TCRLA_Public/170413.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, April 13, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 74


                            Headlines



B E L I Z E

BELIZE: Moody's Raises LT Issuer, Senior Unsecured Ratings to B3


B R A Z I L

JALLES MACHADO: Fitch Affirms B+ IDRs; Outlook Stable
ODEBRECHT ENGENHARIA: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to Caa2


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ARTEMIS PROPERTY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 26
DUB COMPANY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 27
ELDOURADO ENTITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
GOODLAND LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
IBIS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 26

IBIS GLOBAL MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 26
MAM COMPANY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 27
NEZU ASIA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
TIGER NEZU: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
ZUNI HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 26


C H I L E

LATAM AIRLINES: S&P Assigns BB Rating to Cl. C Pass-Through Cert.


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coffee Growers Face Their 'Worst' Crisis


P E R U

CORPORACION FINANCIERA: S&P Lowers Rating on Sub. Notes to 'BB+'


P U E R T O   R I C O

LINDLEY FIRE: Creditors' Panel Hires Marshack Hays as Counsel


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

BPTT: Platform for Angelin Project to be Fabricated Outside T&T
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: La Brea Remains Depressed
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Needs to review State Enterprise Sector


                            - - - - -


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B E L I Z E
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BELIZE: Moody's Raises LT Issuer, Senior Unsecured Ratings to B3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Government of Belize's
long-term foreign- and local-currency issuer and senior unsecured
ratings to B3 from Caa2. The outlook is stable.

The key drivers of the upgrade of Belize's senior unsecured and
long-term issuer ratings are:

1) The improvement in the government's debt service profile and
reduction in the risk of a subsequent credit event following the
recent restructuring of the government's debt.

2) Lingering macroeconomic and fiscal vulnerabilities and risks to
debt sustainability which constrain Belize's creditworthiness
within the low 'B' category.

The stable outlook reflects the balanced risks to Belize's credit
profile at the B3 rating level. The risk of a subsequent credit
event remains low through the outlook horizon, given the
government's more favorable debt payment schedule. However, fiscal
and economic challenges are likely to persist and Moody's believes
that, despite the liquidity relief provided by the debt
restructuring, there is a low likelihood that upward pressure on
Belize's creditworthiness will develop over the next 12 to 18
months.

Concurrent with rating action, Moody's has also raised Belize's
long-term foreign-currency bond ceiling to B1 from B2, and the
long-term foreign-currency bank deposit ceiling to Caa1 from Caa3.
The short-term foreign-currency deposit and bond ceilings remain
unchanged at Not Prime (NP). Finally, the long-term local-currency
bond and deposit ceilings have been raised to B1 from B2.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADE

-- FIRST DRIVER: EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE FOLLOWING THE RESTRUCTURING
IS MORE MANAGEABLE FOR THE SOVEREIGN OVER THE MEDIUM-TERM

The first driver of the upgrade is the decreased likelihood that
the Belizean sovereign will undergo a subsequent credit event
given a more benign debt servicing schedule following the
restructuring in March 2017.

The March 2017 restructuring constitutes the third such credit
event since 2006 of the sovereign's sole external market bond.
Under the terms of this latest restructuring, amortization
payments have now been postponed to begin in 2030 rather than 2019
under the previous terms.

This more benign debt service profile has reduced the risk of a
subsequent credit event and the expected loss on Belize's debt
would be lower than is consistent with a 'Caa' rating. Under the
original terms, the $529 million bond due in February 2038 carried
a 5% coupon rate scheduled to increase ("step-up") to 6.767% in
August 2017 and included 38 semi-annual amortization payments
starting in August 2019. These have been amended to a fixed
4.9375% coupon rate, five annual amortization payments beginning
in 2030 and a final maturity of February 2034. A principal haircut
was never formally proposed throughout the process.

Although less favorable than what the authorities initially sought
based on a Consent Solicitation Statement originally dated January
12, 2017 to begin negotiations with bondholders, the debt service
schedule delineated by the restructuring still followed a very
similar structure to what the authorities had proposed. The new
schedule represents a considerable improvement in terms of
providing liquidity relief relative to the original terms of the
2038 instrument through the deferral of amortization payments
until the latter years of the instrument's new tenor.

Similar to the previous restructuring instances, the latest
restructuring was conducted under a broadly transparent process
where the authorities' initial proposal was not accepted by
bondholders and yielded a more limited net present value (NPV)
loss to creditors than the authorities sought.

-- SECOND DRIVER: LINGERING ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CHALLENGES WILL
CONSTRAIN THE SOVEREIGN'S CREDIT PROFILE

The second driver is Moody's view that Belize's persistent growth
challenges and a high public debt burden will keep its
susceptibility to event risk elevated, limiting further
improvements in the sovereign credit profile beyond those obtained
by liquidity relief from the debt restructuring.

The March restructuring came amid multiple challenges facing the
Belizean economy. The economy's performance has fallen far short
of the growth path envisaged by official projections in 2012-13 at
the time of the previous restructuring negotiations. Rather than
2%-3% real annual average GDP growth envisaged then, the economy
grew by only 1% in 2015. During this period, the effective
exchange rate appreciated sharply both in nominal and real terms,
driven mostly by the strengthening of the US dollar to which the
currency is pegged, reducing competitiveness.

The fiscal position has weakened, pushing public debt higher. In
2015, the overall fiscal deficit widened to nearly 8% of GDP
partly due to government payments related to the nationalization
of two public utilities: electric company Belize Electricity
Limited and telecom company Belize Telemedia Limited. The
structural deficit, which excludes one-off and cyclical factors,
worsened as well because of increases in public sector wages,
transfers and a large overrun in capital expenditures. The
combination of these factors has caused the central government to
run recurrent primary deficits since 2014. The central
government's debt rose to 79% of GDP in 2015 from 74% in 2014.

Moody's estimates that real GDP contracted 1.5% in 2016, that the
fiscal deficit remained high at around 5% of GDP and that central
government debt likely reached 91% of GDP. Given Belize's low
potential growth (1.5%-2%), a debt burden above 90% of GDP
severely constrains the authorities' room for policy maneuver and
limits the economy's ability to absorb shocks. In the absence of
far-reaching structural reforms, the weak growth and fiscal
outlook constrains the sovereign's credit profile.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The stable outlook indicates that rating changes are unlikely in
the near future. Upward pressure on the rating could come from the
adoption of extensive structural reforms that support higher
government revenues, boost competitiveness and attract large
amounts of investment to significantly increase potential growth
rates such that debt sustainability is enhanced. A substantial
reduction of the public debt burden and an ability to sustain high
primary fiscal surpluses would also be credit positive.

Conversely, downward pressure on the sovereign's rating would
emerge if there was a deterioration in external liquidity and
fiscal indicators, potentially stemming from a large shock, that
jeopardized the government's ability to remain current on its debt
payments.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,361 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -1.5% (2016 Estimate) (also known as
GDP Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 2% (2016 Estimate)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -5.0% (2016 Estimate) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -10.6% (2016 Estimate) (also known as
External Balance)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On April 10, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Government of Belize. The main points raised during the
discussion were: The issuer's fiscal or financial strength,
including its debt profile, has materially increased. The issuer
has become less susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


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B R A Z I L
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JALLES MACHADO: Fitch Affirms B+ IDRs; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Jalles Machado S.A.'s Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+' and its
long-term National scale rating at 'A-(bra)'. The Rating Outlook
is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect Fitch's expectations that Jalles Machado will
keep generating resilient cash flow from operations (CFFO), with
moderate leverage and robust operating margins. Nevertheless,
Fitch considers that the company's ability to access different
sources of funding should continue to be limited and consistent
with the current IDR, as the Brazilian sugar and ethanol (S&E)
industry faced a recent period of stress with many players going
into default. The intrinsically high volatility in this sector is
a permanent risk that is incorporated into Fitch analysis.

Jalles Machado's business model is above average when compared to
peers and should strengthen with the construction of a new sugar
factory. The company will then be able to benefit from a premium
portfolio of products that includes branded organic and crystal
sugar. The company's energy production capacity through its
biomass thermal plants also adds to the credit profile due to its
more stable cash flow.

Fitch expects Jalles Machado to present a positive free cash flow
(FCF) over the next four years. Nevertheless, investments in the
new sugar factory and in the cane fields to raise the company's
crushing capacity to 5 million tons from 4.6 million tons are
expected to have a negative impact on cash flow in fiscal 2017 and
2018.

Positive FCF Should Persist

Fitch forecasts FCF at close to breakeven in fiscal 2017 and of
around BRL40 million in fiscal 2018. The company reported positive
FCF of BRL18 million in the last 12 months (LTM) ended Dec. 31,
2016. Cash flow from operations (CFFO) amounted to BRL253 million
in the LTM ended Dec. 31, 2016, down 38% from BRL410 million
reported in fiscal 2016, but sufficient to cover capex of BRL235
million. Jalles Machado's weaker cash flow reflected the 18% drop
in crushed volumes that followed the worst weather conditions in
decades, which were partly offset by higher sugar concentration,
industrial yields and the company's flexibility to maximize
production of high-value-added products. FCF in fiscal 2017 and
2018 will be pressured by investments in the new sugar factory
annexed to the Usina Otavio Lage (UOL) mill, in cane field
productivity, and to raise UOL's crushing capacity to 2.2 million
tons from 1.8 million tons.

Fitch expects that more favorable weather conditions in 2017 will
bring agricultural yields back to historical levels and contribute
to raising crushed volumes to over 4.3 million tons in the
2017/2018 crop season. The company crushed 3.8 million tons of
sugar cane in the 2016/2017 season, comparing unfavorably with the
record 4.6 million tons in the previous season. While
international sugar prices have receded sharply recently to less
than US$17 cents/pound from US$20 cents/pound in the beginning of
the year, Jalles Machado's attractively hedged sugar prices and
improved crushed volumes are expected to contribute to the
positive FCF in 2017/2018. The high uncertainty surrounding sugar
and ethanol prices for the following seasons is an important issue
in Fitch analysis that limits the IDRs.

Moderate Leverage

Fitch expects Jalles Machado to report net adjusted leverage at
around 2.0x in fiscal 2017, flat compared to March 31, 2016, and
at 1.7x in fiscal 2018, well below the sector's average. The
company posted net adjusted leverage of 2.2x as of the LTM ended
Dec. 31, 2016. Fitch's projected decline in net leverage ratios in
the ongoing crop season reflects the expectation of positive FCF
for the fiscal year and the recent strengthening of the BRL
against the USD compared to Dec. 31, 2016. As of Dec. 31, 2016,
consolidated adjusted debt including obligations related to land
lease was BRL1.4 billion, of which USD-denominated debt accounted
for 20%. Principal and interest payments up to March 2018 are
protected through derivatives.

Strong Business Model

Fitch believes the new sugar factory will strengthen Jalles
Machado's business model. The company will already be able to take
advantage of the attractively hedged sugar prices in the 2017/2018
season. Prices for the new sugar production are already hedged and
incremental EBITDA on a pro forma basis is estimated at over BRL60
million. The new factory will balance the company product mix
towards 44% sugar / 56% ethanol (currently 34% sugar / 66%
ethanol), noting that profitability of the sweetener has
historically been above that of the biofuel.

Jalles Machado offers a differentiated product portfolio that
contributes to average EBITDAR margins of 74%, which compare
favorably with the industry average. As of the LTM ended Dec. 31,
2016, net revenues increased by 6% to BRL760 million and EBITDAR
amounted to BRL588 million, at a 77% margin. The company's premium
portfolio of products includes the sale of branded organic and
crystal sugar, the latter holding relevant market share in
Brazil's Northern and Northeastern retail markets. Prices for both
products command large premiums compared to Very High Polarizaton
(VHP) sugar. Product mix also includes sale of hydrous, anhydrous,
industrial ethanol and sanitizers, with the domestic ethanol
market becoming more volatile following Petroleo Brasileiro S/A's
(Petrobras) new fuel pricing policy.

High operating margins also reflect the fiscal incentives provided
by the State of Goias on the sale of sugar and ethanol. In the
nine months through Dec. 31, 2016, tax incentives added BRL27
million to Jalles Machado's EBITDAR. The company's low land-lease
costs, well below the average of the State of Sao Paulo, also play
a role. The self-sufficiency in sugar cane has a positive
accounting impact on Jalles Machado's margins. As spending on the
cane fields is accounted for as capital expenditure rather than
cost, the higher the share of owned cane in the mix, the larger
the capital expenditure and the lower the impact on EBITDAR.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Sugar prices at US$19 cents/pound in 2017/2018 and average
    prices of US$17 cents/pound from then on;
-- The combination of oil prices and the FX rate will lead
    Petrobras to keep increasing domestic gasoline prices, paving
    the way for a gradual increase in hydrous ethanol prices;
-- Average crushed volumes of 4.4 million tons in the projected
    period;
-- Additional capex needed to put the new sugar factory on stream
    and to increase Usina Otavio Lage crushed volumes to 2.2
    million tons by the 2018/2019 season from the current 1.8
    million tons;
-- Higher presence of sugar in the product mix relative to
    historical levels due to the coming on stream of the new sugar
    factory and maintenance of high premiums for organic sugar.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a negative rating action:

-- Net adjusted debt to EBITDAR of 3.5x or above on a sustainable
    basis;
-- Cash plus CFFO over short-term debt below 1x.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a positive rating action:

-- Improving liquidity for the Brazilian S&E industry;
-- Cash plus finished product inventories at market value-to-
    short-term debt equal to or above 2x.

LIQUIDITY

Fitch expects Jalles Machado to report cash near BRL300 million
and cash to short-term debt at around 1.0x in fiscal 2017. This
would compare favorably with cash to short-term debt coverage of
0.9x as of fiscal 2016. The maintenance of a weak cash position in
the third quarter of fiscal 2017 was largely motivated by the
company's strategy of building up inventories in expectation of
higher sugar and ethanol prices during the offseason. While its
cash and short-term debt positions amounted to BRL198 million and
BRL383 million, respectively, for the 3Q17 the company reported
robust inventories position of BRL301 million at market values.
The strategy paid off, as crystal sugar and ethanol prices
increased substantially in the last quarter of fiscal 2017.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
    'B+';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B+';
-- Long-Term National Scale Rating at 'A-(bra)'.


ODEBRECHT ENGENHARIA: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the foreign currency ratings
assigned to the senior unsecured notes issued by Odebrecht Finance
Ltd. (OFL) and guaranteed by Odebrecht Engenharia e Construcao
S.A. (OEC) to Caa2 from Caa1. At the same time, Moody's has
downgraded the corporate family rating assigned on its global
scale to OEC to Caa2 from Caa1. The outlook for all ratings was
changed to negative from positive.

The following rating actions were taken:

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Odebrecht Engenharia e Construcao S.A. (OEC)

Issuer: Odebrecht Finance Ltd.

-- Outlook, Changed To Negative From Positive

Downgrades:

Issuer: Odebrecht Engenharia e Construcao S.A. (OEC)

-- Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Caa2 From Caa1

Issuer: Odebrecht Finance Ltd.

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign
    Currency), Downgraded to Caa2 From Caa1

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade to Caa2 and the change in outlook to negative
reflect the company's backlog erosion, higher than expected cash
burn in a moment of slow construction activity leading to weak
cash conversion. As well, the downgrade incorporates significant
project cancelations especially in important markets to the
company outside of Brazil with no significant signs of recovery in
the near term.

Moody's expected that, after the signature of the lenience
agreement by its parent company Odebrecht S.A. (ODB, unrated) with
Brazilian federal prosecutors in December, 2016, the company would
be able to gradually start replacing its backlog. The expectations
did not materialize in Brazil so far while many other countries in
Latin America initiated parallel investigations. Going forward, in
order to improve liquidity and backlog profile, OEC relies on the
sale of assets such as Odebrecht Ambiental for the repayment of
USD 450 million in intercompany loans from its parent company ODB,
signing of leniency agreements in main countries in Latin America,
and on the rebound of the South American economies especially
Brazil.

According to OEC, during the last quarter of 2016 project backlog
was reduced to about USD 17 billion, a USD 4.3 billion decline in
one quarter. The amount is pro-forma for the exclusion of some
projects Latin America and represents a steep decrease from USD
28.1 billion in the end of 2015 and well under Moody's
expectations of backlog replacement. The backlog reductions have
been accompanied by large cash outlays, driven by delays in the
collection of receivables, lower book-to-bill ratio reducing the
volume of cash advances and foreign exchange losses, which
jeopardized the company's liquidity position and intercompany
loans to parent ODB. As of June 2016, ODB reported consolidated
cash availability of around BRL 17.5 billion and approximately BRL
23.8 billion in short term debt maturities, during the 3Q'16
Odebrecht Agroindustrial concluded the restructuring of its debt
reducing ODB's consolidated short term debt by BRL 5.7 billion.
During the last quarter of 2016 OEC consumed around USD 250
million in cash further reducing its liquidity to USD 1.3 billion
in the end of 2016, which compares to around USD 2.6 billion in
the end of 2015. As of December 2016, the cash availability
represented around 38% of total debt outstanding (unaudited),
including Moody's standard adjustments and off-balance debt
guarantees, that compares to 66% in the end of 2015.

OEC's Caa2 ratings reflect the deterioration in the company's
business fundamentals, reputational risk since the Lava Jato
scandal broke, uncertainties for the near future such as the
timing and success of its asset sale program, and closing of
leniency agreements with other Latin American countries. Despite
the still adequate cash position and long debt tenor, OEC's cash
cushion has been weakening fast together with its project backlog
and cash conversion cycle increasing the company's probability of
default.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's views that OEC's internal
cash generation and financial profile will remain weak in the next
12 months as per the challenging environment for infrastructure
investments in Latin America and the frustrated expectations that
with the conclusion of the leniency the company to be able to
gradually resume the normal course of its business.

Further negative pressure could arise if OEC keeps struggling to
return to its normal operations, if the company fails to comply
with its annual audited reporting requirements, possibly
triggering a debt acceleration, or if the company enters into a
debt restructuring that results in higher than expected losses to
creditors.

Although unlikely in the near term positive pressure on the
ratings or outlook would require a sustainable recovery in OEC's
operations. A positive rating action would also be dependent on
OEC improving and maintaining a stronger liquidity profile along
with evidence of improvement in its business environment that
translates into a backlog replacement ratio (book-to-bill) above
1.0x on a sustainable basis. The positive conclusion of ongoing
negotiations of sisters companies' debt, alleviating ODB liquidity
pressures, would also affect OEC's rating positively.

OEC is the largest engineering and construction company in Latin
America, with USD 10.5 bn billion in net revenues in the last
twelve months ended September 2016. The company's project backlog
of USD 17 billion is diversified into contracts comprising large-
scale construction projects in the transportation segment, energy
and sewage infrastructures, buildings and industrial facilities,
located in Brazil, other Latin American countries and Africa.

OEC is a subsidiary of Odebrecht S.A., a family-owned investment
holding company for one of the largest non-financial conglomerates
in Brazil that controls Braskem S.A. (Ba1 stable), the largest
chemical company in Latin America, along with other investments in
the oil & gas, energy sectors, toll roads, water sewage
concessions and real estate. Odebrecht consolidated net revenues
reached BRL 117.7 billion in the LTM 2Q16, of which 41% generated
by OEC, 42% by Braskem, and 17% by other subsidiaries. As of June
30, 2016, the group's consolidated cash position was BRL 17.5
billion for a total reported debt of BRL 94.5 billion.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
Industry published in March 2017.


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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ARTEMIS PROPERTY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 26
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Artemis Property Services Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by April 26, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 15, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Matthew Wright
          c/o Omar Grant
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295


DUB COMPANY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 27
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of D.U.B Company Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by April 27, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 15, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zedra Directors (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Enola Reid
          136 Shedden Road
          One Capital Place, 3rd Floor
          P.O. Box 487, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914-5413


ELDOURADO ENTITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
Eldourado Entity Ltd., commenced liquidation proceedings on
March 3, 2017.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
April 3, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Amicorp Cayman Fiduciary Limited
          c/o Nicole Ebanks-Sloley
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 10655 Grand Cayman KY1-1006
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943-6055


GOODLAND LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
Goodland Ltd., commenced liquidation proceedings on March 3, 2017.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
April 3, 2017, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Amicorp Cayman Fiduciary Limited
          c/o Nicole Ebanks-Sloley
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 10655 Grand Cayman KY1-1006
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943-6055


IBIS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 26
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ibis Global Media Fund II are required to file
their proofs of debt by April 26, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 16, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


IBIS GLOBAL MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 26
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ibis Global Media Master Fund II are required to
file their proofs of debt by April 26, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 16, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


MAM COMPANY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 27
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of M.A.M Company Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by April 27, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 15, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zedra Directors (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Enola Reid
          136 Shedden Road
          One Capital Place, 3rd Floor
          P.O. Box 487, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914-5413


NEZU ASIA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Nezu Asia Fund Ltd., on March 17, 2017,
passed a resolution to wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Kincaid
          c/o Richard Bennett
          Central Tower, 11th Floor
          28 Queen's Road Central
          Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 3656 6069
          Facsimile: +852 3656 6001


TIGER NEZU: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Tiger Nezu Fund Ltd., on March 17, 2017,
passed a resolution to wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Kincaid
          c/o Richard Bennett
          Central Tower, 11th Floor
          28 Queen's Road Central
          Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 3656 6069
          Facsimile: +852 3656 6001


ZUNI HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 26
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Zuni Holdings Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by April 26, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 14, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Omar Grant
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8295


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C H I L E
=========


LATAM AIRLINES: S&P Assigns BB Rating to Cl. C Pass-Through Cert.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has assigned its 'BB(sf)' rating to Latam
Airlines Group S.A.'s series 2015-1 Class C pass-through
certificates with an expected maturity of May 15, 2023.  The
'BBB+(sf)' rating on Class A pass-through certificates, and the
'BB+(sf)' rating on Class B pass-through certificates are not
affected by the proposed Class C certificates.

The rating is based on:

   -- The consolidated credit quality of Latam Airlines Group
      (BB-/Stable/--);
   -- The adequate collateral coverage because the assets have
      good quality and market liquidity; and
   -- The legal and structural protections available to the pass-
      through certificates.

There are no changes to the company's asset pool, consisting of 17
aircraft -- 11 A321-200 aircraft, four B787-9, and two A350-900.
The average age of the collateral pool is 1.3 years.  The
aircraft-secured notes are cross-collateralized and cross
defaulted, which S&P believes increases the likelihood that Latam
would continue to perform its obligations (including cure any
defaults to payments under the indenture), and continue to pay on
the certificates even in a potential bankruptcy scenario.

The credit uplift to Classes A and B from the 'BB-' corporate
credit rating continues to reflect S&P's view of the quality and
adequate coverage of the assets included in the pool in relation
to the size of the transaction.  S&P also believes that the
company would continue to operate in a default scenario, instead
of going through liquidation, given its significant presence in
most markets where it operates.  Classes A and B benefit from the
21-month liquidity facility provided by Natixis (New York Branch;
A/Stable/A-1) for interest payments.  S&P considers this as
adequate to cover the time it would take to repossess and sell the
aircraft.

Since Class C does not benefit from a liquidity facility, it could
default if Latam stopped paying on its leases of the planes that
collateralize the pass-through certificates.  The Class C
certificates would bear the first loss if the aircraft are
repossessed and are sold for less than the combined amounts of the
Class A, B, and C certificates, plus the amount of any Class A and
Class B liquidity facility borrowings.  In this sense, the rating
uplift on Class C from the corporate credit rating reflects S&P's
view that the company has incentives to continue affirming the
leases under the transaction due to the cross-default and cross-
collateralization of the certificates.

The certificates have a somewhat unusual structure that includes
the sublease of several aircraft from Latam in Chile to its
subsidiary in Brazil; therefore, exposing the transaction to two
jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, S&P believes there are similar levels
of protection for creditors under lease contracts.  In addition,
Brazil has signed and ratified the Cape Town Convention in 2012,
although track record of recovery and export in the country is
limited.  However, S&P believes the extended 21-month liquidity
facility for Classes A and B, as opposed to the usual 18-month
facility S&P generally sees in other S&P rated transactions, would
be enough to cover for potential timing uncertainties under those
jurisdictions.

The initial LTV of the Class C certificates is 81.6%, using the
appraised market values and depreciation assumptions, which are
similar to those assumed in the offering memorandum for Class C
certificates.  S&P's 'BB(sf)' rating on the Class C certificates
is lower than its 'BBB+(sf)' rating on the Class A certificates
and 'BB+(sf)' rating on the Class B certificates because of a
higher LTV, the Class C certificates' subordination to the more
senior certificates, and because the Class C certificates don't
have a dedicated liquidity facility (which would, if needed, pay
interest on the certificates if a bankrupt Latam was making
insufficient payments to cover interest).  Still, the Class C
certificates benefit from the aircraft-secured notes'
securitization of all the certificates are cross-defaulted and
cross-collateralized, which, S&P believes, increases the
incentives, and therefore the likelihood, that Latam would affirm
the notes in bankruptcy.

S&P has recently revised the outlook on Latam to stable from
negative, reflecting S&P's expectation of a lesser cash flow
volatility due to lower capex needs, improved liquidity position,
Latam's cost-cutting strategy, and cautiously positive trends in
the Brazilian market that result in more stable currency exchange
rates than what S&P expected in the past.  S&P expects these
factors to support improvements in financial metrics over the next
few years, diminishing the downside risk in Latam's financial risk
profile that S&P previously envisioned.

RATINGS LIST

Latam Airlines Group S.A.
  Corporate credit rating                          BB-/Stable/--

Ratings Assigned

Latam Airlines Group S.A.
  Series 2015-1 Class C pass-through certificates  BB(sf)


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coffee Growers Face Their 'Worst' Crisis
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's coffee growers
grouped in Concafed said the sector has plunged into its worst
crisis ever, as rust damages their plantations and denounced a
lack of government aid.

Organization spokesman Carlos Ramirez said the country's 30,000
coffee growers have lost out on around RD$18.0 billion (US$383.0
million) in earnings in the last four years, according to
Dominican Today.

Mr. Ramirez said the Dominican Republic has become a net importer,
"importing tens of millions of dollars in coffee every year to be
able to supply the domestic demand for this product," the report
notes.

The report relays that Mr. Ramirez said national production fell
to just over 1,000 short tons per year in the last three years,
"representing only a fraction of the domestic coffee consumption."

Mr. Ramirez accused Agriculture minister Angel Estevez of being
the main culprit for the abandoned coffee plantations across the
country, the report notes.

To mark National Coffee Day, Mr. Ramirez added that those
plantations help protect the environment, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


=======
P E R U
=======


CORPORACION FINANCIERA: S&P Lowers Rating on Sub. Notes to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BBB+/A-2' issuer credit ratings
(ICRs) on Corporacion Financiera de Desarrollo S.A. (COFIDE).  The
outlook remains stable.  At the same time, S&P lowered the bank's
SACP to 'bbb-' from 'bbb' and, consequently, lowered S&P's
subordinated notes rating to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The rating on
these notes is one notch lower than the bank's SACP, reflecting
subordination risk.

S&P's SACP revision stems from COFIDE's increasing credit risk due
to the interruption of large infrastructure projects given the
corruption investigation related to several concessions granted to
the Brazilian construction firm, Odebrecht.  COFIDE holds
considerable exposures in Gasoducto Sur Peruano gas pipeline
($125 million) and Chaglla hydro power plant ($100 million) that
represented around 32% of the bank's total adjusted capital (TAC)
as of Sept. 30, 2016, which S&P deems as high.  In S&P's view, the
default risk for the loans on these two projects has significantly
increased, and S&P expects the bank's credit loss provisions to
spike in the following years.  COFIDE is exposed to some single-
name concentration, given the size of the infrastructure projects
it funds.  The bank has expanded its exposures to infrastructure
in the past five years, in line with public policy initiatives to
speed up large projects in order to boost the country's economic
growth.  Nonetheless, the current risk concentration and S&P's
expectations for asset quality indicators are no longer in line
with S&P's previous risk position assessment for COFIDE.  In this
regard, although its asset quality indicators remain in line with
those of the banking system, S&P expects nonperforming assets to
deteriorate to above 9% in 2018, when the project loan payments
are scheduled to start.  Nevertheless, S&P expects the bank to
maintain conservative coverage policies and to increase loan-loss
reserves throughout the year.

The ICRs on COFIDE continue to reflect its historically
satisfactory business stability mainly because of its unique role
in providing long-term financing to infrastructure projects in
Peru. Despite the bank's low internal capital generation in the
past few years, COFIDE has maintained adequate capital levels
thanks to the ongoing support from its shareholder and modest loan
disbursements in 2016 amid a slowdown in the pace of the country's
infrastructure investment program.  On the other hand, S&P expects
credit provisions to hit the bank's bottom-line results for the
next two years.  The ratings also reflect S&P's expectations that
the government would provide extraordinary and timely support to
the bank in the event of a financial distress, which also results
in a favorable debt profile, ample refinancing flexibility, and
healthy liquidity.

S&P's view of a high likelihood of government support to COFIDE is
based on these factors:

   -- Its important role for the government given that the bank
      promotes and finances investments and public and private
      infrastructure projects in Peru, which has a significant
      infrastructure gap.

   -- The bank's very strong link with the government, which owns
      99% of the bank through "El Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento
      de la Actividad Empresarial del Estado" (FONAFE), a fund
      created in 1999 to oversee the government's corporate
      activities and equity stakes.  The Corporacion Andina de
      Fomento (CAF; AA-/Negative/A-1+) owns the remaining share of
      COFIDE through preferred shares.  Several capital injections
      in recent years and COFIDE's close reputation with the
      government demonstrate the bank's close link with the
      latter.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================


LINDLEY FIRE: Creditors' Panel Hires Marshack Hays as Counsel
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lindley Fire
Protection co., Inc., seeks authorization from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Central District of California to retain Marshack
Hays LLP as counsel for the Committee.

The Committee requires the Firm to:

     a. advise the Committee with respect to its rights, powers,
duties and obligations as the official Committee of creditors
holding unsecured claims of the Debtor's bankruptcy case;

     b. prepare pleadings, applications and conducting
examinations
incidental to administration of this case and to protect the
interests of the unsecured creditors of this Estate;

     c. advise and represent the Committee in its connection with
all applications, motions or complaints filed during the course of
the administration of this case;

     d. develop the relationship of the Committee with the Debtor
in this bankruptcy proceeding;

     e. advise and assist the Committee in presentation with
respect to any plan of reorganization proposed by the Debtor, the
Committee, or other entity;

     f. take other action and performing such other services as
the Committee may require of the Firm in connection with this
Chapter 11 case.

The Firm's lawyers and professionals who will work on the Debtor's
case and their hourly rates are:

     Richard A. Marshack, Partners            $595
     D. Edward Hays Matthew, Partners         $580
     W. Grimshaw, Partners                    $450
     Kristine A. Thagard, Of Counsel          $460
     Judith E. Marshack, Associates           $370
     Sarah Cate Hays, Associates              $395
     Chad V . Haes, Associates                $370
     David A. Wood, Associates                $360
     Laila Masud, Associates                  $300
     Pamela Kraus, Paralegals                 $250
     Chanel Mendoza, Paralegals               $190
     Layla Buchanan, Paralegals               $190
     Cynthia Bastida, Paralegals              $190
     Laurie McPherson, Paralegals             $150

The Firm requests payment of $10,000 from the Estate on a monthly
basis towards the Firm's fees and costs.

Richard A. Marshack, Esq., partner of the law firm of Marshack
Hays LLP, assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested
person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the
Bankruptcy Code, and does not represent any interest adverse to
the Debtor and its estates.

The Firm can be reached at:

      Richard A. Marshack, Esq.
      Davi Wood, Esq.
      Marshack Hays LLP
      870 Roosevelt
      Irvine, CA 92620
      Telephone: (949) 333-7777
      Facsimile: (949) 333-7778
      E-mail: rmarshack@marshackhays.com
              dwood@marshackhays.com

                  About Lindley Fire Protection Co.

Established in 1986 in Anaheim, California, Lindley Fire
Protection Co., Inc. -- www.lindleyfire.com -- provides fire
protection services and contracts with large industrial warehouses
and facilities.

Lindley Fire Protection performs construction services worldwide
and its personnel have performed work in various locations such as
Western Somoa, Puerto Rico, Texas, Illinois, Nevada, Colorado,
Utah, Montana, Idaho and Mexico.

Lindley Fire Protection sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. C.D. Calif. Case No. 17-10929) on March
12, 2017.  The petition was signed by Leslie L. Lindley, II,
president.

The case is assigned to Judge Catherine E. Bauer.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated its assets and
debts at $1 million to $10 million.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


BPTT: Platform for Angelin Project to be Fabricated Outside T&T
---------------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that the decision by bpTT to have the
platform for its Angelin project fabricated outside of Trinidad
and Tobago is a blow to the services sub-sector of this country's
energy industries.

"It means the loss of hundreds of millions of US dollars and
several hundred well-paid jobs at a time when we can ill-afford
both," according to Trinidad Express.

Announcing that the platform will not be constructed at La Brea,
where Trinidad Offshore Fabricators (Tofco) has, for more than a
decade, built deck, jacket and subsea components of many of the
oil -- and gas-producing platforms operating offshore T&T, bpTT
cited "project timelines and other competitiveness factors" as
reasons for relocating fabrication of the Angelin platform, more
than likely to the USA, the report notes.

"BPTT remains fully committed to maximizing local content in all
our operations . . . .  however, given the compressed project
timelines and other competitiveness factors for the Angelin
project, local fabrication is no longer a feasible option," it
added, the report relays.

"BPTT continues to pursue all options to maintain the project
schedule and first gas goal of early 2019. This is a priority to
ensure that gas supply volumes can be maintained in 2019 and
beyond," it said, the report notes.


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: La Brea Remains Depressed
--------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that for as long as anyone can remember,
La Brea has been the country's economic basket case.

Even when the country was in a time of plenty, the area remained
depressed according to Trinidad Express.

The report notes that the town area looks ragged, homes near the
Pitch Lake lean at crazy angles, and too many people are out of
work. The middle class in the area is minuscule.  Crime is also
big problem.

The geology of the area has left the roads in ruins, the report
relays.  Any repair work lasts mere months, then it's back to
potholes and undulations.

The promise of the Union Industrial Estate didn't materialize,
says the report.

The Trinidad Generation Unlimited power plant, built to supply the
Alutrint smelter plant that was never constructed, is the only
facility on the estate, the report says.

The Lake Asphalt company can only employ so many from the area.
The fishing industry is all but dead, given the frequency of
hydrocarbon spills, and scary talk of carcinogenic marine life in
the Gulf of Paria, the report adds.


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Needs to review State Enterprise Sector
----------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that one of the major issues facing the
country as this recession unfolds is the pressing need to review
the State Enterprise sector.

A Cabinet-appointed committee, chaired by Dr. Terrence Farrell,
was established to examine that sector, but we have no idea yet as
to its recommendations, according to Trinidad Express.

One of the hugest State Enterprises is Petrotrin, a major player
in the national economy, with the immense influence of the OWTU on
the side of its workers, the report notes.

A great deal of discussion is now emerging on whether or how
Petrotrin could be restructured or privatized, the report relays.

On October 9, 2015, the newly-installed Petrotrin Board issued a
press release under the rubric "Facing and Overcoming Our Current
Reality," the report notes.

The challenge was said to be "high and increasing debt," the
report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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