TCRLA_Public/170505.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Friday, May 5, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 89


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

COMPANIA DE SEGUROS: Moody's Withdraws B2 IFS Rating


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Down Interest Rates Won't Hike Investments, Moody's Says
SBM BALEIA: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on 2017 Sr. Secured Notes


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ARDMORE INTERNATIONAL: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
CATALUNA INC: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
GINKGO GLOBAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
GINKGO INTERNATIONAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
GOLD RAIN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 8

GREAT OAK: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 8
GREY K ENVIRONMENTAL: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report on May 4
MACAPI INVESTMENTS: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
MOON MELLON: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 8
RADIN GLOBAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 12

ROSEMONT OFFSHORE: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
SUNNY INTERNATIONAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Ministry Announces 20% Minimum Wage Hike


E L  S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: Fitch Raises Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'CCC'
SEGUROS E INVERSIONES: Fitch Cuts International IFS Rating to B-


J A M A I C A

UC RUSAL: Chairman Resigns


M E X I C O

UNIFIN FINANCIERA: S&P Rates Proposed $500MM Sr. Notes 'BB'


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Declares Bankruptcy Under PROMESA
PUERTO RICO: PROMESA Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
PUERTO RICO: Pending Litigation vs Commonwealth & Oversight Board


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Gets Favored US Court Ruling in Oil Expropriation Case


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


COMPANIA DE SEGUROS: Moody's Withdraws B2 IFS Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. has
withdrawn the B2 with stable outlook global local currency
insurance financial strength (IFS) rating and the A3.bo with
negative outlook Bolivia national scale IFS ratings of Compania de
Seguros y Reaseguros Fortaleza S.A.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: Down Interest Rates Won't Hike Investments, Moody's Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brazilian non-financial companies exhibiting large exposures to
debt denominated in reais will benefit most from declining
interest rates, but overall investment will remain stalled,
Moody's Investors Service says in a new report. Their overall
interest expense will be reduced and allow them to access lower
cost debt in the domestic market over time.

The reduction in interest rates will help alleviate some companies
liquidity, which would facilitate a reduction in cost of debt or
even absolute debt. However, corporate investments will remain
limited through 2018.

"A robust improvement in credit quality will depend largely on
sustained recovery in demand. Moody's expects this combination of
deleveraging with very gradual recovery in demand to prevent any
sustained expansion in corporate investment during 2017-18,"
Barbara Mattos, a Moody's Vice President and Senior Credit Officer
says.

The report "Non-Financial Companies -- Brazil: Resumption of
Investments Will Lag Interest-Rate Decline," says companies with
large components denominated in Brazilian reais and debt indexed
to SELIC/CDI, the local interbank deposit certificate will benefit
most and would all experience an advantage in the short term from
a drop in interest rates.

Additionally, any reduction in interest rates will extend to the
individual consumers as high household debt levels gradually
decline, freeing up spending for retail and services. More
disposable income will benefit first low-ticket and non-
discretionary items, while credit-dependent purchases such as
houses, vehicles, air tickets and durable goods would pick up in a
second moment. As well, stronger demand for durable goods,
vehicles and construction will eventually offer knock-on benefits
for steelmakers and for producers of capital goods.

Meanwhile, larger commodity exporters with debt tied to the dollar
and revenues dependent on global market dynamics will not
experience any immediate benefit from lower interest rates.
Besides, most of the large exporters rely on diversified funding
sources for capital spending.


SBM BALEIA: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on 2017 Sr. Secured Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms SBM Baleia Azul, S.a.r.l.'s senior secured
notes as follows:

-- Series 2012-1 senior secured notes due 2027 at 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.

The notes are backed by the flows related to the charter agreement
signed with Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) for the use of
the floating production storage and offloading unit (FPSO) Cidade
de Anchieta for a term of 18 years. SBM do Brasil Ltda. (SBM
Brasil), the Brazilian subsidiary of SBM Holding Inc. S.A. (SBM),
is the operator of the FPSO. SBM is the sponsor of the
transaction. The FPSO Cidade de Anchieta began operating at the
Baleia Azul oil field in September 2012.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Supply and Demand Fundamentals:
While oil prices have rebounded from the lows of early 2016,
prices remain more than 50% below 2015. As a response to this
macro environment, energy companies have continued to cut
expenses. The growth and stability of the FPSO market is more
robust than other floating facilities for many reasons; they
usually require less capex; can be brought on production quicker
(even as a full-scale conversion), with attendant cash flow
benefits and have the possibility for relocation from one
comparable field to another.

Linkage to Petrobras Credit Quality:
The off-taker's credit quality is a key risk factor for
determining the strength of the off-taker's payment obligation. On
Jan. 26, 2017, Fitch affirmed Petrobras' Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating (LT IDR) at 'BB'/Outlook Negative. Petrobras' ratings
continue to reflect its close linkage with the sovereign rating of
Brazil due to the government's control of the company and its
strategic importance to Brazil as its near-monopoly supplier of
liquid fuels.

Strength of Off-taker Obligation:
Fitch's view on the strength of the off-taker's payment obligation
is typically notched from the off-taker's IDR, and will act as the
ultimate rating cap to the transaction. Fitch's qualitative
assessment of asset/contract/operator characteristics and the off-
taker's/industry's characteristics related to this transaction
would ultimately cap the transaction at Petrobras' LT IDR.

Credit Quality of the Operator/Sponsor:
SBM Offshore N.V. is the ultimate parent to SBM Holding Inc. S.A.,
main sponsor of the transaction. The transaction benefits from SBM
Offshore N.V.'s solid revenue growth, global leadership in leasing
FPSOs and overall strong operational performance of its fleet.

Performance of the Asset:
Asset performance is in line with expectations, tied to
characteristics of the contract including fixed rates, which
provide for cash flow stability. Average uptime levels have been
consistently stable, at 97.6% on average during the last 12 months
(as of March 2017); the latter compares favourably to the 95%
average in 2015. Average economic uptime levels, considering gas
production and water injection with bonus days, have averaged
106%, materially higher than Fitch's base case assumption,
including bonus, of 98.5%.

Available Liquidity:
The transaction benefits from a $26 million (LoCs provided by ABN
Amro, rated 'A+'/Outlook Stable) debt service reserve account
(DSRA) equivalent to the following two quarterly payments of
principal and interest. As of March 2017, net debt balance closed
at approximately $393.95 million.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating may be sensitive to changes in the credit quality of
Petrobras as charter offtaker and any deterioration in the credit
quality of SBM as operator and sponsor. In addition, the
transaction's rating is sensitive to the operating performance of
the FPSO Cidade de Anchieta.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third-party due diligence was provided to or reviewed by Fitch
in relation to this rating action.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ARDMORE INTERNATIONAL: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Ardmore International Fund SPC, Ltd. received
on May 1, 2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Simon Conway
          c/o Kadie Prospere
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 914 8745
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237


CATALUNA INC: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Cataluna Inc. received on May 3, 3017, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Peter Goulden
          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


GINKGO GLOBAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
----------------------------------------------------
The members of Ginkgo Global Master Fund will hold their final
meeting on May 11, 2017, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


GINKGO INTERNATIONAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
-----------------------------------------------------------
The members of Ginkgo International Feeder Fund will hold their
final meeting on May 11, 2017, to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


GOLD RAIN: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 8
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Gold Rain Limited will hear on June 8, 2017, at
8:45 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          Elgin Court, 2nd Floor
          Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY1-1106
          Telephone: (345) 945 3466
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


GREAT OAK: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 8
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Great Oak Ltd. will hold their final meeting
on June 8, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          Elgin Court, 2nd Floor
          Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY1-1106
          Telephone: (345) 945 3466
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


GREY K ENVIRONMENTAL: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report on May 4
------------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Grey K Environmental Offshore Fund III, Ltd.
will hear on May 4, 2017, at 11:00 a.m., the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          RNK Capital LLC
          c/o Justin Savage
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


MACAPI INVESTMENTS: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
---------------------------------------------------------
The members of Macapi Investments will hold their final meeting on
May 11, 2017, to receive the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


MOON MELLON: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on June 8
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Moon Mellon Limited will hear on June 8, 2017,
at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          Elgin Court, 2nd Floor
          Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands KY1-1106
          Telephone: (345) 945 3466
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


RADIN GLOBAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 12
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Radin Global Opportunities General Partner
Ltd. will hold their final meeting on May 12, 2017, at 11:00 a.m.,
to receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Tian Peralto
          Harneys Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          Harbour Place, 4th Floor
          103 South Church Street
          P.O. Box 10240 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 - 8599


ROSEMONT OFFSHORE: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Rosemont Offshore Fund, Ltd. received on May 1,
2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Simon Conway
          c/o Kadie Prospere
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 914 8745
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237


SUNNY INTERNATIONAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
----------------------------------------------------------
The members of Sunny International Investment Company will hold
their final meeting on May 11, 2017, to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Ministry Announces 20% Minimum Wage Hike
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic Labor Minister
Jose Ramon Fadul disclosed a 20% increase on the minimum wage, to
be divided into two parts: 13% to take effect this month and the
remaining 7% starting November.

The National Wages Committee had approved the 20% salary increase
at the end of March, but management had challenged the decision
taken during the tripartite negotiation, according to Dominican
Today.

Prior to the talks the Labor Minister had authorized a definitive
increase for the workers, the report notes.

Starting in May, the approved increase takes salaries in small
companies to RD$8,862.59; medium-sized to RD$10,000, and
RD$14,546.49 for large ones, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
1, 2017, RJR News said that Dominican Republic Industries
Association has described the 20 per cent increase in the minimum
wage as excessive, saying it will lead to layoffs.  The AIRD has
demanded an industrial reclassification since 2004, to establish a
salary according to a company's sales volume and number of
workers, according to RJR News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.



====================
E L  S A L V A D O R
=====================


EL SALVADOR: Fitch Raises Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded El Salvador's Long-Term Local Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'RD' (Restricted
Default). The Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR is affirmed at 'CCC'.
The issue ratings on El Salvador's senior unsecured Foreign
Currency bonds are affirmed to 'CCC'. The Long-Term Local and
Foreign Currency IDRs do not have an Outlook. The Country Ceiling
is affirmed at 'B-', and the Short-Term Local and Foreign Currency
IDRs are affirmed at 'C'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of El Salvador's Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'CCC'
reflects the following key rating drivers:

On April 28, 2017, the government made interest payments on
Certificados de Inversion Previsional (CIPs) debt to the local
private pension funds issued under domestic law after obtaining
authorization from the Congress the prior week. In line with its
criteria, Fitch therefore judges El Salvador to have cured the
default on its sovereign obligations. The default followed a
prolonged period of congressional gridlock that severely limited
the government's financing options and hindered meaningful fiscal
measures to arrest the deterioration of public finances.

The Long-Term FC and LC 'CCC' IDRs reflect that the continued high
political polarization could make it difficult for the government
to secure approval for additional long-term external borrowing
that is needed to bridge the financing needs for 2017-2018,
highlighting the continued risks for default. Furthermore, CIPs
payments are due in July and October of this year, which will
require budget reallocations.

The government issued USD601 million in February only half of its
estimated USD1.2 billion financing needs for 2017. The government
could continue building the stock of Letes (short-term
instruments) during the year, increase arrears and make ad hoc
spending adjustments to the budget. However, this does not
sustainably reduce risks around meeting the financing needs in a
credible manner. A two-thirds majority in congress is needed to
secure approval for long-term borrowing, which has been difficult
to achieve given strong opposition from the main opposition party,
Arena.

El Salvador's ratings reflect the sovereign's severe financing
constraints and lack of progress on reforms to arrest the
deterioration of public finances as a result of extreme political
polarization and gridlock. Fitch expects El Salvador's continued
fiscal deficits and low growth prospects to keep the general
government debt, 60.9% of GDP in 2016, on an upward trajectory
during 2017-2018. El Salvador's macroeconomic stability
underpinned by dollarization and its relatively sound banking
system are credit strengths. El Salvador has higher income per
capita, social development, and governance indicators than peers.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns El Salvador a score equivalent to
a rating of 'B' on the Long-Term FC IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final Long-Term FC IDR by applying its QO,
relative to rated peers, as follows:

-- Structural: -1 notch to reflect the extreme political
polarization with prolonged periods of Congressional deadlock that
have led to severe financing constraints and prevented meaningful
progress on reforms to arrest the deterioration of public
finances.

-- Public Finances: -1 notch to reflect El Salvador government's
significant reliance on short-term debt to meet its substantial
financing needs, and the difficulty of obtaining authorization for
external debt issuance. A narrow revenue base and a rigid spending
profile makes fiscal consolidation challenging.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a Long-Term FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within Fitch
criterias that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
a negative rating action are:

-- Concern about El Salvador's ability to service debt due to
hardening financing constraints in domestic or international
markets;

-- Signs of weakening willingness to service debt due to failure
to reallocate budget spending or break the political impasse
regarding financing.

Future developments that could, individually or collectively,
result in a positive rating action include:

-- An easing of political tensions that improves financing
    flexibility;

-- Fiscal adjustment (including a possible IMF agreement) that
    improves prospects for debt stabilization.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- The agency assumes that U.S. economic growth continues to
    support economic and external forecasts. Furthermore, oil
    prices rise only gradually to USD52.5 per barrel in 2017 and
    USD55 per barrel in 2018, helping contain imports, utility
    subsidies and consumer prices.

-- Fitch assumes that monetary policy normalisation in the US
    proceeds in a gradual and orderly manner.


SEGUROS E INVERSIONES: Fitch Cuts International IFS Rating to B-
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Seguros e Inversiones S.A. y Filial's
(SISA) and SISA Vida S.A., Seguros de Personas' (SISA Vida)
International Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating to 'B-' from
'BB-'. Simultaneously, Fitch has withdrawn the IFS ratings for
both entities for commercial reasons. The entities decided not
continue with the IFS rating for both entities, but will continue
rated on a national scale.

The rating actions on SISA and SISA Vida reflect the downgrade of
El Salvador's Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
to 'RD' from 'B', Long Term IDR to 'CCC' from 'B' and Country
Ceiling to to 'B-' from 'BB-'.

EUR150m Signum Finance II plc BTPei GSI inflation linked CLN 2041
(ISIN: XS0659372980), downgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
Stable



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


UC RUSAL: Chairman Resigns
--------------------------
RJR News reports that Russian billionaire Viktor Vekselberg who
has resigned as chairman of UC Rusal, which has mining operations
in Jamaica says bad management has brought on a debt crisis to the
company which is the world's largest aluminum producer.

Mr. Vekselberg, who has an indirect stake in Rusal, clashed with
the company on strategic development issues and human resources
policies, according to RJR News.

He resigned.

In a statement, Mr. Vekselberg noted that Rusal is facing a deep
crisis and has deteriorated from an international aluminium leader
into a company overburdened with debt and entangled in numerous
lawsuits and social conflicts, the report notes.

UC Rusal operates the bauxite and alumina production plant,
WINDALCO.

Meanwhile, U.C. Rusal has released operating results for the first
quarter of 2017 showing that aluminum production numbers were down
slightly, the report relays.

Bauxite production recorded a marginal increase, the report notes.

UC Rusal's smelters ran at a 95% utilization rate and turned out
910,000 metric tons of primary aluminum in the quarter, off by 2.1
per cent from the previous quarter, the report says.

UC Rusal produced 2,869 metric tons of  bauxite ore during the
three months, which was a one per cent increase over the prior
quarter.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Jan. 23,
2017, Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based aluminum company
United Company RUSAL a Long-Term Issuer Default Rating of 'B+' and
a Short-term IDR of 'B'.  The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is
Stable.  Fitch has also assigned an expected senior unsecured
rating of 'B+(EXP) and Recovery Rating 'RR4' to Rusal Capital
D.A.C.'s planned notes issue.  The ratings for Rusal's 100%-owned
subsidiary, Russia-based OJSC Rusal Bratsk (Bratsk), have also
been affirmed at Long-Term IDR 'B+' with Stable Outlook.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


UNIFIN FINANCIERA: S&P Rates Proposed $500MM Sr. Notes 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB' issue-level rating to Unifin
Financiera, S.A.B. de C.V. SOFOM, E.N.R. (Unifin; global scale:
BB/Stable/--; national scale: mxA/Stable/mxA-2) proposed senior
unsecured notes for up to $500 million due 2024 with a fixed rate.

S&P's 'BB' rating on the proposed notes is at the same level as
the issuer credit rating.  The debt rating reflects the firm's
secured debt that represented less than 15% of adjusted assets as
of March 31, 2017, and its unencumbered assets completely covered
unsecured debt.  Furthermore, the rating indicates that the notes
will rank equally in right of payment with all of Unifin's
existing and future senior unsecured notes.  The issuance will
have a full cross currency swap to hedge against currency exchange
fluctuations.  The derivative will cover the complete notes'
amount during the time of the issuance.  The lender will primarily
use the proceeds of this issuance to pay market debt, repay short-
term debt under the other existing credit facilities, and for
general corporate purposes.  As a result, S&P don't foresee a
significant increase in total debt, and this issuance will help to
extend Unifin's maturity profile.

Unifin's funding assessment reflects a diversified funding
structure compared with those of the Mexican industry and other
fincos we rate.  Funding sources are diversified among
securitizations, loans from commercial and development banks, and
domestic/international market debt. Incorporating the new issuance
in the funding structure, the funding mix will be 41% global
issuances will account for 41%, followed by banking debt (30%),
and securitizations (29%).  Debt will increase by around MXN750
million, which in S&P's view is a modest rise.

S&P believes that Unifin's liquidity is sufficient to fund daily
operations and that the lender has the ability to raise liquidity
if needed.  S&P's cash flow analysis (base-case and stress
scenarios) remains positive, and S&P expects the firm to operate
without access to market funding for more than 12 months and to
cover its funding needs on a monthly basis.

S&P's ratings on Unifin reflect its stable and growing operating
revenue base as well as a diversified loan portfolio by sectors.
Moreover, the ratings incorporate S&P's forecasted risk-adjusted
capital ratio of 8.4% for the next 18 months, a risk position that
reflects a slight increase in the firm's nonperforming assets, and
subpar reserve coverage.  The stand-alone credit profile on Unifin
remains 'bb'.

RATINGS LIST

Unifin Financiera, S.A.B. de C.V. SOFOM, E.N.R.
  Issuer credit rating
   Global scale                             BB/Stable/--
   National scale                           mxA/Stable/mxA-2

Rating Assigned

Unifin Financiera, S.A.B. de C.V. SOFOM, E.N.R.
  Senior unsecured                          BB



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Declares Bankruptcy Under PROMESA
----------------------------------------------
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in the U.S. District Court in Puerto
Rico on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of last year's
U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").

Puerto Rico is barred from a traditional municipal bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. code.

                          PROMESA

On June 30, 2016, President Barack Obama signed PROMESA into law.
Starting immediately upon enactment, PROMESA imposed an automatic
stay on all litigation against Puerto Rico and its
instrumentalities, as well as any other judicial or administrative
actions or proceedings to enforce or collect claims against the
government.  This stay initially was effective until Feb. 15,
2017, but was extended by the Oversight Board until May 1, 2017.

PROMESA also created the Oversight Board with the stated purpose
of "provid[ing] a method for a covered territory to achieve fiscal
responsibility and access to the capital markets" and established
Title III and Title VI to provide a restructuring process for
Puerto Rico given the prior absence of access to the Bankruptcy
Code.

                         $74 Billion Owed

The Commonwealth and its instrumentalities owe approximately $74
billion in the aggregate.  Of that amount, $13.3 billion is on
account of general obligation bonds issued by the Commonwealth and
another $4.5 billion reflects debt guaranteed by the Commonwealth,
all of which is backed by the Commonwealth's full faith and
credit. Further, there is approximately $17.6 billion of notes
issued by Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) and
backed by a sales and use tax.  The amounts owed by other covered
entities are equally staggering: (i) Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA) has approximately $9 billion of debt; (ii)
Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) has
approximately $4.1 billion of debt; (iii) Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority (PRASA) has approximately $4.6 billion of debt;
(iv) Government Development Bank (GDB) has approximately $4.1
billion of debt; (v) Employees' Retirement System ("ERS") has
approximately $3.2 billion of debt; (vi) PR Infrastructure Finance
Authority ("PRIFA") has approximately $2.2 billion of debt; (vii)
Children's Trust has approximately $1.5 billion of debt; and
(viii) Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation ("PFC") has
approximately $1.2 billion of debt.

The total public sector debt figure does not account for the $49
billion of pension liabilities, only approximately 1.57% of which
were funded as of June 30, 2015.

              Current State of Puerto Rican Economy

"In PROMESA, Congress recognizes the crisis in the Commonwealth
and its instrumentalities, and explains the fiscal emergency that
renders the Commonwealth unable to provide its citizens effective
services, while suffering the outmigration of residents and
businesses. Congress points to lack of financial transparency,
excessive borrowing, management inefficiencies, and a severe
economic decline as having created the crisis.  The fiscal
distress Congress declared is about to worsen exponentially due to
the elimination of approximately $850 million in Affordable Care
Act funds in fiscal year 2018 and increasing substantially
year-over-year, and the exhaustion of all public pension funding,
the shortfall of which could cost the Commonwealth approximately
$1.5 billion per year.  Negative economic growth has persisted for
nine of the last ten years along with population diminution
highlighted by exiting young doctors and other professionals.
From current revenues, the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities
cannot satisfy their collective $74 billion debt burden and $49
billion pension burden and pay their operating expenses.  Before
Congress enacted PROMESA, the Obama Administration and a dozen
United States Senators concluded Puerto Rico faced a "humanitarian
crisis."  Furthermore, the Commonwealth, across different
Administrations, has declared a state of fiscal emergency and that
it lacks sufficient resources to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the people of Puerto Rico.  And just last week, the
Commonwealth enacted the "Fiscal Plan Compliance Law," which
declares that the island faces a "fiscal and socioeconomic crisis
without precedent" in its history," Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq.,
at Proskauer Rose LLP, serving as attorney for the Oversight
Board, explains.

According to Mr. Biennestock, the numbers are staggeringly grim:

   * GNP Decline since 2007: from 2007-2016, Puerto Rico's Gross
National Product ("GNP") declined by over 14%,11 while total
employment in Puerto Rico fell from 1.25 million to fewer than 1
million;

   * Unemployment Rate: In October 2016, Puerto Rico's
unemployment rate was 12.1%, and only 987,606 persons were
employed, down 23% from 1,277,559 employed persons in December
2006;

   * Labor Participation Rate: the labor participation rate has
plummeted to 40%, two-thirds of the level on the U.S. mainland;14

   * Drop in Economic Activity Index: the Economic Activity Index
composed of four factors (payroll employment, electric power
generation, cement sales, and gasoline consumption) fell from
160.0 to 124.1 between August 2005 and August 2016;

   * Population Decline: since 2007, Puerto Rico's population has
declined approximately 10% down to less than 3.41 million people
in 2016;

   * Poverty and Unemployment: according to the U.S. Census
Bureau's 2015 community survey, 46.1% of Puerto Rico's residents
live below the federal poverty level compared to the national
average of 14.7%, and 36% of the residents of Detroit, whose
financial distress was viewed by many as uniquely devastating.
Puerto Rico's is more so.  For Puerto Rico children under age 5,
63.7% live under the federal poverty level, compared to the
national average of 22.8%. Median household income in Puerto Rico
was $18,626 in 2015, as compared to $56,515 in the United States,
and to $27,862 in Detroit in 2011; and

   * Public Debt as a Percentage of Income: Puerto Rico has
approximately $74 billion of bond debt and $48 billion of unfunded
pension liabilities.  As of 2012, Puerto Rico's public debt as a
percentage of aggregate income was 100.7%, as compared to 29% for
New York, which has the highest ratio of public debt to income in
the United States (the average is 16.8%).

"Compounding matters is that these grim economic conditions will
continue to spur outmigration, which will in turn reduce
production and demand for goods and services and thus drive
further economic contraction.  A bleak spiral has begun," Mr.
Bienenstock said in the court filing.

All the while, Puerto Rico has been financing its fiscal deficits
by issuing debt.  The total public sector debt for Puerto Rico
stands at approximately $74 billion.  Total pension liabilities of
Puerto Rico's three principal retirement systems as of June 30,
2015 were $49.562 billion and were only approximately 1.57% funded
at such date.  These three main retirement systems are projected
to deplete their liquid assets between July and December of 2017.
The result is that Puerto Rico can no longer fully pay its debt
and pay for government services.  Nor can Puerto Rico refinance
its debt-it no longer has access to the capital markets. In short,
Puerto Rico's crisis has reached a breaking point.

               Puerto Rico And Its Instrumentalities

Governmental responsibilities assumed by the central government of
the Commonwealth are similar in nature to those of the various
state governments with their focus on the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens (including, among others, education,
public health and welfare programs, and economic development).
Unlike the states, however, the central government also assumes
responsibility for local police and fire protection.

There are also many governmental and quasi-governmental functions
performed by public corporations created by the Legislative
Assembly with varying degrees of independence from the central
government. Public corporations may obtain revenues from rates
charged for services or products, but many also receive sizable
subsidies from the central government to fund operations. Most
public corporations are governed by boards whose members are
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the
Puerto Rico Senate.

Some of the Commonwealth's principal public corporations are:

   * Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) --
created to assume responsibility for the construction and
maintenance of roads and highways and related transportation
facilities in Puerto Rico;

   * Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) -- supplies
substantially all the electricity consumed in the Commonwealth and
owns all transmission and distribution facilities and most of the
generating facilities that constitute Puerto Rico's electric power
system;

   * Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) -- owns and
operates Puerto Rico's public water supply and wastewater systems;

   * Government Development Bank (GDB) -- historically, served as
(i) fiscal agent, financial advisor, and reporting agent for the
Commonwealth, its instrumentalities, and municipalities, (ii) an
important source of financing for various Commonwealth entities,
and (iii) the principal depository of the funds of the
Commonwealth entities;

   * Puerto Rico Health Insurance Administration (PRHIA) --
created to negotiate and contract for the provision of
comprehensive health insurance coverage for qualifying (generally
low income) Puerto Rico residents;

   * Puerto Rico Medical Services Administration (PRMSA) --
operates and administers certain centralized health services;

   * University of Puerto Rico (UPR) -- the only public university
in Puerto Rico;

   * Puerto Rico Integrated Transit Authority (PRITA) -- created
to integrate the mass transit services currently provided by HTA,
MTA, and MBA;

   * Puerto Rico and Municipal Island Maritime Transport Authority
(MTA) -- operates ferry services between the Municipalities of San
Juan and Cata§o, and Fajardo, Vieques, and Culebra;

   * Metropolitan Bus Authority (MBA) -- operates bus and
paratransit services within Puerto Rico's metropolitan area;

   * Puerto Rico Public Buildings Authority (PBA) -- created to
design, construct, administer, and provide maintenance to office
buildings, courts, warehouses, schools, health care facilities,
welfare facilities, shops, and related facilities leased to the
Commonwealth or any of its departments, agencies,
instrumentalities, or municipalities;

   * Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA) -- owns the major airport
and seaport facilities in Puerto Rico;

   * Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) --
created to promote economic development by stimulating the
formation of new local firms and encouraging firms in the United
States and foreign countries to establish and expand their
Operations in Puerto Rico;

   * Puerto Rico Tourism Company (PRTC) -- responsible for
stimulating, promoting, and regulating the development of Puerto
Rico's tourism industry;

   * Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority (PRIFA) --
created to provide financial, administrative, consulting,
technical, advisory, and other types of assistance to other
public corporations, governmental instrumentalities, political
subdivisions, and municipalities authorized to develop
infrastructure facilities and to establish alternate
means for financing those facilities;

   * Agricultural Enterprises Development Administration (ADEA) --
created to provide a wide array of services and incentives to the
agricultural sector;

   * Puerto Rico Housing Finance Authority (PRHFA) -- created to
provide public and private housing developers with interim and
permanent financing through mortgage loans for the construction,
improvement, operation, and maintenance of rental housing for low
and moderate-income families;

   * Puerto Rico Tourism Development Fund (TDF) -- created to
facilitate the development of Puerto Rico's hotel industry by
working with private-sector financial institutions in structuring
financings for new hotel projects and hospitality related
projects;

   * Puerto Rico Development Fund -- established to provide an
alternate source of financing to private enterprises;

   * Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation (PFC) --  established
to provide agencies and instrumentalities of the Commonwealth with
alternate means of meeting their financing requirements;

   * State Insurance Fund (SIF) -- in charge of managing and
regulating the Commonwealth workers' insurance system that covers
occupational injuries, diseases, and deaths, to which all
employers must be subscribed under law; and

   * Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) --
created, among other things, to raise money for the Commonwealth
in exchange for the Commonwealth's transfer to COFINA of certain
sales and use taxes.

                   Puerto Rico's Fiscal Crisis

The widespread impact of Puerto Rico's fiscal crisis and the
crisis itself can be traced to events occurring over the past
century.  Flaws in Puerto Rico's governance and fiscal controls
have combined to create the financial problems the Commonwealth
faces today.  Some of the major institutional problems that led to
the widespread impact or to the fiscal crisis are identified
below:

   * A 1917 Law Authorizes Puerto Rico to Issue "Triple Tax Free"
Bonds -- in 1917, Congress passed the Jones-Shafroth Act (Pub. L.
64-368, 39 Stat. 951). Section 3 of the Act barred federal, state
and local governments from taxing any bonds issued by Puerto Rico
or its municipalities. 39 Stat. 951, 953 (codified as amended at
Sec. 48 U.S.C.  745).  The "triple tax free" status of Puerto
Rico's bonds caused them to become extremely attractive to U.S.
investors;

   * A New Constitution Loosens Balanced Budget Restrictions in
1952 -- the Puerto Rico Constitution, approved on July 25, 1952,
altered the balanced budget provision by encompassing non-revenue
resources, including federal assistance and funds obtained through
the sale of bonds. This amendment opened the door to recurring
operating deficits;

   * Public Debt Limits Were Revised to Near Irrelevance -- when
it was originally enacted, the Puerto Rico Constitution contained
a debt limit measured by a percentage of property value.  In 1961,
the constitution was amended such that the debt limit was now
measured by a percentage of revenue.  Notably, this revision
allowed for additional debt to be issued that didn't count towards
the debt limit;

   * Repeal of Section 936 Tax Credits -- in 1996, certain federal
legislation phased out tax benefits (over a 10-year period) for
income earned by Puerto Rico-based subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations. Once these tax credits were eliminated, many
capital-intensive businesses chose to relocate elsewhere;

   * Massive Pension Liabilities -- the Commonwealth had
recognized that even after reforms to reduce future benefits, the
Commonwealth and other participating employers would still need to
make additional contributions to maintain sufficient system assets
to make benefits payments when due.  But, all three principal
retirement systems for public employees in Puerto Rico are
severely underfunded as the Commonwealth and other employers did
not fund their contributions;

   * Poor Reporting and Management of Financial Information -- (i)
comprehensive annual reports are completed months late, (ii) for
years, the Commonwealth's budget was based on extremely optimistic
revenue projections that overestimated revenue by 15% annually,
(iii) the Office of Budget Management had no power to implement
spending cuts, and (iv) Puerto Rico struggles with tax collection,
often accepting less money than is owed in exchange for quick
payment in order to meet near-term cash shortfalls;

   * Understatement of Government's True Deficit -- the
government's accounting system, which relies on the Treasury's
General Fund accounts, greatly understates the government's true
deficit. In other words, the actual deficit facing the
Commonwealth is far greater than had previously been anticipated;

   * Collapse in Housing and Investment -- a fall in housing
prices reduced the ability to borrow, which led to less
investment;

   * Recession on the U.S. Mainland -- the Great Recession on the
U.S. mainland - Puerto Rico's largest trading partner and
investor - had a negative effect on the Commonwealth;

   * Bank Distress and Credit Crunch -- with the drop in real
estate values, commercial bank assets have fallen by 30% since
2005, and the FDIC had to intervene to backstop several banks;

   * Low Employment and High Labor Costs -- only 40% of the adult
population in Puerto Rico is employed or looking for work (as
opposed to 63% on the mainland);

   * Emigration and Population Loss -- Puerto Rico's population
declined for the first time in 2006 and has continued to fall to
approximately 3.5 million people today.  The loss of approximately
1% of the population each year decreases potential growth as the
labor force and consumer demand shrink;

   * Energy Costs -- energy costs are several times higher than on
the U.S. mainland.  PREPA produces and distributes electricity
using archaic oil-based facilities and technology;

   * Transport Costs -- Puerto Rico's import costs are at least
double those of neighboring island countries because of the
federal Jones Act of 1920;44 and

   * Barriers to Competition and Business Activity -- certain
local laws and regulations hamper business competition and
investment.

                         Fiscal Plan

To fulfill its mission of achieving for the Commonwealth fiscal
responsibility and market access, the Oversight Board evaluated
the macroeconomic framework underlying the fiscal plans proposed
by the Governor.

On Oct. 14, 2016, then-Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla presented
the Oversight Board with a fiscal plan that contemplated a budget
deficit of $4.8 billion for fiscal year 2017, after the
implementation of austerity measures and revenue enhancements, and
before allocating money for debt service.  But the Oversight Board
declined to certify the Governor's October 2016 fiscal plan
because, among other things, the Oversight Board was not satisfied
that appropriate measures were taken to rein in expenses, impose
discipline on the budget, or grow revenue.

On Jan. 2, 2017, the administration of newly elected Governor
Rossello Nevares took office.  Less than two months later, on
March 1, 2017, the Oversight Board confirmed receipt of a proposed
fiscal plan from the new administration.  Again, the Oversight
Board raised concerns regarding the proposed fiscal plan. After
reviewing the proposed fiscal plan with the Governor's
representatives and analyzing and deliberating over it with the
Oversight Board's members, economists, consultants, and attorneys,
the Oversight Board informed the Governor on March 9, 2017, that
the Oversight Board had determined the Governor's proposed fiscal
plan did not satisfy PROMESA's requirements.  The Oversight
Board identified violations and recommended revisions.

After the new administration complied with the requirements the
Oversight Board specified, the Oversight Board determined the
revised fiscal plan, with two amendments, would comply with the
requirements for certification. The Oversight Board voted to
certify the plan, as amended, on March 13, 2017.

The fiscal plan is built upon the two pillars of fiscal reform and
structural reform.  Fiscal reform measures are aimed at (1)
enhancing revenues, (2) right-sizing the government, (3) adjusting
healthcare spending, and (4) restructuring the pension system.
Structural reform measures are aimed at increasing economic growth
by (a) aiding business activity, (b) improving capital efficiency,
(c) implementing energy reforms, and (d) promoting economic
development.  Together, these reforms are projected to reduce the
ten-year financing gap by $39.6 billion and to achieve a surplus
of approximately $7.9 billion over ten years that will be
available for debt service.

                  No Consensual Deal Reached

From December 2016 through March 2017, the Oversight Board and the
Commonwealth held more than thirty meetings with creditor
representatives to better understand their perspectives.  On March
13, 2017, after almost six months and numerous internal and
external meetings between the Oversight Board and its advisors,
the Oversight Board certified an amended version of the current
Governor's fiscal plan.  Not happy with the result and the
projected level of debt service, creditors requested the
decertification of the current fiscal plan and the certification
of a new fiscal plan that would have exceeded the certified fiscal
plan's debt sustainability analysis.  The Oversight Board and the
Commonwealth convened mediation on April 13, 2017, to find common
ground and a consensual resolution.

As of the termination of the PROMESA stay, no consensual agreement
was reached.  Given the massive debt load to be addressed, as well
as the need to attain pension and operational reform in accordance
with the fiscal plan, it was determined that the best path forward
was to commence a Title III case to protect Puerto Rico and its
citizens.

Title III was especially compelled by the Commonwealth's need to
restructure $49 billion of pension liabilities because Congress
did not authorize pension restructurings in Title VI.  Utilizing
the tools provided by PROMESA, and with the benefit of the
automatic stay under Sections 362 and 922 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the Oversight Board and the Commonwealth will continue efforts to
negotiate, preferably through consensual deals with all
constituencies, a comprehensive debt restructuring through a Title
III plan of adjustment, which can incorporate all consensual
agreements reached (including those that could otherwise form a
qualifying Title VI modification).

                        About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States.  The chief of state is the President of the
United States of America.  The head of government is an elected
Governor.  There are two legislative chambers: the House of
Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats.  The
governor-elect is Ricardo Antonio "Ricky" Rossello Nevares, the
son of former governor Pedro Rossello.

In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other
things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and
imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the
government, which expired May 1, 2017.

The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii)
Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J.
Gonzalez, (v) Jose R. Gonz†lez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and
(vii) David A. Skeel Jr.

On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition
for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").  The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578.  A copy of Puerto
Rico's PROMESA petition is posted at

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/17-01578-00001.pdf

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq.,
at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders.

Paul Weiss is counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto Rico General
Obligation Bondholders.


PUERTO RICO: PROMESA Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
------------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

        c/o Financial Oversight and Management Board for
        Puerto Rico, as Representative of the Debtor
        Jacob Javits Federal Bldg.
        26 Federal Plaza
        Room 2-128, Attn: Jaime El Koury
        New York, NY 10278

Case No.: 17-01578

About the Debtor: Covered Territory as defined in the Puerto Rico
                  Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability
                  Act Section 5(7).  Puerto Rico is a self-
                  governing commonwealth in  association with the
                  United States.

                  In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA,
                  which, among other things, created the Financial
                  Oversight and Management Board and imposed an
                  automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the
                  government, which expired May 1, 2017.

                  The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has filed a
                  petition for relief under Title III of the
                  Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
                  Stability Act ("PROMESA").

                  Title III of PROMESA provides a means for a
                  covered territory (such as the Commonwealth)
                  that has encountered financial difficulty to
                  work with its creditors to adjust its debts.  To
                  that end, certain sections of the United States
                  Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101 et seq., are
                  incorporated and made applicable to cases under
                  title III of PROMESA.  During the Title III
                  Case, the Commonwealth will remain in possession
                  and control of its property, and will continue
                  to maintain its functions and provide services
                  for the benefit of the citizens of Puerto Rico.
                  The Commonwealth intends to propose a plan for
                  the adjustment of the Commonwealth's debts.

PROMESA Title III Petition Date: May 3, 2017

Court: United States District Court
       District of Puerto Rico
       150 Carlos Chardon Street
       San Juan, PR 00918-1767
       http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/

Judge: [To be designated]

Attorneys for the
Financial Oversight and
Management Board as
representative for the
Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico:              Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq.
                          Scott K. Rutsky, Esq.
                          Philip M. Abelson, Esq.
                          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
                          11 Times Square, New York NY 10036
                          Tel: (212) 969-3000
                          Fax: (212) 969-2900
                          E-mail: mbienenstock@proskauer.com
                                  srutsky@proskauer.com
                                  pabelson@proskauer.com

Co-Attorneys for the
Oversight Board:          Hermann D. Bauer, Esq.
                          O'NEILL & BORGES LLC
                          250 Munoz Rivera Ave., Suite 800
                          San Juan, PR 00918-1813
                          Tel: (787) 764-8181
                          Fax: (787) 753-8944
                          E-mail: hermann.bauer@oneillborges.com

Oversight Board's
Strategic Consultant:     MCKINSEY & CO.

Oversight Board's
Municipal Investment
Banker:                   CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS

Oversight Board's
Financial Advisor:        ERNST & YOUNG

Counsel to the
Puerto Rico Fiscal
Agency and Financial
Advisory Authority:       John J. Rapisardi, Esq.
                          Suzzanne Uhland, Esq.
                          Peter Friedman, Esq.
                          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
                          7 Times Square
                          New York, NY 10036
                          Tel: 212.326.2000
                          Fax: 212.326.2061
                          E-mail: jrapisardi@omm.com
                                  suhland@omm.com
                                  pfriedman@omm.com

Claims &
Noticing
Agent:                    PRIME CLERK LLC
                          https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Counsel to
ERS Bondholders:          JONES DAY

Counsel to Ad Hoc Group
of Puerto Rico General
Obligation Bondholders:   PAUL WEISS

The petition was signed by Jaime El Koury, general counsel.

List of Debtor's 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors:

   Entity                          Nature of Claim   Claim Amount
   ------                          ---------------   ------------
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico        Bond Trustee  $12,096,636,080
209 Munoz, Riveru Avenue
Hato Rey, PR 00918
Attn: Hector Rivera & Jorge Velez
Email: hrivera@bppr.com &
       Jorge.velez@popular.com

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers          Services       $212,302,479
Annex Building
Fundacion Angel Ramos
2nd Floor Suite 202
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Avenue #383
San Juan, Puerto Rico-00917
Fax: 787-729-6875
Email: Antilles.AO@usacc.army.mil

Total Petroleum Corps.                 Supplies       $11,506,512
PO Box 362916
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936-2916
Attn: Luis Llado
Fax: 787-783-0407
Email: Luis.Llado@tpprc.com

EVERTEC Inc.                           Services       $10,167,835
Carr. #176 k.m. 1.3 Cupey Bajo
Rio Piedras, PR 00926
Fax: 787-250-7356
Email: eserrano@evertecinc.com

Microsoft                              Services        $8,120,058
City View Plaza I Suite 107
#48 State Road 165 Km 1.2
Guaynabo, PR 00968
Attn: Jenny Rivera
Fax: 787-273-3634
Email: jerivera@microsoft.com

Baxter Sales & Distrib PR Corp.        Supplies        $6,974,075
P.O. Box 360002
San Juan, PR 00936-0002
Attn: Eric Ruiz Malave & John Almeida
Fax: 787-792-4646
Email: cric_ruiz@baxter.com
       pat_johnsen@baxter.com
One Baxter Park Way
Deerfield, Illinois 60015

Cesar Castillo Inc.                     Supplies       $6,008,917
PO Box 191149
San Juan, PR 00919-1149
Attn: Jose L. Castillo
Fax: 787-999-1613
Email: jgonzalez@cesarcastilo.com

IKON Solutions, Inc.                    Services       $5,857,040
270 Avenida Munoz Rivera PHI
San Juan, PR 00918
Attn: Pedro J. Latorre Negron
Fax: 787-620-0590
Email: pedro.latorre@ikonpr.com

Kirkland & Ellis LLP                    Services       $5,342,970
655 Fifteen Street, N.W.
Washington DC 20005
Attn: Travis Langenkamp &
      Michael F. Williams
Email: mwilliams@kirkland.com

MC&CS                                  Services        $3,998,904
428 Ave Escorial Caparra Hts
Vicjo San Juan, Puerto Rico 00926
Attn: Carlos Colon Medina
Fax: 787-774-1870
Email: carloscolon@mccspr.com
       ccolon@mccspr.com

Manpower                               Services        $3,236,683
268 Munoz Rivera Ave, Ground Floor
San Juan, PR 00918
Attn: Melissa Rivera
Fax: 787-767-7611
Email: melissa.rivera@manpower.com

COSALL                                 Services        $3,234,442
Carr 181 Km 2.0
Trujillo Alto, Puerto Rico 00976
Attn: Jorge 1, Valentin Asencio
Fax: 787-292-1211
Email: jorge.valentin@cosallpr.com
PO Box 1858
Trujillo Alto, P.R. 00977

Puerto Rico Telephone Company          Services       $3,200,935
1515 F.D. Roosevelt Avenue
Guaynabo, PR 00968
Attn: Enrique Ortiz de Montelano Rangel
Fax: 787-792-9830
Email: enrique.ortiz@claropr.com

Ediciones Santillana, Inc.             Supplies       $2,807,231
Avenida Roosvelt 1506
Guaynabo, PR 00968
Attn: Daniel Sanz & Obed Betancourt
Fax: 787-486-4826
Email: dsanz@santilluna.com
       ydejesus@santillana.com
       obetancourt@santillana.com

Corporacion de Servicios               Services       $2,517,577
Educativos de Yabucoa
Sector Juan Martin
Carretera #3 Km 93.7
Ruta 901
Yabucoa, PR 00767
Attn: Dr. Roque Diaz Tizol
Fax: 787-266-3881
Email: mmedia@cosey.org

Cardinal Health PR                    Supplies        $2,460,000
Centro Internacional de
Distribucion PR -165
Km 2.4 Edificio 10
Guaynabo, PR 00965
Attn: Deborah Weitzman @ Kaleny Nazario
Bartolomei
Fax: 787-625-4322
Email: kaleny.nazario@cardinalhealth.com
       deborah.weitzman@cardinalhealth.com
PO Box 366211
San Juan PR, 00936

Institucion Educativa NETS, LLC       Services        $2,439,180
84-11 70 Street, Sierra Bayamon
Bayamon, PR 00961
Attn: Nydia T. Rodriguez Lopez
Fax: 787-785-5564
Email: mrodriguez@netspr.com

Braxton School of Puerto Rico         Services        $2,153,106
K-2 Ave. San Patricio
Guaynabo, PR 00968
Attn: Angelina Sosa
Fax: 787-793-0495
Email: wmunoz@baraxtonpr.com
       academico@braxtonpr.com
       braxton.dp@gmail.com

Workforce Training and                Services         $2,063,354
Employment Center, Inc. (WOTEC)
Marginal 65 Infanteria #23
Urb. San Agustin
San Juan, PR 00925
Attn: Rosa J. Orama Ortiz
Fax: 787-815-0432
Email: info@wotecpr.org

Ediciones SM                          Supplies         $1,893,127
Barrio Palmas 776
Calle 7, Suite 2
Catano, PR 00962
Attn: Marisol Diaz
Fax: 787-625-9799
Email: marisol.diaz@primaspr.net
       consultas@sm-pr.com


PUERTO RICO: Pending Litigation vs Commonwealth & Oversight Board
-----------------------------------------------------------------
With approximately $74 billion of debt and insufficient resources
to satisfy it, there have been many lawsuits filed against the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (and in some instances, the Oversight
Board) before the filing of the Title III case.

   1. On Jan. 7, 2016, certain insurers of bonds issued by the
public corporations of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the
"Commonwealth") filed a complaint against the Commonwealth's
Governor, Secretary of Treasury, Sub-secretary of Treasury,
Secretary of Justice, and Director of Office of Management and
Budget (the "OMB Director"), the Puerto Rico Tourism Company's
Executive Director (the "Tourism Director"), the President of the
Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (the "GDB"), and
certain John Does seeking declaratory judgment that certain
executive orders issued by the Governor violate the Takings
Clause and Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Assured
Guaranty Corp., et al. v. Garcia-Padilla, et al., No. 16-01037-FAB
(D.P.R. Jan. 7, 2016).

   2. On Jan. 19, 2016, an insurer of debt issued by the
Commonwealth and its public corporations filed a complaint against
the Commonwealth's Governor, Secretary of Treasury, Sub-secretary
of Treasury, Secretary of State, Secretary of Justice, and OMB
Director, the Tourism Director, the GDB's President, and certain
John Does seeking declaratory judgment that section 8 of the
Puerto Rico Constitution, the Management and Budget Office Organic
Act, and executive orders relating to the foregoing (a) are
preempted by the Bankruptcy Code, (b) improperly operate in a
field occupied by Congress, (c) conflict with the Bankruptcy Code,
and (d) with respect to the executive orders, violate the
Contracts Clause and Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See
Financial Guaranty Insurance Company v. Garcia-Padilla, et al.,
No. 16-01095-FAB (D.P.R. Jan. 19, 2016).

   3. On April 4, 2016, certain holders of outstanding bonds of
the GDB, the Commonwealth's fiscal agent and financial advisor,
filed a complaint against the GDB seeking to enjoin the GDB from
(a) making payments to its creditors, and (b) forgiving or
compromising debts owed to GDB.  See Brigade Leveraged Capital
Structures Fund Ltd., et al. v. the Government Development Bank
for Puerto Rico, No. 16-01610-FAB (D.P.R. Apr. 4, 2016).

   4. On May 10, 2016, the insurer of over $472 million of bonds
issued by the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority
(the "PRHTA") filed a complaint against the PRHTA seeking
expedited discovery into the PRHTA's financial condition, the
appointment of a receiver, and an injunction against PRHTA
preventing it from further breaches of fiduciary or contractual
duties owed to said insurer. See Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Puerto
Rico Highways and Transportation Authority, No. 16-01893-FAB
(D.P.R. May 10, 2016).

   5. On June 15, 2016, the insurer of debt issued by the (a)
Commonwealth, (b) PRHTA, (c) Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing
Corporation ("COFINA"), and (d) Puerto Rico Industrial, Tourist,
Educational, Medical, and Environmental Control Facilities
Financing Authority filed a complaint against the Commonwealth's
Governor, Secretary of State, and OMB Director seeking declaratory
judgment that sections 201 and 202 of the Moratorium Act are
without force or effect because those provisions (a) are preempted
by the Bankruptcy Clause and the Bankruptcy Code, (b) violate the
Takings Clause and Contracts Clause, and (c) unconstitutionally
purport to bar access to the federal courts.  See National Public
Finance Guarantee Corp. v. Garcia Padilla, et al., No. 16-02101-
FAB (D.P.R. June 15, 2016).

   6. On June 21, 2016, certain beneficial owners of the
Commonwealth's general obligation bonds filed a complaint against
the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth's Governor, Secretary of
Treasury, and OMB Director seeking declaratory relief that the
Moratorium Act violates the (a) U.S. Constitution and Puerto Rico
Constitution, including the Contracts Clause and Takings Clause of
each, and (b) laws of the State of New York, which govern such
bonds.  See Jacana Holdings I LLC et al. v. Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, No. 16-04702-GHW (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2016).

   7. On June 30, 2016, certain holders of bonds issued by the GDB
and Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation (the "PRPFC") filed a
complaint against the Commonwealth's Governor and Secretary of
Department of Treasury, the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and
Financial Advisory Authority (the "PRFAFAA"), PRFAFAA's Executive
Director, the PRPFC, the GDB, and GDB's President seeking
declaratory judgment that sections 105, 201, 203, 301, 302, and
401 of the Moratorium Act are void because those provisions (a)
are preempted by the Bankruptcy Clause and the Bankruptcy Code,
(b) violate the Takings Clause, Contracts Clause, and the Puerto
Rico Constitution, and (c) unconstitutionally purport to bar
access to the federal courts.  See Trigo, et al. v. Garcia-
Padilla, et al., No. 16-02257-FAB (D.P.R. June 30, 2016).

   8. On July 18, 2016, certain beneficial owner of bonds issued
by the PRHTA filed a motion seeking relief from the PROMESA stay
to commence and prosecute an action against the Commonwealth's
Governor, Secretary of Treasury, and OMB Director, PRHTA, and
PRHTA's Executive Director seeking declaratory judgment that
sections 105, 201, and 202 of the Moratorium Act are void because
those provisions (a) are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code and
PROMESA, (b) violate the Bankruptcy Clause, Takings Clause,
Contracts Clause, and the Puerto Rico Constitution, and (c)
unconstitutionally purport to bar access to the federal courts.
See Peaje Inv. LLC v. Garcia-Padilla, et al., No. 16-02365-FAB
(D.P.R. July 18, 2016).

   9. On July 20, 2016, certain beneficial owners of bonds issued
by the Commonwealth and its public corporations, guaranteed by the
Commonwealth's good faith, credit, and taxing power, filed a
complaint against the Commonwealth's Governor, Secretary of
Treasury, and OMB Director seeking (a) declaratory judgment that
certain measures taken by the Commonwealth permitting transfers
outside of the ordinary course or in violation of the
Commonwealth's constitution were prohibited under PROMESA, and (b)
an injunction to prevent the same such transfers.  See Lex Claims,
et al. v. Garcia Padilla, et al., No. 16-02374-FAB (D.P.R. July
20, 2016).

  10. On July 21, 2016, certain issuers of insurance policies
guaranteeing payments on bonds issued by the PRHTA filed a motion
seeking emergency relief from the PROMESA stay in order to file a
complaint seeking to enjoin the Commonwealth, the PRHTA, the GDB,
the Commonwealth's Governor, the PRHTA's Executive Director, the
Commonwealth's Secretary of Treasury, and various John Doe
successors to the foregoing from diverting collateral of
bondholders to fund other expenses of the Commonwealth and its
affiliates. See Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, et al., No. 16-02384-FAB (D.P.R. July 21, 2016).

  11. On Aug. 19, 2016, the trustee to certain bonds issued by the
University of Puerto Rico filed a complaint against the
Commonwealth, the Commonwealth's Governor, and the university's
President seeking, among other things, relief from the PROMESA
stay, declaratory judgment that section 201 of the Moratorium Act
is invalid pursuant to the Takings Clause and Contracts Clause,
and an injunction compelling the defendants to comply with the
trust agreement governing such bonds. See U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v.
Garcia-Padilla, et al., No. 16-02510-FAB (D.P.R. Aug. 19, 2016).

  12. On Sept. 21, 2016, certain holders of bonds issued by the
Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico (the "ERS") filed a motion for relief from the
PROMESA stay unless adequate protection were granted by placing
ERS revenues into a segregated account for the benefit of such
holders. See Altair Global Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC v.
Garcia-Padilla, et al., No. 16-02696-FAB (D.P.R. Sep. 21, 2016).

  13. On September 28, 2016, a lender to the Puerto Rico
Metropolitan Bus Authority (the "AMA") filed a complaint against
the Commonwealth's Governor, Secretary of Treasury, and OMB
Director, AMA, the AMA's President, and PRHTA's Secretary seeking
(a) relief from the PROMESA stay, (b) declaratory judgment that
the Moratorium Act and an executive order issued in relation
thereto (i) violate PROMESA, (ii) are preempted by the Bankruptcy
Code, the Bankruptcy Clause, and PROMESA, (iii) violate the U.S.
Constitution, including the Contracts Clause and Takings Clause,
and (c) an injunction against the defendants enjoining them from
diverting transfers of certain tax revenues. See Scotiabank de
Puerto Rico v. Garcia-Padilla, et al., No. 16-02736-FAB (D.P.R.
Sep. 28, 2016).

  14. On October 26, 2016, a participant in a certain housing loan
program filed a complaint against the Commonwealth's Governor and
Secretary of Treasury, the GDB and its President, and the Puerto
Rico Housing Finance Authority and its Executive Director seeking
(a) declaratory judgment that (i) the PROMESA stay is not
applicable or, in the alternative, should be lifted, and (ii)
declaring that section 201 of the Moratorium Act do not apply to
the plaintiff's claims or, in the alternative, such provisions are
unconstitutional and preempted, and (b) injunctions against the
defendants compelling their compliance with applicable law and
agreements. See Oriental Bank v. Rosello-Nevares, et al., Case No.
16-02877-FAB (D.P.R. Oct. 26, 2016).

  15. On Dec. 15, 2016, a contractor with the Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority (the "PRASA") filed a complaint against the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA"), the GDB, a
former President of the GDB, the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality
Board, the PRASA, the Puerto Rico Infrastructure Finance
Administration, and the Commonwealth's Governor seeking funds
allegedly controlled by the EPA arising from a contract on the
grounds that they have been improperly withheld in breach of
contract, and in violation of said contractor's constitutional
rights, including violations of the Due Process Clause, Takings
Clause, and Contracts Clause. See Longo En-Tech Puerto Rico, Inc.
v. the United States Environmental Protection Agency, et al., No.
16-03151-DRD (D.P.R. Dec. 15, 2016).

  16. On April 12, 2017, a labor union and certain individual
members filed a complaint against the Oversight Board (including
its members), the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth's Governor
seeking (a) declaratory judgment that the certified fiscal plan
unconstitutionally (i) impairs the plaintiffs' rights, (ii)
violates the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution, and (iii) was not lawfully developed, approved, and
certified under PROMESA, and (b) an injunction against the
defendants from implementing such fiscal plan. See Servidores
Publicos Unidos de Puerto Rico, et al. v. Financial Oversight and
Management Board, et al., Case No. 17-01483-FAB (D.P.R. Apr. 12,
2017).

  17. On May 2, 2017, the insurer of approximately $1.3 billion of
bonds issued by COFINA filed a complaint against the Commonwealth,
its Governor, Secretary of Treasury, and OMB Director, the
Executive Director of the Autoridad de Asesor°a Financiera y
Agencia Fiscal de Puerto Rico ("AAFAF"), the Oversight Board, each
member of the Oversight Board, including its chairman and ex
officio member, and any successors to the foregoing seeking (a)
declaratory judgment that the fiscal plan and Fiscal Plan
Compliance Law (i) are unconstitutional for violating the
Contracts, Takings, and Due Process Clauses, (ii) unlawfully
interfere with contractual rights, (iii) are preempted by PROMESA
section 303, (iv) violate PROMESA section 407, and (v) violate the
Commonwealth's covenants under the COFINA Resolution, and (b) an
injunction against the defendants from taking any action pursuant
to the fiscal plan or Fiscal Plan Compliance Law. See Ambac
Assurance Corp. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., Case No.
17-01567 (D.P.R. May 2, 2017).

  18. On May 2, 2017, the insurer of a wide variety of
Commonwealth debt, across numerous structures, filed a complaint
against the Commonwealth's Governor, Secretary of Treasury, and
OMB Director, the AAFAF's Executive Director, the Oversight Board,
each member of the Oversight Board, including its chairman and ex
officio member, and any successors to the foregoing seeking (a)
declaratory judgment that (i) each of the Moratorium Act,
executive orders issued thereunder, the fiscal plan, and the
Fiscal Plan Compliance Act (A) violates the Contracts, Takings,
and Due Process clauses, (B) interferes with Ambac Assurance
Corp.'s contractual rides, (C) is preempted by section 303 of
PROMESA, and (D) violates section 407 of PROMESA, and (ii) the
orders issued under the Moratorium Act unconstitutionally deprive
litigants access to courts, and (b) an injunction against the
defendants from taking any action pursuant to the fiscal plan or
Fiscal Plan Compliance Law. See Ambac Assurance Corp. v.
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., Case No. 17-01568 (D.P.R. May
2, 2017).

  19. On May 2, 2017, the insurer of approximately $471 million of
bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority
("PRIFA") filed a complaint against the U.S. Department of
Treasury, its Secretary of Treasury, and any successor thereto
seeking (a) an equitable lien on taxes imposed by the U.S.
government on the sale of rum produced in the Commonwealth and
sold in the United States (the "Rum Taxes"), and (b) either (i) an
injunction against the defendants from remitting the Rum Taxes to
the Commonwealth, or (ii) the appointment of a receiver to hold
all Rum Taxes in escrow pending resolution of lawsuits related
thereto. See Ambac Assurance Corp. v. U.S. Department of Treasury,
et al., Case No. 17-00809 (D.D.C. May 2, 2017).

  20. On May 2, 2017, holders of senior COFINA bonds filed a
complaint against the Commonwealth's Governor, the GDB, its
President, COFINA, its, Executive Director, AAFAF, board members
of the GDB and COFINA, and the ex officio member of the Oversight
Board seeking (a) declaratory judgment the defendants (i)
substantially impaired the plaintiffs' contractual rights, and
(ii) took property without just compensation or due process, (b) a
writ of mandamus ordering the defendants to amend the fiscal plan
and allowing the plaintiffs to inspect documents related to the
restructuring of the Commonwealth's debts, (c) an injunction
against the defendants prohibiting them from further violations of
contractual, property, and constitutional rights, and (d) related
relief. See Perell¢, et al. v. Nevares, et al., Case No. 17-01566
(D.P.R. May 2, 2017).

  21. On May 2, 2017, the insurer of $800 million in principal
amount of bonds issued by COFINA filed a complaint against the
trustee of such bonds seeking (a) damages against the trustee, (b)
a declaration that the trustee breached (i) its fiduciary and
other duties to the plaintiff, (ii) the resolution executed in
connection with such bonds, and (iii) the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implied in such resolution, (c) a declaration
that the plaintiff may remove the trustee, (d) an injunction
against the trustee prohibiting further payments to subordinate
bondholders, (e) an injunction compelling the trustee to recognize
an event of default in connection with such bonds and accelerate
payment thereof, and (e) a declaration that the trustee has a
conflict of interest and must resign. See Ambac Assurance Corp. v.
the Bank of New York Mellon, Case No. 652356/2017 (N.Y. Supreme
Ct. May 2, 2017).

  22. On May 2, 2017, certain beneficial owners of approximately
$1.4 billion in principal amount of general obligation bonds
issued by the Commonwealth filed a complaint against the
Commonwealth and its Secretary of Treasury seeking (a) an
injunction compelling the Secretary of Treasury to "apply all
available resources of the Commonwealth to timely payment of all
amounts that are or become due on the [bonds]," and (b) money
damages owed to the plaintiffs, including all overdue interest on
principal, all amounts of principal, and prejudgment interest. See
Aurelius Investment LLC, et al. v. the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, et al., Case No. 652357/2017 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. May 2, 2017).

                        About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States.  The chief of state is the President of the
United States of America.  The head of government is an elected
Governor.  There are two legislative chambers: the House of
Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats.  The
governor-elect is Ricardo Antonio "Ricky" Rossello Nevares, the
son of former governor Pedro Rossello.

In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other
things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and
imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the
government, which expired May 1, 2017.

The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii)
Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J.
Gonzalez, (v) JosÇ R. Gonz†lez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and
(vii) David A. Skeel Jr.

On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition
for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").  The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578.  A copy of Puerto
Rico's PROMESA petition is posted at

        http://bankrupt.com/misc/17-01578-00001.pdf

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq.,
at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders.

Paul Weiss is serving as counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto
Rico General Obligation Bondholders.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Gets Favored US Court Ruling in Oil Expropriation Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Venezuela in a case involving the expropriation of assets
belonging to oil services company Helmerich & Payne, which accused
the South American country's government of illegally seizing 11
oil rigs in 2010.

The high court ruled that the firm's complaint should not have
been upheld in lower courts because it had not adequately
demonstrated that its property had been seized in violation of
international law, specifically, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, according to EFE News.

The decision was handed down unanimously by the eight magistrates
on the court, who heard arguments in the case last November, when
President Donald Trump's high court nominee, Neil Gorsuch, was not
yet on the bench, the report notes.  Consequently, the newly
confirmed justice did not participate in the decision, the report
relays.

Helmerich & Payne, based in Oklahoma, operated for years in
Venezuela and had the Caracas government as a customer, but in
2009 it ceased its activities there and shut down its wells after
the government built up millions of dollars in debt with it, the
report discloses.

In response to that move, Venezuela's then-president, Hugo Chavez,
in June 2010 ordered the nationalization of 11 rigs owned by
Helmerich & Payne after complaining that the firm had idled them
for "a considerable time," the report relays.

Helmerich & Payne countered by suing the Venezuelan government and
the state-run PDVSA oil company, the report notes.

The report discloses that Venezuela contended that sovereign
immunity prevented the filing of a suit of that kind, but the D.C.
Circuit court ruled in favor of the firm in 2015, finding that the
oil companies could pursue their claim because they had pleaded
facts falling within the expropriation exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.

However, the Supreme Court heard the case last year and vacated
that decision by unanimous vote, the report relays.

Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the court's 17-page decision, stating
that if the Supreme Court allowed foreign governments to be sued
so easily, the risk of creating friction with other nations would
exist and there could be "reciprocal actions" launched against the
United States, the report notes.

Thus, the high court supported the Venezuelan government's
position, arguing that a ruling against Caracas could damage
relations between the two nations, the report adds.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 28, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *