TCRLA_Public/170418.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Tuesday, April 18, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 76



CENTRAL PUERTO: Fitch Affirms Then Withdraws 'B' FC IDRs
NEUQUEN PROVINCE: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
PROVINCE OF NEUQUEN: Fitch Rates Proposed Bond Issue at B(EXP)


BRAZIL: President Michel Temer Allegedly Linked to $40MM Bribe
BRAZIL: IIC Supports Sugarcane Industry With US$50 Million Loan
BRAZIL: Pension Funds Struggle to Restore Surpluses, Moody's Says
EVEN CONSTRUTORA: Moody's Rates BRL87MM Debentures at B1
FUNDO DE INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Sr. Debt

ISA CAPITAL: Fitch Withdraws 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

FUSHAN LTD: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 18
LIONTRUST PANTHERA: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 26
LSP CAL EB II: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 26
RISING SUN: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 28
SKYDOME LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 20

UNIBALL LIMITED: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 28
VICTORI INTERNATIONAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 18
VICTORI MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 18
ZAI PORTOLA: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report


CHILE: Overhauls Pinochet-era Private Retirement System


CUBA: Restricts Sale of Premium Gasoline

E L  S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: Moody's Cuts Debt Rating to Caa1 on Missed Payments

P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Fitch Affirms 'D' GO Bond Ratings

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O


                            - - - - -


CENTRAL PUERTO: Fitch Affirms Then Withdraws 'B' FC IDRs
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Central Puerto S.A.'s Long-term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'B' and 'BB-',
respectively. The Rating Outlook is Stable. Fitch has
simultaneously withdrawn all of Central Puerto's ratings.

Fitch has withdrawn Central Puerto's ratings as they are no longer
considered relevant to the agency's coverage, as Central Puerto is
no longer issuing debt.


Rating Sensitivities are not applicable as the ratings have been

NEUQUEN PROVINCE: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' foreign and local currency
issuer credit ratings on the province of Neuquen.  S&P also
assigned its 'B' issue-level rating on the province's new issuance
of TIDENEU for up to $366.13 million.  The outlook is stable.


The stable outlook on Neuquen mirrors the stable outlook on the
sovereign's local currency rating.  The outlook reflects S&P's
view of a more consistent and institutionalized dialogue between
the LRGs and the federal government to address various fiscal and
economic challenges that are expected to remain in the short to
medium term.  S&P's stable outlook also assumes that Neuquen will
continue to post deficits in 2017 and 2018, and an operating
surplus close to 3% and the deficit after capex narrowing to 3% of
total revenues in 2019.  The latter assumptions stem from S&P's
expectations of an economic recovery amid a decelerating inflation
in Argentina, which will impact revenue growth over the period.
Nevertheless, S&P expects Neuquen's narrow economic base, limited
leeway to raise revenue and cut expenditure amid low levels of
capex, and low free cash levels to cover the projected debt
service in the next 12 months to weigh on the province's

Downside scenario

S&P could lower the ratings on Neuquen if Argentina's economic
performance deteriorates consistently over the next couple of
years, eroding the province's revenue base beyond S&P's current
expectations and/or if Neuquen's finances weaken as a result of
weaker financial management.  Also, failure to refinance existing
debt in foreign and local currency as well as unwillingness to
service debt obligations could prompt S&P to downgrade Neuquen in
the next 12-18 months.  At the same time, S&P could lower its
ratings on Neuquen if Argentina's transfer and convertibility
(T&C) assessment weakens or if S&P was to lower the sovereign
local or foreign currency ratings.

Upside scenario

Given that S&P don't believe Neuquen meets the conditions to have
higher ratings than those on the sovereign, S&P could only raise
its ratings on the province if S&P was to raise the T&C and local
and foreign currency ratings on Argentina.  Such an upgrade would
have to be accompanied by continued strengthening in Argentina's
institutional framework for LRGs, and improvements in Neuquen's
creditworthiness through a combination of average operating
surpluses, relatively low deficits after capex, and free cash
available for debt service payments covering 120% or more of the
province's obligations for the next 12 months.  However, S&P's
base-case scenario doesn't assume such an improvement within the
next 12 months.


Neuquen's 'B' ratings reflect its individual credit profile and
the institutional framework in which it operates.  Neuquen, like
all LRGs in Argentina, operates under a very volatile and
underfunded institutional framework.  At the same time, Neuquen's
budgetary constraints and low investment levels, volatility in
fiscal performance due to double-digit inflation in Argentina and
exposure to cyclical revenues, economy concentrated in the
hydrocarbon industry, weak financial management, as well as low
free cash levels to cover the projected debt service in the next
12 months are rating constraints.  On the other hand, the
province's moderate contingent liabilities and debt burden support
its creditworthiness.

Despite high GDP per capita, economy remains undiversified, while
a volatile institutional framework further impairs an already weak
financial management.

Despite a very volatile and unbalanced institutional framework,
S&P believes that there's a positive trend in the predictability
of the outcome of potential reforms and pace of implementation.
S&P expects moderate reforms of the distribution of federal tax
revenues among the LRGs.  Also, in S&P's view, a more consistent
support from the federal government has allowed LRGs to measure
its short- and longer-term impact on their finances.  S&P views
positively the constructive dialogue between the federal and
subnational governments to solve the current institutional,
administrative, and budgetary challenges.  As a result, a stronger
institutional framework could improve LRGs' credit quality in the
next few years.

S&P estimates that the province's GDP per capita in 2016 reached
$16,665 and that in the past three years it averaged $18,003,
which was higher than the national average over the same period of
$13,504.  Argentina's economy contracted 2.3% in 2016, and S&P
estimates Neuquen to have posted a similar contraction.  S&P
forecasts the Argentine economy to post moderate growth over the
next several years, which is also our base case for the province.
Neuquen's economy heavily depends on the hydrocarbon sector,
though its size has shrunk in the past 10 years due to lack of
investment, capped domestic energy prices, and a generally over-
valued currency.

Neuquen's financial management has showed continuity and stability
throughout changes in administration.  The Movimiento Popular
Neuquino (MPN) party has governed the province since 1962.  Omar
Gutierrez, who was previously the Economy and Public Works
Minister, was elected as governor in 2015.  Neuquen's
administration introduced further modifications in its tax
structure in 2016, which it has been doing since 2010 to increase
its revenue amid volatile economic performance, reflecting a
generally strong consensus to implement reforms.

Similar to other provinces in Argentina, Neuquen is largely unable
to conduct medium- to long-term financial planning due to the
considerable economic uncertainties in the country.  The quality
of its budgetary targets is limited by macroeconomic volatility,
which often results in the province having to significantly revise
its budget in the middle of the fiscal year.  Also, budget
approval has been delayed in some years, and in 2015 the budget
wasn't approved, prompting the province to work under the extended
2014 budget.

Fiscal performance to gradually improve as the economy recovers
and following fiscal consolidation at the sovereign level, making
it possible for capex to increase while maintaining moderate debt.

Neuquen's own-source revenue accounts for slightly more than 70%
of operating revenue, though it has fluctuated given that about
20% come from royalties.  S&P don't expect this ratio to change
given Neuquen's limited ability to raise its revenue.  The
province has taken measures to adjust tariffs, although they
didn't have a significant impact on total revenue.  Additionally,
the federal government determines the royalties' rates, which S&P
believes further limits Neuquen's ability to raise its own-source
revenue.  Capital expenditures averaged 8% of total expenditure in
2016, reflecting delays in capital transfers from the central
government after the change in the administration, leading to the
postponement in investments.  S&P's scenario for 2017-2019 expects
capex to reach 11% of total spending, and Neuquen is likely to
invest in roads, housing, and sanitation projects.

In 2016, Neuquen had an operating deficit of 3% of operating
revenue while the deficit after capital accounts reached almost 8%
of total revenue, according to preliminary data.  S&P believes
that inflation's deceleration in Argentina will put some pressure
on Neuquen's fiscal performance in 2017.  S&P expects revenue to
rise below our expected base case for nominal GDP growth, while
expenses to grow above inflation, which will continue weighing on
the province's operating expenses, mainly in the form of requests
for higher public-servant salaries.  In addition, Neuquen created
a new ministry focused on citizenship and basic rights, which S&P
expects to squeeze the province's finances further.  S&P expects
Neuquen to post an operating deficit of an average 1.5% of
operating revenue in 2017 and 2018, but to post a surplus of 3% in
2019.  Likewise, S&P expects Neuquen to increase its capex in
2017-2019 and the deficit after capex to drop to around 7% of
total revenue, on average.

As of December 2016, Neuquen's debt stock reached approximately
ARP18.95 billion, or 44% of the province's operating revenue,
according to the province's preliminary data.  In 2017, S&P
expects debt to slip to 42% of operating revenue, given that the
province's financing needs and the impact of the depreciation of
the Argentine peso are offset by the impact of lower inflation on
the province's nominal operating revenue.  S&P incorporates the
new issuance, TIDENEU, in S&P's analysis.  Approximately 65% of
the province's debt is denominated in foreign currency or is
foreign-currency linked; therefore, any depreciation of the peso
beyond our expectation would further stress debt service payments.

Neuquen owns a range of government-related entities (GREs)
including a bank (Banco de la Provincia de Neuquen; BPN) and a gas
and oil company (Gas y Petroleo de Neuquen; GPN).  S&P estimates
that the potential recapitalization costs of these GREs are below
15% of Neuquen's operating revenue.  The province doesn't
guarantee the liabilities of its bank, which S&P considers as
self-supporting.  The last time Neuquen provided financial support
to BPN was in 2001.  S&P believes that given GPN's strategic role
for the province, Neuquen would likely provide support to it if

Neuquen's liquidity is weak in S&P's opinion.  The province's debt
issuance and refinancing in 2016 improved its cash position in the
short term.  In May 2016, the province issued secured notes for a
total of $235 million due 2028 (TICADE) for cash and exchanged
approximately $181 million of the original principal amount of the
2021 notes (TICAP) for the new TICADE notes.  However, S&P
believes that Neuquen's free cash and its ability to generate
internal cash flow are limited due to a projected deficit after
capital accounts of 9% of total revenue in 2017.  S&P expects the
province's debt service cost to be ARP7.6 billion in 2017.
According to S&P's estimates, Neuquen's debt service coverage
ratio for the next 12 months was 9%.

At the same time, S&P believes that Neuquen's access to external
liquidity is uncertain.  Despite its obtainment of significant
financing in 2016, this assessment draws on S&P's evaluation of
the ongoing development of domestic capital markets as well as
S&P's assessment of the domestic banking system.  For the latter,
S&P's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) is at group
'9' in Argentina.  S&P's BICRAs, which evaluate and compare global
banking systems, are grouped on a scale from '1' to '10', ranging
from what S&P views as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1')
to the highest-risk (group '10').

PROVINCE OF NEUQUEN: Fitch Rates Proposed Bond Issue at B(EXP)
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B(EXP)' rating to the Province of
Neuquen, Argentina's upcoming senior unsecured bond issuance.


The bond is rated at the same level as the Province of Neuquen
(PN) Issuer Default Rating (IDR).

The notes will be issued in USD for up to USD366.1 million, to
accrue a fixed interest to be determined at issuance and payable
on a semi-annual basis, with estimated maturity of seven years and
equal capital payments in the last three years. The notes will be
a senior unsecured obligation of Neuquen governed by the laws of
the State of New York. The issuance of the note program, TIDENEU
(Titulos de Deuda del Neuquen), is authorized by Law No.3037 and
Law No. 3054 under Decrees No. 408/2017 and No. 444/2017. The
proceeds will be used by the Province to refinance public debt and
to fund capex works.

Considering the province's authorized and proposed new bond, PN's
debt stock will remain moderate and represent around 56.7% of
budgeted operating revenues for 2017. The issuance will alleviate
PN's liquidity pressures from 2017 debt maturities.


The final rating on Neuquen's new bond is contingent upon the
receipt of final documents conforming to information already
received by Fitch. Any change in Neuquen's Issuer Default Rating
as well as the development of the bond's structure could trigger a
rating action.


BRAZIL: President Michel Temer Allegedly Linked to $40MM Bribe
Paul Kiernan and Luciana Magalhaes at The Wall Street Journal
report that a former construction executive said Brazilian
President Michel Temer was involved in a deal to funnel a $40
million bribe to his political party, an allegation that threatens
to erode his ability to govern.

Marcio Faria, former industrial engineering chief of Odebrecht SA,
Latin America's largest construction firm, told authorities that
he met with Mr. Temer in 2010 and agreed to make the payment to
the president's Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, according to

The statement, made in plea-bargain testimony released, is the
most direct allegation linking Mr. Temer to a wide-ranging
corruption scandal at state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro
SA, the report notes. It represents a major landmark in the "Car
Wash" probe, which has implicated scores of high-level politicians
from all of Brazil's main parties but hadn't reached Mr. Temer
until now, the report relays.

Mr. Temer acknowledged meeting with Mr. Faria but denied that they
discussed a bribe, the report discloses.  In an emailed statement,
Mr. Temer called the allegation "an absolute lie," the report

The allegations, splashed across news reports nationwide, are
likely to fuel the protracted political crisis that has roiled
Brazil for three years and led to the impeachment of former
President Dilma Rousseff last year, the report discloses.  They
also come just as Mr. Temer is struggling to overcome dismal
approval ratings while seeking to push a key overhaul of Brazil's
pension system, and other economic reforms, through Congress, the
report relays.

"Brazilians don't see themselves represented by this government,"
said Pedro Fassoni Arruda, a political-science professor at the
Pontifical Catholic University of Sao Paulo, the report discloses.
"He is taking several unpopular measures, changing workers'
rights, and several of his ministers are suspected of corruption,"
he added.

Mr. Faria's testimony, part of a mass plea bargain by current and
former Odebrecht executives, was released after Supreme Court
Justice Edson Fachin authorized a new wave of corruption probes
against top politicians, the report notes.   In all, the
investigations target a third of Mr. Temer's cabinet, 50
legislators and four former presidents, the report notes.

As head of state, Mr. Temer can't be prosecuted for any acts he
committed before he took office last year following the ouster of
Ms. Rousseff, the report discloses.

But Mr. Faria's allegations could deal a major blow to the
president's credibility at a time when Mr. Temer already is short
on political capital, the report relays.  A poll released in late
March put his approval at just 10%, while the number of survey
respondents rating his administration as bad or very bad rose 9
percentage points from December to 55%, the report notes.

Mr. Faria, the executive, said the alleged bribe amounted to 5% of
a contract awarded to Odebrecht by Petrobras' international
division, which prosecutors say was controlled by an appointee of
Mr. Temer's party, known as the PMDB, the report notes.  The money
was paid partly in cash and partly through offshore accounts, Mr.
Faria said, the report discloses.  PMDB officials didn't respond
to requests for comment.

Mr. Faria said the payment was requested by a PMDB intermediary
with Petrobras and agreed upon before his meeting at Mr. Temer's
Sao Paulo office in July 2010, the report relays.  Though Mr.
Faria said he usually didn't interact directly with politicians,
he believes Mr. Temer called the meeting because of the unusually
large amount of money involved, the report notes.

At the meeting, Mr. Temer sat at the head of the table, Mr. Faria
said, the report notes.  Also in attendance were fellow Odebrecht
executive Rogerio Araujo, PMDB congressmen Eduardo Cunha and
Henrique Eduardo Alves, and the PMDB intermediary, the report

After exchanging pleasantries, Mr. Cunha took the floor and
explained that Messrs. Araujo and Faria were competing for a
Petrobras contract and that "there would be a very significant
contribution to the party" if Odebrecht's bid should win, Mr.
Faria said in a video of the testimony. "I went there to bless the
commitment," the report relays

Asked by a prosecutor if it was clear that the payment was a
bribe, Mr. Faria responded, "totally a bribe, sir, because it was
a percentage of a contract," the report notes

In his statement, Mr. Temer countered that "the conversation, fast
and superficial, did not involve money or Petrobras," the report
notes.  He also "categorically" contested any involvement of his
name in "murky business," the report relays.

Mr. Alves' lawyer said in a statement that the congressman
"vehemently repudiates" Mr. Faria's statements, the report adds.

BRAZIL: IIC Supports Sugarcane Industry With US$50 Million Loan
The Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), acting on behalf
of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), has completed the
first disbursement of a $50 million revolving corporate loan to
Sucres et Denrees S.A (Sucden) to support sustainable agricultural
and industrial practices in the sugarcane sector in Brazil.

The loan will enhance liquidity in the sector through an
innovative financial structure that will provide long-term funding
to sugarcane producers for the renovation and maintenance of
sugarcane fields as well as upgrades in industrial facilities.
This will improve the productivity and quality of cane available
for processing and the efficiency of sugar production.

The IIC will also support Sucden in the implementation of an
environmental and social management system to promote sustainable
practices within the industry and to identify potential
biodiversity, energy efficiency or social shared value

BRAZIL: Pension Funds Struggle to Restore Surpluses, Moody's Says
After several years of poor investment performance, Brazil's
closed pension funds struggle to restore surpluses, says Moody's
Investors Service. Although investment returns generally
outperformed actuarial targets last year, Brazilian closed pension
funds' solvency conditions remain weak, and liabilities now
exceeding assets by BRL54 billion for the industry after logging a
surplus of BRL40 billion as recently as 2011.

The deterioration in solvency has been most acute for defined
benefit pension plans with state-owned sponsors. These plans
account for more than 75% of industry's total deficit, according
to Moody's estimates.

"Equity exposures have generated the greatest losses for defined
benefit plans," said Diego Kashiwakura, a Vice President and
Senior Analyst at Moody's. "At the same time, the performance of
their fixed income portfolios has not been strong enough to fully
compensate for the underperformance of equities."

Despite subdued inflationary pressures, the funds' limited
investment choices will continue to make it difficult for defined
benefit plans to beat actuarial targets and restore surpluses.
These targets are typically composed of a Brazilian inflation
index plus a certain interest rate.

An alternative may be for pension funds to allocate the majority
of their portfolios in government bonds, especially inflation-
linked bonds, which offer inviting real yields. However, the shift
in the yield curve has broadly decreased expected real returns,
making it more challenging for pension funds to meet their
obligations through these bonds.

In response to these challenges, closed pension funds will likely
adopt more strict asset liability management (ALM) procedures.
Pension fund managers will likely increase focus on managing
interest rate and liquidity risks that arise from mismatches
between assets and liabilities. Potential strategies include
reducing mismatches between indexes (or proxy indexes) of assets
and liabilities, further reducing exposure to equities and
maintaining optimal levels of liquidity.

EVEN CONSTRUTORA: Moody's Rates BRL87MM Debentures at B1
Moody's America Latina Ltda. assigned a B1 rating on the global
scale and on the Brazilian national scale to the
BRL87 million debentures issuance proposed by Even Construtora e
Incorporadora S.A. with final maturity in 2019. Proceeds from the
transaction will be used for liability management. The outlook for
the rating is negative.

The rating of the notes assumes that the final transaction
documents will not be materially different from draft legal
documentation reviewed by Moody's to date and assume that these
agreements are legally valid, binding and enforceable.

Ratings Assigned:

- BRL 87 million debentures due in 2019 (9th issuance): B1
   (global scale); (national scale)

Ratings Unchanged:

- Corporate Family Ratings (CFR): B1 (global scale);
   (national scale)

- BRL100 million debentures due in 2019 (8th issuance): B1
   (global scale); (national scale)

The outlook for the ratings is negative.


Even's B1/ corporate family rating reflects its strong
brand name and market share in the city of Sao Paulo, with a solid
track record in the construction of apartments for the middle
income families. The ratings also consider Even's relative
conservative financial policies that result in efficient cost
control mechanisms and manageable debt profile. On the other hand,
the company's reduced scale and narrow diversification constrain
the rating, particularly under the current challenging industry

The B1/ rating assigned for the notes stands at the same
level as Even's B1 corporate family rating given the comfortable
level of residual and unencumbered assets that represent an
alternate source of liquidity and strengthen the recovery
prospects for unsecured claims. Even's consolidated debt is
composed of a mix of secured construction loans, representing
about 58% of its total debt at the end of 2016, and unsecured debt
and working capital loans of about 42%.

The proposed debentures will be secured by the mortgage of
specific real estate assets that will be required to cover at
least 40% of the outstanding amount of the obligations at all
times until the final maturity in 2019. In spite of this credit
enhancement, Moody's consider this obligation as largely unsecured
due to the collateral coverage of only 40%.

Proceeds from the transaction will be entirely used to refinance
existing corporate debt, thus lengthening Even's debt amortization
schedule. At the end of 2016, Even had BRL 323 million in
corporate debt maturing until the end of 2017 and BRL 609 million
in cash and equivalents. Pro forma for the transaction, the
company's cash balance of BRL 696 million will cover short term
corporate debt by 2.2 times. Even also had approximately BRL 511
million in short term debt related to project loans that will be
paid upon the successful mortgage take-out of receivables from
completed units of approximately BRL 772 million.

Despite the expected improvement in the liquidity profile, Even
still faces challenges related to shrinking revenues and margins,
arising from lower launches and increased sales cancellations, a
consequence of the Brazilian homebuilding cyclical adjustment and
of Brazil's recessionary environment. Accordingly, further
improvements in the company's liquidity will depend on the pace of
sales of finished units in inventories and on the adequate
management of working capital, capex and dividends throughout

In 2016, Even's new launches amounted to BRL 1.1 billion, compared
to BRL 2.4 billion in 2013. As well, revenues declined to BRL 1.7
billion from a peak of 2.5 billion in 2012, and the company's free
cash flow generation was constrained by high sales cancellations
and lower profitability on the sale of finished units in
inventories. Conversely, Even's leverage metrics remained fairly
stable during the crisis, with a total adjusted debt to book
capitalization ratio of 47% at the end of 2016, reflecting the
company's liability management initiatives and lower funding
requirements for new projects.

The negative outlook takes into consideration the company's
evolving business profile and ongoing challenges to consistently
improve its operations and reduce leverage amid the weakening
industry fundamentals in the Brazilian homebuilding market.

A rating upgrade is unlikely in the short term, but the ratings
outlook could stabilize if Even increases in size in terms of
revenues and EBIT, increasing inventories sales and generating
free cash flow and at the same time maintain or improve leverage
metrics. For example, an upgrade could be considered if the
company consistently maintains its total debt to capitalization
below 40% (47% in 2016), gross margin close to 28% (20% in 2016)
and EBIT interest coverage above 3.5 times (1.0x in 2016). An
upgrade would also require improvement in its liquidity position,
as per an unrestricted cash to short term debt position that is
above 1.0x on a sustainable basis.

On the other hand, Even's ratings could be further downgraded if
the company faces significant deterioration in its liquidity
profile due to a larger than anticipated distribution to
shareholders or a prolonged downturn in the homebuilding industry
that leads to a debt to capitalization ratio above 50%, gross
margin below 14% or EBIT interest coverage consistently below
1.0x. A meaningful change in the proportion of secured versus
unsecured debt or a decrease in the amount of unencumbered assets
that could be used to pay down the unsecured debentures could also
result in a downgrade of Even's unsecured ratings.

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, and established in 1974, Even is a
real estate developer with activities in the states of Sao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul and focus on residential
developments with average units priced above BRL350,000. The
company is vertically integrated, executing all real estate
development phases from the analysis of the prospective land to
the construction of the units and sale to the final homebuyer. In
2016, Even reported consolidated net revenues of BRL1.7 billion
(US$502 million) and net profit of BRL1.9 million (US$0.5

FUNDO DE INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Sr. Debt
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has assigned provisional ratings of
(P) Ba3 (sf) (global scale, local currency) and (P) (sf)
(national scale) to the first senior issuance (senior issuance) to
be issued by Fundo de Investimento em Direitos Creditorios --
Fornecedores CRB (FIDC Fornecedores CRB, FIDC). The FIDC will be a
securitization of existing and performed trade receivables sold by
the key suppliers of Concessionaria Rota das Bandeiras S.A. (Rota
das Bandeiras, Ba3/, the single eligible obligor and the
sole subordinate investor in the transaction.

Issuer: FIDC Fornecedores CRB

  1st senior issuance -- (P)Ba3(sf)(global scale, local currency)/
                         (P) scale)

The provisional ratings address the structure and characteristics
of the transaction based on the information provided to Moody's as
of April 5, 2017. Certain issues related to this transaction have
yet to be finalized. Upon review of all documents and legal
information, as well as any subsequent changes in information,
Moody's will assign definitive ratings to this issuance. If any
assumptions or factors considered by Moody's in assigning the
ratings change, Moody's could change the ratings assigned to the
senior issuance.


The transaction is a two-year revolving trade receivables
securitization program related to the supply chain of Rota das
Bandeiras, the single obligor in the transaction. The eligible
sellers and receivables will be approved by Rota das Bandeiras,
which will provide several confirmations, including that: (1)
products and services were provided appropriately, (2) the
receivables' due amount will not be subject to any reduction
(dilutions) and (3) it will make the payments directly to the FIDC
account on the scheduled date. The ratings of the senior issuance
are linked primarily to Rota das Bandeiras' ability and
willingness to make payments of the securitized receivables.

The provisional ratings of the Senior Issuance are based on a
number of factors, including:

- Strong sponsorship agreement with Rota das Bandeiras. The
   transaction will benefit from a sponsorship agreement between
   the FIDC and Rota das Bandeiras, in which Rota das Bandeiras
   will approve eligible sellers and receivables prior to the
   securitization. In addition, the company will provide several
   representations and warranties, including (1) confirmation that
   products and services were provided, (2) commitment to pay, on
   the agreed-upon due date, the confirmed face value of the
   receivables directly to a bank account in the name of the FIDC
   at Banco Bradesco S.A. (Bradesco, Ba2 stable) and (3) its
   acknowledgment and authorization of the assignment of the
   receivables. Moody's believes the sponsorship agreement
   provides the FIDC a senior unsecured claim against Rota das
   Bandeiras in regards to the underlying receivables pool of the

- The structure of cross default brings the FIDC senior issuance
   to the same level as Rota das Bandeiras' senior secured
   debentures. The FIDC senior issuance benefits from an
   acceleration clause already in place on Rota das Bandeiras'
   senior secured debentures. The minimum subordination level,
   equivalent to the higher of 15% or BRL40 million, will ensure
   that in case the receivables' delinquency level exceeds BRL40
   million and affects the senior class, the FIDC will be able to
   activate an automatic acceleration trigger of Rota das
   Bandeiras' senior secured debentures due 2024. Moody's believes
   this arrangement provides Rota das Bandeiras with a strong
   incentive to maintain the FIDC delinquency level below than the
   BRL40 million threshold in order to avoid the debentures
   acceleration in a stress scenario. Therefore, Moody's believes
   Rota das Bandeiras would treat the FIDC senior issuance with
   the same level of priority as the senior secured debentures.

- Residual risks related to the sellers. Given that the
   transaction is a multi-seller revolving securitization program,
   the FIDC is potentially exposed to the risk of unknown sellers
   securitizing their receivables due by Rota das Bandeiras. The
   key risk is a potential challenge to the true sale in a
   scenario in which that assignment is disputed against third-
   party creditors of the respective supplier. In addition, the
   assignment agreements, as well as the bills of sale, may not be
   filed with the public notaries, which weakens the FIDC's
   perfected interest in terms of the receivables assignment in
   case of challenges by third parties. This exposure is reduced
   through: (1) the sponsorship agreement, as Rota das Bandeiras
   acknowledges that the assignment documents will not typically
   be filed with the public notaries and commits to pay
   receivables directly to the FIDC on the scheduled due date,
   regardless of a potential challenge, and then assume any claims
   the FIDC would have against the sellers and (2) the maximum
   seller concentration criteria, requiring that the concentration
   of the three largest sellers with assignment documents not
   filed with the public notaries does not exceed the
   subordination available to the senior.

- No commingling risk. The transaction is not subject to
   commingling risk, as Rota das Bandeiras will commit to make the
   payment related to the securitized receivables directly to the
   FIDC bank account at Bradesco.

- Interest rate mismatch risk. The fact that receivables will be
   purchased at a fixed discount rate and the senior issuance will
   be indexed to the DI rate (interbank deposit rate), creates a
   negative exposure to interest mismatch between the FIDC assets
   (pre-fixed) and liabilities (post-fixed), as the spot DI rate
   increases during the average maturity of the eligible
   receivable. This risk will be covered by the minimum average
   discount rate of DI + 7% per year (p.y.), which would be
   sufficient to absorb a stress factor of 1.5x over the current
   spot DI rate.

- Counterparty risk. The FIDC will maintain a trust account at
   Bradesco to collect the receivable payments from Rota das
   Banderias in order to pay the receivables purchase price to the
   sellers and make the amortization payments to FIDC investors.
   In addition, the transaction will have a zero balance account
   at Banco Finaxis S.A. (Banco Finaxis, NR) for the payment of
   trust expenses. The maximum intra-day exposure of the account
   held at Banco Finaxis will be 1% of the FIDC net asset value
   (NAV). Moody's believes the counterparty risks are consistent
   with ratings assigned to the senior issuance.

The legal final maturity of the senior issuance will be 24 months
after the transaction's closing, subject to a cure period of 30
business days. The senior issuance will accrue, on a daily basis,
a floating interest rate equivalent to the DI rate plus 3.5% p.y.
The senior issuance will have 12 monthly target amortization
payments after a one-year grace period. In case the FIDC is not
able to make the monthly amortization payments, the trustee will
stop the acquisition of new receivables and trap collection
proceeds until the in-place amortization is paid in full, and then
will resume the revolving process. An event of default will be
considered if the FIDC fails to make the redemption of senior
issuance at legal final maturity, within 30 business days of the
24th amortization payment. Moody's ratings take into account the
ultimate payment of interest and principal to the senior issuance
until the legal final maturity.

Banco Finaxis, the custodian, will verify the following key
eligibility criteria: (1) Rota das Bandeiras should not be
delinquent on any receivable payment of the FIDC; (2) Receivables
should not have a maturity date longer than 270 days from the
assignment date, and, after 11 months, the weighted average term
of securitized pool cannot exceed 150 days; (3) the receivables
discount rate should be sufficient to maintain the weighted
average discount rate of the outstanding pool at a level equal to
or higher than DI + 7% p.y.

Valora Gestao de Investimentos Ltda (Valora, NR), the portfolio
manager, will verify the following conditions: (1) the maximum
concentration of sellers (considering the economic group) and
bills of sale not filed with public notaries should not
individually exceed 10% of the FIDC's NAV and the concentration of
the three largest sellers (considering the economic group) should
not exceed the outstanding amount of the subordinate class; (2)
the maximum individual concentration of sellers and bills of sale
filed with public notaries should not exceed the outstanding
amount of subordinated issuance (3) sellers should not be part of
the same economic group as Rota das Bandeiras (i.e., no intra-
company/group receivables are eligible); (4) sellers should not be
under a reorganization or bankruptcy process (recupera√°ao judicial
ou falància).

ISA CAPITAL: Fitch Withdraws 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn ISA Capital do Brasil S.A.'s Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and
National scale rating for commercial reasons. Accordingly, Fitch
will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for ISA

Rating Sensitivities are not applicable as the ratings have been

Fitch has withdrawn the following ratings:

-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB+; Outlook Stable;
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'BB+'; Outlook Negative;
-- National Scale rating 'AA+(bra)'; Outlook Stable.

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

FUSHAN LTD: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 18
The members of Fushan Ltd. will hold their final meeting on
April 18, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Kevin Butler
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7374
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902

LIONTRUST PANTHERA: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on April 26
The shareholder of Liontrust Panthera Fund Limited will hear on
April 26, 2017, at 10:15 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust Trustees (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Kim Charaman
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100

LSP CAL EB II: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 26
The shareholders of LSP CAL EB II, Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on April 26, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andre Slabbert
          c/o Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 640 0540

RISING SUN: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 28
The members of Rising Sun International Real Estate Investment
Consulting Ltd. will hold their final meeting on April 28, 2017,
to receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Huang, Ming-Shang
          c/o Michelle R. Bodden-Moxam
          Portcullis (Cayman) Ltd,
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          Hibiscus Way, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 32052 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946-6145
          Facsimile: (345) 946-6146

SKYDOME LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 20
The shareholders of Skydome Limited will hold their final meeting
on April 20, 2017, at 10:20 a.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100

UNIBALL LIMITED: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 28
The members of Uniball Limited will hold their final meeting on
April 28, 2017, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands

VICTORI INTERNATIONAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 18
The members of Victori International Fund Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on April 18, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Victori Capital LLC
          c/o Catharina von Finckenhagen
          Harbour Place, 4th Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 10240 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 8599
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4451

VICTORI MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 18
The members of Victori Master Fund Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on April 18, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Victori Capital LLC
          c/o Catharina von Finckenhagen
          Harbour Place, 4th Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 10240 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 8599
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4451

ZAI PORTOLA: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
The shareholders of Zai Portola Joint Venture Limited received the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ying Du
          1043 Halei Road, Bldg.8, Suite 502
          Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park
          Pudong New Area, Shanghai
          China 201203


CHILE: Overhauls Pinochet-era Private Retirement System
EFE News reports that President Michelle Bachelet said the Chilean
government is overhauling the private retirement system
implemented in the country by late Gen. Augusto Pinochet's regime
in 1981.

President Bachelet announced the changes in an address on April
12, responding to long-running complaints about the meager payouts
from the private retirement system, according to EFE News.

The government will impose an additional contribution of 5 percent
of pay that will be used to create "a new social savings system,"
according to EFE News.

"A charge will be imposed on employers over a period of six years
to guarantee a better transition," Mr. Bachelet said in a
nationwide address carried on radio and television, the report

An independent public agency will be created to manage the new
pension system, the president said, the report notes.

The 5 percent contribution will be split into a 3 percent
contribution to individual accounts, which can be pass on to heirs
and belong to account holders, and a 2 percent contribution to the
public pension system, Mr. Bachelet said, according to EFE News.

Chile's retirement system has long been touted as a model by
advocates of privatizing public pension systems, but participants
complain that the monthly payouts are insufficient to cover living
expenses, the report points out.

Currently, 90.7 percent of participants in Chile's private
retirement system receive less than 154,000 pesos ($233) a month,
or about half the minimum wage, the report adds.


CUBA: Restricts Sale of Premium Gasoline
EFE News reports that several service stations that sell only
premium gasoline were closed in Havana, although the Cuban
government has not officially announced restrictions on sales of
the special fuel.

Some of the service stations that sell high-octane fuel, which is
hard to find on the island, had been closed for several days, with
cones and yellow tape keeping drivers away, according to EFE News.

Long lines formed outside one service station and the Havana fuel
outlet was closed a day later, the report notes.

An EFE reporter confirmed that other service stations were still
selling premium fuel, but with cash payment required and the high-
octane gasoline restricted to certain vehicles and cars rented to

Government vehicles can only be fueled using prepaid cards issued
by Financiera Cimex S.A. (Fincimex) at Union Cuba-Petroleo (Cupet)
service stations, the report relays.

Cuba is trying to find a new source of oil amid a cut to the
subsidized supply it has received since 2003 from Venezuela, which
provided the island with 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) of
petroleum, the report notes.

The flow of crude from Venezuela has been reduced to about 55,000
bpd due to the economic crisis in the South American nation, the
report adds.

E L  S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: Moody's Cuts Debt Rating to Caa1 on Missed Payments
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded El Salvador's issuer and
senior unsecured debt ratings to Caa1 from B3 and changed the
outlook on the issuer rating to stable from negative.

The key drivers of the downgrade to Caa1 are:

1) The recent missed payments on pension-related bonds signal a
higher risk that the political impasse in the Legislative Assembly
could lead to missed payments on government debt obligations

2) The failure to reach an agreement to issue long-term debt
raises government liquidity risks and tests local banks' capacity
to absorb additional short-term debt, which is already at record
high levels.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's views that the Caa1 rating
captures the balance of risks to El Salvador's sovereign credit

El Salvador's long-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings
were lowered to B2 from B1. Short-term foreign-currency bond and
deposit ceilings remain unchanged at NP.




On April 7, the trust fund created by El Salvador's government to
finance obligations to the pension system (Fideicomiso de
Obligaciones Previsionales, FOP) began to miss payments on pension
certificates (Certificados de Inversion Previsional, CIP). The
pension certificates are held by private and public sector pension

It is Moody's understanding that the pension certificates do not
carry a sovereign guarantee. Therefore, based on the available
information, Moody's do not considers the missed payments on the
pension certificate to be a default by the government of El
Salvador under Moody's definition of default.

However, this credit event constitutes the first time a decision
has been made to miss a debt-related payment. Prior to this, the
government had made all debt related payments, while building up
arrears in other non-debt payments.

The missed payment occurs in the context of a political impasse
between the ruling party and the main opposition party in the
Legislative Assembly. Disagreements between the two parties have
obstructed fiscal policy and government debt management, leading
to rising arrears and the recent missed payment. Moody's see the
missed payment on the pension fund obligations as a signal that
risks for government debt payments have risen.


The government is required to obtain a two thirds majority
approval in the legislative assembly to issue long term debt. This
has been a long standing feature of El Salvador's debt management
framework. However, over the past year, the ruling party (FMLN)
has failed to secure approval to issue long-term debt from the
main opposition party (ARENA), due to disagreements over policy
priorities and an increasingly acrimonious political relationship.

The government has instead financed itself with short-term debt
(LETES). In January 2016, LETES surpassed the $800 million mark, a
level at which refinancing conditions began to deteriorate,
reflecting the limited absorption capacity of the relatively
shallow domestic market. By November 2016, banks began to slowly
reduce their exposure to LETES, suggesting tightening liquidity
conditions for government debt. Short-term government paper
outstanding is now about $1.06 billion, challenging local banks'
capacity to absorb additional amounts.

While it is unlikely that banks would stop rolling over LETES,
which could lead to a default on short-term debt, the longer the
political impasse prevents the issuance of long term debt, the
greater the liquidity pressure in the short term debt market.

The ruling party and the opposition are currently in negotiations
to issue long-term debt to retire short-term debt. Should such an
agreement be reached, it would alleviate near term liquidity
pressures. However, these pressures would likely return. For
instance, last November the Legislative Assembly did reach an
agreement to authorize issuance of $550 million in long-term debt
and also approved a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) which, at that
time, represented an important break to a political impasse that
had been ongoing for a year.

The November agreement allowed the government to retire only $307
million of LETES and pay 2016 arrears. The potential reduction in
LETES is insufficient to materially lower liquidity risks as the
total outstanding amount will remain at around $800 million. If no
additional long-term debt issuance is authorized (the government's
original request was $1.2 billion) the authorities will be forced
to prioritize payments and will likely run up arrears.

Even though negotiations are ongoing, there have been multiple
setbacks, and it has become increasingly clear that the two
political parties' positions are very difficult to reconcile.
Negotiations revolve around amending the 2017 budget to include
underestimated spending and on how to comply with the FRL, which
mandates a reduction in non-financial public sector deficit by at
least three percentage points of GDP over the next three years.
Reaching an agreement will likely become even more difficult in
the second half of 2017 as campaigns for legislative elections,
which are scheduled for March 2018, intensify.


The stable outlook reflects Moody's views that the Caa1 rating
captures the balance of risks to El Salvador's credit profile. It
is Moody's baseline assumption that under increased financial
strain the government will prioritize government debt service over
other expenses. However, the risks that political considerations
could change priorities have risen.


Upward pressure on the Caa1 rating would come from a material
reduction in political and government liquidity risks. Such a
reduction could stem from an additional agreement between the FMLN
and ARENA to approve a second tranche of long-term debt issuance,
sufficient to retire a significant portion of short-term debt
paper, and prevent a recurrence of future political disagreements
raising debt repayment risks. Fiscal adjustment that reduced
borrowing requirements would also be positive for the credit

Downward pressure on El Salvador's Caa1 ratings would emerge if
Moody's no longer expected that the government would prioritize
debt service over other payments and saw more imminent pressures
towards a credit event that caused losses to bond holders that are
higher than those consistent with a Caa1 rating. Such a change in
view would occur if an agreement to access long-term funding
remains elusive for a prolonged period. Even though Moody's does
not rate El Salvador's short-term government debt, further
escalation of financial stress related to LETES would raise the
credit risks related to the government's long-term debt.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,620 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 2.4% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1.1% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.2% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -2.5% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 59% (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On April 13, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the El Salvador, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's governance and/or
management, have materially decreased. The issuer has become more
susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Fitch Affirms 'D' GO Bond Ratings
Fitch Ratings has maintained the following Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico bonds on Rating Watch Negative:

-- $6.3 billion Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
    (COFINA) senior lien sales tax revenue bonds 'C';

-- $8.9 billion COFINA first subordinate lien sales tax revenue
    bonds 'C';

-- $2.9 billion Employees Retirement System of the Commonwealth
    of Puerto Rico (ERS) pension funding bonds 'C'.

Fitch has also affirmed the following securities, on which the
Commonwealth has already failed to make full and timely payment:

-- General obligation (GO) bonds at 'D';

-- Government facilities revenue and revenue refunding bonds,
    series R, S, T, and U issued by the PR Building Authority and
    guaranteed by the Commonwealth at 'D'.

The commonwealth's Issuer Default Rating (IDR) remains 'RD',
indicating that the issuer has defaulted on a select class of its

rating indicates Fitch's belief that default of some kind on the
COFINA and ERS bonds appears inevitable due to the commonwealth's
stated intent to restructure its debt. The commonwealth has
previously defaulted on its GO and appropriation debt issued by
the Public Building Authority (both rated 'D' by Fitch).

COFINA SET-ASIDES CONTINUE: Although debt service on the COFINA
sales tax bonds continues to be set-aside per the flow of funds
and debt service paid, there is significant uncertainty as to the
eventual impact of a broader restructuring of the commonwealth's
debt on COFINA bondholder protections.

ERS DRAWS ON RESERVES: The ERS has begun to draw on the debt
service reserve to make debt service payments. A default on the
pension bonds is expected once the debt service reserve is
depleted. Under its debt moratorium that was enacted in April
2016, the commonwealth has suspended transfers of employer
contributions to the ERS in an amount equal to the debt service
payable by the ERS during fiscal year 2016-17 and suspended the
obligation of the ERS to transfer pledged funds to the trustee
under the bond resolution.


The ratings on the bonds have reached the lowest level on Fitch's
rating scale in the absence of default. Fitch will resolve the
Rating Watch once debt restructuring plans become clearer.


COFINA BONDS are payable from commonwealth sales and use tax

ERS BONDS were structured as a limited, non-recourse obligation of
the pension system, payable from and secured by a pledge of
statutorily required employer contributions to the system.

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

Trinidad Express reports that Caribbean Airlines advised that for
the period April 7 to 24, 2017, it has made available to
passengers 55,196 seats on the domestic airbridge between Trinidad
and Tobago.

"In particular, for the Easter weekend, April 13-17 and the Tobago
Jazz Festival, April 27 to May 1, 17,500 seats have been made
available to passengers for each period," the airline said,
according to Trinidad Express.

The report notes that Dionne Ligoure, head of Corporate
Communications stated: "The domestic airbridge is a significant
part of Caribbean Airlines operations and we give it high

"We are cognisant of the high demand during the Easter holidays
and the Jazz Festival and have carefully planned how resources
will be used on the airbridge," he added.

                    About Caribbean Airlines

Caribbean Airlines Limited --
-- provides passenger airline services in the Caribbean, South
America, and North America.  The company also offers freighter
services for perishables, fish and seafood, live animals, human
remains, and dangerous goods.  In addition, it operates a duty
free store in Trinidad.  Caribbean Airlines Limited was founded in
2006 and is based in Piarco, Trinidad and Tobago.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
November 2, 2015, RJR News said that Michael DiLollo, Chief
Executive Officer of Caribbean Airlines Limited has quit after
just 17 months on the job. The 48-year-old Canadian national,
citing personal reasons, resigned with immediate effect.  His
resignation was accepted by the airline's board of directors. Mr.
DiLollo was appointed Caribbean Airlines CEO in May 2014,
following the sudden resignation of Robert Corbie in September

In early February 2015, Larry Howai, then Finance Minister, told
Parliament that unaudited accounts for 2014 showed the airline
made a loss of US$60 million, inclusive of its Air Jamaica
operations, and the airline planned to break even by 2017.
Mr. Howai told the Parliament that a five-year strategic plan had
been completed and was in the process of being approved for

In an interview with the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian in early
November 2015, Mr. DiLollo said CAL did not need a bailout just
yet. Mr. DiLollo said the airline had benefited from extremely
patient shareholders for years and he believed the airline was
strategically positioned to break even in three years.


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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