TCRLA_Public/170424.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, April 24, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 80



PETROBRAS ARGENTINA: Moody's Withdraws B3 CFR on Reorganization
PVCRED SERIE: Moody's Rates ARS49.85MM Certs 'Caa2(sf)'


CL FIN'L: CLICO Policyholders to Finally Get Their Money


TEGMA GESTAO: Moody's Affirms B2 Corporate Family Ratings
VM HOLDING: Moody's Assigns Ba2 CFR; Outlook Stable

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CAMARES CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 10
CAMARES EUROPEAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 10
CASTLE POINTE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
CROWLEY INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
DIAMOND EQUITIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11

ENBRIDGE PACIFIC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 8
JADELAND INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
LIONGATE EXTENDED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
LMSF-A: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
NEW CHINA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

PLATINUM PARTNERS: Court Appoints Official Liquidators

E L  S A L V A D O R

AES EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3
BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Moody's Lowers LT Issuer Rating to Caa1


GUATEMALA: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term LC IDR; Outlook Stable


C2W MUSIC: Suffering 'Serious' Accumulated Losses
JAMAICA: Nutraceuticals Will Not Generate Much Wealth


MEXICO: Jobless Rate at Multiyear Low


VENEZUELA: Riots, Looting Claim a Dozen Lives


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 17 to April 21, 2017

                            - - - - -


PETROBRAS ARGENTINA: Moody's Withdraws B3 CFR on Reorganization
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Petrobras Argentina S.A.
(PESA)'s B3 Corporate Family Rating. The rating action reflects
the completion of the acquisition of PESA by Pampa Energia S.A.
(Pampa, B3 stable). On February 16, 2017, PESA was merged into
Pampa, which is now the obligor of PESA's $500 million global


Moody's has withdrawn the rating due to reorganization reasons.

The following ratings were withdrawn:

Corporate Family Rating, B3

Prior to the withdrawal, the outlook on the rating was developing.

PESA was an integrated energy company with operations focused on
petroleum exploration and production but with refining and product
distribution, and petrochemicals business. It also had interests
in electric generation, and in gas pipelines and NGLs production
through Transportadora de Gas del Sur S.A. (B3 positive).

Pampa, in turn, is engaged in generation, distribution and
transmission of electric power in Argentina as well as on oil and
gas production, refining, petrochemicals and hydrocarbon
commercialization and transportation in Argentina and, to a lesser
extent, in Venezuela. The company is the fourth oil and gas
producer in the country, with an equity oil and gas production of
over 58.3 thousands of barrels of oil equivalent per day.

PVCRED SERIE: Moody's Rates ARS49.85MM Certs 'Caa2(sf)'
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has rated
Fideicomiso Financiero Pvcred Serie XXXII. This transaction will
be issued by TMF Trust Company (Argentina) S.A., acting solely in
its capacity as issuer and trustee.

The securities for this transaction have not been placed in the
market yet. The transaction is pending approval from the Comision
Nacional de Valores, if any assumption or factor Moody's considers
when assigning the ratings change before closing, the ratings may
also change.

- ARS128,189,000 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities (VRDA
   TV) of "Fideicomiso Financiero Pvcred Serie XXXII", rated (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Ba3 (sf) (Global

- ARS49,851,000 in Certificates (CP) of "Fideicomiso Financiero
   Pvcred Serie XXXII", rated (sf) (Argentine National
   Scale) and Caa3 (sf) (Global Scale).


The rated securities are payable from the cash flow coming from
the assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of
approximately 7,220 eligible personal loans denominated in
Argentine pesos, bearing fixed interest rate, originated by
Pvcred, a financial company owned by Comafi's Group in Argentina.
Only the installments due after June 30, 2017 will be assigned to
the trust.

The VRDA TV will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus
300bps) from the issue date with first coupon payment date in
August 2017. The VRDA TV's interest rate will never be higher than
31% or lower than 20%.

Overall credit enhancement is comprised of subordination, various
reserve funds and excess spread.

The transaction has initial subordination level of 24.9% for the
VRDA TV, calculated over the pool's principal balance as of June
30, 2017. The subordination level will increase overtime due to
the turbo sequential payment structure. The transaction will have
a grace period for principal and interest payment until August 10,

The transaction also benefits from an estimated 49.1% annual
excess spread, before considering losses, taxes or prepayments and
calculated at the caps of 31% for the VRDA TV.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed
when rating this transaction. Although Moody's analyzed the
historical performance data of previous transactions and similar
receivables originated by Pvcred, the actual performance of the
securitized pool may be affected, among others, by the economic
activity, high inflation rates compared with nominal salaries
increases and the unemployment rate in Argentina.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo
sequential payment structure, when compared with the level of
projected losses in the securitized pool.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this
transaction through the initial subordination levels for each
rated class, as well as the historical performance of Pvcred
portfolio. In addition, Moody's considered factors common to
consumer loans securitizations such as delinquencies, prepayments
and losses; as well as specific factors related to the Argentine
market, such as the probability of an increase in losses if there
are changes in the macroeconomic scenario in Argentina.

These factors were incorporated in a cash flow model that takes
into account all the relevant features of the transaction's assets
and liabilities. Monte Carlo simulations were run, which
determines the expected loss for the rated securities.

Moody's analyzed the historical performance data of previous
transactions and similar receivables originated by Pvcred, ranging
from July 2014 to December 2016. Moody's has observed a weaker
performance of Refis loans compared to Unregulated Pvcred Loans.
In addition, Moody's has observed a weaker performance of Open
Market Loans compared to Existing Loans.

Moody's notes that there is uncertainty around key macroeconomic
variables in Argentina, including inflation rates, salary
increases compared to inflation, and economic activity, which have
an impact on future performance of this transaction.

In assigning the rating to this deal, Moody's assumed a lognormal
distribution of losses for each one of the different securitized
sub-pools: for the loans of Existing Clients, a mean of 15%; for
loans of Open Market, a mean of 35% and for the "Refinanciados"
loans, a mean of 45% with a coefficient of variation of 60% for
each of the three sub-pools. Also, Moody's assumed a lognormal
distribution for prepayments with a mean of 50% and a coefficient
of variation of 70%.

Servicer default was modeled by simulating the default of Banco
Comafi S.A. as the servicer consistent with its current rating of
B3/ In the scenarios where the servicer defaults, Moody's
assumed that the defaults on the pool would increase by 20
percentage points.

The model results showed 1.2% expected loss for Class A Floating
Rate Debt Securities and 26.8% for the Certificates.

Moody's also evaluated the back-up servicing arrangements in the
transaction. If Pvcred is removed as collection agent, Banco
Comafi will be appointed as the back-up collection agent.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's ran several stress scenarios, including increases in the
default rate assumptions. If default rates were increased by 4%
from the base case scenario, the ratings of the Class A Floating
Rate Securities would likely be downgraded to B1 (sf), while that
of the Certificates would remain unchanged.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS" published in
September 2015.


CL FIN'L: CLICO Policyholders to Finally Get Their Money
-------------------------------------------------------- reports that starting today, April 24, CLICO
policyholders in the Bahamas are set to receive long overdue

After failing to deliver monies as promised back in January, the
Government issued a statement assuring that qualified
policyholders will receive three tranches of payments this year in
April, July and November, according to

The Perry Christie administration had initially planned to finance
the second phase of CLICO (Bahamas) payouts through a $45 million
bond issue, with the monies raised designed to compensate former
Executive Flexible Premium Annuity (EFPA) holders and those who
had surrendered their pension policies, the report relays.

The payments will total $5,000 per policyholder and be enough to
payout 70 per cent or 1,595 claims from surrendered policyholders,
the report notes.

The 30 per cent not fully paid out will receive promissory notes
(bonds) carrying a 4.25 per cent interest rate, equivalent to
Bahamian Prime, which will distribute the balance owed over a
four-year period, the report discloses.

In March 2016, the Government made the first payout totaling just
over $11 million.

The Bahamas Tribune reported that the second phase payout to
former CLICO (Bahamas) clients was initially supposed to be
triggered by the creation of a new insurance entity, a special
purpose vehicle (SPV) to be called Coral Insurance Company, the
report notes.  This will hold CLICO (Bahamas) insurance policies
that remain in effect, the report discloses.

The SPV, which will be licensed and regulated by the Insurance
Commission of the Bahamas (ICB), was supposed to be created by the
second week of November 2016, and hold the remaining insurance
portfolio until it is purchased by another insurer, the report

                        *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.
6, 2015, Trinidad Express reports that the Constitution Reform
Forum (CRF) has called on Finance Minister Larry Howai to refrain
from embarking on an "unnecessary drain on the Treasury" by
appealing the decision of a High Court judge, who ordered that the
Minister fulfil a request by president of the Joint Consultative
Council (JCC) Afra Raymond for financial details relating to the
bailout of CL Financial Limited.  The CRF issued a release stating
that if the decision is appealed, not only will it be a waste of
finance but such a course of action will also demonstrate a "lack
of commitment by the Government to the spirit and intent of the
Freedom of Information Act FOIA", under which the request was
made, according to Trinidad Express.

On July 7, 2014, Trinidad Express said that the Central Bank has
placed the responsibility of voluntary separation package (VSEP)
negotiations for workers at insurance giant Colonial Life
Insurance Company Ltd. (CLICO) with the company's board, after
which it will review accordingly, the bank said in a statement.
The bank's statement follows protest action by CLICO workers,
supported by their union, the Banking, Insurance and General
Workers' Union (BIGWU), outside the Central Bank in Port of Spain,
according to Trinidad Express.

In a separate TCRLA report on June 26, 2014, said
that the Trinidad and Tobago government has welcomed an Appeal
Court ruling that the Attorney General Anand Ramlogan said saves
the country from paying out more than TT$1 billion (TT$1 = US$0.16
cents) to policyholders of the cash-strapped CLICO.  The Appeal
Court overturned the ruling of a High Court that ruled members of
the United Policyholders Group (UPG) were entitled to be paid the
full sums of their polices. CLICO financially caved in on itself
at the end of 2008 after the investment instruments of major
policyholders matured and they wanted hundreds of millions of
dollars they were owed.

On Aug. 6, 2013, the TCR-LA, citing, said that
over TT$8 billion worth of CLICO's profitable business will be
transferred to Atruis, a new company that will be owned by the
state.  The Trinidad Express said that the Cabinet approved the
transfer as the Finance and General Purposes Committee continues
to discuss a letter of intent hammered out by the Ministry of
Finance and CL Financial's 400 shareholders, which envisions
taxpayers will recover the more than TT$20 billion Government has
injected since 2009 to keep CL subsidiary CLICO and other
companies afloat.

At its annual general meeting in Sept. 2013, CL Financial
shareholders voted to extend the agreement with Government until
August 25, 2014, while Cabinet decides on a new framework accord
to recover the debt owed to Government through divestment of CL
subsidiaries, including Methanol Holdings, Republic Bank,
Angostura Holdings, CL World Brands and Home Construction Ltd., related.  Proceeds from the divestment of these
assets will go toward Government's recovery of the billions it
pumped into CLICO.

TCRLA reported on Sep 22, 2011, Caribbean News Now, citing
Reuters, said that the cost of the Trinidad and Tobago
government bailout of CL Financial Limited is likely to rise to
more than TT$3 billion.


TEGMA GESTAO: Moody's Affirms B2 Corporate Family Ratings
Moody's America Latina Ltda. affirmed Tegma Gestao Logistica
S.A.'s B2 global scale ratings and upgraded the Brazilian national
scale ratings to from At the same time, Moody's
changed the outlook for the ratings to stable from negative.

Ratings affirmed:

Issuer: Tegma Gestao Logistica S.A.

- Corporate Family Ratings: B2 (global scale)

- BRL 200 million senior unsecured debentures due in 2018 and
   2019: B2 (global scale)

Ratings upgraded:

- Corporate Family Ratings: to from (national

- BRL 200 million senior unsecured debentures due in 2018 and
   2019: to from (national scale)

Outlook: changed to stable from negative


Tegma's B2/ ratings reflect its leading position as the
largest logistics company for the automotive industry in Brazil,
supported by medium and long-term contracts and longstanding
relationships with its client base. The ratings also consider the
company's "asset-light" business model, which entails relatively
stable cash flows and more flexible operations in face of market
downturns, and the company's adequate credit metrics.

On the other hand, Tegma's high revenue concentration in the
cyclical automotive industry, challenges related to still weak
market conditions and track record of high dividend distributions
constrain the ratings. Furthermore, although the current liquidity
profile is adequate, additional improvements are limited due to
the short tenor of debt maturities.

The stabilization of the ratings outlook reflects Tegma's improved
credit metrics resulted from the company's efforts to reduce costs
and from debt amortizations made during 2016. As well, it
considers Moody's expectations that the deterioration in Tegma's
business environment has likely bottomed and should start to
improve slowly and gradually, although Moody's don't expects
material improvements at least until the end of 2017.

After three years of consecutive contraction, Brazil's economy is
showing signs of recovery with falling inflation and interest
rates, which limits downside risks to the automotive industry and
to Tegma's credit metrics. A more stable economic outlook will
support a gradual pick-up of consumer confidence and increase
consumer financing availability in the medium to long term, which
will translate into increased auto sales. After an accumulated
contraction of 44% since 2013, auto sales increased by 5.5% in
March 2017 for the first time since December of 2014, and ANFAVEA
(Brazil's auto manufacturers association) forecasts a 4% increase
in sales for 2017.

As a consequence, Moody's expects Tegma to post stable revenues in
2017, after a 41% contraction from 2013 through 2016, while
profitability should improve thanks to cost saving initiatives
including reduced labor, sale of non-profitable units and focus on
higher capacity utilization rates. In addition, leverage and
interest coverage improved with the amortization of BRL 71 million
in debt during 2016, providing the company more financial
flexibility to whether the industry's downcycle. At the end of
2016, Tegma's adjusted leverage declined to 2.6 times from 3.4
times in 2015, while interest coverage (measured by adjusted
EBIT/interest expense) increased to 1.4 times from 1.1 times.

Tegma has an adequate liquidity profile with BRL 193 million in
cash and equivalents and BRL 128 million in short term debt at the
end of 2016. Even after a debt amortization of BRL 67 million made
in February 2017, Moody's expects Tegma's cash balance to remain
relatively stable given its positive free cash flow generation.
Nevertheless, further improvements in the company's liquidity
profile are limited due to the short tenor of debt maturities. As
such, Moody's expects the company to seek liability management
initiatives or other alternatives to reduce future liquidity

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that Tegma will
maintain leverage and profitability near current levels, while
prudently managing debt amortizations, capex and dividends to
preserve its adequate liquidity.

The rating could be upgraded if operating margins increase to its
historical levels of 10% and if leverage decreases to below 3.0x
on a sustained basis. An improvement in the company's debt
amortization profile is also required for a rating upgrade. Tegma
is expected to maintain its leadership position, ensure healthy
operating margins and debt protection metrics even during the down

The ratings could be downgraded if the outlook for Brazil's
economy and for the automotive industry worsens or if the company
is not able to generate positive FCF, increasing its overall
credit risk. Quantitatively, the ratings could be downgraded if
FCF turns negative or if total adjusted debt to EBITDA increases
to above 4.0x. Further downgrade pressure may arise in case Tegma
cannot sustain its leading market position. Also, a significant
increase in the level of secured debt could cause a downgrade of
the rated unsecured debentures.

Tegma is a logistics company, primarily focused on supply chain
management and products for the automotive industry mainly in
Brazil. In 2016, Tegma transported approximately 681 thousand
vehicles representing approximately 29.1% of Brazil's light
vehicle sales. Tegma also provides delivery services, warehousing,
inventory management and control and other logistic solutions to
the consumer product segment. In 2016, Tegma reported consolidated
net revenues of BRL 924 million (USD 300 million) with adjusted
EBITDA margin of 18%.

VM HOLDING: Moody's Assigns Ba2 CFR; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba2 corporate family
rating to VM Holding S.A. (VMH). The outlook is stable.

Ratings assigned:

Issuer: VM Holding S.A.

Corporate Family Rating: Ba2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: VM Holding S.A.

Outlook: Stable


VM Holding's Ba2 corporate family rating reflects the company's
strong presence in zinc's global markets (4th largest concentrate
producer and 5th largest in smelting production) and its
competitive cost profile. The integration of mining operations
with smelters, both in Brazil and Peru, has translated into steady
EBITDA margins over the last few years and is an additional credit

The Ba2 rating is also supported by adequate leverage and interest
coverage metrics, and Moody's expectations that leverage will
remain between 2x-2.3x until 2019. In this sense, Moody's does not
anticipates that the company will raise additional debt to execute
its upcoming expansion projects, but will rather accommodate them
within its own cash flow generation. The Ba2 ratings also consider
VMH's strong liquidity position, with cash balance covering 80% of
total debt at the end of 2016.

Constraining the rating is VMH's exposure to commodity prices
volatility, in particular zinc and copper, and its high
concentration in zinc (66% of total mining production in FY 2016)
and in one mine (Cerro Lindo responds for 42% of total mine output
for zinc). The execution of planned greenfield projects in Brazil
and in Peru in the coming years would be seen as a positive
development to the extent it leads to further diversification.
VMH's relatively modest revenue size (USD1.8 billion at the end of
2016), as compared to global peers, is a further constraint.

The rating does not incorporate any expected support from VMH's
controlling shareholder, Votorantim S.A. (Ba2 negative), one of
the largest industrial groups in Brazil, which has a 89.35% share
in the company. Votorantim S.A. does not provide guarantees to
VMH's debt (only to BNDES debt, which represents 8% of the total),
and there are no cross acceleration or cross-default provisions
between the two entities. Still, VMH is included as a material
subsidiary in Votorantim S.A.'s financial statements. On the other
hand, the provisions in VM Holding S.A's Shareholders Agreement.,
including conservative Corporate Governance standards and
limitation on dividend distribution, as a mitigating factor to the
risk of cash upstreaming to the parent in case there is a
deterioration in Votorantim S.A.'s credit risk.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that VMH will
maintain its competitive cost position and will continue to invest
to increase integration and production levels. At the same time,
Moody's expects that the company will maintain adequate liquidity
position and leverage within the target set by its financial
policies while carrying out its greenfield projects.

An upward rating or outlook movement would require the company to
maintain its competitive cost position and complete planned
expansions, further diversifying its metal revenue base and
enhancing its production profile, without an increase in leverage
or a deterioration in interest coverage metrics. Besides, to the
extent that VMH is able to achieve and maintain a sound liquidity
profile, interest coverage (measured by EBIT to interest expense)
above 4x and a (CFO-dividends)/debt ratio higher than 25%, the
outlook or ratings could be positively impacted.

Ratings could be negatively impacted if profitability and cash
generation capacity materially deteriorate, as a consequence of
decline in metals prices, increase in production costs
significantly exceeding Moody's expectations, or higher than
anticipated capital expenditures, with negative impact on
liquidity, leverage and interest coverage metrics. Specifically,
if EBIT margin falls below 8% with cash generation being negative
on a sustained basis, ratings could be downgraded. Negative
pressure on the rating could result from consistently higher
dividend payout, jeopardizing its liquidity position and leading
to a CFO-dividends/Debt ratio lower than 20% on a consistent
basis. Negative pressure could also result from increase in debt
levels leading to leverage ratios trending towards 3.5x or above,
and interest coverage below 3.0x on a consistent basis.

The principal methodology used in this ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

VM Holding S.A. (VMH) is a subsidiary of Votorantim S.A., with
integrated operations (mines and smelters) in Brazil and Peru,
mostly concentrated in zinc, but also with exposure to copper and
lead. VMH is the 4th largest zinc concentrate producer in the
world. In June 2016, there was a business spin-off of the
aluminum, nickel, and US zinc assets/operations, previously
managed under Votorantim Metais brand. These businesses are fully
owned subsidiaries of Votorantim S.A.. In FY 2016, VMH reported
revenues of USD 1.8 billion.

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CAMARES CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 10
The creditors of Camares Capital Management L.P. are required to
file their proofs of debt by May 10, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 8, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Highwater Limited
          c/o Nicole Gagliano
          Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 31855 Grand Cayman KY1-1207
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 640 2279
          Facsimile: (345) 943 2294

CAMARES EUROPEAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 10
The creditors of Camares European Credit Fund GP Inc. are required
to file their proofs of debt by May 10, 2017, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 8, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Highwater Limited
          c/o Nicole Gagliano
          Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 31855 Grand Cayman KY1-1207
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 640 2279
          Facsimile: (345) 943 2294

CASTLE POINTE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
The creditors of Castle Pointe Shipping Co. LLC are required to
file their proofs of debt by May 1, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 22, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Peter A. De Vere
          Campbells Secretaries Limited
          Willow House, Floor 4
          Cricket Square, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9010
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 2648
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8613

CROWLEY INTERNATIONAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
The creditors of Crowley International Maritime Services, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 1, 2017, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 22, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Allen Todd Busch
          9487 Regency Square Blvd.
          Jacksonville, FL 32225
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (904) 727-2200
          Facsimile: +1 (904) 805-1652

DIAMOND EQUITIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
The creditors of Diamond Equities Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 11, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 21, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Kent Limited
          c/o Michelle R. Bodden-Moxam
          St. George's International Limited
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          Oleander Way, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 32052 Grand Cayman KY1-1208
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946-6145
          Facsimile: (345) 946-6146

ENBRIDGE PACIFIC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 8
The creditors of Enbridge Pacific (Caymans) Inc. are required to
file their proofs of debt by May 8, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 23, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          James Macfee
          Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Andre Slabbert
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 640 0540

JADELAND INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
The creditors of Jadeland Investment Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 1, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 22, 2017.

The company's liquidators are:

          Desmond Campbell
          Stuart Brankin
          Circumference FS (Cayman) Ltd.
          P.O. Box 32322 Grand Cayman KY1-1209
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 0711

LIONGATE EXTENDED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
The creditors of Liongate Extended Opportunities Fund are required
to file their proofs of debt by May 1, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 22, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes
          Tim Stumpff
          Corey Stokes
          Mourant Ozannes, Attorneys-at-law
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814-9277
          Facsimile: (345) 949-4647

LMSF-A: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 1
The creditors of LMSF-A are required to file their proofs of debt
by May 1, 2017, to be included in the company's dividend

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 23, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes
          Tim Stumpff
          Corey Stokes
          Mourant Ozannes, Attorneys-at-law
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814-9277
          Facsimile: (345) 949-4647

NEW CHINA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
The sole shareholder of New China Holdco, Limited, on March 23,
2017, passed a resolution to liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100

PLATINUM PARTNERS: Court Appoints Official Liquidators
The Grand Court of Cayman Islands, on Dec. 16, 2016, entered an
order appointing Margot MacInnis and Nilani Perera as official
liquidators of Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund
(International) Limited, replacing Matthew Wright and Christopher

The Liquidators can be reached at:

          Margot MacInnis
          Borrelli Walsh (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Place, Ground floor
          103 South Church Street
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands; and

          Nilani Perera
          Borrelli Walsh (BVI) Limited
          Palm Grove House, 4th Floor
          Road Town, Tortola
          British Virgin Islands

E L  S A L V A D O R

AES EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the senior unsecured long-
term debt rating and Corporate Family Rating (CFR) of AES El
Salvador Trust II bis (Trustco II) to B3 from B2. Concurrently,
Moody's changed the rating outlook to stable from negative.

Trustco II issued the 10-year $310 million senior global notes due
in 2023 for the benefit of four affiliated electric distribution
companies in El Salvador: Compania de Alumbrado Electrico de San
Salvador (CAESS), Empresa Electrica de Oriente (EEO), AES Clesa y
Compania (CLESA) and Distribuidora Electrica de Usulutan (DEUSEM).
These four distribution utilities which are majority owned by AES
Corporation (AES; Ba3 positive) unconditionally and severally
guarantee the debt of Trust II bis, collectively the guarantors.


The downgrade of the ratings of Trustco II to B3 and stable
outlook is prompted by the April 13 downgrade of El Salvador
government bond rating to Caa1 from B3 with stable outlook (see
related Press Release).

The guarantors' B3 rating factors in some uncertainty regarding
their ability to fully collect the electric subsidies despite the
material reduction (by 50%) implemented effective March 2017. The
uncertainty to collect the subsidies results from challenges faced
by the sovereign and the government-owned hydroelectric power
generation company, Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica (CEL;
unrated) which has historically funded the electric subsidies
except for the June-December 2016 period.

However, the B3 ratings and stable outlook acknowledge that the
reduced subsidies of around $2.5 million per month or US$30
million p.a. equals to around 5% of the guarantors' combined
revenues recorded for the last twelve month (LTM) period ended
September 2016. Importantly, the B3 ratings also factor in that
the guarantors' combined cash balance at the end of March 2017
aggregated to US$22 million. The company has also committed not to
declare any dividends (2016: US$23 million) until gaining clarity
on whether they will face material delays in the collection of the
subsidies. Therefore, the B3 rating and stable outlook anticipate
that the guarantors will be able to service their debt including
the next principal payments due in 2017 and 2018 under the US$18
million loan maturing in 2018 with US$10.5 million currently
outstanding. The B3 further factors in the growing refinancing
risk of the bullet Global Notes; however, this will only mature in
March 2023. The B3 rating also acknowledges that, under the terms
of the Global Notes, the structure has a six month interest only
debt service reserve account and the incurrence of long-term debt
is restricted to reporting a maximum debt to capitalization of

Moody's notes that the guarantors have not extended yet the
US$16.5 million committed credit facility with Banco Agricola (B2
stable) which expired in February 2017, a material credit
negative. However, Moody's understands that the delay in its
extension is largely due to ongoing negotiations of the terms and
conditions. Moody's also note that although this facility includes
a Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause, which has not been
enforced, the guarantors have borrowings of US$9 million
outstanding under this facility. Moody's also understands that
according to the terms of the US$18 million loan due in 2018 the
guarantors could borrow all the repaid amounts again (around
US$7.5 million). Moody's liquidity analysis assigns limited value
to non-committed facilities but Moody's acknowledge that end of
March 2017, the guarantors had an additional US$6.4 million
available under its three non-committed credit facilities (total
amount: US$23.5 million). In addition, they have recently secured
a new non-committed credit facility for up to US$17 million with a
subsidiary of BAC Internacional Bank Panama (Baa3 stable) with a
borrowing period of 1 year; however, it will also include the
possibility that up to US$10 million under this new facility could
be borrowed for up to seven years.


The prospects of an upgrade of Trustco II's B3 ratings are limited
given the Caa1 sovereign rating for El Salvador.


A downgrade of Trustco's B3 ratings is likely to follow a
downgrade of the sovereign rating. Negative momentum is likely if
Moody's concludes that the guarantors' financial and/or liquidity
profiles are no longer appropriate to maintain the one-notch
difference between Trustco II's ratings and the sovereign rating.
Factors that could drive this view include the deterioration of
the guarantors' liquidity profile following the failure to extend
the US$16.5 million committed credit facility, if they fully use
all the committed and not-committed revolving credit facilities
and/or if they decide to reduce their cash balance significantly
and upstream cash to the shareholders before they gain certainty
of no material delays in the electricity subsidies collection.

Negative momentum is likely if the government's fiscal challenges,
and/or CEL's financial challenges and/or country's tense political
situation impacts negatively the countries' power markets for
example if they result in power prices spikes which also affect
the guarantors' liquidity situation.

In addition, downward pressure on the ratings is likely to occur,
if Moody's perceives a deterioration in the regulatory framework
that reduces the predictability and consistency in which the
regulation is applied and/or an outcome of the next tariff review
(due in December 2017) that is not credit supportive. Negative
momentum is also likely if the consolidated key credit metrics
deteriorate significantly; specifically, if the consolidated
interest coverage ratio and the CFO pre-W/C to debt fell below 2x
and 5%, respectively, for an extended period. An aggressive
distribution policy particularly amid the current delays to
collect the subsidy payments, would also likely result in a

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regulated
Electric and Gas Utilities published in December 2013.

The guarantors' ultimate parent company is AES which holds
indirect ownership stakes that range in between 80.08% (CLESA),
75.11% (CAESS) and 89.11% (EEO), averaging 80% overall. For the
Last Twelve Month period ended September 2016, the guarantors
reported Cash of Operations of around US$57 million (excluding net
interest) and consolidated assets of $709 million.

BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Moody's Lowers LT Issuer Rating to Caa1
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa1, from B3, the
long-term foreign currency issuer rating of Banco de Desarrollo de
El Salvador (Bandesal).

At the same time, Moody's downgraded the long-term foreign
currency deposit rating of Banco Agricola, S.A. and the long-term
foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating of Agricola Senior
Trust (AST) to B2 from B1. AST is a Cayman Islands-based trust
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by Banco Agricola.
Banco Agricola's long-term counterparty risk assessment was also
downgraded to B2(cr) from B1(cr).

The deposit and issuer ratings carry stable outlooks. In addition,
both banks' standalone Baseline Credit Assessments (BCA) were
downgraded to caa1 from b3.

These rating actions follow Moody's downgrade of El Salvador's
government bond rating to Caa1, from B3, with the outlook changed
to stable from negative. For details on the rating action on El
Salvador please refer to Moody's press release "Moody's downgrades
El Salvador's issuer rating to Caa1 from B3 and changes outlook to
stable from negative" published on April 13, 2017.

The following ratings and assessments were downgraded:

Issuer: Banco de Desarrollo de El Salvador

-- Outlook, changed to stable from negative

-- Long-term foreign currency issuer rating, to Caa1 stable
    outlook, from B3 negative outlook

-- Baseline credit assessment, to caa1 from b3

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment, to caa1 from b3

Issuer: Banco Agricola, S.A.

-- Outlook, changed to stable from negative

-- Baseline credit assessment, to caa1 from b3

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment, to b2 from b1

-- Long-term foreign currency deposit rating, to B2 stable
    outlook, from B1 negative outlook

-- Long-term counterparty risk assessment, to B2(cr) from B1(cr)

Issuer: Agricola Senior Trust

-- Outlook, changed to stable from negative

-- BACKED Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt
    rating, to B2 stable outlook from B1 negative outlook


The bank rating downgrades result from the downgrade to Caa1, from
B3, of El Salvador's government bond rating, which considered the
recent missed payments on pension-related bonds, which signal a
higher risk that the political impasse in the Legislative Assembly
could lead to missed payments on government debt obligations. It
also captured the failure to reach an agreement to issue long-term
debt that raises government liquidity risks, and that will test
local banks' capacity to absorb additional short-term debt. The
lower BCAs on the banks reflect Moody's view that the
creditworthiness of both banks is intrinsically linked with that
of the Salvadoran government.

In downgrading the BCA of Bandesal, a local development bank,
Moody's also took into account that its funding, liquidity, and
market access are closely tied to the government's own liquidity
position. While Banco Agricola maintains adequate capital,
consistent profitability and ample liquidity, its financial
strength remains constrained by the creditworthiness of the
Salvadoran government, particularly in light of its significant
holdings of government debt as a proportion of its tangible common

Banco Agricola's B2 foreign currency deposit rating continues to
incorporate two notches of uplift from its caa1 BCA, based on
Moody's assessment of a high probability of support from its
parent, Bancolombia, S.A. (deposits Baa2 stable, BCA ba1), owing
to the importance of this subsidiary to Bancolombia's Central
American banking franchise.

The change in the outlooks to stable from negative on Bandesal's
and Banco Agricola's ratings is in line with the change in the
outlook on El Salvador's government bond rating.


If El Salvador's government bond rating is downgraded further,
Bandesal's and Banco Agricola's BCAs and their respective
supported ratings are likely to be downgraded again as well. The
banks' ratings are unlikely to face upward pressure in the near-
to-medium term, in light of the still weak operating environment
from banks.

The last rating action on Bandesal was on November 9, 2016.

The last rating action Banco Agricola was on November 9, 2016.

The last rating action on Agricola Senior Trust was on November 9,

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Bandesal is El Salvador's development bank, originally established
as Banco Multisectorial de Inversiones by special legislative act
in 1994 and transformed into Banco de Desarrollo de El Salvador by
law in 2012. The bank supports private sector economic development
and investment largely by lending through the financial system.
Bandesal reported total assets of about $591 million as of
December 2016.

Banco Agricola is domiciled in San Salvador, El Salvador, and is
the largest bank in the country with market shares of 26% and 27%
in loans and deposits. As of December 2016, Banco Agricola
reported consolidated assets of $4.3 billion. Agricola Senior
Trust is a Cayman Islands special purpose trust governed by the
laws of the Cayman Islands and is unconditionally and irrevocably
guaranteed by Banco Agricola.


GUATEMALA: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term LC IDR; Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Guatemala's sovereign ratings as

-- Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings
    (IDRs) at 'BB', Stable Outlook;
-- Senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-Currency bonds at 'BB';
-- Country Ceiling at 'BB+';
-- Short-Term Foreign-and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B'.


Guatemala's ratings are supported by its track record of
macroeconomic stability and disciplined policies, low public debt
to GDP and sound external liquidity. These strengths are
counterbalanced by a narrow tax base that constrains policy
flexibility and limits debt tolerance, as well as weak governance
and human development indicators.

Economic growth slowed to 3.1% in 2016, a level below potential
yet still resilient in comparison to median growth rates across
the region and among Guatemala's rating peers. Fiscal retrenchment
was the main drag on headline growth in early 2016. Uncertainty
lingering from the 2015 political crisis and surrounding the
subsequent political transition weighed on investment spending.
With higher budget execution and improving confidence spurring
investment and strong remittances inflows supporting private
consumption, real GDP is forecast to accelerate to 3.4% in 2017
and 3.7% in 2018. Inflation expectations remain anchored within
the Central Bank's target range of 3%-5%.

Investment and growth are constrained by a low domestic savings
rate, narrow revenue base, shallow credit penetration, and
governance problems. Investment to GDP has fallen steadily since
2007 and was only 12.5% in 2016. The government plans to boost
fixed capital spending and promote public-private partnerships
(PPP) in infrastructure. The PPP projects currently in the
pipeline are still in the evaluation and tendering phases and
construction is only scheduled to begin from 2018 onwards,
delaying any potential growth impulse.

Guatemala's external indicators are strong compared to peers in
the 'BB' category. The current account balance flipped into
surplus in 2016 mainly because of a smaller energy import bill and
strong remittance inflows. These drivers are expected to become
less supportive during the forecast period, and the current
account is forecast to revert to a small deficit by 2018. External
financing needs are adequately covered by broad-based foreign
direct investment and external borrowing from multilaterals.
Modest external debt and ample FX reserves - Guatemala's liquidity
ratio is more than double the BB median - mitigate external
liquidity risks. FX reserves rose by 18% in 2016 to USD9.2 billion
or 5.3 months of CXP.

Guatemala's central government fiscal deficit is low relative to
peers. In 2016, it shrank to the lowest level in over a decade
(1.1% of GDP). Institutional strengthening of the tax
administration office (SAT) plus large payments of back-taxes and
fines for tax evasion helped to arrest the slide in revenue-to-GDP
underway since 2013. Better tax collection in conjunction with a
pick-up in economic growth could deliver additional revenues of
around 1 percentage point of GDP by 2018. However, at only 11% of
GDP, the revenue take is still one of the lowest of all rated
sovereigns. Raising it to a level that is closer to the BB or
Central American medians of 32% and 20% of GDP respectively would
require deeper structural fiscal reform. A fragmented legislature
and the executive's limited political capital suggest to Fitch
that this is unlikely in the near term.

A primary surplus in 2016 kept central government debt stable
while enabling the government to cure arrears and rebuild its cash
position. The primary balance is forecast to turn negative again
in 2017, in line with higher budgeted outlays on education, public
health, and security and on the assumption of improved budget
execution. Even so, Fitch expects fiscal deficits to remain modest
over the forecast period, which combined with faster economic
growth will keep the debt-to-GDP ratio relatively stable. At 22%
of GDP (net of public debt holdings by the social security fund
IGSS), the government debt ratio is the lowest in the 'BB'
category, although the strength this confers to the credit profile
is limited by the low revenue take. Debt- and interest-to-revenue
ratios are higher than the 'BB' median and represent a weakness in
terms of debt tolerance and fiscal flexibility.


Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Guatemala a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB' on the Long-term FC IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee did not adjust the output from
the SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within Fitch
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.


The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that upside and downside
risks to the rating are broadly balanced. The main risk factors
that, individually or collectively, could trigger a rating action

-- Sustained improvements in tax collection and the budget
    process that enhance fiscal policy flexibility;
-- Higher investment and growth prospects;
-- Improvements in governance and human development indicators
    relative to peers.

-- Continued erosion of the revenue base that undermines fiscal
-- Political gridlock that constrains government financing
    flexibility and/or leads to interruptions in external
-- Social unrest and governability challenges leading to
    macroeconomic and policy uncertainty.


-- Fitch forecasts that Guatemala's economy and balance of
    payments will continue to benefit from relatively low oil
    prices (USD52.5/bl in 2017 and USD55.0/bl in 2018) and
    supportive U.S. economic growth rates (2.3% in 2017 and 2.6%
    in 2018)


C2W MUSIC: Suffering 'Serious' Accumulated Losses
RJR News reports that C2W Music Limited made a profit of US$42,500
in the financial year ending December.  However, despite the
turnaround in its fortunes, auditors have flagged the company's
accumulated losses as a serious issue, according to RJR News.

C2W Music has accumulated losses of US$1.219 million at December
31, 2016, the report notes.

Its current liabilities exceeded its current assets by US$145,922,
the report adds.

JAMAICA: Nutraceuticals Will Not Generate Much Wealth
RJR News reports that an organization dedicated to exploring the
economic benefits of a regional ganja industry, says pursuing
nutraceuticals alone from ganja, will not generate much wealth for
the country.

Dr. K'adamawe Knife, Coordinator for Enterprise Development and
Strategic Planning at Scarce Commodity, says more money can be
made by extracting certain active ingredients in ganja and putting
them in functional foods, according to RJR News.

Meanwhile, there are plans to list at least three companies
dealing in ganja products on the Jamaica Stock Exchange, the
report notes.

Dr. Andre Haughton, Coordinator for International Finance at
Scarce Commodity, says he is working with the Jamaica Stock
Exchange to develop a nano stock exchange, the report relays.

He said the ganja companies will be listed through that nano stock
exchange, the report discloses.

The nano stock exchange, which is scheduled to be launched later
this year, will allow consumers to purchase stocks and bonds using
a mobile device, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.


MEXICO: Jobless Rate at Multiyear Low
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that Mexico's
unemployment rate held steady in March at a multiyear low amid
solid job creation in the private sector, which continued to
support consumption growth.

Unemployment among Mexico's 54 million workforce was 3.5%
seasonally adjusted last month, practically unchanged from
February even as more people sought work, the National Statistics
Institute said, the WSJ.  Underemployment and informal employment
both fell from the previous month, the report relays.

The March job numbers were "unambiguously good," suggesting the
economy has strengthened in early 2017, against expectations,
PNC's economist Bill Adams said in a note, the report notes.

"In January, Mexico had seemed at risk of a recession in early
2017, even if Mexico's trade relations with the United States
remained status quo, because of large increases in energy prices
and interest rates, as well as sharp drops in business and
consumer sentiment," the report quoted Mr. Adams as saying.

Employment growth has lowered the jobless rate to pre-2008 crisis
levels, supporting household spending, although a recent uptick in
inflation has led to declines in real wages as consumer prices
outpaced average contract wage raises in the first three months of
the year, the report relays.

Annual inflation was 5.4% in March compared with 3.4% at the end
of last year, and is expected to accelerate further in following
months, the report notes.

"Among the most important determinants of consumption, only job
creation remains supportive, with the unemployment rate still
decreasing," Bank of America Merrill Lynch's chief Mexico
economist Carlos Capistran said in a recent report, the WSJ
discloses.  "But, in our view, that also will decelerate and be
insufficient to sustain consumption growth above 3%," the report

The number of workers registered at the Mexican Social Security
Institute -- a measure of formal private-sector employment -- rose
by 140,000 in March to 19 million, and was up 4.6% from a year
earlier, according to the Labor Ministry, the report relays.  A
separate survey published by the statistics institute showed
factory employment up 3.6% in February from a year before, with
solid gains in manufacturing of transport equipment and computers,
the report notes.


VENEZUELA: Riots, Looting Claim a Dozen Lives
Kejal Vyas at The Wall Street Journal reports that a dozen people
were killed in a string of riots and looting in Venezuela's
capital overnight as antigovernment demonstrations led to clashes
between protesters and state security forces, authorities said.

The attorney general's office said it was investigating 11 deaths
from accidental electrocution and gunshots and in the western
Caracas district of El Valle, a working-class enclave and
traditional stronghold of the ruling Socialist Party, according to
WSJ.  Another demonstrator was shot to death in the east Caracas
slum of Petare, that district's mayor said, the report notes.

Eight of those killed were electrocuted by an exposed power cable
while attempting to steal a refrigerator from a bakery,
authorities said, the report relays.  More than a dozen other
businesses were also looted of everything from liquor to meat to
television sets, the report notes.

Not including the men who died from electrocution, the latest bout
of violence brings to 12 the number of people killed during three
weeks of protests seeking an end to 18 years of Socialist Party
rule and elections to replace President Nicolas Maduro, who has
overseen the country's deepest economic crisis in its history, the
report discloses.

Mr. Maduro's detractors have planned more protests in the coming
days, including a silent march to honor those killed to keep the
pressure on the president's increasingly authoritarian rule, the
report relays.

For more than five hours beginning, Venezuelans bombarded social
media with videos of National Guardsmen firing tear gas from
armored vehicles into working class neighborhoods where hooded
protesters had blocked roads with trash and burning tires, the
report discloses.

The report relays that the growing unrest in the barrios that
surround Caracas and other major cities could be a major problem
for Mr. Maduro, as the poor have long been the bedrock of the
government's support.  Until now, most of the unrest has been
limited to lower-middle-class enclaves, the report notes.  But
that could change.

Residents in the videos could be heard screaming and banging on
pots, a common form of protest here called a cacerolazo, ther
eport says.

Faced with crippling shortages of food and medicine, polls show
80% of the country wants Mr. Maduro out of office, and the leftist
leader's support has also withered among the two-thirds of
Venezuelans who live in slums, the report notes.

But Mr. Maduro has scuttled efforts for a recall referendum and
has indefinitely postponed elections that his detractors have
called for, holding on to power with help of the military and
armed paramilitary forces on motorbikes, the report relays.  The
opposition has blamed the latter for a series of deaths during the
protests, the report discloses.

Amid the civil unrest, Socialist Party leader Freddy Bernal tried
to calm the country through a video address broadcast on Twitter
in which he accused the opposition of generating the violence, the
report notes.

"They're trying to make it seem as if we're in a civil war," Mr.
Bernal said, alleging a coup plot led by his opponents and the
U.S. government.  "It's the same manual they used in Libya, Syria,
Iraq. Everyone, remain calm.  Sleep tight. President Nicolas
Maduro is still in charge."

But with the government using the armed forces to crush nationwide
demonstrations, opposition lawmaker Julio Borges said only one
side has the weapons and is to blame for the violence, the report

"This government calls out its people, arms them and then says
they're not the authors of the violence," Mr. Borges said.  "The
author of the violence has one name: Nicolas Maduro," he added.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 28, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 17 to April 21, 2017

Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        68                  BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        67.75               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   4.54     52.63  10/25/2041   PA    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   6        63.5   10/25/2041   PA    USD
Dolomite Capital Ltd     13.26     67.2   12/20/2019   CN    ZAR
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
ESFG International Ltd    5.75      0.66               KY    EUR
General Shopping Financ  10        72.5                KY    USD
General Shopping Financ  10        71.7                KY    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63                  BR    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63.88               BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.16   4/25/2019   HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.26   4/25/2019   HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman I   3.88     58.01   2/7/2035    KY    EUR
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Noble Holding Internati   5.25     72.98   3/15/2042   KY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     39      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     38      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     48.5    6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     47.25   6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49                  KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.29   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.12     48.2    6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     46.15   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        57.02   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.12     53.51   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.25     70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.47   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     45.92   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.1      47.82   6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49.25               KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.39   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.77   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.2      70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        56.85   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.1      52.99   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      39.64  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      36.44  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      38.79  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      38.75  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.19   2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      9      58.28  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      6      40.32   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     50.15   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.22  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.37     37.39   4/12/2027   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5      37.1    4/12/2037   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        41.25  10/28/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        40.01   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9        58.11  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.13  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.2    2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     49.94   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6      60      3/30/2022   AE    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         5.8      49.75   1/30/2018   NO    NOK
Siem Offshore Inc         5.59     50.25   3/28/2019   NO    NOK
STB Finance Cayman Ltd    2.04     58.35               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.36     50.93   9/25/2036   KY    USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesor   5.25     68.02  12/29/2021   UY    UYU
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     67.5   11/9/2019    BR    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     65.75  11/9/2019    BR    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     48.75   5/7/2028    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9        51.75   5/7/2023    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.37     49      1/13/2034   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        71.88  12/1/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     52      9/15/2027   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.65     46.38   4/21/2025   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.75     61.75  10/13/2019   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.95     58.13   8/5/2031    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6        53.75  12/9/2020    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  12.75     67      8/23/2022   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        44      3/31/2038   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6.5      36.53  12/29/2036   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   8.25     47.75  10/13/2024   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.75     57.75  10/21/2026   VE    USD
Venezuela Government TI    5.25    69.59   3/21/2019   VE    USD


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                   * * * End of Transmission * * *