TCRLA_Public/170417.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, April 17, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 75


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

CAP SA: S&P Raises Rating to BB+ on Stronger Cash Flow Generation
ODEBRECHT OFFSHORE: S&P Raises Rating on Notes to 'CC'
SANTA CATARINA: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR; Outlook Remains Negative


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

DRYDEN CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 17
GANYMEDE PARENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 20
IC HOLDING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
NEZU ASIA JAPAN: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
NEZU ASIA PAN-ASIA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

PRIVATE CLIENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 27
RUFFALO CORPORATION: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SMITH ASSURANT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
STARDIAN CORPORATION: Commences Dissolution Proceedings
STONEMOOR CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

VISIONCHINA MEDIA: Creditors' First Meeting Set for April 19


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Gasoline & Diesel Prices Climb for 2nd Week
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: March Prices Fall -0.20%, Paced by Foods


E L   S A L V A D O R

BANCO AGRICOLA: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Rating; Outlook Neg.
EL SALVADOR: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Rating to 'CCC-'
ISTMO COMPANIA: S&P Revises Counterparty Credit Rating to 'D'


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: SWMCOL Workers Protest Again
PETROTRIN: Energy Ministry Not Running Company


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 10 to April 14, 2017


                            - - - - -


===========
B R A Z I L
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CAP SA: S&P Raises Rating to BB+ on Stronger Cash Flow Generation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its global-scale rating on CAP S.A. to
'BB+' from 'BB'.  At the same time, S&P raised its issue-level
rating on its senior unsecured notes to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  The
ratings were removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
positive implications on Jan. 18, 2017.  The outlook is stable.

The ratings on CAP reflect the company's strategy and ability to
change product mix to improve efficiency of its asset-base usage,
while higher average iron ore prices and fairly low capital
expenditure (capex) needs will continue to drive strong cash flow
generation.  This and the company's fairly low debt support S&P's
view of fast improving financial metrics.  Nonetheless, the
company remains subject to financial metric volatility due to its
exposure to iron ore prices, small scale of operations, and
Chile's steel industry, which faces significant competition from
imports.

CAP's flexibility to adjust its product mix between iron ore
pellets, pellet feed, and fines allowed it to overcome declining
iron ore prices in early 2016 and maximize profitability.  This
strategy is likely to continue driving cash generation in coming
quarters, as we expect iron ore to average $67 per ton in 2017,
above last year's $58, but to remain volatile in the short to
medium term.  S&P also expects the company's steel processing and
production businesses to focus on higher-margin products, as the
Chilean steel market continues to face slow demand growth and
intense competition from international players.  CAP will also
continue to benefit from its niche market position with higher
grade iron ore products (63%-68% iron content) that drives more
resilient demand and higher prices from iron ore content premiums.
In S&P's view, the company is better positioned to deal with
further expected price volatility driven by global supply and
demand imbalances, supporting our expectation of fairly stable
EBITDA margins in the 22%-30% range over the next two years.

Further price pressures are likely in the short term, which
combined with CAP's somewhat small scale of operations can add
volatility to its cash generation.  However, S&P expects CAP to
continue to adjust its investment plan according to market
conditions and maximize free cash generation.  In S&P's base-case
scenario, it assumes the company would continue to use its free
cash generation to pay down maturing debt, leading to further
improvement in financial metrics such as debt to EBITDA of about
1x and funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 70% in 2017.  S&P's
base-case scenario also includes these assumptions:

   -- Chile GDP growth of 1.9% in 2017 and 2.2% in 2018, affecting
      domestic steel demand;

   -- Average exchange rate of 670 Chilean pesos (CLP) per $1 in
      2017 and CLP680 in 2018;

   -- Iron ore averaging $67 per ton in 2017 and $50 in 2018 and
      2019;

   -- Coal increasing to $75 per ton in 2017, but declining to
      $65 in 2018;

   -- Cash cost of about $31 per ton in 2017 and $32 in 2018;

   -- Freight cost of $12 per ton in 2017 and 2018;

   -- Total iron ore production of 16.6 million tons in 2017 and
      17.2 million tons in 2018;

   -- Pellet premiums of about $30 per ton over the next two
      years;

   -- Capex of $125 million in 2017 and maintenance capex of
      $60 million in 2018; and

   -- Minimum dividend payout of 30%.

As a result of these assumptions, S&P reaches these financial
metrics:

   -- Revenues of $1.76 billion in 2017 and $1.62 billion in 2018;
   -- EBITDA of $525 million in 2017 and $360 million in 2018;
   -- FFO of $375 million in 2017 and $275 million in 2018;
   -- FOCF of $230 million in 2017 and $150 million in 2018;
   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 1x over the next two years;
   -- FFO to debt above 65% in 2017 and 2018;
   -- FOCF to debt above 35% in 2017 and 2018.

S&P revised CAP's liquidity assessment to strong from adequate.
The company's improved cash generation, from persistently high
iron ore prices, allowed for some debt repayment and boosted its
cash position in 2016.  S&P expects average iron ore prices to
allow CAP's cash generation to cover for its debt maturities and
capex needs over the next 24 months.  Thus, S&P expects sources of
liquidity to exceed uses by more than 1.5x over the next 12
months, and to remain above 1x in the following 12 months.  Also,
S&P expects sources of liquidity to continue to exceed uses even
if EBITDA declines by 30%.  S&P also do not expect covenant
pressures given the current headroom under the company's 4x net
financial debt to EBITDA requirement at the end of 2017.

Principal liquidity sources:

   -- Cash and short-term investments of $785 million as of
      Dec. 31, 2016; and

   -- FFO generation of $375 million for 2017 and $275 million in
      2018.

Principal liquidity uses:

   -- Short-term debt of $327 million as of Dec. 31, 2016;
   -- Peak working capital needs of $20 million;
   -- Capex of $125 million in 2017 and maintenance capex of about
      $60 million; and
   -- Dividend payouts of 30% of the net income.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that CAP will
continue to be flexible with its product mix, execute capex to
maximize cash generation, and mostly offset iron ore price
volatility over the next 12 months.  In addition, S&P expects the
steel business to remain pressured given still-low global prices.
Nonetheless, CAP will also continue to benefit from stable and
predictable inflows from its water and energy transmission assets.
Thus, S&P expects the company to continue presenting strong credit
metrics over the next several quarters, such as debt to EBITDA
below 1.5x, FFO to debt above 60%, and positive FOCF generation,
despite expected weaker iron ore prices.

A downgrade is likely if iron ore prices decline faster than S&P
expects and CAP's offsetting measures don't prevent significant
deterioration in cash flow, leading to significantly weaker credit
metrics, such as debt to EBITDA near 3x and FFO to debt of about
30%.

Although unlikely in the short term, S&P could raise the ratings
if CAP presents improved scale and diversification of operations
that support sustainably stronger profitability and less volatile
cash flow metrics.


ODEBRECHT OFFSHORE: S&P Raises Rating on Notes to 'CC'
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on Odebrecht Offshore
Drilling Finance Ltd's (OODFL's or the project's) notes to 'CC'
from 'D'.  At the same time, S&P placed the rating on CreditWatch
negative.

The upgrade follows OODFL's announcement that it has settled the
overdue interest payment on its senior secured notes.  The payment
occurred on April 7, 2017, seven days after the 30-day grace
period allowed by the indenture.  It's S&P's understanding that
the project is now up to date with the payments on its outstanding
debt instruments.

S&P continues to view OODFL's capital structure as unsustainable,
and believe that the notes are at this point vulnerable to
nonpayment on a timely basis.  Still, S&P expects the project to
comply with the next two debt service obligations (scheduled for
June and September 2017) because it has the available resources in
the form of $130 million in letters of credit and cash position.
However, else being equal, under our base-case scenario, the risk
of non-payment in December 2017 is very high.

The CreditWatch listing continues to reflect the risk of
renegotiation of OODFL's notes under unfavorable conditions, which
S&P would likely consider as a distressed exchange.  The listing
also reflects the risk of a postponement of the upcoming interest
payments on the notes beyond the 30 business days following the
scheduled due date.  It reflects also the risk of a failure to
obtain a waiver after triggering a payment acceleration clause in
October 2015 due to the early termination of ODN Tay drillship
contracts with Petroleo Brasileiro -- Petrobras S.A.

In order to remove the rating from CreditWatch and assign the
stable outlook, OODFL's bondholders would have to waive the
execution of the early acceleration clause, which S&P currently
doesn't believe is likely to happen.


SANTA CATARINA: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR; Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' foreign and local currency
issuer credit ratings on the state of Santa Catarina.  S&P also
affirmed its 'brAA-' national scale rating on the state.  The
outlook on both scale ratings remains negative.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects a one-in-three likelihood that Santa
Catarina's credit quality could deteriorate as a result of lower
ratings on Brazil and/or weakening of the institutional framework
for local governments.  S&P's base-case scenario assumes that
Santa Catarina will continue to post a strong budgetary
performance as the economy gradually recovers in the next few
years, the financial management maintains prudent fiscal and debt
policies, and contingent liabilities remain moderate.

Downside scenario

S&P could lower its ratings on Santa Catarina in the next 12-18
months if deficits after capex rise more than expected, which
could erode the state's liquidity position beyond S&P's base-case
assumptions.  Also, S&P could lower the rating if the financial
management reduces its commitment to service debt in a timely
manner.

Upside scenario

S&P could revise the outlook to stable in the next 12-18 months to
mirror a similar action on the sovereign.

                          RATIONALE

S&P has updated its base-case scenario for Santa Catarina and
extended S&P's forecast period through 2019.  S&P has also
included additional information on the state's pension liabilities
in the scenario.  S&P assumes that Santa Catarina's satisfactory
financial management and the gradual economic recovery will allow
the state to maintain a stable budgetary performance and reduce
its debt burden.

Financial management has remained satisfactory amid weak economy
and state's GDP per capita remains higher than most of Santa
Catarina's peers.  The ratings on Santa Catarina are a combination
of the individual credit profile and the evolving but unbalanced
institutional framework for state and municipalities in Brazil,
which currently has a negative trend.

The state has the sixth-highest GDP in the country.  S&P estimates
that its GDP per capita was $10,604 in 2016, higher than Brazil's
$8,712, and comparable to that of Sao Paulo.  The state benefits
from a lower unemployment rate than those of its national peers,
and sound physical infrastructure, and social conditions.  S&P
forecasts that Santa Catarina's economy will recover in line with
the country's.

Governor Raimundo Colombo, from the Partido Socialista Brasileiro
(Social Democratic Party) has been in power since 2011.  The
state's financial planning has benefited from policy continuity.
Despite the measures to control public-servant wage costs and
annual pension payments, as well as to impring tax collection, S&P
believes challenges in increasing budgetary flexibility will
remain in the next few years.  Amid recession, the current
administration has worked to continue to attract investments to
the state by offering tax incentives and through a large
investment program (Pacto por Santa Catarina).  Therefore,
capacity to raise taxes in 2017-2018 will help the state maintain
its strong budgetary performance in the next few years.

Strong fiscal performance will likely prevail given more favorable
economic conditions, but liquidity remains weak.

S&P expects Santa Catarina to continue posting operating surpluses
above 5% of operating revenues in 2017-2019, on average and
deficits after capex below 5% of total revenues.  S&P assumes that
the state will implement additional measures to improve tax
collection, including technical enhancements, specialization of
tax auditors, productivity bonuses, and actions against tax
evasion.  In addition, the gradual recovery in the economy will
improve Santa Catarina's tax revenue.  S&P's base-case scenario
assumes that the state's operating revenue to rise at a pace
slightly above that of nominal GDP growth.  The state is likely to
control some of its operating expenses, although payroll pressures
will remain high due to the expected increase of the police force.
However, S&P estimates that operating spending overall would
increase just below that of operating revenue in the next two
years.

Santa Catarina faces budgetary constraints.  Public-sector
employee wages (including pensions) and interest payments
represent around 64% of total expenditures.  Despite the state's
commitment to contain wage increases and pension liabilities, they
will continue to squeeze the budget.  S&P believes that the state
will slightly increase its capital spending to 8% of total
spending in 2017-2019, above the previous-year level, thanks to a
slightly easier access to new borrowings.  Santa Catarina's
investment in public works will continue to focus on connectivity
improvement.  In addition, S&P considers that state has a limited
capacity to increase its own source revenues as the government
remains committed to not raising tax rates in order to attract
private investment.  The state's own-source revenue is likely to
average 78% of total revenue in 2017-2019, below those of the
states of Sao Paulo (around 90%) and Minas Gerais (81%).

Santa Catarina's liquidity remains weak, in S&P's view.  S&P
estimates that the state's internal liquidity would be sufficient
to cover 78% of its estimated debt service in 2017.  The state's
debt to suppliers has decreased in 2016 to R$157 million, less
than 1% of operating revenues.  Access to external liquidity is
limited, given that under Brazil's intergovernmental framework,
the states must receive authorization from the federal government
under certain specific rules and in compliance with fiscal targets
to issue debt.  In addition, the states can't maintain open
contingent credit lines from banks.

S&P expects Santa Catarina's tax-supported debt to represent 100%
of its operating revenue in 2019, down from 105% in 2016, given
that the state will only gradually increase its borrowings.
Slightly over 50% of the state's debt is with the federal
government, while the remainder is with public and commercial
banks as well as multilateral lending agencies. Santa Catarina's
debt level is lower than those of other Brazilian states such as
Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo.  S&P's base-case scenario for the next
three years assumes that Santa Catarina's debt service costs will
decline thanks to the debt renegotiation with the federal
government.  Additionally, S&P's debt assessment includes the
state's stock of unfunded pension liabilities that are
significantly higher than the annual operating revenue.

Santa Catarina has moderate contingent liabilities, the largest of
which stems from several state-owned companies including Casan, a
water utility.  S&P's assessment incorporates risks associated
with cross-default clauses in the Brazilian Development Bank's
(BNDES') loans to the state entities.  Casan's debt with BNDES
accounts for less than 1% of Santa Catarina's operating revenue as
of December 2016.  In addition the state guarantees around R$657
million of Casan's debt.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Santa Catarina (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating
Global Scale                           BB/Negative/--
Brazil National Scale                  brAA-/Negative/--



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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


DRYDEN CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 17
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Dryden Capital, Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by April 17, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 17, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Kevin Butler
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7374
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


GANYMEDE PARENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 20
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ganymede Parent Limited will hold their final
meeting on April 20, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


IC HOLDING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of IC Holding Cayman Ltd., on March 15, 2017,
passed a resolution to liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Graham Robinson
          Chris Johnson Associates Ltd.,
          Elizabethan Square
          80 Shedden Road, George Town
          P.O. Box 2499 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 946-0820


NEZU ASIA JAPAN: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Nezu Asia Fund Japan Only Trading Ltd., on
March 17, 2017, passed a resolution to wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Kincaid
          c/o Richard Bennett
          Ogier
          Central Tower, 11th Floor
          28 Queen's Road Central
          Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 3656 6069
          Facsimile: +852 3656 6001


NEZU ASIA PAN-ASIA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Nezu Asia Fund Pan-Asia Trading Ltd., on
March 17, 2017, passed a resolution to wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Kincaid
          c/o Richard Bennett
          Ogier
          Central Tower, 11th Floor
          28 Queen's Road Central
          Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 3656 6069
          Facsimile: +852 3656 6001


PRIVATE CLIENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 27
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of The Private Client Portfolio are required to file
their proofs of debt by April 27, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 9, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Paul Pavli
          c/o Mourant Ozannes
          Attorneys-at-Law for the Company
          Reference: NDL
          Telephone: (+1) 345 949 4123
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 949 4647; or

          Paul Pavli
          Reference: PP
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (+357) 25 817 488
          Facsimile: (+357) 25 749 755


RUFFALO CORPORATION: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Ruffalo Corporation, on March 15, 2017, passed
a resolution to liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ruffalo Corporation
          Vera Lotte Kopenhagen Goldfinger
          Rua Bela Cintra, 2230
          Sao Paulo
          Brazil


SMITH ASSURANT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Smith Assurant Group, on March 11, 2017,
passed a resolution to liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Graham Robinson
          c/o Tanya Armstrong
          P.O. Box 2499 Grand Cayman KYl-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946-0820
          Facsimile: (345) 946-0864


STARDIAN CORPORATION: Commences Dissolution Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------
Stardian Corporation commenced dissolution proceedings on Feb. 14,
2017 in accordance with the British Virgin Islands Business
Companies Act 2004.

The company's liquidator is:

          Cristian Mac Lean
          Rosario Norte 555 Piso 15
          Las Condes, Santiago
          Chile


STONEMOOR CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Stonemoor Capital PTC Ltd., on March 17, 2017,
passed a resolution to wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alexandria Bancorp Limited
          Dayra Triana-Munroe
          Barbara Conolly
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 2428 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 945-1111


VISIONCHINA MEDIA: Creditors' First Meeting Set for April 19
------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Visionchina Media Inc. will hold their first
meeting on April 19, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., to elect a liquidation
committee and deal with other matters or resolutions that the
liquidators think fit.

The company's liquidator is:

          Margot MacInnis
          c/o Stephanie Scott
          Borrelli Walsh (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Place, Ground Floor
          103 South Church Street, George Town
          P.O. Box 30847 Grand Cayman KY1-1204
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 743 8807



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Gasoline & Diesel Prices Climb for 2nd Week
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that in what many people will likely dub a
"palo asechado" (sucker punch), the Dominican Republic's Industry
and Commerce Ministry raised all fuel prices for the week from
April 15 to 21.

Premium gasoline will cost RD$221.30, and regular gasoline
RD$205.20, both RD$2.50 more; regular diesel will cost RD$154.00;
optimum diesel will cost RD$165.60, both RD$2.00 more per gallon,
according to Dominican Today.

Avtur will cost RD$117.90; kerosene will cost RD$143.00, or
RD$3.00 more on both, while fuel oil will cost RD$96.05 per
gallon, or RD$1.75 higher, the report notes.

Propane gas will cost RD$100.50 per gallon, or RD$2.00 more and
natural gas will cost RD$28.97, or RD$3.71 higher per cubic meter,
the report relays.

The Central Bank's posted average exchange rate of RD$47.38 per
dollar was used to calculate all fuel prices, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: March Prices Fall -0.20%, Paced by Foods
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's Central Bank
said March prices were -0.20% compared with February, with first
quarter accumulated inflation at 0.84 percent.

It said annualized inflation, from March 2016 to March 2017, stood
at 3.14%, "remaining around the lower limit of the goal
established in the Monetary Program for the current year of 4.0%
(Ò 1.0%)", according to Dominican Today.

The Central Bank added that the negative inflation in March
stemmed mostly from the lower prices on foods and non-alcoholic
beverages, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.



=====================
E L   S A L V A D O R
=====================


BANCO AGRICOLA: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Rating; Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term rating on Banco
Agricola S.A.  At the same time, S&P raised its short-term rating
on the bank to 'B' from 'C', after placing the bank "Under Credit
Observation" on April 7, 2017, following changes in S&P's revised
global methodology for linking long-term and short-term ratings.
The outlook remains negative.

As a result of a lower anchor for banks operating in El Salvador,
S&P lowered Banco Agricola's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to
'bb-' from 'bb'.

S&P maintains its BICRA score on El Salvador (CCC-/Watch Neg/C) at
group '8'.  S&P also maintained its '9' economic risk score.  In
addition, S&P revised its industry risk score to '7' from '6',
reflecting potential pressure on system-wide funding related to
the sovereign's credit stress.  In S&P's view, the latter reduces
investor confidence and represents a weakness for Salvadorian
banks.  As a result, S&P lowered the anchor for banks operating in
El Salvador to 'b+' from 'bb-'.

At the same time, S&P revised the trend in economic risk to
negative from stable, based on increasing risks related to
economic imbalances stemming from the weakening external position.
The trend in industry risk remains negative.  If the economic and
industry risks materialize, S&P could lower both risk scores to a
weaker category.  Such an action could result in a similar
revision of our BICRA group score, which could lower the anchor to
'b'.

In S&P's view, El Salvador's economic risk is undermined by low
GDP growth prospects, likely to be around 1.3% for 2017-2020,
limited fiscal flexibility, due to political polarization that
continues to limit the government's debt management, and absence
of monetary flexibility, stemming from the 2001 switch to dollars.
In S&P's opinion, the country's economic growth remains vulnerable
to changes in the U.S. commercial and immigration policies because
48.4% of El Salvador's exports are destined for the U.S. and
remittances from the latter represented 16% of the Central
American country's GDP in 2015.  On the other hand, lower foreign
direct investments (FDI) inflow, coupled with high fiscal
deficits, could increase risks to the banking system in terms of
economic imbalances.  In this sense, S&P believes that Salvadorian
banks' resilience to adverse economic developments will be under
pressure.

S&P is revising its trend in economic risk to negative from
stable.  In S&P's view, further weakening of the economic risk
score would stem from higher economic imbalances, particularly
through higher external risk.  S&P projects that the current
account deficit is likely to exceed 5% of GDP in the next three
years, contributing to weaker external liquidity.  S&P also
expects that FDI may decline from its already modest levels due to
continued political stalemate.  Political tensions, along with the
country's deteriorating external position, could bring additional
risks for banks in the form of lower economic growth and
consequently, higher nonperforming loans, and lower credit growth
and profitability.  Lending contraction and rising credit losses
could lead S&P to revise its economic imbalances to a correction
phase.  Therefore, such factors could increase economic imbalances
in the future, weighing on banks' operating performance.

S&P observes higher industry risks in El Salvador's banking system
given that political polarization is weakening the government's
ability to gain access to liquidity.  S&P believes the sovereign
credit stress has worsened following Congress' failure on April 7,
2017, to reach majority votes to allocate resources to cover
payment to the pension system.  Therefore, Salvadorian banks'
access to wholesale funding could erode, and a potential
deterioration of the economy could impair their liquidity given
that total deposits could shrink.  Therefore, S&P views system-
wide funding in El Salvador at extremely high risk.  Risk appetite
in the Salvadorian banking system is currently moderate, reflected
in modest share of high-risk lending and manageable growth of
total assets. In addition, competitive dynamics benefit from a
relatively concentrated banking system that contributes to
industry stability.  The system has a large presence of foreign-
owned banks, parents of which are mostly following international
standards.  This would allow these banks a relatively smooth
transition towards Basel III once the country adopts it.

The negative trend in industry risk reflects a potentially harmful
impact that banks' persistently weakening profitability could have
on the industry's competitive dynamics.  If profitability keeps
falling, banks' risk appetite might increase to generate higher
margins and financial results.  In addition, lower profitability
could pressure operating conditions, undermining the industry's
stability.  Moreover, if El Salvador delays improvements in its
regulatory framework, S&P would revise its institutional framework
score to high risk, which would weaken the industry risk score.

In the past, the sovereign ratings limit those on Banco Agricola.
However, now that the long-term rating on the country is below
'B-,' S&P is maintaining the long-term rating on the bank at 'B-'
because the likelihood of default is the centerpiece of
creditworthiness.  Banco Agricola has a solid and fragmented base
of deposits and has enough liquidity to meet its financial
obligations in the next 12 months.  In this sense, despite the
sovereign's current credit stress, S&P doesn't believe that Banco
Agricola is vulnerable or dependent upon favorable business,
financial, and economic conditions at this time to meet its
financial commitments.

As a result of a lower anchor for banks operating in El Salvador,
S&P lowered Banco Agricola's SACP to 'bb-' from 'bb'.  S&P's
issuer credit ratings on Banco Agricola still reflect its strong
business position -- based on its leading position in El
Salvador's banking industry -- adequate risk position, due to its
stable asset quality metrics, and average funding with adequate
liquidity as a result of a stable and fragmented deposit base.
S&P reassessed the bank's capital and earnings to moderate from
adequate based on a projected risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio
consistently below 7% for the next 12 months.  However, this has
no impact on the bank's SACP.  Banco Agricola is a core subsidiary
of Bancolombia, S. A. y Companias Subordinadas
(BBB-/Negative/A-3).


EL SALVADOR: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Rating to 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign- and local-
currency sovereign credit ratings on El Salvador to 'CCC-' from
'B-'.  The ratings are on CreditWatch with negative implications.
At the same time, S&P lowered the short-term foreign- and local-
currency sovereign credit ratings to 'C' from 'B'.

S&P's 'AAA' transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment is
unchanged.

                         RATIONALE

El Salvador's Congress recently failed to approve a budgetary
allocation that was needed to cover payment of financial
commitments for pension-related debt.  As a result, the government
missed payments on financial obligations coming from the
Certificates for Pension Investments (CIPs) due between April 7
and April 10, 2017, adding up to $28.8 million.

Because the CIP's maturities have no stated grace period, S&P
treats these obligations as having an imputed five-business-day
grace period as per S&P's criteria.  S&P is placing both long-term
ratings on CreditWatch negative given that it could further lower
them to 'SD' (selective default) if the political stalemate
continues to block the approvals for budget allocation during the
following week and, therefore, the government remains unable to
fund these missed payments.

Political polarization has heightened over the last year,
resulting in an uncertain policy environment, including diminished
willingness and capability to maintain timely debt payments.  This
deteriorating political environment continues to erode El
Salvador's credit quality.  The government's budget for 2017,
which was passed earlier this year, did not contain any
allocations for servicing the CIP debt, due in part to political
brinksmanship between the governing Frente Farabundo Marti para la
Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) and the opposition Alianza Republicana
Nacionalista (ARENA).  The political stalemate between the FMLN
and ARENA diminishes the likelihood of a new agreement on fiscal
policy, including reforms to the pension system, before
Congressional elections scheduled for March of next year.

Pension-related obligations have weighed largely on El Salvador's
fiscal and debt assessments and therefore on El Salvador's rating
history since Congress implemented pension reform in 1998.  The
annual shortfall of the pension system is about 2% of GDP, and
pension-related debt represents about 25% of total general
government debt.  Pension-related financial obligations are issued
through a Pension Trust established in 2006 and managed by the
National Development Bank (BANDESAL).  The Pension Trust makes
debt payments to holders of CIPs through transfers from El
Salvador's Ministry of Finance.

El Salvador's 2017 fiscal budget contains allocations to pay
external debt maturities and short-term debt called LETES (Letras
del Tesoro) due this year.  The government is currently on time
with the debt service of these obligations.  However, S&P foresees
higher risks coming from the lack of additional debt
authorizations in Congress for the following six months, which
would tighten the government's liquidity position.

S&P's issuer credit ratings focus on the obligor's capacity and
willingness to meet its financial commitments as they come due.
They do not apply to any specific financial obligation, as they do
not take into account the nature of and provisions of the
obligation, its standing in bankruptcy or liquidation, statutory
preferences, or the legality and enforceability of the obligation.

S&P projects that the current account deficit is likely to exceed
5% of GDP in the next three years, contributing to weaker external
liquidity.  S&P also expects that foreign direct investment (FDI)
may decline from its already modest levels due to continued
political stalemate.  S&P estimates that the country's gross
external financing needs will exceed 100% of current account
receipts and usable reserves in the next couple of years as well.
Net general government debt is likely to surpass 60% of GDP in
2017-2019 compared with less than 55% of GDP in 2013.

S&P's ratings on El Salvador reflect the sovereign's limited
fiscal flexibility, lack of monetary flexibility, and low per
capita income (which S&P estimates at just above US$4,400 in
2016), with expected GDP real growth to remain around 1.3% for
2017-2020.  S&P believes that the government has limited ability
to raise additional revenues and that the country suffers from a
shortfall in basic services and infrastructure.

El Salvador lacks its own currency and has forgone having a lender
of last resort for its banking system.  S&P's T&C assessment
remains at 'AAA' because of S&P's view that the country will
maintain the U.S. dollar as its currency.

                         CREDITWATCH

Failure to make payment on the CIPs within five business days from
their due date would lead to a downgrade to 'SD'.  S&P expects to
resolve the CreditWatch by the middle of next week, based on the
outcome of political negotiations.

The ratings could stabilize at 'CCC-' if successful negotiations
result in the full payment of the CIPs within the imputed grace
period.  S&P would likely maintain the rating at the 'CCC-' level
subsequent to such payments being made because of the high level
of political polarization in the country.  The rating could
improve to the higher 'CCC' category if the government and
opposition parties were to reach agreement on fiscal policy that
boosts access to liquidity and reduces the sovereign's risk of
default in the coming 12 months.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that "Institutional Assessment" and "External
Assessment" had deteriorated.  All other key rating factors were
unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Rating Lowered and Placed On CreditWatch Negative

                                  To                 From
El Salvador (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating          CCC-/Watch Neg/C   B-/Negative/B

Rating Lowered
                                  To                 From
El Salvador (Republic of)
Senior Unsecured                 CCC-               B-



===========
P A N A M A
===========


ISTMO COMPANIA: S&P Revises Counterparty Credit Rating to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its counterparty credit and financial
strength ratings on Istmo Compania de Reaseguros, Inc. (Istmo Re)
to 'D' from 'R' (under regulatory supervision).  S&P also withdrew
the ratings.

The rating action followed the Panamanian insurance regulator's,
Superintendencia de Seguros y Reaseguros de Panama (SSRP's),
decision to forcibly liquidate the company.  The regulator took
control of Istmo Re in December 2016.  S&P views the decision as
the end of the regulatory supervision process.

The forced liquidation reflects the deterioration of Istmo Re's
financial position and its inability to meet its short- and long-
term financial and policyholder obligations including payment
default on policyholder obligations and failure to comply with
payment agreements with ceding companies.  The forced liquidation
process also reflects the company's payment default on bank
obligations, which triggered the execution of guarantees backing
loans.

The forced liquidation will include the sale of company's assets
to use the proceeds to repay its obligors under the legal
framework applicable to insurance companies in Panama.  S&P don't
expect the company to resume its operations anytime in the future.
Therefore, S&P is withdrawing its ratings.



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: SWMCOL Workers Protest Again
-----------------------------------------------
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that workers at the Trinidad
and Tobago Solid Waste Management Company (SWMCOL), for the second
time on the week ended April 14, picketed in front locked gates at
the Beetham landfill morning, calling on Finance Minister Colm
Imbert and the Minister of Public Utilities to meet with union to
discuss issues affecting workers.

President of the Industrial General and Sanitation Workers Union
Robert Benacia described the working condition for workers as
"inhumane," according to Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.  "They are
putting workers at further risk of being poisoned because we have
indiscriminate dumping of toxic materials in these landfills.
Workers are amongst the most hazardous conditions in the country,"
the report quoted Mr. Benacia as saying.

Mr. Benacia said the condition at the landfill is not only
affecting workers but the entire country because the dust blowing
off the landfills contaminates Port-of-Spain and anywhere west of
the landfill, the report notes.

The report quotes Mr. Benacia as saying: "We have hospital waste,
industrial waste, radio waste, dead and decease animals coming in
here, you name it, and that is mixing in with carbon materials and
blows like dust.

"They need to place landfill management as a priority. We need to
hear about time lines and the plans and how they want to
implement, how it is going to affect the SWMCOL and the workers,
and funding provided."

The report notes that Mr. Benacia said they are again calling on
Public Utility Minister Fitzgerald Hinds and Finance Minister Colm
Imbert to settle all back pay immediately, and address the issues
raised by the union.

The workers staged their first protest on April 10.


PETROTRIN: Energy Ministry Not Running Company
----------------------------------------------
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that Energy Minister Franklin
Khan dismissed claims from Oropouche East MP Dr. Roodal Moonilal
that a committee established to look at recommendations for the
restructuring State oil company Petrotrin is running the company.

Responding to Moonilal's claims in the House of Representatives,
Minister Khan said all MPs knew the establishment of such a
committee was "par for the course" and this practice has been used
by several administrations in the past, according to Trinidad and
Tobago Newsday.

"The ministry does not run the oil company," Mr. Khan said. He
also dismissed suggestions that the committee's chairman Selwyn
Lashley has a conflict of interest because he is also the
Permanent Secretary in the Energy Ministry, the report notes.

The report relays that Mr. Khan also rejected suggestions from
Moonilal about there being an attempt to bypass the Integrity in
Public Life Act.

                         About Petrotrin

Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago is the major state-owned
oil company in Trinidad and Tobago.  The company was established
in 1993 by the merger of Trintopec and Trintoc, two state-owned
oil companies.  Petrotrin's main holdings are extensive, mature
onshore fields located across southern Trinidad.  Large areas
have been leased out to small private producers who are able to
make a profit on wells that are unprofitable for Petrotrin,
giving it higher labor costs.  The company operates a refinery at
Pointe-Pierre, just north of San Fernando in south Trinidad.
Most crude petroleum produced in Trinidad is exported without
being refined. The refinery depends on imported crude (mostly
from Venezuela), which is either used domestically or exported.

                         *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America relayed on July
23, 2015, citing Trinidad Express, that state-owned Petroleum
Company of Trinidad and Tobago (Petrotrin) multiplied its losses
11.2 times to reach US$168 million for the nine months ended June
30, 2015 compared to US$15 million loss for the same period in
2014, but its earnings before income tax, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA) rose 132 per cent between March and June.

The TCRLA on Dec. 2, 2014 relayed, citing Trinidad and Tobago
Newsday, that in the face of falling global oil prices, Petroleum
Company of Trinidad and Tobago rolled out a plan to remain viable
and to survive in the harsh global oil industry.  Petrotrin said
in a media release that it is forging ahead with objective cost
management decisions imperative to secure its viability, according
to Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. The report said Petrotrin's
operations have also been severely impacted due to unfavorable
margins.

The TCRLA reported on Jan. 21, 2014 that Trinidad Express, citing
Energy Minister Kevin Ramnarine, said Petrotrin will make a loss
for its 2013 financial year.  According to Mr. Ramnarine,
Petrotrin was scheduled to make the loss even before the series of
oil spills affecting Trinidad's southwestern peninsula since
December, Trinidad Express relayed.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 10 to April 14, 2017
------------------------------------------------------------


Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        68                  BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        67.75               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   4.54     52.63  10/25/2041   PA    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   6        63.5   10/25/2041   PA    USD
Dolomite Capital Ltd     13.26     67.2   12/20/2019   CN    ZAR
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
ESFG International Ltd    5.75      0.66               KY    EUR
General Shopping Financ  10        72.5                KY    USD
General Shopping Financ  10        71.7                KY    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63                  BR    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63.88               BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.16   4/25/2019   HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.26   4/25/2019   HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman I   3.88     58.01   2/7/2035    KY    EUR
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Noble Holding Internati   5.25     72.98   3/15/2042   KY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     39      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     38      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     48.5    6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     47.25   6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49                  KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.29   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.12     48.2    6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     46.15   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        57.02   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.12     53.51   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.25     70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.47   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     45.92   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.1      47.82   6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49.25               KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.39   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.77   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.2      70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        56.85   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.1      52.99   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      39.64  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      36.44  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      38.79  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      38.75  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.19   2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      9      58.28  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      6      40.32   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     50.15   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.22  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.37     37.39   4/12/2027   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5      37.1    4/12/2037   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        41.25  10/28/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        40.01   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9        58.11  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.13  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.2    2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     49.94   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6      60      3/30/2022   AE    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         5.8      49.75   1/30/2018   NO    NOK
Siem Offshore Inc         5.59     50.25   3/28/2019   NO    NOK
STB Finance Cayman Ltd    2.04     58.35               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.36     50.93   9/25/2036   KY    USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesor   5.25     68.02  12/29/2021   UY    UYU
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     67.5   11/9/2019    BR    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     65.75  11/9/2019    BR    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     48.75   5/7/2028    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9        51.75   5/7/2023    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.37     49      1/13/2034   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        71.88  12/1/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     52      9/15/2027   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.65     46.38   4/21/2025   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.75     61.75  10/13/2019   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.95     58.13   8/5/2031    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6        53.75  12/9/2020    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  12.75     67      8/23/2022   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        44      3/31/2038   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6.5      36.53  12/29/2036   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   8.25     47.75  10/13/2024   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.75     57.75  10/21/2026   VE    USD
Venezuela Government TI    5.25    69.59   3/21/2019   VE    USD



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *