seize
the last independent institution remaining in Venezuela would have
also allowed Mr. Maduro to create oil joint ventures without
congressional approval, paving the way for the government to tap fresh
sources of cash, The Financial Times notes.

"Since such joint ventures are often accompanied by fresh financing it
follows that the reversal of the Supreme Court's ruling could actually
make it a bit more difficult for the Maduro Administration to raise
new funding [to make its bond repayments]," said Jan Dehn, global head
of research at Ashmore, The Financial Times discloses.

The sell-off in Venezuelan bonds comes as PDVSA faces a $2.05 billion
bond repayment on April 12 and a further $3.5 billion in payments in
October and November, The Financial Times relays.

By contrast, the country's foreign reserves stand at just $10.4
billion, according to the latest central bank data, while the cost of
insuring PDVSA debt against a default has surged more than 668bps
since March 31 to 4,558.501 -- the highest level since December 2016,
The Financial Times notes.

Siobhan Morden, head of LatAm fixed income strategy at Nomura, said
that while she is not expecting a default this week, the government --
having already slashed imports, liquidated much of its gold holdings
and raided its foreign reserves -- is increasingly running out of
funding options, The Financial Times adds.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 28, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the


* Fitch Sees Shallow Economic Recovery for Latin America in 2017
In its "Latin American Sovereign Overview 2Q17", Fitch Ratings
forecasts regional GDP growth to recover moderately to 1.3% in 2017
following two years of economic contraction. Better external demand, a
moderate rise in commodity prices, and improved performance in two
large regional economies (Argentina and Brazil) should facilitate the
region's economic recovery. Several inflation-targeting central banks
have begun to ease monetary policy (most notably Brazil) as the
pass-through from weaker currencies is waning and the impact of the El
Nino weather pattern is diminishing. Conversely, Mexico has been
tightening monetary policy to control inflation and inflation
expectations in the face of a weak and volatile peso. Fiscal
consolidation continues to face challenges from weak growth and
continued spending pressures, while debt dynamics remain adverse in
numerous countries.

Greater trade protectionism and tighter immigration controls under the
Trump administration, tighter external financing conditions, faster
deceleration in China, and a renewed slide in commodity prices are
downside risks for the region's growth outlook.

Currently, six Latin American sovereigns have Negative Outlooks
(Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Suriname) and none has a
Positive Outlook. "Since Fitch 4Q16 publication, Fitch has downgraded
Suriname by two notches, and El Salvador and Costa Rica by one notch.
Mexico and Chile have had their Outlooks changed to Negative from
Stable. On the positive side, Fitch has upgraded the Dominican
Republic by one notch to 'BB-' with a Stable Outlook, and Fitch has
changed Colombia's Outlook to Stable from Negative," Fitch says.

The full report "Latin American Sovereign Overview 2Q17" provides a
summary of the credit profile of each of the 20 rated sovereigns in
Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as an overview of recent
macroeconomic developments and rating trends. The report is available

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 3 to April 7, 2017

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        68                  BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        67.75               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   4.54     52.63  10/25/2041   PA    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   6        63.5   10/25/2041   PA    USD
Dolomite Capital Ltd     13.26     67.2   12/20/2019   CN    ZAR
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
ESFG International Ltd    5.75      0.66               KY    EUR
General Shopping Financ  10        72.5                KY    USD
General Shopping Financ  10        71.7                KY    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63                  BR    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63.88               BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.16   4/25/2019   HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.26   4/25/2019   HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman I   3.88     58.01   2/7/2035    KY    EUR
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Noble Holding Internati   5.25     72.98   3/15/2042   KY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     39      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     38      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     48.5    6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     47.25   6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49                  KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.29   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.12     48.2    6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     46.15   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        57.02   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.12     53.51   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.25     70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.47   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     45.92   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.1      47.82   6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49.25               KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.39   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.77   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.2      70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        56.85   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.1      52.99   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      39.64  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      36.44  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      38.79  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      38.75  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.19   2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      9      58.28  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      6      40.32   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     50.15   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.22  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.37     37.39   4/12/2027   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5      37.1    4/12/2037   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        41.25  10/28/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        40.01   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9        58.11  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.13  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.2    2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     49.94   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6      60      3/30/2022   AE    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         5.8      49.75   1/30/2018   NO    NOK
Siem Offshore Inc         5.59     50.25   3/28/2019   NO    NOK
STB Finance Cayman Ltd    2.04     58.35               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.36     50.93   9/25/2036   KY    USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesor   5.25     68.02  12/29/2021   UY    UYU
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     67.5   11/9/2019    BR    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     65.75  11/9/2019    BR    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     48.75   5/7/2028    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9        51.75   5/7/2023    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.37     49      1/13/2034   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        71.88  12/1/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     52      9/15/2027   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.65     46.38   4/21/2025   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.75     61.75  10/13/2019   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.95     58.13   8/5/2031    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6        53.75  12/9/2020    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  12.75     67      8/23/2022   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        44      3/31/2038   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6.5      36.53  12/29/2036   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   8.25     47.75  10/13/2024   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.75     57.75  10/21/2026   VE    USD
Venezuela Government TI    5.25    69.59   3/21/2019   VE    USD


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.  Send
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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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