TCRLA_Public/170522.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Monday, May 22, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 100


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: President to Ask Court to Suspend Corruption Probe
CHINA CONSTRUCTION: S&P Raises ICR to BB on Improved Support
CONCESSIONARIA DO SISTEMA: Moody's Rates BRL800MM Unsec. Debt Ba2


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BLUE ELITE: Creditors Proofs of Debt Due Today
CCI INTERNATIONAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
INSPARO AFRICA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
INSPARO AFRICA EQUITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MINSTREL LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

OLYMPIA STAR II: Creditors Proofs of Debt Due June 9
PHOENIX REAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PROMSTROI SPV: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
TREE INVESTMENT: Creditors Proofs of Debt Due June 8


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Merchants Riled as Haiti Again Bars Products


M E X I C O

BBVA BANCOMER: Fitch Affirms Rating on LT Sub. Notes at BB+
ELEMENTIA SAB: Fitch Affirms BB+ IDR; Outlook Stable


P E R U

BANCO DE CREDITO: Fitch Cuts Jr. Subordinated Debt Rating to BB-
BANCO INTERAMERICANO: Fitch Affirms BB- Support Rating Floor
BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Fitch Affirms BB Jr. Subordinated Debt Rating


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Recent US Court Decision Underscores Treaty Importance
VENEZUELA: Opposition Leader Barred from Leaving Country


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Analyst Says Caribbean Firms at Risk for Ransomware Attacks

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From May 15 to May 19, 2017


                            - - - - -


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: President to Ask Court to Suspend Corruption Probe
----------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Pearson and Luciana Magalhaes at The Wall Street Journal
report that Brazilian President Michel Temer said he would ask the
Supreme Court to suspend its investigation into allegations he was
involved in a giant corruption scheme, vowing to remain in power.

Brazil's deeply unpopular president alleged a recording that
implicated him in the scandal was doctored and said he would file
a petition with the Supreme Court to suspend the investigation
until it could be verified, according to WSJ.

"Our country will not go off the rails -- I will continue at the
front of the government," Mr. Temer said in his latest defiant
speech about the allegations, the report notes.

The Supreme Court declined to comment.

Mr. Temer's statement comes the day after it emerged that
executives at Brazil's meatpacking giant JBS SA told prosecutors
they had paid millions of dollars in bribes to the president and
his predecessors, Dilma Rousseff and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva,
the report relays.

In the recording cited by Mr. Temer, the president can be heard
chatting with Joesley Batista, chairman and heir of the family-run
beef-and-chicken JBS empire, apparently giving him his approval to
pay a jailed congressman to buy his silence, the report relays.  A
spokesman for Mr. Batista said the recording of Mr. Temer wasn't
edited.  Mr. Batista made the recording and gave it to
prosecutors.

The report discloses that Mr. Temer used his speech to attack JBS,
accusing its executives of "damaging Brazil."  He also highlighted
media reports that JBS made money from the latest scandal by
buying large amounts of dollars before the news broke, the report
relays.  The Brazilian real plunged in value against the dollar on
Thursday, May 18, the first day of trading after a report about
the recording was published, the report notes.

JBS has said its actions over the past few days were in line with
the company's risk-management and financial-protection policies,
says the report.

In documents and videos released by the country's Supreme Court,
JBS executives told prosecutors the company paid a total of $123
million in bribes to the country's politicians over recent years,
including payments of $4.6 million to Mr. Temer, the report notes.

Mr. Batista said he also deposited at least $50 million in an
offshore account held by Mr. da Silva and another $30 million in
an offshore bank account for Ms. Rousseff, the report says.

Mr. Temer has denied any wrongdoing.  Mr. da Silva's lawyer denied
any wrongdoing on the former president's part.  Ms. Rousseff also
denied receiving illegal payments or having offshore accounts.

Protests are planned across Brazil's major cities against Mr.
Temer, whose popularity rating was less than 9% even before the
latest scandal broke, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 17, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook
on Brazil's rating to stable from negative and affirmed its issuer
rating, senior unsecured at Ba2 and shelf ratings at (P) Ba2.


CHINA CONSTRUCTION: S&P Raises ICR to BB on Improved Support
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings Services raised its global scale long-term
issuer credit rating on China Construction Bank (Brasil) Banco
Multiplo S.A. (CCB Brasil) to 'BB' from 'B+' and its national
scale rating to 'brAA-' from 'brBBB'.  At the same time, S&P
removed the ratings from CreditWatch developing, where it placed
them on April 1, 2016.  S&P also affirmed its 'B' short-term
issuer credit rating.  The outlook is negative.  The bank's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) remains at 'ccc+'.

The upgrade on CCB Brasil reflects S&P's view that it has been
gradually increasing its integration with its parent, China
Construction Bank Corp. (CCB) since the latter acquired the bank
in 2014.  The upgrade also reflects CCB's continued strong
commitments to CCB Brasil.  The parent has been providing high
level support to its Brazilian subsidiary including several rounds
of capital injection, a large funding facility, and placement of
senior management of the subsidiary from China.  S&P believes it's
highly unlikely that CCB will disinvest its Brazilian subsidiary
in at least the next two to three years due to its high importance
to the group's globalization strategy.  Moreover, CCB views the
Brazilian bank as a flagship overseas subsidiary given Sino-Brazil
trade and Chinese companies investing in Brazil, by serving
existing Chinese companies' expansion in South America as well as
acquiring new international clients.  In additional to banking
business in Brazil, CCB Brazil also operates in other countries in
South America.  S&P also believes that CCB Brasil is now fully
integrated with the group from a management, operational
perspective, and risk management process. CCB Brasil's top
management team mostly consists of CCB executives, including the
CEO, CFO, and the CRO.  Each business function of CCB Brazil has
vertical reporting lines to CCB's respective departments on very
high frequencies. CCB Brasil has also adopted CCB's credit
policies and risk appetite.  Moreover, the parent formed a special
task group in 2017 aiming to help CCB Brazil's business, in term
of business and risk control, capital management, as well as legal
matters and compliance.  S&P expects the integration between CCB
Brasil and CCB to further strengthen.

S&P also believes that the extraordinary support that CCB could
receive from Chinese central government could benefit CCB Brasil.
S&P notes Chinese banks' operations in developing economies are in
line with China's national policy of deepening trade ties,
securing natural resources, and facilitating industrial capacity
cooperation.

CCB Brasil's stand-alone assessment reflects its somewhat
concentrated business profile given that the bank mostly lends to
midsize and large corporations.  S&P also bases its assessment on
CCB Brasil's weak internal capital generation, which resulted in
below-minimum required capital Tier I ratio as of December 2016.
Moreover, S&P's assessment reflects the bank's poor asset quality
metrics in the past three years as a result of a deteriorating
credit quality of its small- to mid-size enterprise (SME)
portfolio, stemming from Brazil's stagnant economy for the past
few years.  The ratings also reflect S&P's view of the bank's
funding structure that still lacks broad diversification among
stable funding sources and its liquidity position that provides
adequate cushion to cope with cash outflows over the next 12
months


CONCESSIONARIA DO SISTEMA: Moody's Rates BRL800MM Unsec. Debt Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has assigned a Ba2 global scale rating and
a Aa1.br national scale rating to the planned BRL800 million
senior unsecured debentures due in 2022, to be issued by
Concessionaria do Sistema Anhanguera-Bandeirantes S.A.. The
issuance allows for additional and supplementary amounts during
the book building process that could increase total issuance up to
BRL 1.1 billion. Proceeds from this issuance will be used to repay
the current outstanding 4th issuance of commercial notes due in
January 2018. The outlook remains stable.

AutoBan plans to issue the senior unsecured debentures in June
2017. The notes will have a 5-year tenor with a bullet principal
payment at maturity (2022). Interests payments will be semi-annual
starting after one year following issuance. The debentures will
have cross-default clauses with other debt at AutoBAn and will
include acceleration clauses for the following events among
others: (i) the non-payment of any financial obligation above BRL
100 million, (ii) change of control and termination of the
concession contract and (iii) dividend payment above the minimum
required by Brazilian Corporate Law if the Net Debt to EBITDA
ratio exceeds 4.0x, except in the case in which AutoBAn contracts
a letter of credit equivalent to the outstanding debenture amount.

In date, the state of Sao Paulo's toll road regulator, ARTESP
opened a judicial process to challenge a 2006 contract amendment
that extended the company's concession life in order to compensate
additional investments and taxes that were not contemplated in the
original contract. This debenture issuance will benefit from a
conditional corporate guarantee from CCR S.A. (Ba3 stable) that
will cover the early termination of the concession under a
scenario where there is a judicial ruling against the
concessionaire relative to that process.

As other AutoBAn's debentures do not benefit from a similar
guarantee, Moody's notes that the 2022 debenture issuance could
have a higher claim position relative to existing debentures
holders in the event of an adverse outcome of the ARTESP case.
While the occurrence of such event could result in some
differentiation between the ratings of the 2022 issuance and the
ratings of existing debentures in the future, the certainty of
such a development is not sufficient to warrant a ratings
differentiation at this time.

The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation.
Moody's does not anticipate changes in the main conditions that
the debentures will carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final
documentation deviate from the original ones submitted and
reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's will assess the impact that
these differences may have on the ratings and act accordingly.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2/Aa1.br ratings reflect AutoBAn's road system strong asset
features located in a well-developed and economically diversified
region in the State of Sao Paulo (Ba2 stable) as well as its
relative position to local peers. AutoBAn has strong credit
metrics for its rating category driven by relatively stable cash
flows and low CAPEX requirements due to the mature nature of the
concession. The sound access to the local banking and capital
markets together with strong management team further support the
rating. Moody's foresees that AutoBAn will continue to issue debt,
re-leveraging primarily to pay dividends, in an overall prudent
manner to maintain its credit metrics.

On the other hand, AutoBAn's ratings are constrained by (i)
Brazil's sovereign rating (ii) uncertainty on the 2006 contract
amendment and potential negative outcome, (iii) the track record
of high dividend distributions, which Moody's expects will
continue in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the high level of
investment activity of its controlling shareholder, CCR and the
consequent track record of high dividend distributions also weigh
on the rating.

What Could Change the Rating -- Up/ Down

AutoBAn's ratings are constrained by the sovereign, therefore an
upgrade of Brazil's rating could also lead to an upgrade of
AutoBAn's ratings.

Deterioration in the sovereign's credit quality could exert
downward pressure on the ratings. In addition, the ratings could
be downgraded if there is a significant and sustained
deterioration in the company's credit metrics and liquidity. The
deterioration in the credit quality of CCR could also exert
downward pressure for AutoBAn as well as if Moody's perceives
further deterioration in the concession and regulatory framework
in the State of Sao Paulo, or political interference in the normal
course of business. Moody's also assume that neither CCR nor any
of its subsidiaries will incur new debt containing cross default
provisions that could affect AutoBAn's ratings. A negative outcome
of the ongoing judicial dispute with ARTESP could also weigh on
the ratings.

In 1998, AutoBAn was awarded a 20-year concession to expand,
operate and maintain the 317-kilometer Anhanguera-Bandeirantes
road system, which in 2006 was extended for another eight years
and eleven months, until 2027. The road system comprises the
AnhangĂ…era (SP-330), Bandeirantes (SP-348), and Dom Gabriel
Paulino Bueno Couto (SP-300) highways, and the Adalberto Panzan
(SPI-102/330) connector (altogether the "Concession"). AutoBAn's
system connects the Sao Paulo metropolitan area to the wealthy
cities of Campinas, Jundiai and Limeira. This area has been known
as the "Brazilian Silicon Valley" given the concentration of high
tech industries but it is still a leading industrial and
agribusiness region.

AutoBAn is an operating subsidiary of CCR, one of Brazil's largest
toll-road concession groups, which operates and maintains 3,265
kilometers of toll road concessions. CCR is controlled by the
Andrade Gutierrez Group, the Camargo Correa Group and the Soares
Penido Group with a combined participation of 44.27% while the
remaining 55.23% shares are free float. AutoBAn is CCR's most
important revenue-generating asset accounting for approximately
25% and 28% of CCR's consolidated net operating revenues and
EBITDA, respectively. In the FY2016, CCR reported Moody's-adjusted
consolidated net operating revenues of BRL6.7 billion and EBITDA
of BRL4.5 billion.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Privately
Managed Toll Roads published in May 2014.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in May
2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings from Global Scale
Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute meaning in terms of
default risk or expected loss, a historical probability of default
consistent with a given NSR can be inferred from the GSR to which
it maps back at that particular point in time. For information on
the historical default rates associated with different global
scale rating categories over different investment horizons.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BLUE ELITE: Creditors Proofs of Debt Due Today
-----------------------------------------------
The creditors of Blue Elite Enhanced Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt today, May 22, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Feb. 23, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Priestleys
          c/o Charlotte Jones
          P.O. Box 30310 Grand Cayman KY1-1202
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 1577
          Facsimile: (345) 947 0826


CCI INTERNATIONAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of CCI International Partners European Fund
Ltd., on April 25, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Columbus Circle Investors
          Metro Center
          One Station Place
          Stamford
          Connecticut 06902
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (203) 353 6000


INSPARO AFRICA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Insparo Africa Equity Fund Limited, on
April 24, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          c/o Cate Barbour
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +44 (0)20 7220 4970


INSPARO AFRICA EQUITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Insparo Africa Equity (General Partner)
Limited, on April 24, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          c/o Cate Barbour
          Walkers
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9001
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +44 (0)20 7220 4970


MINSTREL LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Minstrel Ltd., on April 3, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          John Donnelly
          Office 1503, Level15
          AI Moosa Tower 1
          Sheikh Zayed Road
          Dubai
          United Arab Emirates
          Telephone: 971 50 372 1726
          Facsimile: 971 4 401 9666


OLYMPIA STAR II: Creditors Proofs of Debt Due June 9
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Olympia Star II PF Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by June 9, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 24, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          Newington Ltd.
          c/o J. Andrew Murray
          P.O. Box 2075 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-949-9710


PHOENIX REAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Phoenix Real Estate Fund GP Limited, on
April 20, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidators are:

          Ho Lon Gee
          Lee Wei Hsiung
          c/o Carey Olsen
          Willow House, Cricket Square
          P.O. Box 10008 Grand Cayman KY1-1001
          Cayman Islands


PROMSTROI SPV: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Promstroi SPV Limited, on April 24, 2017,
passed a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers Liquidations Limited
          Cayman Corporate Centre
          27 Hospital Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100


TREE INVESTMENT: Creditors Proofs of Debt Due June 8
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Tree Investment Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by June 8, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 20, 2017.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Merchants Riled as Haiti Again Bars Products
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Haitian authorities are barring the
entry of at least 23 Dominican-made products in the sprawling
farmers market held every Monday and Friday, after months of
normal trading.

As of May 9, Friday Haiti Customs inspectors and police officers
in their side of the border turn back Dominican industrial and
agro products, at the bridge across the Masacre river, which
separates the two countries that share the island of Hispaniola,
according to Dominican Today.

The ban sparked the immediate protest by the Dajabon Merchants
Federation, which complained that they weren't notified by Haitian
authorities, the report notes.

Federation leaders Abigail Bueno and Fernando Diaz said Haiti
apparently backpedaled on the ban on a range of Dominican
products, which had been lifted several months ago, the report
relays.

Among the products not allowed by Haiti officials figure frozen
and fresh chicken, eggs, pasta, sausages, plantains, cassava,
sweet potatoes, onions and peppers, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 1, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.  The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment is unchanged at 'BB+'.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


BBVA BANCOMER: Fitch Affirms Rating on LT Sub. Notes at BB+
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following ratings for BBVA
Bancomer: Viability rating (VR) at 'a-' and its Long- and Short-
Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'A-/F1'. The Rating Outlook on the Long-Term ratings is Negative.

Fitch has also affirmed the long- and short-term National scale
ratings of BBVA Bancomer, Casa de Bolsa BBVA Bancomer, S.A de
C.V., Grupo Financiero BBVA Bancomer (CBBB) and Facileasing, S.A.
de C.V. (Facileasing) at 'AAA(mex)/'F1+(mex)'.

The bank's VR and Long-Term IDRs are one notch above Mexico's
sovereign rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Negative Rating Outlook
The Negative Outlook on BBVA Bancomer's IDRs reflects that its VR
is already one notch above the sovereign, an uplift that Fitch is
unlikely to widen in the future; this bank's VR and IDRs will
likely mirror a potential sovereign downgrade. Fitch considers
BBVA Bancomer as a core subsidiary for its parent, Spain's Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA, 'A-'/Stable Outlook). However,
considering the material size of the Mexican subsidiary, the
implicit support floor would be 'BBB+', which limits downside
potential for the IDRs to 'BBB+'.

VR, IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

BBVA Bancomer's IDRs and National ratings are driven by its
standalone profile as reflected in its VR. As of, the bank's VR
and IDRs do not factor in any extraordinary support from its
parent, despite being considered by Fitch as a core subsidiary of
its holding company, Spain's BBVA.

The affirmation of BBVA Bancomer's VR considers its adequate and
stable asset quality metrics and its strong and recurring earnings
that drive the bank's sound profitability metrics, which, in
addition, are above those of its closest peers. The ratings also
factor in the bank's leading franchise in terms of total assets,
customer deposits and loan portfolio, with a sustained local
market share above 20% in every factor mentioned above and well
above its main competitors; and its diversified business model,
revenues and funding sources. The reasonable loss-absorption
capacity of the bank through a relatively tight capital base and
adequate liquidity management were also considered for the
affirmation.

BBVA Bancomer's asset quality metrics are adequate in Fitch's
opinion. Its non-performing loan ratio (NPL) has consolidated
below 2.5% since 2014. Improvements are seen in practically every
business segment as a result of continued efforts to improve
underwriting standards. Fitch also looks at the adjusted
impairment ratio published by the local regulator. This asset
quality measure considers impaired loans + charge-offs (last 12
months). Compared against its closest peers, BBVA Bancomer's total
adjusted ratios are lower. Concentrations by creditor are moderate
at the bank level.

Overall profitability at the bank remains as the strongest element
of its financial profile. The bank's profitability metrics are the
strongest within the G7 and earnings have proven resilient through
the economic cycles. Although net interest income (NII) is the
largest contributor to the bank's income stream, Fitch notes that
net fees and commissions have also become a stable source of
income. The bank's net interest margin (NIM) has remained sound
and steady above 6% since 2012 (March 2017: 6.7%).

The bank's operating profit to risk weighted assets (RWAs) stood
at 3.9% as of March 2017, close to the 3.8% registered as of March
2016 and higher than the average from 2013 to 2016 of 2.9%.
Operating profits are driven by stable core earnings from a
growing lending base and the relatively contained credit and non-
interest costs, despite the amortization costs related to its new
headquarters in 2016. Efficiency (cost-to-income) stood at 38.7%
at 1Q17 (1Q16: 41.1%), the lowest level exhibited by the bank in
the last few years.

Fitch considers BBVA Bancomer's capital metrics as acceptable but
relatively tight when compared against other Mexican systemic
banks. The bank's Fitch core capital (FCC) to FCC minus adjusted
RWAs was 10.9% on average from 2013 to 2016 and 11.2% by the end
of 1Q17. Although capital is supported by the entity's adequate
and recurring earnings, the relatively high dividend pay-out ratio
(average cash dividends-to-net income from 2013 -2015 is 58.8%)
restricts the robustness of its capital ratios.

The bank's funding profile benefits from an ample and stable
deposit base with the highest market share of demand and term core
customer deposits of the total banking system for many years. As
of March 2017, its loans-to-customer deposit ratio stood at 107%.
However, this ratio still compares unfavorably against its closest
peers, whose ratios are closer to 100%. In addition, Fitch
considers BBVA Bancomer's total funding base (excluding
derivatives) to be fairly diversified by source but mainly
concentrated in short-term debt, which drives negative cumulative
gaps in the 30-day and six-month buckets and somewhat constrains
liquidity. However, the agency believes that liquidity is
mitigated by the bank's historical stability of deposits and its
leading role in the system.

BBVA Bancomer complied with the local regulator's limit of the
Basel III LCR. Mexican banks are required to publish the
calculation of this ratio in its quarterly financial results since
March 2015. As of March 2017, BBVA Bancomer's LCR stood at 125%,
well above the requirement of 80% for 2017.

SUPPORT RATING

Fitch affirmed BBVA Bancomer's Support Rating at '2' reflecting
the view that there is high probability of support to BBVA
Bancomer from BBVA if needed given the core role of the Mexican
subsidiary for its parent.

SUBORDINATED AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's global junior subordinated debt is rated four notches
below the anchor rating, BBVA Bancomer's VR, while the foreign
subordinated debt is rated three notches below its VR. The ratings
are driven by Fitch's approach of factoring in the loss severity
in view of the respective degrees of subordination (-1 for the
plain subordinated notes and -2 for the junior subordinated
notes), plus the effect of non-performance risk (-2 notches for
both types of securities).

Fitch rates BBVA Bancomer and Facileasing's local debt issuances
at their respective corporate rating level, as the debt is senior
unsecured.

CBBB NATIONAL RATINGS

The ratings of CBBB are driven by the legal obligation GFBB has to
support its subsidiaries, if needed. In Fitch's view this entity
remains core for the GFBB's strategy and for its ultimate parent,
BBVA. The credit profile of Grupo Financiero BBVA Bancomer (GFBB)
is associated with that of its main subsidiary, BBVA Bancomer.

FACILEASING'S NATIONAL RATINGS The ratings of Facileasing factor
in that, in Fitch's view, the entity is an integral part of BBVA
Bancomer's and GFBB's business model and core to the strategy of
the ultimate parent in Mexico. Facileasing is a direct subsidiary
of the ultimate parent, Spain's BBVA, so regulatory commitments
are not in place and any required support will come from GFBB.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

VRs, IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The ratings and Outlook for BBVA Bancomer are sensitive to any
further changes in Mexico's sovereign ratings, or material
deterioration on the local operating environment over the
foreseeable future. In Fitch's view, there is a material
possibility that the IDRs would be downgraded in the event of a
sovereign downgrade. Short-term ratings do not have an Outlook,
but any downgrade of the bank's IDRs could trigger a one-notch
downgrade of its short-term IDRs.

The ratings could also be downgraded upon a sustained
deterioration of the bank's stable profitability, asset quality,
and capitalization metrics, such as an FCC ratio deteriorating to
levels consistently below 10%. However, Fitch believes this is
unlikely at present given the bank's stable and resilient
recurring earnings.

The bank's ratings have limited upside potential over the
foreseeable future, in line with the expectations for the Mexican
sovereign ratings and its operating environment. However, BBVA
Bancomer's ratings could benefit from a significantly enhanced
financial profile in terms of capitalization and funding.

The National-scale ratings could only be affected in the event of
a multi-notch downgrade of BBVA Bancomer's VR, which is also an
unlikely scenario at present.

SUPPORT RATING

BBVA Bancomer's Support Rating could be affected if Fitch changes
its view of BBVA's ability or willingness to support the Mexican
bank, which is an unlikely scenario.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The bank's subordinated debt ratings will likely mirror any change
in its VR, as these issue ratings are expected to maintain the
same relation to BBVA Bancomer's intrinsic profile. Senior debt
ratings would mirror any changes in the bank's IDRs or National-
scale ratings.

CBBB's NATIONAL RATINGS

A downgrade of CBBB will be driven by any potential changes in
BBVA Bancomer's ratings or in the legal framework that could alter
the propensity of GFBB to support them (an unlikely scenario at
present) and/or by a change in GFBB's credit quality.

FACILEASING'S NATIONAL RATINGS

A potential downgrade of Facileasing's ratings will be driven by a
change on Fitch's view as to the importance of this entity to GFBB
and for the strategy in Mexico, and/or by a change in GFBB's
credit quality.

Fitch affirms the following ratings:

BBVA Bancomer, S.A.
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'A-'; Outlook
    Negative;
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs at 'F1';
-- Viability rating at 'a-';
-- Support rating at '2';
-- National-scale long-term rating at 'AAA(mex)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National-scale short-term rating at 'F1+(mex)';
-- Long-term 'plain vanilla' subordinated notes at 'BBB-';
-- Long-term junior subordinated notes at 'BB+';
-- Long-term senior unsecured global notes at 'A-';
-- Long-term Tier 2 subordinated capital notes at 'BBB-';
-- National-scale long-term rating for local senior unsecured
    debt issues at 'AAA(mex)';
-- National-scale long-term rating for local issues of market-
    linked securities at 'AAAemr(mex)'.

Casa de Bolsa BBVA Bancomer, S.A. de C.V.
-- National-scale long-term rating at 'AAA(mex)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National-scale short-term rating at 'F1+(mex)'.

Facileasing, S.A. de C.V.
-- National-scale long-term rating at 'AAA(mex)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National-scale short-term rating affirmed at 'F1+(mex)';
-- National-scale long-term rating for local senior unsecured
    debt issues at 'AAA(mex)'.


ELEMENTIA SAB: Fitch Affirms BB+ IDR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Elementia, S.A.B. de C.V.'s (Elementia)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'BB+', as well as its long-term national scale rating at
'A+(mex)'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Elementia's ratings reflect its strong business profile
characterized by geographic and product line diversification,
leading market shares in copper and in several of its building
systems products, which have high brand recognition. Other factors
include a well-developed distribution network, stable operating
results and the company's shareholders' strength. Factors that
limit Elementia's ratings are its history of high leverage,
industry cyclicality and input cost volatility.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Broad Product Offering: Elementia's profitability is supported by
a diversified revenue base and wide distribution network and
product offerings. The cement division (49% of pro forma
consolidated EBITDA) should remain the highest margin segment. The
metal segment (28%) applies a cost-plus margin formula, allowing
it to pass through metal price variations to end customers,
resulting in more stable cash flow generation. The building
systems segment (23%) sells a variety of roofing, sidings, water
storage tanks and other products in the Americas.

Expanding Cement Business: The company's cement division became
the largest contributor to EBITDA in 2016. This segment's relative
contribution should continue to grow during 2017. Elementia
recently completed a 1.5 million metric tons (MT) expansion of its
Tula cement plant and is in the process of integrating its
acquisition of Giant Cement Holding Inc. (Giant), a U.S.-based
cement company serving the eastern United States. Elementia
acquired a 55% stake of Giant during fourth-quarter 2016 (4Q16).

Balanced Funding Strategy: Elementia's leverage has been volatile,
partly due to greenfield investments in the cement division, as
well as asset acquisitions and dispositions within its business
portfolio. The company issued shares in the equity markets for
MXN3.9 billion (USD231 million) during 2015 and raised an
additional MXN4.4 billion (USD233 million) in 2016 through a
rights offering to partially fund the acquisition of its stake in
Giant.

High Leverage Should Decline: Elementia's net adjusted debt/EBITDA
should trend to around 2.5x by 2018 from 3.0x as of 1Q17 on a pro
forma consolidated basis with the acquisition of Giant. The main
drivers of deleveraging should be the start of Elementia's cement
expansion plant in Tula, Mexico, rising cement demand and stronger
pricing in the U.S., and cost efficiencies. The reopening of
Elementia's Indiana fiber cement facility, which is expected
to begin ramp-up in 2018, should also contribute.

Positive FCF Expected: The company's free cash flow (FCF) was
negative MXN743 million during 2016 as it invested MXN2.6 billion
in its Tula, Hidalgo cement plant. This compares to a modest
negative MXN73 million during 2015. Fitch projects Elementia's FCF
to be positive between 1% and 2% of sales through 2019 as the
company has deployed the bulk of its expansion capex. Fitch's FCF
estimate includes solid cash flow from operations (CFFO) of
approximately MXN2.8 billion during 2017 and around MXN3 billion
in 2018.

Environmental Regulations: The company uses chrysotile fibers (the
sole form of asbestos still in use, in line with international
standards and local environmental regulations) for production of
fiber-cement products. Elementia has invested in production
capacity for different fibers, with most facilities set to produce
using different technologies. Though Elementia has avoided
litigation for its chrysotile use, future claims cannot be ruled
out.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Elementia's 'BB+' ratings reflect the company's broad product
offering relative to regional cement producers such as Grupo
Cementos de Chihuahua ('BB'/Outlook Stable) and fiber cement
producer James Hardie ('BBB-'/Outlook Stable). This is partially
offset by Elementia's more acquisitive nature which has resulted
in high and more volatile leverage metrics. A weaker competitive
position and geographic diversification than major global peers,
notably Cemex, S.A.B. de C.V. ('BB-'/Outlook Positive) based on
scale and size of cement operations is offset by a balanced
funding strategy, solid financial flexibility and product
diversification. No country ceiling constraint and operating
environment influence were in effect for the ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:
-- Double-digit revenue growth reflecting the contribution from
    acquired assets in 2016. Mid-to-high single-digit revenue
    growth for 2018-2019, reflecting primarily revenue growth in
    building systems and cement divisions;

-- Cement sales volumes accelerate in 2018 reflecting the
    expansion in Tula, Hidalgo and to lesser extent market growing
    cement demand in the Eastern United States;

-- The exchange rate averages about 20 Mexican pesos per U.S.
    dollar;

-- EBITDA margins remain around 17%-18%;

-- FCF positive through 2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
Positive rating actions could be driven by a strengthening of
Elementia's business and financial positions. Expectations of
positive FCF generation and stable operating results through
industry and economic cycles resulting in sustained leverage
levels of total debt/EBITDA around 2.5x and net debt/EBITDA below
2x could have positive implications for the rating.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
Negative factors that could affect the company's credit profile
include, among others, declining market shares along business
lines and loss of competitive position, reduced operating cash
flows and profitability, and reduced liquidity. Expectations of
total debt/EBITDA above 4x or net debt/EBITDA approaching 3.5x
would likely pressure the ratings.

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: The company's cash balance as of 1Q17 was
MXN3.5 billion, which should adequately cover MXN3.1 billion of
short-term obligations. Almost all of the short-term debt is a
revolving short-term credit line which, combined with MXN3.3
billion in committed credit, was used to fund a USD305 million
intercompany loan to Giant. Proceeds from this loan coupled with
USD220 million of equity raised by Elementia through the rights
offering was used to fully pay Giant's high-cost debt. The
resulting interest savings should allow Giant to fund capex needed
to upgrade its operations.
Elementia's debt consists mostly of USD425 million in unsecured
notes due 2025 and bank debt raised to fund investments in the
cement division. The company maintains good access to capital
markets and bank lending, which should allow it extend its
maturity profile. Committed credit lines of MXN1.9 billion due
2020, should provide additional financial flexibility.]

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed Elementia's ratings:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
    'BB+';
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB+';
-- Long-Term national scale rating at 'A+(mex)';
-- Senior unsecured USD425 million notes at 'BB+'.


=======
P E R U
=======


BANCO DE CREDITO: Fitch Cuts Jr. Subordinated Debt Rating to BB-
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banco de Credito del Peru's (BCP)
Viability Rating (VR) and Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) by one
notch to 'bbb+' and 'BBB+' from 'a-' and 'A-', respectively, in
line with Peru's sovereign rating. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Fitch's downgrade of BCP's ratings reflects the agency's view that
despite BCP's leading franchise and strong credit profile,
structural constraints in the operating environment no longer
warrant the bank's one notch rating above the sovereign. These
constraints include the banking system's reliance on the central
bank as a provider of foreign currency hedging as well as local
currency liquidity, which Fitch views as a persistent feature of
the financial system.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
VR, IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

BCP's IDR is based on its stand-alone financial strength as
reflected in its VR. The operating environment and the bank's
dominant franchise highly influence BCP's VR. BCP's VR also
considers the bank's adequate loss absorption capacity, high and
sustained profitability and sound credit risk management, together
with strong liquidity and stable and diversified funding.

Sound risk management policies and diversification allowed BCP to
maintain 90-day past due loans (PDLs) as a proportion of gross
loans below 2% on average for more than five years, although with
an increasing trend. This level is well within the metrics for the
bank's current ratings. Additionally, loan loss reserves amply
covered PDLs by 1.6x at year-end (YE) 2016, one of the highest
levels of coverage among peers in the region. At the same time,
the bank's diversified business model and resilient margins,
improving efficiency and moderate credit cost has resulted in a
consistent operating profit to risk weighted assets (RWA)
averaging 3.5% over the five years ending in 2016.

BCP's Fitch core capital ratio (FCC/adjusted RWA) reached 12.3% at
YE 2016, a significant improvement over the prior year (10.9%),
but at a level that Fitch considers consistent with a bank rating
similar to the respective sovereign, not higher. Fitch views BCP's
capitalization as adequate in light of its strong and sustained
profitability and excess reserve coverage. Furthermore, BCP's
junior subordinated bonds could absorb losses prior to the bank
becoming non-viable, further enhancing capitalization levels.
BCP's Basel III international CET 1 ratio is approximately 11%,
well above the internal minimum (9.5% at 2017 and 10% thereafter).

Like the banking system as a whole, BCP accesses central bank
funding and hedging facilities to help close its funding mismatch
by currency. At YE 2016, the central bank's currency repos
represented approximately 10% of the bank's total funding.
However, the bank's funding is ample and well diversified and low
cost relative to local peers notwithstanding an increase in
Fitch's core funding metric of loans-to-deposits (107% at March
2017). More than 50% of BCP's total deposits derive from stable
retail sources.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

BCP's 35% market share in total customer deposits and its outsize
presence in all business segments make it a crucial part of Peru's
financial sector. Support from the government should be
forthcoming in case of need; Peru's ability to provide such
support is reflected in its Sovereign Rating (Long-Term IDR of
'BBB+') and underpins BCP's Support and Support Rating Floor
ratings.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

BCP's subordinated bonds are plain vanilla and with a probability
of non-performance equivalent to that of BCP's senior bonds.
However, they would entail a higher loss severity in case of
default due to their subordinated nature. Hence, they are rated
only one notch below the bank's VR.

BCP's junior subordinated bonds, rated five notches below the
bank's VR, have strong equity-like features including the non-
cumulative deferral of the coupons and a deeper subordination.
This notching reflects the incremental non-performance risk (three
notches) relative to that captured by the VR and the loss severity
(two notches) given its deeper subordination.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRs, VR, AND SENIOR DEBT

BCP's VR and IDRs are constrained by the sovereign and would be
sensitive to any rating action at the sovereign level. Similarly,
the Stable Outlook reflects the outlook of the sovereign and
Fitch's expectations for the maintenance of the bank's current
risk and financial profile over the rating horizon.

BCP's VR and IDRs could be negatively affected if the bank's asset
quality deteriorates significantly causing a sustained decline of
the bank's operating performance and capital cushions (a sustained
decline in the bank's FCC/adjusted RWA ratio to less than 10%
assuming the maintenance of excess reserves and non-core loss
absorbing capital or operating profit to RWA below 2.5%).

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR =

BCP's SR and SRF could be affected if Fitch changes its view of
Peru's ability or willingness to support the bank.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES
The subordinated and junior subordinated debt ratings would move
in line with BCP's VR.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

BCP
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs downgraded to 'BBB+'
    from 'A-', Stable Outlook;
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs downgraded to 'F2'
    from 'F1';
-- Viability Rating downgraded to 'bbb+' from 'a-';
-- Support Rating affirmed at '2';
-- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BBB';
-- Senior unsecured debt downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-';
-- Subordinated debt downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+';
-- Junior subordinated debt downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB'.


BANCO INTERAMERICANO: Fitch Affirms BB- Support Rating Floor
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Interamericano de Finanzas S.A.'s
(BanBif) Long-term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BBB-'.

The Outlook remains Stable given Fitch's expectations for a
sustained financial and risk profile in line with the bank's
current ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
VR and IDRS

BanBif's Long-Term Local and Foreign Currency IDRs are driven by
its Viability Rating (VR) of 'bbb-'. The bank's VR is highly
influenced by its comparatively moderate franchise. Banbif's
ratings also consider its tight capitalization, sound asset
quality, moderate profitability, stable funding and solid
liquidity.

BanBif is a medium-sized universal bank whose size grew steadily
over the past eight years though it remains much smaller than the
four major banks that dominate Peru. BanBif's local market share
was approximately 3.6% of total loans and 3.8% of total deposits
at December 2016. The bank has been consolidating and
strengthening its competitive advantage in the second-tier market,
achieving consistent, albeit modest, performance metrics while
maintaining sound asset quality.

BanBif's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio is comparably lower than
both local and international peers, as growth exceeded internal
capital generation due to the rapid increase of credit costs in
recent years. Given BanBif's stable performance and focus on less
risky business sectors, Fitch views the bank's capitalization as
adequate. During 2016 a deceleration in asset growth contributed
to an improvement in the bank's FCC-to-risk weighted assets (RWA)
ratio to 8.3% at YE16 from 7.8% at YE15. Although the bank's FCC
ratio is relative low compared with international peers (universal
commercial banks in the 'bbb' operating environment), Fitch
expects lower asset growth to reduce pressure on capital.

Sustained loan growth, resilient margins despite an uncertain
operating environment, and the improvement in efficiency
underpinned BanBif's financial performance. Nevertheless,
relatively high credit cost related to loan quality deterioration
continues to weigh on profitability metrics.

The bank has a relatively diversified funding structure and is
reliant on deposits (77% of the total funding at December 2016;
78% at YE15), which are only moderately concentrated. Liquidity
risk is carefully monitored, and the bank's liquidity position is
ample, as BanBif held about PEN3.6 billion of cash and equivalents
that represented 44% of the total short-term funding as of Dec.
31, 2016. Deposits in USDs represent 50% of total funding given
high financial dollarization within the country.

BanBif's asset quality remains good despite the Peruvian economy's
lower growth trajectory in recent years which led to a rapid
increase in non-performing loans (NPLs). However, BanBif continues
to exhibit one of the lowest delinquency levels in the Peruvian
banking system.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

BanBif's Support Rating of '4' and Support Rating Floor of 'BB-'
indicate its systemic importance for the Peruvian banking system.
As the fifth largest Peruvian bank, Fitch believes that there
would be a limited propensity for support from the government,
should it be required.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS and VR

Upside potential for the international ratings is heavily
contingent on a material improvement in capitalization levels,
which is currently one of the weakest elements under Fitch's
rating approach. An upgrade on the VR and IDRs could occur if the
bank is able to reach and sustain an FCC ratio of at least 13%,
while avoiding material deterioration of its other financial and
qualitative credit fundamentals.

A sustained increase of BanBif's risk appetite and / or
deterioration in its loan portfolio that erodes its profitability
and drives overall capital cushions (measured as FCC plus excess
of reserves) below 8% could pressure ratings downward. NPLs
consistently above 2.5% and operating profits-to-risk weighted
assets ratios consistently below 1.2% also would be negative for
creditworthiness.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Upside potential for the Support Rating (SR) and Support Rating
Floor (SRF) is limited and can only occur over time with a
material growth of the bank's systemic importance. These ratings
could be downgraded if the bank loses material market share in
terms of loans and customer deposits.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR at 'BBB-'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR at 'F3';
-- Viability Rating at 'bbb-';
-- Support Rating at '4';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.


BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Fitch Affirms BB Jr. Subordinated Debt Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Internacional del Peru S.A.A.'s
(Interbank) viability rating (VR) and Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'bbb+' and 'BBB+', respectively.

The Outlook remains Stable, reflecting the Stable Outlook on the
sovereign and Fitch's expectation for the maintenance of the
bank's risk and financial profile over the rating horizon.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The bank's IDRs are driven by its VR and standalone strength.
Interbank's operating environment and company profile highly
influence its VR. The Peruvian financial system benefits from a
stable economy with a strong track record of sustained growth, but
potential GDP growth has declined in recent years. Peruvian banks'
increased reliance on the central bank to close dollarization gaps
on their balance sheets and provide local currency liquidity has
weakened the operating environment to a point that it is no longer
the strength that it was in the past relative to the sovereign.
Interbank is the fourth largest universal commercial bank in Peru.
The bank's ratings also consider its solid financial profile.

A sharp decline in growth in 2016, which was in line with the
banking system as a whole, negatively affected Interbank's
profitability and loan quality metrics while positively impacting
its capitalization. Its loan portfolio grew by only 4.6% in 2016
compared to an average of 15.3% during the previous five years, a
rate moderately higher than the banking system average. Lower
demand for credit, as well as tighter underwriting, particularly
in foreign currency, and a pullback in mortgage and SME lending
contributed to growth slowdown. In addition, during 2016 the bank
made continued progress in reducing loan dollarization to 27.3% of
net loans (29.2% at year-end 2015).

Past due loans greater than 90 days (PDLs) increased to 2.48% at
December 2016 from 2.18% the year prior. Its loan quality
indicators are consistently in line or better than the system
average, notwithstanding Interbank's greater retail orientation.
The increase in PDLs derived primarily from the bank's consumer
loan portfolio, particularly credit cards. Loan quality is
mitigated by the bank's ample reserve coverage of 179.8% of PDLs.

Interbank reported a slight decline in profitability metrics in
2016 due to lower transaction volume, an increase in provisioning
and an uptick in funding costs. However, measured against risk
weighted assets, its operating profit was largely, stable at 3.2%
in 2016 (3.3% annual average from 2012-2015), due to a declining
trend in the proportion of risk weighted assets. Fitch expects to
see continued downside pressure in profitability in light of the
increasing trend in impairment charges. This should be partly
offset by continued improvements in operating efficiency.

Reduced asset growth and strong internal capital generation
benefited the bank's capitalization in 2016. Fitch core capital
increased to 11.1% of risk weighted assets at year-end 2016 (9.7%
the prior year) and regulatory capital increased to 15.9% from
15.5% during the same period. The bank's capitalization is
adequate given excess loan loss reserves as well as USD 198
million in Tier I compliant junior subordinated debt and USD 523
million in Tier II compliant subordinated debt equivalent.

Interbank has made significant gains in attracting a stable,
retail deposit base, ranking fourth in customer deposits with a
market share of 12.7%. Like the financial system as a whole,
Interbank's loan de-dollarization has outpaced its deposit de-
dollarization. However, the bank maintains liquidity buffers well
above the local requirements in both local currency and U.S.
dollars. At year-end 2016, the proportion of liquidity to short
term obligations was 57% in foreign currency and 29% in local
currency, above the system averages and well above the 20% and 8%
regulatory minimums.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Interbank's Support Rating and Support Rating Floor reflect
Interbank's sizeable market share in deposits, its presence in all
business segments, as well as the Republic of Peru's capacity to
provide support should it be required.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Interbank's subordinated bonds are plain vanilla. In Fitch's
opinion, their probability of non-performance is equivalent to
that of Interbank's senior bonds but, they would entail a higher
loss in case of default due to their subordinated nature. Hence,
they are rated only one notch below the bank's VR.

Interbank's junior subordinated bonds, rated four notches below
the bank's VR, have non-cumulative deferral of the coupons and a
deeper subordination. This notching reflects the incremental non-
performance risk relative to that captured by the VR and the loss
severity (two notches) given its deeper subordination.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
VRs, IDRS, AND SENIOR DEBT

Given its current rating, there is little upside potential for
Interbank's VR and IDRs. Interbank's ratings could be downgraded
if a severe decline in asset quality (PDLs above 4%) or weak
profitability erode its capital (FCC below 11%) and reserve
cushion.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Interbank's SR and SRF could be affected if Fitch changes its view
of Peru's ability or willingness to support the bank.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The subordinated and junior subordinated debt ratings would move
in line with Interbank's VR.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco Internacional del Peru S.A.A. (Interbank)
-- Long-term foreign currency IDR at 'BBB+', Stable Outlook;
-- Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'F2';
-- Long-term local currency IDR at 'BBB+', Stable Outlook;
-- Short-term local currency IDR at 'F2';
-- Viability rating at 'bbb+';
-- Support rating at '2';
-- Support floor at 'BBB';
-- Senior unsecured debt at 'BBB+';
-- Subordinated debt at 'BBB';
-- Junior subordinated debt at 'BB'.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Recent US Court Decision Underscores Treaty Importance
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Seizures of multinational companies' assets in Venezuela have
become all too common in recent years. The past weeks have brought
two significant new developments, each of which highlights the
importance of securing investment treaty protection -- both in
Venezuela specifically and in any nation where populism or
unstable institutions lead to a high-risk investment climate.

In April 2017, Venezuela again seized assets owned by a U.S.
company, potentially portending a renewed round of expropriations
targeting foreign companies with Venezuelan operations. This
raises the question of what remedies U.S. companies would have if
their assets are expropriated overseas. Because the United States
lacks a treaty with Venezuela providing for international
investment protection, American companies with Venezuelan
operations will not have easily enforceable treaty protections
against expropriation unless they structure their investments in
Venezuela through an appropriate overseas subsidiary in a country
that does have a treaty with Venezuela.

Historically, investors resorted to their own governments to seek
diplomatic protection of their investments overseas, but the
political climate often makes such government intervention
unlikely. Even where an investment does have some treaty
protection, not all treaties are equal. This is particularly true
in Venezuela, which has withdrawn from the ICSID Convention that
provides a framework for the resolution of international
investment disputes. Careful advice is necessary to ensure that
the arbitration provisions in a treaty remain enforceable; the
ability to initiate non-ICSID arbitration will depend on the
treaty's terms.

The most likely avenue for securing investment treaty protection
in Venezuela is to utilize investment treaties that Venezuela has
entered into with other countries that provide for enforcement of
treaty protections through arbitration under the rules of UNCITRAL
(an arm of the United Nations). The recent Andarko interim award
upholding UNCITRAL arbitral jurisdiction under a Barbados-
Venezuela investment treaty following Venezuela's denunciation of
the ICSID demonstrates that such protection remains available to
foreign investors. This requires careful planning, as many
countries including the United States have not signed an
investment treaty with Venezuela.  In order to obtain this
investment protection, investments must be properly structured
before an investment dispute arises.

The U.S. Supreme Court's May 1, 2017, decision in Republic of
Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. further
underscores the importance of investment treaty protection, as the
Court limited the circumstances in which companies can resort to
U.S. courts to pursue remedies against expropriation. In that
case, Venezuela seized oil rigs from the Venezuelan subsidiary of
a U.S. oil company.

The U.S. oil company and its Venezuelan subsidiary filed a lawsuit
against Venezuela in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia claiming that Venezuela's expropriation was unlawful. The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") generally prevents U.S.
courts from exercising jurisdiction against a foreign country,
but, unlike many countries' sovereign immunity laws, contains an
exception for cases involving property rights taken in violation
of international law where the foreign agency or instrumentality
engages in commercial activity in the United States. The district
court dismissed the claims by the Venezuelan subsidiary but held
that the claims asserted by the U.S. parent could proceed under
the expropriation exception of the FSIA. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the claims of both
the parent and subsidiary could proceed because they presented a
non-frivolous argument that the property was taken in violation of
international law, which sufficed to invoke the expropriation
exception and grant American courts jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that only an actual violation of
international law in the seizure would suffice. While the
Court did not decide whether the expropriation at issue violated
international law, it did cite a number of international cases and
treatises suggesting that international law generally does not
provide a remedy for a state's seizure of its own nationals'
property, and that a locally incorporated subsidiary is considered
solely a national of that state.

Given the Court's ruling in Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne, it
seems likely that companies operating through local subsidiaries
around the world may find it increasingly difficult to bring
claims in U.S. courts for expropiatory actions taken abroad.
Although that part of the decision is in dicta only, companies
operating overseas may want to consider whether there are other
corporate structures available that would preserve their right to
invoke the expropriation exception to the FSIA.

In any event, these developments underscore the importance of
considering treaty protection in structuring investments (whether
future or existing) in higher-risk countries. Investor-state
arbitration provides a much more certain remedy than either
diplomatic protection or navigating the narrow path to U.S.
jurisdiction under the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.
Kirkland's experienced international arbitration counsel can
assist you in structuring investments to maximize your protection
under treaties before a dispute arises, and can help clients to
assess the relative benefits of different transnational structures
for your international operations.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 28, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign.


VENEZUELA: Opposition Leader Barred from Leaving Country
--------------------------------------------------------
Kejal Vyas at The Wall Street Journal reports that prominent
Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique Capriles said he was barred
from leaving the country after authorities seized his passport
while en route to the United Nations to denounce rights abuses by
President Nicolas Maduro's government.

The two-time presidential candidate was scheduled to fly to New
York but was stopped by immigration officials at the airport near
Caracas, where street protests calling for an end to Mr. Maduro's
authoritarian rule raged for the seventh straight week, according
to The Wall Street Journal.  Looting and civil unrest have cost at
least 44 lives since the beginning of April, the report notes.

"I've been notified that my passport was annulled," the report
quotes Mr. Capriles as saying in a video he posted on social
media. "My passport has been stolen from me," he added.

He said he would return to street protests in the capital city,
the report notes.

There was no immediate response from the Maduro government, which
is facing mounting international criticism over its efforts to
silence political dissent.  The rights group Foro Penal says the
government is holding more than 200 political prisoners as Mr.
Maduro fends off almost daily demonstrations around the country,
calling for elections that the president has indefinitely
postponed, the report relays.

Mr. Capriles, a 44-year-old state governor, last month was banned
from running for political office for 15 years for alleged
irregularities in the finances of a public works project, charges
he says were trumped up, the report notes.

In recent months the government has also voided passports of
opposition lawmakers and earlier, a prominent radio host and
government critic was also prevented from traveling, syas the
report.

During his visit to New York, Mr. Capriles was scheduled to meet
with the U.N.'s human rights commission and also with editors at
The Wall Street Journal, the report relays.

Zeid bin Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein, the U.N.'s human rights chief, in
a post on Twitter lamented that Mr. Capriles was unable to travel,
the report discloses.  "[I] hope Capriles' passport removal is not
reprisal linked to planned meeting with me tomorrow," he said, the
report adds.

As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America,
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 28, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative.  S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings.  In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: Analyst Says Caribbean Firms at Risk for Ransomware Attacks
------------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that Caribbean companies are at risk of
falling prey to large-scale cyber-attacks similar to the one that
interrupted computer systems across the globe, unless they take
operational risk more seriously, a risk analyst has warned.

Regional Risk Assurance Leader for PricewaterhouseCoopers
Caribbean Region Network Bruce Scott says he's not satisfied that
firms in the region are paying enough attention to assessing and
mitigating such risks, according to Caribbean360.com.

"I don't think they are taking operational risks that seriously.
Anything to do with money, there is a little bit more formality
around that," Mr. Scott told online newspaper Barbados Today on
the sidelines of a PwC regional risk management seminar at the
Radisson Aquatica Resort, the report notes.

"I think operational risk, the stuff that have to do with your
people and processes, doesn't get the attention as much as the
banking and the liquidity and loan financing.  A lot of focus is
placed on financial risks, but where we struggle is in the
operations.  We tend to just accept that, 'yeah, a fraud is going
to happen'," he said, the report relays.

A cyber-attack, dubbed WannaCry, saw computer malware quickly
spread to 150 countries, holding an estimated 200,000 computers
hostage by blocking access to files, the report notes.  Hackers
demanded a ransom in Bitcoin, an untraceable digital currency, the
report says.  The attack slowed down after a British cybersecurity
researcher found and inadvertently activated a "kill switch" in
the malicious ransomware, the report relays.

However, experts have warned that the hackers are likely to strike
again after improving the malware to eliminate the kill switch,
the report notes.

The report discloses that Mr. Scott advised regional businesses to
back up their data as a means of circumventing the ransomware, and
to conduct diagnostic assessments of their vulnerability.

"They need to get a 'friendly hacker' who is not the criminal but
behaves like one, to do an assessment of how vulnerable they are
and then once they see the vulnerabilities they need to get the
budget to close it down," he advised, the report relays.

"You have a response strategy and then you have a diagnostic to
see where you are.  The rest of it is just monitoring what you
have put in place, because you can't stop these guys.  This is
what we call risk avoidance.  You can't go out of business just
because you don't want to be attacked.  So you just accept that
this is reality and you move towards your goals, but you manage
your risks while you are still trying to make profits, and give
your employees a good experience."

Computer security firm Symantec estimated that the varieties of
ransomware have more than trebled since 2014, while the US Federal
Bureau of Investigation calculates that CryptoWall, a particularly
nasty strain of ransomware, netted at least US$18 million for
hackers in 2015, the report adds.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From May 15 to May 19, 2017
--------------------------------------------------------


Issuer Name               Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
-----------               ---     -----   --------  -------   ---

BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt   0.518    62.07               KY    EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        68                  BR    USD
CSN Islands XII Corp      7        67.75               BR    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   4.54     52.63  10/25/2041   PA    USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomi   6        63.5   10/25/2041   PA    USD
Dolomite Capital Ltd     13.26     67.2   12/20/2019   CN    ZAR
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
Empresa de Telecomunica   7        73.14   1/17/2023   CO    COP
ESFG International Ltd    5.75      0.66               KY    EUR
General Shopping Financ  10        72.5                KY    USD
General Shopping Financ  10        71.7                KY    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        74.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65.5    2/1/2019    SG    USD
Global A&T Electronics   10        65      2/1/2019    SG    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63                  BR    USD
Gol Finance               8.75     63.88               BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA     10.75     34.63   2/12/2023   BR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
Inversora Electrica de    6.5      55      9/26/2017   AR    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.16   4/25/2019   HK    USD
MIE Holdings Corp         7.5      75.26   4/25/2019   HK    USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman I   3.88     58.01   2/7/2035    KY    EUR
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Newland International P   9.5      19.88   7/3/2017    PA    USD
Noble Holding Internati   5.25     72.98   3/15/2042   KY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     39      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc         7.25     38      4/1/2019    CY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     48.5    6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norb   6.35     47.25   6/30/2021   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49                  KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.29   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.12     48.2    6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     46.15   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        57.02   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.12     53.51   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.25     70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.47   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.25     45.92   6/27/2029   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.1      47.82   6/26/2042   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7.5      49.25               KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     4.3      48.39   4/25/2025   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6        51.77   4/5/2023    KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     8.2      70.88   4/25/2018   KY    BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     7        56.85   4/21/2020   KY    USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.1      52.99   6/26/2022   KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      39.64  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      36.44  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.6      38.79  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Odebrecht Offshore Dril   6.7      38.75  10/1/2022    KY    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.19   2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      9      58.28  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela      6      40.32   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     50.15   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.22  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.37     37.39   4/12/2027   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    5.5      37.1    4/12/2037   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        41.25  10/28/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        40.01   5/16/2024   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9        58.11  11/17/2021   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    6        38.13  11/15/2026   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela   12.75     67.2    2/17/2022   VE    USD
Petroleos de Venezuela    9.75     49.94   5/17/2035   VE    USD
Polarcus Ltd              5.6      60      3/30/2022   AE    USD
Siem Offshore Inc         5.8      49.75   1/30/2018   NO    NOK
Siem Offshore Inc         5.59     50.25   3/28/2019   NO    NOK
STB Finance Cayman Ltd    2.04     58.35               KY    JPY
Sylph Ltd                 2.36     50.93   9/25/2036   KY    USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesor   5.25     68.02  12/29/2021   UY    UYU
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
US Capital Funding IV L   1.25     51.35  12/1/2039    KY    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     67.5   11/9/2019    BR    USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA    9.87     65.75  11/9/2019    BR    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     48.75   5/7/2028    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9        51.75   5/7/2023    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.37     49      1/13/2034   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        71.88  12/1/2018    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   9.25     52      9/15/2027   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.65     46.38   4/21/2025   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  13.63     82.58   8/15/2018   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7.75     61.75  10/13/2019   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.95     58.13   8/5/2031    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6        53.75  12/9/2020    VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  12.75     67      8/23/2022   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   7        44      3/31/2038   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   6.5      36.53  12/29/2036   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In   8.25     47.75  10/13/2024   VE    USD
Venezuela Government In  11.75     57.75  10/21/2026   VE    USD
Venezuela Government TI    5.25    69.59   3/21/2019   VE    USD


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *