TCRLA_Public/170511.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, May 11, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 92


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

CONSULTATIO LIQUIDEZ: Moody's Assigns B-bf Global Bond Fund Rating


B A R B A D O S

BARBADOS: Fiscal Deficit Too High, Says Central Bank Governor


B R A Z I L

BANCO FIBRA: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Rating to 'B'
BANCO INDUSTRIAL: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
ESSENCIS SOLUCOES: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ADI SPV: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CASSABAH INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
CHINA QIBU: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 16
GAMMA OPPORTUNITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
GAMMA OPPORTUNITY FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24

GLOBAL DEVELOPER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
GOLDEN HORN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
HAPPYLATTE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 16
OCTAGON PAN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
OXFORD ENTERPRISES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24

SUMMER TIME: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
TROMSO PARTICIPATIONS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Can Access UK GBP500 Million Financing at 3.8%


E L  S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: S&P Raises Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'CC'


G U A T E M A L A

BANCO AGROMERCANTIL: Fitch Affirms BB+ Long-Term IDR
BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Fitch Affirms BB IDRs; Outlook Stable
BANCO G&T: Fitch Affirms BB IDR; Outlook Remains Stable


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Insurers Sue Govt. for Violating Restructuring Law
PUERTO RICO: Two Law Firms File FINRA Claim Against UBS Financial


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN CEMENT: JSE Receives Unaudited Financial Statements
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Borrowing to Pay Off Debt


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Former Minister Warns of Civil War in Country


                            - - - - -



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


CONSULTATIO LIQUIDEZ: Moody's Assigns B-bf Global Bond Fund Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned initial bond fund ratings to Consultatio Liquidez Ley
27.260, a new bond fund managed by Consultatio Asset Management
SA. The global scale and national scale ratings assigned are:

- Global scale bond fund rating: B-bf

- National scale bond fund rating: Baa-bf.ar

RATING RATIONALE

The B-bf/Baa-br.ar bond fund rating reflects Moody's expectation
that the maturity adjusted weighted average credit quality of the
fund's portfolio will be consistent with a B-bf global scale
rating. The Fund will largely invest in local USD Tbill and B3-
rated sovereign government bonds. The fund's ratings are also
supported by the fact that its credit profile is in line with
other B-bf/Baa-bf.ar which invest in short term dollar-sovereign
securities.

"Consultatio Liquidez is an investment vehicule for conservative
investors which has a peso/dollar convenance and an average
duration not to exceed 1 year," said Assistant Vice President
Carlos de Nevares.

Consultatio Asset Management G.F.C.I.S.A., is a large independent
asset manager in the Argentinean mutual fund Industry with 4.2% of
market share. As of April 2017, Consultatio Asset Management,
managed approximately AR$19,437 million or $1.30 billion in Assets
under Management (AUM).



===============
B A R B A D O S
===============


BARBADOS: Fiscal Deficit Too High, Says Central Bank Governor
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Barbados' fiscal deficit is still too high
and this means Barbadians will have to tighten their belts some
more.

Cleviston Haynes, Acting Central Bank Governor, said new measures
need to be introduced to "dampen demand" for foreign exchange,
thereby ensuring a healthy amount of international reserves are in
hand, according to RJR News.

Mr. Haynes said such policies were necessary, even as he reported
that the economy grew by two per cent in the first quarter, the
report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 7, 2017, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign ratings on Barbados to 'CCC+' from
'B-'.  The outlook is negative.  S&P also lowered the short-term
ratings to 'C' from 'B.'  At the same time, S&P lowered its
transfer and convertibility assessment for Barbados to 'CCC+' from
'B-'.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO FIBRA: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Rating to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its short-term global scale issuer
credit rating on Banco Fibra S.A. (Fibra) to 'B' from 'C'
following the implementation of S&P's new "Methodology For Linking
Long-Term And Short-Term Ratings".  At the same time, S&P removed
the "under criteria observation" (UCO) designation on the bank.
All other ratings on the bank remain unchanged.

On April 7, 2017 S&P Global Ratings revised its global methodology
for linking long- and short-term ratings.  S&P now display its
mapping of long- to short-term ratings in a uniform way across
sectors, which is S&P's standard mapping that applies to all
sectors, including the financial institutions.

For financial institutions including multilateral lending
institutions, the standard mapping applies with no alternative
mapping.  Compared with issuers in other sectors, S&P views banks
as highly confidence sensitive, given their heavy reliance on
short-term funding and the trust of customers and counterparties.
S&P analyzes a financial institution's liquidity in combination
with other key factors, including other elements of S&P's bank-
specific analysis and its banking industry country risk
assessment, and not in isolation.  Therefore, S&P believes that
the short-term rating on a financial institution is most
effectively derived from the long-term rating, which provides an
integrated view of the issuer's liquidity position in conjunction
with other key analytical factors.

This rating action stems solely from the application of S&P's
revised methodology for linking long-term and short-term ratings
and doesn't reflect any change in S&P's assessment of the
creditworthiness of the bank.

The ratings on Fibra continue to reflect its concentrated business
profile given its focus on middle-market and its poor
profitability metrics in the past five years.  S&P also bases its
ratings on its expectation that the bank will maintain its
internal capital generation leading to a forecasted risk-adjusted
capital ratio of about 6.5% for the next two years.  Moreover,
S&P's assessment reflects the bank's asset quality metrics, which
have been consistently weaker than those of its peers.  The
ratings also reflect S&P's view of Fibra's funding structure that
still lacks broad diversification among stable funding sources and
its liquidity position that provides adequate cushion to cope with
cash outflows for the next 12 months.


BANCO INDUSTRIAL: Fitch Affirms BB Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Industrial, S.A.'s Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB', Short-Term IDR at 'B' and
Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb', following a peer review of
Guatemala's largest banks. The Rating Outlook is Stable. Similar
rating actions were taken on the national ratings of Industrial's
subsidiaries.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

Industrial's VR, IDR and National Ratings balance the bank's
leading market position in Guatemala with its pressured capital
levels. Industrial's VR also reflects its sound asset quality and
strong profitability.

Despite growing competition, Industrial maintains pricing power in
the corporate lending segment. The bank's strong franchise enables
it to sustain an ample and diversified deposit base and to
complement this base with local and internationally sourced
wholesale funding. As of December 2016, Industrial held the top
rank in market share for loans and deposits within Guatemala, with
market shares of 27.9% of total assets and 24.3% of total
deposits. Industrial maintains ample geographic coverage through
its extensive retail branch network and other commercial channels.

Industrial's Fitch Core Capital ratio remains stable around 9.5%,
below similarly rated international peers. In order to sustain
expected growth without further capital pressures, the bank is
reducing its dividend payout ratio and calling fresh capital
increases in 2017. Industrial's loss absorption capacity also
benefits from additional buffers against unexpected losses in the
form of loan loss reserves coverage above 100%, as well as GTQ1.4
billion in subordinated debt and hybrid securities.

As Guatemala's largest bank, with exposure to all major economic
actors, Industrial's ratings are sensitive to changes in the
operating environment. Systemic events such as regulatory changes
or political uncertainty can affect the bank's performance and
prospects. For 2016, lower economic growth and specific regulation
on credit cards limited growth and profitability.

Industrial's conservative investment portfolio and controlled
delinquency ratios sustain its controlled credit costs,
outperforming those of domestic and international peers. Non-
performing loans greater than 90 days have averaged 0.6% of gross
loans over the past five years. However, Industrial's corporate
orientation results in elevated loan concentration. Industrial's
top 20 borrowers represented nearly two times its Fitch Core
Capital.

Industrial's stable margins and controlled operating and credit
costs sustain a long track record of strong profits. In 2016,
operating profitability was pressured by lower loan growth and
tighter net interest margins. Loan impairment charges also
registered a moderate increase, but these are still lower than
local peers because of sound asset quality. In the agency's
opinion, the bank's strategy to gradually move to higher-yielding
segments may have a moderate positive impact in profitability over
the medium term.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Despite Industrial's systemic importance, Fitch assigns only a
moderate probability of support from the Guatemalan government,
should it be required (reflected in a Support Rating of '3' and a
Support Rating Floor of 'BB-', one notch below the sovereign
rating). Fitch's expectation of support is affected by the state's
limited financial flexibility and the banking system's significant
foreign currency obligations.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

INDUSTRIAL'S SUBORDINATED TIER 1 CAPITAL NOTES, SUBORDINATED AND
SENIOR TRUSTS KEY RATING DRIVERS:

Industrial's subordinated Tier I capital notes (IST-I) are rated
four notches below the bank's Long-Term IDR given its deep
subordination status and discretionary coupon omission. Fitch has
assigned a recovery rating of 'RR6' to reflect its expectation for
poor recovery prospects in the event of default.

Industrial Subordinated Trust's Notes (ISbT) are rated one notch
below Industrial's Long-Term IDR reflecting the subordinated
status, ranking junior to all Industrial's present and future
senior indebtedness, pari passu with all other unsecured
subordinated debt and senior to Industrial's capital and tier I
hybrid securities.

Industrial Senior Trust's Notes' (ISnT) ratings are in line with
Industrial's Long-Term IDR, reflecting that the senior unsecured
obligations rank equally to Industrial's unsecured and
unsubordinated obligations.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

The national ratings of Industrial's subsidiaries: Contecnica S.A.
(Contecnica), Financiera Industrial S.A. (Financiera Industrial)
and Westrust Bank (International) Limited (Westrust Bank), are
equalized with those of Industrial. Fitch views these entities as
key and integral parts of Industrial's business given their high
degree of integration with the group, complementary activities and
enhancement of Industrial's business model.

The national ratings in Panama of BI Bank S.A.(BIBank) reflect the
potential support from its sister company, Industrial through
their holding company Bicapital Corporation would be forthcoming,
given the strong synergies with parent, providing
products/services in markets identified as strategically important
and the high integration with the group.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

A Fitch core capital ratio below 9% could negatively affect
ratings, as would a sustained deterioration in the bank's asset
quality and financial performance. However, Industrial's VR and
IDR have limited upside potential given the constraining operating
environment (sovereign rating of 'BB'/Stable Outlook) and the
tight capital levels.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Industrial's Support and Support Rating Floor ratings would be
affected by a change in Guatemala's ability or willingness to
support the bank.

INDUSTRIAL'S SUBORDINATED TIER 1 CAPITAL NOTES, SUBORDINATED AND
SENIOR TRUSTS' RATING SENSITIVITIES

Changes in the ratings of IST-I, ISnT and ISbT's are contingent on
changes in Industrial's long-term IDR.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

Changes in the ratings of Contecnica, Financiera Industrial,
Westrust Bank, and BIBank are contingent on changes in
Industrial's capacity and propensity to provide support.

Fitch has affirmed the following:

Banco Industrial S.A.:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B';
-- Viability Rating at 'bb';
-- Support at '3';
-- Subordinated Tier I Capital Notes debt at 'B-'/ 'RR6';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';
-- National scale long-term rating at 'AA(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National scale short-term rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.

Industrial Subordinated Trust:

-- Industrial Subordinated Trust Tier II debt at 'BB-'.

Industrial Senior Trust:

-- Long-term senior unsecured debt at 'BB'.

Contecnica S.A.:

-- National scale long-term rating at 'AA(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National scale short-term rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.

Financiera Industrial S.A.:

-- National scale long-term rating at 'AA(gtm); Outlook Stable;
-- National scale short-term rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.

Westrust Bank (International) Limited:

-- National scale long-term rating at 'AA(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National scale short-term rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.

BI Bank, S.A.

-- National scale long-term rating at 'A(pan)', Outlook Stable;
-- National scale short-term rating at 'F1(pan)'.


ESSENCIS SOLUCOES: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina assigned a first-time B3 (global scale) and
B1.br (national scale) corporate family rating (CFR) to Essencis
Solucoes Ambientais S.A. At the same time, Moody's assigned a
B3/B1.br rating for Essencis' senior secured debentures issued in
2011 and due 2023. The outlook for the ratings is stable.

Ratings assigned:

Issuer: Essencis Solucoes Ambientais S.A.

  Corporate family ratings: B3 (global scale) and B1.br (national
  scale)

  BRL150 million senior secured debentures due 2023: B3 (global
  scale) and B1.br (national scale)

The outlook for the ratings is stable.

RATING RATIONALE

Essencis' B3/B1.br secured ratings reflect the company's position
as a major environmental services and waste management company in
Brazil, operating sanitary landfills that are strategically
located close to large metropolitan areas. The ratings also
incorporate Essencis' above-average operating margins when
compared with global peers, and its adequate credit metrics. The
current environmental regulatory framework in Brazil, which
increases the industry's entrance barriers, and the more stable
outlook for Brazil's macroeconomic conditions also support the
ratings. The relatively stable and predictable nature of the
company's cash flows, derived from long-term agreements and high
switching costs for customers is an additional positive
consideration.

On the other hand, Essencis' ratings are constrained by its size
compared to global peers, high revenue concentration in terms of
clients and products, and by the regional geographic footprint of
its operations. The company's tight liquidity profile based on
cash relative to short term debt and risks related to eventual
large shareholders distributions also limit the ratings. Finally,
the ratings incorporate the company's evolving corporate
governance standards.

The B3/B1.br ratings assigned to the company's BRL 150 million
debentures due 2023 stand at the same level as the corporate
family ratings due to the instruments' security package, which
includes the fiduciary lien of land, fiduciary assignment of
receivables equivalent to at least 30% of the company's gross
revenues and the existence of a reserve account covering future
installments of principal and interest payment. The debentures and
other secured debt instruments represent 51% of the company's
total indebtedness and, in Moody's view, would have stronger
recovery prospects and rank senior to unsecured instruments during
a financial distress situation.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that Essencis'
profitability will remain near current levels and that the company
will adequate capex and dividend distributions to its cash
generation to fully service debt amortizations.

The ratings could be upgraded if Essencis' liquidity profile
improves, with increased free cash flow generation and cash
coverage of short term debt on a sustained basis. A rating upgrade
would also require an improvement of the company's financial
policies and the maintenance of adequate credit metrics.

The ratings could be downgraded if Essencis' liquidity
deteriorates, increasing the risk of debt restructuring that
entails losses to secured creditors. Quantitatively, the ratings
could be downgraded if the company's adjusted leverage (measured
by adjusted total debt to EBITDA) rises to above 5.5x (2.7x in
2016) or if interest coverage (measured by adjusted EBIT to
interest expense) declines to below 1.0x (1.6x in 2016).

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, Essencis Solucoes Ambientais
S.A. is a major provider of environmental services and waste
management for industrial and public customers in Brazil. In 2016,
the company reported net revenues of BRL 280 million (USD 80
million), coming mainly from operations in sanitary landfills
(62%), operations at clients (13%), environmental services (7%),
co-processing (6%), sale of byproducts (4%), incineration (3%),
waste-to-energy (1%) and others (4%). Essencis is 100% owned by
Solvi Participacoes S.A. (Solvi). Solvi operates in Brazil,
Bolivia, Argentina and Peru through approximately 60 subsidiaries
offering mainly environmental services and waste management to
public and private customers.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Environmental
Services and Waste Management Companies published in June 2014.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ADI SPV: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of ADI SPV Fund (Offshore) Ltd., on April 7,
2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Adi Capital Management LLC
          Paritosh Gupta
          295 Madison Avenue, 36th Floor
          New York
          New York 10017
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (212) 946 7630
          e-mail: rwong@adicapllc.com


CASSABAH INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
---------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Cassabah Investment Co. are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 24, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 6, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


CHINA QIBU: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 16
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of China Qibu Group Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 16, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on April 11, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zhang Limin
          Qibu Co., Ltd
          No. 3 Chiyan, Qiaoziang Industrial Zone
          Youzhu New District
          Qingtian County, Lishui City
          Zhejiang Province
          China
          Telephone +86 578 6558999
          Facsimile: + 86 578 6558999


GAMMA OPPORTUNITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Gamma Opportunity General Partner, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 24, 2017, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 31, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          El Gabino 13492
          c/o Jayme Colter / Jonathan Knight
          Lo Barnechea
          Santiago de Chile
          Telephone: 56 22 724 9218


GAMMA OPPORTUNITY FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Gamma Opportunity Fund - Series II, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 24, 2017, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 31, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          El Gabino 13492
          Lo Barnechea
          Santiago de Chile
          c/o Jayme Colter / Jonathan Knight
          Telephone: 56 22 724 9218


GLOBAL DEVELOPER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Global Developer Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 24, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 11, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


GOLDEN HORN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Golden Horn Trading Limited, on April 11,
2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Doran + Minehane
          59/60 O' Connell Street
          Limerick
          Ireland
          Telephone: 00353 61 430000
          Facsimile: 00353 61 408613


HAPPYLATTE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 16
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Happylatte are required to file their proofs of
debt by May 16, 2017, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 28, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Bjorn Stabell
          Ho Lee Commercial Building, Suite D, 6th Floor
          38-44 D'Aguilar Street
          Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 2528 1008
          Facsimile: +852 2529 9830


OCTAGON PAN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Octagon Pan Asia Levered Fund, on April 11,
2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


OXFORD ENTERPRISES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 24
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Oxford Enterprises are required to file their
proofs of debt by May 24, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 6, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


SUMMER TIME: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Summer Time Corp., on April 5, 2017,
passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidators are:

          Summer Time Corp.
          Jose A. Toniolo
          307 Fairbanks Road
          Apt. 50, George Town
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 916-2956


TROMSO PARTICIPATIONS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Tromso Participations Limited, on
March 10, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Tromso Participations Limited
          c/o Hilton Nogueira Ribeiro
          Rua Engenheiro Prudente Meireles De Morais
          965, APT 604
          Sao Jose Dos Campos
          Sao Paulo 12243-750
          Brazil



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Can Access UK GBP500 Million Financing at 3.8%
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that British Ambassador Chris Campbell
said the financing available from the United Kingdom for the
Dominican Republic of around 500 million pounds sterling through a
MOU is cheaper than the open market, with a fixed rate of around
3.8% for 10 years and could be as high as 18 years with fixed
interest, if it's for renewable energy.

Quoted by diariolibre.com, the diplomat said the funds are
available, for which the Dominican government has to set its
priorities and compile all necessary documents to access the
agreed funding, according to Dominican Today.

"That was to give access to British funding to help with large
infrastructure projects here in the Dominican Republic, so that
was a direct request from the President to do something
government-to-government to help, because in principle the
President wanted to move many of the large infrastructure projects
for the future and we organized this memorandum of understanding
to give access to the Dominican government to British funding,"
Mr. Campbell said, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.



====================
E L  S A L V A D O R
====================


EL SALVADOR: S&P Raises Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings on El Salvador to 'CC' from 'SD'
(selective default).  The outlook on both long-term ratings is
negative.  In addition, S&P raised its short-term ratings to 'C'
from 'SD', and it raised its issue credit rating on the foreign
currency senior unsecured debt to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'.  S&P's 'AAA'
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment is unchanged.

                             RATIONALE

El Salvador's government resolved on April 28 the missed payments
on financial obligations coming from the Certificates for Pension
Investments (CIPs) amounting to $56.5 million.  This action
follows Congressional approval of a budget reallocation of the
same amount of missed payments one week before.  The Congress also
approved a bill that extends the term of CIPs to 50 years from 25
years, includes a five-year grace period for capital payments, and
modifies interest rates (only for new CIPs issuances) from 3.5%-
5.5% to 4% and, beginning February 2019, to 5.5%.  S&P considers
that investors will receive less value than the promise of the
original CIPs because expected certificates' maturities extend
beyond the original, and the timing of payments is slowed given
the capital payments grace period.

S&P's 'CC' ratings reflect its opinion that the CIPs are currently
highly vulnerable to nonpayment.  In S&P's view, the approved CIPs
amendments are tantamount to an intention to undertake an exchange
offer or similar restructuring that S&P would classify as
distressed due to the reasons detailed above, even though the
transaction has not been completed.

Even though the missed pension debt payments were cured, short-
term financing remains unresolved.  Political polarization
continues to erode El Salvador's credit quality.  With an
uncertain policy environment, S&P foresees higher risks coming
from the lack of additional debt authorizations in Congress, which
would tighten the government's liquidity position.  In S&P's
opinion, as a consequence of the missed CIPs payments, there is a
risk of deterioration in the cost of external financing, which
undermines our external assessment.

The next CIPs' payments coming due in July and October still
require a budgetary allocation.  Moreover, for the second half of
2017, the government will require around $635 million to refinance
domestic short-term debt called LETES (Letras del Tesoro), for
which a two-thirds majority in Congress is needed.

S&P raised the issue credit ratings on the foreign currency senior
unsecured international bonds outstanding to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'
because S&P do not foresee they will be defaulted on within six
months.  Although, a near-term liquidity crisis in the next 12
months, without an unforeseen positive development, would reduce
the capacity to meet those obligations.

The T&C assessment remains 'AAA' based on S&P's view that the
sovereign will continue to use the U.S dollar as its currency and
not restrict dollar outflows by private parties to make debt
service payments.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the long-term ratings reflects the high
likelihood that the government will restructure CIPs.  S&P would
lower the ratings to selective default upon completion of an
exchange S&P views to be distressed, according to its criteria.
On the other hand, S&P could revise the outlook to stable within
the next 12 months if government and opposition parties reach an
agreement on fiscal policy and improve the sovereign's access to
liquidity.  S&P could consider raising the ratings if political
consensus leads to measures that sustainably improve El Salvador's
growth potential and, with it, public finances and external
resilience.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the "external assessment" had
deteriorated.  All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Upgraded
                                          To             From
El Salvador (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating                  CC/Neg./C      SD/--/SD
Senior Unsecured                         CCC            CCC-

Ratings Affirmed

El Salvador (Republic of)
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment     AAA



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


BANCO AGROMERCANTIL: Fitch Affirms BB+ Long-Term IDR
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala's
(BAM) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' following a
peer review of Guatemala's largest banks. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

BAM - IDRS, VR, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATINGS

BAM's IDRs and national ratings reflect Fitch's opinion that the
support from its ultimate shareholder, Bancolombia ('BBB'/ Outlook
Negative) will be timely and sufficient if needed. In Fitch's
opinion, Bancolombia's capacity and propensity to support BAM
considers that any required support would be manageable relative
to the ability of the parent to provide it, and the high
reputational risks to the parent in the event of subsidiary
default. Fitch's view factors in the low cost of potential
support, as BAM accounts for 4.7% of the group's assets.

BAM's standalone creditworthiness, as indicated by its Viability
Rating (VR), is driven by its company profile based on its
moderate franchise in Guatemala combined with its consistent and
proven business model that allows the bank to maintain a stable
performance and prospects. The VR also considers the bank's
pressured capital position, good asset quality, diversified and
stable funding, as well as its moderate profitability.

BAM's capital position is adequate but has been pressured
recently. The bank's capital buffers have declined to the lowest
point in the last four years as credit growth has outpaced
internal capital generation. As of December 2016, the Fitch Core
Capital ratio was 10.9%.

BAM's asset quality is still good despite some moderate
deterioration in 2016. Loans past due more than 90 days reached
1.8% of gross loans (2015: 1.4%), the highest point in the last
four years, but still in line with the bank's current ratings. The
deterioration was mainly from retail loans. Credit cards were hit
due to temporary regulation changes that disrupted the credit card
portfolio performance across the system. The deterioration also
reflected the bank's increased risk appetite given its higher
proportion of retail loans in recent years, though management
expects this deteriorating trend to improve in the short term due
to the implementation of tighter controls and underwriting
standards for this segment.

Modest profitability is prevalent in the largest Guatemalan banks
with no significant retail portfolio. BAM's modest profitability
is the product of a continuously constrained margin due to
competition. The net interest margin (NIM) continues to be
pressured by the increased funding costs and heightened
competition, leading to lower profitability.

BAM's funding structure is deposit-based and has a good track
record of stability. Despite not having a comparable franchise in
the deposit sector relative to larger banks, BAM's deposits are
well diversified, in Fitch's view. As of YE16, the 20 largest
depositors represented 8.1% of total deposits, comparing favorably
to local peers. The bank's funding is complemented by an ample and
diversified number of wholesale sources. The bank has 23 open
credit lines (14 of them in use) from international financial
institutions.

AGROMERCANTIL SENIOR TRUST (AST)

Agromercantil Senior Trust's (AST) rating is in line with BAM's
IDR reflecting that the senior unsecured obligations rank equally
with the bank's unsecured and unsubordinated obligations.

MERCOM - NATIONAL RATINGS

Mercom's national ratings are based on the support it would
receive from its ultimate shareholder, Bancolombia, if needed.
Mercom is an important subsidiary for the group in Guatemala given
that it operates in complementary market segments - enhancing
BAM's business model - and reflects a high degree of integration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

BAM
IDRS, VR, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATINGS

BAM's Foreign Currency IDR is capped by Guatemala's country
ceiling. The bank's Long-Term Local Currency IDR is above the
sovereign's Local Currency IDR and as such would be sensitive to
any sovereign rating action.

Downward risk for the bank's IDRs, national ratings and support
rating is limited given its parent support but the ratings could
be downgraded if Fitch's assessment of Bancolombia's ability or
willingness to support its subsidiaries changes. Currently, there
is no upside potential for the bank's IDRs as these are above the
sovereign's IDRs, which have a Stable Outlook.

The VR could be downgraded if the Fitch Core Capital ratio
consistently falls below 10%.

AST

Changes in the notes' rating would derive from changes in BAM's
IDR.

MERCOM

A downgrade in Mercom's ratings is contingent on Bancolombia's
ability and propensity to support its operations if needed.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala, S.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-Term Local Currency IDR at 'F3';
-- Viability Rating at 'bb';
-- Support at '3';
-- National scale long-term rating at 'AAA(gtm)' ;
-- National scale short-term rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.

Agromercantil Senior Trust
-- Long-term foreign currency loan participation notes at 'BB+'.

Mercom Bank Limited
-- National scale long-term rating at 'AAA(gtm)';
-- National scale short-term rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.


BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Fitch Affirms BB IDRs; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco de Desarrollo Rural, S.A.'s
(Banrural) Long- and Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB' and 'B', respectively. The
Viability Rating (VR) was affirmed at 'bb'. The Rating Outlook of
the long-term ratings is Stable. At the same time, the National
Ratings of its Subsidiary Financiera Rural S.A. (Finrural) were
also affirmed.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS
Banrural's IDR and national ratings are driven by its VR. This
rating is highly influenced by the bank's company profile,
especially its strong franchise in Guatemala. The VR also takes
into account its moderate risk appetite and the recent negative
trends in asset quality and profitability, as well as the bank's
capitalization, funding structure and operating environment.

In Fitch's view, Banrural has a strong franchise in Guatemala
which is reflected in its market share as it remains the second
largest bank in the banking system. Fitch believes that the bank's
relative competitive advantage and pricing power in its main
segment supports its higher profitability and funding profile.

Despite historically stable non-performing loan (NPL) ratios, in
2016 this ratio deteriorated significantly mainly because of the
default of a client involved in a corruption case related to a
Guatemalan political party. This ratio was also negatively
affected by a reclassification of some restructured loans from
current to past due, according to the regulator's rules as well as
the underperformance of other large loans. By year-end (YE) 2016
the NPLs ratio deteriorated to 3.2% from an average of around 0.7%
in 2013-2015. As there are other reclassifications to be made,
Fitch expects this negative trend to continue; though the bank's
impaired loan ratios should remain at levels commensurate with its
ratings.

In addition, the bank's impairment charges increased, which along
with higher funding costs resulted in pressures on its
profitability metrics. By YE2016, the ratio of operating profits
to risk weighted assets (RWAs) declined to 2.7% from an average of
4.2% in 2013-2015. Fitch believes that this ratio will probably
show a further slight decline, but will also remain at adequate
levels.

In Fitch's opinion, Banrural's capital position is adequate. The
bank's FCC ratio has been consistently around 13% comparing well
with domestic peers. Capital metrics are aided by steady growth
accompanied by similar internal capital generation levels.

Fitch believes that Banrural's funding structure is adequate,
based almost entirely on a diversified, low cost deposit base.
Other available funding sources include banking credit lines and
subordinated debt. Banrural's loans to customer deposit ratios
have been consistently around 75%, a level that Fitch deems
acceptable.

Liquidity is at adequate levels.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The bank's Support Rating (SR) of '3' reflects Fitch's opinion
that there is a moderate probability of support from Guatemala,
given Banrural's systemic importance in the banking system. This
probability is limited by Guatemala's sovereign rating of
'BB'/Outlook Stable. The bank's Support Rating Floor (SRF) is one
notch below the sovereign rating at 'BB-'. The bank's SRF reflects
the moderate financial flexibility of the government to provide
support to systemically important banks in the country and the
significant presence of foreign currency funding.

FINANCIERA RURAL
NATIONAL RATINGS

Finrural's ratings are driven by the support it would receive from
Banrural, if required. Fitch deems Finrural as a core subsidiary
for the bank due to its high integration and the shared brand.
Additionally, a default of Finrural would constitute a high
reputational risk to Banrural.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, VR AND NATIONAL RATINGS

Fitch believes there is limited upside potential for Banrural's
IDRs and VR given the constraints of its operating environment
(Guatemala's IDR is 'BB'/Outlook Stable).

A sustained deterioration in asset quality that results in a
material impact to the bank's financial profile could pressure the
bank's ratings. In particular, a sustained decline in
capitalization (FCC/Risk weighted assets below 12%) and
profitability (operating ROAA to RWA below 1.25%) could result in
a downgrade of the bank's ratings.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Banrural's Support and Support Rating Floor ratings would be
affected by a change in Guatemala's ability or willingness to
support the bank.

FINANCIERA RURAL
NATIONAL RATINGS

Changes in Finrural's ratings are associated with changes in
Banrural's propensity to provide support.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco de Desarrollo Rural:
-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Foreign Currency Short-Term IDR at 'B';
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Local Currency Short-Term IDR at 'B';
-- Viability Rating at 'bb';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';
-- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA+(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National Short-Term Rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.

Financiera Rural, S.A.
-- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA+(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National Short-Term Rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.


BANCO G&T: Fitch Affirms BB IDR; Outlook Remains Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco G&T Continental S.A.'s Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' and Viability Rating (VR) at
'bb' following Fitch's peer review of Guatemala's largest banks.
G&TC's Rating Outlook on the Long-Term IDR remains Stable.

G&TC'S KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, VR, National Ratings and Support

G&TC's IDRs and National ratings are driven by its intrinsic
creditworthiness, as reflected in its Viability Rating (VR).
G&TC's VR is highly influenced by its strong domestic franchise
and corporate oriented business model. The bank's ratings also
factor in its moderate profitability, high exposure to sovereign
risk, increased impaired loans, moderate capitalization and stable
deposit base.

The support rating of '3' reflects Fitch's opinion that the bank
maintains a moderate probability of support from the state, given
its systemic importance in the banking system. The current support
rating floor ('BB-'), one notch below the sovereign rating,
reflects the government's moderate financial flexibility to
provide support to systemically important banks in the country and
the significant presence of foreign currency funding.

G&TC is the main entity of the second largest banking group in
Guatemala. Its franchise is strong in the corporate segment;
however, the opportunities to strengthen it imply a greater
business diversification, especially in the SME and consumer
segments. G&TC is a systemically important bank in Guatemala, with
a market share that is close to 18% in terms of assets and
deposits. In its main lending segment (corporate and commercial
loans), its market share rises up to 22.7%, as of December 2016.

The deterioration of some large debtors negatively affected G&TC's
loan portfolio quality. Since 2012, impaired loans have increased,
representing 2.8% of gross loans as of March 2017 (December 2016:
1.7%). Nevertheless, Fitch expects a lower NPL ratio by the end of
2017 due to the risk management measures taken by the bank. G&TC
maintains a high exposure to the Guatemalan sovereign ('BB'/Stable
Outlook). As of December 2016, securities issued by or guaranteed
by the sovereign and central bank accounted for 2.4x of equity.

G&TC's moderate profitability is characterized by a stable net
interest margin (NIM) that reflects its focus on wholesale
segments, 47.2% of loan portfolio denominated in USD and high
proportion of liquid assets. In Fitch's opinion, the bank's
profitability will be under pressure this year due to the expected
increase of interest rates that could increase its funding cost as
well as the weakening of some debtors that could increase impaired
loan expenses.

G&TC's capitalization is low; however, dividend payments have
declined and shareholders have demonstrated their commitment to
inject capital. The actions to increase NIM and revenue
diversification, new capital injections as well as measures
control impaired loans will favor the bank's capitalization in the
medium-term, which could progressively increase FCC ratio to
levels closer to 12%. According to Fitch, greater risk comes from
the potential deterioration of some of the bank's largest debtors,
considering the high concentration of its loan portfolio by
business group.

One of G&TC's strengths is its well-balanced and stable base of
depositors and a high proportion of liquid assets in relation to
deposits (60.6% as of December 2016). G&TC's concentration by
deposits is moderate given about half of deposits come from
individuals. In 2017, the bank's efforts remain focused on
reducing its cost of funding through attracting demand deposits
and reducing the maturities of its term deposits.

CONTICREDIT, FG&TC, GTC AND FG&TC'CR KEY RATING DRIVERS -National
Ratings

In Fitch's opinion, G&T Conticredit S.A. (Conticredit), Financiera
G&T Continental, S.A. (FG&TC), GTC Bank Inc. (GTC) and Financiera
G&T Continental Costa Rica, S.A.'s (FG&TC CR) national ratings are
underpinned by institutional support they would receive from their
shareholder, G&TC. Fitch's opinion of the support is based on the
high integration of the subsidiaries with the parent and the
significant reputational risk that a default of one of them would
pose to G&TC. As a result their national scale ratings are aligned
with G&TC's credit profile.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

G&TC IDR's upside potential is limited over the medium term given
the constraints of its operating environment. G&TC's ratings could
be pressured downward if the bank sustains a deteriorating trend
in impaired loan ratios that causes its Fitch Core Capital ratio
to fall below 10%.

The national ratings of G&TC's subsidiaries will mirror changes on
the national scale ratings of the parent.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco G&T Continental S.A.
-- Long-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B';
-- Long-term Local-Currency IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term Local-Currency IDR at 'B';
-- Viability Rating at 'bb';
-- Support at '3';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-';
-- Long-term National Rating at 'AA-(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.

G&T Conticredit S.A.
-- Long-term National Rating at 'AA-(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1+(gtm)';
-- Short-term senior unsecured debt national ratings at
'F1+(gtm)'.

Financiera G&T Continental, S.A.
-- Long-term National Rating at 'AA-(gtm)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1+(gtm)'.

GTC Bank Inc. --Long-term National Rating at 'AA-(gtm)'; Outlook
Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1+(gtm)';
-- Long-term National Rating at 'A+(pan)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1(pan)'.

Financiera G&T Continental Costa Rica, S.A.
-- Long-term National Rating at 'A+(cri)'; Outlook Stable;
-- Short-term National Rating at 'F1(cri)';
-- Long-term senior unsecured debt national ratings at 'A+(cri)';
-- Short-term senior unsecured debt national ratings at
    'F1(cri)'.



======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Insurers Sue Govt. for Violating Restructuring Law
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rick Archer, writing for Bankruptcy Law360, reports that Assured
Guaranty Corp. and National Public Finance Guarantee Corp.,
insurers of $9 billion of Puerto Rico's $70 billion debt, filed a
lawsuit against the government and fiscal oversight board,
claiming that the commonwealth's plan breaches restructuring law.
The Insurers, according to Law360, told a federal court that the
commonwealth's fiscal plan illegally prioritizes government
spending over debt service.

                      About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States.  The chief of state is the President of the
United States of America.  The head of government is an elected
Governor.  There are two legislative chambers: the House of
Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats.  The
governor-elect is Ricardo Antonio "Ricky" Rossello Nevares, the
son of former governor Pedro Rossello.

In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other
things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and
imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the
government, which expired May 1, 2017.

The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii)
Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J.
Gonzalez, (v) Jose R. Gonzalez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and
(vii) David A. Skeel Jr.

On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition
for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").  The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578.  A copy of Puerto
Rico's PROMESA petition is posted at:

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/17-01578-00001.pdf

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq.,
at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at:

            https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders.

Paul Weiss is counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto Rico General
Obligation Bondholders.


PUERTO RICO: Two Law Firms File FINRA Claim Against UBS Financial
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Securities Arbitration Law Firm of Klayman & Toskes, P.A.,
www.sueubspuertorico.com, together with Carlo Law Offices, P.S.C.
located in Puerto Rico, on May 5, 2017, disclosed that they filed
a FINRA claim against UBS Financial Services Incorporated of
Puerto Rico and UBS Financial Services, Inc. (collectively "UBS")
for $15 million.  The claim has been filed in the wake of Puerto
Rico's recent bankruptcy filing, which is the largest in U.S.
Municipal history.  According to the Claim, the Claimant entrusted
his retirement assets to UBS with an investment objective of
current income and capital preservation. Contrary to these
objectives, UBS concentrated his account in Puerto Rico Government
Bonds ("PRGBs") and its proprietary Puerto Rico closed-end bond
funds ("UBS PR CEBFs"), which are leveraged with UBS Bank USA
Loans.

UBS purchased and held for Claimant PRGBs and UBS PR CEBFs, both
of which are closely tied to the performance of Puerto Rico's
economy.  The Claimant believed the purchases were consistent with
his risk tolerance.  However, the over concentration in these
PRGBs and UBS PR CEBFs resulted in excessive risks, which were
exacerbated by the use of UBS' Bank Loans.  UBS failed to disclose
to Claimant the risks associated with over concentrating his
account in these securities. Ultimately, the Claimant suffered
losses which were precipitated by margin calls since his illiquid
securities were utilized as collateral.

The sole purpose of this release is to investigate, on behalf of
our clients, the sales practices of UBS in connection with
unsuitable investment recommendations provided to their customers.
Current and former customers of UBS who have information relating
to the investment advice provided by UBS related to Puerto PRGBs
and UBS PR CEBFs, are encouraged to contact Steven D. Toskes of
Klayman & Toskes or Osvaldo Carlo of Carlo Law Offices, at
(787)268-6444, or visit the Web site
http://www.sueubspuertorico.com/

                    About Klayman & Toskes, P.A.

K&T is a national securities law firm which practices exclusively
in the field of securities arbitration and litigation, on behalf
of retail and institutional investors throughout the world in
large and complex securities matters.  The firm represents high
net-worth, ultra-high-net-worth, and institutional investors, such
as non-profit organizations, unions, public and multi-employer
pension funds. K&T has office locations in California, Florida,
New York and Puerto Rico.

                        About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States.  The chief of state is the President of the
United States of America.  The head of government is an elected
Governor.  There are two legislative chambers: the House of
Representatives, 51 seats, and the Senate, 27 seats.  The
governor-elect is Ricardo Antonio "Ricky" Rossello Nevares, the
son of former governor Pedro Rossello.

In 2016, the U.S. Congress passed PROMESA, which, among other
things, created the Financial Oversight and Management Board and
imposed an automatic stay on creditor lawsuits against the
government, which expired May 1, 2017.

The members of the oversight board are: (i) Andrew G. Biggs, (ii)
Jose B. Carrion III, (iii) Carlos M. Garcia, (iv) Arthur J.
Gonzalez, (v) Jose R. Gonzalez, (vi) Ana. J. Matosantos, and
(vii) David A. Skeel Jr.

On May 3, 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a petition
for relief under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").  The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico under case number 17-cv-01578.  A copy of Puerto
Rico's
PROMESA petition is posted at

         http://bankrupt.com/misc/17-01578-00001.pdf

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose LLP and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq.,
at O'Neill & Borges LLC are onboard as attorneys.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Jones Day is serving as counsel to certain ERS bondholders.

Paul Weiss is counsel to the Ad Hoc Group of Puerto Rico General
Obligation Bondholders.



================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


CARIBBEAN CEMENT: JSE Receives Unaudited Financial Statements
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Jamaica Stock Exchange has said it is in
receipt of the unaudited financial statements of Caribbean Cement.

The JSE however said it has requested additional information from
the company and will not publish what it has received so far until
relays that information is received, RJR News.

                           *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Aug. 18, 2014, RJR News disclosed that Caribbean Cement said it
racked up a loss of $89 million in the three months to the end of
June, compared to a $359 million profit in the corresponding
period a year ago.  The report noted that Caribbean Cement said
the loss was due to the shutdown of a clinker line to facilitate
maintenance work.

According to a TCRLA report on Aug. 7, 2013, RJR News related that
Caribbean Cement Company Limited suffered a consolidated loss of
J$137 million for the first six months of 2013 down from J$1.2
billion during the corresponding period last year, according to
RJR News.  The report related that the loss resulted from J$701
million of non-cash foreign exchange losses compared to J$136
million in 2012.


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Borrowing to Pay Off Debt
--------------------------------------------
Aleem Khan at Trinidad Express reports that financial experts are
recommending Trinidad and Tobago adopt fiscal rules in the face of
a rising debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, for which the
country lost its investment grade rating at Moody's Investors
Service late last month.

The report notes that during an April 18 interview at the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) office in St Clair, Port of Spain,
IDB country representative Tomas Bermudez said: "Fiscal rules as
to when do you stop borrowing and so on, I think that makes sense.
It's important to have (a) certain fiscal framework that you work
with, and it is important, I think, to have it designed yourself,
and implement yourself before somebody else comes and tells you
that you have to do it because you are in trouble and in a
situation where you just have to do it."

The report relays that defining fiscal rules, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) says on its website: "A fiscal rule imposes a
long-lasting constraint on fiscal policy through numerical limits
on budgetary aggregates. Fiscal rules typically aim at correcting
distorted incentives and containing pressures to overspend,
particularly in good times, so as to ensure fiscal responsibility
and debt sustainability."


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Former Minister Warns of Civil War in Country
--------------------------------------------------------
Anatoly Kurmanaev at The Wall Street Journal reports that
nationwide protests are spreading beyond Venezuela President
Nicolas Maduro's control and risk morphing into civil war, said a
retired Venezuelan general who was in charge of suppressing the
last wave of unrest three years ago.

"We're seeing much larger masses protesting across all major
cities, including the working-class neighborhoods" once firmly
supporting the government, said Major Gen. (Ret.) Miguel Rodr°guez
Torres, who served as Mr. Maduro's interior minister in 2013 and
2014, according to The Wall Street Journal.  "The government is
losing control," he added.

The report notes that the embattled president needs to begin
negotiating election dates now to avoid plunging the country into
anarchy, Mr. Rodriguez said.

Mr. Rodriguez Torres's comments come days after Attorney General
Luisa Ortega criticized the government's escalating repression,
underlining growing pressure on Mr. Maduro from top current and
former ruling party officials, the report notes.

An attempt by judges allied with Mr. Maduro to dissolve the
opposition-controlled congress in late March has triggered a wave
of unrest that has claimed at least 37 lives, provoked
unprecedented international condemnation, divided the ruling party
and energized a fractious opposition, the report relays.

Thousands of opposition supporters gathered across Caracas and
other cities again to demand the release of political prisoners
and call for general elections, the report notes.

Mr. Maduro has responded to spiraling economic crisis and plunging
popularity by neutering the National Assembly, postponing all
elections scheduled for last year and repressing opponents, the
report discloses.

"Closing political avenues to elections means opening the door to
violence," said Mr. Rodriguez Torres, who ran Venezuela's
intelligence service for 12 years and was a close associate of Mr.
Maduro's predecessor, Hugo Ch†vez.  "They are heading toward
anarchy on the streets," he added.

As Mr. Maduro's interior minister, he quashed a wave of
antigovernment protests in 2014, which resulted in the deaths of
43 people, including protesters and security officers, the report
notes.  Those largely middle-class protests against an economic
recession faded without winning concessions from the government,
demoralizing the opposition movement for years, the report relays.

That recession has led Venezuela to its worst economic crisis, the
report says.  The economy has shrunk by more than a third in the
last five years, according to investment bank Torino Capital,
leading to crippling food and medicine shortages, the report
notes.

"The life conditions of Venezuelans have deteriorated greatly
since 2014, leading more people on to the streets," said Mr.
Rodr°guez Torres, the report notes.  The government won't restore
order with repression without addressing the economic roots of the
crisis, he said, the report says.

Opposition leaders have called on the military to stop cracking
down on the largely peaceful protests and to defend the country's
constitution against what they call Mr. Maduro's slide to
dictatorship, the report discloses.

Mr. Rodriguez Torres, 53 years old, said he is unaware of any
discontent among the military's top brass but added there is
growing discontent among the common soldiers who have been
battered by the economic mess, the report says.

"What's happening outside in society, is also happening inside in
the armed forces," he said.  "The soldiers are suffering because
they can't obtain medicines, because they don't have enough money
for food," he added.

Mr. Rodriguez Torres said Mr. Maduro fired him from the government
in late 2014 for criticizing the president's handling of the
economy, particularly his insistence on maintaining stringent
currency controls, the report notes.  The retired general said he
believes the currency controls are the root cause of the country's
falling production and rampant corruption, the report discloses.

He has since founded the Wide Movement political group aimed at
supporters of Mr. Chavez's movement, known as chavismo, who have
grown disenchanted with Mr. Maduro, the report recalls.

"We can't be thinking about saving chavismo now, we have to save
the country," Mr. Rodr°guez Torres said, the report notes.

He said he is evaluating launching a presidential bid in the next
elections as an independent candidate, the report relays.

To try to quell the unrest, Mr. Maduro began a process to call a
special assembly with sweeping powers that include redrafting the
constitution, the report notes.  He said the assembly will
represent all sectors of society but has hinted that he himself
will pick the constituents who will elect the assembly
representatives, the report relays.

The opposition alliance has decried the assembly as a sham and
said it would stay on the streets until the government calls free
general elections, the report discloses.

Mr. Rodriguez Torres said even by handpicking the electorate, Mr.
Maduro can't be assured control of the assembly given how little
popular support he has, the report relays.

"This is a very high-risk strategy for the government," he said.
"They can end up losing everything," he added.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 28, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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